MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

Subject: Security Guidance

1. (U) Enclosed is the EC-79 Briefing Guide to be used when briefing new personnel on EC-79. Additionally, all personnel currently briefed for EC-79 should be familiar with its contents. You are encouraged to use it for a refresher briefing for those persons.

2. (TS) Also enclosed is a copy of the JTF 1-79 classification guide, intended to assist you in properly classifying project related information originated by your organizations. It is especially important that any material to be retained for historical purposes carry the proper classification and declassification/downgrading instructions. Specific instructions on disposal of project material will be issued at the appropriate time.

3. (U) Due to the sensitivity of the enclosed documents, they are being closely controlled. Reproduction of either document IS NOT authorized.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

2 Enclosures
a/s

CLASSIFIED BY J-3, OJCS
REVIEW ON 28 NOVEMBER 2000
EXTENDED BY J-3, OJCS
REASON: PARA 2-301(c) 6

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JTF 1-79 (7)
JTF 1-80 (5)
DELTA (1)
150P (1)
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158th AVN BN (1)
AWACS (1)
1. (U) INTRODUCTION

You are about to begin an indoctrination preparing you for access to an extremely sensitive project, EC-79. Prior to granting you access to this sensitive information, both your need-to-know and personal eligibility for access were subjected to a most stringent appraisal. To provide maximum protection of this information to which you are about to be granted access, it is necessary that you firmly and clearly recognize its vital importance, its sensitivity, and the basic requirements which are placed on you for insuring its protection. In this respect, you must execute an oath that you understand the nature of your obligation and that you will, to the best of your ability, fulfill this obligation.

2. (U) GENERAL

(FO) The Joint Task Force 1-79 (JTF) is responsible for the planning and execution of hostage rescue missions in Iran. The very existence of JTF is classified TOP SECRET. Likewise, any information revealing association with JTF carries the same classification. This includes details of plans, units and personnel involved in JTF plans and operations, relationship to other organizations or projects, and all other information which would reveal the name or existence of JTF. Information concerning JTF should be discussed only in secure areas and only with persons who have executed the EC-79 Security Oath. If a person's access is not known, do not discuss the JTF project until their access has been checked. Access to projects (discussed below) should not be confused with access to JTF information. Nor is access to JTF information programs to be considered automatic access to special compartmented intelligence (SCI) or other compartmented intelligence programs.

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REVIEW ON 24 NOVEMBER 2000
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REASON: PARA 2-301(c) 2, 3, 5, 6

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COPY 1 OF 18 COPIES

TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
(1) The codeword SNOWBIRD is used to cover JTF planning, training, and execution. When used alone, it is classified SECRET, however, its association with JTF projects or information is TOP SECRET. Under no circumstances should it be revealed to unauthorized persons or through non-secure communications. No JTF/SNOWBIRD messages will be transmitted outside JTF communications channels (ESS channels are no exception). Hardcopy JTF/SNOWBIRD documents will be kept to a minimum and will be hand carried, not transmitted through ARP/COS, mail, or other administrative channels.

(2) EC-79 is an unclassified term which covers JTF operations. Its association with JTF however, is TOP SECRET.

(3) RICEBOWL is the unclassified nickname used for the April 1980 hostage rescue attempt. It is unclassified only when used alone. Its association with the hostage rescue attempt is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

(4) The JTF in that it conducts legitimate operational evaluation projects. While projects are conducted in support of JTF plans and operations, projects/tests and from JTF and the JTF mission. To the extent possible, all JTF coordination, training, and other actions are done under the unclassified, however, much information pertaining to its projects, exercises, personnel and equipment, is classified. The unclassified nicknames HONEY BADGER and ELITE GUARD are used for . There are numerous individuals briefed on the HONEY BADGER/ELITE GUARD projects who are not cleared for access to SNOWBIRD and are unaware of the . Again, you are cautioned not to confuse the JTF and and reveal SNOWBIRD information to individuals having access only to the HONEY BADGER/ELITE GUARD projects.

3. (U) OPSEC

a. At this point it should be apparent that nearly everything associated with the projects is classified. The main exception to that rule is information contained in official press guidance for an individual test. That is not to be confused with the appearance of
a piece of information in the newspaper. Just because something appears in the news media, it is not declassified. The rule in such instances is to neither confirm nor deny the information. If any doubt exists as to the classification of information, it should be treated as classified until such time a positive determination to the contrary can be made. The foregoing is especially applicable prior to discussing information over unsecure communications or with persons whose access/need-to-know is unknown or questionable. Most classification questions can be answered by reference to the Classification Guide.

b. (TS) The need for constant security awareness cannot be over emphasized. The sensitive nature of the projects makes them especially vulnerable to hostile intelligence collection efforts.

(1) (TS) Maximum use of secure communications is required at all times when discussing matters. Attempts to "talk-around" classified topics on unsecure communications are not acceptable. Personnel who are unsure about proper communications security procedures should familiarize themselves with them prior to discussing any related information on unsecure communications.

(2) (TS) The HUMINT threat exists not only from hostile intelligence services, but from the news media and the curious as well. Any attempt by any unauthorized persons to gain information concerning operational exercises, should immediately be reported to Security. Under no circumstances will any information be revealed, confirmed or denied, or any commitments made to the individual. No attempt to pursue or investigate the matter will be made by the individual approached.

(3) (TS) OPSEC is a primary consideration in all matters. The goal of the OPSEC Program is not only to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of information, but to prevent the release of bits and pieces of unclassified information which might be pieced together, and to minimize the amount of outside attention drawn to projects and exercises.
4. (U)indoctrination and Debriefing

a. (TS) Only the Commander, JTF is authorized to grant access to EC-79 information based upon strict interpretation of the need-to-know principle. No one will be given EC-79 access until that approval has been given. Once approval is given to grant EC-79 access, the commander assumes the access will be given, and places the individual on the access roster. If for any reason the individual is not given access after approval has been given to grant it, security should be notified immediately so the name can be withdrawn from the access roster. When the commander gives approval for an individual to be given EC-79 access, it is with the implied understanding that no access will be given until the individual has signed the EC-79 security oath and been properly briefed. Only after those actions have been accomplished, is the individual considered "read on" or "indoctrinated." EC-79 access does not automatically grant full access to all actions, plans or programs; need-to-know principle prevails.

b. (TS) When individuals depart or no longer require access to EC-79 information, they will execute an EC-79 Debriefing Statement and the commander will be notified that the individual was debriefed. It is the responsibility of both the unit and the individual to insure that a Debriefing Statement is executed when EC-79 access is terminated.

c. (TS) When an uncleared individual is inadvertently exposed to EC-79 information, a judgement decision is required. Under most circumstances, the individual will be required to execute an Inadvertent Disclosure Statement. In some cases however, an individual may not be aware of the information they were exposed to. In such instances, asking the individual to sign an Inadvertent Disclosure Statement might do more harm than good, by highlighting the fact that they were exposed to sensitive information. In all cases however, the details of the disclosure will be reported to security and guidance requested if necessary. Under no circumstances will an individual who has been inadvertently exposed to EC-79 information be exposed to more information in the form of explanations, warnings, etc.

5. (U) Summary

When in doubt, ask. If you are not sure about any security matter, get the answer before acting. JTD security is prepared to assist you with your security problems. Too many lives are at stake in this operation. A minor security violation could prove fatal.

TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
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SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #3

A. JTF MSG044 SUBJ: INTELL SUMMARY DTG 142015R NOV 79
B. JTF MSG008 SUBJ: SITUATION SUMMARY DTG 151800Z NOV 79
C. JTF MSG024 SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE UPDATE DTG 203200Z NOV 79
D. JTF MSG056 SUBJ: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT DTG 260545R NOV 79
E. JTF MSG010 SUBJ: COMPOUND SITUATION UPDATE DTG 040100Z DEC 79
F. JTF MSG023 SUBJ: COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE DTG 092100Z DEC 79

1. THIS ASSESSMENT CONSOLIDATES AND SUPERCEDES DATA CONTAINED IN REFERENCES. THE FORMAT OF THIS ASSESSMENT IS IAW WITH THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX OF AN OPLAN/OPORD AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS SUCH. MAJOR CHANGES/SUPPLEMENTS TO THIS ASSESSMENT WILL BE MADE BY TYT AND WILL BE IDENTIFIED IN THE SUBJECT AS SUCH. THE FOLLOWING INDEX IS PROVIDED AS A BASE OF REFERENCE

A. PART I SITUATION
   A. GENERAL
   B. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA
   C.
   D.
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   F. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
   G. PROBABLE ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION
B. PART II BACKGROUND
   A. GROUND FORCES
   B. AIR DEFENSE/AIR FORCES
   C. NAVAL FORCES
C. PART III KEY EXTERNAL LOCATIONS
   A. MAIN MILITARY AFLD
   B. SEMAN NEW AFLD
   C. MANZARIYEH AFLD

2. PART I SITUATION

IN ADDITION BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE "STUDENTS" HAVE STATED THEY
PLAN TO PUT THE REMAINING HOSTAGES ON TRIAL FOR ESPIONAGE. ALTHOUGH
THE LABEL "STUDENTS" IS USED IN THE MEDIA AND IN THIS REPORT WHEN
REFERRING TO THE PRINCIPAL CAPTIVES THE LABEL IS NOT CORRECT. THE
"STUDENT CAPTIVE" FORCE CONSISTS OF A GROUP OF SENIOR MEDICAL, ENGI-
NEERING AND RELIGIOUS STUDENTS BELONGING TO THE MOJAHEDIN FACTION
WHICH SUBscribes to a blend of ISLAM and MARxISM. SEVERAL LEFTIST
INSTRUCTORS FROM TEHRAN TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, MEMBERS OF THE TUDIK
(COMMUNIST) PARTY MAY HAVE ALSO INFILTRATED THESE GROUPS. IN
ADDITION, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COLLECTIVE GROUP (WHICH IS CALLED A
COMMITTEE) RECEIVES COUNSEL ON PROTAGON~A, AND SECURITY MATTERS FROM
PLO AND FEYADEEN ADVISORS. THE SITUATION HAS NOW CRYSTALLIZED TO THE
POINT THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AS A POLITICAL ENTITY MUST BEAR
FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTRACTED AND UNCOMPROMISING NATURE OF THE
IRANIAN POSITION. THE SITUATION APPEARS TO BE A POLITICAL PROBLEM
WITHOUT AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR EITHER THE GOVERNMENT
OF IRAN OR THE U.S.

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA: THE EMBASSY COMPOUND IS
LOCATED IN CENTRAL TEHRAN (UTM 39S-WV-583518/GEOGRAPHIC 4230N/5125E).
THE COMPOUND AREA CONSISTS OF 27 ACRES OF FLAT TERRAIN SHAPEd IN
BASICALLY A RECTANGLE PATTERN RUNNING NORTH/SOUTH. THE COMPOUND IS
BOUND ON THE SOUTH BY TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD WHICH IS A MAJOR EAST/
WEST THROUGHFARE; ON THE EAST BY ROOSEVELT STREET, (A RELATIVELY
BUSY NORTH/SOUTH ROAD); ON THE WEST BY AMERICA AVENUE AND THE NORTH
BY ARDALAN STREET. THE MAIN BUILDING (CHANCEY) RUNS EAST/WEST AND
FORMS THE BASE LINE REFERENCE POINT. THE CHANCEY FACES ON TAKHT-
E-JAMSHID BLVD. THE COMPOUND CAN BE DIVIDED INTO FOUR GENERAL AREAS,
GROUPED AROUND TWO PLAYING FIELDS LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF THE
COMPOUND. THE CHANCEY AND MOTOR POOL AREA ARE TO THE SOUTH. THE
WAREHOUSE, TEMPORARY APARTMENTS AND SUPPLY AREA ARE TO THE NORTH. THE
COMMISARY, CONSULATE STAFF COTTAGES AND OLD POLICE QUARTERS ARE TO THE
WEST. THE AMBASSADOR'S AND DCM RESIDENCES ARE LOCATED IN THE EASTERN
HALF OF THE COMPOUND WHICH IS FORESTED WITH HIGH TRUNKED PINE
TREES. THE NORTHWEST SEGMENT OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND ABUTS AN IRANIAN
ARMY DEPOT. THE COMPOUND IS SURROUNDED BY A SERIES OF WALLS AND FENCES
WHICH RESTRICT INTERIOR VISIBILITY FROM THE SURROUNDING STREETS.
STREET AND BUILDING LIGHTS ARE LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE COMPOUND AND
SURROUNDING AREAS BUT MANY ARE NOT FUNCTIONING.

(1) THE COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN DOWNTOWN TEHRAN IN THE MIDST OF
A MIXED BUSINESS AND RESIDENTIAL AREA, WITH RELATIVELY EASY ROAD
ACCESS FROM THE NORTH AND EAST. SEVERAL HIGH BUILDINGS IN THE AREA
PROVIDE GOOD VANGUARD POINTS FOR VIEWING THE INTERIOR OF THE COMPOUND.
A MAJOR SPORTS COMPLEX WITH LARGE STADIUM AND SEVERAL PLAYING FIELDS
IS LOCATED NORTHEAST OF THE COMPOUND DIAGONALLY ACROSS ROOSEVELT
AVENUE. A LARGE PARKING LOT IS ALSO LOCATED EAST OF THE COMPOUND
ON ROOSEVELT, MIDWAY BETWEEN THE STADIUM AND TASHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD.

(2) THE BUILDINGS FACING THE COMPOUND ON THE SOUTH (TAKHT-E-JAMSHID)
ARE MOSTLY OFFICE BUILDINGS WITH SOME RESIDENTS. ON THE WEST SIDE THE
PRINCIPAL STRUCTURES APPEAR TO BE FOUR SMALL BUT AFFLUENT PROFESSIONAL
OFFICE BUILDINGS SURROUNDED BY TREES AND BACKED BY TWO LARGE PARKING
LOTS. THE NORTH SIDE OF THE COMPOUND BACKS INTO A MIDDLE CLASS
RESIDENTIAL AREA CONSISTING OF THREE BLOCKS OF MULTI-STORY APARTMENT
HOUSES.
(3) ACTIVITY RELATED TO THE EMBASSY TAKEOVER IS LARGELY LOCALIZED WITHIN A TWO BLOCK RADIUS OF THE COMPOUND EVEN WHEN MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ON GOING.

(4) TRAFFIC IN THE CITY IS HIGHLY CONGESTED BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0600-2300 DURING THE ISLAMIC WORK WEEK (SAT-SUN) DECREASING IN VOLUME ON THE ISLAMIC WEEKEND (THURS-FRI) ALTHOUGH TRAFFIC ACTIVITY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE THURSDAY NIGHT UNTIL 0200 FRIDAY MORNING.

(5) THE EMBASSY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5 KM WEST OF THE NEAREST AIRFIELD (DOSHAN-TAPPEH AFB WHICH IS A NON COMBAT BASE). TWO OTHER AIRFIELDS ARE WITHIN 10KM, GHALI-MORSHI, IS 8KM SSW AND MEHRBAND INTERNATIONAL IS LOCATED 10 KM WSW.

(6) WEATHER AT THIS TIME OF YEAR IS COMPARABLE TO NW UNITED STATES/DENVER COLORADO WITH CLEAR CRISP DAYS, OCCASIONAL MIST/RAIN IN THE CITY AND SNOW IN THE NEARBY MOUNTAINS. WINTER TEMPERATURES ORDINARILY RANGE BETWEEN 20 AND 40 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AT NIGHT RAISING TO THE MID FIFTIES DURING THE DAY.

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C. CHANCERY

B. MOTOR POOL AREA - FOCUS OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA/MEDIA EFFORT, CENTER FOR STAGING PUBLIC DISPLAYS OF HOSTAGES AND CONTROL OF VISITORS TO THE COMPOUND.

C. STAFF COTTAGES

D. COMMISSARY/COMMISSARY WAREHOUSE

E. CONSULATE BUILDING

F. OLD POLICE GUARD QUARTERS, AND UTILITY WORKSHOPS, CURRENT FUNCTION UNKNOWN. MAY BE USED AS QUARTERS FOR PASDARAN ELEMENTS OF INTERNAL GUARD FORCE.
G. WAREHOUSE

BASEMENT FLOOR USED BY ELEMENTS OF MARINE GUARD AS SLEEPING QUARTERS PRIOR TO TAKE OVER. PART OF SPACE WAS USED AS SNACK BAR NICKNAMED MUSHROOM INN.

H. TEMPORARY APARTMENTS/OLD MARINE HOUSE.

I. DCM RESIDENCE - SINGLE STORY RESIDENCE CAPABLE OF ACCOMMODATING 8-12 HOSTAGES.

J. AMBASSADOR RESIDENCE - TWO STORY BUILDING WITH A SMALL GLASS PENTHOUSE ON ROOF. THE BUILDING IS CAPABLE OF HOUSING 12-16 HOSTAGE IN THE RESIDENCE PROPER AND ANOTHER 6 TO 8 IN THE ADJOINING SERVANTS QUARTERS.

HOSTAGE DISTRIBUTION

IS THAT MOST HOSTAGES REMAIN UNDER "STUDENT" CONTROL AND REMAIN IN THE COMPOUND. CURRENT ESTIMATES INDICATE THE HOSTAGE TOTAL AS 49-52 AND INCLUDES AT LEAST TWO FEMALES. BELIEVE THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN CATEGORIZED INTO AT LEAST TWO - POSSIBLY THREE CATEGORIES.

- CATEGORY ONE PROBABLY CONSISTS OF 8 TO 9 HOSTAGES WHO HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS OR ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING "SPIES". THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE PROBABLY BEING HELD INDIVIDUALLY AND ARE LIKELY CANDIDATES FOR TRIAL. INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF FALLING INTO THIS CATEGORY ARE:
I. DCM RESIDENCE - SINGLE STORY RESIDENCE CAPABLE OF ACCOMMODATING 8-12 HOSTAGES.

J. AMBASSADOR RESIDENCE - TWO STORY BUILDING WITH A SMALL GLASS PENT HOUSE ON ROOF. THE BUILDING IS CAPABLE OF HOUSING 12-16 HOSTAGE IN THE RESIDENCE PROPER AND ANOTHER 6- TO 8 IN THE ADJOINING SERVANTS QUARTERS.

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- CATEGORY ONE PROBABLY CONSISTS OF 8 TO 9 HOSTAGES WHO HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS OR ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING "SPIES". THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE PROBABLY BEING HELD INDIVIDUALLY AND ARE LIKELY CANDIDATES FOR TRIAL. INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF FALLING INTO THIS CATEGORY ARE:
- CATEGORY TWO PROBABLY CONSISTS OF 10 TO 12 HOSTAGES WHO HAVE THROUGH THEIR ATTITUDE OR JOB POSITION ATTRACTED THE ATTENTION OF THE GUARD FORCE. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE PROBABLY BEING HELD SINGULARLY OR IN SMALL GROUPS OF 2-3. CANDIDATES FOR THIS CATEGORY ARE:

- CATEGORY THREE PROBABLY CONSISTS OF THE BALANCE OF HOSTAGES (28-30) WHO IN THE MINDS OF THE CAPTORS WERE NOT INVOLVED IN ANY SPY ACTIVITY AND THEIR EMBASSY FUNCTIONS WERE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE/HOUSE KEEPING NATURE. INDIVIDUALS LIKELY TO BE INCLUDED IN THIS CATEGORY ARE:
The following is provided for planning purposes.

Also of concern are other official AMCITS located in Tehran. Data available this location indicates two groupings as follows:

1. Iranian Foreign Ministry under protective custody:
   - Bruce Laingen
   - Victor Tomseth
   - Michael Howland

2. At large at unknown location:
   - Robert Anders
   - Joseph Stafford
   - Mark Lijek
   - Plus two unidentified

D. Guard Force Distribution

1. Compound internal security:
The situation in the compound has now settled into a routine with demonstrations periodically staged outside the Chancery/Motor Pool gate on Takht-e-Jamshid Blvd. Crowd size varies from 50-75 curiosity seekers to several thousand at lunch/prayer time or when announcements go out via the radio and the local public address system.

A. Security of the hostage areas is maintained by personnel. Personnel within the compound are made up of several factions in approximately the following proportions:

- Actual students: 50 percent
- PAHAK trained militants: 10 percent
- Iran university/religious leaders: 15 percent
- PLO advisors: 15 percent
- Pasdaran: 5 percent

Note: PLO advisors are present only during the day and in the evenings when strategy meetings are being held.

The actual students function as personal guards of the hostages and as propagandists and ideologues trying to indoctrinate the hostages. The PLO function as observers, advisors, and propagandists. The PAHAK trained militants supervise security, interrogations, and document exploitation. The Pasdaran, besides providing external security, maintain a presence within the compound, primarily providing sentries. Within the buildings, the students typically carry pistols or G-3 rifles. Those on duty outside typically are armed with G-3 rifles. Guards carrying rifles have not been observed carrying any spare magazines for their weapons.
B. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL PRESENT SEEMS TO VARY ACCORDING TO THE OCCASION AND DAY OF THE WEEK. OTHER FACTORS BEING EQUAL, THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IN THE COMPOUND DROPS ON THURSDAY AND FRIDAY (THE ISLAMIC WEEKEND, WHEN SOME LEAVE TO VISIT FAMILIES). THERE IS ANOTHER REDUCTION WHEN SOME MEMBERS OF THE OCCUPATION FORCE (STUDENTS) LEAVE THE COMPOUND TO ATTEND CLASSES.

C. GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION IS ESTIMATED AS follows with a day/night duty ratio of

D. OF SOME SORT. THE STUDENTS HAVE INSTALLED ADDITIONAL LIGHTING AND LOUDSPEAKERS IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS.

E. THREE BASE STATION RADIOS; IN THE AMBASSADOR RESIDENCE, THE CONSULATE, AND THE CHANCERY ARE PROBABLY USED TO CONTROL SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN AND AROUND THE COMPOUND.
2. Compound External Security

A.

B. East Wall: (Roosevelt Avenue)

Roosevelt should be relatively well lit by the street lights which are spaced about 75 feet apart. However, illumination will be decreased by the trees which line the street.

C. South Wall: (Takht-e-Jamshid)

South wall is excellent. Few street lights on both sides of Takht-e-Jamshid with minimum interference from trees.

D. West Side (America)

There are street lights along America Alley but they were shot out in February and whether they have been replaced or not is unknown.

There are street lights along Arak and on the street running north to Ardalan.

E. North Side (Ardalan)
F. THE GUARD DISPOSITION DESCRIBED IN PRECEDING PARA WOULD REQUIRE APPROX. PERSONNEL.

E. EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES

REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE STUDENT GUARDS AND PASDARAN ARE AVAILABLE FROM SEVERAL LOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PRINCIPAL FORCES AND THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES ONCE THEY HAVE RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OR HEARD A MAJOR DISTURBANCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE COMPOUND ARE SHOWN BELOW.

A. WITHIN 5-7 MIN-FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.

B. WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES REINFORCEMENTS FROM STUDENT HGS AND PASDARAN KOMITEH STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS.

C. WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES 100-300 PASDARAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS.

D. WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES PASDARAN REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.

E. WITHIN 30-40 MINUTES PASDARAN BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

F. WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.

G. WITHIN 60 MINUTES IT IS POSSIBLE THAT COULD REACT AND ATTEMPT A LAUNCH AGAINST ANY ORBITING AIRCRAFT.

H. WITHIN ONE HOUR IT IS POSSIBLE THAT COULD LAUNCH AND ATTEMPT TO INTERDICT THE
SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT/WEATHER

1. THE THREE MAJOR NETWORKS HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WILL AIR FILM CLIPS OF INTERVIEWS WITH FOUR HOSTAGES MADE DURING THE CHRISTMAS VISIT BY THE CLERGYMEN TO TEHRAN. THE INTERVIEWS ARE TO BE SHOWN THE EVENING OF DECEMBER 31.

2. REACTION TO WALTZED GENERAL WALDHEIM'S VISIT IS MIXED. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOBZADEH HAS SAID, "SINCE OUR COUNTRY IS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL DID NOT RAISE ANY OBJECT TO WALDHEIM'S VISIT." WALDHEIM CAN COME TO IRAN, AND "IF WALDHEIM CAN COME TO THE EMBASSY CAPTORS ON THE OTHER HAND HAVE SAID THAT THEY DID NOT ACCEPT WALDHEIM AS A TRUE REPRESENTATIVE. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER KHOMENI WILL SEE HIS CLAIM OR NOT."
7. BAHRAIN HAS INFORMED THE UNITED STATES OF ITS DECISION TO BAN U.S. NAVAL VESSELS IN THE PERSIAN GULF FROM CALLING AT BAHRAINI PORTS. THE BAHRAINI GOVERNMENT EXPLAINED ITS DECISION BY ITS STRIVING TO PREVENT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXACERBATION OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS.
9. IRANIAN OIL PRODUCTION HAS DROPED SHARPLY SINCE CHRISTMAS. ACCORDING TO NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY FIGURES, ONLY ABOUT 1.2 MILLION BARRELS WERE PRODUCED ON DECEMBER 29 AS COMPARED WITH 3.0 MILLION BARRELS A WEEK EARLIER. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASCRIBE POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE RELATIVELY SHORT TERM FLUCTUATION IN PRODUCTION.

10. WEATHER

A. MID-RANGE FORECAST FOR U.S. EAST COAST
CLOUDY SKIES WITH ISOLATED RAINSHOWERS IN THE SOUTHERN 2/3'S OF SOUTHEAST COAST UNTIL 01/18Z WITH REDUCED VISIBILITY IN FOG AT NIGHT AND DURING EARLY MORNING HOURS. CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES FOR WASHINGTON D.C. AREA BOTH DAYS, AND CLEARING IN SOUTHERN 2/3'S OF COAST AFTER SYSTEM MOVES EASTWARD.
1-4 JAN: PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES OVER ENTIRE REGION WITH NO SIGNIFICANT STORM SYSTEM EXPECTED UNTIL THE 4TH.

B. LONG-RANGE OUTLOOK FOR SOUTHWEST U.S.A.
31 DEC - 1 JAN: PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES, GUSTY SURFACE WINDS, AND ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS EXPECTED FROM WEAK FRONTAL SYSTEM PASSING THROUGH NORTHERN PORTIONS OF DESERT REGION, PRIMARILY CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA.
2 - 8 JAN: HIGH PRESSURE IS EXPECTED TO DOMINATE THE REGION WITH CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES AND GOOD VISIBILITIES UNTIL THE 5TH. HIGH PRESSURE SURFACE WINDS ARE INFLUENCED BY TOPOGRAPHY AND DIURNAL HEATING/COOLING: CALM AT NIGHT, GUSTY IN THE AFTERNOON HOURS AT 10-15 KNOTS. A WEAK FRONT IS EXPECTED TO MOVE INTO CALIFORNIA WITH INCREASING CLOUDINESS AND A CHANCE OF RAIN. THIS WEAK SYSTEM SHOULD GRADUALLY MOVE THROUGH DESERT REGION BY THE 7TH, BUT WITH RESIDUAL CLOUD COVER AFTER FRONTAL PASSAGE.

C. ANALYSIS WEATHER FOR MIDDLE EAST - 31 DEC 79
CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES OVER MOST OF THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY. A WEAK FRONTAL SYSTEM HAS CLOUDY SKIES, LIGHT RIME ICING, REDUCED VISIBILITIES IN RAIN/SNOW/FOG, AND GUSTY SURFACE WINDS AFFECTING TURKEY.

(1) LONG-RANGE OUTLOOK FOR MIDDLE EAST (EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN, TURKEY)
31 DEC - 2 JAN: HIGH PRESSURE TO DOMINATE MOST OF THE MIDDLE EAST WITH CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES AND COLD TEMPERATURES. A WEAKENING STORM OVER TURKEY WILL BE FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER FRONT ON THE 2ND.
2-9 JAN: BAD WEATHER FOR THE TURKS THROUGH ENTIRE PERIOD AS STORMY WEATHER KEEPS PREDOMINATELY CLOUDY SKIES, RAIN/SNOW, ETC. OVER TURKEY. CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE MIDDLE EAST AS HIGH PRESSURE ATTEMPTS TO DOMINATE THE REGION.

(2) WIND/TURBULENCE FORECAST FOR IRAN & PERSIAN GULF
IRAN: LIGHT AND VARIABLE SURFACE WINDS. NO TURBULENCE.
PERSIAN GULF: SURFACE TO 15000FT AGL WINDS NE AT 6-15 KNOTS. NO TURBULENCE.
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TO
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RDTA CITE J3 00036
SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

ATTN: 

1. SEVERAL CLERGYMEN ARE APPARENTLY TO BE PERMITTED TO VISIT THE HOSTAGES ON CHRISTMAS. IN ADDITION TO THE THREE AMERICANS, THE CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF ALGIERS HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN INVITED BY KHOMINEI TO SEE THEM. YESTERDAY A SPOKESMAN FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SAID THAT KHOMINEI HAD ALSO AUTHORIZED REPORTERS TO MEET WITH THE HOSTAGES ON CHRISTMAS EVE. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH SUBSEQUENTLY "CLARIFIED" THIS BY SAYING THAT IT WAS ONLY POSSIBLE, BUT THE STUDENT SPOKESMEN MINCED NO WORDS, SAYING THAT NO ONE WOULD SEE THE HOSTAGES BEFORE THE CLERICAL DELEGATION, AND THERE WERE NO PLANS FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT VISITS.

SAYS ALL THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN MOVED OUT OF THE OCCUPIED US EMBASSY TO OTHER PLACES IN THE IRANIAN CAPITAL. THE SOURCE WOULD NOT GIVE ANY DETAILS OTHER THAN TO SAY THE HOSTAGES ARE IN TEHRAN, BUT NOT IN THE EMBASSY. A SPOKESMAN FOR THE MOSLEM MILITANTS HOLDING THE EMBASSY REFUSED TO COMMENT ON THE REPORT. HE SAID, ANY NEWS ABOUT THE HOSTAGES MUST COME FROM US. AND HE SAID, WE WILL NOT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONFIRMING OR DENYING OTHER PEOPLES ANNOUNCEMENTS. THERE'S BEEN SPECULATION SOME OF THE HOSTAGES MIGHT BE IN HEAVILY-GUARDED APARTMENT BLOCK ADJACENT TO THE EMBASSY.
5. Former Irish Foreign Minister Sean McBride is currently in Tehran. He has held talks with Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh. McBride has told the press that he feels that things are worse than three weeks ago when he visited Tehran, and that his discussions there do not leave him particularly optimistic. McBride is planning to leave Tehran for Dublin tomorrow. He is not scheduled to visit the hostages.

6. Collection activity against the Midway and Kitty Hawk task groups: a minesweeper and a guided missile frigate are continuing surveillance of the Midway and Kitty Hawk task groups, respectively. A refrigerated stores ship, an auxiliary and a naval subordinated tanker continue to support those units. A guided missile destroyer continues a barrier patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. An intelligence collector remains in the vicinity of the US task groups. A frigate may be transiting northerly, southwest of these units.

8. Activity in the vicinity of Diego Garcia: none. RVW 24 Dec 89 BT 9036
SUBJ: IRANIAN SITUATION REPORT

1. FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH FROM THE UNITED STATES, IRANIANS HOLDING AMERICAN HOSTAGES HAVE THREATENED TO PROCEED WITH THEIR THREAT TO TRY THE HOSTAGES IF THE SHAH LEFT THE UNITED STATES FOR ANY PLACE OTHER THAN IRAN. PARS NEWS AGENCY SAID THAT THE SHAH’S DEPARTURE MADE THE TRIAL “INEVITABLE”. NO TRIAL DATE HAS BEEN SET. THE CAPTORS HAVE ALSO CHOSEN TO IGNORE THE RULING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. A SPOKESMAN SAID THE DECISION WAS “NOT IMPORTANT FOR US.” THE HEARING WAS HELD AT AMERICA’S REQUEST AND ITS VERDICT IS ALSO BASED ON THE DEMAND OF AMERICA”. FURTHER COMMENTARY IS EXPECTED WHEN MINISTER GHOTIBAZDEH APPEARS ON “ISSUES AND ANSWERS” LATER TODAY.

2. ANOTHER HOSTAGE HAS BEEN PERMITTED TO PHONE RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES. THE RECIPIENT OF THE CALL WAS CONVINCED THAT THE CALLER WAS UNDER DURESS AND FORCED TO SPEAK FROM A PREPARED SCRIPT.

3. THE SITUATION IN TABRIZ REMAINS CONFUSED. PRO-KHOMEINI STUDENTS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY ARE CLOSING THE UNIVERSITY, AND THE HIGH SCHOOL FOR TWO DAYS TO DEMAND THE DISSOLUTION OF SHARIAT-MADARI’S MUSLIM PEOPLE’S REPUBLICAN PARTY (MRP). HOWEVER, SHARIAT-MADARI SAID THE SCHOOLS, SHOPS, AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS WERE CLOSED IN ORDER TO OBSERVE A RELIGIOUS HOLIDAY. ALSO YESTERDAY THE MRP ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS CLOSING ALL OF ITS OFFICES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY UNTIL THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN IRAN IMPROVES. THIS APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THE MRP WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE CLANDESTINELY, THERE ARE PRESENTLY ONLY TWO MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES OPERATING OPENLY, THE RIGHT-WING, PRO-KHOMEINI ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE PRO-SOVIET TUDEN (COMMUNIST) PARTY. SHARIAT-MADARI ALSO MAY BE PLANNING TO ASSUME A LOW PROFILE. THE AYATOLLAH’S OFFICE ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT HE WOULD NOT RECEIVED ANY JOURNALISTS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.
B. ANALYSIS WEATHER FOR U.S. 16 DEC 79

B. MID-RANGE FORECAST FOR U.S. EAST COAST 16-18 DEC: A RAPIDLY MOVING COLD FRONT WILL BRING MOSTLY CLOUDY SKIES WITH RAIN/RAINSHOERS AND GUSTY SURFACE WINDS (30-35 KNOTS) TO MOST OF THE AREA WITH SNOW IN THE N1/4 ENDING BY THE 17TH. RAPID CLEARING WILL BRING FAIR SKIES TO THE ENTIRE AREA BY THE 18TH.


D. ANALYSIS WEATHER FOR MIDDLE EAST - 16 DEC 79
A MAJOR STORM SYSTEM IS MOVING THROUGH MOST OF IRAN TODAY WITH CONSIDERABLE CLOUDINESS AND ASSOCIATED WEATHER. A SECOND STORM SYSTEM IS MOVING FROM THE AEGEAN SEA INTO TURKEY WITH A COLD FRONT EXTENDING BACK ACROSS THE LEBANON - ISRAELI COAST INTO NORTHERN EGYPT. JET STREAM CIRRUS EXTENDS NORTHEAST TO SOUTHWEST ACROSS THE S1/4 OF SAUDI ARABIA. THE REST OF THE MIDDLE EAST IS UNDER CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES INFLUENCED BY A HIGH PRESSURE SYSTEM.

E. LONG-RANGE OUTLOOK FOR MIDDLE EAST (EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN, TURKEY)
16-18 DEC: THE MAJOR STORM SYSTEM IN IRAN WITH LOW CEILINGS, RAINSHOERS, THUNDERSTORMS, GUSTY SURFACE WINDS, ICING AND TURBULENCE, AND REDUCED VISIBILITIES AFFECTING E 2/3'S OF IRAN SHOULD MOVE EASTWARD OUT OF THE AREA BY 17/00Z. A HIGH PRESSURE SYSTEM GIVES CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES, MORNING FOG AND REDUCED VISIBILITIES, AND COOLER TEMPERATURES TO IRAN, TURKEY, AND NW 1/3 OF SAUDI ARABIA AFTER THE FIRST FRONTAL PASSAGE. A SECOND STORM SYSTEM MOVES INTO TURKEY TODAY AND SHOULD REACH W 1/3 OF IRAN BY 17/01Z WITH CLOUDY SKIES AND ASSOCIATED WEATHER. THIS SECOND FRONT EXTENDING BACK OVER THE N 1/4 OF EGYPT BRINGS CLOUDY SKIES, FOG AND REDUCED VISIBILITIES. HIGH PRESSURE WILL GIVE CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES OVER S 3/4 OF EGYPT AND MOST OF SAUDI ARABIA. THE SE 1/4 OF SAUDI ARABIA WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE JET STREAM CIRRUS IN A NARROW BAND.
SECRET

MSG085
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FM JTF
TO DELTA
INFO

SECRET

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0330 EST DEC 1, 1979

1. CHARGE LAINGEN TOLD TO LEAVE IRAN:
   THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS INSTRUCTED CHARGE LAINGEN TO INFORM
   FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH THAT HE AND HIS TWO COLLEAGUES
   WISH TO LEAVE IRAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. LAINGEN WAS ALSO
   INFORMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH
   RESPECT TO A GUARANTEE OF SAFE PASSAGE TO THE AIRPORT. THE
   GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT CALLING ON THE IRANIAN
   AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE THE GROUP A SUITABLE ESCORT. LAINGEN
   HAS ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH GHOTBZADEH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE; WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION
   OF A MEETING AS YET.

   A. THE STUDENTS AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HAVE ALREADY CHALLENGED
   THE AUTHORITY OF NEW FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH. FOLLOWING
   GHOTBZADEH'S
   ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE AMERICAN CHARGE AND TWO OTHER EMBASSY OFFICIALS
   PRESENTLY HELD AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY COULD LEAVE IRAN, THE STUDENTS
   IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED THAT THE THREE DIPLOMATS SHOULD BE PUT ON TRIAL
   FOR ESPIONAGE.

   B. THE ANNOUNCED SPY TRIALS:
   WILL REPORTEDLY TAKE PLACE AFTER COMPLETION OF REFERENDUM ON THE
   CONSTITUTION SCHEDULED TO BE HELD DECEMBER 13.

2. TEHERAN, NOV 30, REUTER - MOSLEM STUDENTS HOLDING
   50 AMERICANS HOSTAGE AT THE US EMBASSY CHALLENGED
   THE AUTHORITY OF NEW FOREIGN MINISTER SADIQ GHOTBZADEH AND SAID
   THAT IF THEY WANTED US DIPLOMATS TO BE RELEASED HE SHOULD BE PUT ON
   TRIAL IN IRAN FOR ESPIONAGE.
   MR GHOTBZADEH TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER TODAY THAT
   US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES BRUCE LAINGEN AND TWO OTHER MEN, HELD AT
   THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN PROTECTIVE CUSTODY SINCE THE
   EMBASSY WAS OCCUPIED ON NOV 4, WERE FREE TO TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY.
   BUT ONE OF THE STUDENTS AT THE EMBASSY TOLD REUTER'S BY
   TELEPHONE: "WE HAVE GOTTEN DOCUMENTS PROVING THAT THESE MEN ARE
   SPIES, SO THEY MUST NOT BE RELEASED"

3. IRAN SCового WITH ITS NEIGHBORS:
   IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH HAS PLAMED NEIGHBORING
   IRAQ FOR AN ATTACK ON A TELEVISION TRANSMITTING STATION
   IN WESTERN IRAN LAST SUNDAY. AT HIS FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE
   SINCE TAKING CHARGE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON WEDNESDAY,
   GHOTBZADEH ACCUSED IRAQ OF "DIRECT INTERFERENCE" IN IRAN'S
   PROVINCES OF KERDISTAN AND KHUZESTAN. ASKED WHETHER HE
   THOUGHT IRAQ HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR A MACHINE GUN AND
   GRENADE ATTACK BY SOME 500 ARMED MEN ON THE TELEVISION
   STATION IN ILAM PROVINCE ON THE BORDER WITH IRAQ, HE IS
   REPORTED TO HAVE REPLIED "UNFORTUNATELY, I DO RELIEVE
   SO". THE IRANIANS HAVE ACCUSED IRAQ OF ENCOURAGING
   AUTONOMY-SEEKING KURDS IN THE MOUNTAINS OF KERDISTAN AND
   OF SUPPORTING NEBULOUS ETHNIC ARABS IN OIL-RICH KHUZESTAN.

SECRET
ACTION TO FREE SOME ASSET
IRAN Began LEGAL ACTION OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES NOVEMBER 30 TO CHALLENGE PRESIDENT CARRER'S DECISION TO FREEZE OFFICIAL IRANIAN ASSETS AT U.S. BANKS. CHASE MANHATTAN'S LONDON SUBSIDIARY, THE MAIN BANK INVOLVED IN AN ACTION LAST WEEK DECLARING IRAN IN DEFAULT ON A $90 MILLION DOLLAR LOAN, SAID TODAY ITS LAWYERS HAD BEEN SERVED WITH A WRIT. CHAS IS THE ONLY AMERICAN BANK SERVED WITH SUCH A WRIT SO FAR, SETTING 14 DAYS FOR PAYMENT BY CHASE OF SUITS CLAIMED DUE BY THE IRANIAN CENTRAL BANK.

THE IRANIAN ACTION IS TO SHOW THAT PRESIDENT CARRER'S MEASURES HAVE NO LEGAL STANDING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AIDS AT THE RELEASE OF IRANIAN FUNDS HELD AT BRANCHES OF U.S. BANKS ABROAD.

4. STUDENT EMPHASIS ON MARTYRDOM:
THE STUDENTS HOLDING 50 AMERICAN HOSTAGES HERE COMPARED THEMSELVES TO THE FOLLOWERS OF HUSSEIN WHO DIED FOR THEIR SHI'ITE FAITH, AND THEY COMPARRED ATOLLKH KHOMEINI TO HUSSEIN, THEIR STATEMENTS AR Friedman WITH PHRASES SUCH AS "WE WILL HAPLY DIED OUR BLOOD FOR THE IMAM (KHOMEINI) AND ISLAM. THE RED FLAGS CARRIED BY SOME OF THE TWO MILLION FAITHFUL WHO MARCHED OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY COMPUND AFTER PRAYERS ON ASHURA REPRESENTED TO BLOOD OF THEIR NATION'S MARTYRS. NOBODY, IT SEEMS, IS AFRAID TO DIE FOR IRAN OR IF THEY ARE, THEY ARE KEEPING QUIET ABOUT IT.

ANALYSIS COMMENT:
THIS PUBLIC DISPLAY OF INCLINATION TO MARTYRDOM IS SUPPORTED BY AND IS COMPLEMENTARY TO FRAZENARY BUT UNCONFIRMED REPORTING INDICATING THAT HAND GRENADES HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE INTERIOR GUARDS INCLUDING THE WOMEN WHO HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING 1ST ECHelon SURVEILLANCE OF THE HOSTAGES.

5. KEY SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN: A MINESWEEPER CONTINUES SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE USS MIDWAY TASK GROUP IN THE NORTHWESTERN ARABIAN SEA, WHILE A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE IS OPERATING IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ/GULF OF OMAN AREA. AN OILER IS PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE SOVIET UNITS OPERATING IN THE AREA.

7. DESPITE RUMORS THAT HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING TO THE CONTRARY, USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES ARE BEING HELD, AS BEFORE, IN THE COMPLEX OF BUILDINGS OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY.

A. THE NEW IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, SADRE GHOZIBADEH, WANTS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE AMERICAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. THE CHARGE MAY SOON BE MOVED TO WHERE THE REST OF THE HOSTAGES ARE.
A. THE INNER CIRCLE OF THE GROUP OCCUPYING THE EMBASSY HAS NOT CHANGED ITS COMPOSITION. IT HAS SET UP HOUSEKEEPING AND HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL A FIELD KITCHEN.

B. IN THE OUTER CIRCLE, BESIDES THE PASDARAN, A UNIFORMED GROUP HAS RECENTLY APPEARED. THE UNIFORMS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE IRANIAN ARMY. THE GROUP IS BEING LED BY A MULLAH IN THE SAME KIND OF (NON IRANIAN ARMY) UNIFORM.

C. THE ANNOUNCED SPY TRIAL IS SUPPOSED TO TAKE PLACE AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE REFERENDUM ON THE CONSTITUTION (VOTING TAKES PLACE ON 3 DECEMBER 1979, RESULTS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE BY END OF WEEK). THE COURT WILL BE LOCATED IN THE EMBASSY.

D. INFORMED OBSERVERS IN TEHRAN HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE US HOSTAGES WILL NOT BE PHYSICALLY HARMED, BEFORE OR AFTER THE SPY TRIALS, SO AS TO FORESTALL THE KIND OF RETALIATION BEING MENTIONED BY US POLICY MAKERS. IT IS WIDELY ASSUMED IN TEHRAN THAT THE HOSTAGES WILL BE SENTENCED TO BETWEEN 10 AND 25 YEARS AND THEN DISAPPEAR INTO IRANIAN PRISONS. IN THIS CASE, THE IRANIAN LEADERS COULD WAIT IN PEACE FOR EVENTS TO DEVELOP FURTHER.
SUBJECT: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

REF: A. MSG/FR52/24145R NOV 79/Critical Info Gaps
    B. MSG/FR56/29113R NOV 79/Critical EEI

(2) THE RESPONSES PROVIDED BELOW ARE KEPT TO THE
APPROPRIATE PARAGRAPHS IN REFERENCE ALPHA.

(2) EMBASSY COMPOUND/HOSTAGES
A. ALTHOUGH THE EXACT LOCATIONS AND NUMBERS OF HOSTAGES
    ARE UNKNOWN AND OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT IS THAT PRIOR TO INITIATION
    OF "TRIALS" IN THE COMPOUND THE HOSTAGES WILL CONTINUE TO
    BE ROTATED BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS: THE AMBASSADOR'S
    RESIDENCE, THE CONSULATE BLDG. AND THE STAFF COTTAGES. SELECTED
    "HARD CASES" OR SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE LIKELY BEING HELD SEPARATELY,
    POSSIBLY IN THE BASEMENT OR THE DOMINO RESIDENT STOREROOM. ONCE THE "TRIALS"
    ARE IMMINENT THE HOSTAGES MAY BE REGROUPED AND SEGREGATED BY THE DEGREE
    OF THEIR "CRIMES". LIKELY HOLDING LOCATIONS FOR THE "SENIOR
    SPIES" ARE THE CLOAK ROOM IN THE BASEMENT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S
    RESIDENCE, THE WAREHOUSE BASEMENT, OR POSSIBLY STORE
    ROOMS IN THE CHANCERY BASEMENT.
B. HOSTAGE CONDITION: AGREE WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT
    BUT SUGGEST A FEW HOSTAGES MAY BE PHYSICALLY INCAPACITATED
    AT EXECUTION TIME OR BECOME SO SHOCKED IF EXECUTION IS
    REACTED TO IMMEDIATELY AND VIOLENTLY BY HOSTILE FORCES THAT SOME
    MAY NOT WANT TO LEAVE THE "SECURITY" OF THEIR ENVIRONMENT.
C. HOSTAGE COUNT: AGREE WITH THE THRUST OF YOUR COMMENTS
    AS DOES CONJFF. ANALYSIS CONDUCTED HERE INDICATED
    FOUR INDIVIDUALS LISTED AS HOSTAGES BY DOS WERE NOT
    THE FOUR NAMES ARE:

   (NO FURTHER INFORMATION)

D. AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN
    TOTAL COUNT IS 18 AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUSPECT BUT RECOMMEND
    BASE LINE FIGURE OF 49-52 BE USED FOR PLANNING
    PURPOSES. THE NAMES OF THE FIVE INDIVIDUALS YOU CITED
    ARE BELIEVED TO BE THE FIVE OFFICIAL ANCITS THAT HAVE
    BEEN AT LARGE IN THE CITY, MOVING OCCASIONALLY AND PERIODICALLY
    CHECKING IN WITH LAJING, TOMSETH, AND HOWLAND
    BY PHONE. THE PAST THREE INDIVIDUALS ARE LOCATED IN THE
    IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER PROTECTIVE CUSTODY.
D. COMPOUND HARDENING: BELIEVE "HARDENING MEASURES"
    ARE RELATIVELY LIMITED AND INITIATED BY STUDENTS IN REACTION TO
    EXTERNAL STIMULUS; RUMORS OF AMERICAN ASSAULT.
    FROM NATURE OF PREPARATIONS STUDENTS ANTICIPATE ASSAULT
    TO BE HELICOPTERBORNE, NOT GROUND INITIATED.

SECRET
3. ESTIMATES OF STUDENT/GUARD STRENGTH:
   A. THIS FLUCTUATES WITH SOURCES AND TIME OF OBSERVATION.
      CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT OF THIS LOCATION PLACES TOTAL STUDENT
      STRENGTH AT 280-350 WITH UP TO 2/3 THAT NUMBER
      WITHIN THE COMPOUND DURING THE DAY, PARTICULARLY ON
      DAYS WHEN DEMONSTRATIONS ARE SCHEDULED. BELIEVE THE NUMBER
      DROPS DURING THE NIGHT, WITH A RANGE OF 88-120 AVAILABLE WITHIN
      THE COMPOUND. OF THIS NUMBER, ANTICIPATE
      APPROXIMATELY ONE THIRD ARE ON GUARD DUTY AT ANY ONE TIME.
      OF THIS NUMBER, HALF OR SOME 20 WOULD BE ON DUTY OUTSIDE
      OF HOSTAGE BUILDINGS, WITH ANOTHER HALF DOZEN ON ROOF OBSERVATION
      DUTY. ALL EXTERIOR GUARDS MUST BE CONSIDERED
      ARMED AND AT LEAST AN EQUAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS INSIDE
      SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED, BUT IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT
      TO DIFFERENTIATE.
   B. CANNOT CONFIRM GUARD/STUDENT LOCATIONS PUT CONCUR
      WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT OF KNOWN AND SUSPECTED LOCATIONS.

4. CONCUR WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH FOUR.

5. COMPOUND EXTERIOR:
   A. AGREE THAT A THREAT EXISTS FROM THE SURROUNDING
      BUILDINGS AND THE CHANCERY. THE POTENTIAL FOR THIS THREAT
      IS ESTIMATED TO BE SO HIGH THAT THE ATHLETIC FIELDS IN
      THE COMPOUND WOULD BECOME KILL ZONES WITHIN 7-12 MINUTES
      AFTER THE ASSAULT ACTION IS IDENTIFIED AS SUCH AND/OR
      A WARNING/CALL FOR HELP IS BROADCAST ON THE PUBLIC ADDRESS
      SYSTEM CONTROLLED FROM THE CHANCERY.
   B. IN ADDITION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED STUDENTS
      IN THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS OTHER ELEMENTS WHO MIGHT WANT
      TO HUMILIATE THE UNITED STATES COULD BE ALSO POSITIONED
      IN THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS--I.E. THE PLO/PLFP ACTIVISTS
      SEEKING REVENGE FOR ENTREMBE, OR THE KGB SEEKING REVENGE FOR
      SON TAY. SOMMIT TO DELTA 52, WHERE IS CARLOS, THIS
      SMOKE FROM POSSIBLE SETUP OF USG.

6. RECOGNIZE YOUR CONCERN FOR ROAD BLOCKS AND CHECK
   POINTS, STILL WORKING THIS PROBLEM, WITH GREAT
   EMPHASIS PLACED ON SUBJECT BY MG VAUGHT.

7. CONCUR WITH YOUR PARA 7. WE CONTINUE TO SEARCH
   FOR A RELIABLE AND SECURE MEANS OF INTRODUCING FORCE.
   THIS IS A MAJOR WEAKNESS IN CURRENT PLANS. MG VAUGHT
   GREATEST CONCERN.

8. CONCUR AND RECOGNIZE YOUR CONCERNS-COMMENTS IN
   PARA 7 APPLY.

9. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS APPLY TO YOUR REF B.

10. REACTION TIMES: AT YOUR REQUEST AND BASED UPON
    CONTINUING CONCERN FOR ASSAULT FORCES THE FOLLOWING REVISED
    HOSTILE FORCE REACTION TIMES ARE POSTULATED: (ALL
    TIMES ARE ESTIMATED FROM THAT POINT IN TIME WHEN THE RECOGNITION
    OF THE ASSAULT REACHES THE CHANCERY AND THE SURROUNDING ENVIRONS.)
    A. WITHIN 5-10 MIN-FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND ANY
      WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.
    B. WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES REINFORCEMENTS FROM LOCAL
      IRG MILITIA/PAKHAN STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITEL
      STATIONS.
    C. WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES 100-300 MILITIA AND THE BEGINNINGS
      OF LOCAL CROWDS
    D. WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES IRG MILITIA REINFORCEMENTS OF
      AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.
    E. WITHIN 30-45 MINUTES IRG BACK-UP UNITS AND
      ADDITIONAL CROWDS.
    F. WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND
      MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.
    RECOGNIZE THAT THE
    WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE OFFENSIVE ACTIONS
    OF HOSTILE FORCES AND CROWDS. THE CRITICAL
    PHASE OF "IN TOWN OPERATIONS" WILL BE AT THAT TIME WHEN THE
    EXTRACTION HELICOPTERS ARE ON THE GROUND LOADING. THE
    POTENTIAL FOR HOSTILE DISABLING FIRE WILL STILL BE HIGH
    AS LONG AS THE LZ IS WITHIN THE COMPOUND.

RW 26 NOV 83
SECRET
1. (B) FROM KUWAIT OPTIC, IT APPEARED THAT IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WAS HAVING DIFFICULTIES IN DEALING WITH STUDENTS, WITNESS DELAYS IN GETTING RELEASE OF THIRTEEN HOSTAGES. PLAYING DEVIL'S ADVOCATE, HE WONDERED IF KHOMEINI STATEMENT OF INTENT TO TRY AMERICAN HOSTAGES WAS NOT IN FACT LAYING BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND STUDENTS. WHILE THIS THREAT IS ABHORRENT TO AMERICANS, HE WONDERED IF THIS WAS NOT A METHOD TO CONTROL HIGH EMOTIONS OF STUDENTS. HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE A WAY TO DESENGAGE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH SHAH FROM THAT OF WHAT TO DO WITH HOSTAGES. HE CLAIMED KHOMEINI HAD SAID IN TV INTERVIEW THAT AMERICANS WOULD BE TRIED BUT NOT KILLED. A "TRIAL" FOLLOWED BY DEPORTATION MIGHT BE WAY OUT OF DILEMMA BETWEEN IRAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND STUDENTS.
4. **(A) FROM A TRAVELLER:** The immediate evacuation of public institutions and offices in the vicinity of the United States embassy in Tehran.

 **(B) FROM AN EMPLOYEE OF A BUSINESS FOR SPARE PARTS:** PLO forces in Tehran are posted on the right side of the thoroughway from Tehran to Karaj, about 5-6 km from Maidan-e-Azai. There also are Basdaran forces at this location. There is a PLO headquarters co-located with the Fedayeen Khalq in the building on the corner of Roosevelt and Keyvan Alley.

6. **COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY BATTLE GROUP:** A guided missile frigate, a minesweeper, and an oiler remain in surveillance of the USS Midway battle group in the North Arabian Sea/Gulf of Oman entrance. Sightings continue from units of the Midway task group.

7. **COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE SEVEN-SHIP TASK GROUP:** There are currently no Soviet naval/assault units in the vicinity of **[redacted]**. However, a Soviet guided missile cruiser, an amphibious vehicle landing ship and an auxiliary remain in the vicinity of the coition-anchorage.

9. **COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE KITTY HAWK TASK GROUP:** A guided missile cruiser and guided missile destroyer remain at a contingency station southwest of Spratly Island, in the South China Sea, in possible reaction to Allied shipping in the area. One, or both, of these units may assume surveillance of the Kitty Hawk task group as she moves to the Indian Ocean.
SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 ECT, APRIL 21, 1980

1. REUTER AND ARA REPORT THAT THE MILITANTS WILL ALLOW US VICTIM TO VISIT HER HOSTAGE SISTERS THIS FOLLOWING 360 MH 199 ADVISORY. LORD IN MRS. LITMKI TO THE MILITANTS TO THE EMERGENCY WAT AND WANTED LETTERS TO THE CAPTORS FROM LITMKI AND CLINTONG. THE LETTERS ARE TO BE DELIVERED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. THE MILITANTS HAVE INFORMED THE US. MISSION THAT THE HOSTAGE SISTERS WILL VISIT THE TEHRAN CEMETERY FOR VOTING IN THE REVOLUTION.

2. AFP REPORTS MRS. LITMKI WAS ESCORTED BY THE US MILITARY TO HER HOTEL THE NIGHT OF APRIL 21 FROM THE US MILITARY VEHICLE TO HER HOTEL WHERE IT WAS DETERMINED THAT SHE WAS DESIRING TO MEET WITH AYATOLLH KHOMENI. GREGORY TELLS FORBES THAT THE MEETING OCCURRED ON THE FLIGHT WITH KHOMENI AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, CHIKHDADAR.

3. HACK NEUMAN, A CONGRESSMAN AT HOWARD UNIVERSITY, SAID IN A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW FROM TEHRAN SUNDAY THAT KHOMENI WAS IN A STATE OF FASTING AND HOPED TO MEET WITH THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AT THE TEHRAN CEMETERY. NEUMAN AND THE REV. CHARLES WOICE OF HOPE, WHIT BE AT THE CEMETERY SINCE APRIL 13, ARE STAYING WITH GREGORY NEUMAN.

4. NEUMAN AND GREGORY NEUMAN HAVE BEEN IN TELRMN SINCE APRIL 13 AND STAYING WITH KHOMENI, NEUMAN SAID. HE SAID THEY HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THEIR RECEPTION FROM THE THEOCRACY THAT "EVERYTHING IS GOING WELL." NEUMAN SAID. THE POLITICAL IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE CREDITS TO PERSUDE THE KHOMENI TO GIVE UP THE HOSTAGE SISTERS FAST WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN TEHRAN.

5. LAST MONDAY, A MUSLIM STUDENT MOBILITY WITH LIAMKH IN Doha, WILL BE ALLOWED BY US MILITANTS TO HOLD THE 360 MH 199 ADVISORY STAGE AS A CONCRETE DAMAGE TO THE DURREIONS TO PEPSE IRAN'S UNIVERSITIES OF LEFTIST STUDENTS. THE TUTAS ACTIONS WERE IN RESPONSE TO KHOMENI'S CALL LAST WEEK FOR THE UNIVERSITIES TO BE INANILATION OF THEIR COLLEGE-COALITION. ON FRIDAY, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL FOLLOWED THE STUDENTS LEAD AND URGED ALL POLITICAL GROUPS TO CLOSE THEIR CAMPUS OFFICES WITHIN THE NEXT 24 TO

6. IN ORDER TO ENFORCE THE DECISION WHICH WAS CLEARLY OUT TO ENFORCE LEFTIST INFLUENCE IN IRAN'S UNIVERSITIES, THE COUNCIL CHARGED ALL UNIVERSITIES TO CLOSE THEIR CAMPUS OFFICES WITHIN THE DAY. THE RATIONAL SUDIST MANIFESTO OR COMMISSION INITIALLY SAID THEY WOULD RESCIND THE ORDER AND ENJOY THE CODER THAT URGED EVERY INFRINGEMENT AND STAND STANDS ALONG AT LEAST THE RHODY REPORTED. ON SUNDAY THE JOURNEYS ANYWHERE WILL BE IN TELRMN FROM THE CAMPUS RATHER THAN FACE A THREATEN THEIR EFFORTS BY ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS.

7. WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE WISH THIS GOVERNMENT TO TELL THE COMMISSION FOR THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT INSTITUTION, THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, SOUGHT TO IMPROVE THE RELATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO ITS INDEPENDENT CHAMBERS AND ENLARGE THE CONSUMER'S SIGHT.

8. REUTER, ARA REPO INTHE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, SAYS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILLース ONE OF ITS OWN. NEVERTHELESS, AN IRANIAN RALLY, PLEDGED, IS PREPARING TO VISIT GULAGRAMATIAN CAUSE AND A POLICY ENABLING THE COMMISSION TO TELL IN.TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AGREEMENTS OFFERED ASSISTANCE IN PURSUING GOODS FOR IRAN.
SUBJECT:
Intelligence and Collection Approval

REMARKS
Attached memorandum requests CJCS approval to [REDACTED] the Humint source identified as Pencil One. Purpose of mission is to [REDACTED].

ACTION OFFICER
Lt Col, USAF
J-3, SOD
Ext 55078

DATE OF PREPARATION
10 Jun 80
VZCZCDVA306
OO RUFA11F
DE RUEIZJC #0152 1611745
ZNY TTTTT
O 091740Z JUNE 80
FM JTF/SNOWBIRD/J2
TO
BT
TOPCGR T CITE J3 00152

SUBJ: SOURCE EVALUATION

1. THIS OFFICE UNABLE TO COMPLETELY VALIDATE OR NEGATE THE
   SUBSTANCE OF PREVIOUS REPORTING.

2. (TS) BASED UPON
   THIS OFFICE WILL REQUEST CJCS/SECOFF
   APPROVAL.

4. RVV ON 09 JUNE 80
   BT
   #0152
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Proposed Insertion of an American Intelligence Asset into Iran (TS)

1. (TS) The need to develop a viable in-country support structure for support of a military option is still considered critical. To assure this support structure's success, a great deal of information about is needed. One such effort to gain timely, first-hand information is being developed by my element. It involves the insertion of an American citizen in cover status into Iran.
(U) I understand that SECDEF approval is required for insertion of an American citizen/asset into Iran. With that and the importance of time in mind, I am proceeding with all preliminary measures to insure this plan is sound.

8. (U) This memo is for your information. Shortly, you will receive another requesting the Secretary of Defense's approval.

James B. Vaughn  
Major General, USA

7/30/02

The Operation, Allegria and I approve this concept. You should proceed with your memo I request.

The Korean  
VADM, USN

TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE MATERIAL

WARNING

ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!
EYES ONLY FOR: Gen Jones
LTG Pustay
MG Vaught
VM Harrsen

RETURN TO SOD, 2C840
ACTION OFFICER: Gen[redacted] Maj[redacted]
TELEPHONE: EXT 54087 SECURE 2818

TOP SECRET
(CLASSIFICATION)
REMARKS

1. (TS) The attached memorandum requests permission to provide an American citizen into Iran.

2. (TS) This mission will be that of an observation agent only.

5. (U) Recommend memorandum be approved and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

Memorandum for the
Subject: SNOWBIRD Support (TS)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: SNOWBIRD Support

1. (TS) The development of a viable in-country structure for support of a military option is being pursued. We have screened and selected DOD assets and our posture in this effort is much improved. One such plan to obtain in-country data, which is greatly needed, is outlined below. Because it involves inserting an American citizen into Iran, your approval is required.

2. (TS) Our insert's intelligence collection mission will be that of an observation agent only.

3. (TS) Our experience in RICE BOWL clearly demonstrated that a trained US military observer is the best source of accurate and timely reconnaissance data. Given the
training program and cover development already underway, I believe that the projected mission has a high probability of success with relatively low risk.

5. (U) This memorandum is for your approval.
Mon.

From a policy stand-point I do not approve this proposal unless it is carried out by the Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense - the Department of the Army - operating under the provisions of DoD Directive S-5105.29 dated 1 December 1976. I strongly recommend that the Joint Staff stay out of
Clandestine intelligence operations.

* If this is a problem even then I do not believe an American should be inserted.
The Operation's Deputy, considering the DIA's comments, do not recommend that this agent be inserted.

Should this man be killed or captured, DIO would be in an untenable situation.

THOR HANSON
VICE ADMIRAL, USN
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
CJCS noted the Ops Deps
DIA concerns and

directed

This should be
arranged. Through Gen. Wright.

Thel Hanson

THOR HANSON
VICE ADMIRAL, USN
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
25 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: [Redacted]

1. A meeting was held on 25 July 1980 to discuss [Redacted]. Persons present at the meeting were:

   - OPS GP - LTC [Redacted]
   - CW [Redacted]
   - MR. [Redacted]
   - SNOWBIRD: COL [Redacted]
   - MAJ [Redacted]
   - MAJ [Redacted]

2. After much discussion, it was agreed that OPSCG will determine if it is feasible. If so, he will accomplish this immediately.

3. [Redacted] asset will be placed in contact with [Redacted] probably NET 10 August, with an expected launch date [Redacted].

4. [Redacted] should meet [Redacted] early for coordination in

5. [Redacted]

6. [Redacted]

7. (u) Next meeting to be 29 July 1980.

G

MAJOR, USA
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: IR HOSTAGE SITUATION (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: OBSERVATIONS OF TERROR FOREIGN MINISTRY BUILDING AND US HOSTAGES IN IRAQ (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

SECRET

DIA

CLASSIFIED BY:

Declassified ON: OADR

SECRET

NATIONAL
SECRET

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [Redacted]

TITLE: U.S. HOSTAGE LOCATIONS AND DR. PEYMAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

RECIPIENTS COPIES: NFN 240348 HAS REPORTED NO SUBJECT INFORMATION

SOURCE: NFN 240348 IS

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 12255
COMPLETED ON: 11 Aug 1987
DERIVATIVE OF UM PP NMCC
O RED UC MINUS TO SECRET
RECR: OADR
GENERATED FROM Multiple Sources

SECRET

[Signature]

[Declassified On: OADR]
STATUS OF KHOMENI'S HEALTH (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGINATORS CONCERNS:
FN 240348 HAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ON INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT TENDS TO BEAR OUT AFN'S EARLIER REPORTS

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE:
FN 240348 IS AN

DISTRIBUTION:
EXCLUSIVE

Redacted by NARA

SECRET
SECRET

15 JAN 81

SECRET

CJ

SECRET LINDIS CITE J2 0535/EYES ONLY FOR

SUBJ: INFORMATION REPORT

(//) FOLLOWING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM DOD SOURCE MH:2483/86,
RECEIVED FROM USA OPS BR.

3. (NOTE: SOURCE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY STATE THAT "ALL" HOSTAGES
ARE TO BE RELEASED IN A FEW DAYS, HOWEVER, THIS IS INFERRED BY
REPORT NAME/HEADER: NMH 24038 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: STATUS OF KIOWELINI'S HEALTH - UPDATE (U)
(COT: 17 DECEMBER 1980)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

EXTRACT OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

RECEIVERS CONCERNED: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE
TO: ADAMS - HUBERT (COL WHITE/LTC HAMES)
DIAN - ISH (LTC SASAI)
CIVS 2CA10 (LTC LENAHAN/MAJ FRIEDEL)
SFD HUMLET (COL LUNT/MR. O'BRIEN)
LT. FLANN

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
REPORT NAME/NUMBER:  NFN 240348 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:  INSOM

TITLE:  STATUS OF KHOMEINI'S HEALTH (U)

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
(SEE ATTACHED)  SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS:  NONE.

SOURCE:  NFN 240348

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

TO:  AOSOPS - HUMINT

DAM - ISH

Room 2C840

NOG HUMINT

SFC LYNNE

CLASSIFIED DETERMINATION:  NAFI

SECRET

348

X

Classified by: OAD/R

Declassified on: OAD/R
IAGPC-CR

DATE: 17 SEPTEMBER 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: MFN 240348 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: INSOL

TITLE: PARTIAL RESPONSE TO 9 SEP 80 TASKING (U).

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS INFORMATION AND PARTIALLY RESPONDS TO 9 SEP 80 TASKING. ITEMS OF INTEREST:

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE (SEE ATTACHED REPORT).

SOURCE: SOURCE MFN 240348 IS:

CLASSIFICATION WHEN RELEVANT TO
CLASSIFIED BY: 11 AUG 80
REVIEWED BY: DIA
DECLASSIFIED ON
MULTIPLE LEVELS

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

SECRET
SECRET NOT TO BE MARKED
REPORT NAME/HUMBER: NFN 240331 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: INSCO

TITLE: Name Changes of Tehran Streets (U)

(Partial Response to SECPO EEI)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: This Report details a list of Tehran Street name changes, as of 10 Oct 80.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: Meydun-K translates to square; Jiaane translates to street.

Information was obtained from (redacted) and is believed to be an accurate repetition of data provided by (redacted). REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: NFN 240331

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive

CLASSIFICATION REMOVES ALL

DECLASSIFIED ON (redacted)

DIID

CLASSIFIED BY: (redacted)

Declassified ON: (redacted)

SECRET INCO
H. AREA IN FRONT OF MOTOR POOL/GENERAL SERVICE AREA; LIGHTS ON WALLS OF BUILDINGS.
I. FRONT AND BACK OF CHANCERY ARE WELL LIGHTED; EAST END WELL LIGHTED BECAUSE THIS WAS THE PRIMARY AFTER-HOURS ENTRANCE PRIOR TO OCCUPATION.

(5) INDIVIDUAL NOTED THAT IN MAY 1979 FIRE FROM EITHER RIFLES OR AUTOMATIC WEAPONS USING TRACER AMMO HAD BEEN DIRECTED INTO THE COMPOUND FROM THE FOLLOWING SIX LOCATIONS:
   (A) VICINITY SEMIRAMIS HOTEL (VICINITY SW CORNER OF ROOSEVELT AND TAKHTE-JAMSHID).
   (B) FROM MULTISTORY BLDG ON EAST SIDE OF ROOSEVELT APPROX DUE EAST OF CHANCERY.
   (C) FROM A BUILDING DUE SOUTH OF CHANCERY, DIRECTLY ACROSS TAKHTE-JAMSHID.
   (D) FROM A BLDG SOUTHWEST OF CHANCERY, SOUTH OF TAKHTE-JAMSHID.
   (E) FROM TALL BUILDING ON NORTHWEST CORNER OF AMERICA AND TAKHTE-JAMSHID.
   (F) FIRE AT ONE TIME CAME THROUGH THE FRONT OF THE AMB RESIDENCE, APPARENTLY FROM BUILDINGS NORTH OF THE COMPOUND.
   (G) THE PRECEDING INDICATES THAT SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN BY STUDENTS, ETC) EXHIBIT A BASIC CONCERN AGAINST A PREVIOUSLY DEMONSTRATED THREAT. RVW 27DEC09
PORT NAME/HUBNER: NFH 210241 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: INSCOM

TITLE: POSSIBLE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT

(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

SOURCE: NFH 210241 IS

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE
1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT/ DANI - ISH
Room 2C840
DOD HUMINT
DG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION asking is ISS

RECEIVED ON: 11Aug87
RERE CecW by: DDC bmc-1

RECLASSIFIED TO: ADA

REVIEWED ON: 6ADP

DECLASSIFIED 88-89-02-14

DIAClassified by
Declassified On
THIS INFORMATION PASSED VIA KY-3 TO MAJOR ROOM 20840, 1200 HOURS, 31 DEC 80, by 2R AL BARI
21 April 1969

Chuck,

I got a call from the NPA on Saturday, 19 April. They've been moved from the conference room where they were being held to the "former state dining room". It's located on the west side of the building, same floor, the third.

The toilet they use (apparently there was quite a to-do about it recently) is still located just outside the door of their present location. The shower facilities are on the fourth floor. Because of one of Mike's capers, they're no longer allowed to use the elevator. Coming back from the shower recently with his guard, when the elevator reached the third floor the guard got out. Mike waved goodbye to him and went down to the ground floor. Mike could hear the guard madly running down the three flights of stairs and waited inside the elevator for him. Just as the guard could see him Mike again waved and went back up to the third floor, and back into the room. (Thought you'd be interested to see they haven't lost their sense of humor.)

Their guards have been changed and Mike said he thinks the new ones have close contact with the "students" on the cell. He can no longer call our friends "up north", nor can he run on the stairs for exercise. He said they are very closely watched. He still, however, sits in the window for a couple of hours every day "working on his tan" -- he won that battle with the guards. He said he went into more detail in a letter which is on its way -- I'll let you know.
SECRET

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00 RUEAIIIF
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ZNY SSSS
O 071800Z FEB 80
FM JTF/RICE BOWL
TO RUEAIIIF/

SPECIAL CITE J3 00052
SUBJECT:
SOURCE:

1. MAIN MFA BLDG IS OLD ORNATE BLDG RUNNING EAST TO WEST, FACING ON FOROUGHI STREET ACROSS FROM MINISTRY OF WAR. LAINGEN, HOWLAND, TOMSEITH HELD ON THIRD (TOP FLOOR) IN BALLROOM AT WEST END OF CENTRAL SECTION.

2. NORMAL ENTRY IS VIA GROUND FLOOR LEVEL AT EAST END OF BLDG WITH PARKING IN THE "U" COURTYARD. ENTRANCE IS DOUBLE CLEAR GLASS DOORS, PROBABLY LOCKED AT NIGHT. NO WALL OR FENCE IN THIS AREA.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 00052 6-E-C-R-E-T
VEHICLES ARE DRIVEN AND PARKED TO WITHIN 20-30 FEET OF ENTRANCE.

3. GUARDS ARE CONSCRIPT TYPE SOLDIERS LOCATED INSIDE THE LOBBY - (POSSIBLY PULL DUTY FROM MINISTRY OF WAR COMPOUND LOCATED NEARBY). GUARDS DESCRIBED AS LOW RANKING, BARELY ABLE TO SPEAK PERSIA. DURING THE DAY (3) ON DUTY, CAN BE BLUFFED THROUGH W/SHOW OF AUTHORITY. CREDENTIALS CHECKED DURING THE DAY BY "OLD TIME" CIVILIAN SITTING AT DESK ON LEFT AS YOU ENTER. STAIRWAY TO UPPER FLOORS, ON THE LEFT AS YOU ENTER. ALL STAIRS MARBLE W/CARPET RUNNERS.

4. STRAIGHT/LONG MARBLE HALLWAY WITH CARPET RUNNER LEADS TO WEST END OF CENTRAL SECTION OF BUILDING. OFFICES ON RIGHT (NORTH) SIDE OF HALLWAY, WINDOWS ALONG LEFT (SOUTH) SIDE OF HALLWAY.

5. NORMAL ACCESS TO 3RD FLOOR (TOP FLOOR) IS UP THE STAIRWELL AT WEST END OF CENTRAL SECTION. UPON REACHING THIRD FLOOR LANDING TURN BACK TO LEFT AROUND STAIRWELL, TURN LEFT AT END OF STAIR WELL INTO ENTRY AREA TO "DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION ROOM" - SINGLE CIVILIAN GUARD ON DUTY THIS LOCATION DURING DAY-DOOR NOT LOCKED DURING DAY (UNKNOWN AT NIGHT). LAINGEN, HOWLAND, TOMSEITH, RESIDE INSIDE THIS ROOM ON THE
6. ROOM IS LARGE BALLROOM WITH UNBARRED WINDOWS ON BOTH SIDES (NORTH VIEW IS MOUNTAINS/SOUTH VIEW IS GARDEN AND HELI PAD). WINDOWS ARE BELIEVED TO OPEN IN/OUT AND LEDGE IS BROAD AND REMEMBERED TO BE FLAT. DOORS AT EAST END ARE CHAINED AND LOCKED FROM 3RD FLOOR CENTRAL BLDG AREA.

7. OTHER ACCESS TO AREA COULD BE THROUGH SOUTH FORMAL ENTRANCE (VICINITY BUS PARKING) THROUGH THE HALL OF MIRRORS AND UP FORMAL WIDE STAIRS TO TOP FLOOR. REPORTER DID NOT BELIEVE THIS ENTRANCE IN NORMAL USE, PRESUMED TO BE LOCKED EXCEPT FOR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS (HOWEVER PRESENCE OF BUSES IN PHOTOGRAPHY MAY INDICATE OTHERWISE.)

8. NORMAL WORKING HOURS AT MFA ARE REPORTEDLY 0800-1400 (1500).

9. SEPARATELY.

10. VISITATION BY SWISS FOR PURPOSES OF MAIL DELIVERY IS FREQUENT.
FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFO AND USE.

SOURCE OBSERVED THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY COMPLEX IN
TEHRAN AT ___ LOCAL TEHRAN TIME AND AT THE SAME TIME
ON ___ SOURCE WALKED ALONG GAVAN DALTARER STREET WHICH IS
THE WESTERN PERIMETER OF THE COMPLEX. DURING BOTH OBSERVATIONS,
SOURCE NOTED THE ABSENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS OUTSIDE THE FENCE
WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED IN OBSERVATIONS.

THERE WERE NO OTHER VISIBLE SECURITY POSITIONS OR SENTRY
S VISIBLE IN THE PERIMETER OBSERVED BY SOURCE. SOURCE FURTHER NOTED THAT THE
CLOSEST REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WERE LOCATED INSIDE THE FORMER
IRANIAN OFFICER'S CLUB (NORTH OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMPLEX) ON
SEVOM ESFAND AVENUE. SOURCE BELIEVED THAT REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS HAD
NOT BEEN PRESENT AT THIS CLUB DURING PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS.

RVD 18 JUL 98
18 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD SECORD

SUBJECT: FBI Liaison

Reference: Memorandum for Director, DIA, dtd 7 Aug 80, subject SAB.

1. On 12 August 1980, LTG [redacted] (DIA JSJ-1X) coordinated with Mr. [redacted] (Terrorism Section, FBI) in regard to obtaining current information on hostage locations.

2. The conversation resulted in the following disclosures:

   a. Any information that the FBI obtained from their sources in regard to the 4 November 1979 US Embassy incident in Iran was and is being passed to the Department of State.

   b. The FBI will review their files for any significant current information (if any) concerning hostage locations and provide said information to DIA.

3. Close coordination will be maintained with the FBI and information obtained will be provided to your planners.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

[Blacked out for JCS Support]

DIA

OADR

Classification Review Ed 1735
Declassified ON: DIA

[Redacted]

SECRET
2 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL TIGHE

Subject: SNOWBIRD Intelligence Status

1. This memorandum provides a summary of the current intelligence and operational support requirements of Project SNOWBIRD. The requirements have been divided into three major categories:

a. Category One

b. Category Two: Establishing an in-country support structure.

c. Category Three: Maintaining a cognizance of political, military, and civil events in the region which could have an impact on mission planning.

2. The balance of this memo will address the status of the individual requirements contained within each category:

a. Category One

(1) Penetration Agent (Possible reinsertion of "Pencil One").

(2) Technical identification

(3) Surveillance and tracking (Vehicle drive-by planned).

(4)

b. Category Two

(1) Acquire in-country assets.

(2) Establish in-country communications base.

(3) Acquire transportation means.
(4) Acquire in-country safehouses.
(5) Develop equipment/infiltration means

c. Category Three
(1) Environmental data (DIA Photo).
(2) Military/political activity (DIA Photo).
(3) Air and air defense activity (DIA Photo).
Other special programs being coordinated by SNOWBIRD/J-2:
a. DOS interface...

c.

d. Interface on DOD agents.
e. Identification and screening of DOD support assets.
f. Establishment of field training office for DOD SNOWBIRD support assets.
g. ICAS photo tasking.
h. Test of SR 71-HRR capability.
i. Radar planning chart (DMA).
j. LZ search project.
k. Imagery transformation (DARPA).

4. Request DIA review the above and advise of any assistance or additional capabilities that could be used.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA
MEMORANDUM TO ATTENDEES

Subject: SNOWBIRD Operational Intelligence and In-Country Mission Support Requirements (TS)

1. (TS) This paper provides a baseline of mission-related intelligence requirements which are considered essential to effective planning and eventual mission success. Due to the critical limitations imposed by time, resources and personnel and the need to avoid their inefficient use, satisfaction of these requirements will require a coordinated and cooperative effort by all intelligence and field operational entities involved in supporting SNOWBIRD.

2. (TS) The task of matching capabilities with these requirements is complicated by the For planning purposes, however, a structure to support simultaneous assaults on six geographically separated targets is considered essential. To assist in sizing the structure and associated requirements, a matrix style spread sheet has been prepared on each of the following targets.

TEHRAN - MFA Building
- Chancery Building (U.S. Embassy)

3. (TS) A basic list of requirements has been compiled and divided into the following categories to simplify a "needs versus capabilities" analysis.

CATEGORY I - In-Country Support Network:

a. Transportation

b. Communications

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED BY: JCS
REVIEWER: DOD/NNC

Declassified On: OADR

SECRET

[Redacted]
Tabriz
  g. Tabriz
  h. Vayqan
  i. Rezaiyeh International

Mashhad
  j. Mashhad
  k. Gonabad

NOTE: Generic EEI lists for active and inactive airfields are attached for planning purposes.

4. (P5) This paragraph briefly summarizes existing (E) or potential/desired capabilities. (P)

DOD:
- Net Control Agents (2), CONUS (P)
- Operatives (30+), CONUS (P)
- Special Vehicles (P)
  - Econovans (2), CONUS
  - Pickups (2), CONUS
  - Sedans (2)
- Air Infiltration (8), CONUS (E)

Commercial:
- Informant Agents
- Net Control Agents
- Field Operatives
- Vehicles
- Quarters

Attachments:
1 - Active Airfield EEI
2 - Inactive Airfield EEI
3 - Target Data Sheets

TOP SECRET
Target Name: [Redacted]

Description:

Hostage population 6-12  Guard Force size 6-10/Unknown

Defenses UNK - None noted in immediate vicinity - 1 park guard.

Distances to nearest:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>w/u</th>
<th>(a) HLZ 200m</th>
<th>(b) FW/LZ 7 km SE</th>
<th>(c) Active Airfield</th>
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| (d) Komitee/Pasdaran location 1.5 km SE |
| (e) Police/Gendarmerie Station 500 m SW |
| (f) Army Post 4 km SE |
| (g) Air Force Base |

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY I</th>
<th>(Support)</th>
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<td>a. Trans</td>
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<td>b. Comm</td>
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<td>c. Housing</td>
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<td>d. Survey</td>
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<th>CATEGORY II</th>
<th>(Surveillance)</th>
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<td>a. Confirm</td>
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<td>b. Hostile</td>
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<td>d. Select</td>
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<td>e. Survey</td>
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</table>
c. Housing and Subsistence
d. Survey of Metropolitan Entry Zones

**CATEGORY II - Target Area Surveillance:**

a. Confirmation of Indicators
b. Hostile Security Measures
c. Physical make-up of Target
d. Selection of Approach and Egress Routes
e. Survey of Extraction Zones

**CATEGORY III - Mission Support Measures**

a. Force Reception
b. Pathfinder Actions
c. Communication Neutralization
d. Diversions
e. Blocking Actions

**CATEGORY IV - Post-Mission Support**

a. Stay-Behind Communications
b. E & E Link-up Points
c. E & E Safehouses
d. Extraction Zone Marking
e. Secure Transport Net
f. Stay-Behind Informant Network

**CATEGORY V - Airfield Data Collection**

Tehran
a. Mehrabad
b. Doshan-Tappeh
c. Manzariyeh
d. Semnan New
e. LZ Susan
f. LZ Donna

Defenses: Walls or fences/guard towers/machine guns, small arms.

Distances to nearest:

(a) HLZ  
(b) FW/LZ  
(c) Active Airfield Mehrabad, Doshan-Tappeth, Chale Morgi

(d) Kommittee/Pasdaran location See map

(e) Police/Gendarmerie Station See map

(f) Army Post See map

(g) Air Force Base Mehrabad, Doshan-Tappeth

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| e. Survey   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
**Target Name:** US EMB  

**Description:**

- **Hostage population:** 6-12  
- **Guard Force size:** 6-10/30-50

**Defenses:** Walled compound, sandbagged positions, small arms, mines?

**Distances to nearest:**

(a) HLZ on site  
(b) FW/LZ 3.5km E.  
(c) Active Airfield 3.5 km E.  
(d) Kommittee/Pasdaran location 1 km W.  
(e) Police/Gendarmerie Station 2 km SE.  
(f) Army Post 1.5 km WEST  
(g) Air Force Base Doshan-Tappeth 3.5 km E.

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**CATEGORY I**  
(Support)

- a. Trans  
- b. Comm  
- c. Housing  
- d. Survey

**CATEGORY II**  
(Surveillance)

- a. Confirm  
- b. Hostile  
- c. Physical  
- d. Select  
- e. Survey

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**TOP SECRET**
| CATEGORY III | | | | | | | | | |
| (Mission) | | | | | | | | | |
| a. Force | | | | | | | | | |
| b. Path | | | | | | | | | |
| c. Comm | | | | | | | | | |
| d. Diver | | | | | | | | | |
| e. Blocking | | | | | | | | | |
| CATEGORY IV | | | | | | | | | |
| (Post) | | | | | | | | | |
| a. Stay- | | | | | | | | | |
| b. E & E | | | | | | | | | |
| c. E & E | | | | | | | | | |
| d. Extract | | | | | | | | | |
| e. Secure | | | | | | | | | |
| f. Stay- | | | | | | | | | |
| CATEGORY V | | | | | | | | | |
| (Support A/F) | | | | | | | | | |
| a. Mehrabad | | | | | | | | | |
| b. Doshan-T | | | | | | | | | |
| c. Manzariy | | | | | | | | | |
| d. Semnan N | | | | | | | | | |
| e. LZ Susan | | | | | | | | | |
| f. LZ Donna | | | | | | | | | |
| g. Tabriz | | | | | | | | | |
| h. Vaygan | | | | | | | | | |
| i. Rezaiyeh | | | | | | | | | |
| j. Mashhad | | | | | | | | | |
| k. Gonabad | | | | | | | | | |

Attachment 3
Target Name: MFA

Hostage population: 3

Guard Force size: 3-4 / 4-6

External Defenses: None noted in immediate vicinity

Distances to nearest:

(a) HLZ 200 m (b) FW/LZ (c) Active Airfield 4.5 km E.

(d) Kommittee/Pasdarun location 1.5 km E.

(e) Police/Gendarmerie Station 100 m E.

(f) Army Post 3 km NE (g) Air Force Base 4.5 km E. Doshan-Tappeth

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Attachment 3
Target Name: 

Hostage population: 12-18. Guard Force size: 6-10/6-10


Distances to nearest:
(a) HLZ UNK
(b) FW/LZ UNK
(c) Active Airfield

(d) Kommittee/Pasdarain location: LOC UNK - Strength c. 1000
(e) Police/Gendarmerie Station: SW part of
(f) Army Post Barracks
(g) Air Force Base as FOB no AOB assigned.

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CATEGORY I
(Support)
a. Trans
b. Comm
c. Housing
d. Survey

CATEGORY II
(Surveillance)
a. Confirm
b. Hostile
c. Physical
d. Select
e. Survey
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Attachment 3
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<tr>
<td>Hostage population</td>
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<td>Guard Force size</td>
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**Defenses**: Walled compound, guard towers, sandbagged positions outside compound.

**Distances to nearest**:

- **a. HLZ site**
- **b. FW/LZ 7.5 km NW**
- **c. Active Airfield 7.5 km NW**
- **d. Komitee/Pasdarshan location** UNK
- **e. Police/Gendarmerie Station** UNK
- **f. Army Post 1.5 km E.**
- **g. Air Force Base 7.5 km NW.**

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**CATEGORY I**

(Support)

- a. Trans
- b. Comm
- c. Housing
- d. Survey

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**CATEGORY II**

(Surveillance)

- a. Confirm
- b. Hostile
- c. Physical
- d. Select
- e. Survey
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Attachment 3
SUBJ: MATERIAL SHIPMENT

1. THE COMUTF IS CONSIDERING REQUEST
   (VIA COVERED COMMERCIAL SHIPMENT) MISSION ESSENTIAL ITEMS
   SUCH AS:
   
   A. PT 25/250 RADIO
   B. PARKHILL ENCRYPTION DEVICE
   C. P04 RADIO TRANSMITTER
   D. MX 360 RADIOS
   E. REMOTE ACTIVATED BEACONS
   F. SILENCED WEAPONS
   G. FLARE GUNS
   H. PYFONAL GUNS
   I. 15-20 LBS BULK (C-4) EXPLOSIVE

2. CUST REQUEST PROVIDE BY RETURN MESSAGE LISTING OF
   MISSION ESSENTIAL ITEMS IN SHIPMENT OF NO MORE THAN 60 LBS.

PER:

RENV 19 NOV 00
ST

SECRET
SUBJ: REPLY TO QUERIES

REF: (A) SFOD MSG 016, SUBJ SI/SAO ACCESS POLICY DG 061250Z MAY 80

(B) SFOD MSG 017, SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION DG 061342Z MAY 80

(C) [Redacted]

THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO EACH REFERENCE BY SUBPARA BELOW

A. SI/SAO ACCESS POLICY EMPLOYED DURING RICEBOWL WILL BE CONTINUED WITH ONE TIME ACCESS GRANTED ON BASIS OF BASIS OPERATIONAL NEED. PHYSICAL CONTROL OF SI/SAO MATERIAL IS BASIS REQUIREMENT EVEN WHEN MATERIAL HAS BEEN SANITIZED TO PROVIDE PROTECTION OF SOURCE DATA AND SYSTEM CAPABILITIES.

B. HOSTAGES LOCATION: THE TASK OF IS BEING PURSUED ON SERVERAL FRONTS. ALL A FORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OR FEASIBILITY RESEARCH. ONE OF THESE POSSIBILITIES REGARDLESS OF HOSTAGES LOCATIONS. BE ASSURED YOU WILL BE INFORMED WHEN THESE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES REACH A STAGE WHERE THEIR EMPLOYMENT APPEARS IMMINENT.
Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Line of Sight Analysis - LZ SUSAN

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:
1. (TS) DMA conducted line of sight analysis between selected points in the LZ SUSAN.
2. (TS) Analysts produced terrain profiles showing terrain relationships between selected points.

COMMENTS:
1. (TS) LOS charts were produced in limited quantities for briefing and planning.
2. (TS) LOS charts could be used to determine maximum safe flying altitudes vic SUSAN to avoid visual detection.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. (TS) That DMA be used to produce LOS analysis of critical operational areas as necessary.
2. (TS) That only highly specific and defined areas be tasked since this process is highly man intensive.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:
J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [Redacted], Cpt [Redacted]

POINTS OF CONTACT:
DMA - CoI [Redacted] - 254-4426

ATTACHMENT:
LOS Analysis - LZ SUSAN (SEP)
THREAT ASSESSMENT: SUSAN (151618N/0533110E)

DESCRIPTION: AN APPARENTLY UNINHABITED, FLAT, OPEN AREA IN THE DASHT-E KAVIR. AN AREA APPROXIMATELY 12,000' X 10,000' IS SUITABLE FOR FIXED WING AIRCRAFT OPERATION. THE AREA, DIVIDED INTO 2 PARALLEL FIELDS, IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 10 NM SSW OF SEMNAN CITY APPROXIMATELY 13 NM SW OF SEMAN NEW AIRFIELD.

ON-SITE THREAT AS OF 14 NOV 80: NONE. NO HUMAN ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED IN THIS AREA SINCE COLLECTION BEGAN IN MAY 80. NO COVERAGE FROM PRIOR YEARS BACK TO 1972. ALTHOUGH TRAILS CROSS THE AREA, THEY ARE PROBABLY A RESULT OF ANIMALS (E.G. CAMELS) THAT HAVE BEEN NOTED IN THE AREA.

THE CLOSEST MAN-MADE FACILITY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 4 NM N AND CONSISTS OF SUPPORT BUILDINGS FOR A NON-ACTIVE OPEN PIT SULFUR NINE. APPROXIMATELY 12 MAJOR STRUCTURES ARE LOCATED HERE, BUT NO ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED SINCE CURRENT COLLECTION BEGAN IN MAY 80. NO COVERAGE FROM PRIOR YEARS BACK TO 1972.

4. ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 13 OCT 82 SHOW NO REGULAR ARMY UNITS IN THE VICINITY OF SUSAN. APPROXIMATELY 100-150 AIR FORCE SUPPORT PERSONNEL ARE STATIONED AT THE SEMNAN NEW SUPPORT AREA (APP 15 NM NW) TO SUPPORT THE SEMNAN NEW HAWK TRAINING FIRING RANGE. LAUNCHERS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ARE DEPLOYED BUT NO MISSILES. HAWK EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWL ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED AT SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD RECENTLY. HAWK EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWN PROBABLY CAME OUT OF STORAGE, SINCE NO EQUIPMENT IS MISSING FROM THE TRAINING/FIRING RANGE. SEMNAN NEW AFDL HAS NO ACTIVE AIR DEFENSES AND IS NO LONGER BLOCKED. PREVIOUS BLOCKADE WAS DONE WITH VEHICLE TIRES.

5. DUE TO NON-EXISTENCE OF ROADNET BETWEEN SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD AND SUSAN AND GIVEN THE DIFFICULTY OF CROSS COUNTRY NAVIGATION AT NIGHT, IT WOULD BE SEVERAL HOURS AFTER DETECTION BEFORE A LANDBASED REACTION FORCE FROM SEMNAN NEW COULD REACH SUSAN.

6. CHANCE OF VISUAL DETECTION OF FIGHT/RECON ACTIVITY AT SUSAN BY OBSERVERS AT SEMNAN NEW IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY LOW DUE TO DISTANCE (12 NM) AND LINE OF SIGHT OBSTRUCTIONS DUE TO TERRAIN WASHINGS.

7. THE CLOSEST PARA-MILITARY FORCES ARE LOCATED IN THE CITY OF SEMNAN. GIVEN THE LOCATION AND SIZE OF THE CITY, IT IS PROBABLE THAT A FEW GROUND REACTION FORCES WOULD USED NO WMR THAN 100 PERSONNEL. BEING PARA-MILITARY, THE FORCES DO NOT HAVE LARGE NUMBERS OF MILITARIZED TRUCKS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. GIVEN TERRAIN AND VEHICLE USE, THEY WOULD BE REQUIERED TO TRAVEL FORKED FROM SEMNAN TO SUSAN. ALTHOUGH THE ROAD FROM SEMNAN CITY TO SUSAN IS "LINED" WITH MILITARIZED TRUCKS, THEIR EFFECTIVENESS REMAINS IN QUESTION.
THE TRAIL FROM THE SULPHUR HILL TO SUSAN IS EVEN LESS WELL-DEFINED AND ALSO CROSSES STREAM BEDS. WHILE NO ONE OF THE TERRAIN SHOULD POSE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFICABILITY PROBLEMS FOR 4 X 4 VEHICLES, THE LACK OF IDENTIFIABLE TERRAIN FEATURES AND THE PRESENCE OF MANY STREAM BEDS WOULD CAUSE SEVERE NAVIGATION PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY AT NIGHT, UNLESS PERSONNEL WERE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA AND POSITIVELY KNEW THE LOCATION OF SUSAN. ALTHOUGH SEMNAN IS ONLY 18 NM FROM SUSAN, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT GROUND TRAVEL TIME WOULD BE AT LEAST 2-3 HOURS AT NIGHT.

9. SIX GENDARMERIE POSTS COMPRIZE THE SEMNAN CO DISTRICT. ONLY 2 POSTS (SEMNAN POST 3533336/8532324E, 18 NM FROM SUSAN; SAROKH POST 352512K/8531312E, 24 NM FROM SUSAN) ARE CLOSE ENOUGH TO INVESTIGATE SUSAN. BOTH POSTS ARE OUT OF AUDIBLE DETECTION RANGE FOR LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT APPROACHING SUSAN FROM THE SOUTH. GENDARMERIE POSTS TYPICALLY HAVE 7-10 PERSONNEL ASSIGNED. THE GENDARMERIE PERSONNEL AND PARA-MILITARY FORCES WOULD UTILIZE THE SAME ROUTES, WITH TRAVEL TIME TO SUSAN ESTIMATED AT A MINIMUM TO BE ONE AND A HALF TO TWO HOURS.

10. UPON DETECTION AND GIVEN NOTIFICATION OF A US FORCE AT SUSAN, THE IIAF COULD PLACE 2 X F-4'S FROM TEBRAN MEHRABAD OVER SUSAN WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES. AIRCRAFT WOULD BE LOADED WITH AIM-9 AAM'S AND 20MM CANNON. HOWEVER, THEIR ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY INTERCEPT U.S. OPERATIONS WOULD BE SEVERELY RESTRICTED DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS.

11. SUMMARIZE. GIVEN THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN, IT IS REASONABLE TO ESTIMATE THAT 2-3 HOURS OF OPERATIONS ON SUSAN ARE POSSIBLE BEFORE ANY OVERT INVESTIGATION OR REACTION; ASSUMING FORCE INGRESS AND LANDING WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT DETECTION/IDENTIFICATION. THE MOST LIKELY CONFLICT REACTION WOULD BE BY THE IIAF F-4'S FROM TEBRAN/GEHRABAD. INVESTIGATION BY GENDARMERIE/REV GUARDS BY GROUND/LIGHT AIRCRAFT/HELICOPTER COULD ALSO OCCUR, ALTHOUGH THIS POSSIBILITY IS FAR LESS LIKELY, PARTICULARLY SINCE NO HELICOPTERS ARE KNOWN TO BE BASED IN THE SEMNAN AREA.

NEW 25 NOV 77
SUBJ: LZ ASSESSMENT (U)

THIS IS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND.

THE AREA DESIGNATED LZ SUSAN IS RELATIVELY SMOOTH, PROBABLY WITH PEBBLE OR GRANULAR SURFACE. NORTH OF THE AREA DESIGNATED SUSAN TO THE HEAD OF THE FAN THE SURFACE PROBABLY PROGRESSES FROM PEBBLE TO HAND AND POSSIBLY EVEN BOULDER-SIZED ROCKS. FROM THE SOUTHERN ONE HALF OF SUSAN TO THE TOE OF THE FAN (THE EXTREME SOUTHWESTERN EDGES) THE SURFACE PROBABLY PROGRESS FROM PEBBLE, GRANULAR TO FINE SOIL (SILT AND CLAY). PRESENCE OF TRAILS INDICATE NOTHING LARGER THAN PEBBLES AND THAT THE ENTIRE FAN HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY INUNDATED IN AT LEAST 6 YEARS. PRESENCE OF WATER AT THE TOE OF THE FAN INDICATES WATER IS PERCOLATING THROUGH THE FAN AT THIS TIME.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0456 TOP SECRET

LANDING AT THIS TIME WITHOUT PRIOR RECONNAISSANCE WOULD BE QUESTIONABLE FOR LARGE AIRCRAFT EVEN IF CONFINED TO THE NORTHERN ONE HALF OF SUSAN. SOIL PROFILES 3 TO 5 FEET DEEP (NOT SURFACE SAMPLES) ARE NEEDED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE BEARING STRENGTH OF SUSAN AND THE SOUTHERNMOST LOCATION THAT WOULD WITHSTAND THE LANDING IMPACT OF LARGE AIRCRAFT.

2. DMA PERFORMED LINE OF SIGHT ANALYSIS OF THE LZ SUSAN/SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD AREA WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS: THERE IS NO LINE OF SIGHT BETWEEN LZ SUSAN AND SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD, OR LZ SUSAN AND THE SEMNAN NEW SUPPORT CANTONEMENT AREA, OR BETWEEN SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD AND THE SEMNAN NEW SUPPORT CANTONEMENT AREA.

REVW 08 DEC 00

#0456
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

COMMENTS: None.
RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [Redacted], [Redacted]
Major [Redacted], ODCSOPS, DA

POINTS OF CONTACT:

Intelligence School, Tel: 9-433-3802

Mr. [Redacted], HQ OSI, Bolling AFB, MD
Tel: 9-767-5144

ATTACHMENT:

Interview Form
Rescue of the hostages will be accomplished via an air attack ( ) on the Embassy. A RH-53D Force will be transported by 5/SH-60s from the USS patio. In order to gain the range to reach the Tehran area, the MH-53's will make a refueling stop at a predetermined spot in the desert approximately 265 miles east of Esfahan. Once the RH-53's have landed and established a drop zone, the fuel will be delivered in palletized bladders by air drop from 5 MC-130's. The MC-130's will refuel and accomplish two aerial refuelings en route to the drop zone. We estimate it will take three hours and thirty minutes to move the fuel bladders to the Helo's, complete the refueling and be ready to launch. Once airborne the Helo's with Delta aboard will proceed to a drop off point approximately 120 miles southeast of Tehran where they will be met by an agent arranged for by . At this time the 5 Helo's will move to a predesignated hiding area where they will go under camouflage until the next evening. All flying operations are scheduled to be completed by 0515 Tehran time which is one hour before first light. Therefore, the entire flying schedule just described has a maximum of one hour slippage available. After drop off, Delta will move to a prearranged safe haven, then to the Embassy in time to reconnoiter (2000 L) prior to a 0130 L attack. The helo's will depart their hiding area in time to arrive at the Embassy 15 minutes after the initiation of the attack. The primary extraction zone will be the field behind the Embassy. It will require at least three RH-53's to extract all of the US personnel.
At the same time that the rescue team arrives, 5 
MC-130's will land and deliver 75 US Army "K" force on an isolated airstrip
(Ganjavas, located approximately 60 km southwest of Teheran. 
Once the field is secure the MC-130's will prepare to receive the 
hostages, Delta and the Rangers. The MC-130's will carry all US personnel to a third country. The EC-130's will be destroyed in place.

The following is a chronological summary of the major events, 
possible problems and alternative courses of action available to the 
Joint Task Force Commander.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>CONSEQUENCES</th>
<th>DECISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/0800Z (0300 Est)</td>
<td>Decision to launch MC-130</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1000Z (0500 Est)</td>
<td>a. 5/MC-130, OK</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1115Z (0615 Est)</td>
<td>b. 4/MC-130, OK</td>
<td>Reduced fuel for Helo's (by #19575)</td>
<td>Require 19 operational bladders to complete mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1115Z (0615 Est)</td>
<td>c. 4/MC-130, OK</td>
<td>Insufficient fuel for Helo's</td>
<td>No go/Delay 24 hr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1150Z (0650 Est)</td>
<td>KC-135 Launch: 3 KC-135, OK</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1430Z (0930 Est)</td>
<td>3 KC-135, OK</td>
<td>Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling</td>
<td>Go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1430Z (0930 Est)</td>
<td>Helo launch a. 6/Helo, OK</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1430Z (0930 Est)</td>
<td>b. 5/Helo with no more than 1:00 delay</td>
<td>Max delay and still be able to reach hide out by daylight</td>
<td>Instruct MC-130 orbit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1430Z (0930 Est)</td>
<td>c. 5/Helo, OK by 1530Z</td>
<td>Would degrade equip and or personnel for &quot;Delta&quot;</td>
<td>Go degraded by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1645Z &amp; 2245Z (1145 &amp; 1745 Est)</td>
<td>MC-130 refuelings 4 successful</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Go, inform Helo's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1645Z &amp; 2245Z (1145 &amp; 1745 Est)</td>
<td>4 successful</td>
<td>Insufficient fuel for Helo's</td>
<td>-24 hr delay, Helo continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/Helo's</td>
<td>One of 1st 5 Helo's goes down en route before 250 NM point (mechanical failure)</td>
<td>Force is degraded; US personnel on the ground in Iran</td>
<td>-No go, recall Helo's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/Helo's</td>
<td>No. 6 Helo goes down before 250 NM point</td>
<td>Other 5 Helo's unable to make P/U due to force degradation</td>
<td>6th Helo acts as chase till 250 NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/Helo's</td>
<td>2 Helo's go down before 250 NM point</td>
<td>Beyond capability of No. 6 Helo to recover</td>
<td>All RTB-cycle one Helo to P/U survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/Helo's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All RTB-cycle required without a Helo's for...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TIME** | **ACTION** | **CONSEQUENCES** | **DECISION**
---|---|---|---
2/1810Z | Helo pass point of no return| None | Go
5 MC-130, OK | Reduced fuel for Helo's mission| Require 16 operational bladders to complete mission
4 MC-130, OK | Insufficient bladders to accomplish mission| No Go - Advise Helo to recover to cor. Advise NC-135 of refuel requirements
>4 MC-130, OK | None | Go

2/2248Z | Helo goes down after 250 KM point | Force is degraded; US personnel on the ground in Iran | Remaining four Helos land and pick up personnel and equipment
(Note: Helo should be able to proceed to refuel point single engine)

2/2248Z | Helo launch from refueling | None | Go
- On time | Spread "Delta" crew and equipment over 4 good helos. Probable rolling T/O
- 5 helo, OK | Would have to leave equipment and/or people
- 4 helo, OK | Go
- 3 helo, OK | - Go in degraded status

< Delay 1:00 to 2348 | Longest acceptable delay and reach hide out by first light | Go
> 1:00 Delay | Reduced force, troops on ground

2/ | Helo goes down between refueling point and drop off point (Note: Helo's will have limited single engine capability) | None | - Delay 24 hrs.
- About mission, spread 2 Helo load over remaining Helo's strip down return to ship (ship may have to close with the beech)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>CONSEQUENCES</th>
<th>DECISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/0124Z</td>
<td>Any major problem at the drop off point</td>
<td>&quot;Delta&quot; or a portion is unable to link up with agent</td>
<td>- Pick up 6454 and move out (Mission Point)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Leave &quot;Delta&quot; in clear pick as will move to hide out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/0145Z</td>
<td>Helo goes down en-route to hide out: 54 Helo, OK</td>
<td>Helo could be spotted</td>
<td>Will have to shift on the extraction. &quot;Delta&quot; must be notified on last</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Helo's arrive at hide out</td>
<td>Reduced capability for extraction</td>
<td>contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>CONSEQUENCES</td>
<td>DECISION</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31630Z</td>
<td>MC-130 launch</td>
<td>Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers (P/U, P/U)</td>
<td>GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 MC-130 OK</td>
<td></td>
<td>P/U only hostages + wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Direct gunship to launch and P/U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>some leftovers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>KC-130 launch</td>
<td>Insufficient fuel for 5 MC-130</td>
<td>Refuel at least 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 KC-135 OK</td>
<td></td>
<td>MC-130, more if possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>MC-130 refuel</td>
<td>Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers</td>
<td>GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;2 MC-130 OK</td>
<td></td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;2 MC-130 OK</td>
<td></td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32135Z</td>
<td>Helo lift off from hideout</td>
<td>Use extras (&gt;3) for CAS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 RH-53 OK</td>
<td>- Cycle Helo's from Manzariych to Embassy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;3 RH-53 OK</td>
<td>- Unable to land secure airfield</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Parachute Rangers onto airfield</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Wait for Delta Helo's to arrive to secure field &amp; clear R/W</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Use extra Helo's to provide</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Land Helo's until use other two for cover fire if needed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Cycle Helo's for extraction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32230Z</td>
<td>MC-130's arrive at Manzariych</td>
<td>Will have extra Helo's</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>find R/W blocked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Men required Helo's for extraction</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not sufficient Helo's for extraction</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>32230Z</td>
<td>Helo's land at Embassy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 RH-53 OK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 RH-53 OK</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 RH-53 OK</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>CONSEQUENCES</td>
<td>DECISION</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>322452</td>
<td>Extraction:</td>
<td>Normal operation</td>
<td>Go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;3 Helo's OK</td>
<td>Unable to extract all personnel</td>
<td>Cycle Helo's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>≤1 Helo OK</td>
<td>Unable to extract by Helo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zero Helo's OK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>323002</td>
<td>Helo's arrive at Manzariyech</td>
<td>All personnel can be extracted immediately on MC-130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;3 RH-53 OK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;3 RH-53 OK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;3 RH-53 w/5 MC-130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zero helo's OK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DELTA IS DISCOVERED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MISSION IS BLOWN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- MC-130's depart when loaded
- Launch loaded
- MC-130 plus 1 or 2 extra MC-130
- Keep all MC-130's ground till personnel arrive
- Launch two MC-130 for cover relay or for departure
- HAVE DELTA SET UP PRE ARRANGED RALLY POINTS. IF DISCOVERED DISPERSE. PROCEED TO RALLY PT. WHEN HELO LIFT OFF, DIRECT THEN APPROPRIATE PRZ ZONE
- ESTABLISH MANZARIYCH RALLY POINT, HELO 8 & 6 TO MANZARIYCH IF NO CONTACT WITH PEST
A brief listing of the subjects and dates of correspondence will provide the reader with an overview of the dialogue.

b. Memo to CJCS, 21 Jul 80, subj: Intelligence Support Schedule...provided schedule for establishing an effective in-country support structure to support the planning of simultaneous assaults against five separate locations.
5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bldg, Tehran Memo stated practically speaking, sixty days or more will (would) be required to establish the necessary structure, unless drastic measures are taken to upgrade the priority accorded this project by the... Memo closed with the following statement, "Recommend priority of intelligence support to SNOWBIRD be addressed at senior levels of DOD... Action...subject considered for discussion.  

c. Memo to CJCS, 23 Jul 80, Subj: Collection (Mission) Approval. ...Requested CJCS approval for... Action: OPSDEPS recommended against due to risk to source.  

d. Memo to CJCS, 23 Jul 80, subj: Authorization for Civilian Contact...Advised CJCS of proposals from Civilian Business person of willingness to assist in locating and freeing the hostages. Action: OPSDEP indicated proposal had merit but... not independently or directly from (by) DOD.
e. Memo to CJCS, 24 Jul 80, subj: SNOWBIRD Intelligence Review...Provided CJCS with summary of 23 Jul 80 meeting of JTF Executive Intelligence Review Group chaired by COMJTF. This was the first of a series of such review meetings to be held through December 1980. Attendees included reps from the following offices: CJCS, JCS/J3, DIA, COMJTF, JTF/J2 and High-lights: _____________________________________________________________________________________________

C

DOD assessment stated hostages were probably being detained in Tehran, at a minimum.

f. Memo to CJCS, 28 Jul 80, subj: Proposed Insertion of American into Iran...Advised CJCS & SECDEF that COMJTF would be request- ing approval for insertion to perform road & security reconnaissance. Action: OPSDEPS approved the concept for development as a formal proposal. On 7 Aug 80 Director, DIA, stated in a note to OPSDEPS that "from a policy standpoint

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he did not approve of the proposal unless carried out by DA acting as executive agent for clandestine OPS for SECDEF... Dir, DIA should be inserted...Based upon Dir, DIA, comments OPSDEPS and CJCS recommended...g. Memorandum to CJCS, 1 Aug 80, subj: PAO Policy Guidance: Hostage locations...Requested CJCS recommend to SECDEF he coordinate with SESTATE or NSC Staff to obtain approval of Policy Note to be circulated to all government departments which would provide PAO guidelines regarding statements to the press on hostage locations. Points to be made were: 

- USG continues to receive conflicting reports of unknown reliability,
- USG is concerned first and foremost with a resolution of the crisis and speedy safe return of the hostages.
- USG believes that continued speculation (particularly crediting "Official Sources" is counter-productive to the welfare of the hostages and may be restricting mail flow and other morale sustaining efforts to and from the hostages.
The OPSDEPS approved the suggestion and forwarded it to CJCS on 5 Aug 80. CJCS directed DJS discuss subject with Ambassador Komor. In note back to DJS Amb Komor stated he had discussed matter with Mr. Ross (DOD PAO) and noted Ross was dubious and indicated, "Statement we don't know is not entirely true., and

On 2 Sep 80 JTF summarized the above sequence of events and suggested based on Iranian use of US media that the matter be tabled at a NSC meeting. The correspondence never went forward.

h. Memo to Dir, DIA, 2 Sep 80, subj: Asset Approval...

Summarized the case for [redacted] USAINSCOM source whose [redacted] had been turned down previously (ref para c above). Request based on [redacted] fluidity of the situation, uncertainty of the technical collection programs, and the lack of an Action on this proposal was put in abeyance and follow up work was assumed by the [redacted] and USAINSCOM. Note: [redacted]
it appeared that sometimes it was more difficult to get our own organizations to cooperate than working against the enemy. CONWRP lead meeting with statement the key intelligence lead meetings and that JTF indicated reports regarding hostage location was incorrect.

Key elements of this source reporting regarding hostage

Memo for Record, 4 Sep 80, subj: (2nd) Executive Level Intelligence Review Meeting, 3 Sep 80. Attendees included representation from DIA, NSC, JCS, USA/ACSI and JCS/J3.
COMJTF raised the subject of the need for a governmental policy on official announcements regarding the need to agree to and NSC rep stated he would mention subject to National Security Advisor along with status of proposal during the course of his back brief on the meeting. NCS rep asked JTF/J2 opinion on what was needed to satisfy KIG. JTF/J2 realized a combination of reliable HUMINT reporting including agents as well as the employment of several of the technical collection efforts would be required.

Another subject that was raised by COMJTF was suggested development of mid-level inter-agency cooperative group to consider the full scope of psychological actions that could be employed to convince the Iranian power elite that it was counterproductive to detain the hostages. A clear opinion on composition of such a group was not reached. The only subject on the agenda that was not discussed was the proposal to conduct an air penetration reconnaissance mission to confirm useability of a potential insertion airhead.

j. Memo to Attendees, 12 Sep 80, subj: SNOWBIRD Operational Intelligence and In-country Mission Support Requirements. Provided a baseline of mission related intelligence requirements which were considered essential to effective planning and eventual mission success. For planning purposes an in-country
support structure to support six geographically separated targets was considered essential. Requirements were divided into five categories.

CAT I... In country support network

CAT II... Target Area Surveillance

CAT III... Mission Support measures

CAT IV... Post-Mission Support

CAT V... Airfield Data Collection

JTF/J2 had identified six facilities as actual or generic target (hostage detention) sites. These were:

a. Tehran ... MFA Bldg, Chancery,

b.

c.

Attendees at the meeting included DIA, JTF and the Copy of memorandum was provided

k. Memorandum For Record, 9 Oct 80, subj: Intell Review meeting #3 ..... Reps included NSC, DIA, CJCS, JCS/J3, USA/ACSI, JTF/J2 and COMJTF lead off meeting with review of training and operational concepts one of which involved
premission survey of clandestine landing site.

publicizing data on locations. JTF/J2 briefed on site of potential clandestine airhead and need to conduct survey.

provided overview of training and cover development indicating were fully coverable

1. Memorandum for Record, 12 Nov 80, subj: Minutes of 6 Nov Intell rev meeting (#4). COMJTF led off mtg with review of transition efforts indicating the turnover would take place no earlier than 15 Dec 80. reported coverable. Rumors of release of hostages regarded as nothing more than rumors.
subject of pressuring GOI for hostage accountability through Algerian diplomatic visit, publicizing mail denial, seeking medical conditions.

Memorandum for Record, 9 Dec 80, subj: Minutes of 9 Dec Intell review meeting. COMJTF led off mtg by indicating operational change of command to [redacted] anticipated on 15 Dec 80, however, the requirement to continue an active and aggressive intelligence effort is essential as the (rescue) mission has not changed. Based on HUMINT reporting concensus was that some, possibly all hostages, continue as of 6/7 Dec (DOI: HUMINT Observations: [redacted] Near term termination of situation was envisioned, however, [redacted]
n. On 15 Jan 81 message announcing date of 6th intell review meeting was disseminated with tentative date of 19 Jan 81 established. NOTE: Meeting was postponed to 21 Jan 81 and then cancelled due to release of hostages.
1. THE FOLLOWING MSG. REPLIES TO YOUR EEI REQUESTS AS CITED BELOW:
REF A. LTR//INTELL REQUIREMENTS//13NOV79
REF B. MSG//EEI UPDATE//141755R79
REF C. MSG//EEI UPDATE//151615R79
REF D. MSG//PASS TO //160745R79
REF E. MSG//PASS TO SENIOR INTEL REP//16223R79
REF F. MSG//BRIEFING REQUEST//190905R79
REF G. MSG//INTELL REQUIREMENTS//191705R79
REF H. MSG//REQUEST FOR//201200R79

2. REPLIES KEYED TO REFERENCE A:

PARA 2 MAPPING COVERAGE PROVIDED
PARA 3 WEATHER DATA PROVIDED
PARA 4 (-) ANALYSIS CONTINUING AND DATA PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE
PARA 4(PLUS) COLLECTION ONGOING DATA PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE
PARA 5 COLLECTION ONGOING, DATA FLOWING AS AVAILABLE
PARA 6 ESTIMATES PROVIDED, FULLER ANALYSIS BEING COMPILED.
PARA 7 E&E GRAPHIC BEING PREPARED, PHOTO MATERIAL PROVIDED

3. REPLIES KEYED TO REFERENCE B.

ITEM
1 HOSTAGE DATA PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE COLLECTION CONTINUES
2 ORDER OF BATTLE - GUARD FORCE DATA PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE
3 ORDER OF BATTLE-OUTSIDE DATA PROVIDED, UPDATES FORWARDED AS AVAILABLE
3 E&E DATA BEING SOUGHT AND DMA PREPARING TO PRODUCE E&E MAP OF INNER CITY ON DEMAND
4 COORDINATING THE ACTION
5 PHOTO/HUMINT SEARCH IN PROGRESS FOR INFIL/EXFIL DATA
6 DIVERSION/DECEPTION SPECIAL PLANS TEAM PREPARING SUPPORTING MEASURES
7 COMM DATA PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE-REGRETS ABLE CAPABILITY IS LIMITED
8 MATERIAL PROVIDED
9 WEATHER DATA PROVIDED ON CONTINUING BASIS

4. REPLIES KEYED TO REF C

PARA 1 UNABLE TO CONFIRM PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF RANGER COMPANIES, ALL INSTALLATION IS STILL ACTIVE.

PARA 2 - DATA HERE INDICATES F4/F5 ARE NOT LOADED WHILE ON ALERT, BUT REACTION TIME FOR ALERT AIRCRAFT IS 5-15 MINS. ORDNANCE RELIABILITY IS QUESTIONABLE.

PARA 3 - PERCEPTION OF STUDENT GUARDS IS PROBABLY THAT A US ASSAULT ON
ENLISTED PERSONNEL WERE BEING HELD IN CONSULATE الجزیره NOT THE OLD MARINE QUARTERS.

PARA 6. CHECK POINTS WITHIN THE CITY ARE FEW, RARELY FOUND ON MAJOR STREETS, HOWEVER STREET BARRICADES ARE ERRECTED AROUND THE EMBASSY AT NIGHT, ON THE MAIN STREETS ROOSEVELT, AND TAKHT-E-JAMSHID. THE NORMAL CHECKPOINT IS MAINTAINED BY 2-3 PASDARAN ARMED WITH G3 RIFLES, NORMALLY ONE STAYS FORWARD TO CHECK CREDENTIALS, A SECOND HOLDS BACK BEHIND THE BARRICADE WHILE A THIRD MAINTAINS AN DESCREETE DISTANCE.

PARA 7. WORKING ON THIS POSSIBILITY - ASSESSMENT IS THAT IT CAN BE DONE

PARA 8. SAME STATUS AS PARA 7
PARA 9. SAME STATUS AS PARA 7
PARA 10. SAME STATUS AS PARA 7
PARA 11. SAME STATUS AS PARA 7

5. REPLIES KEYED TO REF D

A//PARA 1/1
REACTION TIMES HAVE BEEN REVISED AND PROVIDED IN SEPARATE ESTIMATE. THEY ARE STILL ON THE SHORT TIME SIDE BUT IT WAS PREFERRED TO LEAN TO WORST CASE, BASED ON MAJOR DISTURBANCE WITH LOUD NOISE HEARD AT DISTANCES OF 2KM. FROM COMPOUND.

A//PARA 1/2 AGREE THAT MOST SPECIAL FORCES HAVE PROBABLY BEEN MOVED TO KURDESTAN AND QUOTE THE "RANGER COMPANY/IRG SPECIAL FORCES" ARE PROBABLY INDIVIDUALS DEADICATED TO THE IRG AND/OR KHOMEINI WHO HAVE ASSUMED THE ROLE OF "RANGERS/SF" WITHOUT THE ASSOCIATED TRAINING, HOWEVER THE ALLEGED UNITS STILL POSE A POTENTIAL REINFORCEMENT THREAT EQUAL TO TWO COMPANIES.

C/PARA 2 (SEE ABOVE)

D PARA 3//A// ARMOR UNIT DOES NOT EXIST AT W315485. HISTORICAL INDICATES ONLY MINOR MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES AND THE TOTAL NUMBER AT THE SERVICE AREA AND THE STORAGE AREA HAVE ALMOST ALWAYS BEEN CONSTANT, INDICATING A LOW OPERATIONAL LEVEL.

B. AIR ORDER BATTLE FOR TEHRAN AREA PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY. BEOHRAD MAINTAINS AIRCRAFT ON ALERT WITH HOT ORDNANCE. NORMAL ALERT WOULD BE 2/74'S. INTERCEPT CAPABILITY IS EXTREMELY LIMITED AT NIGHT AND WOULD BE COMPLICATED BY THE LOW LEVEL REQUIREMENT.

C. ARMOR CONCENTRATIONS - ANALYSIS OF CITY FAILED TO INDICATE ANY NEW INTRODUCTION OF ARMORED UNITS AND THE ACTIVITY OF THOSE LOCATED WITHIN CITY CONFINES INDICATES A QUESTIONABLE OPERATIONAL STATUS.

D. HAWK BATTERIES - TWO HAWK BATTERIES ARE DEPLOYED IN THE TEHRAN AREA AND IN THE PAST 30 DAYS, PHOTOGRAPHY CONFIRMED THE SITES BUT FAILED TO REVEAL ANY SIGNS OF MISSILES IN OR NEAR THE SITES.
REF E "SEE PARA E ABOVE"

REF F SUMMARIES AND UPDATES ARE PROVIDED AS DATA AND ANALYSIS BECOMES AVAILABLE - WORK UNDERWAY TO COMPILE A COMPREHENSIVE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT - EXPECTED COMPLETION IS 22 NOV 79. -- CRITICAL INFORMATION IS PASSED AS SOON AS RECEIVED. COMPLETE ASSESSMENT OF ALL EEl SUBMITTED BY "BEECHTREE". REGRET UNABLE TO PROVIDE BRIEF REQUESTED IN YOUR 190905R NOV 79

REF G PARA 1/2 - CURRENT LISTING OF OFFICIAL AMERICANS IN TEHRAN PROVIDED YOUR LOCATION 20 NOV 79 PHOTOGRAPHS WERE FORWARDED AS PROVIDED BY PARENT AGENCY/SERVICE

PARA 3 DATA ON TRAFFIC PATTERN REQUESTED FROM AGENCY OBSERVATIONS FILED TO DATE HAVE TYPICALLY BEEN DAY LIGHT AND NOT DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED W/EMBASSY. DATA WILL BE PROVIDED AS BECOMES AVAILABLE.

PARA 5 - DATA ON COMMISSARY REQUESTED FROM STATE VIA DIA

PARA 6 - DATA ON ACTIVITY IN QUARTERMASTER COMPOUND ADJACENT TO EMBASSY FORWARDED VIA COURIER 21 NOV 79

PARA 7 DATE REQUESTED FROM STATE/STATE ADVISED NO DATA AVAILABLE

REF H - FULL REQUEST PASSED TO DIA AND FOR ACTION. WILL PROVIDE AS DATA BECOMES AVAILABLE.

RW 21 NOV 79
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIA

SUBJECT: Project RICE BOWL Intelligence Support

Ref: DIA Memo U-026/JJS DTD 31 JAN 80

1. Concur with the procedures outlined in the reference.
   a. Access for key DIA personnel is authorized.
   b. Existing communications and support personnel including
      and NSA/CSS will remain in place.
   c. A JTF Operational Coordinating Element will remain in place
      and will contain a principal point of contact for all operational
      matters.

2. Once the JTF displaces, I will look to DIA to serve as the
   focal point for all intelligence judgements, analysis, and timely
   distribution of information related to the RICE BOWL mission.

James B. VAUGHN
MGEN
USA
COMMANDER, JTF
MEMORANDUM FOR MG VAUGHT

SUBJECT: DIA Intelligence Support During Deployment/Execution Phase of Project Rice Bowl

1. (S) The purpose of this memo is to outline DIA's general plan for intelligence support during the critical period when and if the JTF staff deploys to a forward area.

2. (S) All of DIA's resources will be available during the operation. To insure continuous, timely and well-coordinated intelligence support, however, DIA will dedicate key personnel solely to JTF support.

3. (S) A 24 hour intelligence cell will be established under the direction of LTC [redacted], USA. This cell will operate as the JTF J2 REAR and be responsible for insuring timely reporting, tailored specifically to the operation. The cell will be the intelligence focal point in the Pentagon and will monitor the reporting of...

4. (S) The DIA intelligence cell will prepare an especially tailored situation report (SITREP) for transmission to the JTF. The format and frequency of these reports will be developed by LTC [redacted] and LTC [redacted]. Additionally, significant intelligence will be transmitted as spot reports by the most expeditious means available. Also, the DIA cell will prepare and present briefings as required to the CJCS and his staff.

5. (S) In addition to the intelligence cell, a team of DIA Imagery Interpreters (II) will be dedicated to the operation. This team, using specially designed matrices, will provide... directly to the JTF.

6. (S) To insure a maximum support capability, it is requested that:

- [redacted] and three members (on each shift) of the DIA cell be authorized to operate out of the SOD Office.

Existing communications and communications personnel be maintained.
be requested to maintain present communications and liaison arrangements.

- DIA, through the DIA cell be kept fully abreast of the operational plan and changes thereto.

7. (U) Attached is the proposed composition of the DIA cell. LT( ) and the top three members of each team would operate out of the SOD office. The rest of the team members would report directly to LTC( ) from the DIA NMIC.

8. (U) Request any comments, clarifications and or your concurrence in the above outline be directed to Captain( ), DIA Liaison Officer.

1 Enclosure a/s

A.L. KELLN
RADM, USN
Deputy Director, DIA
DIA INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CELL

[Diagram showing the structure of the DIA Intelligence Support Cell with connections and roles labeled]

TEAM A
- IRAN ANALYST
- OB ANALYST
- ADMIN SPECIALIST
- II ANALYST
- WEATHER OFFICER

TEAM B
- IRAN ANALYST
- OB ANALYST
- ADMIN SPECIALIST
- II ANALYST
- WEATHER OFFICER
SUBJ: \[Redacted\] TRANC OPS

REF: \[Redacted\] TRAC 15194CZ FEE 67

INVESTIGATION BY EUROC WITH \[Redacted\] INDICATES \[Redacted\] HAS NOT BEEN TRAINING WITH A MOCK UP OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TERRAN ANY U.P.I.S REPORTING OF PRESS SPECCULATIONS AND DIPLOMATIC CHAT CHAT WITH NO BASIS IN FACT.

RECV O\[Redacted\] FEE 16
ST
\[Redacted\] 124289

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12255

CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 97

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDC NMC

\[Redacted\] TO SECRET

REVE ON 6A08

DERIVED FROM \[Redacted\] SOURCES
15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: THIS IIR SHOULD NOT RECEIVE FOREIGN DISSEMINATION SINCE SUCH DISSEMINATION COULD LEAD TO THE COMPROMISE OF THE COLLECTION ACTIVITY INVOLVED. DIRE. NO.

16. (C/NOFORN) SUMMARY: THIS IIR FORWARDS COMMENTS PROVIDED BY DIA PERTAINING TO A NEW HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONAL UNIT BEING TRAINED IN GE.

17. THROUGH 21. (C) OMITTED

252300Z FEB 80

FM: JTF/J2
TO: SFOD/S2

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE LOCATIONS

REF: (A) SFOD 252030Z FEB 80/SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION

(1) THIS MSG RESPONDS TO REF ALPHA.

(2) REFERNCE BRAVO STATED.

(3) DISCUSSION WITH SFOD REP AT THIS LOCATION 25 JAN INDICATED THAT SFOD MISSION PLANNING EMPHASIS WAS DIRECTED TO BASEMENT OF CHANCERY.

(4) SFOD REP WAS APPRAISED OF INFORMATION IN REF BRAVO AND PLACED SECURE CALL TO SFOD TO PASS ON DATA.

(5) THERE WAS NO INTENT BY JTF/J2 TO INDICATE THAT.

(6) JTF/J2 HAS PREPARED UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF HOSTAGE LOCATIONS WHICH WILL BE RELEASED AFTER OBTAINING APPROVAL OF COMJTF.

RECV 25 FEB 2010
SECRET

SUBJECT: SITUATION

(1) GENERAL: ON 4 NOVEMBER MEMBERS OF AN IRANIAN STUDENT GROUP SWARMED ONTO THE US EMBASSY COMPOUND AND TOOK THE EMBASSY EMPLOYEES CAPTIVE AND STATED THEY WOULD HOLD THE EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE UNTIL THE US RETURNED THE SHAH TO IRAN FOR TRIAL. THE TAKE OVER WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT FLOODSHEDE. APPROXIMATELY 62 AMERICAN AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF IRANIAN AND 3RD COUNTRY CITIZENS WERE INITIALLY HELD. SHORTLY AFTER THE TAKEOVER THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL WERE RELEASED. ON 19 NOVEMBER THE STUDENTS BEGAN TO RELEASE PERSONNEL WITH THE EXCEPTION OF "WHITE MALE CITIZENS", WHO ARE BEING HELD FOR TRIAL ON CHARGES OF ESPIONAGE. NO SPECIFIC DEADLINE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED HOWEVER THE "TRIALS" ARE LIKELY TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT 24 NOV AND CONTINUE FOR SEVERAL DAYS WITH SENTENCING LIKELY TO COINCIDE WITH OR TAKE PLACE SHORTLY AFTER 26-29 NOV. 79. THESE DATES ARE KEY RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS IN THE ISLAMIC SHIITE FAITH COMMEMORATING THE MARTYRDOM OF A HIGHLY VENERATED RELIGIOUS FIGURE.


THE COMPOUND IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5 KM WEST OF THE NEAREST AIRFIELD (DOSHAN TAPPEN AIR FORCE BASE). TWO OTHER AIRFIELDS ARE WITHIN 10 KM. GHALE-MORZGH, AN ARMY LIGHT AIRCRAFT HELICOPTER FIELD IS 8 KM SSW AND MENHABAD INTERNATIONAL 10 KM WSW. TEHRAN CITY IS A HIGHLY CONGESTED METROPOLIS DURING THE HOURS OF 0600-2300 DURING THE ISLAMIC WEEK AND UNTIL 0200 OR LATER ON THE ISLAMIC WEEKEND (THURSDAY/FRIDAY). WEATHER AT THIS TIME OF THE YEAR IS COMPAREABLE TO THE UNITED STATES WITH CLEAR CRISP DAYS FORECAST FOR THE 20-30 NOV PERIOD AND TEMPERATURES DROPPING TO 30-40 AT NIGHT.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 123555
CONDUCTED ON: 22 Jun 97
DERIVATIVE CL: NA
DECL: NA
REVIEW ON: DAE
RELEASED FROM: NA
3. ENEMY DISPOSITION: THE SITUATION IN THE COMPOUND HAS NOW SETTLED INTO A ROUTINE WITH DEMONSTRATIONS PERIODICALLY STAGED OUTSIDE THE CHANCELLORY GATE ON TAKTI-E-JAMSHID PLVD. CROWD SIZE VARIES FROM 50-75 CURIOSITY SEEKERS TO SEVERAL THOUSAND AT LUNCH/PRAYER TIME OR WHEN ANNOUNCEMENTS GO OUT VIA THE RADIO AND THE LOCAL PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM. SECURITY OF THE AREA IS PROVIDED BY GUARDS AT THE CHANCELLORY GATE, ANOTHER GROUP OF SOME STUDENTS ARE LOCATED IN THE CHANCELLORY BUILDING. SECURITY OF THE HOSTAGE AREAS IS MAINTAINED BY STUDENTS. INSIDE THE BUILDINGS THE STUDENTS CARRY PISTOLS, WHILE THOSE ON DUTY OUTSIDE THEY CARRY G3 RIFLES OR UZI SUBMACHINE GUNS. THE OVERALL COMPOUND MAY BE UNDER PROTECTIVE SURVEILLANCE FROM THE WINDOWS OF SEVERAL SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.

ANALYSIS OF ALL REPORTING INDICATES THE HOSTAGES MAY BE HELD IN

GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION IS ESTIMATED AS FOLLOWS WITH A DAY/NIGHT DUTY RATIO OF

THE PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES ARE LISTED BELOW WITH THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES FOR THE 0200-0400 TIME FRAME.

A. WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES - LOCAL IRG MILITA/PASDARAN
   50-100 FROM TWO NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS LESS THAN 1 KM SOUTH
   WITH NOMINAL STRENGTH OF 250.
B. WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES - LOCAL CROWDS 100-300 PLUS MILITIA
C. WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES - IRG STRIKE TEAM 150-200 (MOTORIZED)
D. WITHIN 30-45 MINUTES - IRG BACK-UP STRIKE FORCES
   1,000-1,500 AND LARGE CROWDS
E. WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES -IRG STRIKE FORCE RESIDUAL AND MPS 2,000-3,000

SECRET
4. HOSTILE COURSES OF ACTION: THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION ARE OPEN TO THE STUDENT CAPTORS AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD COMMAND.

(A) ELECT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES.

(B) ELECT TO KILL SOME OR ALL HOSTAGES.

(C) ESTABLISH DEADLINE FOR RETURN OF SHAH, DEMAND USG ADMIT THAT EMBASSY WAS "SPY NEST" AND RELEASE HOSTAGES IF SHAH WAS RETURNED.

(D) CONDUCT ESPIONAGE TRIALS AT COMPOUND, RELEASE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL, FIND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS AND SELECTED EMBASSY STAFF GUILTY OF SPYING AND SENTENCE TO LONG PRISON TERMS OR DEATH.

5. WHILE THE TERRORISTS ARE CAPABLE OF FOLLOWING ANY OF THESE COURSES OF ACTION, THE MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE HANDLING OF THE HOSTAGES SINCE THE TAKEOVER IS FOR THE STUDENTS TO CONDUCT ESPIONAGE TRIALS WITHIN 5-10 DAYS IN THE CHANCELLORY BUILDING, FIND SELECTED INDIVIDUALS GUILTY, FREE THOSE FOUND NOT GUILTY, TURN THE GUILTY OVER TO THE IRG FOR TRANSFER TO CASP PRISON FOR EXECUTION OF SENTENCE.

RVW 19NOV09
TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: CRITICAL DIMENSIONS

1. The following dimensions of the stadium east of the embassy compound were derived from
   and are the most accurate available and should be used as common reference by all concerned.

   A. Height of light towers 98.8 feet above the playing field
   B. Height of north score board 26.5 feet above the road
   C. Height of north wall 13.0 feet above the road
   D. Height of n wall extension 21.1 feet above the road
   E. Length of playing field 347.9 feet
   F. Width of playing field 233.8 feet
   G. Length of stadium 638.0 feet
   H. Width of stadium 463.6 feet
   I. O/A width of stadium 480.6 feet
   J. O/A length of practice fld 371.4 feet
   K. Width of practice field 240.3 feet
   L. Height of press box 35.4 feet above the road
   M. Max height of box (towers) 40.2 feet above the road
   N. Height of tennis court poles 30.0 feet
   O. Height of trees surrounding practice field 60.0 feet
   P. Height of soccer goal 8.2 feet
   Q. Height of multi story bldg 1332 feet s of stadium 341.0 feet
FOLLOWING INFO FROM FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW WITH AND CONDITIONS IN COMPOUND IN MAY 79. NOTE: THESE OBSERVATIONS ARE FROM SOURCE'S MEMORY ALONE, AND NOT FROM HARDCOPY RECORDS.

ACCORDING TO SOURCE, MARINES HAD FLACK JACKETS, AND IT IS POSSIBLE A SMALL QUANTITY OF OTHER BODY ARMOR WAS AVAILABLE IN THE COMPOUND.

THE APARTMENTS ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF BIJAN HAVE BARS ON THEIR NORTH WINDOWS.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON LIGHTING WITHIN COMPOUND:


B. THE AREA IMMEDIATELY INSIDE THE SOUTHEAST GATE IS WELL LIGHTED, BY A LIGHT ON A POLE ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE GATE AND POSSIBLY OTHER LIGHTS.

C. THE AMB AND DCM RESIDENCES ARE NOT ILLUMINATED BY DECORATIVE LIGHTS OR FLOODLIGHTS DIRECTED IN TOWARDS THE STRUCTURES. SUBJECT INTERVIEWED COULD NOT REMEMBER ANY LIGHTING WHICH DIFFERED FROM LAYOUT PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED.

D. GARDEN AREA AT NE CORNER OF COMPOUND RELATIVELY DARK; TENNIS COURT TO WEST OF GARDEN IS POTENTIALLY WELL-LIGHTED.

E. APARTMENTS WITHIN NORTH WALL ARE WELL LIGHTED. ALSO SOME LIGHTING AROUND POOL BETWEEN APARTMENTS AND WAREHOUSE. LIGHTS ON WAREHOUSE AT BOTH ENDS AND ALONG NORTH AND SOUTH SIDES.

F. SUBJECT REMEMBERS STREET TO NORTH OF CONSULATE AS POORLY LIGHTED; RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL LIGHTING (BELIEVED TO BE IN PLACE NOW) ON N SIDE OF CONSULATE.

G. SUBJECT RECALLS AREA AROUND STAFF COTTAGES AS POORLY LIGHTED WITH POSSIBLE 1M HIGH MUSHROOM LIGHTS ALONG WALK WEST OF COTTAGES.
MSG B 62
231010R DEC 79
FR W T
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NSTECKT

SUBJECT: SUPPLEMENT NUMBER 2

1. AMBASSADOR McHENRY SENT FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL DECEMBER 22.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON NOVEMBER 4, 1979, 63 AMERICANS AS WELL AS PERSONNEL OF OTHER NATIONALITIES WERE SEIZED WHEN A DISCIPLINED, ARMED GROUP OF DémonSTRATORS INVADE THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN TEHRAN. WHILE THIRTEEN OF THOSE CAPTURED HAVE BEEN RELEASED, AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, SEVEN WEEKS LATER, 50 AMERICANS REMAIN CAPTIVE.

ON NOVEMBER 25, 1979, SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM, INVOKING ARTICLE 99 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER TO REQUEST AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, DECLARED THE PRESENT CRISIS A SERIOUS THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

ON DECEMBER 4, 1979, THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED RESOLUTION 457 URGENTLY CALLING UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN IMMEDIATELY TO RELEASE THE PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY BEING HELD IN TEHRAN, PROVIDE THEM PROTECTION AND ALLOW THEM TO LEAVE IRAN. THIS RESOLUTION ALSO CALLED ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES TO SEEK A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS.

ON DECEMBER 15, 1979, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ISSUED AN ORDER CALLING FOR "THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE, WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTION," BY IRAN OF ALL AMERICANS HELD IN IRAN AND FOR THEIR SAFE DEPARTURE FROM IRAN."
SUBJECT: INTELL SUPPLEMENT

A. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH TOLD IRANIAN TELEVISION SUNDAY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HOPES TO FORM AN INTERNATIONAL PLANET "BEFORE CHRISTMAS" TO EXAMINE "THE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES." GHOTBZADEH ALSO SAID IRAN HAD NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO TRY THE 59 AMERICAN EMBASSY WORKERS HELD HOSTAGE BY ISLAMIC MILITANTS. "THEIR JUDGMENT IS A SECONDARY PROBLEM," HE SAID. HE ALSO SAID THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HOPED TO RECRUIT JUDGES, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FIGURES FOR THE "MISSION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE" THAT WILL LOOK INTO U.S. POLICIES IN IRAN. THE MUSLIM STUDENTS HOLDING THE HOSTAGES HAVE RULED OUT AN EARLY RELEASE; AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WHO ACTUALLY WILL DECIDE ON THIS ISSUE HAS ANNOUNCED HE HAS NO COMMENT FOR THE MOMENT.

B. REPORTS FROM RADIO STATION KANU IN LAWRENCE, KANSAS INDICATE TWO UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS PROFESSORS HAVE BEEN INVITED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH TO NOMINATE AN AMERICAN TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO INVESTIGATE THE SHAH'S CRIMES AND U.S. INTERVENTION IN IRAN. THE TWO K.U. PROFESSORS VISITED IRAN RECENTLY AS SPEAKERS FOR A GROUP CONCERNED ABOUT ENDING THE IRAN CRISIS. HOW THEY WILL RESPOND TO THE INVITATION IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME.

C. PRESIDENT CARTER REACTED CAUTIOUSLY TO GHOTBZADEH'S REMARKS ON ABC'S ISSUES AND ANSWERS YESTERDAY, TELLING REPORTERS "WE'RE NOT PLEASED WITH THE INTERVIEW. I THINK ACTION WOULD BE MORE INDICATIVE THAN WORDS." HE ALSO SAID HE HOPED THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH FROM THE UNITED STATES TO PANAMA WOULD BE A STEP TOWARDS THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THE PRESIDENT REPEATED THE US POSITION THAT ALL THE HOSTAGES MUST BE RELEASED BEFORE THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER ANSWERING IRANIAN CHARGES THAT IT AIDED THE SHAH AND WAS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS CRIMES. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES HAS NO QUARREL WITH IRAN, ADDING, "OUR LONG RANGE HOPE IS TO BE FRIENDS WITH THE PEOPLE OF IRAN BUT UNTIL THEY RELEASE THE HOSTAGES SUCH A RELATIONSHIP WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE."

D. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN, IN A SEPARATE TELEVISION INTERVIEW, SAID THE UNITED STATES WANTED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. "WE DO NOT WANT TO BE THE FIRST TO SHED BLOOD" HE SAID ON CBS-TV. BUT BROWN SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER ANY TRIALS OF THE HOSTAGES AS AN ESCALATION OF THE CRISIS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO AN APPROPRIATE U.S. RESPONSE. HE DID NOT ELABORATE.

E. IRANIAN AUTHORITIES TODAY ORDER THE EXCLUSION OF TWO CORRESPONDENTS OF TIME MAGAZINE FOR ALLEGED BIAS REPORTING OF THE US EMBASSY HOSTAGE CRISIS. THE EXCLUSION ORDER APPLIES TO TIME'S AMERICAN STAFFER BRUCE VON VOORST AND MALTESE ROLAND FLAMINI. SOME 5,000 DEMONSTRATORS YESTERDAY MARCHED THROUGH CENTRAL TEHRAN DEMANDING AN END TO ALLEGED LIASED REPORTING BY WHAT THEY CALLED ZIONIST AND IMPERIALIST NEWS AGENCIES AND BACKING THE EXPULSIONS SO FAR ORDERED BY THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE.

F. FBI REPORTS IRAN RADIO TODAY AS SAYING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS UNDER THE NEW IRANIAN CONSTITUTION WILL TAKE PLACE ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 25 AND THAT NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS WILL START ON FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1980. CHARGE LAIENGER CONFIRMS THAT THIS MORNING'S PAPERS IN TEHRAN ALSO CARRY THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

RWW 17DEC89
SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. THERE ARE FURTHER INDICATIONS OF THE GROWING POLITICAL STRUGGLE WITHIN IRAN'S RULING CIRCLE. FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER BANI SADR HAS APPEALED FOR THE RELEASE OF THE US HOSTAGES AND SAID THAT THE UN RESOLUTION PAVED THE WAY FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE HAS LAUNCHED A TRULY VEILED ATTACK ON GORBACHEV AND LECTURED THE STUDENTS IN THE EMBASSY.


3. IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GORBACHEV HAS LOST HIS POST AS HEAD OF NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION (IRI), WHICH HE HAD HELD SINCE MIDS-FEBRUARY. A BROADCAST COUNCIL IS TO MANAGE IRI. GORBACHEV HAS BEEN VERY CONTROVERSIAL IN THE PAST AND HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF USING IT TO FURTHER HIS OWN ENDS AND TO STIFLE DISSIDENT VIEWS. THE ACTION COMES AFTER A REPORT THAT THE NEWSPAPER SUPPORTING AYATOLLAH KHOMENI'S POLITICAL PARTY HAS ATTACKED GORBACHEV FOR BEING TOO HARDCORE CONCERNING THE RECENT RESOLUTION OF THE UK SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT TEHRAN RADIO MAY BE TAKING A MORE CONCILIATORY LINE, WITH A COMMENT TODAY THAT THE UN RESOLUTION HAS LEFT OPEN THE WAY FOR NEGOTIATIONS.


5. OVER THE PAST 24 HOURS, MILITARY ACTIVITY HAS INCREASED, PROBABLY IN CONTINUANCE RESPONSE TO WIDESPREAD PUBLIC SPECULATION THAT US FORCES WOULD ATTACK IRAN DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN DECEMBER.
FOREIGN OWNERS OF CARGO LINERS THAT NORMALLY DELIVER GOODS TO IRAN HAVE BEEN ASKED TO WITHDRAW FROM IRANIAN TRADE, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE SITUATION IN THE AREA. THEY MAY ALSO BE MOTIVATED BY THE AVAILABILITY OF CARGO FOR IRAN. IN ADDITION, INSURANCE RATES WERE QUADRUPLED ON WEDNESDAY AFTER UNITED STATES' NATIONAL UNDERWRITERS DECLARED IT UNWISDOM TO INSURE THE PERSIAN GULF WAR ZONE.

6. TWO OF THE IRANIAN LIGHT CARGO SHIPS ARE PROBABLY EXPERIENCING LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN LOADING THE SHIPMENTS OF THE MIDWAY. THE IRANIANS FORESIGHT TO SIMULATE A GREATER IRANIAN C-3 CAPABILITY THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY ASSESSED.

5. IRAN IS DEPENDENT ON WATER-BORNE FREIGHT FOR ABOUT 40,000 TONS OF GOODS A DAY. IRANIAN SHIPS COULD HANDLE AT PEAK CAPACITY 625,000 TONS OF CARGO IN A YEAR. SIMILARLY, IRANIAN SHIPS COULD CARRY 1,000,000 TONS OF CARGO AT THIS TIME. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER IRANIAN SHIPS COULD HANDLE THE CARGO FOR THE CARGO SHIPS THAT THEY'LL REPLACE. AS COMMERCIAL SHIPS AREhält ALIGNED WITH THE PERSIAN GULF, SOME COMMERCIAL SHIPS HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY IRANIAN SHIPS.

4. OVERLAND TRANSPORT LINKS HAVE A CAPACITY OF 800,000 TONS OR SO FOR 1984. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THESE ROUTES' HAVE A CAPACITY OF ABOUT 1,000,000 TONS FOR THE OFFICIAL TONNAGE. IRANIAN

3. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE IRAQI DEVELOPMENT FUND HAS SAID THAT IRAQ DOES NOT KNOW THE PRICE FOR 1984, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE A MINIMUM OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, WHICH MIGHT RISE. AS IRANIAN OIL PRODUCERS BELIEVE THAT THE MEASURES TO ACCEPT THE DOLLAR PAYMENT FOR OIL DO NOT MEET THEIR REQUIREMENTS.

2. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE IRAQI DEVELOPMENT FUND HAS SAID THAT IRAQ DOES NOT KNOW THE PRICE FOR 1984, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE A MINIMUM OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, WHICH MIGHT RISE. AS IRANIAN OIL PRODUCERS BELIEVE THAT THE MEASURES TO ACCEPT THE DOLLAR PAYMENT FOR OIL DO NOT MEET THEIR REQUIREMENTS.

1. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE IRAQI DEVELOPMENT FUND HAS SAID THAT IRAQ DOES NOT KNOW THE PRICE FOR 1984, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE A MINIMUM OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, WHICH MIGHT RISE. AS IRANIAN OIL PRODUCERS BELIEVE THAT THE MEASURES TO ACCEPT THE DOLLAR PAYMENT FOR OIL DO NOT MEET THEIR REQUIREMENTS.
A GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER, A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER, A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE ARE CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS KITTY HAWK (TG 70.2) TASK GROUP. WHILE A MINESWEEPER REMAINS WITH THE USS MIDWAY (TG 70.1) TASK GROUP. AN OILER, A NAVAL SUBORDINATED MERCHANT TANKER, AND A REFRIGERATED STORES SHIP ARE PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THESE UNITS. A PAIR OF IL-38/MAY ASW AIRCRAFT CONDUCTED RECONNAISSANCE OF BOTH TASK GROUPS ON 5 DEC. A LIGHT FRIGATE REMAINS IN THE WESTERN HULABAN AREA.

14. WEATHER FORECAST SUMMARY
(A) FORECAST FOR U.S. EAST COAST
6-8 DEC: CLOUDY SKIES WITH WARM MOST AIR MASS MOVING INTO AREA FROM GULF OF MEXICO AHEAD OF FRONTAL SYSTEM WINGING THROUGH MIDWEST, LOW CEILINGS, LIGHT TO MODERATE RAIN, REDUCED VISIBILITIES EXPECTED AS SYSTEM MOVES THROUGH REGION. TEMPERATURES WARMER THAN RECENT PAST FEW DAYS AS PREFRONTAL RAIN FALLS OVER AREA, THEN DROPPING BACK DOWN TO COLDER TEMPERATURES AFTER FRONTAL PASSAGE.
8-11 DEC: FIRST FRONT MOVES THROUGH AREA RAPIDLY FOLLOWED BY A SECOND FRONT WITH ASSOCIATED LOW CEILINGS, RAIN SHOWERS (POSSIBLE SNOWSHOWERS), GUSTY SURFACE WINDS AND LOWER TEMPERATURES. THIS SECOND FRONT WILL LINGER SLIGHTLY OVER EAST COAST MOVING OFFSHORE AT END OR PERIOD.

(B) FORECAST FOR SOUTHWEST U.S.A.
6-14 DEC: UPPER LEVEL RIDGE WILL CONTINUE TO DOMINATE THE DESERT REGION. ASSOCIATED SURFACE HIGH PRESSURE WILL GIVE GOOD VISIBILITIES IN THE DESERT EXCEPT NEAR POPULATED AREAS. SURFACE WINDS ARE INFLUENCED BY TOPOGRAPHY AND DIURNAL HEATING/C-cooling; CALM AT NIGHT, GUSTY IN THE AFTERNOON AT 10-15 KNOTS. UPPER LEVEL RIDGING PRODUCES CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES; HIGH LEVEL CLOUDS ASSOCIATED WITH jet STREAM.

(C) OUTLOOK FOR IRAN
6-7 DEC: SURFACE HIGH PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE TO DOMINATE REGION. SURFACE LOW PRESSURE CENTER MOVING INTO CASPIAN SEA HAS FRONT EXTENDING SOUTHWARD INTO NORTHERN IRAN WITH SCATTERED LOW AND MIDDLE LEVEL CLOUDS. NO SIGNIFICANT WEATHER EXPECTED IN IRAN. HIGH CLOUDS OVER SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL IRAN ASSOCIATED WITH UPPER LEVEL RIDGE.
7-15 DEC: UPPER LEVEL RIDGE AND SURFACE HIGH PRESSURE WILL DOMINATE DURING PERIOD KEEPING ALL FRONTS NORTH OF IRAN. BATTLE FOR DOMINANCE WILL BEGIN TOWARD END OF PERIOD FOR RETURN OF FRONTAL SYSTEMS AND ASSOCIATED BAD WEATHER.

RVW 0GDEC09
3. The task group 70.2, headed by the USS Kitty Hawk, may also be currently under surface surveillance by the Kynda Class Rocket Cruiser (RKR) 019 "Admiral Fokin." This group is accompanied by the Sam Kotlin Class Destroyer (EP) 783 "Vozruchenny" and the merchant tanker "Lenina."
MSG053
251153R NOV 79

FM JTF TO DELTA

SECRET

SUBJECT: WORKING PAPER [FOR DELTA]

1. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY TASK GROUP: COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE USS MIDWAY TASK GROUP REMAINS CONSTANT DURING THE LAST 24 HOURS. WITH A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE AND A MINE SWEeper (SUPPORTED BY AN OILER) REMAINING WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 15 NM OF THE TASK GROUP.

2. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE VICINITY OF THE SEYCHELLE ISLANDS: THERE ARE CURRENTLY NO SOVIET NAVAL/ASSOCIATED UNITS IN THE VICINITY OF THE SEYCHELLE ISLANDS. HOWEVER, A SOVIET-GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER AND AN AUXILIARY REMAIN IN THE VICINITY OF THE SEYCHELLE ISLANDS, WHILE AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIP AND AN AUXILIARY ARE TRANSITING NORTHERLY NORTH OF THE ISLANDS.

3. DISPOSITION OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES:

4. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE KITTY HAWK TASK GROUP: AT PRESENT NO SOVIET SURFACE UNITS ARE IN SURVEILLANCE OF THE KITTY HAWK TASK GROUP. HOWEVER, A GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER, A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER, AND A NAVAL ASSOCIATED MERCHANT TANKER ARE LOCATED AT THE NORTHERN APPROACHER OF THE MALACCA STRAIT AND MAY REMAIN THERE FOR THE KITTY HAWK TASK GROUP TRANSITING NORTHERLY IN THE CENTRAL MALACCA STRAIT.

[NOV 25 NOV 03]
A. AIRPORT

(1) PROCEDURES CLEARING OUT OF AIRPORT:
DO NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY MORE STRINGENT THAN OTHER TRIPS
MADE DURING JUNE/JULY 1979. REVOLUTIONARY GDS (RG)
ARE IN SUPERVISORY POSITIONS. HOWEVER, MOST OFFICIALS ARE /
REGULAR CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION OFFICERS SEEN PRIOR TO
REVOLUTION. MAINLY CONCENTRATING ON PAPERS, DOCUMENTS,
ANYTHING BURIED (E.G. BLUEPRINTS) OR ANYTHING WITH NUMBERS.
ENTIRE DOCUMENT PACKAGE CONFISCATED. HOWEVER,

THERE ARE 30 ROAD/VEHICLE CONTROLS ON WAY TO AIRPORT.
FIRST CONTROL IS INSIDE MAIN DEPARTURE HALL WHERE
PASSENGERS ARE CHECKED IN AIRLINES AND CHECKED
SUPERFICIALLY. PROCEEDING TO APPROPRIATE AIRLINE
COUNTER PASSENGER CHECK IN SPACE BY AIRLINE
PERSONNEL AND FINAL CARRY-ON PACKAGES CHECK BY RG
PERSONNEL. THEY PURPORT TO BE AIRLINE PERSONNEL BUT
ARE OBVIOUSLY NOT.

(2) NIGHT TIME AIRPORT LIGHTING:
FACILITIES ABOUT 12 MINUTES OUT (BY BUS) AIRPORT PADS,
AND SURROUNDING AREAS ARE VERY WELL SEEN (LIGHTED).
APPROACH TO TERMINAL, PARKING AREAS, précédent AND
IMMEDIATE VICINITY RUNWAY AREA ALSO WELL LIGHTEN. ALL
BELIEVE THE AIRPORT HAS GROUND POWER UNITS AVAILABLE
BUT DOES NOT RATE RELIABILITY FACTOR VERY HIGH.
GENERALLY, EQUIPMENT CONDITIONS ARE IN
STATE OF DETERIORATION THROUGHOUT COUNTRY.

(3) SECURITY: NO ARMY UNITS SEEN
ANYWHERE IN CITY AND VICINITY. RG AND OTHER CIVILIAN
GUARD ARE PERFORMING WHAT LITTLE POLICE FUNCTIONS
ARE STILL VISIBLE. TRAFFIC POLICE PRACTICALLY
PRESENCE—NO ONE PAYS ATTENTION TO THEIR DIRECTIONS.

5. ROADWAY FM AIRPORT TO CITY:

(1) ASPHALT PAVED (POOR CONDITION, NOT HOLED OR
RUTTED) FIVE LANE HIGHWAY (CIRCA 20 FT WIDE/TWO LANES EACH
DIRECTION) WITH BARRIERS PLANTED WITH
GROUPS AND TREES. HWY TRK TRF IS CAUSING DAMAGE TO SURFACE.

(2) TOM BEHIND 3645 THAN 9330
IRS 76 DAYS, OTHER TIMES GENERALLY DENSE BUT HIGH-
SPREAD MIXED TRAFFIC. (USUAL SPEED IS 50-60
MPH FOR CARS, BUSES, TNKS). MUCH OPEN TRAFFIC.
HOWEVER, COMMERCIAL TRF NOT ALLOWED EAST OF QUITE OLD
TOLL STATIONユAMOUNT ON TEHERAN-KARAJ HIGHWAY. SINCE
APPROX TWO YEARS INTERCHANGE ON TEHERAN-KARAJ HIGHWAY LEADING
OUT TO MOHAMMED ALI JAFARI ROAD (ROUTE FM CITY TO AIRPORT)
HAD BEEN CLOSED, FORMERLY FM CITY TO AIRPORT LEFT
HIGHWAY BEFORE REACHING MOHAMMED ALI JAFARI ROAD AND HAD TO
STOP FOR TRF BEFORE TURNING SOUTH ONTO MOHAMMED ALI JAFARI
ROAD TO PROCEED DIRECTION OF AIRPORT. TRF NOW CROSSES
OVER MOHAMMED ALI JAFARI ROAD AND EXISTS RIGHT, CIRCLES
DOWNTOWN WITH SOURCING TRF ON MOHAMMED ALI JAFARI
ROAD. DECREASED DRIVING TIME CIRCA TEN MINUTES IN PEAK
TRF TRAFFIC DOWNTOWN INTO HIGHWAY NORTHBOUND ON MOHAMMED
ALI JAFARI ROAD FROM AIRPORT TO CITY HAS NOT BEEN CHANGED.
IT IS SIMPLY A RIGHT-HAND ACCESS RAMP WITH MERGE ONTO HIGHWAY.
ROADWAY (HIGHWAY) IS CAPABLE OF CARRYING LARGE
TRAFFIC. ALL FORM OF VEHICULAR TRF, USUALLY DENSE.
(3) ROAD HIGHWAY LIGHTED VERY WELL FROM AIRPORT TO CITY SUBURBS. INGRESS INTO CITY (VIC AMEM) IS ON TARBLACK HIGHWAY, WHICH IS EXTENSION OF TEHERAN-KARAJ HIGHWAY IN NORTH EASTERN DIRECTION. ONE CAN EXIT AT FIRST SIGNAL LIGHT ON HIGHWAY, AND DRIVING EAST (PASS TWO SIGNAL LIGHTS) ENTER THE SOUTHBOUND VAKAK HIGHWAY WHICH EMPTIES OUT INTO KENNEDY TURNING EAST ON SHAH REZA (RLVD/SIC) ONE COMES INTO THE CITY APPROX TWO/THREE PROCELS SOUTH OF AMEM.

C. EMBASSY:

(1) CONDITIONS IN FRONT OF AMEM VARY WITH NUMBERS OF DEMONSTRATIONS TAKING PLACE. TARAK-E-JAMSHID (STREET) EXTENDS ALONG SOUTH OF AMEM COMPOUND. MAIN ENTRANCE IS ALSO LOCATED. THAT STREET IS MAIN THROUGHFARE AND NO POLICE TRY TO KEEP IT CLEAR. HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE DURING DEMOS. THERE SEEMS TO BE NO CYCLICAL FREQUENCY TO DEMOS. NON-CONSISTENTLY AVERAGE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS. AS TOLD BY AN LN (LOCAL NATIONAL) EMPLOYEE THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY OBSERVED BEGGS PASSING OUT MONEY TO PERSONS IF THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN DEMOS. AS CONCLUDES THAT THERE ARE THE FERVENT FEW AND THE PAID CROWDS. UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS (NO OR FEW DEMOS): AS REPORTED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PASS IN FRONT OF AMEM COMPOUND IN A VEHICLE. PASSENGERS WOULD PROBABLY BE SUBJECTED TO NECKLINS AND VERNAL ABUSE, BUT NO VIOLENCE. THERE WERE NO ROADBLOCS ON ROADWAYS LEADING INTO THE VICINITY OF THE AMEM AS OF 16-17 NOV 79.

(2) AS REPORTS THAT AMEM GRANDS HAVE STANDARD STREET LIGHTING IN FRONT, HOWEVER, THE SIDES AND BACK OF THE COMPOUND ARE POORLY LIGHTED.

AND REMARKED THAT THE AREA BETWEEN THE REAR (NORTH) OF THE MAIN EMBASSY BUILDINGS AND THE AMBASSADOR'S HOUSE WAS VERY DIMLY LIGHTED. HE COMPARED IT TO CENTRAL PARK.

(3) LIMITED AND INFREQUENT PERIPHERAL OBSERVATION DURING DAYTIME HOURS SINCE THE TAKEOVER BY BOTH A1 AND A2, REVEALED THAT THE INTERIOR PERIMETER OF THE AMEM COMPOUND APPEARED TO BE WELL GUARDED BY ARMED GUARDS WITH SPG & G3'S NO INFORMATION OF CONTROLS IN VICINITY OF AMEM ENTRANCE. HOWEVER, A2 RESPONDED THAT ANYONE RESEMBLING AN AMERICAN WOULD CERTAINLY BE STOPPED AND INVESTIGATED BY AMM BEFORE HE COULD GET CLOSE TO THE MAIN ENTRANCE. A1 OPINES THAT USE OF ANY MILITARY FORCE TO RELEASE HOSTAGES WOULD RESULT IN THEIR DEATH.

RVW 21 NOV 79
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

SECRET
SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0900 9 APRIL 1980

1. IN POLITICAL EVENTS, KHOMENI HAS CHARACTERIZED THE BREAKING OFF OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BY THE US AS A VICTORY FOR IRAN, SINCE THIS SHOWS "THE REELLING GOVERNMENT HAS LOST ALL HOPE OF CONTROLLING IRAN," REVOLUTIONARY COALITION SPOKESMAN, MABAKI, DECLARED A "SELF-TIGHTENING HOLY WAR" IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S EMBARGO, SAYING IT WOULD MEAN RATIONING OF CONSUMER GOODS, PUTTING A LIMIT ON SALARIES AND OVERTIME, AND CHARGING TAXES ON IMPORTS AND OTHERS WHO CAUSE DOMESTIC SHORTAGES. KHOMENI WILL ACTUALLY HAVE LITTLE OR NO AFFECT ON IRAN'S ECONOMY. HOWEVER, IRAN WILL PROBABLY BLAME MOST OF ITS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ON THE US EMBARGO.

2. KHOMENI, IN A MICROWAVE UNIT last night radiocast from the EMBASSY, called for "ALL INTELLIGENCE..." REPORTING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE US. IN A STATEMENT BROADCAST BY TEHRAN RADIO, THE MILITANTS CALLED FOR "IMMEDIATE ACTION" ON FRIDAY TO DEMONSTRATE IRANIAN UNITY IN THE EMERGENCY MEETING, THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING UNITY CROPS DILATORY IN THIS STATEMENT.

3. KHOMENI AND HIS SPOKESMAN DURING A TEHRAN RADIO INTERVIEW yesterday, accused Iran of FAILING MILITANTS. He also warned the CHERNOBYL-IRAN NUCLEAR WASTE TO BE TRANSURANIZED. He hinted that the US might take a more forceful role. KHOMENI also said Iran could act. KHOMENI said that Iran has the most to fear from domestic pressure.

4. KHOMENI also announced that KHOMENI HAD URGED THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO POSTION AN OBSERVER AT THE EMBASSY TO ENSURE THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. He gave no details on how fast this directive would be implemented.

5. IRAN LAST NIGHT RECEIVED ARGENTINA CARDINAL CAPPUCCI WHO PARTICIPATED IN A CEREMONY THAT WERE CONDUCTED FOR THE HOSTAGES.

6. A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT: "THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS THREATENED BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE FACT THAT NO SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IS IN EFFECT. IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT THE MARRIAGE ARRANGEMENTS JOURNEYED WITH ALL THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED. HOWEVER, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A REUNITED SETTLEMENT AND THE SAFE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES.

7. WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN JERRY POWELL TOLD REPORTERS yesterday THAT THE MEASURES TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL IF ADDITIONAL MEASURES INVOLVING EVEN GREATER RISKS FOR ALL THE HOSTAGES. POWELL CHARACTERIZED HIS REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE FURTHER ACTIONS AS A STATEMENT OF POLICY.

8. IRAN ANNOUNCED THEY OUSTING THEIR PROPAGANDA WAR AND APPEARING TO COLLISION COURSES. YESTERDAY IRANIAN PRESIDENT, FORGE, HAS ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTIONS TO ADVANCE ON BATTLE DIPLOMATIC SOURCES REPORTED TANGLED RELATIONS TO BE RESTORED TO SEVERAL Sectors, INCLUDING IRAN'S PERSIAN GULF

1. **Weather Analysis for the Middle East - April 1986**

   **Long-range Outlook for the Middle East Region**

   - **Cloudy skies over Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait**
   - **Poor visibility in western Saudi Arabia**
   - **Improvement in the eastern Mediterranean and parts of Iraq**

   - **Frontal System Advance**
     - **The frontal system is moving eastward**
     - **favorable conditions for improved visibility**

   - **Arid Conditions in the Western Mediterranean**

2. **Political Analysis**

   - **Iranian Parliament Could Free Hostages**
   - **Significant political developments in the region**

   - **International pressure on Iran**

3. **Economic Considerations**

   - **Impact of volatile oil prices on regional economies**

   - **Continued reliance on oil exports**

4. **Security Developments**

   - **Increased security measures in response to internal and external threats**

   - **Tension between Iran and neighboring countries**

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**Further Reading**

- **The Middle East - Political and Economic Considerations**
- **International Relations and Security**
- **Economic Outlook for the Region**
SITREP: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 EST, APRIL 10, 1980

1. THE FKG HAS INDIcATED IT WILL TAKE ACTION TO SUPPORT U.S. EFFORTS TO WIN THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. POSSIBLE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN -- AND THAT COULD BE TAKEN BY OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS -- ARE TO BE DISCUSSED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NINE DURING A MEETING, NOT UNTIL TODAY, IN LIsbon.

2. KYODO NEWS THIS MORNING REPORTS THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED IT WILL ALSO TAKE SUPPORTIVE MEASURES IN "PACIFIC" WILL INCLUDE LIMITATION EXPORTS TO IRAN TO PRESENT LEVEL, HOLDING OIL IMPORTS TO PRESENT LEVELS, AND ACCEPTING IRANIAN COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS FROM IRAN AND REFUSING FURTHER IRANIAN DEMANDS FOR OIL PRICE HIKES OR OTHER CONTRACTS.

3. IN AN IMPORTANT COMMENTARY, TENNAN RADIO YESTERDAY OCCUPIED A DEEPLY LEARY STANCE ON THE U.S. DECISION TO ESLAM DIPLOMATIC TIES. MOST OF THE BROADCAST WAS MADE UP WITH RACIALLY INJURIOUS AGAINST "SEVER THE RISES" FOR ATTENTION TO ILL ILL OF THE PEOPLE" TO THE EXTENT THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIVE POINT IT WAS THAT THE BAKR FURTHERED IRAN'S REAL INTENTS BY PUTTING SHALLOW DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES TO THREATS WERE MADE.


5. IRANIAN T.V. ALSO SHOWED A FILM OF ALLEGED SPY CONFINEMENTS, MANY OF WHICH IDENTITIES WERE NOT MADE CLEAR. IN THE FILM, THE HOSTAGE IS SAID TO TALK "ELECTRONIC MONITORING EQUIPMENT" WHILE THE OTHER MAN TALKS OF "AERIAL SPYING." THE SUGGEST SPECTACULAR THIS MAY BE A PRECURSOR TO HOSTAGE TRIALS.

6. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOULZADEH YESTERDAY TOOK A MODERATE LINE ON HIS MEETING WITH U.S. AND SAID HE PERSONALLY FAVOR UNIVERSAL K-OF HOSTAGE POSSIBILITIES TO VISIT THEM. THE MINISTER REPORTED THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE RELATIVE UNICATION WITH THE HOSTAGES. HOWEVER, THE UPI REPORT A MILITANT AT THE MEETING YESTERDAY AS SAYING "THERE IS NO NEED FOR OTHER PEOPLE TO VISIT." GHOULZADEH SAID YESTERDAY'S TRIALS ARE "OOF THE JACK."
3. On 9 March, a large blue station wagon was seen driving south on Roosevelt. Source spoke to 3 individuals in veh, who said they were "checking the spy West". Base appears to be the building on the road, previously noted as a large area. Route appears to be near by. There is no Roosevelt.

4. At station, the unarmed police were noted at Y-19, inside West Gate.

5. There is a U.S. Embassy building in Sharifabad. The old post, No. 1, 10-10, but it has been moved to a point south west of the U.S. Embassy, north of the road. (There is also a traffic police post right at the intersection, on the north side).
SECRET

SUBJECT: SATRAN EXTENSION (U)

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 130430/000001 TO 170430/240000:

FOR SITE POINT H 320035N 0310346W

FOR POINT Y.P.C. 330000N 1140000W

FOR E 302500N 0264000W

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 12SEP89
CONDUCTED ON 20JUN89
DECLASSIFIED 01SEP89
DECLARED (DOWNGRADED TO) INITIAL
REVIEW ON 09SEP89
DEEMED TO DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

NNNNA
SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN ON 20 APRIL 80

1. LOUISA KENNEDY TOLD REPORTERS THAT IN THE END THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD NOT BLOCK RELATIVES FROM GOING TO IRAN. SHE SAID THAT IF A FAMILY WANTED TO SUBJECT ITSELF TO THE PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF VISITING IT WOULD FACE FROM A SHORT VISIT, IT WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THAT PERSONAL DECISION. BUT SHE SAID THE MORE PROPAGANDA THE MILITANTS MIGHT GAIN FROM SUCH VISITS, THE LONGER THEY MIGHT KEEP THE HOSTAGES.

2. MRS. KENNEDY WAS SPEAKING AT A NEWS CONFERENCE AT WHICH SHE ANOUNCED A TRIP TO WESTERN EUROPE BY FOUR RELATIVES OF HOSTAGES ON 12 APRIL TO WIN PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT. THE FOUR WILL TRAVEL TO LONDON, PARIS, ROME AND LUXEMBOURG FROM APRIL 28 TO 29 IN HOPES OF MEETING NATIONAL LEADERS, REPORTERS AND MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC. "WE WANT THE EUROPEANS TO SUPPORT US; WE ARE OFFERING NO SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS," SHE SAID.

3. THE TRIP WILL BEGIN THE DAY AFTER EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET IN LUXEMBOURG THE DAY WESTERN EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEET TO DECIDE ON A COMMON POLICY. SHE SAID THE TRIP WAS FUNDING FROM PRIVATE DONATIONS. THE IDEA CAME FROM THE HOSTAGE FAMILIES THEMSELVES, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS NOT HELPING IN THE ORGANIZATION. FLAP AFTER ACTS AS LIAISON TO ALL 53 HOSTAGE FAMILIES, WAS TOTALLY INDEPENDENT FROM THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, SHE ADD.

4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, MOMENTUM IN FAVOR OF SOME ACTION AGAINST IRAN IS BUILDING WITHIN THE NINE-NATION EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, BUT THE OUTCOME OF THE EEC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG'S NEXT MONDAY AND TUESDAY IS STILL IMPOSSIBLE TO FORECAST. MUCH DEPENDS ON FRANCE, WHICH SO FAR HAS BEEN COOL TO THE IDEA OF BREAKING DIPLOMATIC AND TRADE RELATIONS. THE FINAL DECISION IS LIKELY TO BE MADE BY THE APRIL 27-28 EEC SUMMIT.

5. JAPAN HAS JOINED SOUTH KOREA AND PORTUGAL IN PLEDGING SUPPORT FOR US ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON IRAN. ON SATURDAY THE JAPANESE MILITARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY INSTRUCTED JAPANESE FIRMS NOT TO NEGOTIATE NEW TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH IRANIAN FIRMS, AND ON SUNDAY JAPAN ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD NOT PAY THE OIL PRICE HIKED FEES IMPORTED FROM IRAN. ALTHOUGH THESE MOVES ARE SLOW TO THE FULL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BEING IMPOSED BY THE US, THEY WERE SEEN BY THE IRANIANS AS HOSTILE ACTS. IRAN HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT WILL CUT OFF ALL FURTHER OIL SHIPMENTS TO JAPAN.

6. TEHRAN DAILY NEWSPAPER ANNOUNCED APRIL 19 THAT IT IS INSTALLING FOR PORTUGAL'S SPAIN IN TRADE RELATIONS WITH IRAN IN RESPONSE TO THE U.S. CALL FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. ALL IRANIAN OIL DELIVERED TO PORTUGAL WILL STOP. NO IRANIAN OIL SHIPS WILL VISIT PORTUGAL, AND IRANIAN OIL TO PORTUGAL WILL BE BLACKLISTED.

7. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC SIGNS INDICATE THAT TEHRAN PLANS WILL TAKE PLACE. THE MOST PROMINENT IRANIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, FOR EXAMPLE, LEFT LAST WEEK, LEAVING THE U.K. TO INTENSIFIES EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.
IMPERIALIST AND ANTI-REVOLUTIONARIES & CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN CLASHING WITH LEFTISTS AND HAVE EFFECTIVELY CLOSED DOWN UNIVERSITIES AND MAJOR INCIDENTS RECORDED OVER THE WEEKEND IN HAMMERER, TEHRAN, SARI, BANDAR ABBAS, AND KERMAN.


PRESS REPORTS FROM IRAN INDICATE THAT A MAJOR CONFRONTATION IS FORMING BETWEEN KURDS AND THE 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION AT SANANDAJ. ARMY TROOPS MOVING TO REINFORCE THE IRAN-IRAQ BORDER HAVE BEEN BLOCKED AT SANANDAJ BY KURDISH INSURGENTS AND FEARED THAT THE ARMY'S REAL MISSION WAS TO CRUSH THE KURDISH SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS. ON SATURDAY THE ARMY ISSUED AN APPEAL TO THE KURDS TO LET THEM PASS, THREATENING MASSIVE RETALIATION IF THE ARMY WAS NOT ALLOWED TO CARRY OUT ITS FUNCTION. THE SITUATION HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED AS OF THIS MORNING AND THE POTENTIAL FOR A SERIOUS OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE KURDS IS CONSIDERED TO BE HIGH.

ACCORDING TO TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE, TEHRAN NEWS PAPER HEADLINES PROCLAIM WITHOUT ELABORATION QUOTE "THE PENTAGON ANNOUNCES THAT A NAVAL BLOCKADE AGAINST IRAN WILL BEGIN THE NEAR FUTURE," AND "THE UNITED STATES IS IN THE PROCESS OF PLANTING MINES ON IRAN'S SOUTHERN BORDERS." UNQUOTE.

THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AREA.

THERE WILL BE NO MESSAGE TODAY DUE TO LACK OF ADEQUATE COVERAGE.
SHORT WEATHER ANALYSIS FOR MIDDLE EAST:

CLEAR SKIES AND EXTREMELY LOW PRESSURE OVER EASTERN PORTION OF MIDDLE EAST UNDER HIGH PRESSURE INFLUENCE. LOW PRESSURE CENTER MOVES INTO CENTRAL IRAN WITH STRONG WESTERLY WINDS AND HIGH LEVEL CLOUDS ASSOCIATED WITH FRONT ADVANCING OVER TURKEY, IRAQ, AND THE FRONTAL BOUNDARY PENS YUGOSLAVIA TO A SOUTHERN UTILITY. DUST TEMPERATURES OVER EGYPT AND SYRIA ARE ORDINARY WITH DUST LAST NIGHT SURFACE WINDS PRODUCING GLOOMY SKIES.

SHORT RANGE FORECAST FOR MIDDLE EAST: 29-30 APR 80

STORM SYSTEM SHOULD MOVES AT THROUGH TURKEY INTO SOUTHERN USSR-CASPITAN SEA REGION BY 22ND. FRONTAL BOUNDARY WILL TRAIL TO THE SOUTH ACROSS EGYPT THROUGH SYRIA AND IRAQ INTO NA IRAN BY 22ND. MEDIUM TO HIGH LEVEL CLOUDS SHOULD ADVANCE OVER HW 1/2 HW 23-24. EXPECT GUSTY SFC WINDS, LOW LEVEL TURBULENCE, AND FLOWING DUST/SAND ALONGFRONTAL BOUNDARY. A SECOND LOW PRESSURE CENTER IS EXPECTED TO DEVELOP OVER E TURKEY 21ST MOVING NE INTO USSR ALONG THE FRONTAL BOUNDARY BEHIND THE 1ST LOW. FRONTAL BOUNDARY WEAKENING WITH TIME. HIGH PRESSURE DOMINATES EASTERN PORTION OF MIDDLE EAST WITH HOT TEMPERATURES CLIMING.

LONG-RANGE OUTLOOK FOR MIDDLE EAST: 29-30 APR 80

UPPER ATMOSPHERE RINGS OVER EASTERN PORTION OF MIDDLE EAST TO MAINTAIN SURFACE HIGH PRESSURE OVER SAUDI ARABIA & IRAN. STORM SYSTEMS EXPECTED TO MIGRATE FROM CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN NW ACROSS TURKEY WITH TRAILING FRONTAL BOUNDARIES AFFECTING EGYPT, SYRIA, IRAQ, AND NA IRAN.

MIXTURE FORECAST FOR IRAN 2 AND PERSIAN GULF. IRAN SFC WINDS WESTERLY 5-15 KNOTS, ISOLATED GUST TO 25 KNOTS. NO TURBULENCE.

PERSIAN GULF: SFC TO 1500FT AGL WINDS SE-NW 5-15 KNOTS, NO TURBULENCE.

SITE ALPHA OBS-1000FT TEMP 128°F. WINDS SOUTHERLY 15-20 22KNOTS. PREVAILING VSVY 7-10 MILES IN 3 MILES BLOWING DUST. MAX MIN 19TH WAS 104/72°F AT SITE ALPHA.

SUNrise AT TEHERAN ON 19TH 64/52°F. WINDS 26/26/26 KNOTS.
9. In response to the continuing instability along the Iranian-Iraqi border, additional Army infantry and artillery battalions are being deployed to the southern portion of the frontiers. An armored brigade apparently is to be relocated to this region as well. The armed Iranian F-4s (PHANTOM II) fighters are to provide close support for Iranian tank-age vehicles between 20 and 24 April. Possibly in reaction to the Iranian naval exercise scheduled during that time.

10. Also probably in response to the heightened tension in Iranian-Iraqi relations as well as to the increased Iranian threat, the Iranian Army forces apparently have sited additional Iranian civilians. Information of early April indicates both the 3rd Army and Air Force are involved.

12. Soviet activity in Indian Ocean and South China.

As ship activity...
SECRET

SUBJECT: SOVIET/IRANIAN/OTHER VESSELS OPERATING IN THE NORTH ARABIAN SEA

1. (U) THIS IS THE UPDATE REPORT PREPARED AS OF 241500Z APRIL 1989. THE LATEST OR PROJECTED LOCATION OF ALL VESSELS IN THE SUBJECT AREA IS VEN.

IF A VESSEL HAS DEPARTED THE SUBJECT AREA SINCE THE FIRST REPORT IT HAS BEEN SO NOTED. ANY ADDITIONAL SIGHTINGS SINCE THE FIRST REPORT HAVE BEEN AD

IF FURTHER REPORTING IS DESIRED PLEASE RESPOND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT ANALYTICAL AND RESPONSE TIME.

2. (S) SOVIET NAVAL AND AUXILIARY VESSELS:

A. AGI PELENG/INTEL COLLECTOR/2211Z/06314Z/6MN IN TRAIL OF ABG ALP

B. NO OTHER SOVIET NAVAL OR AUXILIARY VESSELS IDENTIFIED IN THE AREA.

JUST OUTSIDE OF THE SUBJECT AREA A SOVIET PATROL FRIGATE WAS SIGHTED AT 2633Z/05325E/22162Z. ALSO SIGHTED/2203Z/05354E/22130Z.

3. (S) IRANIAN NAVAL - none sighted in subject area.

4. (S) OTHER NAVIES:

A. AL MARSHUR/FG/lH/26310Z/05311Z/FIXED/5,0K/24060Z/ VISUAL A-GE AIRCRAFT.

B. RATCHURIT/FG/lH/VIKTAYAKHER/FG/lH/22310Z/ 05311Z/0751/5K/22113Z APRIL 58/VISUAL A-GE AIRCRAFT. NO FURTHER SIGHTING.

C. GEORGES LEYBUTS/DD/FN/VICTOR SCHOLLER/FV/FN/2211Z/0636Z/ VISUAL EA-GE AIRCRAFT.

D. LA CHARENTE/MOR/FN/2211Z/0531Z/01Z/5K/23074Z/ VISUAL.

E. HAMBURG/BB/PK/DPTD MUSCAT 22 APRIL ENR KARACHI/OPBS IN NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA (ETA 25 APR).
3. (C) MERCHANT SHIPS - ALL PSW GIVEN ARE AN ESTIMATE OF THE PROJECTED LOCATION AS OF 241900Z BASED ON DEAD RECKONING.

A. ENERGY GROWTH/TKR/LI/2051N/06338E/315T/8.5K
B. ESSO BILBAO/TKR/LI/2608N/05529E/236T/16.9K
C. ESSO LANGUEDOC/TKR/FR/2055N/05909E/205T/17.0K
D. GUNVER CORD/BLK/LI/2334N/06102E/313T/13.7K
E. JAPAN WISTERIA/TKR/JA/2313N/06045E/314T/12.2K
F. LATIRUS/TKR/NL/2259N/06046E/315T/11.1K
G. PALACE TOKYO/TKR/JA/2128N/06332E/314T/10.7K
H. RYUYO MARU/TKR/JA/2149N/06230E/315T/16.1K
I. VANJA/TKR/NO/2338N/05831E/IN PORT MUSCAT.
J. WORLD SAGA/TKR/LI/2210N/06205E/315T/16.8K
K. KOMSOMOLETS Lенинграда/TKR/UR/24132/05603E/196T/17.0K

6. (C) OTHER SIGHTINGS: IF THE TIME OF INFORMATION RECEIVED WAS NOT CURRENT, ANALYTICAL DEAD RECKONING WAS USED TO PROJECT THE PROBABLE LOCATION AS OF 241900Z.

A. CORAGGIO/TKR/IT/IN ROUTE PORT IN PERSIAN GULF/241900Z
B. KOTA JASE/CBO/SW/IN PORT IN PERSIAN GULF/2419000Z.
C. KRYM/TKR/UR/OUT OF SUBJECT AREA HEADING SE/241900Z.
D. ESSO BILBAO/TKR/LI/2625N/05600E/235T/14.0K/241900Z
E. TOKUYAMA MARU/TKR/JA/2518N/05758E/260T/4.0K/241900Z.
Situation in Iran as of 0530 EST, April 27, 1980

Movement of Hostages and Threat of Trial

In a statement broadcast today by Tehran Radio, the student militants declared that they have decided to move the hostages to various cities in Iran. One city to which some of the hostages are to be transferred is Qom, according to the statement. The students added "several of the students stationed in the den of espionage will accompany these hostages to guard them. And we ask our brothers of the Revolution Guards corps to keep the security of the place around where they live."

The militants in their statement also renewed their threat to try the hostages and announced that "if America refuses to return the traitorous Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his plundered wealth to the brave nation of Iran, we can put this mother of corruption of the century on trial by trying the spy hostages."

In his press conference today, President Bani-Sadr is reported to have said that the hostages have already been moved out of the Embassy compound. Bani-Sadr is quoted as saying that the hostages were moved "in order to be prepared for the probable attacks that may occur in the future and so that the students do not have to take measures that we are not willing to have happen." This is an apparent reference to student threats that the hostages would be killed if the United States attempted a second rescue mission.

Further Iranian Reaction to the Rescue Mission

According to FBIS reports, Iranians were called upon to climb onto their roofs last night and chant "Allah O Akhbar" (God is great) for 10 minutes to celebrate the abortive rescue mission.

There are reports that also last night Iran television showed the first film of the landing site of the airborne rescue mission. The film showed the process of the C-130 transport, the helicopter, the bodies of six U.S. commandos, and bundles of dollar bills and Iranian currency reportedly found at the scene."

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS 4/27/86
Iranian security forces are reported to be on alert in the region 250 miles southeast of Tehran, in an effort to seek out any of the U.S. force still in Iranian territory. According to Reuter, gendarmes and Revolutionary Guards are spread out in an area 50 miles from the landing site searching for the U.S. commandos that they insist are hiding. The landing site and surrounding areas have been sealed off to all but security forces.

In an interview broadcast yesterday by Tehran Radio, General Bagheri, Iranian Air Force Commander, denied that Iranian jets had chased U.S. aircraft and shot some down. Bagheri added that two helicopters used in the rescue mission were destroyed by the Iranian military planes, leaving three helicopters intact.

Return of Dead in Rescue Mission to U.S.

Bani-Sadr is quoted in press reports as saying that the bodies of the eight members of the rescue team who perished in the mission will be returned to the U.S. "with no conditions attached." "Diplomatic sources" are reported as saying that the bodies are now in the town of Tabas, near the landing site of the rescue mission and will be handed over to the Swiss Embassy, now representing U.S. interests in Iran.

Arrival of Injured Members of Rescue Team in U.S.

Five servicemen injured in the abortive rescue mission arrived at Kelly Air Force Base in Texas yesterday. The four most seriously injured were to be taken to Brooke Army Medical Center at Fort Sam Houston, site of the well-known burn treatment center. The fifth man was to be taken to the Air Force hospital located at Lackland Air Force Base. The five arrived earlier at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey and were reported conscious and in good spirits during the 2-hour layover there.

Iranian Reaction to EC Measures

The measures decided by EC foreign ministers at Luxembourg by far have received a low key reaction in Tehran. There have been no specific comments from official sources on the measures and the media has concentrated on other subjects. Still, there has been some tendency in the press to focus on the U.K. as the primary force behind the EC acti

Late Item: Transfer of the Hostages

According to today's edition of the Israeli evening paper Ma'ariv, the 50 hostages have been transferred to Qom. The newspaper's source is a militant on guard at the Embassy compound in Tehran.
SECRET

MEMORANDUM

To: Rock

Date: 7 April 80

Subject:

Col (7) ASCI DA

Warm message from JTF to: ACSI DA (DAKI-JIH)

Support is required to enhance intel support to JTF and request

Col [redacted] meets w/USAF 5 P.M. of 8 April. Told me to let you know.
Set it up through already established contacts.
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: INSOC

TITLE: NON-RELEASE OF U.S. HOSTAGES (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT

ORIGINATORS COMMENT: THIS REPORT FROM NFN INDICATED THAT THE HOSTAGES RELEASE WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE. (NOTE: SUBSEQUENT REPORTING STATED THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS NOT CORRECTLY VERIFIED PRIOR TO AGENT'S REPORTING)

SOURCE: NFN 240317 IS

INSTRUCTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT
DAM - IS
Room 23840
DOD HUMINT
BG FLYNN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED COPY OF

SECRET

Declassified On

DIA 1976

SECRET

SECRET
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: THIS IS THE FIRST REPORT FROM NFN 240317 THAT INDICATES A DEFINITE DATE FOR RELEASE OF U.S. HOSTAGES.

SOURCE: NFN 240317 IS A

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to:

SECRET

Declassified SSA

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED: 12 MAY 1997
CLASSIFIED BY: BG FLYNN
DECLASSIFIED BY: SSA
SECRET

DATE: 12 JANUARY 1983

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: DISCOM

TITLE: LOCATION OF US HOSTAGES (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
SEE ATTACHED REPORT

ORIGINATORS COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST REPORT FROM NFI 240317,

SOURCE: NFI 240317 IS

CLASSIFICATION REVISED 13 JUNE 1983

RECIPIENT: DOD/DIA

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy To: DOD/HUMINT

2 Cy To: DOD HUMINT

Department of Defense

Declassified On:

Classified By:

Declassified On:
This is an information report not finally evaluated intelligence.

This report details the following:

[Redacted text]

This latest report by REN 240317 is consistent with NFMs previous 1980 reporting on...

[Redacted text]

Distribution: Exclusive
1 Cy to: ADF/PS - HUMINT
       DAMI - ISIT
       Room 2C840
       DOD HUMINT
       DG FLYNN

Classified by: DIA/ODAPR
Declassified on: 

[Redacted text]
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGI NATED BY: INS COM

TITLE: US HOSTAGE SITUATION - UPDATE (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SUMMARY OF REPORT: See Attached Report

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

SOURCE: NFN 240317 is

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT
DANI - ISH
Room 2C840
DOD HUMINT
BG FLYNN

Classified By: OMDR
Declassified ON:

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SECRET
REPORT NAME/NUMBER:  NSN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:  INSCOM

TITLE:  U.S. HOSTAGE SITUATION - UPDATE (U)

DOI:  4 JAN 81

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGIATORS COMMENT:  THIS LATEST REPORT BY NSN 240317 IS CONSISTENT WITH NSN'S PREVIOUS 1980 REPORTING.

SOURCE:  NSN 240317 IS

DISTRIBUTION:  EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to:  NSN 240317

SECRET

Classified By:  DIA

Declassified ON:  OADR
SUBJ: LOCATION INFORMATION (U)

REF: WDC/J2 CITE 6518016 6517382 JAN 1981/SAB

[Redacted]

THE FOLLOWING DATA IS HÄRDÖPY TRANSCRIPT OF FULL REPORTING SITED IN REFERENCE.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC $522 TEMP SECRET LINDIS

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC $522 TEMP SECRET LINDIS

REVW 07 JAN 01
BT 0522

NNNN

SECRET
SUBJ: SOURCE REPORTING

1. (DO) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES INFORMATION FROM DOD (ARMY) SOURCE.
   REPORT CONTAINS DATA WITH
   
   2. (U) COMPLETE TEXT OF REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED UPON RECEIPT.

REV 07 JAN 01
SI

NNNN
SECRET NOFORN

DATE: 2 January 1981

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCON

TITLE: US HOSTAGE SITUATION - UPDATE (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
(SEE ATTACHED)

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS CONCERN: NONE

SOURCE: NFN 240317 IS AN IRANIAN NATIONAL WHO HAS REPORTED RELIABLY ON IRAN SINCE APRIL 1980.

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE
1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT
DAHI - ISH
Room 2C840
HQD HUMINT
DC FYNN

CLASSIFICATION REMOVED 12/95
RECLASSIFIED U S Declassified by: DIA NMEC
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[Signature]
Declassified On:

SECRET
SUBJECT: SOURCE REPORTING

1. (CI 

(FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PROVIDED BY DOD (ARMY) 

SOURCE: 240517 ON DATES INDICATED
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

**SUMMARY OF REPORT:**

This report details info concerning U.S. hostages.

**ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS:**

None - see report.

**SOURCE:**

NFN 240317 is an...

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Exclusive

1 Cy to:
ADSOPS - HUMINT

DAMIS - ISU

100oor 20840

DOD HUMINT

BG FLYNN

Classified By: DIA

Declassified On: OAR

SECRET
SUBJ: INFORMATION REPORT

US THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM DOD (ARMY) SOURCE MFN 240317 WITH DOI OF 17 DEC 80

A: REF: PREVIOUS 317 REPORT OF

ABOVE

B: SOURCE 317 ALSO REPORTED THAT

--- REDACTED ---

NOTE #1 PREPARATIONS FOR THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY WAS REPORTED BY DOD 240434 ON 2 NOV 80.

NOTE #2 THIS OFFICE HAS SPECULATED PREPARATIONS FOR SOME TYPE OF MEDIA EFFORT WERE UNDERWAY IN THE 2ND/3RD OF SEPTEMBER 1980, WHEN THE MAJLIS WERE ACTIVELY DISCUSSING THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.

REVW 19 DEC 80
BT
#2480
18 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Hostage Trials

The inclosed reports were received from US Army source NFN 240317 (Pencil)

TAB A is a summary. TAB B is the full report. Both have been forwarded to DIA,

RICHARD V. SECORD
Major General, USAF

Attachments
a/s
SOD SUMMARY SHEET

TO: CJCS

CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret

SOD CONTROL NUMBER

ACTION

APPROVAL SIGNATURE INFORMATION OTHER

XX

SUBJECT: Hostage Trials

REMARKS

In closed reports received from US Army source 240317 (Pencil).

TAB A is a summary. TAB B is the full report. Both have been forwarded to DIA,

ACTION OFFICER: LtCol, USAF

SOD, J-3

X55078

DATE OF PREPARATION: 17 Sep 80
REPORT NAME/HUMBER: JBNF 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: INSCON

TITLE: H.C. HOSTAGE TRIALS

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

SOURCE: JBNF 240317, WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND HAS REPORTED FAMILIAR IN THE PAST, FROM JBNF 240447, WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN UNEPHEMED.

EXECUTION:
Attached memorandum provides summary of events regarding the past use of Army Source 240317 (PENCIL ONE) and requests approval of Intelligence Policy Review Council to

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DATE OF PREPARATION
2 Sep 80
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Asset Approval, Comments Reply

Ref: JCS memorandum, subject: Asset Approval, dtd 2 Sep 80

1. (TS) Reference memorandum for Director, DIA requested approval to allocate or to support the operation.

2. (TS) This correspondence provides reply to Director, DIA comments of 2 September regarding above.

3. (S) A meeting between Army representative COL detailed to as MG Thompson's executive agent, is scheduled for Friday 5 September. The purpose of the meeting is to resolve questions concerning 240317's and future operational utilization.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, US Army

Attachment
5. **TOP SECRET** Given the fluidity of the situation, the uncertainty of the technical collection programs, recommend that the Senior Intelligence Review Committee:

a. Approve the ___ and

b. Allocate ___ to INSCOM from DIA Intelligence Contingency funds to support the operation.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

1. What would be mission of 240317?

2. DIA has no contingency funds available to support.

3. ___
15 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Hostage Trials;

This data was provided to you on 8 August.

3. Source 240317 has provided apparently credible information in the past, portions of which have been corroborated.

RICHARD V. SECORD
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF
SECRET

C RUEAMF
DE RUEIZJC #0272 2211745
ZNY TTTTT
O 281742Z AUG 86
FM JCS/SNOWBIRDZC
TO
BT

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE TRIALS

ON 2 AUG, THIS OFFICE WAS ADVISED BY SECURE PHONE FROM
OF THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

凭据 ARMY SOURCE 240317

REV 28 AUG 86
BT
#0272

VIN

SECRET
MEMORANDUM

TO: CJCS

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

SOD CONTROL NUMBER: 

SUBJECT: Hostage Trials:

REMARKS

Memorandum summarizes information from HUMINT source concerning hostages.

ACTION OFFICER

LT COL, USAF
J-3, SOD
X-55078

INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL

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DATE OF PREPARATION

15 AUG 1980
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAIL

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT WAS OBTAINED ONLY

SOURCE: SOURCE NFW 240317, WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, HAS REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST.

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CENSUS CAR (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCOM

TITLE: POSSIBLE TRIAL OF US HOSTAGES DURING AUGUST 1980 (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAIL (SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

SOURCE: SOURCE 240317, WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, HAS REPORTED FACTUALLY IN THE PAST.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 12/23/76
CONDUCTED ON 12/23/76
DERIVATIVE IS BY [REDACTED]
□ REV. FROM TO [REDACTED]
REVIEWED [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CENSUS CAR (D)-II

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: ATISCOO

TITLE: Trial of U.S. Hostages (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: This report details the prosecution of three Iranians in the U.S. Hostages in Tehran.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: None.

SOURCE: SOURCE 240317, who has reported directly to INTELL.

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.
SECRET

VZCZCDVA411
00/RUEAIIF
DE/RIEIZJC 60191 1791910
ZNY TTTT
0 271905Z JUN 80
FM JTF/SHO-LIRU/J2
TO
BT
CITE J3 0191

SUBJECT: SOURCE EVALUATION

REF: CENSUS C4R REPORTING

1. ALTHOUGH A REVIEW OF

A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE THREE
SUBSTANTIVE REPORTS FROM PENCIL ONE DEBRIEFING SESSIONS
REVEALED SOME DATA WHICH PUTS SOME ASPECTS OF SOURCE'S
CLAIMED ACCESS IN QUESTION.

2. BRIEF LISTING OF THESE ITEMS FOLLOWS:

(A) USE OF EVIN PRISON TO HOLD HOSTAGES IS INCORRECT WITH
PREVIOUS FACTS, BUT CONSISTENT WITH OTHER NEWS
CIRCULATED IN THE PAST.

(B) EXTENSIVE REFERENCES BY SOURCE
IS NOT CONSISTENT
WITH PREVIOUS SECURITY PROCEDURES.

(C)

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0151

(E) SOURCE REPORT
IS NOT SUBSTANTIATED
BY ANOTHER SOURCE OF GREATER CREDIBILITY.

(F) SOURCE'S M04IFICATION OF
SOURCE'S CREDIBILITY.

(G)

(H)

SECRET
Page 4. Review 6/21

After reviewing all reports, it appears that:

1. Source 6419 is reliable.
2. Source 6419's report is more factual than reports from the other sources.
3. The sequence of events as stated is difficult to accept.
4. Summarized, believe that with proper mission fulfillment.

Although source 6419's report is not unusual to hear, small arms fire at night is unusual. Also, the compound was not a nightly target.

Page 4. Review 6/21

After reviewing all reports, it appears that:

1. Source 6419 is reliable.
2. Source 6419's report is more factual than reports from the other sources.
3. The sequence of events as stated is difficult to accept.
4. Summarized, believe that with proper mission fulfillment.

Although source 6419's report is not unusual to hear, small arms fire at night is unusual. Also, the compound was not a nightly target.
MEMORANDUM FOR USAOG, DET A

Info: [Redacted]

Subject: Source Evaluation

Ref: Census Car Reporting

1. Although a review of a detailed analysis of the three substantive reports from Pencil One debriefing sessions relieved some data which puts some aspects of source's claimed access in question.

2. Brief listing of these items follows:

(a) Use of EVIN PRISON to hold hostages is inconsistent with previous facts, but consistent with street rumors circulated in the past.

(b) Extensive references by [Redacted] is not consistent with previous security procedures.

(e) Source reporting of [Redacted] is not substantiated by another source of greater credibility.

(f) Source's misidentification of [Redacted] undermine source's credibility.

(g)

(h)

(i)

TOP SECRET

[Redacted]
(1) Source's comment that its compound it seems exaggerated and based on street rumors vat facts as reports from reliable observers indicate that although it was not unusual to hear small arms fire at night.

(m) Although source's claim cannot be repudiated the sequence of events as stated is difficult to accept.

3. After reviewing all reports, it appears that it also appears that his reporting of the situation prior to the rescue attempt was more factual than reporting after the attempt. Perhaps the source in his effort to provide a complete story incorporated everything he saw, read, or heard into his debriefing.

4. In summary, believe that with proper mission briefing source could provide useful hostage related data.

[Signature]

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Collection Approval

1. (TS) This memorandum requests CJCS approval of

2. (TS) The source has provided apparently credible but unverifiable information concerning

3. (TS) Total cost is estimated at —— with —— deposited to a ——. The balance will be held in the —— and will be used only if essential. The individual will receive help

4. (TS) Based upon —— approval to

ROD WARSHALL COL. USA for

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

To Jim Vaught
return formy concurrence

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: DADR
SUBJECT: SATURDAY EXTENSION (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 21/04/92 TO 24/04/92 FOR SITE 718665.172248CE

2. [Redacted]

MESSAGE (3) RECEIVED.

NO EOM.
MSG 125
240535Z APR 80
FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: ALPHA/J2
BT

TOP SECRET

SUBJ: SOV NAVAL ACTIVITY
REF: UR 221700Z APR 80, SAB

1. PER UR REQUEST THIS IS FIRST OF 2 REPORTS CONTAINING INFO AS OUTLINED IN UR PARA 3.

2. THIS IS THE BASELINE REPORT PREPARED AS OF 240500Z APRIL 1980. AN UPDATE REPORT WILL BE PUBLISHED AS OF 241400Z APRIL 80. GENERAL FORMAT AS FOLLOWS: NAME OF VESSEL; TYPE OF VESSEL; NATIONALITY; LOCATION; HEADING; SPEED; TIME OF INFORMATION; AND HOW ACQUIRED IF KNOWN.

3. SOVIET NAVAL AND AUXILIARY VESSELS:

   A. AGI PELENG/INTEL COLLECTOR/2213N/06314E/030T/10.0K/232000Z/RADAR.

   B. NO OTHER SOVIET NAVAL OR AUXILIARY VESSELS IDENTIFIED IN THE AREA. JUST OUTSIDE OF THE SUBJECT AREA A SOVIET PATROL FRIGATE WAS SIGHTED AT 2630N/05630E/221400Z. ALSO STOROZHVOY/FFG WAS ID NORTH OF SOCOTRA 1437N/5356E/231828Z.

4. IRANIAN NAVAL - NONE SIGHTED IN SUBJECT AREA.

5. OTHER NAVIES:

   A. AL MANSUR/PTG/MU/2419N/05803E/330T/10K/221028Z APRIL 80/VISUAL A-6E AIRCRAFT.

   B. RATCHARIT/PTG/TH/WITHAYAKHUM/PTG/TH/UDOMET/PTG/TH/2351N/06002E/078T/28K/221138Z APRIL 80/VISUAL A-6E AIRCRAFT.

   C. GEORGES LEYGUES/DD/FR/VICTOR SCHOELCHER/FF/FR/2211N/06301E/305T/12K/230730Z/VISUAL EA-6B AIRCRAFT.

   D. LA CHARENTE/AOR/FR/2021N/05912E/010T/12K/230745Z/VISUAL
SUBJ: TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE REPORTING

REF: CUR MSG 201332Z APR 80

1. THE CREDIBILITY OF REPORTING FROM TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE HAS PROVED TO BE PARTICULARLY LOW IN THE PAST. THE REPORT OF TODAY'S DATE, CONCERNING A "CIA PLAN TO KIDNAP THE US HOSTAGES," MUST BE VIEWED WITH CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM.

2. FOR EXAMPLE, IN ITEM 10 OF REFERENCE, TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE REPORTED "WITHOUT ELABORATION" THAT THE U.S. WAS IN THE PROCESS OF MINING IRAN'S SOUTHERN BORDER WATERS.

3. WITHOUT MORE COMPLETE DETAILS AND CORROBORATION, ALL SUCH REPORTS FROM TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE SHOULD BE VIEWED WITH A VERY HIGH DEGREE OF SKEPTICISM, AND CONSIDERED A TOOL OF IRANIAN PROPAGANDA.

4. FULL TEXT OF HEADLINES REGARDING THE HOSTAGES, WHICH WAS BROADCAST AT 0710Z ON 23 APRIL IN ARABIC, READS: "IRAN WILL USE SOVIET TERRITORIES FOR ITS FOREIGN TRADE IF UNITED STATES CLOSES OUR WATERWAYS; THERE ARE GREAT POSSIBILITIES THAT PUMPING OF NATURAL GAS TO SOVIET UNION WILL RESUME;" AND "A CIA PLAN TO KIDNAP THE U.S. HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN HAS BEEN REVEALED."

NNNNN

Declared by

DDO, NMC
23 Jan 9
6. MERCHANT SHIPS - ALL PSN GIVEN ARE AN ESTIMATE OF THE PROJECTED LOCATION AS OF 241200Z BASED ON DEAD RECKONING.

A. ENERGY GROWTH/TKR/LI/2001N/06417E/314T/16K
B. ESSO BILBAO/TKR/LI/2619N/05603E/238T/19.2K
C. ESSO LENGUEDOC/TKR/FR/2239N/06007E/145T/4.5K
D. GUNVER CORD/BLK/LI/2228N/06217E/314T/13K
E. JAPAN WISTERIA/TKR/JA/2208N/06147E/313T/12.6K
F. LATIRUS/TKR/NL/2203N/06142E/315T/11.2K
G. PALACE TOKYO/TKR/JA/2028N/06429E/314T/15.5K
H. RYUYO MARU/TKR/JA/2024N/06350E/314T/15.6K
I. VANJA/TKR/NO/2315N/05827E/159T/0.6K
J. WORLD SAGA/TKR/LI/2045N/06326E/314T/15.6K
K. KOMSOMOLETS LENINGRADA/TKR/UR/2346N/05939E/141T/9.2K

7. OTHER SIGHTINGS:

A. CORAGGIO/TKR/IT/2138N/06002E/360T/10K/220708Z/VISUAL.
B. KOTA JASA/CGO/SN/ 2157N/06155E/300T/10K/220556Z/VISUAL.
C. KRYM/TKR/UR/2548N/05657E/144T/6.0K/231030/VISUAL.
0 241600Z APR 80
FM HELC DET/NIMITZ/S-2 INFO ZNY TTTTT
TO SITE ALPHA/J-2

//DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST

SUBJ: INT REP 06

1. ALL SOVIET NAVAL COMBATANTS REMAIN WELL CLEAR OF NIMITZ AS EXERCISE CONTINUES. AGI 477 IS LOCATED ASTERN OF ARQ ALFA AND IS ONLY KNOWN SNOOPER CURRENTLY MAINTAINING SURVEILLANCE OF CTF 70 UNITS. AS OF 240630Z 477 WAS 212 NM FROM NIMITZ AT APPROX 2259N 06319E PROCEEDING CSR 100, SPEED 10KTS.

2. PRIMARY SOVIET PLATFORM OF CONCERN IS AOR LENINA AS SHE CURRENTLY HOLDS HER THERE; HOWEVER, CTF 70 UNITS AND A/C MONITORING PERSIAN GULF HAVE NOT SIGHTED LENINA IN TRANSIT. VERY TENTATIVE OUTBOARD DF WITHIN LAST 6 HOURS HAD LENINA ASSOCIATED CALL SIGNS POSSIBLY EMANATING FROM AREA JUST SOUTH OF AL MASIRAH ON ONE CUT AND BETWEEN MASIRAH AND OMAN MAINLAND IN ANOTHER. FLEET SCOUT A/C OPERATING IN THIS AREA HAVE NOT SEEN HER BUT NIMITZ IS SCHED TO FLY ANOTHER MISSION THIS AFTERNOON. OMANIS, WHOSE REPORTING HAS BEEN EXCELLENT IN THE PAST, HAVE NOT LOCATED LENINA IN THIS AREA SINCE THE 20TH.

3. GIVEN UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING AOR'S LOC BELIEVE IT PRUDENT TO CONCLUDE SHE IS IN MASIRAH AREA AND PLAN ACCORDINGLY. LENINA HAS NO AIR SEARCH RADAR BUT MUST BE CREDITED WITH PASSIVE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES FOR BOTH ELINT AND COMINT. CONSEQUENTLY RECOMMEND THAT MC-130'S USE RADAR ALTIMETER ONLY (VICE TERRAIN MAPPING) IN GULF TRANSIT AND STAY OFF THE AIR AS PLANNED. SIDE LOBE PATTERN OF ALTIMETER AT 500 AGL IS SO SMALL THAT LIKELIHOOD OF DETECTION IS NEAR ZERO. CHANCE OF VISUAL ID IN PROJECTED FLIGHT ROUTE CLEARING DARKNESS IS SAME. SAME LEVELS OF CAUTION ADVISED ON OUTBOUND OVER WATER LEG.

4. NO KNOWN RED FLAG MERCHANTS IN THE BOX BUT COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC REMAINS HEAVY THROUGH STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

5. FURTHER INTEPS WILL BE ON AS REQUIRED BASIS FOCUSING ON LENINA AND AGI. YOUR MSG 062 OF 221630Z REQUESTED "LOCATION AND DTG OF INFO ON SOV AND OTHER SHIPS" IN THE BOX. GIVEN COURSE/SPEED POSSIBILITIES, TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE MERCHANTS IN THE AREA WILL REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 4 PAGES OF SINGLE SPACE POSITS AND TWO MAN DAYS OF CALCULATION. UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED INTEND TO REPORT RED FLAGS ONLY.

REVW: 24APR80

BT

SECRET
FILE: REPORTED PHYSICAL ASSAULT ON AYATOLLAH BEHESEHTI (U)
(DT: 11 JAN 81)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGINAL REPORT:

SOURCE:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 13220
CONFIDENTIAL NO.
DEVELOPMENT CL.
INCL.
REVIEW:
DECLASSIFIED ON:

SECRET
SUBJECT: COMMENT ON INTEL SUPP

1. (U) REF JCS/RC J-2 MSG 170 261115Z APRIL 80.

2. (S) ALL ALERTS INITIATED PROBABLY CAUSED BY RELEASE OF FORTY FOUR (44) IRANIANS TEMPORARILY DETAINED BY RESCUE FORCE.

RVW 26APRIL 2010
BT #0105
SSN 0191
ZNY TTTIT
DTG 02318102 APR 80
FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/J-2
TO SITE ALFA/J-2
INFO JCS/RCON-12

BT
KOPS 2 C R E T//DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
SUBJ: INT REP 05

1. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUATION OF
   EXERCISE IN S. ARABIAN SEA/N. INDIAN OCEAN.
   EXERCISE NOW INVOLVES AT LEAST TEN UNITS AND INCLUDED
   SECOND CONSECUTIVE DAY OF IL-38 OPS. CTF 70 OUTBOARD RDF
   PROVIDED FIRST LOCATING DATA ON KRIVAK 693 CONFIRMING SHE IS
   DEFINITELY OUT OF OUR PICTURE.

2. AGI 477 REMAINS SOLE SOVIET SURVEILLANCE PLATFORM IN
   OUR IMMEDIATE AREA. AS OF 231700Z SNOOPER WAS LOC VIC 22.2N
   62.5E IN TRAIL OF ARG. OUTBOARD RDF CONFIRMS PGC 679 ON
   STRAITS OF HORMUZ PATROL AT 0730Z FRENCH DDG 640
   AND FF 725 WERE SIGHTED BY NIMITZ SCOUT A/C VIC 22.1N 63E
   ON NW COURSE AT 12KTS. SECOND SCOUT LOCATED FRENCH AOR 626
   PROCEEDING 010 AT 12KTS.
   ALL THREE FRENCH SHIPS ARE REPORTEDLY ENROUTE KARACHI FOR PORT
   CALL. ANTICIPATE THEY WILL BE WELL CLEAR OF OUR AO BY TOMORROW
   A.M. NO KNOWN SOVIET MERSHIPS IN THE BOX ALTHOUGH AOR LENINA IS
   UNLOCATED. NIMITZ FLAG INTELL O BELIEVES SHE IS ENROUTE ADEN BUT WE
   ARE STILL CHECKING TODAY'S FAC RECON PHOTOS.

3. AT APPROX 0800Z LIGIL SIEFFERT AND
   (MSN PRIMARY NAV) FLEW LEADERS AERIAL RECON OF CIP IN VA-35 (A-6E).
   REVIEW OF FLIR TAPES AND DEBRIEF INDICATE OUR CHARTS OF CIP AREA ARE
   ACCURATE.

4. NEXT INT REP WILL BE ON THE WAY NLT 240930Z AS PER YOUR
   REQUEST.

REVW 23APR00

BT

G-197
SECRET REPORT

DATE: 2 January 1981

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: US Hostage Situation - Update (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: See Attached Report.

ORIGIANATOR'S COMMENTS: None.

SOURCE:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 12/26/80
CONDUCTED BY:
DERIVED CL BY: DIA Non-C
C' DECLASSIFIED TO:
REVIEW ON:
DECLASSIFIED ON:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE
1 Cy to:
ADSOPS - HUMINT
DAH - JSH
Room 2C840
DOD HUMINT
BG FLNN

SECRET WORLD
G-217

This is an information report not finally evaluated intelligence.

May of report: see attached report.

Initiators comments: see attached report.

Exclusive

1 cy to: DOD HUNTING

G

Secret

Classification review by 23568
Conducted on: 12Jan01
Declassified by: DOD

Review on: 00000

Released from: 12Jan01

Declassified by: BG FLYNN

SECRET
Possible Cancellation of US Hostage Trials (U)
(Dated: 11 Jan 81)

This is an Information Report Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence.


Originators Comments: [Redacted]

Source: [Redacted]

Distribution: Exclusive
  1 Cy to: ADSOPS - Human
  DIAI - ISII
  Room 2C840
  DOJ Humint
  UC Flynn

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassified By: [Redacted]
SECRET

DATE: 17 December 1980

REPORT NAME/HISTORY: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: 

TITLE: SOVIET PRESENCE IN IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS THE FOLLOWING INFO: (DOI: 17 Dec 80)

1. 
2. 

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: None. See attached report.

SOURCE:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO DERIVATIVE CONDUCTED ON 12/30/80
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/NI/C

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE
1 Cy to: 
ADSOPS - HUMINT

DOD HUMINT

SECRET
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: NONE.

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE
1 Cy to: ADSOPS HTUMINT
DAHI TSH
Room 2C840
DOD HUMINT
BG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IS OVER
CONDUCTED ON 22 Dec 80
DERIVATIVE CI BY DOD NMC
□ DECL □ DEROGATED TO
REVIEW ON 01 Dec 80
DELIVERED FROM DIA DIA

SECRET

SECRET

Declassified On:
REPORT NAME/HIJUER: NFM 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: 

TITLE: UPDATE - SITUATION IN TEHERAN (U)
(DTI: 10 Dec 80)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
(SEE ATTACHED)

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: 

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to:

SECRET

Classified By: DIA
Declassified ON: DAD
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: MFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: 

TITLE: LOCATIONS OF U.S. HOSTAGES (U)

(DD/ 6 DEC 80)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED: 10 DEC 80

CONDUCTED ON: 22 DEC 80

DERIVATIVE CV: DOD, NMCS

DECL. OR DOWNGRADABLE TO:

REVIEW ON: 6 APR

REVIEWED: 6 APR

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA

Declassified ON: 04 DR

DISTIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

1 cy. to:

ADCSOPS-HUMINT

DAMMISH

ROOM 20240

TXTD HUMINT

BG FLYNN

SECRET
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: PARTIAL RESPONSE TO EEL (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: 25 Nov 80

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION:

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT
DAMLI-ISH
ROOM 2C840
DOD HUMINT
BG FLynn

Classified By: DIA
Declassified On: OADR
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE. SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.
1 cy to: ABCSOPS-HUMINT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12256
CONDUCTED BY: DOD
REVIEWED BY: OADR

Declassified Oct

Classified By: DIA
OAIR

DATE: 1 Dec 80
HOSTAGE INFORMATION (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: DOI: 30 Nov 80.

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION:

1 ey to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT
        DAMI-ISH
        ROOM 2CB4
        DOD HUMINT
        BG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12/28
CONDUCTED ON 28 Jan 80
DERIVATIVE CL BY: DDO NMC C
I ACCL  DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON 04/28/81
DERIVED FROM

Classified By: GADOR
Declassified ON: GADOR
REPORT NAME/HINUMBER: HFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: RESPONSE TO 9 SEP 80 TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION.

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED ON 12/76
CONDUCTED ON 22MAR76
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/NME
DECL Q D/E/D/AGED TO
REVIEW ON 06MAR
DERIVED FROM

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassified On: [Redacted]
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFM 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: 

TITLE: RESPONSE TO 9 SEP 80 TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: 

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION.

SOURCE: 

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 2255
CONDUCTED ON: 07 Jan 92
DEROGATIVE CT 5

DECLASSIFIED TO: 

REVIEW ON: O.A.D. 

DERIVED FROM: 

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA
Declassified by: O.M. B.G.
RESPONSE TO 9 Sep 80 TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION.

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [Redacted]

TITLE: U.S. HOSTAGE TRIALS

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

SOURCE:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED LESS
CONDUCT ON 22 June 9
DERIVATIVE CL BY DOD DSMC
☑ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADA
DECLARED FROM

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

SECRET
SECRET/NOFORN

240317
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CENSUS CAR (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: INFORMATION ON US HOSTAGES IN TEHERAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT (SEE ATTACHED):

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE. SEE ATTACHED.

SOURCE:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 12/28
CONDUCTED BY: AQ
DERIVED BY: TO

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

DECLASSIFIED ON: GADDR

Classified By: DIA
Declassified On: GADDR
REPORT NAME/NUMBER:  CENSUS CAR (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE:  Trial of U.S. Hostages (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION:  Exclusive.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 00 12345
CONDUCTED ON:  28 Jan 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY:  DDO/NC
CI DECL CI DECLASSIFIED TO
REVIEW CX:  0000
RELEASED FROM

SECRET

Classified By: [Signature]
Declassified On: [Signature]

G259
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: Census Car (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [blank]

TITLE: Possible Trial of US Hostages (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: [redacted]

(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [redacted]

SOURCE: [redacted]

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DUE 12/31
CONDUCTED BY: [redacted]
DERIVATIVE CLE: [redacted]
DUE DECL. DUE 12/31 REVIEWED TO 04/01
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassified ON: [redacted]
IAGPC-CR

DATE: 2 June 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CENSUS C4R (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED IN:

TITLE: DEBRIEF OF PENCIL 1 (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: ATTACHED ENCLOSED IS DEBRIEFING CONDUCTED BETWEEN 26-28 MAY AND CONCERNED SITUATION IN TIBETAN, ET. ALSO INCLUDED ARE ANSWERS TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS PREPARED BY INFORMATION CONSIDERS.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

SOURCE: SOURCE 2430317, WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS ACTUALLY IN THE PAST.

BEEN ESTABLISHED, HAS REPORTED

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 72XX
CONDUCTED ON 02JUN82
DERIVATIVE CL BY 1D00 N/MCC
□ DECL □ DEGRADED TO
REVIEW ON N/A
DECREED FROM

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

SECRET NONFORN

Classified by
Declassified

[Redacted]
SECRET

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

6 May or 23 142

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S-B-E-E-N NOFON LINDIS AFT 381A

SECTION 02 OF 03

PASS TO LTC

LTC

NIGHT ACTION REQUIRED

CFC 3553/7323

CFC 2643/7418
8 MAY 80: Pages 6 and 7 have been added; previous MSG was incomplete, due to transmission difficulties.

Source #240317
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240241

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: POLICE STATION, TEHERAN, IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

INFORMATION MAY BE OF USE TO

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE
REPORT NAME/NUMBER:   CAIUS CAN (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:  

TITLE:   POSSIBLE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD FACILITY (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:   

(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED

SOURCE:

DISTRIUBITION: EXCLUSIVE

SECRET NOFORN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 3255
CONDUCTED ON  DOD NMCC
REVIEW ON  OADR
REVIEWED FROM  DIA

Classified By:  DIA
Declassified On:  

SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN

G 278

DATE: 6 AUGUST 1980

C

JCS/cyr
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: RESPONSE TO TASKING (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [Redacted]

TITLE: RESPONSE TO TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: REPORT FORWARDS OBSERVATIONS OF SOURCE AND RESPONSES TO SPECIAL TASKING.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [Redacted] (SEE ATTACHED)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1226
CONDUCTED ON 23 JUN 92
DESIGNEE CL BY DMD WMC

CLASSIFIED BY: [Redacted]
DECLASSIFIED ON: [Redacted]

SECRET NOFORN

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: IRAN SITUATION REPORTING (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: DUS TRIP FROM TEHRAN TO WEST EUROPE (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

SOURCE:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 12258
CONDUCTED ON 22/3/92
DERAILLED TO
REVIEWGR DAPR
DETECTED FROM

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

Classified By: DIA
Declassified On: 11

SECRET NOFORN
1. Information received from 0153 debriefings has proved valuable in our intelligence program. Source provides good data derived from peripheral observation and elicitation, and he appears to be reliable. We regret that your office cannot make wider dissemination of his IIR's, but security requirements preclude this.

2. Request that 0153 be debriefed on 
   Questions apply to Iran

3. Request that 0153 be tasked to obtain the following information
d. Activities at the following locations:

4. We understand that 0153 [redacted] Request you determine if 0153

LtCol, USAF
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

V2CZCVQA934
OTTHZYUW YFQNAH 5036 2031002-MORK-YYA0V.
ZNY MMCRN
ZKZK OO SOA DE.
Q 211730Z JUL 50 (O
FM AFSSO USAFRED
TO SSO MEADE
INFO SSO MUNICH
ZEM
SPECIAL TASKING RESPONSE (CU)

REFERENCE: SECOND TELCON OF 19 JUL 82 (LTC
(S/OFOF/NINDS/NOCONTACT/UNINTEL) IN RESPONSE TO
SPECIFIC GUIDANCE PROVIDED FOLLOWING ARE RESPONSES OBTAINED.
FROM 2 242-3153 DEBRIE
IAGPC-CR

DATE: 15 July 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: OBSERVATION OF US EMBASSY (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: 

TITLE: SECURITY AT US EMBASSY, TEHRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

SOURCE:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED ON: 02 Aug 80
DERIVED CL: DIA
DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA
DECLASSIFIED ON: OADR

SECRET NOFORN
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.
(SEE ATTACHED)

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO EYES
DECLASSIFIED ON: 25/01/87
REVIEW ON: 24/01/87
DECLASSIFIED BY: DOD/ADM

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Copy
ADSOPS - HUMINT
DOD - HUMINT
Room 2C840
EG FLYNN

Declassified ON: 01/01/87
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: M65 240348

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [Name redacted]

TITLE: STATUS OF KHOSSEINI'S HEALTH - UPDATE (U)

And Hozhage movement 01/8 - 22 Dec

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT (SEE ATTACHED).

ORIGINATORS CONSENT: HOME

SOURCE: [Redacted]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to: ADJCS - HUMINT

DAM - I SH

Room 20849

DoD HUMINT

BG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY: [Redacted]

CONDUCTED ON: 22 Jun 91

DERIVED CL By: [Redacted]

REVIEW ON: [Redacted]
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NEC-240240 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED:

TITLE: STATUS OF KHOMEINI'S HEALTH (U)

DOI: 19 DEC 80

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

SOURCE:

DISTRICTION: EXCLUSIVE

Cur to: ADGOPS - HUMINT

DAR - ISM

Room 2C840

dd HUMINT

BG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 1225B

CONDUCTED ON: 04FMA

DETERMINE BY: DBO VRCC

UV DECL USO REVEIVED TO

REVIEW ON: 04D0A

DELETED FROM

Classified By: Declassified ON 04ADR

CIUJ
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:
NONE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW RD 2958
CONDUCTED ON: 29/06/94
DERIVATIVE CL BY: DAC H/M/E
D E C E I V E D D O N A T E D TO:
REVIEW ON: DAC H/M/E
DERIVED FROM:

DISTRIBUTION:
EXCLUSIVE
1 cy to:

C C C
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFM 240348

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: 

TITLE: U.S. HOSTAGES AND DR. PEYMAN (U)
(DD: 7 DEC 80, 2100 HRS)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 2256
CONDUCTED ON: 02 JUN 81
DECLASSIFIED BY: DDB NMC
DECL. 0 DECIMALS TO
REVIEW ON: OADR
DELETED FROM

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to:
ADCSOPS-HUMINT
JAMI-TOH
ROOM 2C2910
JOD HUMINT
BG FLYNN

Classified By: DDB NMC
Declassified ON: OADR
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFM 240348

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS FROM TEHERAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: DO: 25 NOV 80

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION:
1 cy to: AGCOIG-HUMINT
DNI-HUMINT
DCI-HUMINT
DCI, NO FLYNN

INFO NOT PUBLISHED
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240348

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: PARTIAL RESPONSE TO EBI (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

SEE ATTACHED.

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION:

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT
DMH-TSH
ROOM 2C840
DOD HUMINT
BG FLYNN

INFO NOT PUBLISHED

CLASSIFICATION DEDUCTION LOCATED
CONDUCTED ON: 22May92
DERIVATIVE CL BY: DOD/NSC
1 DEC 1 BOOKCASED TO
REVIEW OK: DAD
REVIEWED FROM: DAD

Declassified ON: [Signature]

Classified By: [Signature]
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:

(SEE ATTACHED)

THIS REPORT DETAILS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

1. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION MEDIATOR (U)
2. COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN IRAN (U)

SOURCE:

[Redacted]

DISTRIBUTION:

EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] classified ON 1/20/81

[Redacted] declassified ON 1/20/81

NOT releasable to foreign nationals
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

INSTRUCTIONS: THIS REPORT DETAILS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

1. POLITICAL CONFLICT IN IRAN (U)
2. COMMunist ACTIVITY IN IRAN (U)
3. APPEARANCE OF SOVIET WEAPONS IN IRAN (U)

NO PUBLICATION

DISPOSITION:

EXCLUSIVE

Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT
DAMI - ISH
Room 2C840

DOD HUMINT

BG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO DECLASS
CONDUCTED ON 23 JUN 97
DERIVATIVE CL BY DOD KMCC
DECL. DECLARATORY TO
REVIEW ON

DELETED FROM

CLASSIFIED BY
Declassified ON

SECRET-NOFORN
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFM 240134 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [Redacted]

TITLE: HOSTAGES IN IRAN

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

SOURCE: [Redacted]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

1 cy to: ADCSCOPO-HUMINT
        DMI-TSHI
        VROM 2CO5
        DOD-HUMINT
        DG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REMOVED 22JUN92
CONDUCTED ON 22JUN92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [Redacted]
DECL. DOWNGRADED TO [Redacted]
REVIEW ON [Redacted]
REMOVED FROM [Redacted]
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFH 240434

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: 

TITLE: #3 SW MESSAGE

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS:

SEE ATTACHED

1. STATUS OF U.S. HOSTAGES IN IR (AS OF 21 Nov 80).

2. POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF IR POPULATION.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: 

SOURCE: 

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED BY:

REVIEWER: 

DECLASSIFIED:

DISTRIBUTION:

1 copy:

ADCSOPS-HUMINT
DAMI-ISH
DOD POC
ROOM 2C810
D. FLYNN

FILE

(REPORT NOT PUBLISHED IN NORMAL DOD CHANNELS)
REPORT NAME/HUSBAND: HPN 240434

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: #2 SV COMMUNICATION (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

THIS REPORT DETAILS:

(1)

(2)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

REQUEST: WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY: DR. REYNOLDS
CONDUCTED ON: 21 October 1980
DECLASSIFIED BY: OADA
REVIEW ON: OADA
DERIVED FROM:

Made by: OADA
Declassified ON:
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240 331 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: Mosalatollah Musavie Khoveini (U) (Partial Response to Q Sep 80 FBI)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: This report provides information concerning the activities of Musavie Khoveini, and his relationship to the students guarding the US hostages.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: Consumer should be aware of the spelling of Khovtini's name. He has been referred to (in previous news media) as Khomeini. The correct spelling should receive appropriate dissemination.

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: [Redacted]

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive

CLASSIFICATION REMOVED 12/25/86
CONDUCTED ON 22 Dec 85
DERIVATIVE OF DS
REVIEW ON 26 Jan 86
REVIEWED FOR

Classified By:
Declassified On 09/01/86

[Redacted]
INFLUENCE OVER US HOSTAGES IN IR (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT CANNOT BE DETERMINED AT THIS TIME.

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE: 

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFIED UNTIL DISTRIBUTED TO

DECLASSIFIED BY

REVIEW ON

DISTRIBUTED FROM
DATE: 25 Sep 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240331

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (DST 8 Sep 80) THIS REPORT FORWARDS INFORMATION CONCERNING GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: PORTIONS OF THE INFORMATION REPORTED BY NFN HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS AS IS INDICATED BY CONTENT. REPORT IS INDICATIVE OF POLITICAL/RELIGIOUS MIDDLE CLASS IRANIANS WHO MANAGE TO REMAIN INFORMED ON DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS.

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: NFN'S REPORTING RELIABILITY CANNOT BE DETERMINED AT THIS TIME.

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.
REPORT NAME/MONUMBER: NFN 240434 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: Continued Debrief of NFN 240434 (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED).

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: None, See Attached.

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive.

CLASSIFICATION Review to TSSS
CONDUCTED BY: DDO MMC
DECLASSIFIED BY: OAD
REVISED ON: OAD
REVIEWED FROM

SECRET

Declassified On
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFM 240434 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [Redacted]

TITLE: RESPONSE TO SPECIAL TASKING - IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

THIS REPORT DETAILS INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NFM 240434 RESPONDING TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE - SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

SOURCE: [Redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 42225
CONDUCT ON: 22 Dec 97
REVIEWED BY: [Redacted]

DERIVED FROM: [Redacted]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

Declassified ON: [Redacted]
REPORT NAME/HUMBER: RFN 240241

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: RESPONSE TO 9 SEP 80 TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 1975

CONDUCTED ON: 22 JUN 92
DEBRATED BY: DSS NMC

DECL: DOWNGRADED TO:

REVIEW DA: OADR

DERIVED FROM:

Classified By: OADR
Declassified On: OADR
REPORT NAME/H NUMBER: INF 240497 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [Redacted]

TITLE: OPINIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF FORMER MILITARY OFFICER CONCERNING CURRENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: [Redacted]

SEE ATTACHED - SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

SOURCE: [Redacted]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 ey to: ADOCS-HUMINT [Redacted]
BO FLYNN [Redacted]
HAMI-ISH [Redacted]
ROOM 2C840 [Redacted]
DOD HUMINT FOC

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO ZER0
CONDUCTED ON: 22 Jun 97
DERIVATIVE CL BY DOD 3377C
[Redacted]
REVIEW ON: [Redacted]
RETRIEVED FROM: [Redacted]

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassified ON: 04 DX

SECRET
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: LANDING DOLLAR 2 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: 

TITLE: EXFILTRATION METHOD AND ROUTE OF LANDING DOLLAR 2 (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EXFILTRATION METHOD AND ROUTE OF LANDING DOLLAR 2 FROM IRAQ.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

SOURCE: 

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT
BG FLYNN
DAMI-ISH
ROOM 2C64C
DOD HUMINT POC

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 08/12/96
CONDUCTED ON 08/12/96
DECLASSIFIED ON 14 NOV 80
CLASSIFIED BY: DIA
DECLASSIFIED: DADX
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 260683 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: 

TITLE: STATUS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE IRANIAN ARMY (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS INFORMATION CONCERNING THE STATUS OF THE IRANIAN GROUND FORCES AND ITS CURRENT ORGANIZATION TO INCLUDE SOME OF THE KEY MILITARY OFFICERS IN COMMAND OF THE CURRENT IRANIAN ARMY.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:  

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: 

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive

KEY TO: ADCSOPS-HUMINT BC FLYNN DAVI-ISSH

ROOM 2C840 DOD HUMINT PCC

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED BY
CONDUCTED ON 29 June 92
DERIVATIVE BY DOD MACS

REVIEW ON?

DELETED FROM

SECRET

Declassified ON

BADR
INTERNAL SABOTAGE OF IR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICAL SYSTEM (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS:
NONE

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

ALL TO:

ADCSOPS-HUMINT...[redacted]...

BG FLYNN...

DAMT-ISH...[redacted]...
ROOM 26840...
DOD HUMINT FOU

CLASSIFIED BY:...[redacted]...
DECLASSIFIED ON:...[redacted]...
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFW 240483

REPORT ORIGINATED:

TITLE: EXFILTRATION METHOD AND ROUTE OF "LANDING DOLLAR" (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED) REPORT DETAILS INFORMATION ON EXFILTRATION ROUTE AND PERSONALITIES INVOLVED.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: NONE

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

ck to: ADCSOPS
BG FLYNN
DAMI-ISH
ROOM 2C040
DOD HUMINT TOC

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED
COMMUNICATED ON: 22 JAN 87
DESIGNATE G. BY: D. S. N. 87241
O BACK, O INTELLIGENCE TO:
REVIEW ON: OPR
DELETED FROM

Classified By:
Declassified On:

SECRET

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240483 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: ABSENCE OF IRANIAN MILITARY FORCES IN AREA WEST OF REZAIYEH, IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED) 

THIS REPORT DETAILS LIMITED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ABSENCE OF IR MILITARY UNITS, TO INCLUDE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, IN THE AREA WEST OF THE IRANIAN CITY OF REZAIYEH.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to: ADOGOPS (COL)
BG FLYNN
DAMI-IISH (LTC)
ROOM 26840 (LTC)
DOD INTELL FOC

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12/55
CONDUCTED ON 12 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE D/BY: D/DO NAC
O SEC, O DECLASSIFIED TO
REVIEW OF O AOC
REVIEWED FROM

Classified By: [Redacted]
Declassified On: [Redacted]
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<td>C. NOT RESPONSIVE TO TASKING CITED</td>
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<td>14. TYPE OF PRODUCTS TO PROVIDE BENEFIT FROM USE OF IR</td>
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REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240483 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: SECURITY MEASURES IN EFFECT IN TEHERAN (U)

DOI: 12 OCTOBER 1980

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: PROVIDES LIMITED INFORMATION CONCERNING SECURITY MEASURES IN EFFECT IN TEHERAN, IR, AS OF 12 OCTOBER 1980.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO BE CONDUCTED ON 22 JUN 97
DECLASSIFIED BY DOD NMC

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to: ADCSOPS (COL) BG FLYNN
DAHI-ISH (LTC) ROOM 2C840 (LTC)
DOD HUMINT POC

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TITLE: OPINIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF FORMER IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICER CONCERNING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED ON 25 Sep 99
DECLASSIFIED ON 30 Sep 99

SECRET
REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN.240483(U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: Current Use of Former US Military Facilities (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

DOI: 12 October 1980 & Earlier

SUMMARY OF REPORT: This report details information on the current use of [Redacted].

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NFN 240483 is voluntarily providing info to USAI.

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive.

SECRET NOFORN
Partial Response to 9 Sep 80 EEI Tasking (U)

This is an Information Report Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence

Summary of Reports (See Attached)

Originators Comments: NFN 240483 is voluntarily providing info to USAF

Request Written Evaluation

Source: [Blank]

Distribution: Exclusive.

Classification Review 60 Years
Conducted On: 02 Aug 93
Revised On: [Blank]

Declassified On: [Blank]

SECRET
REPORT NAME/HUNDRED: OTS-E-005

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [Redacted]

TITLE: RESPONSE TO 9 SEP 80 TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CONTENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT

SOURCE: [Redacted]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE
1 Cy to: AO5OPS - HUNINT(COL Lmc DOD HUNINT(COL KG PITTMAN

CLASSIFICATION REPORT TO DOD
CONSIDER ABUSIVE. NO DISCLOSURE TO
REVIEW ON [Redacted] [Redacted]

Copies to: [Redacted]
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT (SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE:

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.
MEMORANDUM FOR General Tighe

SUBJECT: Meeting with Source

1. (S/NF) Source came to my office to report on his trip to Egypt and his meeting with Queen Farah. Source went to Egypt at the request of Source, who had maintained close contact with the Shah during the latter's stay in Egypt. In addition to Source, Source was present at the meeting with Farah. Source reportedly has close contacts in the clergy and knows which clergy are pro- and anti-Khomeini. Source was also there at the request of Source. No members of either the Oveisi or Bakhtiar groups were present at the discussions with Farah. Source said they were met in Egypt by Source upon their 7 Sep 80 arrival. There were registered in a hotel under assumed names and escorted into the palace where Farah lives in a manner which caused minimum notice.

2. (S/NF) There were two, three hour meetings with Farah. She said it is her duty to try and overthrow Khomeini and has convinced the Crown Prince (who was not present) he must be the symbolic leader of the opposition movement. She realizes the Crown Prince does not have the experience to be the actual leader and asked for recommendations from which she could select a leader. Farah said since neither Oveisi or Bakhtiar seem to be able to get anything started she wanted to establish her own organization with the Crown Prince at the head. The Crown Prince may announce his intentions to assume the position of Shah on his 20th birthday at the end of October 1980.

3. (S/NF) Source proposed the organization (attached at Enclosure 1) which in its entirety is to be called the Council of Leadership. They also submitted a list of names for her to select the leader and the staff positions for the High Command Council, which in turn would select the heads of the Executive Committees in the US and Europe who are to coordinate the recruitment and transportation of personnel to the staging area of the opposition force (nfi).
4. (S/NF) Once the organization is staffed, delegations will be sent to Bakhtiar and Oveisi asking for their support and possible participation. Simultaneously, delegations will be sent to Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, US, etc., to solicit support for the movement. Farah was initially against seeking US support as she believes the fall of the Shah was a US conspiracy but agreed to the group's recommendations to include the US.

5. (S/NF) The next step, that of naming the High Command Council, will be initiated by Farah and carried out by [redacted] who has remained in Egypt to assist her. Once this has been accomplished another series of meetings will follow. Source was impressed with Farah's poise, knowledge of the situation and purpose. He said this visit and the organization being developed are very sensitive and should be closely held. (Comment: The press has already picked-up on this story over this past week-end).

6. (S/NF) Comment:

- If Farah's scheme materializes this would insert another player into the opposition movement scene. I question how much support Farah's movement would receive especially from inside Iran. This may be the work of Princess Ashraf who would like to see the Pahlavi Family back in Iran in some official capacity in order to regain some of her former influence and wealth. It will be interesting to see Oveis'i/Bakhtiar's reaction to this scheme, I cannot see them subordinating themselves to the Crown Prince but frustration may breed some strange coalitions.

- Attached as Enclosure 2 is a photograph of Evin prison where a large number of former military officers are imprisoned including [redacted]. I have no further identifying data as to date, direction, etc., but I will provide a copy to our Iran Desk if you have no objections. Source got this from [redacted].

LTC, USA
DI-A(NFIB/MIB)
Total number of personnel excluding the Executive Committees is 25. However, this is a very tentative figure and will probably be expanded.
Name: [redacted]
Date of Contact: 26 July 1980
Report #1

1. Circumstances of Contact: Arlington VA in the apartment of a mutual friend.

Date, Time and Place of Meeting: 26 July 1980, approximately 9:30 until 11:00.

Travel and Itinerary: None involved.

Security Measures: None.

Cover: None.

Unusual Occurrences: None.

Language Used: English.

2. Personalia and Reason for Contact: 
   He is approximately 34 years old and extremely thin. He has long straight blond hair and a beard. He wears metal-rimmed glasses and generally seems to be somewhat of an aged hippie. His dress on the other hand is neat and stylish. The clothing is expensive and new in appearance. He speaks Farsi and lived in Iran a number of times since the early 60's. He is a graduate of Tehran Community School.

   He was in Iran as a freelance writer (with a press card) at the beginning of 1980 and was counted among American journalists when the Iranian government ordered expulsion. Following the US rescue attempt in April, he decided to attempt a personal initiative for the release of the hostages. Some hostages (unnamed) are personal friends of his. Through the son of an Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who is a personal friend of [redacted], arranged to acquire a special visa in Bahrain and travel to Iran in the early part of May 1980. He remained there until the 26th of June when he traveled to Egypt, France and then to the United States arriving here in early July.

   [redacted] is a sincere, pacifistic individual whose actions seem motivated by a honest interest and concern for Iran and its future. He has many friends in the country. He is intelligent, articulate and quite practical in his idealism, and seems to be sincerely saddened by his inability to contact any of the hostages or their captors.
Having failed in his personal diplomatic initiative, he decided to acquire further information for a book which he has been planning for some time, and to remain in Iran as long as possible for that purpose. In connection with those plans, he later decided to travel to Egypt in order to personally learn of the Shah's condition. Subsequently, he went to Paris, where he hoped to meet Former Prime Minister Bakhtiar. He said that he did speak with him by phone some six days before the assassination attempt on Bakhtiar's life.

He departed Iran on the 26th of June because of Iranian government actions regarding American journalists. The Iranian government allowed visas to expire as a means for having journalists leave. He learned through his contacts that the last of these journalists were to depart Iran on 25 June. By leaving a day later, he would be the "last" American out of Tehran, and felt that might be an important feature should he publish his book. Iran subsequently permitted the return of two US journalists, who left again on 26 July.

Upon his arrival in Tehran, he checked into an inexpensive hotel where he stayed for 3-4 days. He called the individual who had arranged his visa and announced his arrival, asking what steps he should take next. This person indicated by his response that he was unable to talk with him further and advised that it would be unwise for him to call him again.

He then returned to his hotel where he established some contacts with an... This... and other members of the... invited him to stay with them. The hotel does not pay well and therefore houses its personnel in its building, in the top floor or the one immediately below it. There are several room and... was invited to either stay in one of those or, if he preferred, to sleep on the roof (customary in Iran during the summer). For the remainder of his time in Iran, he lived in the top floors of the... and slept on the roof.

Shortly after moving in, he went to the Ministry of Public Affairs and inquired about the possibility of obtaining a new press card. He was advised to direct himself to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and apply. When he did so, he commented to them that he had been a validated correspondent up until the departure of Americans from Iran in the earlier part of the year. The Iranians, however, could find no record of that, and asked about his purposes at this time. He explained that he was researching a book, which he planned to publish upon his return to the United States. He showed them
the visa which had been arranged for him in Bahrain. They accepted that but advised him that it would be best for him to continue merely as a "diplomatic tourist" rather than to get a press authorization. He was advised to be somewhat cautious about what questions he asked and was given some specific advice about how he should approach members of the Revolutionary Guard.

During the following month and a half, [redacted] was able to move freely about the city of Tehran, at all hours, day and night. He said that at least five nights out of seven he was on the streets wandering around between the hours of 11:00 and 1:00 in the morning. At no time was he approached by any member of the Revolutionary Guard nor was he harassed by any official Iranian other than one incident which took place approximately three weeks after his arrival. Having returned from a tennis game, he went to meet a friend at the Hotel Intercontinental. When he entered the hotel, another person pointed him out to a policeman, (that is an official government policeman, not a Revolutionary Guard). The policeman took [redacted] to a back room where he forced him to strip and examined him for marks that would indicate he was an addict to some kind of a drug, probably heroin. [redacted] felt quite apprehensive that he would be turned over to the Khomeni following this examination, but upon completion of the exam, was released. Other than this incident, he had no trouble with the Guards or the police. One may speculate that [redacted] appearance following a tennis game was somewhat unkempt and he might possibly have been suspected of using drugs.

During this time in Iran he met with a physician who was an old friend, the physician who treated Khomeini during the first period after Khomeini returned to Iran in 1979. The physician related several incidents. He told [redacted] that the first time he was called to visit Khomeini was shortly after Khomeini had returned to Iran. The Ayatollah had become ill as a result of drafts experienced in the helicopter while he was flying around the city, and required some medical attention. In addition to the Doctor, a Professor from the University of Tehran was asked to come. The Dr. told [redacted] that he and the Professor were waiting in an outer room when the doors opened and they were ushered into Khomeini's presence. The Professor from the university began groveling and bowing low along the floor and then prostrated himself in front of Khomeini to kiss his feet. The physician couldn't resist the impulse and supposedly kicked the prostrate professor in the rear while at the same time observing Khomeini's reaction. He told [redacted] that Khomeini smiled slightly and then returned to his normal stern visage. The Dr. claims to have subsequently treated Khomeini six or seven times. Simultaneously, of course,
the situation in Iran was deteriorating. He told [REDACTED] that the last time he was asked to come to treat Khomeini was approximately a year or six months ago (time uncertain) but that [REDACTED] claimed to have used these words. Following these comments he was fired from his job at [REDACTED] but has continued to practice privately. 

[REDACTED] apparently made several attempts to contact the hostages without success. He said that every time he thought he might be making progress in this regard, he ran into a blank wall. He visited with several other friends and had no trouble at all, including the [REDACTED] and their mother [REDACTED], all of whom are known to me. Apparently there was no problem at all for either [REDACTED] to meet with an American. 

[REDACTED] said that he never claimed to be anything but an American. In fact, he advertised it quite freely since he didn't want anyone to think he was doing anything devious. He avoided the appearance of spying or anything of that nature.

The meeting ended shortly thereafter and we agreed to meet again for breakfast the following morning--the 27th of July. An agency check was conducted of [REDACTED] on the 25th of July with no record.

Comments: [REDACTED] is a very sincere, very capable man. He is obviously quite well-educated and cannot be classified as a starry-eyed idealist. He is however, very much a pacifist, and would be disinclined to cooperate with the intelligence agency or the Dept of Defense. Nonetheless, he represents an interesting prospect since he is willing to return to Iran and probably will do so. Our common friends provide a basis for mutual understanding. He seems to trust me and feels quite at ease discussing his experiences with me. This experience of [REDACTED] provides some detailed insight into the ease with which an American could move about in Tehran, and quite a bit of information for us in regard to the lack of tight security in that country.

SECRET
27 July 1980
Report #2

Met again with Mr. [Name Redacted]. There were a few anecdotal reports of his travels in Iran prior to this last visit. Also present, however, was [Name Redacted] who is under the Shah.

There are eight male members of the family who were all quite influential in Iran. [Name Redacted] was the wealthiest of this group. All eight of these men have been marked by the Revolutionary Guards for arrest or trial. Two are currently in jail in Iran, and one is dead. The remainder of the family has gotten out of Iran and is in the States or Europe. [Name Redacted] left Iran in Oct 79 after much difficulty and by means of a great deal of bribery. It was interesting to see her discussions with [Name Redacted] because she was able to report to her on the condition of her properties at the Caspian Sea (they have been seized by the Revolutionaries) and the conditions of her furniture, which is still in her home in Tehran. Apparently the system now is that when the Revolutionary Guards or the Pasdaran come to inspect, i.e., when they suspect there is furniture or some possession that should be the property of the State, advance warning is given to the families and they move the furniture around. There are groups of people that are making their living by moving the possessions of wealthy people from one place to another to be hidden while the inspections are taking place.

The meeting concluded more or less on notes of this nature, basically anecdotal and of very little substance. I will be having dinner this evening with [Name Redacted] and a number of members of the family. Her husband is currently in San Francisco, however, and will not be there.

Continuation 27 July

Dinner meeting with [Name Redacted] and several others, among whom was [Name Redacted] who is related to the [Name Redacted] and was a fairly high level Ministry of Foreign Affairs official during the time of the Shah. He left Iran in Sep or Oct 79. Most of the conversation related to political discussions and the implications of the Shah's death today.

Little of substance was discussed other than one interesting point. [Name Redacted] pointed out that the primary route currently being used by wealthy Iranians to escape Iran is...
to drive to Sanandaj in Kurdistan. There they link with
Kurdish individuals who place them in jeeps and drive them
to a town called Banee on the Turkish-Iranian border.
According to Sharoukh there are four towns named Banee. At
that town, the escaping Iranian is met by a Turkish driver
in a different jeep who takes them across the border. The
Turk at the border also provides the escapee with a passport
and all other related documents. There were a number of
discussions about discontent in the Iranian population.
One of the points was that the cohesion which had existed
up until a few months had now been eroded. Even the peasant
class, formerly quite loyal to Khomeini, now feels that his
position is probably in error. These observations were, of
course, made by fairly influential Iranians rather than by
peasants themselves, although Sharoukh claimed that his
gardener had said as much the last time they had talked
(by phone, last week).
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SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR DHAHARAN, SAUDI ARABIA

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MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA

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**SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY**

**ALL TIMES IN GMT**

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WHEN USING MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA, YOU MUST USE THE JULIAN DATE THAT IS GIVEN WITH EACH TIME GROUP. UNLIKE THE SUN, THE MOON IS NOT ON A 24 HOUR CYCLE AND OFTEN "RISES" AND "SETS" ON DIFFERENT DAYS. ON SOME DAYS DURING THE MONTH, IT DOES NOT RISE OR SET AT ALL, WHICH IS INDICATED WITH ALL 9'S OR ALL 8'S IN THE TIME GROUP.

CAUTION

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY

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MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY

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**SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN**

**ALL TIMES IN GMT**

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**SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN**

**ALL TIMES IN GMT**
### Sunrise-Sunset-Twilight Data for Muscat, Oman

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### MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN

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All time in GMT

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### Moonrise/Moonset Data for Muscat, Oman

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Moonrise/Moonset data for Muscat, Oman

All times in GMT

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ALL TIMES IN GMT
### Sun Rise-Sun Set-Twilight Data for 2632N 03307E

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**Latitude:** 2632 N  
**Longitude:** 03307 E  
**Altitude:** 00354 M
**CAUTION**

When using moonrise/moonset data, you must use the Julian date that is given with each time group. Unlike the sun, the moon is not on a 24-hour cycle and often rises and sets on different days. On some days during the month, it does not rise or set at all, which is indicated with all 9's or all 8's in the time group.

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**MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR 2632N 03307E**

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**LONGITUDE 03307 E**

**ALTITUDE 00354**

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**MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR 2632N 03307E**

**ALL TIME IN GMT**

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MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR 2632N 03307E

ALL TIME IN GMT

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ALTITUDE 00354

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**ALL TIMES IN GMT**

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**SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN**

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**SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN**

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SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN

ALL TIMES IN GMT

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# CAUTION

When using Moonrise/Moonset data, you must use the Julian date that is given with each time group. Unlike the Sun, the Moon is not on a 24-hour cycle and often rises and sets on different days. On some days during the month, it does not rise or set at all, which is indicated with all 9's or all 8's in the time group.

---

**SECRET**

### Moonrise/Moonset Data for Makū, Iran

**All Time in GMT**

**Latitude 39°18' N**

**Longitude 04°43' E**

**Altitude 01°29'**

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**Moonrise/Moonset Data for Makū, Iran**

**All Time in GMT**

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MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN

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WHEN USING MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA, YOU MUST USE THE JULIAN DATE THAT IS
GIVEN WITH EACH TIME GROUP. UNLIKE THE SUN, THE MOON IS NOT ON A 24-
HOUR CYCLE AND OFTEN RISES AND SETS ON DIFFERENT DAYS. ON SOME DAYS
DURING THE MONTH, IT DOES NOT RISE OR SET AT ALL, WHICH IS INDICATED
WITH ALL 9'S OR ALL 8'S IN THE TIME GROUP.

CAUTION

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MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE: 00003

<table>
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<tr>
<th>DAY</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
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<th>MOONSET</th>
<th>% ILLUMINATION</th>
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MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE: 00003

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
### MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA:

#### All Time in GMT

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<th>Day</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Moonrise</th>
<th>Moonset</th>
<th>% Illumination</th>
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<td>Jun</td>
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### Notes:
- **Latitude:** [Redacted]
- **Longitude:** [Redacted]
- **Altitude:** 00003
- **Secret**
- **Confidential**
### Exposure Weather

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<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Maximum (°F)</td>
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<td>109</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>Mean Maximum</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>Mean Minimum</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>71</td>
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<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean # Days ≥ 90 F</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Precipitation (Inches)</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Frequency Winds ≥ 17 knots</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Frequency Winds ≥ 27 Knots</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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#### % Frequency Visibility < 6 Miles

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<th>2200</th>
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<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
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<td>1600</td>
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<tr>
<td>2200</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
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#### % Frequency Visibility < 2¼

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<thead>
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<th>1000</th>
<th>1600</th>
<th>2200</th>
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<td>0700</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2200</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 0.5 % or day
1. General. The Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) moves northward in April and May. The island experiences northwesterly winds when located north of the ITCZ and the southeast trades after the passage of the ITCZ. Cloudiness is less extensive, but precipitation is still abundant and the weather is warm and humid. Tropical cyclones and/or hurricanes are virtually non-existent during this period.

2. Flying Weather. Generally good. Cloud bases are usually between 1500-3000 feet. The percent frequency that the ceiling/visibility is less than 5000 feet and/or 6 miles ranges from 10-15%, less than 1500/3 is 5%, and less than 500/1 occurs about 1% of the time. Ceiling/visibility is restricted primarily due to heavy rainshowers. Fog is rarely observed. Thunderstorms are infrequent, but massive cumulonimbus clouds may reach to 40,000-50,000 feet.

3. Terminal Weather. Mean cloudiness during this period averages 4/8-5/8. Precipitation is less abundant than the rainy months, but still significant in that it averages approximately 7 inches per month. The percent frequency that the ceiling/visibility is less than 300/1 is less than 1% per month. Crosswinds greater than 15 knots are expected 1% of the time.

4. Reconnaissance Weather. Fair during April, but improves substantially during May. During April cloud cover is less than 3/8ths 10-15% during daylight hours and 25-35% of the time between sunset and sunrise. During May the cloud cover is less than 3/8ths 25-35% of the time during daylight hours and 35-45% during the hours of darkness. Cloud types are mainly cumulus with extensive areas of cirrus. The sky is seldom free of clouds and overcast skies are expected 15-20% of the time.

5. Exposure Weather. The weather is warm and humid with moderate precipitation. Relative humidity averages 75-90%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Maximum (F)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Maximum</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Minimum</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Minimum</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Precipitation (Inches)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<tr>
<td># Days Rainfall</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Thunderstorm</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = less than 0.5 day
6. **Port/Beach Conditions.** On the open sea, winds are greater than 16 knots 5% of the time in April and 15% in May. Gale force winds are rare in both months. Amphibious landing craft or small boats may encounter rough seas 10% of the time. Tropical cyclones or hurricanes are rare during this period.

### Astronomical Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Twilight</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Light</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Last Light</strong></td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>1822</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capt, USAF  
DOE Climatological Officer  
Pentagon Telephone: 697-1638  

Prepared Date: 14 April 1980
1. General. The season of the southeast trades is characterized by winds predominantly out of the southeast at about 10 knots. The weather is normally fair and warm; however, precipitation averages 6-9 inches per month. Precipitation is usually a heavy shower, but periods of steady rain may persist for several hours. The Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) is at its northernmost position during this season. In late August and September tropical cyclones/hurricanes sometimes form or pass to the south of the island, producing moderate rainfall and fresh westerly winds.

2. Flying Weather. Generally good. Cloud bases are most frequently between 1500-3000 feet. The percent frequency that the ceiling/visibility is less than 5000 feet and/or 6 miles ranges from 15-20%; less than 1500/3 ranges from 5-10% and less than 500/1 is expected less than 1% of the time. The ceiling/visibility is restricted primarily by heavy rainshowers. Fog is rare. Thunderstorms are expected less than 1 day per month; however massive cumulonimbus clouds often reach to 40,000-50,000 feet.

3. Terminal Weather. Generally good. Low ceilings or visibilities associated with rainshowers result in restrictions to flying activities about 1% of the time. Crosswinds greater than 15 knots are expected 1-2% of the time. Generally the strongest winds occur in the early morning hours or the late afternoon.

4. Reconnaissance Weather. Fair to poor. Although visibility is generally good, cloudiness is quite extensive. Cloud types are mainly cumulus and cumulonimbus, but thick layers may persist for several hours. Reconnaissance weather is generally the poorest between sunrise and sunset. During daylight hours sky cover less than 3/8 is expected only 5-10% of the time. At night the sky is seldom free of clouds; overcast skies are expected 15-25% of the time.

5. Exposure Weather. The weather is warm and humid with moderate precipitation. The relative humidity averages 75-85%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
</tr>
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<td>Absolute Maximum (°F)</td>
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<td>Mean Minimum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absolute Minimum</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Precipitation (Inches)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td># Days Rainfall</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Thunderstorm</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
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</table>

* = Less than 0.5 day
6. Port/Beach Conditions. On the open sea, winds greater than 16 knots are expected 30-40% of the time. Gale force winds are expected 1-3% of the time. Amphibious landing craft or small boats may encounter rough seas 15-30% of the time. Tropical cyclones and/or hurricanes forming or moving south of the island may cause heavy seas and high winds in the vicinity of Diego Garcia.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Twilight</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>(Local Time)</td>
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<td>0610</td>
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<td>Last Light</td>
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<td>1811</td>
<td>1827</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capt, USAF

DOD Climatological Officer

Pentagon Telephone: 697-1638

Prepared Date: 14 April 1980

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
5. **EXPOSURE WEATHER.** The weather is hot, dry and dusty over most of Iran. Temperatures may exceed 120F in the interior desert regions. Sandstorms/duststorms are frequent and may last for several days.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>TEHRAN, IRAN</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCT</th>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>MEAN MAX</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEAN MIN</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td># DAYS TSTMS</td>
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<td>*</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* = Less than 0.5 inch/0.5 Day

6. **PARADRONE WEATHER.** Over most of Iran the weather conditions are favorable for paradrone 75-95% of the time. However, in southern Iran, from approximately 31N southward, during the afternoon hours, weather conditions are favorable only 35-45% of the time. Over all of Iran weather conditions are unfavorable for paradrone primarily due to winds in excess of 13 knots. Generally, only in northern Iran, particularly along the Caspian Sea would cloudiness and/or rainfall be a factor.

7. **TRAFFICABILITY.** Most of Iran has a cone index (CI) rating of 150 or greater (soil will support most surface vehicles and helicopters). Isolated sections along the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf and the Central Plateau have a much lower CI rating. In the Central Plateau region there are large marsh areas that are impassable even to men on foot.

8. **ASTRONOMICAL DATA.** Tehran, Iran

Civil Twilight (Standard Time of the Meridian 52 DEG 30 Min)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAY</th>
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FIRST LIGHT

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Capt, USAF
DOD Weather Liaison Officer
Pentagon Telephone: 697-1638

Prepared: 22 January 1979
### SITUATION CLIMATIC BRIEF

**ADDENDUM**

**IRAN**

**Exposure Weather - Jask, Iran (Gulf of Oman)**

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**Exposure Weather - Zanhedan, Iran (Desert)**

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**Exposure Weather - Kerman, Iran (Southern Mountains)**

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**Exposure Weather - Birjand, Iran (Desert)**

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* = Less Than 0.5 Day
### Exposure Weather - Yazd, Iran (Southern Mountains)

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### Exposure Weather - Zanjan, Iran (Northwest Mountains)

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*CONFIDENTIAL*
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SITUATION CLIMATIC BRIEF

TURKEY

APRIL - MAY

1. GENERAL. This season is generally characterized by decreasing cloudiness and precipitation, and mild temperatures. Locations in central Turkey normally experience their greatest precipitation amounts and highest thunderstorm frequencies during these months. Morning minimum temperatures range from the mid 40's (F) in the interior to 50-60°F on the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea Coasts to 10-14 days on the Black Sea Coast. Thunderstorms occur on 2-5 days per month along the coasts and 5-8 days per month in the interior. The Sirocco, a hot, dry, dust-laden wind originating in North Africa, occurs most frequently in these months.

2. FLYING WEATHER. Flying weather is generally good. Ceiling/visibility is less than 5000/6 15-25% of the time and less than 1500/3 1-2% of the time. Ceiling/visibility less than 500/1 is rare in Turkey during these months. Icing can be expected above the freezing level in the stratified cloudiness and thunderstorms that accompany migratory low pressure systems. Mountain wave turbulence can be expected occasionally, but data on its frequency are not available.

3. RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER. Reconnaissance weather is generally fair to poor. The mean number of days with cloud cover 2/8 or less ranges from 5-15 days along the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea Coasts to 0-8 days over interior Turkey. Maximum cloudiness tends to occur during the early afternoon. Visibility is usually good except along portions of the Black Sea Coast where fog can be a problem.

4. TERMINAL WEATHER. Terminal weather is generally good. Samsun on the Black Sea Coast has more cloudiness than the other terminals. Ceiling/visibility less than 300/1 is very

Distribution: 0JCS/3-36
AF/XO00X, OLA
USAFETAC/CBD/ENO
5NW/DNC
5NS/DO
Det 3, 5NS/CC

See Add 1
rare at any location. Crosswinds are greater than 15 knots 5-10% of the time except at Izmir where they are greater than 15 knots 15-25% of the time. Crosswinds are generally strongest in the mid and late afternoon. Ankara and Izmir usually experience their highest thunderstorm frequency of the year in May.

5. EXPOSURE WEATHER. Most locations are partly cloudy to cloudy with mild temperatures and moderate amounts of precipitation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAMSUN</th>
<th>ANKARA</th>
<th>ADANA</th>
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<tr>
<td>APR</td>
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<td>APR</td>
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<td># DAYS SNOWFALL</td>
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<td># DAYS THUNDERSTORMS</td>
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</table>

* = LESS THAN 0.5 DAY

6. PARATRAP WEATHER. Paradrop weather is generally poor during the mid and late afternoon due to winds in excess of 13 knots. The percent frequency that winds exceed 13 knots during the mid and late afternoon ranges from 30-50% except at Izmir where it ranges from 50-70% of the time.

7. TRAFFICABILITY. Large portions of Turkey have a cone index (CI) rating of 76-150 (soil will support most all-wheel drive trucks, a number of trailered vehicles, heavy tanks and most helicopters). About 30% of the area has a CI rating greater than 150 (soil will support most surface vehicles and helicopters). Large sections along the Black Sea Coast have a CI rating of 46-75 (soil will support vehicles with low contact pressures). Mountain passes above 4000-6000 feet may still be blocked with snow at this time of year.

8. PORT/BEACH CONDITIONS. Winds exceeding 16 knots are experienced in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas 10-20% of the time. Gale force winds occur about 5% of the time in April decreasing to 1% of the time in May.
Amphibious craft or small boats may encounter rough seas 1-5% of the time in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, and 5-10% of the time in the Black Sea. Wind speed data are not available for the Black Sea, but the incidence of rough seas indicates that gale force winds may be common there.

9. ASTRONOMICAL DATA. Incirlik (Adana), Turkey.
Civil Twilight (Local Time)  APR  MAY
First Light  0438  0502
Last Light  1839  1908

Capt, USAF
DOD Weather Liaison Officer
Pentagon Telephone: 697-1638
## SITUATION CLIMATIC BRIEF

### TURKEY

#### APRIL - MAY

**EXPOSURE WEATHER.**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Absolute Maximum</th>
<th>Mean Maximum</th>
<th>Mean Minimum</th>
<th>Absolute Minimum</th>
<th>Precipitation (Inches)</th>
<th>Days Rainfall@</th>
<th>Days Snowfall</th>
<th>Days Thunderstorms</th>
<th>Freq Les 5000/5</th>
<th>Freq Les 1500/3</th>
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<td>97</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>88</td>
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* = LESS THAN 0.5 DAY
@ = OR GREATER THAN 0.1 INCHES

**EXPOSURE WEATHER.** Increased frequency of thunderstorm activity noted during month of May for these four locations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Absolute Maximum</th>
<th>Mean Maximum</th>
<th>Mean Minimum</th>
<th>Absolute Minimum</th>
<th>Precipitation (Inches)</th>
<th>Days Rainfall@</th>
<th>Days Snowfall</th>
<th>Days Thunderstorms</th>
<th>Freq Les 5000/5</th>
<th>Freq Les 1500/3</th>
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* = LESS THAN 0.5 DAY
@ = OR GREATER THAN 0.1 INCHES

**NOTE:**

1. Last two entries for Exposure Weather are ceiling/visibility criteria measured in feet/miles respectively.

2. Exposure Weather for Adana and Ankara in primary Situation Climatic Brief.
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**APRIL 1980**

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<th>SUNDAY</th>
<th>MONDAY</th>
<th>TUESDAY</th>
<th>WEDNESDAY</th>
<th>THURSDAY</th>
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<th>SATURDAY</th>
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<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
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</table>
|        |        |         | **Good Light Building** - Ends on 12th |          |        | O405 Dark +
|        |        |         |          |          |        | Moon 0330-050 |
| 13     | 14     | 15      | 16        | 17       | 18     | 19       |
|        |        |         | **Poor Light** |          |        |          |
| 20     | 21     | 22      | 23        | 24       | 25     | 26       |
|        |        |         | **Moon Light** building **Good** for 3-4 Day Optimal |          |        |          |
| 27     | 28     | 29      | 30        | 31       |        |          |
|        |        |         | **Carries through until 2-3 May 1980** |          |        |          |
|        |        |         |           |          |        |          |

**CONFIDENTIAL**
 Intelligence Historical Report

Subject: (U) Executive Summary For Weather Support to American Hostage Rescue Efforts.


Purpose: (U) The attached reports describe the scope of weather support provided to the Joint Task Force 1-79 and concerned with the American hostages in Iran during this period. Each of the eight reports addresses a separate issue or portion of support relevant to the planning, exercises, rescue attempt and subsequent events. To gain a full appreciation of the depth of support and the problems encountered one needs to review the complete series of reports.

Recommendations: (U) Planners and operational personnel need to closely coordinate with their staff weather officer through all phases of the planning cycle, mission implementation, and post evaluation to enhance the probability of success. The key point to stress for future efforts is the absolute necessity of a resident staff weather officer dedicated to the support effort to be incorporated into the planning/operational staff in a full-time status.

Summary: (U) Weather played a key role in the planning and execution phases of the American Military Rescue Attempt on 24 April 1980 and subsequent efforts by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


Attachments:

1.

2. (U) Acquisition and Deployment of Meteorological Equipment to POF.

3. (U) Exercise Weather Support, Pre Raid.

4. (U) Exercise Weather Support, Post Raid.

5. (U) Climatological Planning Data.

6. (U) Meteorological Satellite Shortfalls.

7. (U) Remote Tactical Weather Sensors.

8. (U) Meteorological Surface and Upper Air Data Shortfalls.

Subject: Acquisition and Deployment of Meteorological Equipment To FOL

Time Frame: Jan - Apr 80

Acronyms:

1. DMSP - Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
2. TWAC - Tactical Weather Analysis Center
3. DSTE - Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment

Summary:

1. (U) Purpose: This report reviews the initial taskings, the subsequent plans, coordination, acquisition and deployment of meteorological support equipment to a Forward Operating Location (FOL).

2. (O) The Joint Task Force (JTF) Staff Weather Officer (SWO) was tasked on 7 Jan 80 to prepare plans for a deployment to support the COMJTF. He began initial communication resource planning with the JTF Communications Officer at this time. See attachment 1 - After Action Report, 7-10 Jan 80 portion for more details about initial contacts, taskings and planning.

3. (O) On 9 Jan 80 Lt Col [redacted] tasked the JTF SWO to prepare a paper describing the current weather support in the Pentagon and how we would envision FOL weather support. Attachment 2, presented to MG Cast on 10 Jan 80, outlines the initial plans for deployment.

In late January, after a Fort Bragg conference where weather was highlighted as being more critical to the operation than originally thought, the JTF SWO was tasked to prepare a fact sheet describing a FOL at [redacted]. This led to the development of a deployment package with TWAC, DSTE and DMSF equipment as opposed to simple autodin, secure phone, and teletype traffic at [redacted]. See attachment 3, fact sheet, 28 Jan 80.
5. (TS) During February and March a great deal of coordination occurred between the JTF SWO; HQ Air Weather Service (AWS); HQAIR Force Communications Command (AFCC); 2049 CIG/LCK at McClellan AFB, CA; and 2044 CG/LCM2 in the Pentagon. HQAWS arranged for an equipment modification of the Mark III contingency DMSP van at McClellan to receive NOAA satellites due to failing DMSP satellite capabilities. The JTF SWO worked through both HQ AFCC and local 2044 CG personnel to verify acquisition of required operational supplies and support equipment before deployment from McClellan AFB. HQAWS selected a DMSP Satellite Officer from Air Force Global Weather Central, and two backups with passports, clearances and shot records to accompany the DMSP vans to FOL for additional weather support manpower.

6. (TS) During this same period the JTF SWO coordinated with Lt Col JTF Communications Officer; Lt Col JTF Transportation Officer; and HQ AWS Action Officer to set up arrangements for acquisition of TWAC and DSTE equipment, and their deployment to FOL. This required an evaluation by HQ AWS of the TWAC for FOL use and subsequent addition of EURFAX compatible facsimile machines with supplies by AFCC; the development of a contingency communication weather package for transmission from Croughton AB, England Automated Digital Weather Switch to the FOL; the tasking for AFCC and DCA to provide a dedicated full-duplex communication link from Croughton to the FOL via satellite for the TWAC and DSTE operations; the acquisition of the DSTE and support personnel from Robbins AFB, GA; and the load planning for C-5 deployment from conus to FOL.

7. (TS) On Mar 23rd the JTF SWO and DMSP Satellite Officer deployed from conus locations via C-5 containing DMSP, DSTE, TWAC and all support personnel. Attachment 4, 12 Apr 80, describes the set up of the DMSP
Site 12 at FOL. Attachment 5 highlights some problems encountered with the TWAC reception capabilities.

Comments:

1. (U) OPSEC limited coordination efforts between key agencies as only a small group of individuals were allowed to make all the decisions required for selection and deployment of equipment. This bypassed normal channels of communications or set procedures leading to a lot of confusion, extra research efforts to acquire information already available in proper channels, and possible errors in judgement.

2. (U) Lack of antenna receipt capabilities limited acquisition of known meteorological facsimile products from foreign meteorological centers in the Europe - Middle East region.

Recommendations:

1. (U) Evaluate the use of portable Mark IV DMSP C-130 deployable vans with remote readout capabilities for future efforts. (These vans first became available the fall of 1980)

2. (U) Investigate the development of more reliable antenna receipt capabilities by the TWAC or other futuristic meteorological communication equipment used in bare base sites.

Other Related Items: See reports on Meteorological Surface and Upper Air Data Shortfalls, Meteorological Satellite Shortfalls, and Remote Tactical Weather Sensors.

J2 Personnel Involved: [Redacted] AF/XO00X, A227-1638.

Point of Contacts:

1. [Redacted] HQ AWS/ DOJ (Directorate of Readiness), Scott AFB, IL, A638-4911.

2. [Redacted] HQ AFCC/LGMKS (DMSP Management), Scott AFB, IL, A638-2580.
3. AFGWC/WFM (DMSP Operations), Offutt AFB, NE, A271-5451.

Attachments:


2. (U) Weather Support Concept Paper, 10 Jan 80.


5. (U) Notes on TWAC and DSTE Operations, 26 Apr 80.
AFTER ACTION REPORT
WEATHER ANNEX

8-10 Jan 80 - I prepared a message to AFGWC documenting the station list requirements and sent it before the morning briefing. I presented the morning weather briefing to the two Major Generals. The station list had not arrived from Offutt yet, so we arranged to meet again when I had it ready. I worked again today with the C-130 group trying to get their routes and heights above ground determined. By the end of the day we had the initial routes set-up, coordinates selected, and codes, so I prepared and sent the message requirement for wind route bulletin XXI to AFGWC for support to begin on 9th. AFGWC forwarded the station list to me by mid-day. I prepared a typed listing of the observation stations, both surface and upper air, and prepared maps visually depicting their locations. I presented the list and maps to both generals in the afternoon and briefed them on the sparsity of meteorological information in the Middle East. In particular I pointed out the lack of data in the country of Iran where the number of reliable stations has dwindled to only three 24-hour a-day stations since the Iranian revolution. The sparsity of data in the desert areas is quite evident in the map display, especially for the helicopter route. As of this date there are only 16 other reporting stations in the country of Iran that provide some observations and these are primarily only daylight reports with little or no data at night or on weekends. There are eight upper air stations in Iran that have a pretty good record for reporting. Kerman is the only one near the helicopter route leaving the vast majority of the desert region without any wind data to prepare forecasts for the helicopter bulletin. This is also quite evident in the map display. Presented morning briefing to Lt Col. [redacted] and Col. [redacted] Chief of Staff. Provided first C-130 bulletin XXI to the C-130 planning group. Gave me a new requirement to prepare a paper describing the current weather support in the Pentagon as opposed to how it would work in the field at a FOL, i.e. what weather information do we currently receive at AFGWC to prepare weather support, where does our climatological data come from, how does the information flow to the Pentagon, how long does it take to prepare the data for presentation to the customer, what confidence factors do we have for our forecasts, how would we provide weather to a FOL, and how would we disseminate the information to other locations in the Middle East for the FOL. I called AFGWC to discuss requirement with the Chief of Special Operations. He set out to obtain detailed information for me to plug into the paper, while I continued working on writeup format. I was called upstairs to see Col Kyle; they had changes to the C-130 bulletin already. They changed the time block slightly, altered the routes, and added a refueling area with different altitudes. I coordinated these changes with AFGWC and sent documenting message. By the end of the day I had the paper pretty well written describing the different weather support scenarios. AFGWC did not have forecast confidence figures for that region, so gave reliability figures for the reconnaissance forecasts for that region as a first guess. The figures given were approved at the command level at AFGWC as this was a highly unusual request. First wind verification bulletin for route XIX arrived today for forecast made for the 8th of January.
Presented the morning briefing to the two Major Generals again and gave them the paper on weather support scenario's. We went over the paper line by line discussing how and why things are done; MGEn Gast asked me to add clouds and visibility comments on the route forecasts, which I coordinated with AFGWC to begin the following day. Lt Col asked me to provide another weather officer or senior NCO from AWS resources to be here by the 15 - 16th for in-brief. The individual should be an experienced meteorologist with Middle East experience preferred. He gave me the name of Maj at 12WS in Colorado as a likely candidate, whom MGEn Gast had recommended. I received approval to call BGen Kaehn, Commander of AWS for the selection of this individual. I called BGen Kaehn to pass the tasking. BGen Kaehn stated that had been in Iran but not as a meteorologist. BGen Kaehn would prefer to select an individual from AFGWC resources who knows the capability of the central to provide support. I gave him the authorization to select whomever, but to keep OPSEC in mind, use face-to-face contact or secure phone contact for negotiation. I checked with AFGWC to arrange for top level discussions with BGen Kaehn by key command elements. BGen Kaehn and staff selected at AFGWC. BGen Kaehn asked for permission to brief CINCMAC of tasking and the support that AWS was providing. I coordinated request with Lt Col and received his approval for briefing to CINCMAC with qualification that BGen Kaehn was to mention that AWS support was associated with support being done by MAC Special Operations with the connection being the name of a specific contact individual in that group.
Weather Information.

1. All weather forecast information is derived from a select group of individuals at the Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) at Offutt AFB, NE.

   - Satellite data - DMSF 07-09Z daily
   - Weather observations - 00Z plus available 03Z
   - Upper air soundings (RAOB's) - 00Z
   - AIREPS - random

2. Climatological information is obtained either locally in our own resource library or obtained from USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center (USAFETAC) at Scott AFB, IL.

Information flow from AFGWC to Pentagon.

1. Overall Middle East and Iran forecasts are initiated at 00Z. The forecaster reviews the last 24hrs of data and computerized progs for the region. A hand analysis of the region is prepared every three hours to check the accuracy of the computerized products. The 00Z data base becomes available in an analysis form and in progs between 05-0600Z. Based upon the latest and most reliable data base the forecaster fine tunes his impression of what is to occur for the next 24 hours out to 10 days. The forecaster prepares a written draft between 06-0700Z and has it in final form on DD Form 173 for communication center normally by 0800Z. Depending upon backlog in the center, the message will arrive in the Pentagon somewhere between 0845 and 1130Z.

2. Route wind forecasts. These are prepared for transmission out of AFGWC by 08-10Z and arrive at the Pentagon between 10-12Z. They use the 00Z data base to prepare these route bulletins.

3. Satellite photos. These photos are shipped daily to the Pentagon over a dedicated circuit to a unique Digital Facsimile System between 08-1100Z.

Weather preparation for customer.

1. It takes approximately 2½ - 3 hours to prepare package of information for delivery to customer currently due to inclusion of United States forecast package. Present delivery time varies between 1330-1400Z.

Confidence figures in forecasts.

1. The following information was coordinated with AFGWC.

   - Short-range forecasts: 24-48 hours - 75-80%
   - Medium-range forecasts: 3-5 days - 65%
   - Long-range forecasts: 6-10 days - 55%
TASK FORCE WEATHER SUPPORT

(c) AFGWC will provide Autodin message traffic with all weather forecasts. Weather observations from the Middle East need to be obtained locally via teletype circuit. The Croughton, England Automated Weather Network (AWN) center will have to transmit required weather observations to the communications site in coordination with Lt Col. [Redacted]. The teletype circuit is already in place for use by Navy personnel stationed there. I need to coordinate requirement for specified blocks of data and frequency of transmission. AFGWC will provide the following information:

Bulletin XVII - Weather analysis, every six hours.

Bulletin XII - 1-10 Day forecast for Middle East including Iran and [Redacted].

Bulletin XIX - Route wind forecast for helicopters.

Bulletin XXI - Route wind forecast for C-130's including refueling areas.

Note: Bulletin XII also contains forecasts for point locations - Teheran, Gulf of Oman, and [Redacted]. This can be adjusted to quite easily. The bulletin also contains wind and turbulence forecasts out to 48 hours for Iran and the Persian Gulf.

(c) Dissemination of Weather Information from Offutt and Carriers.

Weather information should arrive between 9-1100Z in Greece from Offutt. The information can be turned around within less than two hours for retransmission to [Redacted] and Carriers for launch decision. Information will be passed either by Autodin or secure voice.

Weather briefing can be presented to Task Force Commander informally or formally within minutes after receipt of messages from AFGWC, formally taking longer to prepare slides or typed material.
1. BARE BASE REQUIREMENTS—AUTODIN AND SECURE PHONE.
   PROVIDE PREFORMATTED WEATHER INFORMATION TO DESCRIBE CURRENT WEATHER,
   FORECAST WEATHER, AND ROUTE WINDS FOR ENTIRE MISSION.

2. VARIOUS EXPANDED WEATHER SUPPORT OPTIONS:
   A. ADD TELTYPE CIRCUIT TO RECEIVE
      1. OBSERVATIONS OF WEATHER OCCURRING
      2. FORECASTS FROM INDIGENOUS LOCATIONS
      3. FORECAST BULLETINS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL FOR REGIONAL MOVEMENT
         OF WEATHER SYSTEMS.
   B. ADD FACSIMILE CIRCUIT TO PROVIDE WEATHER CHARTS FOR AREA OF CONCERN
   C. DEPLOY A DEFENSE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM (DMSP) CONTINGENCY VAN
      INTO THE FORWARD LOCATION FOR DIRECT READOUT OF CURRENT WEATHER AS SEEN
      BY THE SATELLITE. DMSP VAN SUPPORTED BY SUPPLY VAN AND GENERATOR TRAILER.

3. ADDITION OF SUPPORT OPTIONS ABOVE REQUIRE MATERIAL AND MANPOWER SUPPORT, I.E.
   TELTYPE TERMINALS, FACSIMILE EQUIPMENT, EXPENDABLE SUPPLIES, MAINTENANCE FOR A
   1 OFFICER AND 7 NCO'S FOR DEPLOYMENT OF VANS TO INCLUDE GENERATORS REQUIRING
   DIESEL FUEL TO SUPPLY UNINTERRUPTED POWER FOR SATELLITE TRACKING.
   SETTING UP A SMALL WEATHER STATION FOR OBSERVING CHANGING WEATHER ELEMENTS
   OVER A 24-HOUR PERIOD FOR SEVERAL DAYS REQUIRES AN ADDITIONAL WEATHER FORECASTER
   TO ASSIST THE PRIMARY OFFICER IN CHARGE.

BRIEFED: DEN VAUGHT & EAST 28 JAN 80
CONFIDENTIAL THE ARMY 30 JAN 80
SUBJ: After Action Report for the Setting-Up of the Site 12 Transtern

1. Description of Duties: Meteorological Satellite Coordinator (MSC) with the Site 12 Mk111 Transtern (TTS).

2. Timetable of significant events:

FIRST DAY: After a local noon arrival, the TTS, supply van and generator trailer were offloaded. Initial site surveyed for TTS determined to be unsatisfactory due to obstructions to north and west: soft sand; and proximity to communications transmitters. Some calibration followed and the result was an excellent location on a concrete hardstand. While moving the trailers to the hardstand, trouble was experienced with the brakes on all three units. The process of unhooking was awkward and frustrating. Repeated attempts and swapping of air hoses finally brought success. (The air system from the tractor may have been the source of the problem.) A short-notice, high priority requirement was received to have the antenna pedestal and dish mounted by 9 o'clock the following morning. Local crane and crew were obtained to speed the mounting of the pedestal atop the TTS. Pedestal was in position shortly after dark. Generator's performance proved unsatisfactory; one I6U-15 couldn't be started because of a stuck relay; and, the other ran OK but the frequency of the three phases remained unstable. A lighting cart and drop cord light were borrowed from the ACE unit for illumination to aid unpacking during the night.

SECOND DAY: Antenna dish that had been assembled during the darkness was mounted at first light, while the winds were light. Feedhorn was bolted on later in the morning. By mid morning, winds were southerly 20-25 gusting 38 knots with visibility greatly reduced by blowing sand. Generator power was still unreliable. Air conditioner in TTS failed after intake screen plugged with dirt and sand. Air conditioner maintenance got unit going again. Maximum temperature for the day peaked at 100°F. Supply van unpacking continued.

THIRD DAY: Winds switched to southwest 10-15 knots during the night and visibility improved—sandstorm abated. 48 hours had passed since arrival when first EMSP F-4 (FTV 15532) imagery processed successfully. Power supply was unstable and affected sweep alignment. Wide angle phase demodulator unit for TIMOS-II reception could not be located. Requested McClean to send one. Borrowed extra generator (13777-72), so the generators (I6U-15 series) could be worked on.

FOURTH DAY: Beautiful weather finally. Three passes (real time directed) expected this day from F-4, however, eastern pass was not available due to command uplink impossible in darkness on the other side of the world. Message sent to AFGC/NOGO stating site 12 requirements for real time directed. The F-4 data that was copied was of excellent quality and hardcopies (TTL10) were provided to the base forecaster. Arrangements were made for hard copies to be provided daily.

FIFTH DAY: Tracked two F-4 passes but had video problems which were later corrected by reseating a loose card in the block V.
SIXTH DAY: Two-pass day for F-4 and data quality was excellent.

SEVENTH DAY: Lost first F-4 pass due to tracking calculation error. Rapid recalculation allowed recovery of the second pass. TRAC-2 wide angle phase demodulator arrived. Subsequently, the 1080 cards in the A-4 drawer was noted as missing—fortunately identical cards for the 65 circuitry was available and repositioned to make the TRAC-2 circuits complete. "Selector switch for five channel TRAC-2 capability defective on two positions. Switch was quickly repaired. Air conditioner compressor section failed which prevented evening satellite readouts.

EIGHTH DAY: First full coverage of both U27 and TRAC-2 spacecraft. Quality of all images was excellent. Site was fully operational. (The air conditioner and generator failures remained with us. Backup generator stayed at the site while work continued on the EN-15's. Air conditioner limped along while parts were being flown in for repair of the compressor section.)

3. Critique and Recommendations.

a. EN-15 generators: Although these were certified before shipment, the question that should have been addressed by the certifying individuals was, "can they operate for sustained periods of time without extensive maintenance?" One EN-15 ran OK but had a frequency problem. It wouldn't settle down. The second EN-15 had a hung relay in the safety circuitry that had to be bypassed for starting. After running awhile, this generator began throwing oil. (Also upon initial inspection, one of the output cables had a split in the insulation which could have allowed the wire to contact the frame.) Some of the criticism levied against the EN-15's follows: unstable power under varying load conditions, hydraulic governor which is speed sensing rather than load sensing, antiquated (servicing personnel were unfamiliar with the unit) and overly complex safety circuitry, and excessive physical size and weight. Recommend a smaller four stroke diesel (Cokeen series) or turbine generator (AV24-8) to replace the EN-15 on the TSs. If the EN-15's are to be continued, a qualified maintenance person should accompany the generator to insure their operation. MEP was included equipment for testing and testing to a future renovation of the EN's.

b. Air Conditioner: This unit was described as difficult to maintain. Recommend a portable unit be supplied that could be set up and maintained separately from the TS. Also, a qualified air conditioner maintenance person should accompany the TS to insure correct operation. (It should be noted that it was one refrigeration man's opinion that the failure on the eighth day of the compressor section could have been related to the sustained usage of unstable generator power.)

NOTE: Tactical/contingency equipment should be of the highest quality so operations are not plagued with uncertainties about equipment failure. Especially in remote areas, neither the parts nor the extra experienced personnel are available to rebuild these units.

c. Status of the site TSS: It appeared that this TSS had several roles. It was the contingency van, the prototype/cock-up van, and the training van. Under this concept of operations, it was understandable how equipment such as the wide angle phase demodulator and cards from the A-4 drawer would be missing. If the present concept of operations for the TSS is to continue, recommend that in the future the HOC be present to certify the van as operational before it is packed up.
d. Electrical grounding of the site: It was found that an electrical ground was almost impossible to obtain due to the high resistance of the soil. A 19-20 volt potential was measured where a reading of millivolts was expected. (One suggestion was to dig a pit, fill it with charcoal and salt, and frequent waterings would complete the job.) Recommend that vans be supplied with alternate procedures and materials for establishing a good electrical ground in areas where high soil resistance is present.

e. Overcurrent Protection Circuitry: The initial set up of the Block V equipment was complicated by the 24 volt power supply, overcurrent protection circuit. Finally the overcurrent circuit was adjusted above tolerances to allow for routine operation. (In retrospect this was the same solution that was applied years ago at the Guam DUSP site.) Recommend that this protective circuitry on the power supply be examined by the shop to determine if a design is necessary or a change to the T.O. would be appropriate, or both.

f. TIROS-N Channel Selector: The presence of a selector switch which allowed access to any of the five channels of High Resolution Picture Transmission (HRPT) from the TIROS-N spacecraft proved invaluable. Of particular importance were the two channels in the visual spectrum—one channel enhanced cloud while the other heightened land-water contrast which was essential for precision gridding of the transparencies. Recommend that the Block V racks that have received the TIROS-N modification also acquire the five channel capability. This capability is already being designed into the AFSC/AEDG equipment.

g. TIROS-N Visual Imagery: Due to the reduced signal level within the range of voltage available, a brilliance inversion (310x24RV) setting was used. This made the "washed out" images sharp and crisp with an excellent black-to-white contrast. Recommend this setting be used as a first guess when higher contrast images are desired.

h. Tracking Calculations: Two items were needed to supplement the excellent tracking software that was worked up by [Redacted]. These were the microfiche nodal summary for DUSP vehicles and a plotting board for earth central angles which allow azimuth and elevation to be determined manually without computer assistance. Recommend future checklists include these items so they will arrive with the TTS.

i. Lighting: Because of the importance of getting a TTS operational as soon as possible on location, adequate lighting was essential for unpacking and assembling equipment during the hours of darkness. Recommend that the security lights be packed last so that they are one of the first items available upon unpacking. Tungsten security lights would be adequate; four would be ideal. Also a set of drop cord lights should be included for close work (i.e., generator/air conditioning repairs, antenna assembly, etc.).

j. Paper hardcopies: The one roll of TPL101 for copies of satellite imagery was old and unusable. Fortunately, sheets of hardcopy TPL10 were available, although a roll was preferable since the length of the images vary considerably within the station circle. A replacement roll of TPL10 was requested from another site which expressed difficulty in acquiring any more through supply channels. (In retrospect, the availability of this high-quality paper (TPL101 and new TPL110) has been a problem for several years). Because of the excellent gray scale response of this paper, it could retain the detail.
of the optical transparency for picture interpretation, briefing, or retransmission
Normal black image paper lost too much detail. Recommend that the RAPD sys-
tem manager (Smiley) handle this as a special item. They could work with
MRS/ADOS, who currently obtains TTE20 in rolls. The vendor only produces semi-annually
to meet bulk requirements. If this is not within reason, an acceptable substitute
paper should be identified and made available.

k. Billing and Housing: Use of the supply van/TTE complex as an operational
site and living quarters was undesirable. Although it was advantageous to have
technicians close by to handle equipment problems, it was unsettling to have the
site double as a housing/residence area. The crisp distinction between operational
and billing/housing functions was needed. Recommend that TES facilities and
living quarters not be colocated. Only when there are absolutely no billing/housing
facilities available should this distinction between these two important and
separate functions be blurred.

4. In summary (and most important of all), the cooperation and performance of the
McClain AGP Team was outstanding. Only by their personal sacrifice, "can-do" spirit, and noteworthy extra
efforts could the site have been established in so short a time. Also the site
scored handling of the interface and integration into the base com-
munication service structure was absolutely outstanding. In this regard, not
enough can be said in praise for the support provided by the host AFCC personnel
and their OIC, particularly with respect to the ailing generators and air condi-
tioning.

SIGNED

Meteorological Satellite Coordinator

Cc to: MRS/DO

Net 2, SQ MRS

DC AFCC/DO
Notes on TWAC and DSTE Operations

1. The TWAC facsimile product was limited due to capability of the installed HF whip antenna. The HF antenna was only able to receive EURFAAX and Cairo products. All attempts to reach other stations were fruitless. The whip antenna is an omni-directional antenna with low gain. We attempted to acquire Rota, Spain; Guam; Ankara, Turkey; Rome, Italy; Nairobi, Kenya; New Delhi, India; Paris, France; and Khabarook and Moskva, USSR.

2. We requested the maintenance technician to try a dipole antenna. This antenna is directional, receiving in two directions at once, however the gain is only slightly better than the whip antenna. The receipt capability for Cairo was improved, but we still could not obtain other stations.

3. A third step was then taken after consulting with the communications engineer. The technicians constructed a vertical half rhombic antenna, a highly directional antenna receiving in only one direction. The antenna has a gain of about 6db. The antenna was oriented 295° to intercept Rota, Spain. The result was reception of the Rota products with minimum fading/interference, but the quality of the product was quite poor due to the omnidirectional broadcast mode of the Rota facsimile station. This antenna required a lot of ground space to install. Our communication site was congested making it difficult to reorient the directional cable for receipt of other stations. The vertical height of the tower for this antenna was 48 feet with 500 feet of cable used to establish the antenna.

4. The DSTE support was excellent after we were able to get the equipment operational. No significant problems encountered with equipment or personnel. Both TWAC and DSTE traffic were limited at times due to environmental interference between satellite and conus.

Originally prepared on 26 Apr 80 in hand written notes by JTF SWO.
Subject: Exercise Weather Support, Part 1

Time Frame: Dec 79 - Apr 80

Summary:

1. Purpose: This report highlights the types of exercise weather data requested by the JTF staff planners and transmitted to the field during this period in addition to the normal daily weather discussion briefings for the east coast and southwest desert areas of the USA.

2. (U) Weather support to the five exercises during this period began in a rather ad hoc manner, i.e., requested at the last minute for specific information at specified locations. OPSEC constrained coordination of optimum weather support to the exercises, although coordination did improve for the latter exercises as it became increasingly evident to the planners that the impact of weather was critical to the overall mission success. All weather support was coordinated between the JTF Staff Weather Officer, and the planning staff in the Pentagon with no contact between and the field operators except for weather messages sent to the field.

3. (U) Exercise 1 support for the first weekend of Dec 79 began abruptly with a phone call to home Friday evening, shortly after a late afternoon confirmation from the planners that no weekend weather support was required. The planner was referred to a secure contact with the Air Force Global Weather Central duty officer for desired weather information. Solar/lunar data was provided early Saturday morning for the Yuma Proving Grounds location to the planners in computer table format similar to the attached solar/lunar data.
4. (U) Exercise 2 at the Nevada Proving Grounds during the week of 15-19 Jan 80 received a little better weather support due to prior notification of event occurrence. Prepared a message for field distribution by secure communications in the format specified by planners in addition to local weather briefings for SW desert areas.

5. (U) Exercise 3, during the 26 Jan - 2 Feb 80 period, again at Nevada Proving Grounds, received much more weather support, due to poor weather affecting the entire southern half of the USA, delaying the start of exercise by several days, and greater concern on the part of planning staff about impact of weather. Twice daily weather briefings for both the east and west coasts also included mid-continent refueling area climatology and wind/temperature/turbulence forecasts. Field units were given brief weather text description and message format data.

6. (U) Exercise 4, 21-27 Feb 80, again centered on Yuma Proving Grounds with extensive weather support provided locally to planners through solar/lunar data, daily weather forecasts for first 24hrs, and 10-day outlook trends. Field units received weather table format messages and brief text discussion of weather information by secure means.

7. (U) Exercise 5, 21-26 Mar 80, centered on Indian Springs, NV with extensive weather planning coordination, daily weather briefing support to the planning staff, and messages to the field. LtCol was briefed into the staff to provide weather support for this exercise while was TDY to setting up weather support facility in

Comments:

1. (U) Formal climatological evaluations of selected exercise
areas for comparability with Middle East locations were
quested nor developed during this period; somewhat different from
Exercise Weather Support, Part 2.

2. (U) It is extremely important for the planner or operator
to extensively discuss the exercise (i.e., purpose, types of air-
craft, routes, areas of concern, flight levels, times, dates, re-
fueling areas, etc.) with the staff weather officer well in ad-
vance of the exercise and as changes are made to the plans to
optimally tailor the weather support.

Recommendations: The planners/operators need to closely coordinate
with their staff weather officer through all phases of the exer-
cise planning cycle and implementation of mission to insure the
best possible weather support and to decrease the chances of mission
delay or failure.

Other Related Items: See reports on Meteorological Support Package
Development, Climatological Planning Data, and Exercise Weather
Support, Part 2.


Point of Contact:

1. Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC/WFO),
Offutt AFB, NE, A271-6019 (Operational Monitor).

Attachments:
1. Light Data, date irrelevant, Edwards AFB.
2. Lunar Data, date irrelevant, Edwards AFB.
3. (U) Weather Message, 26 Jan 80, Exercise at Nevada Proving
Grounds.
SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR EDWARDS AFB, CA

LATITUDE: 34°54' N  LONGITUDE: 117°52' W  ALTITUDE: 00705 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT  END TWILIGHT

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THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC WEATHER APPLIES TO NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS FOR THE PERIOD

26-30 JANUARY

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SECRET
Subject: Exercise Weather Support, Part 2

Time Frame: May - Dec 80

Summary:

1. (U) Purpose: This report highlights support and lessons learned during deployed exercises for the time frame.

2. (U) HONEY BADGER
   A. (U) Pre-Deployment (May - June)
      (1) (U) Daily and weekly meteorological comparisons of maximum temperature, maximum pressure altitude, and maximum density altitude were made between CONUS test sites and key Middle East locations (copy of this work is an attachment to the historical report on Climatological Planning Data). This was the first exercise that the comparisons were used.
      (2) (U) Based on preliminary planning a meteorological Mission Control Forecast (MCF) Bulletin from Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) was devised. This bulletin provided data not only for sites, but also routes to be used (Centralized Support Bulletin XV - copies were destroyed).
      (3) (U) Daily forecasts and light data for selected CONUS test sites were provided to the J3 (see attachment 1).
      (4) (U) Weather thresholds were examined by Major (J3) and Major (J2). The test thresholds were to be:
         (a) (U) Ceilings less than 1500 feet.
         (b) (U) Visibility less than 3 miles.
         (c) (U) Moderate or greater turbulence.
         (d) (U) Any severe weather phenomena (i.e., floods, freezing precipitation)
         (e) (U) Jump winds greater than 13 knots.
         (f) (U) Surface winds equal to or greater than 45 knots.

B. (U) Deployment (July)
(1) (U) A total of eight weather personnel deployed to support this exercise (Major one member from the weather support element of the 101st Avn Gp), and six members of the 1st Special Operations Weather Team (SOWT). All members either operated out of White Sands or Dugway.

(2) (U) Besides MCF bulletins from AFGWC to White Sands and Dugway, weather stations at both locations were used.

(3) (U) Daily weather briefings were given to elements of the 1st SOW by their weather officers and to elements of the 101st Avn Gp by its weather forecaster.

(4) (U) During the exercise night an SOWT observer deployed with the CCT and took remote observations. These observations were not passed to the command and control location because unforecasted weather conditions developed.

(5) (U) Night Vision Goggles were used for the first time by weather personnel to assist them in taking nighttime observations.

(6) (U) Problems encountered are highlighted in the Comments section of this report.

3. (U) POTENT CHARGE (Sep)

A. (U) Pre-Deployment

(1) (U) Comparative climatological data were prepared and used to help determine test locations (see attachment 2).

(2) (U) Light data was also provided.

(3) (U) Hurricane Allen was closely monitored for potential problems to training elements prior to the exercise.

(4) (U) Coordination on support for the Navy (F-14 exercise operations) by AFGWC was accomplished.

(5) (U) A MCF bulletin from AFGWC was devised and sent to the Pentagon and Hurlburt Field for exercise support (see attachment 3).
B. (U) Deployment

(1) (U) All weather personnel were at Hurlburt to support the exercise (Major and the SOWT).

(2) (U) No weather personnel deployed forward to Reese AFB.

(3) (U) Some logistical problems were encountered (see Comments).

4. (U) POISON DART (Sep)

A. (U) Pre-Deployment

(1) (U) Light data and climatological data for deployment locations provided.

(2) (U) High Frequency propagation forecasts for both the Middle East and CONUS test sites given to the J6.

(3) (U) Centralized MCF for AWACs (Tinker AFB), Navy F-14s, and ground elements were coordinated. Weather forecasts for were to be transmitted by the SOWT at Hurlburt Field at 00Z and 12Z beginning on 26 Sep 80 (see attachment 4). In addition, observations in accordance with the CEOI were also to be passed back from site to Hurlburt. However, could not be contacted although efforts were made daily to do so.

(4) (U) Like POTENT CHARGE all of the meteorological support was to be provided by the SOWT. However, two member of the SOWT (one officer forecaster and an enlisted observer) were to deploy forward with the helicopters to Ft Hood.

B. (U) Deployment

(1) (U) The weather for the first time in any exercise was a big problem as a stationary frontal system developed along the Gulf. Moist air pumped over the system caused low ceilings, rain, and thundershower activity which remained a problem for several days (see attachment 5 for synoptic review). These adverse conditions caused most of the exercise to be accomplished in the Hurlburt area (see Comments).

(2) (U) Based on previous exercises an extensive MCF package was developed (see example in attachment 6).
5. (U) STORM CLOUD (Nov)

A. (U) Pre-Deployment

(1) (U) Extensive meteorological support planning on this exercise with AFSC and AGMWC.

(2) (U) Situational climatology for the exercise sites for Edwards AFB, CA and Indian Springs, NV were provided. Unfortunately, only the Edwards one was published in the OPlan (a sample in attachment 7).

(3) (U) In addition to the situation climatology an area climatology was also provided to the J3 (see attachment 8).

(4) (U) Light data provided for exercise locations (see attachment 9).

(5) (U) Based on the weather problems experienced during POISON DART a more extensive meteorological pre-deployment watch was initiated (see sample in attachment 10).

B. (U) Deployment

(1) (U) None, exercise cancelled.

(2) (U) Problems are noted in Comments section.

Comments:

1. (U) During all exercises Major [redacted] provided in-house support to the planners.

2. (U) HONEY BADGER

A. (U) The largest problem I faced supporting any JTD training exercise was getting the J3 to specifically tell me what was planned. Although I was under J2 control (the interest of the J2 primarily focused on the Middle East weather support), when it came to CONUS exercise support I was thrust over to the J3 with infrequent assistance and guidance at times. This situation gave way to incomplete information and sometimes degraded support.

B. (U) Another large meteorological support problem with this exercise was:

(1) (U) Knowing what unit or system to support, how and when. In all fairness the entire JTD staff element was feeling its way along on this exercise.

(2) (U) Trying to determine the type and number of weather personnel
deployed to the field. Then after working this out, trying to make contact with them to assist in providing them with a MCF.

C. (U) The secure KY 70 was a big help in the exercise. This aided in obtaining much needed support from AFGWC and the Pentagon.

38. (U) POTENT CHARGE. No real major problems except being kept informed by the J2/J3 elements.

48. (U) POISON DART

A. (U) The first problem in the planning was being able to support not only the work in the Pentagon but also providing an experienced planner at Hurlburt. The Staff Weather Officer was pressed into service and did a very fine job except he had to split his time between his job and the planning. Also, he did not possess the inside knowledge of the JTD.

B. Communications with were disastrous. They were later appraised of our efforts and problems.

C. (U) Some deficiencies early in the meteorological watch of the exercise areas posed some minor problems that were later adjusted in STORM CLOUD.

58. (U) STORM CLOUD

A. (U) Found out about this exercise by accident.

B. (U) Was not afforded the opportunity to pre-brief expected weather for the exercise locations to the operational commanders.

C. (U) Was not told by JTD that the exercise was cancelled prior to TDY departure time. Fortunately, my counterpart called to warn and stop me.

Recommendations:

1. (U) The main one is "Keep the Weatherman Informed"! Tell him what, how, why, and when is to be supported as soon as possible.

2. (U) Start meteorological watch of the exercise or test area at least 2-4 days ahead of time.

3. (U) If possible, get a representative from AFGWC in the planning phase (even a TDY) as soon as productively possible.

4. (U) Construct climatological overviews of exercise (test) locations (like
attachments 7 and/or 8) plus light data as soon as possible.

5. (U) Write a weather support annex or plan for every exercise. Make sure the weather support personnel are identified and that they know their tasks as early as possible.

6. (U) Identify meteorological communications requirements to the J6 as early as possible.

Other Related Items: See topics on Exercise Weather Support, Part 1 and Climatological Planning Data.

J2 Personnel Involved: Major A227-1638.

Points of Contact:

1. AFGWC/WFO, Offutt AFB, NE, A271-6019 (Operational Support Contact).

2. Staff Weather Officer or Capt Hurlburt Field, FL, A872-6198 or 7348, (Operational Field Support).

3. AWS/DOJ (Readiness Division), Scott AFB, IL, A638-4911.

Attachments:

1. (U) Sample of light data for Dugway, UT

2. (U) Station Comparison Data for POTENT CHARGE.

3. (U) Sample of the MCF bulletin for POTENT CHARGE.

4. (U) POISON DART CECI (segment for reporting and receiving meteorological data including the centralized forecast), effective 26/1500Z Sep 80.

5. (U) POISON DART synoptic weather review (27/04Z, 28/04Z, and 28/23Z).

6. (U) Sample of the MCF for POISON DART.

7. (U) Sample situation climatic brief for Edwards AFB, CA for November.

8. (U) Southern Sierra Nevada Climatology for October-November.


(Note: A new display developed for the JTF 1-79 Support.)

10. (U) Pre-deployment Meteorological Watch bulletin for STORM CLOUD exercise area.
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**Remarks:**

- Nellis AFB
- McConnell AFB
- Mineral Wells
- Socorro
- Cannon AFB
- White Sands
- Ft. Hood
- Dugway
- Tehran
- Manzariyeh
- Rezaiyeh
- Semanan New
- Gonabad
- Ras Safaniya

*LETAC JOHN MAY 76 0:37*
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

BTSZYUR HWWAAA1559 2541858=39EUHQA.

INMEDIATE

I 101849Z SEP 88
M. AFGH Aloffutt AFB NE////4F/4
O RUEAHQA/DET 2 MO AWS WASHINGTON DC
UCMHA/DET 75 3 MS HURLBURT FIELD FL

CEST

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XUVAC(U)
FORECASTS VALID 11/000Z TO 13/000Z SEP 88
YNOPTIC DISC USSION...

UPPER HIGH PRESSURE CENTERED OVER CENTRAL AREA2 WITH A SURFACE HIGH PRESSURE TO THE N OF AREA2 DOMINATES THE REGION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD. A WEAK, DIFFUSE FRONTAL BOUNDARY EXTENDS THROUGH N AREA1 INTO CENTRAL AREA2. DISSIPATING IN WRN AREA2. THIS BOUNDARY WILL CONTINUE TO WEAKEN THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD, PRODUCING NO SIGNIFICANT WEATHER. STRONG UPSLOPE INDUCED BY THE ANTICYCLONIC FLOW AROUND THE SURFACE HIGH, IS GENERATING AN EXTENSIVE AREA OF LOW STRATUS/FOG; AND DRizzle WITH ISOLATED INBEDDED TS THS IN EXTREME WRN AREA2 AND ERN 1/3 AREA3.

EXPECT THE SURFACE RIDGE TO WEAKEN AND MOVE E THROUGH THE PERIOD AS WEAKENING SHORT WAVE TROUGH TRACKS FROM THE SW SLOWLY PUSHING THE PER RIDGE TO THE S. BY 13/00Z, THE UPPER TROUGHS W ILL HAVE MOVED TO POSITION IN EXTREME WRN AREA3, INDUCING A LEESIDE SURFACE LOW N OF EA3, WITH THE ASSOCIATED TROUGHING SURF. THIS PATTERN WILL CAUSE E UPSLOPE EFFECT TO DIE, CUTTING OFF THE LOW LEVEL MOISTURE, ENDING E PRECIP ACTIVITY IN AREAS2 AND 3 BY 13/12Z AND CLEARING OF THE LOW LINGS BY 13/18Z. EXPECT SCATTERED CONDITIONS TO PREVAIL IN ALL AREAS FROM 12/18Z TO 13/00Z.

CL 31 DEC 86
AS 6

******** AIR FORCE MESSAGE ********

1 2 HQ AWS VIA XCOO...ACT

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

IGN=625254/23278 TOR=80254/2046Z TAD=5254/2048Z CDSN=AFG0053

*************** PAGE 01 OF 01***************

101849Z SEP 88
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

11/02 091949G RUEAHQA
IMMEDIATE
101949Z SEP 80
1 AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE
1 RUEAHQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC
1 CIBHA/DET 75 AWS HURLBURT FLDDFL
1 CIBVA/6550AB W PATRICK AFB FL//0TH//

CRF 09/10 1947Z
*CORRECTED COPY CORRECTED COPY CORRECTED COPY CORRECTED COPY CORRECTED COPY*
TERMINAL FORECASTS VALID 11/02Z - 13/02Z SEP 80

0000
/0024...1804 8023 05HZ 2CU030 1CI320 QNH 2994INS TS/RASH VCNTRY TIL 23
GRADU 0729 2300 320010BR 1CI300 1CI330 QNH2997INS
GRADU 1315 27236 800005HZ 2CU730 1CI320 QNH2992INS TS/RASH
VCNTRY AFT 23

TEMPS MAX 92F/33C MIN 72F/23C MAX PAT...*30FT MAX DA...*2600FT
/0024...23205 8023 05HZ 2CU035 2AC160 2CI320 QNH2992INS CIG06
TS/RASH VCNTRY TIL 0300
GRADU 0709 VFR03 140010BR 1CI320 QNH2995INS
GRADU 1315 2007 650005HZ 2CU330 2CI320 QNH2992INS TS/RASH
VCNTRY AFT 23

TEMPS MAX 90F/32C MIN73F/24C MAX PAT...*IN/C MAX DA...*2500FT

S555
/0024...10006 9999 6ST013 8SC025 8AC277 501280 QNH3222INS CIG010
GRADU 0425 39005 65000520 17BR 85205 8AC277 85C1280

QNH3222INS CIG010

*** AIR FORCE MESSAGE *********

2 HQ AWS VIA XO00...ACT ADV 1

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CN=82254/23914 TOR=82254/21322 TAN=82254/21342 CRSN=AFC073

PAGE 71
101949Z SEP 800
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

GRADU 1719 1500Z 999903ST015 4SC030 2AC125 2C1225
QNH3016INS CIG230
GRADU 2223 VPB25 999905C035 14C105 1C1320 QNH3015INS

TEMPS...MAX 89F/31C MIN 66F/19C MAX PA...31000FT MAX DA...5900FT

LEVEL WINDS/TEMPS VALID 11/0000Z-1200Z
10006/24C
12010/24C
14015/24C

0024...34205 9999 SKC QNH3010INS
GRADU 1415 20212 999901CU030 1AC125 2C1302 QNH3206INS

TEMPS...MAX 87F/33C MIN 61F/16C MAX PA...32000FT MAX DA...5900FT
L 31 DEC 86

S 6
**PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER**

TSZYUW RHHWAAA1561 25419090 RUEAHGA,
MEDIATE
101851Z SEP 80
AFGWC ROFFUTT AFB NE/WF/000
RUEAHGA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC
CLHUA/DET 753 WS HURLBURT FIELD FL

**B-C-R-T**
**B-JEC-T** FORECAST SUPPORT XVZC (U)
**ROUTE** FORECASTS VALID 1100Z-12Z SEP 80

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**H-R-A-Z-A-R-D-S**
00=SSS

**O-U-D-S (SFC=400 ALL LRS):**

- FC3/400 200 1C130/330
- 8SFC05/020 55C230/060 8AC373/150 5C1290/330
- UNDERSTORMS
- FFWMAX TOPS 480 70-03Z
- ISOLD MAX TOPS 453

**R-B-C (MDT OR GTR):**

- NONE

**G (LGT OR GTR):**

- NONE

**C VS BY LT 3 NH:**

- N/A

CL 31 DEC 86
AS 6

--- AIR FORCE MESSAGE ---

T 2 HQ AWS VIA X000 ACT

**ADV 1**

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**MCN=80254/26319**
**TOR=80254/2247Z**
**TAD=8254/2249Z**
**CDSN=AFC265**

--- PAGE 71 OF 316 ---

101851Z SEP 80
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

JTszyuw rhwaaa1592 25419255-RUeAHQ.
IMMEDIATE
J 101852Z SEP 80
F.M. AFGHC OFFUTT AFB NE//WFC
TO RUeAHQ/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC
RUCLHAQ/DET 75 JWS HURLBURT FIELD FL
IT-

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XYD (U)
OUTLOOK VALID 13/0200Z TO 16/0300Z SEP 80

SYNOPTIC DISCUSSION...AT START OF PERIOD A FNTR SYSTEM IS N OF THE
AREAS, AS LOW NE OF AREAS MOVES EWD THE FNTR WILL DRIFT SLOLY SINTO
HE N PART OF AREA 2 BY 14/02Z; NW PART OF AREA 1 EXTEND E-W ACROSS
AREA 2 BY 15/02Z AND BY THE END OF THE PERIOD THE FRONT WILL EXT
FROM THE CENTER OF AREA 2 NORTHEAST ACROSS THE W 1/3 OF AREA 1; A
ONE SCT TO BKN LOW-MID-HI CLOUDS CAN BE EXPECTED WITH THE FRONT ALONG
ITH A POSSIBILITY OF SOME ISOLATED RAIN/THUNDERSTORMS ALTHOUGH THE FNTR
ILL BE FAIRLY WEAK IN THESE AREAS. VSRY WILL BE GOOD OCCASIONALLY
AIR IN THE RAIN/THUNDERSTORMS AND WINDS WILL BE S BECOMING W AS THE
VT MOVES THRU THE AREA. PORTIONS OF THE AREAS AWAY FROM THE FRONT
ILL CONTINUE TO HAVE SCT SKIES AND GOOD VSBY AND WINDS WILL BEG
ENERALY SOUTHERLY.

SL 31 DEC 86
AS 6

***** AIR FORCE MESSAGE *****

T 2 HQ AWS VIA XCOO...ACT

ADVAD 1

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

IGN=82254/22869 TOR=82254/21312 Tag=82254/21112z CDSN=AFG373

PAGE 71 OF 71
101852Z SEP 80
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

TTSZYUW RHWWAAA1563 25419000•RUEHGA;
MEDIATE
101852Z SEP 80
AFGHAN OFFUTT AFB NE/HF/
RUEHGA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC
JCHUA/75 3 WS HURLBURT FIELD FL

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XVCE (U)

HF FORECAST
FORECAST SUPPORT 15E
UT=UNIVERSAL TIME
MUF=MAXIMUM USABLE FREQUENCY
FOT=FOURQUENCY OF OPTIMUM TRANSMISSION

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CL 31 DEC 86
AS 6

*** AIR FORCE MESSAGE ***

T 2 HQ AWS VIA X000...ACT

ADV= 1

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

MCN=80254/20323 TOR=80254/20472 TAD=80254/20482 CDSN=AFC764

PAGE 21 OF 7100
101852Z SEP 80
WEATHER REPORT FORMATS:

1. The "FORECAST" format will be used in transmitting forecasted information to field elements. Do not transmit data in parenthesis:

   A. Forecasts
   B. (Day-Month)
   C. (ZULU times) either 00-12 OR 12-00
   D. (Sky condition) clear/partly/cloudy
   E. (Ceiling) None/XXXX (Feet)
   F. (Visibility) Unlimited/X (MILES)
   G. (Precipitation) None/Rain/Fog
   H. (Winds-Direction/Max) Calm/SE AT 5
   I. (Temperature-Max/Min) 73 and 64

NOTES: Unlimited Visibility = Greater than 7 miles. Temperatures are for next 24 hours.

2. Example:

   A. FORECAST
   B. 27 SEP
   C. 00-12
   D. PARTLY
   E. 5,000
   F. 5
   G. NONE
   H. NW AT 10
   I. 72/57
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

SFGBC RHWWAAA2778 2721808--RUEAHQA.
EDIATE
81508Z SEP 80
AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE
RUEAHQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC
CHUA/DET 75 3WS HURLBURT FLD FL

AFGWC
SUBJECT: FORECAST (U)
29 SEPTEMBER
VALID: 0000Z-1200Z
SKY CONDITION...PARTLY CLOUDY
CEILING...NONE
WSBY.....7+
WEATHER...NONE
WINDS.....34008
TEMPS.....MAX 78F MIN 57F
REMARKS...MIN ALTIMETER...2990INS
31 DEC 86

** AIR FORCE MESSAGE *****
NCE COPY TO: DET 2 HQ AWS VIA X000 TUBES

2 HQ AWS VIA X000...ACT

ON DET 2 HQ AWS (VIA X000)(1)

ADV 1
ADV 1

(N,C)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 2

N=80272/06294 TOR=80272/1808Z TAD=80272/1815Z CDSN=SCM262
3. The "OBSERVATION" format will be used in transmitting locally observed information from field elements. Do not transmit data in parentheses:

A. OBSERVATION
B. (Day-Month)
C. (ZULU-time of Observation)
D. (Sky condition) Clear/Partly/Cloudy
E. (Ceiling Estimated) None/XXXX (Feet)
F. (Visibility Estimated) Unlimited/X (Miles)
G. (Precipitation) None/Rain/Fog
H. (Winds Estimated - Direction/Max) Calm/SE AT 5
I. (Temperature) 70 (Degrees F.)
J. (REMARKS)

4. Example:
A. OBSERVATION
B. 27 SEP
C. 1430
D. CLOUDY
E. 7,000
F. 3
G. FOG
H. CALM
I. 70
J. LOW PATCHES OF FOG SEEM TO BE LIFTING
Poison Dart

- Ceiling less than 3000 ft

27/04Z
Poison Dart
Airmass flow has become zonal across the area as the long wave trough of Area 1 has shifted to the east. The upper-air trough still persists SW of Area 3. Surface high pressure cell has pushed well to the east of Area 1. The surface front lies just south of Sparkler, Shank, and Coffee and then west to Vendetta. Moisture in the mid level continues to pour over the northern 1/2 of Area 1 from Area 2. 700mb ridge continues to hold its position just south of Area 1. The 700mb northwesterlies over the western portion of Area 1 have veered during the past hours allowing moisture to be advected over the front area. Near Area 1, sat pics continue to hold the mid and high clouds from just south of Sparkler to just north of Olive and then west. LFM shows little change in the position of the mid level moisture and across the area of interest. This appears reasonable. The location of the moisture band at the mid levels and the elongated upper troposphere pattern over Area 2 and progged to move east will be favorable for continued rain and lowering ceilings across the northern 1/2 of Area 1. Rain to continue over southeast 1/2 of Area 2 for 24-36 hours and then decrease substantially thereafter. The 700mb flow remains drier from the northwest. A frontal wave will ripple from the front area and will be located in the vicinity of 40°N 36°W 36 hours. This wave will be weak as the upper-air support.

*** AIR FORCE MESSAGE *****

ANCE COPY TO: X000

ADV 1

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

IGN=80272/0597 TOR=80272/16597 TAD=80272/16597 CNS=AFG147

PAGE 01

DCI RECP PR16597 SEP 80
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

NTTSCGRC RNWWAAA2654 2721657—RUEAHA.
IMMEDIATE
Q 291657Z SEP 80
PM AFGRC OCEEUTT AFB NE
TO RUEAHAQ/NET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC
RUCIMUA/DFT 75 3WS HURLBURT FLO FL
RT

SPECIAL AFGRC
SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-8(III)
1. TERMINAL FORECASTS VALID 29/000Z SEP 80 - 01/000Z OCT 80
A. SHAMROCK
29/0024...17006 9999 2CU030 2CI250 QNH2995INS TS VNCY TIL 03
GRADU 0809 17007 4800 10PR 6ST010 2CU030 QNH2992INS C1G010
TS/RASH VNCY
GRADU 1415 20016 9999 3CU030 2AC100 4CI250 QNH2983INS
C1G250 TS VNCY AFT 20

TEMPS...MAX 89F/31C MIN 72F/22C MAX PA...+130FT MAX DA...+2400FT
30/0024...24008 9999 2CU030 1AC100 4CI250 QNH2983INS C1G250
TS VNCY TIL 03
GRADU 1011 21005 6000 10PR 2CU030 4CI250 QNH2992INS C1G250
TS VNCY AFT 20

TEMPS...MAX 89F/31C MIN 70F/21C MAX PA...+400FT MAX DA...+2450FT
H. LETTERHEAD
29/0024...34008 9999 1AC120 3CI250 QNH2990INS
GRADU 0910 01006 9999 SKC

TEMPS...MAX 78F/26C MIN 57F/14C MAX PA...+430FT MAX DA...+6650FT
30/0024...09005 9999 SKC QNH3003INS

TEMPS...MAX 74F/23C MIN 52F/11C MAX PA...+4240FT MAX DA...+6200FT
I. SCHOOL
29/0024...06005 9999 60RA 6SC120 8AS100 6CS200 QNH2994INS C1G020
GRADU 0608 04005 4300 60RA 103R 6ST010 8AS100 5CS200 C1G009
GRADU 1617 20006 8000 05HZ 5SC200, 5AC100 5CI250 QNH2997INS

****** AIR FORCE MESSAGE ******
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NET 2 HQ AWS VIA XCPN...ACT

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MCN=80272/05919 TFR=AC272/16597 TAI=80272/17002 CDSN=PRBR302

PAGE 01

*************** PAGE 01

291657Z SEP 80
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

TFGBC RHWWAAA2656 2721700--RUEAHQA.
MEDIAN
281700Z SEP 80
AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE
RUEAHQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC
CLHUA/DET 75 3MS HURLBURT FLD FL

AFGWC

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-C PART I(U).
TERMINAL FORECASTS VALID 2900Z SEP - 0100Z OCT 80

0024...WVRG5 9999 05HZ 1CU030 2AC080 4CI250 QNH3000INS CIG250
       GRADU 0809 24006 2400 10BR 8ST010 QNH2995INS
       CIG010 TS/RASH VCNTRY
       GRADU 1516 30008 6000 60RA 10BR 8ST015 QNH2987INS CIG015
       TS/RASH VCNTRY
       TEMPS...MAX 87F/30C MIN 68F/20C MAX PA...+80FT MAX DA...+2100FT
0024...30000 6000 60RA 10BR 8ST015 QNH2985INS CIG015
       TS/RASH VCNTRY TIL 09
       GRADU 1516 24006 6000 10BR 8ST015 QNH2983INS CIG015
       INTER 1620 34008 4800 60RA 10BR 6ST015 8NS050 CIG015
       TS/RASH VCNTRY AFT 17
       TEMPS...MAX 87F/30C MIN 69F/20C MAX PA...+120FT MAX DA...+2250FT

ANDPiper

0024...05010 9999 5SC030 8AC100 4CI250 QNH2992INS CIG030
       INTER 0004 05010 6000 60RA 10BR 8ST010 CIG010
       GRADU 0405 08010 4800 60RA 8ST005 5AC050 QNH2990INS CIG005
       GRADU 1011 03010 3200 60RA 8ST005 QNH2986INS CIG005
       TS VCNTRY
       TEMPS...MAX 80F/27C MIN 67F/19C MAX PA...+110FT MAX DA...+1300FT
0024...06010 6000 60RA 8SC015 8NS050 QNH2985INS CIG015
       GRADU 0809 08006 6000 60RA 10BR 6ST008 8SC015 QNH2982INS

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ADV 1

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PAGE 01
281700Z SEP 80
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SFGBC RHWWAAA2681 2721711--RUEAHQA.
EDITATE
31711Z SEP 80
AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE
RUEAHQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC
HUA/DET 75 3WS HURLBURT FLD FL

AFGWC

JECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-D (U)
PURPLE ROUTE

"E FORECAST WINDS/TEMPS/DA/PA/D-VALS VALID 29/00Z-30/00Z SEP 80

FL 03Z 09Z 15Z 21Z PARAMETER
AA 005 12010/30C 15015/23C 21020/22C 24012/29C AA DA 2400 PA 130
AB 005 12010/27C 15015/18C 21020/17C 24012/26C AC DA 2050 PA 220
AB 020 14010/22C 16010/17C 17010/16C 18010/21C AA DVAL 250 ADD

CQ 005 12010/25C 15015/18C 21020/17C 24012/24C CQ DA 2650 PA 370
AC 005 12010/30C 15015/23C 21020/22C 24012/24C A3 DA 2250 PA 40

AIR REFUEL ROUTE........VALID 28/2100Z-29/0900Z
S AT FL050-160............24020
-----------------------------P100C
.........................P550FTAD

E FORECAST HAZARDS VALID 29/00-24Z SEP 80

PURPLE

DS (SFC-140)...

8ST015/030 6AS050/080
4ST015/030 8NS050/080
8ST005/030 8NS050/080
8ST010/030 6AS050/080

** AIR FORCE MESSAGE **
NCE COPY TO: X000

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ADV 1

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PAGE 01

SECRET

281711Z SEP 80
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

UNDERSTORMS........ ISOLD MAX TOPS 450
RBC (MDT OR GTR)..... NONE.
G (LGT OR GTR)....... NONE.

WEATHER.............. STEADY RAIN/RAINSHOWERS MIDPT AA/AB-3/4PT CR/AA
VSBY 1-3 RAIN/RAINSHOWERS AD-AF
VSBY LESS THAN 1 FOG  CQ-3/4PT CR/AA
VSBY 2-3 FOG.......... 3/4PT CR/AA-AA

AIR REFUELING VT 28/2100Z-29/0900Z
RUDS (050-160)....... LOCATION
4ASO50/080 6CSS250/300 RTE

UNDERSTORMS........ ISOLD MAX TOPS 450
RBC (MDT OR GTR)..... NONE.
G (LGT OR GTR)....... NONE.

IL 31 DEC 86

N=80272/06001 TDR=80272/1712Z TAD=80272/1727Z CDSN=SCM253

SECRET

PAGE 02 OF 02
281711Z SEP 80
Situation Climatic Brief

Edwards AFB, CA

November

1. General. Site E is generally clear to partly cloudy in November with chilly nights and mild days. Skies are clear 42-68% of the time. Maximum cloudiness occurs between 0900 and 1700 local time. Mean cloudiness is 17-23% at night and 28-34% during the day. Morning minimum temperatures average 36°F increasing to 66°F during the afternoon. Precipitation occurs on about 3 days per month. Thunderstorms are very rare. The prevailing surface wind direction at night is southwest to west (11-17% of the time) at mean speeds of 3-10 knots. Calm winds occur 19-29% of the time. Daytime wind directions are variable, but show a slight tendency to be north-easterly. Speeds are 3-16 knots, and calms occur 19-34% of the time.

2. Flying Weather. Good to excellent. Cloudy and rainy conditions are infrequent. Ceilings less than 5000 feet and/or visibilities less than 5 miles occur 3-6% of the time; less than 1500/3 1% of the time or less. Conditions less than 500/1 are rare. Icing and turbulence are usually not a problem.

3. Exposure Weather. Generally pleasant. Nighttime temperatures are chilly, but reach the mid 60's during the afternoon. Sunshine is abundant and rain is rare. Relative humidity varies from an early morning high of 60-65% to an afternoon low of 35-40%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolute Maximum (°F)</th>
<th>85</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Maximum</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Minimum</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Minimum</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days with Precipitation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snow</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fog</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95% Worst DA</td>
<td>4800Ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95% Worst PA</td>
<td>2400Ft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Less than 0.5 day
Southern Sierra Nevada Climatology
for October-November

The weather in this area during late October and early November is characterized by mild temperatures and a high percentage of clear skies or scattered clouds. Precipitation amounts increase from .1-.2 inches in October to about .5 inches in November. Mean maximum temperatures decrease from the low 80's (deg F) to the upper 60's; mean minimums decrease from near 50 to about 40. The percent of time that a cloud ceiling exists increases from about 25% in October to around 35% in November. Ceilings less than 5000 feet and/or visibilities less than 5 miles occur rarely in October and less than 2% of the time in November. Winds below 1000 feet AGL tend to be northerly or northeasterly at 10-12 knots. From 1000 feet to 5000 feet AGL winds are south-southwesterly at 15-20 knots with a secondary direction from the north-northeast. The prevailing surface wind direction is northerly (on the east side) and southwesterly (on the west side) at 8-10 knots (about 10% of the time with that wind speed). However, calm winds occur about one-third of the time. Surface winds occasionally (about 1% of the time) stir up dust during the afternoon, especially in October. Icing should not be a problem due to the relatively warm temperatures and lack of low level cloudiness.
<table>
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<td>11:28</td>
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</table>

**LOCAL (Z - 8:0 HRS) NAUTICAL TIME - INDIAN SPRINGS, NEVADA**

- Morning
- Darkness
- Afternoon
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-A(U)
SYNOPTIC DISCUSSION VALID 21/1200Z - 24/0000Z NOV 80
AT 500MA... MODEL OUTPUT STILL SHOWS SIGNS OF INSTABILITY FROM ONE *
PROG CYCLE TO THE NEXT. THE BASIC PATTERNS OF THE SYNOPTIC SCALE
WAVES, BOTH UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM OF THE AREA OF INTEREST ON EACH
PROG CYCLE, AGREES. BUT THE SPEED OF THE WAVES ARE IN DISAGREEMENT.
THE EFFECT THIS INSTABILITY WILL HAVE ON THE FORECASTS WILL INVOLVE
THE POSITIONS OF THE PRIMARY SURFACE LOWS, WHICH WILL REMAIN WELL
NORTH OF THE FORECAST AREAS, AND THE LOCATION OF THE TRAILING FRONT.
THE ONLY ADJUSTMENT ON THIS FORECAST FROM THE PREVIOUS FORECAST
INVOLES THE LOCATION OF THE COLD FRONT THAT WILL SETTLE DOWN ACROSS
THE CENTRAL REGIONS. EAST TO WEST OF AREAS 2 AND 3. AT 21/127 A
RAPIDLY MOVING, FULL LONGITUDINAL TRIF WILL BE OVER CENTRAL AREA 1
AND MOVING EAST AT 25KTS. BY 22/00Z THE TRIF WILL BE APPROACHING
THE EAST EDGE OF AREA 1 AND BY 22/12Z WILL BE EAST OF AREA 1. THE
ASSOCIATED FRONTAL SYSTEM WITH ITS CLOUDS AND WEATHER WILL STAY WELL
TO THE EAST OF AREA 1. AS RIDING DEVELOPS AT ALL LEVELS OVER AREA 1
GUSTY SURFACE WINDS A POSSIBILITY ALONG EAST EDGE OF AREA 1 AS
PRESSURE GRADIENT TIGHTENS IN RESPONSE TO DEVELOPING SYSTEM TO THE
EAST. SURFACE WINDS WILL ABATE BY 22/12Z AS LOW MOVES EAST.
NEXT UPSTREAM TRIF WILL BE APPROACHING THE REGION NORTH OF AREA 4
BY 21/12Z AND WILL MOVE EAST AT 30KTS. BY 23/00Z THE TRIF WILL BE
OVER CENTRAL AREA 2. SIGNIFICANT PUSH OF COLD AIR WILL FORCE
THE SURFACE FRONT TO THE NORTHERN REGIONS OF AREAS 3 AND 4 BY 22/00Z

***** AIR FORCE MESSAGE *****

DFT 7 HQ AWS VIA XCT...ADV 1

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**********SECRET**********

PAGE 01 193905Z NOV 80
Subject: Climatological Planning Data

Time Frame: Nov 79 - Dec 80

Summary:

1. (U) Purpose: This report highlights the climatological data (historical meteorological information) provided to the planners and/or the operators during this period to optimize decision making.

2. (U) Most of the background climatological information used during the period came from the USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center (USAFETAC) at Scott AFB, IL.

3. (U) Climatological information was necessary to help support route planning, flight times, check aircraft load requirements, size exposure weather requirements, determine if test locations was compatible with Middle East locations, and many other interest and planning items.

4. (U) Most of the products provided during the period fall into the following categories (examples of each are found in the attachments):

   A. (U) Seasonal Location Summaries. These included situational climatic briefs, usually of several pages, which were generally on Middle East countries of interest and used mostly by the intelligence community.

   B. (U) Monthly Summaries. These are items of paragraph length that highlight specific geographic locations (i.e., Tehran) or planned operations (i.e., routes) used by both the planner and operator.

   C. (U) Monthly Parameter Values. Usually a tabular display of data provided to planners or operations personnel containing some expected values in CONUS or the Middle East. This also included monthly and/or daily comparisons of several parameters between CONUS test sites and Middle East operation locations.

Comments: (U) It is extremely important for the planner or operator to discuss with the staff weather officer needed climatological support. The weatherman needs to know what data are required and why so that the greatest benefit can be gained from the information.
Recommendations:

1. (U) If climatological data are needed the following information is helpful:
   
   A. (U) What is planned or why is the information needed (see Comments)?
   
   B. (U) Location(s), Date(s), and Time(s).
   
   C. (U) The desired parameters to be provided, such as temperatures, cloud cover, visibility, ceilings, precipitation, pressure altitude, etc.
   
   D. (U) The information is desired in what form (i.e., narratives, tabular, or maps/charts)?

2. (U) If a training exercise or an actual operation is planned, the following is needed:
   
   A. (U) Type of aircraft, system, or organization.
   
   B. (U) Route or area of interest.
   
   C. (U) Flight level, if applicable.
   
   D. (U) Take-off and Landing Times (this item and C above help to develop a computerized flight plan to check planned times against climatological winds).
   
   E. (U) What environmental criteria would terminate operations (specific values help, i.e., 3000 foot or less ceilings; not just ceilings).
   
   F. (U) Refueling Area/Time.


Points of Contact:

1. [redacted] AF/XOOO, A227-1638 (The DOD Climatologist).

2. AWS/DOOX (Central Support Division at Air Weather Service Headquarters), Scott AFB, IL, A638-4673 (Requirements).

3. USAFETAC/DO (Operations Branch), Scott AFB, IL, A638-4024 (Operational Monitors).

Attachments:

1. (U) Iran Situation Climatic Brief (May–October).

2. (U) Weather Information for NW Iran.

3. (U) Tabriz, Iran Temperature, Pressure Altitude, and Density Altitude Data.
4. (U) July Daily Temperature Comparisons Between Dugway, UT and

5. (U) Iran/Afghanistan Mean Thaw Date of Surface Soil.
1. **GENERAL.** The weather is hot, dry, windy and virtually rainless. Temperatures along the Persian Gulf Coast and the southern interior reach daily maximums of 100-120°F. Locations in the north and along the Caspian Sea reach daily maximums of 85-100°F. Except for the Caspian Sea area, all of Iran reports less than ½ inch of rainfall per month. Many locations report no rainfall at all. Skies are virtually cloudless 70-80% of the time. June through the middle of July is dominated by the "Shamal". This wind blows down the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers across western Iran creating almost a constant dust/sandstorm problem which may last several days. Winds from the northwest across the Seistan Valley (approximately 31°N, 61°E) during May through September cause frequent dust storms. This phenomena is called the "Wind of 120 Days". Both these wind systems are dry and the result of the thermal low pressure system dominate over the Persian Gulf during the summer months. These winds are strongest during daytime, sometimes as high as 60 knots, but usually weaken to a breeze at night. Wind speeds of 25 knots or greater are reported 5-15% of the time over most of Iran.

2. **FLYING WEATHER.** Flying weather is generally good. The percent frequency that the ceiling/visibility is less than 5000 feet/6 miles ranges from 5-10%; less than 1500/3 approximately 1% of the time. Flying activities may be restricted due to high winds and/or sandstorms/duststorms.

3. **RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER.** Reconnaissance weather is generally good. The percent frequency that the cloud cover is less than 2/8ths ranges from 80-95%. The visibility is less than 2½ miles 1-5% of the time over most of Iran. Generally the late evening or early morning hours are the most favorable for aerial reconnaissance. Sandstorms/duststorms may lower the visibility during the afternoon hours.

4. **TERMINAL WEATHER.** Tehran, Iran. The weather is hot, windy and virtually rainless and cloud free. During the hottest months, the daily maximum temperatures will be in the high 90's and will reach 110°F on rare occasions. Rainfall is expected on 6 days in May and on 1-2 days the rest of the months. Ceiling/visibility less than 300/1 is rare. Gusty surface winds greater than 16 knots are expected 10-20% of the time for June through August and 5% in other months. Gale force winds are rare. Runway crosswinds greater than 15 knots are expected approximately 1% of the time.

5. **EXPOSURE WEATHER.** The weather is hot, dry and dusty over most of Iran. Temperatures may exceed 120°F in the interior desert regions. Sandstorms/duststorms are frequent and may last for several days.
6. PARACHUTING WEATHER. Over most of Iran the weather conditions are favorable for parachuting 75-95% of the time. However, in southern Iran, from approximately 31N southward, during the afternoon hours, weather conditions are favorable only 35-45% of the time. Over all of Iran weather conditions are unfavorable for parachuting primarily due to winds in excess of 13 knots. Generally, only in northern Iran, particularly along the Caspian Sea would cloudiness and/or rainfall be a factor.

7. ASTRONOMICAL DATA. Tehran, Iran

Civil Twilight (Standard Time of the Meridian 52 DEG 30 Min)

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<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
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<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
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<th>OCT</th>
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<td>1952</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>1756</td>
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Prepared: 4 November 1980
SEPTEMBER

September weather is hot, dry, and dusty. Average temperatures range from a low in the low to mid 60's to a high in the mid to upper 80's. Skies are clear to partly cloudy with ceilings only six percent of the time. Visibility is good with dust being observed only two days per month. Rainfall for the month is normally less than \( \frac{1}{2} \) inch. Thunderstorms are very rare. The prevailing wind direction is northerly in the morning backing to a southerly direction by mid-afternoon. The average windspeed is five knots.

OCTOBER

Temperatures begin to drop with a diurnal range in the low 50s to the middle 70s. This cooling trend is accompanied by an increase in cloudiness. Ceilings prevail over the area about 20 percent of the month. Visibility is good with dust being a problem only two days during the month. Rain falls on an average of two days in October totaling less than \( \frac{1}{4} \) inch. The winds are northerly at five knots during the morning, becoming westerly at eleven knots in the afternoon.

NOVEMBER

The transition to winter is now completed with average high temperatures now reaching only in the low 60s, and the lows are in the low 40s. Ceilings are present 31 percent of the time. Visibility remains above 2\( \frac{1}{2} \) miles 99 percent of the time with dust a problem generally one day during the month. An average of 0.8 inches of rain fall on about five days during November. Winds are northerly at four knots during the morning and westerly at eleven knots in the afternoon.

DECEMBER

During December the mercury reaches a high of only 50 degrees and lows are at the freezing mark. Ceilings persist 42 percent of the time. Visibility stays above 2\( \frac{1}{2} \) miles 96 percent of the month. Dust is observed one day during the month. Snow falls on an average of two days per month and rain falls seven days during December. Precipitation normally totals 1.2 inches for the month. Winds are northerly at four knots during the morning hours and westerly at eleven knots in the afternoon.
# CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA SHEET

**STATION:** TABRIZ, IRAN  
**PERIOD OF RECORD:** JAN 1973 - DEC 1979  

## DATA:

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<th>09Z</th>
<th>12Z</th>
<th>15Z</th>
<th>18Z</th>
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</table>

| **PA** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **ABSOLUTE** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **95% WORST** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **90% WORST** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **MEAN** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

| **DA** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **ABSOLUTE** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **95% WORST** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **90% WORST** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **MEAN** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## REMARKS:

* - No Data Available

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**USAF/TAC FORM** MAY 76 0-37  

[Signature]

[Attachment]
Subject: Meteorological Satellite Shortfalls

Time Frame: Nov 79 - Dec 80

Terms:
1. DMSP - Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
2. NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Summary:
1. (U) Purpose: This report highlights the operational loss of orbital weather satellites during the period. Other meteorological satellites are also noted in the report.

2. (U) Entire Time Frame:
   A. (C) During this period four weather satellites (all orbital) either totally or partially suffered operational failure.
   B. (C) One replacement DMSP vehicle failed to achieve orbit in July 1980.
   C. (U) Other historical events are highlighted in the attachments.

3. (U) The Raid:
   A. ( ) During the raid only two DMSP vehicles were operational or partially operational during daylight hours and none were operational during nighttime hours.
   B. ( ) Also during the raid two NOAA civilian satellites were in operation and were used to make the initial forecast.

Comments: None

Recommendations:
1. (U) Continue to monitor satellite status.

2. (C) Continue to investigate the receipt of all available geostationary satellite data to supplement existing orbital data. This is especially true of the METEO SAT II being launched in Europe in March 1981.

Other Related Items: See the report topic on Meteorological Surface and Upper Air Data Shortfalls.

J2 Personnel Involved: [Redacted] AF/X000X, A227-1638 or 1159.
Points of Contact:


Attachments:

1. (S) Memo for MG Secord, 12 Aug 80, Degradation of the DMSP Data on Operational Forecasting.

2. (S) Memo for Director JCS, 10 Sep 80, Degraded Weather Forecasting Capability.

3. (S) Memo for MG Vaught, 4 Nov 80, Operational Loss of the TIROS-N (NOAA One) Meteorological Satellite.

4. (S) 22 Dec 80 Analysis of the Percent Availability of Required Weather Satellite Data (Orbital).
MEMORANDUM FOR: MG Secord

12 August 1980

SUBJECT: Degradation of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Data on Operational Forecasting

1. Problem: The DMSP (F-4 satellite) permanently lost all operational capability on 9 Aug 80 at 0721Z.

2. Current Capability: There are three meteorological satellites currently in orbit. Two civilian NOAA satellites (NOAA Six and TIROS-N) make two passes (one daylight and one nighttime) per day. The DMSP F-3 satellite also makes two passes per day; however, the infrared (for nighttime photographs) capability is no longer operational.

3. Impact: The F-4 satellite loss leaves the Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) with only five usable satellite passes per day. AFGWC cannot at present process the fine resolution (one kilometer) data from the NOAA satellite passes. Fine resolution data are used to detect localized dust/sand storms and expand/blow up an area for a closer look. The loss of F-4 fine data and the inability to process the NOAA fine resolution data at AFGWC tremendously impacts the daily forecasting capability, especially in data sparse areas or in resolving small scale phenomena. The F-3 only provides limited daylight area coverage and degraded visual images every second or third day over the Middle East.

4. Additional Information:

   a. A new NOAA satellite (TIROS-N) is scheduled for launch in April 1981.

   b. The DMSP is tri-service used and is funded through USAF. The next DMSP (F-6santellite) launch is scheduled for Sep - Nov 1981. The F-5 satellite failed upon launch on July 1980.

   c. The tactical MARK III satellite van at Wadi Kena has the capability to receive fine civilian NOAA data down to one kilometer resolution. With only five passes a day; however, the data are not as timely as it was prior to the F-4 failure. In addition, the data received at the van cannot be transmitted back to AFGWC for centralized forecasting.

5. Possible Solutions:

   a. The Secretary of the Air Force has requested that AFSC's Space Division, the DMSP SPO, convert block V central display machines at AFGWC to process the fine (one kilometer) TIROS-N series satellite imagery. This conversion display will greatly improve AFGWC's current capability. The current NET date is 15 Oct 1980 for the conversion and a NLT date of 1 Apr 1981.
b. A Meteo Sat II (European Meteorological Satellite) is scheduled for launch about Nov 1980 with a capability similar to the U.S. GOES (Geostationary Environmental Satellite) product seen on television weather shows. Fine resolution (about 1/2 mile) and an expand capability should be available from Meteo Sat over the Middle East. Present planning calls for receipt of this data only at civilian European sites; however, we are favorably pursuing a method of obtaining this data in CONUS.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Degraded Weather Forecasting Capability

1. I am distressed by the degraded state of our weather forecasting capability. As you can see from the attached paper, the capability of the Defense Meteorological Satellite program will soon be zero. The TIROS-N civilian system could deteriorate.

2. In view of all the criticism leveled about weather the last time, I want to be sure that everyone above me understands that the present forecasting capability is considerably less than what we had in April. It is clearly below the present state of the art. In a word, unsatisfactory.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA
SUBJECT: Defense Meteorological Satellite (DMSP) and Civilian Satellite Status Sheet (U)

I. DMSP: Minimum stated requirement is for two polar orbital satellites taking two photos per vehicle (one night/one day).
   - During a military crisis these systems provide the only encrypted satellite data. The civilian data might be denied.
   - Picture resolution is 1/3 mile across the entire photo.

II. TIROS-N (US Civilian/NOAA)
   - Presently two polar orbital vehicles up and operating; however, one is past its design lifespan. New vehicle scheduled for launch in Apr 81.
   - Each system is estimated to be 60% the capability of a DMSP vehicle.
   - Picture resolution is 1/2 mile at photo center and 3 1/2 miles at the edge.
   - Pictures are taken by TIROS-N (past its design lifespan) at 1530 and 0330 hours (local) and NOAA 6 at 1930 and 0730 hours.

III. METEOSAT (European Civilian/Geo-Stationary orbit)
   - Expected launch date is Feb 81.
   - Useful data are limited to 50N and 50S by 40W and 40E (not helpful east of Turkey and central Saudi Arabia).
   - Picture resolution is 1/2 mile at photo center and about 100 miles at the edge.
   - Presently evaluating receive capability for tactical location.

IV. METEOR (Soviet Civilian/Polar Orbital Satellites)
   - Currently about six to eight operating.
   - Soviets command on/off capability making the reliability very erratic with respect to time and area coverage.
   - Presently trying to determine if data can be received at a tactical location. If attainable, it should not be more than 20% as capable as a DMSP vehicle.
LEGEND
1 - F-3 vehicle primary sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
2 - F-4 vehicle had a power problem on 27 Dec 79 causing IR sensor loss.
3 - F-2 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80.
4 - F-5 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
5 - The TIROS-H, civilian satellite, is past its design lifespan and has technical problems which could cause failure at anytime.
6 - A new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in Apr 81.
7 - F-6 vehicle expected to be launched in late CY 1981.
8 - F-7 vehicle expected to be launched about 2 - 3 months after F-6.
LEGEND

1 - F-3 vehicle primary sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
2 - F-2 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80. This vehicle lasted 19 months past its design lifespan.
3 - F-3 vehicle began to obtain limited daytime data in Apr 80.
4 - F-5 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
5 - F-6 vehicle failed on 9 Aug 80.
6 - The TIROS-N, civilian satellite, is past its design lifespan and has technical problems which could cause failure at anytime.
7 - F-3 vehicle is very dependent upon the earth's angle to take photographs. As winter begins the capability to capture any daylight data becomes less of a reality. This situation will improve to a limited extent again in spring and summer.
8 - A new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in Apr 81.
9 - F-6 vehicle expected to be launched in late CY 1981.
10 - F-7 vehicle expected to be launched about 2 - 3 months after F-6.
MEMORANDUM FOR: MG Vaught  

4 November 1980

SUBJECT: Operational Loss of the TIROS-N (NOAA One) Meteorological Satellite (U)

1. (S) Purpose: The purpose of this memo is to inform you of the total operational loss of the TIROS-N meteorological satellite on 2 Nov 80 at 2202z and its impact on our mission capability.

2. (U) References:
   a. (S) Your classified SECRET memo to Director, Joint Staff, "Degraded Weather Forecasting Capability", 10 Sep 80.

3. (S) Current Capability: The loss of this satellite (imagery times of 0321 and 1521 local sun time) leaves only the NOAA Six satellite (imagery times of 0735 and 1935 local sun time) with Middle East capability. The NOAA Six is currently operating at 100 percent capability.

4. (S) Impact: This situation leaves both the Air Force Global Weather Central and our forward operating location at Wadi Kena with only two usable satellite passes per day (the previous satellite impact analysis is attached).

5. (U) Additional Information: The NOAA Six is not forecast to have any problems until after the next NOAA satellite is launched. This launch is currently projected for early April 1981.

Major, USAF

1 Atch
(S) Satellite Impact Analysis

SECRET
WEATHER SATELLITE DATA

- Daytime

Explore Use Of
1. METEOSAT (Feb 81)
2. METEOR (USSR)

Level of Required Data

Legend
1 - F-3 vehicle primary sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
2 - F-3 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80. This vehicle lasted 19 months past its design lifespan.
3 - F-3 vehicle began to obtain limited daytime data in Apr 80.
4 - F-3 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
5 - F-4 vehicle failed on 9 Aug 80.
6 - The TIROS-N civil satellite is past its design lifespan and has technical problems which could cause failure at anytime.
7 - F-3 vehicle is very dependent upon the earth's angle to take photographs. As winter begins the capability to capture any daylight data becomes less of a reality. This situation will improve to a limited extent again in spring and summer.
8 - A new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in Apr 81.
9 - F-6 vehicle expected to be launched in late CF 1981.
10 - F-7 vehicle expected to be launched about 1-3 months after F-6.
PERCENT AvAILABILITY OF REQUEStED WEATHER SATELLITE DATA

Level of Data Required

Best Case
Local Time: 0330L

Worst Case
Local Time: 1930L

LEGEND
1 - F-3 vehicle primary sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
2 - F-4 vehicle had a power problem on 27 Dec 79 causing IR sensor loss.
3 - F-2 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80.
4 - F-3 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
5 - The TIROS-N, civilian satellite, in past its design lifespan and has technical problems which could cause failure at anytime.
6 - A new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in Apr 81.
7 - F-6 vehicle expected to be launched in late CY 1981.
8 - F-7 vehicle expected to be launched about 2 - 3 months after F-6.
Note: One NOAA satellite is "subjectively capable" to 60% of a DMSP vehicle.

LEGEND

1 - F-3 vehicle primary sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
2 - F-2 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80. This vehicle lasted 19 months past its design lifespan.
3 - F-3 vehicle began to obtain limited daytime data in Apr 80.
4 - F-5 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
5 - F-4 vehicle failed on 9 Aug 80.
6 - TINOS-H, civilian satellite, failed on 2 Nov 80 losing all imagery.
7 - F-3 vehicle is very dependent upon the earth's angle to take photographs. As winter approaches the capability to capture any daylight data becomes less reliable.
8 - A new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in early May 81.
9 - F-6 vechile expected to be launched in early CY 82.
10 - Another new NOAA satellite programmed for launch in Apr 82.
PERCENT AVAILABILITY OF REQUIRED WEATHER SATELLITE DATA (ORBITAL)

As of: 22 Dec 80
Nighttime

Note: One NOAA satellite is "subjectively capable" to 60% of a DMSP vehicle.

LEGEND
1. F-3 vehicle sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
2. F-4 vehicle had a power problem on 27 Dec 79 causing IR sensor loss.
3. F-2 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80.
4. F-5 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
5. TIROS-N, civilian satellite, failed on 2 Nov 80 losing all imagery.
6. A new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in early May 81.
7. F-6 vehicle expected to be launched in early CY 82.
8. Another new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in Apr 82.
9. F-7 vehicle expected to be launched by mid CY 82.
Subject: Remote Tactical Weather Sensors

Time Frame: Jun – Oct 80

Summary:

1. (U) Purpose: This report reviews the actions taken during the period in estimating the feasibility of producing a remote weather station capable of transmitting via secure satellite communications necessary tactical weather information.

2. (U) Late in June a proposal was made by MG Vaught to investigate the feasibility of acquiring a remote weather sensor package.

3. (U) An exercise and the lack of "read in" experienced research and development weather personnel initially limited work on the proposal.

4. (U) In a late July meeting with Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) surfaced past and current advances in remote weather sensors.

   A. (U) In the early 1970's the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratory (now designated the AF Geophysics Laboratory) designed and tested an air implanted package known as the Expendable Remote Operating Weather Station (EROWS). The system obtained limited weather data (wind speed and direction, temperature, pressure and dewpoint) and had only a line-of-sight transmission capability. (For more information see AFCRL-72-0501 publication (Instrumentation Paper 179), 21 Aug 72, by Peirce and Church).

   B. (U) Recently, the US Army at the Atmospheric Sciences Laboratory (ASL) has tested a hand implanted unit (AN/TMQ 30) that also transmits via line-of-sight. This package has almost the same sensors as the EROWS unit. (The AN/TMQ 30 is known as the Automatic Meteorological Station, POC at ASL is [redacted].)

   C. (U) After reviewing the current state-of-the-art in remote sensors, it was decided by [redacted] and the JTD/J2 element (LtCol [redacted] and Majors [redacted] to let AFSC examine the feasibility of building a remote weather package. The project would examine the use of existing sensors (temperature, dewpoint, wind speed and direction, and pressure) and include a satellite communications capability (see attachment 2).
6. (U) In late August, stated that AFSC could build six, five-sensor packages in three months with the desired satellite communications link for $300,000. In addition, AFSC would like Air Weather Service (AWS) to fund this acquisition (see attachment 2).

7. (U) After reviewing the original sensor package outlined in paragraph 5, weather personnel from HQ AWS and the Pentagon felt that the meteorological information gained from the proposed package by AFSC was not sufficient to merit the cost of the project. (see comments). Major, met with to discuss the AWS position and show the documented requirements for Pre-Strike Surveillance/Recon System (PRESSURS). (Ref. AWS Capabilities Master Plan 1980-1994, June 1980, page E-4).

A. (U) The PRESSURS requirement is to observe and collect essential weather information in mission arenas not under friendly control and provide it to in-theater weather facilities in near real-time. Timely weather information is vital to the mission director in making effective tactical decisions. The required data are: clouds (cover, bases, and tops), contrast transmission (visible wavelength), path transmission (infrared and millimeter wavelengths), wind, temperature, pressure, and humidity. Currently, HQ USAF has issued a PMS in November 1979 which directs development of tactical sensors supporting the use of infrared systems in the hostile tactical areas.

B. (U) The PRESSURS requirements were agreed to in principle by at Eglin AFB was contacted by so that the unit at Eglin could begin a feasibility review of the requirement and provide a time and cost estimate. (see attachment 1).

8. (U) In mid-September Major met with and some of the staff working on the project at Eglin AFB to discuss the proposal face-to-face.

9. (U) The results of AFSC's efforts are stated in 17 Oct 80 letter to Major (see attachment 2).
Comments: (U) The basic instruments (temperature, winds, pressure, and dewpoint) is not hard to produce. However, with only those measured parameters very little meteorological intelligence is gained (estimated less than 5%) by the weather forecaster. An increase in meteorological information to a usable intelligence level (estimated 10% increase or greater) would require the measured parameters of ceilings, cloud cover, visibility and some way of determining present weather conditions (i.e., snow falling).

Recommendations: (U) AFSC should review all currently marketed commercial equipment during the systems acquisition phase for possible use.

Other Related Items: Meteorological Surface and Upper Air Data Shortfalls.

J2 Personnel Involved: [Redacted], AF/X000X, A227-1638.

Point of Contact:

1. [Redacted], DUSD&E, A225-9604 (R&D).
2. [Redacted], AF/X0OTF, A227-4399 (R&D).
3. [Redacted], AFSC/DLZ, A858-4215 (AF Systems Command).
4. [Redacted], AF/RDSL, A224-8570 (R&D).

Attachments:

1. (U) Memo for Record, 11 Sep 80, Remote Weather Sensors.
2. (U) AFSC/DLZ Letter, 17 Oct 80, Portable Remote Weather Station.
MEMO FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Remote Weather Sensors

1. On 2 Sep 80 I called [REDACTED] to say that HQ Air Weather Service would be willing to listen to AFSC's proposal for an eight sensor package (temperature, dew point, pressure, winds (speed and direction), ceiling, visibility, and some measure of present weather). [REDACTED] gave me the name and number of [REDACTED] at Eglin AFB to talk to about our proposal.

2. Called [REDACTED] on 3 Sep 80 to ask him if they could come up with a proposal for the eight sensors and a dollar amount. I also provided him with the AWS requirements for PRESSURS. He told me he would see what he could do and would get back to me in about two to three weeks.

[REDACTED], Major, USAF
Portable Remote Weather Station

1. In August I proposed that AFSC construct six portable unmanned weather stations measuring wind velocity, wind direction, temperature, humidity and atmospheric pressure. The cost was approximately $100K exclusive of the radio transmitter. Delivery in 10-12 weeks was committed.

2. After our discussions the problem of funding the effort was turned over to G

3. In subsequent discussions with G of AFSC/AD added several additional measurements to the task including cloud height, visibility, atmospheric transmission, and other parameters.

4. We have determined that instruments to make these additional measurements remotely and compactly are not commercially available, and considerable additional risk is associated with making these measurements.

5. AFSC, therefore, cannot commit to the production and delivery of remote weather stations having the requested capabilities at this time.
Subject: Meteorological Surface and Upper Air Data Shortfalls

Time Frame: Nov 79 – Dec 80

Summary:

1. (U) Purpose: This report highlights the surface and upper air data quantity and acquisition problems encountered during the period.

2. (U) Major events on this subject through 21 Oct 80 are found in the attachment.

3. (S) Since the attached memorandum was written the quantity of meteorological data from Iran seems to have remained relatively constant.

Comments:

1. (U) Weather observations, whether surface or upper air, from the Middle East are scarce and are frequently unreliable except for those observations taken at international airports. Political problems in a country can definitely disrupt the flow of weather data. For these reasons it might be necessary to use remote weather sensors and/or special operations weather personnel to supplement existing observations during periods of increased military operational emphasis.

Recommendations: (U) Develop a contingency for denied or limited data.


Point of Contact:


2. HQ AWS/DOK (Air Weather Service Communications), Scott AFB, IL, A638-4721.

Attachments:

1. (S) Memo to J2, 21 Oct 80, Surface and Upper Air Reporting Weather Stations Iran.
MEMORANDUM FOR

SUBJECT: Surface and Upper Air Reporting Weather Stations in Iran

1. From November 1979 through March 1980 there was significant variations in the number of weather reporting stations in Iran (see the table below). Capt [redacted] bore this fact out initially in detailed memorandums prepared for the Commander on 17 Nov 79 and 8 Jan 80.

2. After the Iraq-Iran conflict began these surface and upper air reports were stopped through normal channels. Very few Iranian surface reporting stations had 24 hour a day hourly reports. Most stations prior to the conflict were three hourly reporting and only about 30-40% of those reported during the night.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting Weather Stations in Iran</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As of Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Nov 79</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Jan 80</td>
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<td>Until 20 Sep 80</td>
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<td>After 20 Sep 80</td>
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</table>

NOTE: By comparison, if the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada were grouped together (reporting stations in an area of similar terrain and area - 613,000 square miles for these states compared to 636,000 square miles for Iran) their station reporting statistics would be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Hourly</th>
<th>Upper Air</th>
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<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>12</td>
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</table>

3. Since 20 Sep 80 the only source of weather data at the Air Force Global Weather Central has been special weather [intercept data]

Initially the amount of this data were small (less than ten reporting stations once daily). During the past week, however, the amount of data have been increased to 25-30 stations plus some local and area forecasts (received at 12Z or 15Z, sometimes 18Z, daily).

2 Atch
1. (S) 17 Nov 79
   Data Memo
2. (S) 8 Jan 80
   Data Memo
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Station Code</th>
<th>Station Name</th>
<th>ICAO</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
<th>Status</th>
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**Note:**
- "SECRET" marks the stations with classified or restricted access.
- "X" indicates presence or activity at the station.
- "REPORTED" indicates that a report was submitted.
- "Only 1-3" suggests limited activity.

Weather service reporting in area monitored 17 Nov.
408 210 race OIYV
408 510 fladen OIAA
408 410 Kernen OIKK
408 480 Shiny OIAS
408 560 Jakoben OIZH
408 580 Budzuh OIAB
408 570 HASA
408 750 OIKB
408 790 IRANSHAHR
408 830 BANDAR-LENGEH

Reported

SECRET

SECRET
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<th>BLOCK STATION NUMBER</th>
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<td>40372</td>
<td>OKBK</td>
<td>MARGWA (R)</td>
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</table>
1. Exercise in garden out of doors.
2. New chief of protocol
3. TIMM only family
4. Pictures get out
   17' wall in left side
   Sun coming in thru windows unknown
   what time of day

   [Illustration of striped curtains]
   2 big windows

3/18/80
SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 30 MAY 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: IRAN SITUATION (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:

TITLE: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUILDING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:
REPORT FORWARDS INFORMATION DERIVED FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING EXTERNAL SECURITY MEASURES IN EFFECT AT THE KPA, TEHRAN.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE (SEE ATTACHED)

SOURCE:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 76356
CONDUCTED ON 15 JULY 90
DERIVATIVE BY
REVIEW ON
DERIVED FROM

SECRET NOFORN

Declassified ON 04/01/98

OAKR
SOURCE HAS FREQUENTLY REPORTED ON THE SITE IN IR IN THE PAST.

1. (7) PROJ NO: 2154-31
2. (U) COLL: PGM TDCRS
3. (U) SPEC INST: DIR: NO
4. (U) APP BY:
5. (U) RED EVAL: YES, REL TO:
6. (U) ENCLS: N/A
7. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A
8. (U) ADMIN NOTE: THIS IS MSG NO. 118.
9. NO NITE ACTION REQUIRED
10. REVW ON 28 MAY 2000
11. #118
12. NNNN

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
SUSPECTED DUPLICATE
EYES ONLY

PERSONAL FOR LT. COL. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SUITABILITY INTERVIEW WITH ALPHA FOUR: (U)

BACKGROUND: As requested by COMJTF, 'ALPHA FOUR' was interviewed to determine his suitability as an in-country asset under US military control. The results of this interview are summarized below.

A. (U) GENERAL TEHRAN INFORMATION
To: Col

Subj: Contact with U.S. Citizen Returning from Iran

1. As proposed by LtCol, and coordinated through Air Force Intelligence channels, I intend to contact this person to discuss specifically his capabilities and assistance to the JTF.

2. I intend to determine the following:
   a.
   b.
   c.
   d.
   e.
   f.
   g.
   h.
   i.
   j.
   k.
   l.
   m.

Confidential
1. MFA BUILDING
2. MFA ANNEX
3. LIBRARY / ETHNOLOGICAL MUSEUM
4. ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM
5. NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (MFA)
6. POLICE HQ
7. MINISTRY OF WAR
8. OFFICER'S CLUB
9. STAFF COLLEGE
10. MINISTRY OF WAR
11. OPERA HOUSE
12. COMMITTEE PRISON
13. BANK-E SEPAH
14. FERDOWSI HOTEL
15. BANK-E MEILLI
16. ORPHANAGE / BIMARESTAN-E FARAHANZ-E PAHLAVI
17. DOCUMENT REGISTRATION
18. BANK-E RAANI
19. BANK-E ETEBARAT-E IRAN
20. CROWN JEWELS TREASURY
21. BASIQAH-E BANK-E MEILLI (ZURIGNEH) - "HOUSE OF STRENGTH"
22. BANK-E MARKAZI
23. TURKISH EMBASSY
24. BANK-E OYRAN
25. FRG EMBASSY
26. IMPERIAL ORGANIZATION FOR SOCIAL SERVICES
27. SANATI ZADEH MUSEUM
28. POST OFFICE (CENTRAL)
29. POST CUSTOMS
30. MINISTRY OF POWER AND WATER
31. NIOC HOSPITAL
32. SCHOOL (NPI)
SUMMARY OF ROOF ANALYSIS (WAREHOUSE)

- WAREHOUSE ROOF WAS NOT DESIGNED TO SUPPORT HELICOPTER LOADING. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE DESIGN LIVE LOAD WAS 390 kg/m², THE CAPACITY OF THE ROOF BEAM JOISTS AND GIRDER, AND BUILDING COLUMNS IS FULLY LOADED SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ONE OR MORE CH-550 HELICOPTERS (OR EQUIVALENT) AT ANY ORIENTATION ON THE BUILDING ROOF.

- PLASTIC ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE ROOF BEAM JOISTS WILL BE STRESSED ABOVE DESIGN ALLOWABLE FOR WORST CASE WHEEL LOADING, BUT PLASTIC ANALYSIS INDICATES A LARGE RESERVE CAPACITY.

- AS A RESULT OF NORMAL SPACING REQUIRED BY PRINTERS OF ADJACENT HELICOPTERS, LANDING OF MORE THAN ONE HELICOPTER WILL NOT CREATE ANY SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ROOF STRUCTURAL SYSTEM.

- BECAUSE OF ROOF COVERING CONSTRUCTION, THE COVERING MAY BECOME DEPRESSED UNDER THE WHEELS, THERE
WOULD BE NO DANGER OF ROOF PENETRATION.

- ADDITIONAL ROOF LOADING AS A RESULT OF PEOPLE WALKING IN VICINITY OF HELICOPTER WILL NOT CREATE A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM IN ROOF.
MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Reaction Capability

1. (C) Report that IIAF fighters airborne on CAP would likely be the first aircraft to respond to a significant threat to Mehrabad. Follow-on fighters would come from Shahrokhi. Finally, Mehrabad fighters would launch.

2. (T) Request DIA evaluation of fighter reaction directly from a CAP orbit, assuming Mehrabad does not go to "Red Alert" until H-Hour.

a. Reaction Times:
   (1) Full fuel load when alerted.
   (2) Air-refuel required before approach to Tehran.

b. Expected aircraft numbers and mix, i.e. F-4's alone or mix of F-4's/F-14's.

c. Will tanker maintain orbit or move closer to Tehran.

d. Which CAP will provide the fighters.

e. Considering the propensity for Iranian fighters to avoid air-to-air engagements with Iraqi aircraft, probability that CAP fighters will actually engage US aircraft.

Major, USA

G

CLASSIFICATION SEVERE EO 12254
CONDUCTED ON 15 Oct 92
REVIEWED BY DDO/NA MCC
DECL. DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON 0 AD 92
DERIVED FROM

TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: FBI Liaison

1. (TS) During RICEBOWL planning in 1979, several reports were received that American students in U.S. universities were in telephone contact with the Iranian militants holding the U.S. hostages in Iran.

2. (U) Recent news reporting indicates that Iranian activists in the U.S. are now in telephone contact with the militants and are receiving funding from Iran.

3. (U) The Iranian activist groups, themselves, and international telephone conversations between Iranian/U.S. personnel in CONUS and the militants in Iran would seem to be lucrative sources of intelligence concerning the hostages.

4. (TS) Therefore, request DIA obtain any and all available information on hostage locations that the FBI has derived from these sources and provide this data to JTF SNOWBIRD.

RICHARD V. SECORD
Major General, USAF
MEMORANDUM FOR [Redacted]

Subject: Persian Gulf Activity

1. Request DIA provide baseline analysis of daily commercial shipping through the straits of Hormuz into the northern portion of the Persian Gulf.

2. Thereafter, request DIA provide a periodic (every 7-10 days) report on actual ship traffic through the Straits of Hormuz into the northern portion of the Gulf.

3. Information should include:
   a. Type/category of ship (e.g., tanker, breakbulk cargo, container, RORO).
   b. Nationality (actual and registry).
   c. Weight.
   d. Type cargo.
   e. Port-of-call in the Gulf (in sequence).
   f. Length of stay in the Gulf.

[Signature]
Major, USA

[Classification]
Declassified by [Signature]
JCS/Declassified Date [Date]
MEMORANDUM TO DIA/JSJ-1

Subject: EVIN PRISON

1. Request DIA analysts review existing photo coverage of EVIN PRISON, TEHRAN, approximately 1 image per month and preferably Saturday from November 1979 to present, to determine number of vehicles present. List information by date in the following categories: (1) within the cell block area walls and (2) within the EVIN complex but outside the cellblock area.

2. Request information be provided by COB, 10 Jul 80, if possible.
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT

SUBJECT: Personnel Request (U)

We will be glad to support your request of 15 July 1980. I have directed my staff to work out the details with Lt Col [redacted].

John B. Marks

JOHN B. MARKS, Maj. Gen., USAF
Acting Chief of Staff, Intelligence
IN

Personnel Support

J-3 Special Operations Division (Major General Vaught)
Office, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference your memo of 7 July 1980, same subject. Permission is granted to use Mr. [Redacted] or both as executive agents for the subject project. We are happy to assist you in anyway possible.

John B. Marks
JHON B. MARKS, Major General, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence

Declassification:
DDNmem
15 Jul 92

Confidential
REQUEST FOR EEL (STADIUM) (18)

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING ARE EEL FOR THE STADIUM OF AMERICAN EMBASSY:

A. WHAT IS COMPOSITION OF GATES INTO STADIUM?
B. IN WHICH DIRECTION WOM THE GATES OPEN?
C. WHAT TYPE OF LOCKS ARE ON THE GATES?
D. WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE BUNKER?
E. HOW MANY PERSONS MAN THE BUNKER?
F. WHAT TYPE OF WEAPONS ARE THE PERSONNEL EQUIPPED WITH?
G. ARE ANY OTHER WEAPONS IN THE BUNKER?
H. WHAT IS THE REACTION TIME OF PERSONNEL IN THE BUNKER TO AN ASSAULT?
I. WHAT ROUTES ARE THERE FROM THE BUNKER TO STADIUM?
J. WHAT TIME DOES THE GUARD CHANGE?
K. WHAT KIND OF COMM IS THERE IN THE BUNKER?
L. WHAT IS THE BASIC LOAD OF ALL WEAPONS IN THE BUNKER?
M. WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE TENNIS COURTS?
N. WHAT TYPE OF LIGHTS ARE IN THE STADIUM?
P. WHERE IS THE MAIN SWITCH FOR LIGHTS LOCATED?
Q. WHAT IS THE WIRING PATTERN IN VICINITY OF STADIUM?
R. WHAT TYPE OBSTACLES ARE IN VICINITY OF STADIUM?
S. WHEN IS STADIUM LIGHTED?
T. WHAT TYPE OF FLARES ARE USED IN LIGHTS?
U. WHAT IS COMPOSITION (HEIGHT, THICKNESS, MATERIAL) OF WALL AROUND SPORTS COMPLEX?
V. ARE THERE ANY BARRIERS ON THE WALL?
W. WHAT IS TRAFFIC DENSITY OR STREETS IN IMMEDIATE AREA OF STADIUM FROM 6-1 HOUR TO 6 PLUS 3 HOURS?
X. WHAT IS PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC IN VICINITY OF STADIUM FROM 6-1 TO 6 PLUS 3 HRS?
Y. ARE THERE ANY SECURITY ELEMENTS WITHIN SPORTS COMPLEX?
Z. ARE THERE ANY OBSTACLES WITHIN STADIUM?
AA. WHAT IS HEIGHT OF PRESS BOX ABOVE GROUND?
BB. WHERE ARE ENTRANCES TO PRESS BOX?
CC. WHAT TYPE OF LOCKS ARE ON THE ENTRANCES?
DD. HOW IS ACCESS TO ROOF OF PRESS BOX GAINED?

2. (U) REQUEST ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PHOTOS, DESCRIPTIONS, STRENGTHS, ETC.) CONCERNING TAHAN AND FORCES LOCATED THEREIN. REQUIRE THIS INFORMATION LIT BY OCT 88.

(1)

3. (a) Even though soil penetrometers can provide an accurate measure of soil shearing strength (CBR - California Bearing Ratio), more accurate classification can be obtained through the use of piston samples and augered holes. Penetrometers can be used in conjunction with these techniques to determine shear strength. For soil layers below the surface, an alternative method to determine shearing strength below the surface is to excavate holes with a shovel or spade. Then, after the surface soil and the penetrometer readings progressively decrease, the depth of the holes below the surface and readings made be carefully recorded for analysis. Piston samples and loose samples obtained by this method can be analyzed for compaction. With the use of all three methods, piston samples, and loose sample from each method, a local method for analyzing the strength of the soil can be developed.


5. (c) NATIONAL SOIL PENETROMETERS ARE AVAILABLE THROUGH: N.D.C., 2025 LEE ST., EVANSTON, IL 60202. TWO PARTICULAR MODELS WITH POSSIBLE APPLICATION ARE THE POCKET PENETROMETER MODEL CL-770 AND THE RM 155 GEOSTICK.

6. ON REQUEST: AVAILABILITY THROUGH A LOCAL DISTRIBUTED

7. CALL TO ORDER, USE OF THE POCKET PENETROMETER AND GEOSTICK ARE:

POCKET PENETROMETER - 27.72 ON HAND

GEOSTICK - 215.48 - 3-4 WEEK ORDER
MSG NBR 158
0 15144Z OCT 60
DELTA/INTEL
TO: JCS/SNOWBIRD/J-2
BT:

SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED EEL/DIR (U)

1. (S) A REVIEW OF DELTA'S STANDING EEL/DIR HAS BEEN MADE IN LIGHT OF ADDITIONAL MISSION GUIDANCE AND INFORMATION PROVIDED TO DATE. THE FOLLOWING IS A CONSOLIDATED LISTING OF PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED AND NEW EEL/DIR. NEW, CANCELLED AND NEW EEL/DIR ARE MARKED WITH AN ASTERISK (*).

2. PROVIDE STRAY CAT REPORTS FOR ALL LOCATIONS.

3.
SUBJECT: ACCESS POLICY

1. Operational members of this unit were given one time access for the duration of RICEBOWL/EAGLE CLAW. As you know, this greatly facilitated operational planning - in short very little could have been done at tactical level without this access.

2. Delta self imposed restrictions on hard copy documents. None were carried forward of no restrictions were imposed upon the unit by higher headquarters and this allowed for the maximum in flexibility. However, in view of the sensitivity of Snow Bird, some direction may be desired.

3. Request guidance as to ground rules for the protection of compartmented information including decompartmentation procedures during the planning of this option.

REVW 06MAY00
BT
SUBJECT: SHARING INTEL WITH 4TH PSYOPS GROUP, FT. BRAGG, N.C.

1. (S) 4TH PSYOPS GROUP HAS APPROACHED S-2 DELTA AND INDICATED THAT THEY HAVE BEEN TASKED TO WRITE A COMPREHENSIVE PSYOPS PLAN FOR IRAN BY COMJIF. THEY HAVE REQUESTED DIRECT EXCHANGE OF INTEL WITH DELTA IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION.

2. (G) DELTA S-2 WILL PER PHONCON THIS DATE WITH JIF S-2, PROVIDE M "DAYS:"

"4TH PSYOP GROUP S-2, WITH JIF INSUMS COVERING THE LAST 30"

REVW 12 MAY 00

SI

NNNNN
SUBJ: ACCESS TO SNOWBIRD (35) INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC

RCI: 712-957 392 MI GROUP 712 957 392 MI GROUP

SUBJ: SECURITY OF INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC

1. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL FROM 1-75TH HAVE ACCESS TO SNOWBIRD (35) INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC:

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<td>LTC</td>
<td>BN CORP</td>
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<tr>
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<td>LTC</td>
<td>BN XO (LNC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
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<td>MAJ</td>
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<td>C CC. COR</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL FROM 24TH ID (1) HAVE ACCESS TO SNOWBIRD (35) INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC:

a. CPT, 24TH ID (1), CO COCHRAN
b. MAJ, 24TH ID (1), BG STOTSER

2. THE ABOVE NAMED INDIVIDUALS ALSO HAVE ACCESS TO ALL SNOWBIRD (35) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOUND IN MESSAGE TRAFFIC.

From: OUT TO

SECRET

Classified by:

DINNC 15 July 82

10/10/10 6/10/10
SECRET: SECURITY OF INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC.

1. Ref: Message CSC 060, JFC 071554, SEC 2.

   i. Reference message required notification of individuals as to sensitivity of sensitive intelligence. The following reflect those individuals allowed access to sensitive intelligence traffic:

   [Redacted]

2. ii) All personnel listed above possess a top secret clearance with access to sensitive compartmented intelligence (SCI) granted by Special Security Group (SSG) in compliance with appropriate regulations.

   Revw 21 Oct 80

   [Redacted]

Declassified by DDC nmc 15Jul9
SUBJECT: Geodetic Data Point Reduction

TIMEFRAME: Nov 79 - December 1980

SUMMARY:
1. (TS) J2 tasked DMAAC to provide precise coordinates for specified locations in Iran, for navigation and planning.
2. (TS) DMAAC utilizing satellite imagery and computerized Geodetic Data Point Reduction Methods Products locations in chart related, WGS-72, and European Datums and UTM coords.
3. (TS) Locations difficult to describe precisely required J2 to provide DMAAC annotated photographs pinpointing the location.
4. (TS) Even though computerized, this process is very manpower intensive because imagery must be selected and points located manually so that the computer can provide data.

COMMENTS:
1. (TS) DMAAC provided data point reductions for pre and post 24 April 1980 planning.
2. (TS) Data point reductions are highly manpower intensive and may require liaison to DMAAC in St. Louis, MO.
3. (TS) Due to the nature of work and impact on programmed projects maximum leadtime available should be allotted to DMAAC.
RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That DMAAC be used to provide precise data point reduction coordinates if mission planning time allows.
2. That if used, the most precise and specific details be provided DMAAC for reduction.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC Maj Cpt

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DMA - Col BQ DMA - 254-4445
DMAAC - Mr. DMAAC (314) 263-4806 (AV) 693

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Pre 24 Apr 80 Data Reduced Coordinate Reference Points
2. Post 24 Apr 80 Data Reduced Coordinate Reference Points
POINT RF - NW END OF RUNWAY - MANZARIYEH AFL

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 59' 22.0"N  050° 47' 21.4"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  75  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2985 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  75  Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 59' 26.0"N  050° 47' 21.5"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  75  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2985 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  75  Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG N1 39-6, Ed. 2  Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords: 34° 59' 00"N  050° 47' 15"E

POINT RF - SE END OF RUNWAY - MANZARIYEH AFL

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 58' 41.5"N  050° 49' 22.3"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  75  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2895 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  75  Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 58' 45.5"N  050° 49' 22.5"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  75  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2895 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  75  Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG N1 39-6, Ed. 2  Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords: 34° 58' 25"N  050° 49' 15"E
SECRET

SUBJ: DMA DATA REDUCED COORDINATES (U)

REF: YR MSG 231 DTG 052100Z FEB 80

1. REF DATA FOR RUNWAYS AT [REDACTED] AS FOLLOWS.

POINT RF - END OF RUNWAY

A. WGS-72 DATUM
   (1) COORDS:
   (2) HORIZ. ACC. [REDACTED]
   (3) MSL ELEV.

B. EUROPEAN DATUM
   (1) COORDS:
   (2) HORIZ. ACC. [REDACTED]
   (3) MSL ELEV.

C. CHAPT RELATED DATA
   (1) JOGNGS [REDACTED]
   (2) COORDS:

POINT RF - END OF RUNWAY

A. WGS-72 DATUM
   (1) COORDS:
   (2) HORIZ. ACC. [REDACTED]
   (3) MSL ELEV.

B. EUROPEAN DATUM
   (1) COORDS:
   (2) HORIZ. ACC. [REDACTED]
   (3) MSL ELEV.

C. CHAPT RELATED DATA
   (1) JOGPNGS [REDACTED]
   (2) COORDS:
POINT RF - END OF RUNWAY

A. WGS-72 DATUM
   (1) COORDS:
   (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75
   (3) MSL ELEV. , MSL VERT. ACC. 87

F. EUROPEAN DATUM
   (1) COORDS:
   (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75
   (3) MSL ELEV., MSL VERT. ACC. 87

C. CHART RELATED DATA
   (1) JOCRNG
   (2) COORDS:

POINT RF - END OF RUNWAY

A. WGS-72 DATUM
   (1) COORDS:
   (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75
   (3) MSL ELEV. , MSL VERT. ACC. 87

F. EUROPEAN DATUM
   (1) COORDS:
   (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75
   (3) MSL ELEV., MSL VERT. ACC. 87

C. CHART RELATED DATA
   (1) JOCRNG
   (2) COORDS:

PEVW 15 FEB 2010

NNNH
POINT RE - 1

a. WGS-72 Datum - NW POINT OF LAND
   (1) Coords: 25°26' 40.8"N 059°15' 21.9"E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 108 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 0 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 15 Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 25°26' 45.4"N 059°15' 21.4"E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 108 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 0 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 15 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG NG 40-12, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1962
   (2) Coords: 25°27'10"N 059°15'10"E

POINT RE - 1A INTERSECTION OF ROAD & TRAIL

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 25°37'11.1"N 059°14'01.1"E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 108 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 59 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 96 Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 25°37'15.7"N 059°14'00.5"E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 108 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 59 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 96 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG NG 40-12, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1962
   (2) Coords: 25°37'10"N 059°14'00"E

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FCS OFFICERS
POINT RF - 2 WEST TIP OF LAND IN DRY LAKE

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 27° 32' 41.9" N 058° 58' 50.6" E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 1144 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 27° 32' 46.4" N 058° 58' 50.1" E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 1144 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG NG 40-4, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
   (2) Coords: 27° 33' 20" N 059° 01' 20" E

POINT RF - 2A INTERSECTION OF TWO STREAMS

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 27° 39' 17.5" N 059° 02' 08.2" E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 1169 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 27° 39' 22.0" N 059° 02' 07.6" E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 1169 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG NG 40-4, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
   (2) Coords: 27° 39' 20" N 059° 02' 10" E

* NO VILLAGE DISCERNIBLE
* ROADS NOT VISIBLE

SECRET
POINT REF - 3

ISOLATED PEAK (SPOT ELEV. 1998)

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: 28° 55' 54.6 N 059° 06' 20.9 E
(2) Horiz. Acc. 110 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 1946 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords: 28° 55' 59.0 D N 059° 06' 20.3 E
(2) Horiz. Acc. 110 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 1946 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG NH 40-16, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
(2) Coords: 28° 55' 55'' N 059° 07' 05'' E

POINT REF - 3A
MILE NADERI RUINED TOWER

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: 29° 04' 39.0 N 059° 08' 51.6 E
(2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 1627 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords: 29° 04' 43.4 N 059° 08' 51.0 E
(2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 1627 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG NH 40-12, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
(2) Coords: 29° 04' 35'' N 059° 09' 05'' E

* ORIGINAL REF. COORDS. IN ERROR.

SECRET

NOT RELEASED TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
POINT RF - H DARBAND AFLD EAST END RUNWAY

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 31° 46' 33.5" N 057° 00' 11.5" E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 114 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 2097 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 31° 46' 37.8" N 057° 00' 11.1" E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 114 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 2097 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG NH 40-3, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
   (2) Coords: 31° 47' 25" N 057° 00' 45" E

POINT RF - H A DARBAND VOR *

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 31° 47' 01.2" N 056° 59' 33.2" E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 114 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 2088 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 31° 47' 05.5" N 056° 59' 32.8" E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 114 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 2088 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG AH 40-3, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
   (2) Coords: 31° 47' 40" N 057° 00' 20" E

* VOR DOES NOT EXIST AT REF. COORDS.

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
POINT RF - 4B

INTERSECTION OF ROAD 4 TRAIL

a. WGS-72 Datum

(1) Coords: 33° 04' 33.2"N 055° 45' 35.7"E
(2) Horiz. Acc. 119 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2536 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 79 Ft.

b. European Datum

(1) Coords: 33° 04' 37.4"N 055° 45' 35.4"E
(2) Horiz. Acc. 119 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2536 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 79 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

(1) JOG NI 40-10, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords: 33° 04' 35.°N 055° 45' 35.°E

SECRET

NOT RELEASED TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
**POINT RF - 5**

a. WGS-72 Datum **INTERSECTION OF HIGHWAY & ROAD**
   
   (1) Coords: 33° 04' 35.6 N 053° 24' 39.9 E  
   (2) Horiz. Acc.  106  Ft.  
   (3) MSL Elev.  3506 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.  

b. European Datum
   
   (1) Coords: 33° 04' 39.8 N 053° 24' 37.8 E  
   (2) Horiz. Acc.  106  Ft.  
   (3) MSL Elev.  3506 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.  

c. Chart Related Data
   
   (1) JOG NI 39-12, Ed.  1  Ed. Date 1971  
   (2) Coords: 33° 04' 40" N 053° 24' 40" E

**POINT RF - 5A**

a. WGS-72 Datum **TELEPHONE/ROAD CROSS OVER PT**
   
   (1) Coords: 33° 06' 18.0 N 053° 29' 31.1 E  
   (2) Horiz. Acc.  106  Ft.  
   (3) MSL Elev.  3232 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.  

b. European Datum
   
   (1) Coords: 33° 06' 22.2 N 053° 29' 31.0 E  
   (2) Horiz. Acc.  106  Ft.  
   (3) MSL Elev.  3232 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.  

c. Chart Related Data
   
   (1) JOG NI 39-12, Ed.  1  Ed. Date 1971  
   (2) Coords: 33° 08' 20" N 053° 29' 40" E

* A/F NOT VISIBLE.

**SECRET**

**NOT RELEASED TO FOREIGN NATIONALS**
POINT RF - 58  WEST ENDSEMKNAN NEW ARLD

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: 35° 22' 53.0"N  053° 39' 07.8"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  106  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev.  366.5  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords:  35° 22' 57.0"N  053° 39' 07.7"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  106  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev.  366.5  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG NI 39-4, Ed.  2  Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords:  35° 23' 50.0"N  053° 40' 15.5"E

POINT RF - 6  CAVANSENRY RUINS

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: 35° 15' 39.2"N  052° 10' 59.2"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev.  2957  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords:  35° 15' 43.2"N  052° 10' 59.9"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev.  2957  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG NI 39-3, Ed.  1  Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords:  35° 15' 45.0"N  052° 10' 50.0"E
POINT RF - 6A ROAD BRIDGE

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 35°14'28.25" N 052°13'09.7" E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 2841 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 35°14'32.5" N 052°13'09.8" E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 2841 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG 39-3, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1971
   (2) Coords: 35°14'30" N 052°13'15" E

POINT RF - 6B

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords:
   (2) Horiz. Acc. Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords:
   (2) Horiz. Acc. Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG , Ed. Ed. Date
   (2) Coords:

   * To Be DACOM 20 Dec 79

SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
POINT RF - 7  TRAIL + ROAD INTERSECTION

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 55' 39.4"N 052° 00' 49.3"E
(2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2765 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 55' 43.4"N 052° 00' 49.3"E
(2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2765 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JG 47 39-7, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords: 34° 55' 45"N 052° 00' 50"E

NEW NMAC PT. BRIDGE DID NOT EXIST AT FURNISHED REF. COORDS.

SECRET

NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
POINT RF - 7A
TRAIL INTERSECTION

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 49' 00.3"N  052° 03' 47.2"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  110  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev.  2748  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  74  Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 49' 04.4"N  052° 03' 47.2"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  110  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev.  2748  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  74  Ft.

C. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG NI 89-7 , Ed.  2  Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords: 34° 49' 45"N  052° 03' 55"E

POINT RF - 7B
POINT ALONG SIGNIFICANT STREAM
ADJACENT TO DRY LAKE BED (NORTH SHORE)

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 46' 40.0"N  051° 54' 59.6"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev.  2634  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 46' 45.0"N  051° 54' 59.6"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev.  2634  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG NI 39-7 , Ed.  2  Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords: 34° 46' 45"N  051° 52' 30"E

* DMAAC SELECTED POINTS ARE EAST OF FURNISHED COORDS.

SECRET

NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
POINT RF - TC  POINT ALONG SIGNIFICANT STREAM ADJACENT TO DRY LAKE BED (NORTH SHORE)

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 47' 47.4"N  051° 52' 45.2"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2547  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 47' 52.0"N  051° 52' 45.3"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2547  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG NL 39-7, Ed.  2  Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords: 34° 47' 35"N  051° 51' 30"E

POINT RF - TD  INTERSECTION CONTOUR LINE 3285 & STREAM BED

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 52' 31.1"N  051° 53' 31.0"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 3268  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords: 34° 52' 35.2"N  051° 53' 31.1"E
(2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 3268  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG NL 39-7, Ed.  2  Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords: 34° 52' 45"N  051° 53' 30"E

* DMAAC SELECTED POINTS ARE EAST OF FURNISHED COORDS.

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
POINT RF - 8

POINT WHERE DRAIN CROSSES 2626 CONDUIT

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 34° 53' 15.8 N 051° 44' 46.8 E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 26.26 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 34° 53' 19.8 N 051° 44' 46.8 E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 26.26 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG NT 39-7, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
   (2) Coords: 34° 53' 20"N 051° 44' 47"E

POINT RF - 8A

ISOLATED PEAK (3960)

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 34° 59' 31.0N 051° 43' 23.0E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 39.35 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 34° 59' 35.0N 051° 43' 23.1 E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 39.35 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JGNMD 39-7, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
   (2) Coords: 34° 59' 35"N 051° 43' 20"E

* DMARC SELECTED POINT. COULD NOT LOCATE
  POINT DESCRIBED.

SECRET

NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONS
POINT RF - 9

RAILROAD BRIDGE OVER STREAM

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: $35° 10' 40.4 N$ $051° 56' 20.5 E$
(2) Horiz. Acc. 110 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2651 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 74 Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords: $35° 10' 44.4 N$ $051° 56' 20.6 E$
(2) Horiz. Acc. 110 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2651 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 74 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG NN 39-3, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords: $35° 10' 40'' N$ $051° 56' 20'' E$

POINT RF - 9A

CENTER OF CHANDAB VILLAGE

a. WGS-72 Datum
(1) Coords: $35° 25' 25.2 N$ $051° 56' 05.5 E$
(2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 3772 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum
(1) Coords: $35° 25' 29.2 N$ $051° 56' 05.6 E$
(2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 3772 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
(1) JOG NN 34-3, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords: $35° 25' 25'' N$ $051° 56' 05'' E$

SECRET
NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
POINT RF - 98  CENTER OF SANGAREYUM VILLAGE

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 35°41'15.9"N 051°42'01.1"E
   (2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 4601  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 35°41'19.8"N 051°42'01.2"E
   (2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 4601  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG NI 39-3, Ed.  2  Ed. Date 1971
   (2) Coords: 35°41'15"N 051°42'00"E

POINT RF - 9C  NORTHEAST CORNER OF NARMAK

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 35°45'07.7"N 051°30'26.4"E
   (2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 4524  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 35°45'11.7"N 051°30'26.5"E
   (2) Horiz. Acc.  111  Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 4524  Ft., MSL Vert. Acc.  76  Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG NI 39-3, Ed.  2  Ed. Date 1971
   (2) Coords: 35°45'25"N 051°30'35"E

SECRET

NOK RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
POINT RF - 10 CENTER OF STADIUM 70 EAST OF EMBASSY
  a. WGS-72 Datum
     (1) Coords: 35° 42' 38.2" N 051° 25' 38.0" E
     (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
     (3) MSL Elev. 4043 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
  b. European Datum
     (1) Coords: 35° 42' 42.2" N 051° 25' 38.1" E
     (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
     (3) MSL Elev. 4043 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
  c. Chart Related Data
     (1) JOGNI 39-3, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
     (2) Coords: 35° 42' 40" N 051° 25' 30" E

POINT RF - 10A HIGHWAY JUNCTION
  a. WGS-72 Datum
     (1) Coords: 35° 43' 49.8" N 051° 25' 36.4" E
     (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
     (3) MSL Elev. 4260 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
  b. European Datum
     (1) Coords: 35° 43' 53.8" N 051° 25' 36.5" E
     (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
     (3) MSL Elev. 4260 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
  c. Chart Related Data
     (1) JOGNI 39-3, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
     (2) Coords: 35° 43' 50" N 051° 25' 30" E

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONS
**POINT RF - 11** SOUTH END KARAJ AFLD

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 35° 46′ 24.6″ N 050° 53′ 00.6″ E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 4044 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 73 Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 35° 46′ 28.5″ N 050° 53′ 00.8″ E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 4044 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 73 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG 1139-2, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1971
   (2) Coords: 35° 46′ 25″ N 050° 53′ 05″ E

**POINT RF - 11A** EAST END KUSHE-NOSRAT AFLD

a. WGS-72 Datum
   (1) Coords: 35° 01′ 34.2″ N 050° 49′ 18.6″ E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 2890 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum
   (1) Coords: 35° 01′ 38″ N 050° 49′ 18.8″ E
   (2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
   (3) MSL Elev. 2890 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data
   (1) JOG 1139-2, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1971
   (2) Coords: 35° 01′ 40″ N 050° 49′ 15″ E

SECRET

NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
POINTER RF - 11B CENTER OF PARALLEL TAXIWAY MANZARIYEH AFDL

a. WGS-72 Datum

(1) Coords: 34° 58' 54.7" N 050° 48' 17.1" E
(2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2986 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

(1) Coords: 34° 58' 58.2" N 050° 48' 17.3" E
(2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
(3) MSL Elev. 2986 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

(1) JOG NA 37-6, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
(2) Coords: 34° 58' 30" N 050° 48' 10" E
DATA REDUCED COORDINATE REFERENCE POINTS
POINT RF: 1 (NW POINT OF LAND)

MGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 25 26' 40"N 059 15' 21".9E
B. HORIZ ACC: 103 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 0 FT MSL VERT ACC: 15 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 25 26' 45".4N 059 15' 21".4E
B. HORIZ ACC: 103 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 0 FT MSL VERT ACC: 15 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NG 40-12 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
B. COORDS: 25 27' 10"N 059 15' 10"E
POINT REF: 1A  (INTERSECTION OF ROAD AND TRAIL)

WGS-72 DATUM

A. COORDS: 25 37' 11".1N 059 14' 01".1E
B. HORIZ ACC: 108 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 59 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 96 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

A. COORDS: 25 37' 15".7N 059 14' 00".5E
B. HORIZ ACC: 108 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 59 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 96 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

A. JOB NG 40-12 ED. 1  ED DATE: 1969
B. COORDS: 25 37' 10"N 059 14' 00"E
POINT RF: 2  (WEST TIP OF LAND IN DRY LAKE *)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 27° 32' 41.9" N 058° 58' 50.6" E
B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 1144 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 27° 32' 46.4" N 058° 58' 50.1" E
B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 1144 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NG 40-4 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
B. COORDS: 27° 33' 20" N 059° 01' 20" E

* NO VILLAGE DISCERNIBLE
POINT REF: 2A (INTERSECTION OF TWO STREAMS *)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 27 39' 17.5N 059 02' 08.2E
B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 1169 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 27 39' 22.0N 059 02' 07.6E
B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 1169 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NG 40-4 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
B. COORDS: 27 39' 20"N 059 02' 10"E

* ROADS NOT VISIBLE
POINT RF: 3

(ISOLATED PEAK--SPOT ELEVATION 1998 *)

**WGS-72 DATUM**
A. COORDS: 28 55' 54.6N 059 06' 20.9E
B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 1946 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

**EUROPEAN DATUM**
A. COORDS: 28 55' 59.0N 059 06' 20.3E
B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 1946 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

**CHART RELATED DATA**
A. JOG NH 40-16 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
B. COORDS: 28 55' 55"N 059 07' 05"E

* ORIGINAL REF COORDS IN ERROR
POINT REF: 3A  (MILE NADERI RUINED TOWER)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 29 04' 39".0N 059 08' 51".6E
B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 1627 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 29 04' 43".4N 059 08' 51".0E
B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 1627 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NH 40-12 ED. 1  ED DATE: 1969
B. COORDS: 29 04' 35"N 059 09' 05"E
POINT RF: 4 (DARBAND AIRFIELD EAST END RUNWAY)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 31 46' 33".5N 057 00' 11".5E
B. HORIZ ACC: 114 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2097 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 31 46' 37".8N 057 00' 11".1E
B. HORIZ ACC: 114 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2097 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NH 40-3 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
B. COORDS: 31 47' 25"N 057 00' 45"E
POINT RF: 4A (DARBAND VOR *)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 31 47' 01".2N 056 59' 33".2E
B. HORIZ ACC: 114 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2088 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 31 47' 05".5N 056 59' 32".8E
B. HORIZ ACC: 114 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2088 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NH 40-3 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
B. COORDS: 31 47' 40"N 057 00' 20"E

* VOR DOES NOT EXIST AT FURNISHED REF COORDS
POINT RF: 4B  (INTERSECTION OF ROAD AND TRAIL)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 33 04' 33.2N 055 45' 35.7E
B. HORIZ ACC: 119 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2536 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 79 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 33 04' 37.4N 055 45' 35.4E
B. HORIZ ACC: 119 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2536 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 79 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 40-10 ED. 1  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 33 04' 35"N 055 45' 35"E

SECRET
POINT RF: 5  (INTERSECTION OF HIGHWAY AND ROAD *)

NGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 33° 04' 35.6 N  053° 24' 39.9 E
B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3506 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 33° 04' 39.8 N  053° 24' 39.8 E
B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3506 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-12 ED.1  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 33° 04' 40" N  053° 24' 40" E

* A/F NOT VISIBLE
POINT RF: 5A (TELEPHONE/ROAD CROSS-OVER POINT)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 33° 08' 18".ON 053° 29' 31".1E
B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3232 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 33° 08' 22".2N 053° 29' 31".0E
B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3232 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-12 ED. 1  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 33° 08' 20"N 053° 29' 40"E
POINT REF: 5B (WEST END, SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 22° 53’.0N 053 39° 07’.8E
B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3665 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 22° 57’.0N 053 39° 07’.7E
B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3665 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-4 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 35 23° 50’N 053 40° 15’E

SECRET
POINT RF: 5C  (CENTER OF EAST END OF PAVED RUNWAY--NAIN)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 33 05' 10".0N 053 25' 25".5E
B. HORIZ ACC: 105 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3534 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 75 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 33 05' 14".2N 053 25' 25".5E
B. HORIZ ACC: 105 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3534 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 75 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-12 ED. 1  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 33 05' 15"N 053 25' 25".5E

SECRET
POINT RF: 5D  (CENTER OF WEST END OF PAVED RUNWAY -- NAIN)  

WGS-72 DATUM  
A. COORDS: 33 05' 31".ON  053 24' 39".OE  
B. HORIZ ACC: 105 FT  
C. MSL ELEV: 3523 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 75 FT  

EUROPEAN DATUM  
A. COORDS: 33 05' 35".2N  053 24' 38".9E  
B. HORIZ ACC: 105 FT  
C. MSL ELEV: 3523 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 75 FT  

CHART RELATED DATA  
A. JOG NI 34-12 ED. 1  ED DATE: 1971  
B. COORDS: 33 05' 35"N  053 24' 40"E  

SECRET
POINT REF: 6  (CAVANSERY RUINS)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 15' 39".2N  052 10' 59".2E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2957 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 15' 43".2N  052 10' 59".9E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2957 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 1  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 35 15' 45"N  052 10' 50"
POINT RF: 6A (ROAD BRIDGE *)

NGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 14' 28".5N 052 13' 09".7E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2841 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 14' 32".5N 052 13' 09".8E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2841 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 35 14' 30"N 052 13' 15"

* NEW DMAAC POINT. BRIDGE DID NOT EXIST AT FURNISHED COORDS.
POINT RF: 6B  (ROAD/TRAIL INTERSECTION)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 34 32' 17".5N  52 09' 43".6E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2597 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 34 32' 21".6N  52 09' 46".6E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2597 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-1 ED. 2  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 34 32' 20"N  52 09' 50"E
POINT RF: 7  (TRAIL AND ROAD INTERSECTION)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 34 55' 39".4N 052 00' 49".3E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2765 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 34 55' 43".4N 052 00' 49".3E.
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2765 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 34 55' 45"N 052 00' 50"E
POINT RF: 7A  (TRAIL INTERSECTION)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 34 49' 00".3N 052 03' 47".2E
B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2748 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 74 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 34 49' 04".4N 052 03' 47".2E
B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2748 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 74 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 34 39' 45"N 052 03' 55"E
POINT RF: 7B  (POINT ALONG SIGNIFICANT STREAM ADJACENT TO DRY LAKE BED -- NORTH SHORE)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 34 46' 41".0N  051 54' 59.6"E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2634 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 34 46' 45".0N  051 54' 59.6"E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2634 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 34 46' 45"N  051 52' 30"E

* DMAAC SELECTED POINTS ARE EAST OF FURNISHED COORDS.
POINT RF: 7C  (POINT ALONG SIGNIFICANT STREAM ADJACENT TO DRY LAKE BED -- NORTH SHORE) *

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 34° 47' 47.9"N  051° 52' 45.2"E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2547 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 34° 47.5' 52".0N  051° 52' 45.3"E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2547 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2  ED DATE: 1971
* B. COORDS: 34° 47' 35"N  051° 51' 30"E

* DMAAC SELECTED POINTS ARE EAST OF FURNISHED COORDS.
POINT RF: 7D (INTERSECTION OF CONTOUR LINE 3285 & STREAM BED)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 34 52' 31".1N 051 53' 31".0E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3268 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 34 52' 35".2N 051 53' 31".1E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3268 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 34 52' 45"N 051 53' 30"
POINT RF: 8  (POINT WHERE DRAIN CROSSES 2625 CONTOUR) *

**WGS-72 DATUM**
A. COORDS: 34 53' 15"N 051 44' 46".8E  
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT  
C. MSL ELEV: 2626 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

**EUROPEAN DATUM**
A. COORDS: 34 53' 19"N 051 44' 46".8E  
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT  
C. MSL ELEV: 2626 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

**CHART RELATED DATA**
A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2  ED DATE: 1971  
B. COORDS: 34 53' 20"N 051 44' 47"E

* DMAAC SELECTED POINT/COULD NOT LOCATED POINT DESCRIBED.*
POINT RF: 8A (ISOLATED PEAK -- 3960)

**WGS-72 DATUM**

A. COORDS: 34 59' 51".0N 051 43' 23".0E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3935 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

**EUROPEAN DATUM**

A. COORDS: 34 59' 35".0N 051 43' 23".1E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3935 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

**CHART RELATED DATA**

A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 34 59' 35".N 051 43' 20"E
POINT RF: 9 (RAILROAD BRIDGE OVER STREAM)

**WGS-72 DATUM**
A. COORDS: 35° 10' 40.4" N 051° 56' 20.5" E
B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2651 FT, MSL VERT ACC: 74 FT

**EUROPEAN DATUM**
A. COORDS: 35° 10' 44.4" N 051° 56' 20.6" E
B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2651 FT, MSL VERT ACC: 74 FT

**CHART RELATED DATA**
A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 35° 10' 40" N 051° 56' 20" E

SECRET
POINT RF: 9A (CENTER OF CHANDAB VILLAGE)

**WGS-72 DATUM**
A. COORDS: 35 25' 25".2N 051 56' 05".5E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3772 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

**EUROPEAN DATUM**
A. COORDS: 35 25' 29".2N 051 56' 05".6E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 3772 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

**CHART RELATED DATA**
A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 35 25' 25"N 051 56' 05"E
POINT REF: 9B  (CENTER OF SANGAREYUM VILLAGE)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 41' 15''.9N  051 42' 01''.1E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 4601 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 41' 19''.8N  051 42' 01''.2E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 4601 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 35 41' 15''N  051 42' 00''E
POINT REF: 9C  (NORTHEAST CORNER OF NARMAK)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 45' 07".7N  051 30' 26".4E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 4524 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 45' 11".7N  051 30' 26".5E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 4524 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 35 45' 25"N  051 30' 35"E
POINT RF: 10  (CENTER OF STADIUM TO EAST OF EMBASSY)

**WGS-72 DATUM**
A. COORDS: 35°42'38".2N 051°25'38".0E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 4043 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

**EUROPEAN DATUM**
A. COORDS: 35°42'42".2N 051°25'38".1E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 4043 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

**CHART RELATED DATA**
A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 35°42'40"N 051°25'30"E
POINT REF: 10A (HIGHWAY JUNCTION)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 43' 49".8N 051 25' 36".4E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 4260 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 43' 53".8N 051 25' 36".5E
B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 4260 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 35 43' 50"N 051 25' 30"E

SECRET
POINT RF: 11  (SOUTH END OF KARAJ AIRFIELD)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 46' 24".6N  050 53' 00".6E
B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 4044 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 73 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 46' 28".5N  050 53' 00".8E
B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 4044 FT  MSL VERT ACC: 73 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-2 ED. 1  ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 35 46' 25"N  050 53' 05"E
POINT REF: 11A (EAST END OF KUSHN-E-HOSRAT AIRFIELD)

WGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 01' 34".6N 050 49' 18".6E
B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2890 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 35 01' 38".6N 050 49' 18".8E
B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2890 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-2 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 35 01' 40"N 050 49' 15"E
POINT RF: 11B (CENTER OF PARALLEL TAXIWAY--MANZARIYEH AIRFIELD)

NGS-72 DATUM
A. COORDS: 34° 58' 54.1".1N 050° 48' 17.1".1E
B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2986 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM
A. COORDS: 34° 58' 58.2".2N 050° 48' 17.3".3E
B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
C. MSL ELEV: 2986 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA
A. JOG NI 39-6 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
B. COORDS: 34° 58' 30"N 050° 48' 10"E

SECRET
# Tehran Area

## Group I

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<tr>
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<td>Open area</td>
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SUBJECT: Video Taping of Network News Broadcasts

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. ( ) National Military Command Center maintains capability to monitor and record TV news footage on a 24-hour basis through the Visual Record Facility (VRF).

2. ( ) At various times, J2 requested VRF to tape news footage of the hostages, specifically, and Tehran, in general. Tapes were provided to J2 on the day following the broadcast.

3. ( ) News footage provided valuable updated appearance of the hostages and were used for assessments of hostage conditions.

4. ( ) Coverage of Tehran provided current environmental data of the city that affected JTF clandestine operations and assault planning.

COMMENTS:

5. The JTF/J2 acquired a portable color camera from INSURM which could be used for capability to make stills from video tapes, copy hostage letters and make record copies of planning and briefing materials. Print of KT 1278 is attached.
SECRET

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC (USAF).

POINTS OF CONTACT: VRP: 8-227-9033
SUBJECT: Photo Analysis - Special Projects

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:
1. [U] J2 requested several special photo analysis products to support EC-79.
2. [U] The requested special products took anything from 2-3 days to 2-3 weeks to complete.
3. [U] Typical special photo products include the following:
   a. [U] Area/strip orientation from vic LZ PATTY East to Tehran Shayad Monument. Package was composed of 20 x 24 prints.
   b. [U] Area orientation showing geography linking Karaj, Tehran, and Qom to put into perspective LZ PEGGY, LZ ANN, LZ PATTY and LZ LOIS (5 20 x 24 prints).
   c. [U] The American Embassy and Amjadiyeh Stadium were analyzed for vulnerability to incoming fire and the positions from which small arms fire could be directed. These studies pointed out key buildings and approaches to minimize risk.
   d. [U] Mehrabad, Doshan-Tappeh, and Ghale Morghi were analyzed to determine areas of minimum small arms threat to parked aircraft and sectors most likely to present a hostile fire threat.
e. Special ADA fields of fire studies were made of Ghale Morghi and Doshan Tappeth to determine if any existing ground structures would mask the ZU 23-2's and Rapiers creating a gap in coverage of low flying aircraft.

f. Mehrabad International was analyzed to locate all POL facilities and functions and all ADA were identified, classified and plotted. Vehicle counts of all vehicles present within the Mehrabad complex were also made.

g. All Tehran airports were studied for vertical obstructions on the approaches to all runways.

h. Intensive terrain analysis was conducted of selected areas chosen as possible FWLZ/HLZ/DZs. Multiple sources and agencies were utilized (e.g., LZ SUSAN, LZ ANNE, LZ PATTY, etc.).

i. DIA also provided analysis and photographs of ADA in Tehran not located at one of the airfields (2 Oerlikons in North Tehran).

COMMENTS:

1. Special photo products require highly defined requirements.

2. Special photo products may require in progress review between requestor and analyst.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

OTHER RELATED ITEMS: Studies were also accomplished on Iran Radio, TV Network, Power Grid, POL Network and major lines of communications.
J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC, Maj, Cpt

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DIA - LTC - JSJ-1 (NMIC 2782R) 90-3243 (G) 2581 (R) 695-1032

AFINTEL - CPT - AFIS/INOP Bldg 213 - 3-3815 (G) 351-3101

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Mehrabad POL Study (Scp)
2. Mehrabad ADA Study (Scp)
3. Mehrabad Approach Study (Sep)
Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Photo Analysis Support (AF INTEL)

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:
1. (NS) J2 contacted the AF INTEL (PI) sections at Bldg 213, Washington Navy Yard with permission of AFACISI for detailed Photo Interpretation support.
2. (NS) AF INTEL provided detailed 2nd and 3rd phase photo interpretation and products.

COMMENTS:
1. (NS) AF INTEL was utilized in addition to other agencies 2nd and 3rd phase readout/analysis on selected sites to not overload any single agency.
2. (NS) AF INTEL provided detailed 2nd-3rd phase readout of military installations in/aroundottom.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
- (NS) Service Photo Intel Teams should continue to be used on longer term 2nd and 3rd phase PI requirements.
- (NS) That AF INTEL continue to be used on longer term projects as requested.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [Redacted], Cpt [Redacted]

POINTS OF CONTACT:
AF INTEL - Cpt [Redacted] AFIS/INOP 351-3103
KY3 - 3815/16
Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Use of ITV Tapes


SUMMARY:
1. (C) American commercial television broadcasts of videotapes provided by Iran of visits by clergy, dignitaries and relatives of the hostages at various times (Christmas, Easter, etc.) were recorded by the Video Recording Facility (VRF) in the Pentagon.

COMMENTS:
1. (U) In some cases, hostage groupings at Christmas services were obviously unchanged from everyday groupings, in other cases they were obviously a mix of everyday groupings.

2. 

3. By freezing the recording of that broadcast, it was possible to ascertain what group that hostage was a part of.

4. (U) Overall, the films provided many bits of information which aided in confirming previous conclusions and in revising/improving analysis methods.
5. (U) A key element to the success of obtaining the video footage is advance detailed briefing of VRF personnel as to what is desired and constant watching by intelligence personnel of national news broadcasts to ensure no key footage is missed.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Capt [Redacted] SMC.
Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Hostage Biographical and Personal History Data


SUMMARY:
1. (U) Some biographical and personal history data about the hostages was obtained from the various branches of services.
2. ( ) These types of data about the hostages were, to the extent available, used to verify or understand certain hostage.

COMMENTS:
1. (U) At no time did the data approach the quantity or quality desired. In major part this was due to three factors:
   a. (U) The only medical information on military personnel was located at the Embassy.
   b. (U) Early, very strict security measures limited contact with families/relatives of hostages and precluded obtaining information of this type from them.
   c. (U) A lack of cooperation by the State Department made it very difficult to obtain information of this type about those hostages employed by the State Department.
2. (U) Such data could have provided collateral confirmation of reports such as one of a Marine hostage with a tattoo on thumb side of wrist reportedly seen in a prison.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (U) In hostage situations early contact should be made with agencies, departments and companies for whom the hostages work to obtain such data and at the same time establish a channel of communication through which later detailed questions may be put.

2. (U) Contacts with the agencies, departments and companies should be made by J-2 personnel under a cover that minimizes any possible connection with the OJCS and Department of Defense.

3. (U) Departments and agencies should be required to maintain in CONUS much more complete medical and personal data records of their personnel assigned overseas.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LtCol [REDACTED]; Capt [REDACTED]; SMC.
Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Hostage Family Contacts


SUMMARY:
1. (TS) From November 1979 through 1980 JTF contact with hostage families was extremely limited for operational security reasons.

2. (TS) Beginning in 1980 an effort was made to cultivate sources within and through the first by gaining their confidence and then by a steadily increasing solicitation of information.
   a. (TS) who were in daily contact with relatives of hostages were periodically asked to solicit specific bits of information from relatives as required to clarify information about or in letters from hostages.
   b. (TS) JTF-J2 personnel developed the confidence of a number of wives of hostages and thus were able to, in some cases, and in other cases receive information otherwise withheld from all others, the wife.

COMMENTS:
1. (TS) In some cases the gaining of confidences proved very valuable. An example is the acquisition from one wife of information...
2. (TS) Some wives were very hesitant to give information to personnel associated with DOD because of their opposition to any potential military action and concern that providing such information might contribute ultimately to a decision to execute such an operation, whereas other families would provide data to DOD but not DOS.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. (V) In any situation similar to the seizing of the American hostages by Iran, plans and efforts should be made to establish early rapport with both relatives of hostages as well as other Service, executive branch and company personnel tasked to assist and work with those relatives.
2. (V) A cover should be used in establishing contacts, much as was used in the JTF 1-79 operation. The cover story should minimize association with the defense department, particularly with the OJCS and any operational forces.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:
J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LtCol [REDACTED], USAF,
Capt [REDACTED], USMC.
Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Control of US Military Drivers/Monitors
(Parsi Linguists)

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - April 1980

SUMMARY:
1. (U) J2 was single POC for US military drivers/monitors.
2. (U) Drivers/monitors remained at home stations until required for driver training or integrated training with SFOD-D.
3. (U) Respective Service POC's had established procedures with each driver/monitor's home station to insure TDY orders were issued immediately, with no bureaucratic delay.
4. (U) Drivers/monitors returned to home stations after each training phase/exercise.

COMMENTS:
1. (U) Drivers/monitors' home stations funded the TDY trips. Severe financial problems arose at installations whose TDY budgets were not adequate to cover this requirement.
2. (U) Control of drivers/monitors at JTF vice SFOD-D level was advantageous due to JTF direct contact with Service POC's and wider perspective of training requirements.
3. (U) OPSEC problems occurred several times, when home stations inadvertently identified OJCS and J3-SOD on TDY orders rather than DIA (which was supposed to be used as cover). Further, numerous unexplained TDY trips led to

Declassified by
DDA

[Signature]
speculation at home stations concerning nature of drivers/
monitors' absences. This OPSEC problem was particularly
true for the one native Iranian US military driver.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

To avoid such OPSEC problems, drivers/
monitors or similar support personnel should be attached to
service staffs or DAs when detached

to TSF.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Maj

ODCSOPS, DA

POINTS OF CONTACT: Service POC's

ATTACHMENTS: None
Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Iran Area Overview Studies

TIMEFRAME: November - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. [PS] J2 tasked DIA to provide an Iran overview analysis showing LOC, GOB, AOB, w/emphasis on "TEHRAN AREA."
2. [PS] Additional studies were requested on May 80 on selected cities to show major military installations, gendarmerie and revolutionary guard facilities. Power, water, oil and communications facilities were depicted in various overlays.

3. [PS] Tehran, Tabriz, Esfahan, Shiraz and Mashad were analyzed, w/emphasis on airfields, L3 and LOC's.

COMMENTS:

1. [PS] These products are very man intensive in production and required several weeks for completion.

2. [PS] Although information was in many cases dated, it provided a good line of intelligence and feel for geography.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LtCol [DECLASSIFIED] Maj [DECLASSIFIED]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DIA - LTC [DECLASSIFIED] JSJ-1 (NMIC 2782R)
- LTC [DECLASSIFIED] JSJ-1 (G) 90-3243
- LTC [DECLASSIFIED] JSJ-1 R-2581 - 695-1032

SECRET

G 585

Item Number: __________
SUBJECT: TEHRAN-ARMY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

REFERENCE: TEHRAN, IRAN ORIENTATION PHOTO

DISCUSSION:

1. (S/NFORD) Iranian Ground Forces and national defense organizations normally garrisoned in the Tehran area are listed below:

   Ministry of National Defense
   Tehran Ministry of Defense
   BE 0428-00144
   35-41-30N 051-24-55E

   General Staff of the Iranian Islamic Armed Forces
   Tehran Supreme Command Staff Headquarters
   BE 0428-00122
   35-43-58N 051-26-49E

   Iranian Islamic Ground Forces Headquarters
   Tehran IIGF HQ and Barracks Lavizan
   BE 0428-00673
   35-47-20N 051-31-42E

   1st Headquarters Infantry Division
   Tehran Army Barracks and Military University Faranabad
   BE 0428-00241
   35-41-27N 051-29-40E

   2nd Infantry Division
   Tehran Barracks and Brigade HQ Lavizan
   BE 0428-00722
   35-46-45N 051-30-50E

   23rd Special Forces Brigade
   Tehran Barracks and Special Forces BDE HQ Bagh e Shah
   BE 0428-00097
   35-41-17N 051-23-21E

   33rd Field Artillery Group
   Tehran Barracks and Artillery Brigade HQ Jāfī
   BE 0428-00099
   35-40-50N 051-20-55E

   NOTE: The 397th Field Artillery Battalion (8 in. self-propelled howitzer)
   is located at Tehran Bde Impal Grd Bde Salatanabad, BE 0428-00238,
   35-46-32N 051-28-27E.

   Military Intelligence Group
   Tehran Barracks and SF Bde HQ Bagh e Shah
   BE 0428-00097
   35-41-17N 051-23-21E

   402nd Electronic Warfare Company
   unlocated within the Tehran area.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN-ARMY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES (continued)

Third Area Support Command
unlocated within the Tehran area

NOTE: The Third Area Support Command is comprised of at least the following units: 501st Medical Depot, 502nd Area Hospital, 543rd Logistics BN, 544th Quartermaster CO, 547th Truck Transportation BN.

National Defense College
Tehran War College
BE 0428B1107
35-41-33N 051-23-07E

Command and General Staff College
Tehran Command and General Staff College
BE 0428-00240
35-41-31N 051-23-08E

Military Academy
Tehran Military Post and Academy
BE 0428-00203
35-41-07N 051-24-02E

1st Training Center (cadre)
Tehran Barracks and SF Bde HQ Bagh e Shah
BE 0428-00097
35-41-17N 051-23-21E

Military Intelligence School
Tehran Barracks and SF Bde HQ Bagh e Shah
BE 0428-00097
35-41-17N 051-23-21E

Special Forces School
Tehran Barracks and SF Bde HQ Bagh e Shah
BE 0428-00097
35-41-17N 051-23-21E

Signal Training Center
unlocated within Tehran

2. (S/NOFORN) Iranian paramilitary units normally garrisoned in the Tehran area are listed below:

Gendarmerie Central Headquarters
35-42-05N 051-23-35E

1st District (Central) Headquarters, Gendarmerie
Tehran Military Barracks
BE 0428-00237
35-39-58N 051-24-35E

NOTE: There are normally approximately 300 gendarmerie garrisoned in this facility.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN-ARMY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES (continued)

Gendarmerie Ordnance Depot, Hospital and Officer Academy
Tehran Barracks and Ordnance Depot Gendarmerie
BE 0428-00721
35-46-10N 051-24-30E

Gendarmerie Aviation Battalion
Tehran/Ghale Morghi Airfield
BE 0428-08010
35-38-45N 051-22-54E
NOTE: The gendarmerie area is in the northwest corner of the airfield. Equipment is limited to light fixed wing and helicopter aircraft.

National Revolutionary Guard Headquarters
Tehran Iranian National Parliament
BE 0428-00315
35-41-24N 051-26-10E
NOTE: Reportedly 1,000 to 1,500 Revolutionary Guards are here. It is unlikely that more than 50 remain after normal work hours.

Revolutionary Guard Tehran Headquarters
Tehran Barracks Imperial Guard Brigade Saltanabad
BE 0428-00238
35-46-32N 051-28-27E

Tehran Gendarmerie Regiment
Shahr Ray Company
Shahr-Ray Post 35-38-00N 051-26-00E
Farah-Abad Post 35-39-00N 051-25-00E
Nemat-Abad Post 35-37-30N 051-20-00E
Hassen-Abad Post 35-21-30N 051-14-30E
Kak-Rizak Post 35-31-00N 051-21-00E
Hashem-Abad Post 35-36-00N 051-31-00E
Kazaneh Post 35-38-00N 051-21-00E
Nouhen-Abad Post 35-36-00N 051-23-30E
Amin-Abad Post 35-35-30N 051-29-00E
Ghaleh Post 35-16-00N 051-00-30E
Ghaleh-Nou Post 35-31-00N 051-31-00E
Ghassem-Abad Post 35-34-30N 051-14-30E

Shemirant Company
Tehran-Nov Post 35-43-00N 051-30-30E
Tehran-Pars Post 35-44-00N 051-31-00E
Solimanieh Post 35-39-00N 051-30-00E
Koyeh-Norou Post 35-40-30N 051-31-00E
Lavassanat Post 35-50-00N 051-46-00E
Lash-Garak Post 35-49-30N 051-35-00E
Farsham Post 35-56-00N 051-31-30E
Kamard Post 35-45-00N 051-43-30E

Shahr-Ara Company
Shahr-Ara Post 35-42-30N 051-23-30E
Amir-Abad Post 35-43-00N 051-25-00E
Vanak Post 35-44-00N 051-24-00E
Mehr-Abad Post 35-40-00N 051-13-00E
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SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY QASR E QAJAR
BE 0428-00098
35-44-00N 051-27-05E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BKS A NAT DEF UNIV QASR E QAJAR IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. (S/NOTFOR) The following force is suspected of being garrisoned at this installation:

2. (S) Description:
   This installation, in central Tehran, houses an unidentified unit and consists of an administration area, two barracks areas and a large vehicle storage area. The administration area consists of four administration-type buildings, eight support buildings and a swimming pool. This area may possibly house an officers club. One barracks area, east of the administration area, consists of seven small barracks, three large barracks, one vehicle shed and seven support buildings. An additional three large barracks have been totally burned down and only the foundations remain. The second barracks area, west of the administration area, consists of 31 barracks, three administration buildings in a heavily wooded area, a vehicle park, and a parade field. The vehicle storage area consists of 15 vehicle parks, nine support buildings, and a parade field with a helicopter landing pad. A separately secured area with three large circular foundations for POL tanks is adjacent and due north of the vehicle storage area.
   Tehran Supreme Command Staff Headquarters which houses the General Staff of the Iranian Islamic Armed Forces is located at 35-43-58N 051-26-49E (BE 0428-00122), just at the southwest corner of the installation. It is believed an extensive underground command post was constructed here. Navy headquarters is just south of the installation. (BE 047-00252 35-43-50N 051-26-50E)

3. (S) Security:
   There are no known special security procedures in effect at the installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e. guard posts manned at night with a duty officer on watch.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN IIGF H.Q. A.BARRACKS LAVIZAN IRAN

REFERENCE: TEHRAN IIGF H.Q. A.BARRACKS LAVIZAN IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. (S/NOTFOR) Iranian Ground Forces units normally found at this installation are listed below:

   Iranian Islamic Ground Forces Headquarters
   Capability: The ground forces headquarters and some support elements are located at this facility. Strength figures are not available but it is estimated 1,000 to 2,000 persons are employed here. There are no combat units distinguishable, however a small quick-reaction guard force is undoubtedly assigned to the headquarters.

2. (S/NOTFOR) Description:
   This installation was constructed during the later half of the 1970's. It is located on the northeast edge of Tehran. It is wall and fence secured. In addition to the Ground Forces Headquarters, an unidentified electronics facility is located adjacent to the northeast edge of the installation and contains a control building, four circular pads, each with two communications antenna masts.

3. (S/NOTFOR) Security:
   A quick-reaction guard force is probably employed around the clock to secure the installation and its occupants. No other extraordinary security measures are known to be in force.

DB 3c
29 May 2000
SUBJECT: TEHRAN ARMY BARRACKS AND MILITARY UNIVERSITY FARANABAD
BE 0428-00241
35-41-27N 051-29-40E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN ARMY BK'S A MIL UNIV FARANABAD IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. Iranian Ground Forces units normally found at this installation are:

   Capability: Authorized personnel strength for the unit is approximately 14,000 troops. Estimated strength is 7,000. Five infantry battalions are believed deployed outside the Tehran area. The division is dogged by poor discipline, training and logistics support. The 1st HQ Inf Division and the 2nd Inf Division were formed out of the old Imperial Guard Brigade and other forces stationed in the Tehran area. A limited number of these troops (two battalions) saw duty in Oman in 1975. They were involved in patrolling, setting ambushes, road clearing, and vehicle checks.

2. Description:

   This installation is located in southeastern Tehran, just southeast of Tehran/Doshan Tappeh Airfield, BE 0428-08001. The installation is divided into three separate areas. The southern and northern areas house major ground forces maneuver elements. The central area contains a storage depot. The southern area includes three NOL points, a large parade field with four helipads and two obstacle courses. The installation is wall and fence secured.
3. (c/NOFORN) Security:

There are no known special security procedures in effect at this installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e., guard posts manned at night with duty officer on watch.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS AND BRIGADE HQ LAVIZAN
BE 0428-00722
35-46-45N 051-30-50E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BKs A BDE HQ LAVIZAN IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. **The following units are normally found at this installation:**

   **Capability:** Authorized personnel strength for the division is approximately 14,000 troops. Estimated strength is 4,000 men. A small number of these troops served in Oman in 1975. They were involved in patrolling, setting ambushes, road clearing, and vehicle checks.

2. **Description:**

   This installation is located in northeast Tehran, approximately 5 NM NNE of Tehran/Doshan Tappeh AFLD, BE 0428-08001. It is situated between a mountain and a large communications facility. The facility is well secured with a fence and six guard towers. IIGF HQ is located just north of the installation. Included within the installation are two helipads near the division headquarters, a large parade field, two swimming pools, tennis courts, and three POL points.

3. **Security:**

   There are no known special security procedures in effect at the installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e. guard posts manned at night with a duty officer on watch.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS ARTY BDE HOSPITAL, IRAN

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BARRACKS ARTY BDE HOSPITAL, IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. (S/NOFORN) The following army units are normally garrisoned here:

   Capability: Authorized personnel strength is 4,000 men. Estimated current strength is 2,000 men.

2. (NOFORN) Description:
   The installation is located on the western edge of Tehran, and is wall secured. A parade field and an obstacle course are included within the installation. At least 15 barracks/support buildings are burned out. The motor park where the artillery pieces are stored is fence secured.

3. (NOFORN) Security:
   There are no known special security procedures in effect at this installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e. guard posts manned at night with a duty officer on watch.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS IMPERIAL GUARD BRIGADE SALTANABAD

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BKS IMPRL GRD BD SALTANABAD, IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. The following army and paramilitary units are normally stationed at this installation:

   - **Capability:** Authorized personal strength is 500 men. Estimated strength of this unit is 250 men.

   - **Revolutionary Guard Tehran Headquarters**
     - **Capability:** Reportedly a total of 2,000 Revolutionary Guards are stationed here of which 250 are headquarters staff and guards. Two units are formed with 250 men each to serve a "strike forces" as an emergency on-call force.

2. **Description:**
   The installation is well-secured and road served. It is located in north-eastern Tehran and is adjacent to Tehran Ammo Plant Saltanatabad, BE 0428-00212. Two large parade field, one soccer field and a swimming pool are present. A Yagi antenna is adjacent to the headquarters area. One of the parade fields includes a soccer field, a basketball court and an obstacle course.

3. **Security:**
   There are no known special security procedures in effect at this installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e. guard posts manned at night with a duty officer on watch.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS AND SPECIAL FORCES BDE HQ BAGH E SHAH  
BE 0428-00097  
35-41-17N 051-23-21E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BK5 A SF BDE HQ BAGH E SHAH IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. The following army and paramilitary units are normally found at this installation:

   Capability: Authorized personnel strength is approximately 1600 men. Estimated current strength is 1200 men. The unit is equipped with light arms and has received anti-hijacking training from the Israelis. Training was based on the lessons learned from Entebbe. Using Boeing 707 and 727 aircraft, the men were trained in the use of the Israeli Uzi submachine gun, as well as the use of Israeli commando tactics, methods of boarding aircraft and demolitions. Prior to the revolution the unit had the mission of infiltrating Iranian student groups and other radical organizations opposed to the Shah's rule and, in several cases, participated in the subsequent raids on meeting places used by such groups. There was much coordination between this unit, the Imperial Iranian Police and SAVAK, the Iranian secret police. The brigade operates its own jump school. Each battalion is divided into a number of B Teams which control six A Teams. The unit was employed in Oman beginning in 1972. They have displayed a weakness in small unit tactics and patrolling discipline. They are unable to rig their own loads. Personnel are in excellent physical condition. At least 200 men are deployed outside the Tehran area.

   No further information.

   No further information.

2. Description:

   This road-served, fence-secured installation is in central Tehran and houses the above mentioned units and an unidentified supply and transportation unit. Facilities include a soccer field, one swimming pool, three large vehicle parks and a parade field. Training facilities include two aircraft mockups, an airborne associated jump tower, an obstacle course, a repelling tower and a parade field. The National Defense College (Tehran War College) BE 0428R31107 35-41-33N 051-23-07E is located adjacent to the northwest corner of the installation. The Military Academy (Tehran Military Post and Academy), BE 0428-00203, 35-41-07N 051-24-02E is located just east of the installation and the Military

DBSC

09 May 2000
High School (no BE number) is located adjacent to the northeast corner of the installation.

3. [Blacked out] are on call 24 hours a day for the Revolutionary Guard Corps as quick-reaction force. These troops are regarded as the primary force to repel any counter-revolutionary force. Additionally, it is presumed guard posts are manned at night with a duty officer on watch.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS ORDNANCE DEPOT AND HEADQUARTERS ASHRATABAD
BE 0428-00096
35-42-40N 051-26-30E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN EKS ORD DPO A HQ ASHRATABAD, IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. (S/NODEN) This installation is occupied by an unidentified unit. No combat equipment is observed.

2. (S/NODEN) Description:
The installation is located in the center of Tehran. Facilities present include 40 barracks, one multistory administration building, two vehicle sheds, 13 storage buildings/warehouses, and 24 support buildings. The facility is in a state of disrepair. Five barracks, the corner of one long warehouse and one vehicle shed have been burned out. This damage occurred during the revolution. Also present are two parade fields and a soccer field. An obstacle course was observed adjacent to the soccer field and another adjacent to one of the parade fields. Installation is approximately 1 NM east of the American Embassy.

3. (S/NODEN) Security:
No firm information is available, however it is likely that this installation is unguarded during non-work hours.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS AND TRAINING CENTER LASHGARAK
BE 0428-00714
35-48-50N 051-35-20E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BKS A TNG CTR LASHGARAK, IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. (SAPRED) This installation houses an unidentified unit. No combat equipment is observed.

2. (SAPRED) Description:
   The installation is located approximately 10 NM northeast of the center of Tehran. The facility is wall and fence secured, though there are breaks in them. Included within the facility is a large parade field, and a POL point. It appears that only a caretaker force is present.

3. (SAPRED) Security:
   No information is available, however it is likely that this installation is unguarded during non-work hours.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS AND ORDNANCE DEPOT GENDARMERIE
BE 0428-00721
35-46-10N 051-24-30E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN EKS A ORD DPO GENDARMERIE IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) The following paramilitary organizations are normally housed at this installation:

   Gendarmerie National Ordnance Depot: National level repair depot for gendarmerie equipment.
   Gendarmerie National Hospital: National level hospital only for Gendarmerie.
   Gendarmerie Officer Academy: An OCS-type school to produce Gendarmerie officers.

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) Description:
   This installation is located in northern Tehran. It is wall and fence secured containing a soccer field, tennis courts, a hand-to-hand combat pit, helipad, and a POL point. Two additional helipads are located on the north side of the installation.

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) Security:
   There are known special security procedures in effect at the installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e. guard posts manned at night with a duty officer on watch.

DB3E
29 May 2000
SUBJECT: UNIDENTIFIED INSTALLATION
35-45-20N 051-35-30E

REFERENCE: U/I INSTALLATION, IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. (U) This installation houses an unidentified unit. No combat equipment is observed.

2. (U) Description:
   The installation is located approximately 5 NM northeast of the center of Tehran. It appears to be still largely underconstruction. A soccer field with an obstacle course, two parade fields and two possible small arms ranges are observed. The installation is, for the most part, unsecured.

3. (U) Security:
   No information is available, however it is likely that this installation is unguarded during non-work hours.
SUBJECT: Tehran/Mehrabad
BE 0428-08824
323418N 0514112E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN/MEHRAHAD INT'L AIRFIELD, IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. (S/NOFOR) This airfield is a dual military/civil facility. It serves as the 1st Tactical Fighter Base, which consists of 24 F-4E, 13 RF-4E, 11 RF-5, 6 F-5B, 8 T-33A, 3 RT-32A, 26 C-130, 11 KC-707, 3 KC-747, 7 Boeing 747, and some light VIP utility aircraft. In addition, there are 5 CH-47C, 3 AB-212, 33 AB-214C, 5 UH-1H, and 2 SH-3D helicopters at this facility. Numerous civilian transports are normally observed on the civil side. The latest OB data indicates that 32 F-4, 13 F-5, 21 C-130, 5 CH-47, and 15 UH-1 aircraft have been observed.

2. (S/NOFOR) This fence-secured airfield, located on the western edge of Tehran, consists of 2 parallel asphalt runways (one 4000 x 45 meters NW/SE and one 4000 x 60 meters NW/SE). The taxiway system includes one parallel taxiway, 2 end connecting links, 7 asphalt crossovers, a loop asphalt taxiway to the civil terminal area, loop/link taxiways to 3 military parking areas and a loop taxiway to the military hangarette parking area. Parking facilities include 8 various sized hangars and 2 alert shelters on the military side, 9 various sized hangars on the civil side, 16 major parking aprons and 17 revetted concrete arched drive-thru hangarets. Support facilities include 2 major aircraft overhaul facilities, 1 terminal, 1 civil air terminal, and a large housing area located south of the runway. Munitions storage is located 1 KM SW of the center of the airfield and consists of 17 storage bunkers, 15 revetted storage buildings, 1 below ground unidentified building, 4 medium storage buildings, and 19 support buildings. POL storage is located approximately 300 meters SW of the center of the airfield and consists of 2 underground vertical cylindrical tanks. A POL handling facility is located approximately 300 meters NW of the center of the field and contains approximately 20 support buildings, a portable transloading area, a vehicle parking area, and probably is served via pipeline. On the SE section of the airfield adjacent to the end of the runway is an I-Hawk SAM complex which houses storage and training facilities for I-Hawk equipment. Two fixed firing sites with two complete batteries (12 launchers with associated radars) are located in this area and two training configured sites complete with equipment are located near the storage buildings where approximately 4 batteries (24 launchers and associated radars) are stored. This facility
is used for initial I-Hawk crew training. Additional details on the airfield are provided in the attached Airfield Facilities Report.

3. Security forces for the airbase are provided by a small airpolice detachment and a detachment of army personnel from 3rd Area Support Command located at Tehran. At least two BTR-60 vehicles have been observed at this airbase. Air defenses for this facility include 21 ZSU 23-2 AAA guns, 2 Oerlikon 35-mm AAA gun sites (4 guns), 4 Rapier SAM launchers, and the I-Hawk SAM training sites described above. While the I-Hawk are in a training status they could be used to engage attacking aircraft.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN-ARMY AND AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT RESPONSE TIMES

The Army and Air Force aircraft assets within 20 NM of Tehran are included in the preceding airfield analyses.

2. The only known Army or Air Force aviation outside the Tehran area which is within 150 NM of the city is at Shahroki AB. Shahroki AB is located approximately 150 NM from Tehran. This airbase is equipped with at least 59 F-4E fighter-bombers. The F-4 OR rate is estimated to be 40. Therefore, as many as 24 aircraft would probably be available.

Assuming 5 minutes to call the scramble through the C system and a flight speed of 600 MPH, the response time to Tehran for these alert aircraft would be 30 minutes. Probably 15-20 aircraft could respond incrementally as pilots become available over the next 12-24 hours and the remainder within 36 hours.
DISCUSSION:

1. Tehran's principal water sources are two large dam-impounded reservoirs on mountain streams northwest and northeast of the city respectively.

   (a) Karaj reservoir and dam (coordinates 35-57-20'/051-05-30'E) is located about 40 km. northwest of the city center (BE #0428-0161, refers to adjacent hydroelectric powerplant). This source provides about 530,000 cubic meters/2.126 million gallons per day.

   (b) Farahnaz-e-Pahlavi (name undoubtedly changed by current regime) dam and reservoir (BE #0428-0319) is located at 35-42-25'/051-40-40'E, about 24 km. northeast of the city; it provides about 220,000 cubic meters/58 million gallons per day.

   Both large dams/reservoirs are connected to Tehran by large underground aqueducts (exact dimensions/capacities not available); smaller secondary dams also lie about 1-2 km downstream of each large dam and also probably serve as intake points.

   Lesser sources included a variety of deep wells and galleries scattered about the area. The two main sources described above, however, supply more than three-fourths the daily consumption of the metropolitan area.

2. Three major water treatment facilities (and several scattered smaller chlorinator facilities) are located in the urban area. The largest treatment facility identified lies in the northwestern environs (BE #0428-0290) near Kar (coordinates 35-42-25'/051-19-02'E); capacity is estimated at between 25 and 50 million gallons per day. A second large treatment facility (BE #0428-0152) is
probably located in conjunction with reservoirs and the reported Tehran Water Authority headquarters in the north-central part of the city near 35-42-58N/051-23-52E; treatment capacity is reported to be between 20-30 million gallons per day. A third large treatment/filtration facility (no BE #, no capacity data available) is located in the northeastern suburb of Pars near 35-44-30N/051-35-30E. (Insufficient data are available to reconcile the wide differences between reported sources and treatment capacities).

3. Several very large distribution reservoirs (all generally concrete/underground) are scattered across the higher elevations of the northern half of the city. In addition, numerous secondary/smaller distribution/storage facilities throughout the metropolitan area. The estimated storage capacity of just three of the largest facilities is 70 million gallons; more detailed storage data are not available.

4. The distribution system serves most parts of the metropolitan area through piped networks; some areas are served only by public taps and fountains. Gravity flow is augmented in many places by pumped assist. Supplies are generally considered potable. Supplies are barely adequate for daily requirements, and additional sources/facilities have been constantly under development. Since 1977 water consumption in the Tehran metropolitan area (total estimated population over 4 million) has ranged between 850,000 and 1 million cubic meters (225-265 million gallons) per day. Consumption has been increasing an average of 12% annually in recent years with demand ever pressing available supplies and the distribution system. Water rationing has been used fairly often in mid-to late-summer months to conserve the principal reservoir and ground water sources during dry spells.
The water supply system is most vulnerable at the two principal reservoir/intake sites, then at the two or three major treatment facilities astride the major source aqueducts. Loss by physical destruction could cause long-term and potentially catastrophic disruption of water supplies for a large population group. Loss/damage of electric power supplies and selected component parts/controls could cause short to medium term reductions or cut-offs of supplies, the precise extent of which cannot be determined. Total storage capacity within the distribution system, however, probably does not exceed a few days supply at normal consumption rates.

DOL: To August 1979
DIA/DR-HD2; 23 May 1980
SUBJECT: TEHRAN-ELECTRIC POWER

REFERENCE: TEHRAN, TRAN ORIENTATION PHOTO-ELECTRIC POWER

Tehran city is serviced by a double circuit 230 kilovolt (kV) loop which encircles the city. The loop encompasses two powerplants (BE 0428-00137 and 0428-00445) and six operational transformer stations (BEs 0428-00690, 0428-00691, 0428-00689, 0428-00738, 0428-00692, 0428-00683 and 0428-00691). Power within the city is supplied by underground cable.

1. 0428-00444 354727N/0514039E Tehran HPP Farahnaz Pahlavi Latiyon, plant has 45,000 kV capacity using two 22,500 kV generators. Plant feeds single circuit 66 kV to BE 0428-00809 and single circuit 66 kV eastward. Vulnerable at transformers and power lines in adjacent transformer station. Generators also vulnerable.

2. 0482-00809 354420N/0513415E Tehran TS Hakimeh, substation under construction. Will be part of 230 kV loop around Tehran and terminus for 400 kV from BE 0338-00490 and 66 kV from BE 0428-00444.

3. 0428-00689 354155N/0512950E Tehran TS East, substation is component of 230 kV loop around Tehran. Taps 230 kV double circuit. Walled with access control building. Substation personnel probably control access to facility. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

4. 0428-00445 353843N/0512535E Tehran GTPP and TPP Farahabad, plant has capacity of 392,500 kW using 3-82,500 kilowatts (kW) oil fired steam units, 2-60,000 kW gas turbine and 1-25,000 kW gas turbine. Plant is in a walled complex area with controlled access probably provided by plant

DB3C
27 May 2005
personnel or security personnel. Transformers and powerlines of servicing transformer yard are vulnerable as are the gas turbines, generators and boilers. Plant feeds national grid and Tehran loop.

5. 0428-00810 353545N/0512510E Tehran TS Shah Rey, small substation fed double circuit probably 132 kV from BE 0428-00445. Feeds double circuit possibly 132 kV westward. Fenced area with restricted access probably controlled by station personnel. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

6. 0428-00768 353305N/0512545E Tehran TPP Pet Ref, plant has estimated capacity of 30,000 kW using 3-10,000 kW oil fired steam units. Plant is located within refinery complex and serves the complex. Generators and boiler units are vulnerable.

7. 0428-00774 353300N/0512605E Tehran GTPP Pet Ref, plant has capacity of 40,000 kW using 2-20,000 kW gas turbines and serves the refinery. Plant is located within refinery complex. Gas turbines are vulnerable.

8. 0428-00769 353225N/0512545E Tehran TPP Pet Ref 2, plant has an estimated capacity of 40,000 kW using 4-10,000 kW oil fired steam units. Plant serves the refinery and is located within the complex. Generators and boiler units are vulnerable.

9. 0428-00699 353140N/0512450E Tehran GTPP Shah Rey Refinery, plant has capacity of 1,340,600 kW using 28-24,000 kW; 6-32,000 kW; 7-35,000 kW and 3-77,200 kW gas turbines. Plant is fenced or walled in with controlled access probably by plant personnel. Plant feeds the Tehran loop and
Transformers and lines of servicing transformer station and gas turbines are vulnerable.

10. 0428-00738  353730N/051820E  Tehran TS SW 400 kV, a principal national grid transformer station and key transformer station in Tehran loop. Substation receives power via single circuit 400 kV from powerplants to the south, and 230 kV circuits from BE 0428-00699 (double circuit) and BE 0428-00651 (one double and one single circuit). A second single circuit 400 kV line from the south has not been completed. Substation is component of the 230 kV double circuit Tehran loop and provides some local service. Substation is walled or fenced with limited access. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

11. 0428-00692  354222N/0511505E  Tehran TS Mehrabad, substation is part of Tehran loop and handles both 230 kV and probably 132 kV power. Substation is walled or fenced with limited access probably controlled by substation personnel. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

12. 0428-00811  354405N/0511540E  Tehran TS WNW, substation is small serving local area using double circuit probably 132 kV power tapped from line fed from BE 0428-00137. Substation is walled with controlled access. Transformers and power lines are vulnerable.

13. 0428-00683  354600N/0511745E  Tehran TS, substation is a key transformer station in the Tehran 230 kV loop. It provides switching service for BE 0429-00137 and the loop. Substation feed 230 kV double circuit from BE 0428-00137 and feeds power into the loop and westward. Substation
14. 0428-00137 354330N/0512117E  Tehran TPP and GTPP Alstom Tarasht, plant has capacity of 75,000 kW using 4-12,500 kW oil fired steam units and 2-12,500 kW gas turbines. Plant feeds Tehran loop and national grid. Plant feeds a double circuit 230 kV to BE 0428-00683 and to westward and a double circuit prob. 132 kV parallel to loop (west and south) and one north probably to BE 0428-00691. Plant is walled with controlled access. Transformers and powerlines of adjacent transformer yard are vulnerable. Also gas turbines, generators and boilers are vulnerable.

15. 0428-00691 354545N/0512330E  Tehran TS Amerabad, substation serves local area using 230 kV double circuit tap on Tehran loop and possibly 132 kV double circuit from BE 0428-00137. Substation is walled with limited access. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

16. 0428-00690 354125N/0512915  Tehran TS Saltanatabad, substation is component of Tehran loop. Substation is walled with controlled access. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.
SUBJECT: TEHRAN-POL

REFERENCE: TEHRAN. IRAN ORIENTATION PHOTO-ELECTRIC POWER

1. 0428-00686  Tehran Pet Storage Kan
   354645N/0511745E
   CAT 21810
   Capacity = 1,120,000 barrels

   Site contains 9 large vertical POL storage tanks of which 4 are floating
   roofed. Facility consists of a pumphouse, several storage buildings, and
   a truck loading area. Facility is pipeline and road served. Tanks are
   surrounded by low berms to contain spillage. Entire site area is surrounded
   by a security wall. Products stored should include motor fuels and some
   packaged products.

2. 0428-00685  Tehran Pet Storage Saltanatabad
   354720N/0513230E
   CAT 21810
   Capacity = 791,000 barrels

   Site consists of 8 large vertical storage tanks, of which 4 are floating
   roofed. Vents for eight underground tanks are located westerly of the
   above ground tanks. Facility is pipeline and road served. Storage tanks
   are surrounded by a low berm to contain spillage, entire site is surrounded
   by a security fence. Site is located near military storage areas and may
   be military reserve POL storage for motor fuels and other related products.

3. 0428-00019  Tehran Petroleum Storage NIOC
   353939N/0512325E
   CAT 21810
   Capacity = 641,000 barrels

   Facility consists of 6 large vertical tanks and 9 medium vertical storage
   tanks. Site contains open drum storage, 2 pumphouses, several support
buildings, POL packaging building, administration building, truck loading area, rail loading/unloading area. Facility would contain motor fuels and many other types of oil and greases. Site is pipeline, railroad, and road served.

4. 0428-00445 Tehran GTPP A TPP Farahabad
353840N/0512530E
CAT 21810
Capacity = 43,000 barrels

Facility consists of 6 medium and 3 small vertical POL storage tanks to provide fuel for the adjacent power station. Tanks are surrounded by low berms to contain spillage. Site is pipeline and road served.

5. 0428-00138 Rey Petroleum Refy and Storage
Reefinity Units (21130)
353212N/0512525E
Petroleum Product Storage (21840)
353250N/0512550E
Crude Petroleum Storage (21700)
3532202N/0512535E
Pumpstation (21510)
3532240N/0512540E

Capacity - 21130 = 200,000 barrels per day
10 million metric tons per year
21840 = 9,217,000 barrels
21700 = 2,234,000 barrels

Facility is located 10 NM south of Tehran on an all weather road. Site is railroad, pipeline and road served. The site is composed of several areas. In the southwest section of the facility is the original refinery and products storage which began operations in 1968. The new sections, completed in 1974, are in the northwestern part of the facility. The facility is a high-grade refinery, capable of producing high-grade fuels, specialized fuels, and a range of lubricating oils.
SUBJECT: Tehran Ammunition Storage

REFERENCE: TEHRAN, IRAN ORIENTATION PHOTO-LOGISTICS

DISCUSSION:

The Tehran Ammo Depot Northeast (BE: 0428-00723, coord 35-47-10N/051-33-30E) is 8 kilometers northeast of Tehran and consists of 30 bunkers totaling 19,900 square meters of ammunition storage space.
SUBJECT: Tehran/Mehrabad Transportation

REFERENCE: TEHRAN, IRAN ORIENTATION PHOTO-LOGISTICS

DISCUSSION:

Rail - Tehran is the hub of the Iranian rail network with the main north-west, eastern, and southern lines of the country radiating out from the major yard and station (BE 0428-00020, 35°39’29”N/051°23’51”E) in the southern end of Tehran. All the lines are standard-gauge, and are operating at a very reduced level due to a shortage of equipment. The main facility in Tehran consists of a station, a 612-meter, 28-track classification yard, and a repair shop. The station is 2.4 km. northeast of Ghale Norghi Airfield and 7.8 km ESE of Mehrabad and consists of a 3-story concrete building, 2 covered loading platforms served by 4 tracks and an uncovered platform served by 2 tracks. The station is 6.7 kilometers south of the U.S. Embassy.

Highway - Tehran, the focal point for major roads in Iran is cleared by several excellent roads in all directions. To the west is a good four (4) lane divided freeway traversing flat undulating terrain with a capacity of over 77,000 metric tons per day. It also provides access to a major rail/highway transhipment point in the city. To the north is a good bituminous road, 18 to 22 feet wide with a capacity of 20,000 metric tons per day. This route traverses mountainous terrain and there are several tunnels and many sharp curves and steep grades. The road to the south provides access to Qom, is a fairly new 108-foot wide (6 lanes) bituminous highway in excellent condition. The road to the east, although a good bituminous road clearing Tehran, has stretches between Tehran and Meshed which are still gravel, limiting the capacity to a little over 7,000 metric tons per day. The route is subject to snow blockage in winter, and flooding and sand/dust storms much of the year.

Airfields Clearance:

Tehran/Doshan Tappeh: Adjacent to bituminous surfaced Tehran/Mashhad road in eastern part of Tehran. A railroad station is 4.7 miles SW of the airfield.

Tehran/Ghale Norghi: This airfield has a bituminous surfaced access road connecting to the main Tehran-Esfahan and Tehran-Qom road. It is also clear by the railroad west to Tabriz, south to Yazd, east to Mashhad, and north to Bandar Shah. Nearest rail station is in Tehran, 2.4 kilometers northeast.

Tehran/Mehrabad Int’l: A good bituminous surfaced access road connects this airfield to the main Tehran/Karvin road which is adjacent to the north side of the field and another good two lane bituminous road adjacent to the south side. A standard gauge, single track railroad is to the south of the field. Nearest rail station is located in Iran 7.8 kilometers to the east.

The eight military (ground) installations are in developed portions of Tehran and clearance is provided by congested city streets.
LOGISTICS OVERLAP TO BE PROVIDED AT A LATER DATE
SUBJECT: Response to Intelligence Requirement

REFERENCE: JCS Letter, 13 May 1980, Subject: Intelligence Requirements

Enclosed are five studies which are in partial response to reference.

5 Enclosures
1. Intelligence Study - Bushehr
   [S/W INTEL/NOFORN]
2. Intelligence Study - Tabriz
   [S/W INTEL/NOFORN]
3. Intelligence Study - Kerman
   [S/W INTEL/NOFORN]
4. Intelligence Study - Mashhad
   [S/W INTEL/NOFORN]
5. Intelligence Study - Manzariyeh
   [S/W INTEL/NOFORN]
SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis - LZ SUSAN (DMA)

TIMEFRAME: November 80

SUMMARY:
1. (TS) DMA provided a terrain analysis of LZ SUSAN upon request of J2.
2. (TS) Analysis was principally done through available
3. (U/S) Unbiased analysis generally supported the selection of LZ SUSAN for fixed wing operations.

COMMENTS:
1. (U) DMA analysts performed work without knowledge of our proposed use so that as complete yet unbiased a report as possible could be obtained.
2. (U) Analysis required several man-weeks work.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. (U) Terrain analysis specialists are available at DMA/HTC and should be given ample time for work if utilized.
2. (U) That DMA/HTC terrain analysts be used to provide unbiased terrain analysis.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:
J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [name hidden], Cpt [name hidden]

POINTS OF CONTACT:
1. DMA - Col [name hidden] HQ DMA - 254-4426
2. DMA - Mr. [name hidden] DMA/HTC - 227-2736

ATTACHMENTS:
DMA Terrain Analysis
1. The area is covered with wormwood or sagebrush rather widely spaced. Typically 30-40 cm occasionally up to one meter high. This vegetation would cause a degree of roughness but would not be an obstacle. It is visable in the center of existing tracks indicating that vehicles can drive over it.

2. Vehicle tracks deviate to by-pass minor relief features. There are signs of considerable maneuver at the washes adjacent to the area in order to cross them. Tracks appear to have some relief to them. This could be caused by disturbance of the surface and wind removal of the silt sized material. Two of the tracks crossing the area appear to have this characteristic. This rutting could cause a slight roughness but would not be considered an obstacle.

3. Both the north and south ends of the area appear to contain washes. On the northern end the washes (two or three) are broad and low with no significant escarpments. These would cause no significant problems. In the southern part of the area there are a number of washes which increase in size and depth as they proceed to the south, terminating at a relatively high escarpment. These washes appear to have lateral escarpments which should be considered as potential obstacles. There are also a couple minor escarpments on the extreme eastern side of the area. They are rather limited in extent and are not a major problem but should be avoided if possible.

4. Surface materials should be adequate to support the craft. It consists of alluvial (fan) material near the lower extremity of the fan. Typically these are a mixture of gravels, sands and silts with sands and silts predominating. The surface is normally covered with gravels and coarse sand. The silt and clay sized material is removed by the wind. The gravel material at the surface becomes varnished (dark brown) after a long period of time (hundreds of years). Disturbance of this surface causes the unvarnished (light colored) side of these gravels to be exposed. Tracks thus exposed will remain indefinitely.

5. The surface configuration of the area is relatively flat with an overall less than three percent and possibly as low as one percent. The surface is not perfectly smooth. It appears to contain small undulations with relief of these closely spaced features probably in the 5 to 20 centimeter range.
6. Disturbance of the surface materials top layer could free the silt sized material and could produce a potential dust problem. Numerous passes over the same path could accentuate the problem.

7. Moisture (rainfall) would not normally create any difficulty. Runoff would be rapid and soils would soak up the balance rapidly. The coarse textured surface would be supportive regardless of moisture. During a rain storm, even a relatively small one, flash flooding could occur in the washes adjacent to the area on either side. Caution would have to be taken in the event of rain in traversing these washes. If flash floods occur they are normally of short duration, usually only minutes.

8. Adjacent to the site in the northeast there are tracks which appear to be tank tracks. This area may have been used as a military training area. This fact does not appear to have any significance in terms of the terrain analysis of the study area.
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As of 27 Nov 1979
3. ENEMY DISPOSITION: THE SITUATION IN THE COMPOUND HAS NOW
SETTLED INTO A ROUTINE WITH DEMONSTRATIONS PERIODICALLY
STAGED OUTSIDE THE CHANCELLORY GATE ON TAKTI-E-JAMSHID
BLVD. CROWD SIZE VARIES FROM 50-75 CURIOSITY
SEEKERS TO SEVERAL THOUSAND AT LUNCH/PRAYER TIME OR WHEN
ANNOUNCEMENTS GO OUT VIA THE RADIO AND THE LOCAL PUBLIC ADDRESS
SYSTEM. SECURITY OF THE AREA IS PROVIDED BY 20-30 IRG GUARDS AT
THE CHANCELLORY GATE, SUPPORTED BY FOOT AND VEHICLE PATROLS.
ANOTHER GROUP OF SOME 20-30 STUDENTS ARE LOCATED IN
THE CHANCELLORY BUILDING.
SECURITY OF THE HOSTAGE AREAS IS MAINTAINED BY 125-175
STUDENTS. WITHIN THE BUILDINGS THE STUDENTS CARRY PISTOLS,
WHILE THOSE ON DUTY OUTSIDE THEY CARRY G3 RIFLES OR UZI SUBMACHINE
GUNS. THE OVERALL COMPOUND MAY BE UNDER PROTECTIVE SURVEILLANCE
FROM THE WINDOWS OF SEVERAL SURROUNDING BUILDINGS. NO OBSERVATION
POSTS OR GUN POSITIONS HAVE BEEN SEEN ON SURROUNDING ROOFTOPS.
ANALYSIS OF ALL REPORTING INDICATES THE HOSTAGES MAY BE HELD IN
AT
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION IS ESTIMATED AS FOLLOWS WITH A
DAY/NIGHT DUTY RATIO OF 60/40.

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

THE PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES ARE LISTED BELOW WITH
THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES FOR THE 0200-0400 TIME FRAME.

A. WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES - LOCAL IRG MILITA/PASDARAN
50-100 FROM TWO NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS LESS THAN 1 KM SOUTH
WITH NOMINAL STRENGTH OF 250.
B. WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES - LOCAL CROWDS 100-300 PLUS MILITIA
C. WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES - IRG STRIKE TEAM 150-200 (MOTORIZED)
D. WITHIN 30-45 MINUTES - IRG BACK-UP STRIKE FORCES
1,500 AND LARGE CROWDS
E. WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES - IRG STRIKE FORCE RESIDUAL AND MOPS 2,000-3,000

SECRET
(4) HOSTILE COURSES OF ACTION: THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION ARE OPEN TO THE STUDENT CAPTORS AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD COMMAND.

(A) ELECT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES.

(B) ELECT TO KILL SOME OR ALL HOSTAGES.

(C) ESTABLISH DEADLINE FOR RETURN OF SHAH, DEMAND USG ADMIT THAT EMBASSY WAS "SPY NEST" AND RELEASE HOSTAGES IF SHAH WAS RETURNED.

(D) CONDUCT ESPIONAGE TRIALS AT COMPOUND, RELEASE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL, FIND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS AND SELECTED EMBASSY STAFF GUILTY OF SPYING AND SENTENCE TO LONG PRISON TERMS OR DEATH.

(5) WHILE THE TERRORISTS ARE CAPABLE OF FOLLOWING ANY OF THESE COURSES OF ACTION, THE MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE HANDLING OF THE HOSTAGES SINCE THE TAKEOVER IS FOR THE STUDENTS TO CONDUCT ESPIONAGE TRIALS WITHIN 5-10 DAYS IN THE CHANCELLORY BUILDING, FIND SELECTED INDIVIDUALS GUILTY, FREE THOSE FOUND NOT GUILTY, TURN THE GUILTY OVER TO THE IRG FOR TRANSFER TO QASR PRISON FOR EXECUTION OF SENTENCE.

(6) CRITICAL FACTORS: ANALYSIS OF SITUATION TO INCLUDE EXAMINATION OF POTENTIAL GROUND REINFORCEMENTS AND LIKELIHOOD OF AIR INTERDICTION/INTERCEPTION AFTER EXECUTION STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT EXTRAVAGANCE PHASE WILL BE EXTREMELY CRITICAL. THE FACTOR OF SURPRISE WILL HAVE BEEN NEUTRALIZED, AND THE REGULAR MILITARY UNITS AND THE GENERAL POPULATION ALERTED. A CRITICAL POINT IN PLANNING DECEPTION, DIVERSION, AND ACTUAL OPERATIONS IS TO INSURE OR MINIMIZE THE SCALE OF OPERATIONS SO THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE ACTIONS IS LIMITED TO A RESCUE MISSION AND NOT AN INVASION OR SERIES OF MAJOR INDIGENOUS DESTRUCTIVE STRIKES. CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED TO AVOID ARousing FEELINGS OF NATIONALISTIC SELF-DEFENSE OR REVENGE, BOTH OF WHICH COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE RESCUE FORCE DURING EXFILTRATION.
FROM: JTF/J2
TO: JTF/J2
INFO:SECRET

SUBJECT: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

REF: A UR 241415R NOV 79//CRITICAL INFO GAPS
    B UR 251430R NOV 79//CRITICAL EEI

1. The responses provided below are keyed to the appropriate paragraphs in Reference Alpha.

2. EMBASSY COMPOUND/HOSTAGES
   a. AND OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT IS THAT PRIOR TO
      INITIATION OF "TRIALS" IN THE COMPOUND THE HOSTAGES WILL CONTINUE TO
      BE ROTATED BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:
      SELECTED
      "HARD CASES" OR SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE LIKELY BEING HELD SEPARATELY,
      POSSIBLY IN THE BASEMENT OR THE DCM RESIDENCE STORE ROOM. ONCE
      THE "TRIALS" ARE IMMINENT THE
      HOSTAGES MAY BE REGROUPED AND SEGREGATED BY THE DEGREE OF
      THEIR "CRIMES". LIKELY HOLDING LOCATIONS FOR THE "SENIOR
      SPIES" ARE THE CLOAK ROOM IN THE BASEMENT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S
      RESIDENCE, THE WAREHOUSE BASEMENT, OR POSSIBLY STORE
      ROOMS IN THE CHANCERY BASEMENT.

b. HOSTAGE CONDITION: AGREE WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT
   BUT SUGGEST A FEW HOSTAGES MAY BE PHYSICALLY INCAPACITATED
   AT EXECUTION TIME OR BECOME SO SHOCKED IF EXECUTION IS
REACTED TO IMMEDIATELY AND VIOLENTLY BY HOSTILE FORCES THAT SOME
MAY NOT WANT TO LEAVE THE "SECURITY" OF THEIR ENVIRONMENT.

C. HOSTAGE COUNT: AGREE WITH THE THRUST OF YOUR COM-
MENTS AS DOES COMJTF. ANALYSIS CONDUCTED HERE INDICATED
FOUR INDIVIDUALS LISTED AS HOSTAGES BY DOS WERE NOT MENTI-
ONED BY ANY RELEASEES. THE FOUR NAMES ARE:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{G} \\
\text{DOS} \\
\text{G} \\
\text{USMC} \\
\text{USMC}
\end{array}
\]

IN ADDITION, ANALYSIS OF DEBRIEFINGS REVEALED NAMES
OF AT LEAST SIX INDIVIDUALS HELD AS HOSTAGES THAT DO NOT
APPEAR ON DOS LISTING. NAMES ARE:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{G} \\
\text{U/I AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN}
\end{array}
\]

(NO FURTHER INFORMATION)

TOTAL COUNT IS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUSPECT BUT RE-
COMMEND BASE LINE FIGURE OF 49-52 BE USED FOR PLANNING
PURPOSES. THE NAMES OF THE FIVE INDIVIDUALS YOU CITED
ARE BELIEVED TO BE THE FIVE OFFICIAL AMCITS THAT HAVE
BEEN AT LARGE IN THE CITY, MOVING OCCASIONALLY AND PER-
IODICALLY CHECKING IN WITH LAINGEN, TOMESETH, AND HOWLAND
BY PHONE. THE LAST THREE INDIVIDUALS ARE LOCATED IN THE
IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER PROTECTIVE CUSTODY.
d. COMPOUND HARDENING: BELIEVE "HARDENING MEASURES" ARE RELATIVELY LIMITED AND INITIATED BY STUDENTS IN REACTION TO EXTERNAL STIMULUS; RUMORS OF AMERICAN ASSAULT. FROM NATURE OF PREPARATIONS STUDENTS ANTICIPATE ASSAULT TO BE HELICOPTERBORNE, NOT GROUND INITIATED.

3. (u) ESTIMATES OF STUDENT/GUARD STRENGTH:

a. THIS FLUCTUATES WITH SOURCES AND TIME OF OBSERVATION. CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT OF THIS LOCATION PLACES TOTAL STUDENT STRENGTH AT 280-300 WITH UP TO 2/3 THAT NUMBER WITHIN THE COMPOUND DURING THE DAY, PARTICULARLY ON DAYS WHEN DEMONSTRATIONS ARE SCHEDULED. BELIEVE THE NUMBER DROPS DURING THE NIGHT, WITH A RANGE OF 80-120 AVAILABLE WITHIN THE COMPOUND. OF THIS NUMBER, ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATELY ONE THIRD ARE ON GUARD DUTY AT ANY ONE TIME. OF THIS NUMBER, HALF OR SOME 20 WOULD BE ON DUTY OUTSIDE OF HOSTAGE BUILDINGS, WITH ANOTHER HALF DOZEN ON ROOF OBSERVATION DUTY. ALL EXTERIOR GUARDS MUST BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND AT LEAST AN EQUAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS INSIDE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED, BUT IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DIFFERENTIATE.

b. CANNOT CONFIRM GUARD/STUDENT LOCATIONS BUT CONCUR WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT OF KNOWN AND SUSPECTED LOCATIONS.

4. (u) CONCUR WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH FOUR.

5. (u) COMPOUND EXTERIOR:

a. AGREE THAT A THREAT EXISTS FROM THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS AND THE CHANCERY. THE POTENTIAL FOR THIS THREAT IS ESTIMATED TO BE SO HIGH THAT THE ATHLETIC FIELDS IN
THE COMPOUND WOULD BECOME KILL ZONES WITHIN 7-12 MINUTES
AFTER THE ASSAULT ACTION IS IDENTIFIED AS SUCH AND/OR
A WARNING/CALL FOR HELP IS BROADCAST ON THE PUBLIC ADDRESS
SYSTEM CONTROLLED FROM THE CHANCERY.

b. IN ADDITION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED STUDENTS
IN THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS OTHER ELEMENTS WHO MIGHT WANT
TO HUMILIATE THE UNITED STATES COULD BE ALSO POSITIONED
IN THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS--I.E. THE PLO/PLFP ACTIVISTS
SEEKING REVENGE FOR ENTEBBE, OR THE RGB SEEKING REVENGE FOR
SON TAY. COMMENT TO DELTA S2: WHERE IS CARLOS, THIS
SMELL OF POSSIBLE SETUP OF USG.
6) (TS) RECOGNIZE YOUR CONCERN FOR ROAD BLOCKS AND CHECK
POINTS STILL WORKING THIS PROBLEM, WITH GREAT
EMPHASIS PLACED ON SUBJECT BY MG VAUGHT.
3. (C) CONCUR WITH YOUR PARA 7. WE CONTINUE TO SEARCH
FOR A RELIABLE AND SECURE MEANS OF INTRODUCING FORCE.
THIS IS CONSISTENT MAJOR WEAKNESS IN CURRENT PLANS. MG
VAUGHT GREATST CONCERN.
8. (C) CONCUR AND RECOGNIZE YOUR CONCERNS- COMMENTS IN
PARA 7 APPLY.
9. (C) THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS APPLY TO YOUR REF B.
10. (C) REACTION TIMES: AT YOUR REQUEST AND BASED UPON
CONTINUING CONCERN FOR ASSAULT FORCES THE FOLLOWING RE-
VISED HOSTILE FORCE REACTION TIMES ARE POSTULATED: (ALL
TIMES ARE ESTIMATED FROM THAT POINT IN TIME WHEN THE RE-
COGNITION OF THE ASSAULT REACHES THE CHANCERY AND THE SURROUND-
ING ENVIRONS.)
a. WITHIN 5-7 MIN- FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND ANY
WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.
b. **WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES** **REINFORCEMENTS FROM LOCAL IRG MILITIA/PASDARAN STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITIH STATIONS.**

c. **WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES** **100-300 MILITIA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS.**
d. **WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES** **IRG MILITIA REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.**
e. **WITHIN 30-45 MINUTES** **IRG BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.**
f. **WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES** **IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.**

RECOGNIZE THAT THE VOLUME OF FRIENDLY FIRE, WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE OFFENSIVE ACTIONS OF HOSTILE FORCES AND CROWDS, THE CRITICAL PHASE OF "IN TOWN OPERATIONS" WILL BE THAT TIME WHEN THE EXTRACTION HELICOPTERS ARE ON THE GROUND LOADING, THE POTENTIAL FOR HOSTILE DISABLING FIRE WILL STILL BE HIGH AS LONG AS THE LZ IS WITHIN THE COMPOUND.
TEHRAN AND IMMEDIATE VICINITY

General. The city is densely populated with a potential for heavy traffic congestion at rush hour periods or if a demonstration or mob activity is taking place. The population is generally distributed with Europeans and high-income housing in the North. There are three major air fields: Mehrabad, Ghale-Morhi, and Dohman Tappeh on the West, South and East of town, respectively.

Weather. Winter weather is generally cold and partly cloudy. Morning lows average low 30's F in the morning to mid 40's and low 50's in the afternoon. Winds over 16 kts 5% of the time. Mean sky cover ranges 30-60%. Precip expected 3-7 days/month; snow 1-3 days. (Detailed info in WX section)

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(Detailed info in light data section)

Enemy Forces

1. Students. Tehran University is the primary origin of students involved in the current situation. They can probably muster crowds of several thousand, on sufficient notice, to carry out demonstrations and provide at least moral support.

2. Revolutionary Guards - (Pasadaran). The most active security force in the city, there are approx 4000 Revolutionary Guards in the city; in various states of organization, training, and readiness. An estimated 3000 are undergoing training at military
installations in the city. Komiteh's or local units of Revolutionary Guards have been reported approx 400 M north of the Embassy (150 pers) and 800 M south of the Embassy (2 Komiteh's of 250 pers each). Other concentrations of Revolutionary Guards are reported in Zafar St., approx 6.5 KM north of the Embassy, and Saltanatabad Barracks, approx 9 KM to the northeast. There are reportedly a total of 12 local units of 300 pers each and 5 reserve units of 150 men each of 12 hours call.

3. The Gendarmerie. Numbering approx 75,000 prior to the revolution, they are a lightly armed paramilitary force mainly responsible for border and rural security. Their ranks have been reduced by desertions particularly in Kurdish areas.

4. The National Police. Responsible for urban law enforcement, the national police do not represent a major tactical force in the Tehran area.

5. Regular Army. Army units in the Tehran area recently consisted of an under-strength infantry division, a special forces brigade, two armored brigades, two artillery brigades, and various support units. Most of the special forces brigade and several battalions of the infantry division are in the northwest fighting the Kurds. Recent analysis indicates almost all combat gear administratively parked, indicating a low alert status. Significant recent dispositions include:

   a. Lavizan barracks (northeast edge of town) (UTM WV 4559)

   42 X Chieftan Tanks

   48 X BTR/OT-64

   9 X M113
b. Saltanatabad barracks (north-northeast edge of town) (UTM WV 4529)
12 X FA pieces
12 X mortars
c. Vic Doshan-Tappeh airfield (east edge of town) (UTMWV 4250)
35 X M-46's (artillery)
8 X U/I artillery pieces
50 X possible tanks
12 X possible mortars
d. Baggi-E-Shah compound (approx 4KM west-southwest of Embassy)
12 X companies of "rangers" (Regular Army, defected to the Khomeini/IRG cause).
e. Vic Niavaran Palace (north edge of town) (UTMWV 4264)
f. Vic Mehrabad Airfield
2 X infantry companies, reported low combat effectiveness
36 X M-46 artillery pieces.

It is notable that at some Army posts, such as Abbasabad compound (approx 2-3 KM northeast of embassy), Army troops are not all armed and may be mixed with or under control of Revolutionary Guards.

Army units are generally manned at half strength and are experiencing maintenance and supply problems. Although the Army is well equipped, difficulties in maintaining armor and breakdowns of support equipment and transportation vehicles have been reported.

There is little capability to guarantee coordinated tactical control by the opposition. The Revolutionary Guards might be able to control their actions internally, but not with other elements such as students, police, public, or
military. Despite this, a convergence of opposition forces and the public around the embassy is likely, with a sharply increasing response within 30-45 minutes of an alarm.

6. Air. Air elements immediately within the Tehran area include the first fighter base at Mehrabad. Maintenance and supply have reduced pilot training and operational capability. Mehrabad is the home of the 11th Combat Crew Training Squadron and 12th Fighter Squadron, with 27 X F4D and 25 X F4E aircraft. Recent dispositions of significant aircraft include:

Doshan-Tappeh:
14 X F-27
1 X C-130

Ghale-Morghi
38 X light aircraft (including O-1's and O-2's)
20 X UH-1
1 X CH-47

Mehrabad:
31 X F-4's
16 X F-5's
7 X T-33
11 X KC-135
23 X C-130
6 X CH-47
14 X UH-1
7. Air Defense. Air defense weapons recently reported in the Tehran area include:

5 X Hawk sites vic Mehrabad (2 reported occupied, no missiles)

1 X BN 23 NM AD guns, in depot east of Mehrabad (64 X Wpns)

Maintenance and air defense coordination will seriously limit any coordinated air defense effort in the objective area.
MANZARIYEH ORIENTATION DATA

I. TARGET DESCRIPTION -

MANZARIYEH AIR FIELD IS AN AIR AND GROUND TRAINING FACILITY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE II AF WHICH APPEARS TO BE USED DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY. THE MAIN FACILITY IS THE 3322M X 45M ASPHALT RUNWAY, MARKED WITH AZIMUTH HEADINGS AND RUNWAY EDGES (POSSIBLY USEFUL RECOGNITION FEATURES). THE RUNWAY IS ORIENTED WNW X ESE WITH NO APPARENT RUNWAY LIGHTS OR APPROACH LIGHTS. ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE RUNWAY THERE IS A CIVILIAN PASSENGER TERMINAL, A CONTROL TOWER, AND FIVE SMALL SUPPORT BUILDINGS. WATER MAY BE AVAILABLE AT TERMINAL.

OTHER FACILITIES IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA INCLUDE:

A. KUSHK E NOSRAT AIRFIELD, A GRADED EARTH STRIP WITH A RADIO/WEATHER STATION AND A BOMBING/GUNNERY RANGE. KUSHK E NOSRAT IS LOCATED APPROX 5KM NORTH OF MANZARIYEH AIR FIELD, AND LINKED BY GROUND CABLE.

B. A RAPIER SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITE APPROX 1.7 KM NORTH OF THE CENTER OF MANZARIYEH'S RUNWAY. THIS SITE APPEARS TO HAVE 3X LAUNCHERS APPROX 150-200M APART. VEHICLES HAVE BEEN OBSERVED AT THESE LAUNCHERS, BUT NONE WERE PRESENT ON 20 NOV.
C. A barracks area approx 1.8 km SE of the east end of
the runway.

D. An ammunition storage depot approx 8.5 km south of
Manzariyeh field.

E. An unidentified group of bldgs approx 3.5 km south of
Manzariyeh field.

II. LOCATION

Manzariyeh airfield is located approx 5 mi north by west of
Manzariyeh, 20 mi north of Qom, and 50 mi southwest by south of Tehran.

III. COORDINATES

The center of the runway is located geographic 34° 58' 39" N,
050° 48' 12" E. UTM 39S VU 82 048 70636 (This may be a useful ref
pt for air/ground coordination without detailed maps available.)

IV. MAP REF

A) 1:1,000,000 ONG G5

B) 1:250,000 joint operations graphic series 1501

Sheet M139-6

C) Map-substitute: Manzariyeh photo with grid approx scale 1:25,000

V. WEATHER AT MANZARIYEH (SPECIFIC POINT) NOV DEC

A. CLIMATOLOGY: MEAN PRECIP (INCHES) .6 .4

MAX TEMP (DEGREES) 60 52

MEAN TEMP 55 49

MIN TEMP 45 36

For further information on climatology, see attachment.
B. LIGHT DATA: SEE LIGHT DATA ON TEHRAN AREA (ATTACHED)

VI. TOPOGRAPHY

MANZARIYEH IS ON FAIRLY FLAT BUT ROUGH TERRAIN WITH NATURAL DRAINAGE. AREA IS TRAFFICABLE OFF-ROAD BY HIGH AXELED WHEELED VEHICLES (NOTE RAPIERS AND ASSOCIATED VEHICLES WERE NOT MOVED INTO POSITION ON ROADS.) PEAKS OF 4347' AT 3MI TO WSW AND 3451' AT 1.2MI WEST.

VII. ENEMY

A. AIR - NO AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED RECENTLY AT MANZARIYEH AS OF 20 NOV.

B. MISSILE - RAPIER TRAINING SITE WITH THREE LAUNCHERS IS APPROX 1.7 KM NORTH OF THE CENTER OF THE RUNWAY. NO VEHICLES WERE OBSERVED AT THE SITE ON 20 NOV.

C. GROUND - ALTHOUGH INTEL ESTIMATES HAVE GIVEN A POTENTIAL OF 500 X PERSONNEL THROUGH-OUT THE AREA (INCLUDING THE AMMUNITION DEPOT, THE BARRACKS AREA, AND THE FIELD OF KUSSH-E-NOSRAT) THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITY OBSERVED AT MANZARIYEH RECENTLY. IT IS ALSO ESTIMATED THIS AREA IS ONLY USED DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.
THERE ARE NO REGULAR IRANIAN ARMY GROUND FORCE UNITS LOCATED WITHIN 50 NAUTICAL MILES OF QOM/MANZARIYEH AMMO DEPOT. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SECURITY/ADMIN UNITS AT QOM/MANZARIYEH AIRFIELD (COMPANY PLUS). THESE UNITS COULD REACT WITHIN 5-10 MIN. OR LESS, DEPENDING ON STATE OF ALERT.

THERE ARE AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS IN THE CITY OF QOM, WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY 29 KM FROM QOM/MANZARIYEH. TRANSIT TIME FOR THESE UNKNOWN FORCES, ASSUMING TRAVEL BY TRUCK, IS APPROXIMATELY 40 MINUTES.
GENERAL:

Although the military command structure in the Iranian armed forces is weak and insubordination is not unusual, the majority of the military would obey orders if Iran were attacked or threatened with imminent invasion.

The Iranian officer corps is divided between royalists (supporting restoration of the Monarchy), revolutionaries (supporting Khomeini), and moderates (who are politically ambivalent but dissatisfied with the military situation). The moderates are upset by the lack of discipline, the status of the military in society, and religious interference in the military, such as ordering participation in demonstrations. The moderates are disorganized and have adopted a wait and see attitude. They lack a clear definition of the military's role in society, largely due to recent purges of ranking military officers. While many moderates continue to believe they should protect the country against external aggression, they have serious doubts about involving themselves in the suppression of internal opposition. In Kurdistan these doubts have caused several incidents of refusal to obey orders and subsequent executions.

The military self-image was seriously affected after the revolution. They do not believe they can oppose the, "Will of the People." The military attempted to do this prior to the revolution and were defeated. The moderate officers doubt they could lead an uprising against the Islamic Government because the military are not considered a, "Progressive," force due to their previous support of the Shah.
Air Defense

1. Fighter Aircraft. The overall operational effectiveness of the IIAF has been seriously impaired by maintenance, supply, and training problems. Although flying squadrons are fully manned, pilots fly only 2 to 5 hours per month, with no advanced combat maneuver training permitted. F-14 aircraft should present less threat than the better maintained, more familiar F-4 and F-5's.

Iran has a total of approx 90 X F-4, 135 X F-5, and 77 X F-14 fighters deployed at eight bases, primarily in western Iran. (A ninth base, Chah Bahar has been used for occasional F-4 deployments). The post revolution sortie rate has been only: [redacted] which may indicate (and contributes to) an impaired operational capability.

F-14's are suffering for parts, maintenance, and trained pilots; reportedly only 20 pilots had been through intercept training and only 3 had finished the complete air defense/air superiority course and were operationally qualified at the time of the revolution. Only 15 IP's were trained weapon systems officers, and had only been through first-phase training (single missile on a single target). Since the revolution, there has been little training.

Also, Iran's only F-14 F-14 simulator is at least partially inoperative.

Only 2 firings of the Phoenix missile were conducted before the revolution. Only 30 of 268 Phoenix missiles are operational. According to one report, although estimates have run as high as 200.
but an indigenous source has questioned the missiles' reliability.

2. Air Defense Radar Network. Many radars are inoperative due to parts or maintenance:
   a. Soviet border
   b. Turkey and Iraq
   c. Persian Gulf
   Comprehensive coverage
   Comprehensive except for terrain masking at low altitudes (mountains)
   Theoretical coverage. Temp inversion "ducting" - causes multiple or false targets. (95% probability at 2000' and 60% probability above 2000'.) Conditions will worsen over next month time period.

d. Afghanistan and Pakistan
   Weak; only three radars, large gap between Mashad and Zahedan. Zahedan and Chah Bahar may be inoperative

3. Air Defense (ground). Iran has no I-Hawks operational according to some reports, but sites have been observed at Tehran and Bushehr, with some missiles seen at Bushehr. Given the need for maintenance and calibration, other Hawk sites may be inoperative or impaired. Other Hawk sites listed in a recent (19 Nov) summary, in addition to Tehran and Beshehr (I-Hawk reported), are Tabriz, Khorramabad, and Mehran, total air defense assets listed in this summary are:

   17 X Hawk Btty
   10 X Seacat Btty
   8 X Rapier Bn
   32 X SA-7 Plt
Other ADA systems available include 23MM Soviet and 35MM Oerlikon guns. Their effectiveness will be impaired by C&C problems, but they still could pose a local threat.

**Ground Forces**

The Regular Army numbers approx 150,000, about half what it was prior to the revolution. The bulk is stationed along borders with Iraq and the Soviet Union. Except for small units fighting the Kurds, there have been no major redeployments since the revolution.

The Army is well equipped but hindered by lack of maintenance and spare parts. Discipline and morale are low in some units, due to interference by the Revolutionary Guard and support conditions, but have improved slightly over the last few months.

The Army is supplemented by the paramilitary field police (Gendarmerie) and Revolutionary Guards (Pasadarn) numbering something under 75,000 and approx 20,000 respectively.

**Dispositions:** (see map for Hq locations)

- **Northwest**
  - 64 Inf Div
- **Iraqi border**
  - 28 Inf Div
  - 81 Armd Div
  - 84 Inf Bde
- **Southwest (oil fields)**
  - 92 Armd Bde
  - 55 Abn Bde
- **Northeast (USSR/Afghanistan)**
  - 77 Inf Div
- **Southeast (Pakistan/Afghanistan)**
  - 88 Armd Div
Units in the northwest and Iraqi border areas are occupied with suppressing the Kurds. An extra 10,000 troops and 5,000 revolutionary guards have been deployed to the areas as reinforcements.

In the southwest there has been some guerrilla activity by Arabs, but this has not reached the dimensions of the Kurdish problem. Iraq could increase pressure in the West by actively supporting either the Arabs or the Kurds.

The Navy's operational capability has been increasingly impaired since the revolution due to maintenance and military discipline problems, compounded by a lack of parts and revolutionary interference in command channels. The Navy has put in a poor showing on the only two exercises it has held since summer.

The Navy's nine harpoon-firing guided missile patrol boats are probably in the best condition of all Iranian ships.

There are also 3 destroyers in the Iranian inventory. These ships each carry 4 "Standard" (name of missile) Surface to Surface missiles with 1 reload capability. Maintenance may have reduced the missile capability.

The Navy also has 2 coastal minesweepers, based at Khorramshahr and 6 RH-53D minesweeping helicopters, based at Bushehr. All are
currently grounded for maintenance and parts. There are also a squadron each of SM-3D and AB-313 helicopters with anti-sub and anti-surface missions, which are reported as operational. The P-27 logistics support aircraft used by the Navy are also reported as operational.

The Iranian Navy is not believed to have any mines or mine-laying capability.
IRANIAN EQUIPMENT INVENTORY

GROUND

3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS
4 ARMORED DIVISIONS (1 AT BRIGADE STRENGTH)
1 SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE
1 SEPARATE AIRBORNE BRIGADE

250 LIGHT TANKS (SCORPIONS)
1765 MAIN BATTLE TANKS (M60, M47, CHIEFTAIN)
2300 APCs (M113, BMP, BTR-60, BTR-50)
525 SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY (M109, M107, M110)
700 TOWED ARTILLERY (M101, M46, M59, M115)
1200+ ATGMs (TOW, DRAGON, SAGGER)

NAVAL

3 DESTROYERS (2 SUMNER/US AND 1 BATTLE/UK CLASS)
4 FRIGATES (VOSPER MK-V)
9 MISSILE BOATS (LA COMBATTANTE)
14 HOVERCRAFT

AIR

403 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (F-4D/E, F-14A, F-5A/E)
35 COMBAT CAPABLE TRAINERS (F-5B/F)
29 RECON (RF-4E, RF-5A, P-3F)
14 TANKERS (KC-747, KC-707)

AIR DEFENSE

17 HAWK BATTERIES
10 SEACAT BATTERIES
8 RAPIER BATTALIONS
32 SA-7 PLATOONS
19 November 1979

IRANIAN GROUND FORCES

Personnel
Army
Gendarmerie
Revolutionary Guards

Approx. 150,000
Unknown, 75,000 prior to revolution
20,000

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E & E OUTLINE

I. SCOPE: THIS OUTLINE IS INTENDED AS GUIDANCE TO AIRCREW AND RANGER PERSONNEL; IF DELTA FORCE PERSONNEL ARE IN THE EVADING PARTY, TAKE DIRECTION FROM THEM DUE TO THEIR MISSION ORIENTATION, TRAINING, AND DETAILED PREPARATION FOR THE EVASION OPTION.

II. AREAS: THIS OUTLINE ADDRESSES TWO GENERAL AREAS, REFERRED TO AS THE WESTERN AREA AND THE EASTERN AREA. THE EASTERN AREA IS A NORTH-SOUTH STRIP RUNNING ALONG A LINE RUNNING FROM KMARK ISLAND NORTH TO TEHRAN, EXTENDING EAST TO A WIDTH OF APPROX 50 MILES ON THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE AREA. THE EASTERN AREA EXTENDS FROM THE COAST NEAR THE PAKISTANI BORDER NORTHWEST TO A POINT NEAR TABAS AND THEN WEST-NORTHWEST TO TEHRAN.

III. GENERAL INFLIGHT PROCEEDURES:

A. AT LEAST ONE INDIVIDUAL IN EACH TACTICAL FORCE OF TROOPS CARRIED SHOULD BE DESIGNATED TO KEEP TRACK OF THE AIRCRAFT'S LOCATION AT ALL TIMES, BASED ON CHECK POINTS AND TIME SINCE THE LAST CHECK POINT, ESPECIALLY IF TROOPS ARE RIGGED FOR AIRDROP AND FACING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EMERGENCY EXIT.

B. IN THE EVENT OF FORCED LANDING, PERSONNEL WILL RALLY A SAFE DISTANCE OFF THE NOSE OF THE AIRCRAFT. INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE DESIGNATED TO GRAB DOOR GUNS, MEDICAL KITS, AND ANYTHING ELSE USEFUL. AIRCRAFT RADIOS SHOULD BE MOVED OFF FREQ AND CRYPTO ZEROIZED IF THEY
ARE NOT GOING TO BE USED AGAIN AND IF THERE IS TIME.

C. GROUND-FORCE PERSONNEL: SET UP SECURITY AND OBTAIN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY, USING THE AIRCRAFT AS A REFERENCE POINT FOR A CLOCK ORIENTATION. A NON-FIRE CORRIDOR WILL BE DESIGNATED TO PROTECT INDIVIDUALS MOVING FROM THE AIRCRAFT TO THE RALLY POINT. (THIS PROCEDURE IS IMPORTANT ESPECIALLY IF THE AIRCRAFT COMES DOWN IN A CONCENTRATION OF HOSTILE FORCES, BUT WILL ASSIST IN CONTROL IN ANY EVENT. IT WILL ALSO PROVIDE READY REFERENCE TO ANY FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT AS TO WHERE THE FRIENDLIES ARE IF FIRE SUPPORT OR QUICK PICKUP ARE AVAILABLE.)

D. INITIAL HIDING PLACE: AS SOON AS ACCOUNTABILITY IS OBTAINED, A DECISION WILL BE MADE BY THE SENIOR MAN PRESENT AS TO WHETHER IMMEDIATE PICKUP IS LIKELY, SUCH AS PICKUP BY ANOTHER AIRCRAFT IN THE SAME FORMATION. (BE CAREFUL OF EXTENSIVE CLEAR TEXT VOICE TRANSMISSIONS ON GUARD CHANNEL.)

IF IMMEDIATE PICKUP IS UNLIKELY, PERSONNEL SHOULD MOVE OUT OF THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE AIRCRAFT TO THE CLOSEST COVERED AND CONCEALED POSITION, FAVORING THE NORTH AND WEST QUADRANTS IF ALL OTHER FACTORS ARE EQUAL. THIS STANDARD PROCEDURE WILL ASSIST FRIENDLIES IN LATER LOCATING EVADERS IF POSSIBLE. THE SITUATION, INCLUDING ENEMY, TERRAIN, AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE WILL PROBABLY Dictate WHERE TO MOVE IF THE DECISION IS MADE TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, IF IT DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE OTHERWISE, GO IN ORDER OF PRIORITY. IF MOVING AWAY FROM THE AIRCRAFT, TRY TO LEAVE
E. Personnel rigged for paratroop and forced into an emergency exit will assemble in the air, using steerable canopies, as much as possible and assemble on the ground towards the center of the stick.

1. Consideration should be given to forced landing at indigenous airdromes enroute and using surprise and/or tactical assets on board to commandeer escape aircraft. Otherwise, the driving consideration for a forced landing will be to select an isolated area.

G. If a forced landing is made in an isolated area and the evaders move to an initial hiding place away from the aircraft, one of two courses of action are open.

1. Remain at initial hiding place/move to a new hiding place to await pickup. At this time, no assets are available to support this option.

2. Enter a long range E&E option based upon the area; either paragraph H or I below.

H. Long range evasion, eastern area:

1. Southern third (coastline to level of Pakistan/Afghanistan border; approx 30 deg N): If forced down in this area, the objective will be to move east to the Pakistan/Iran border, cross and turn self in to Pakistani police or border guards. Despite recent anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, intelligence indicates a favorable result if evaders reach Pakistani control.

The Kerman-Bam-Zamedan road, "along the northern border of the 

F-3
SOUTHERN THIRD, MAY BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE VEHICLES TO BE BRIEDED OR COMANDEERED. THERE IS A GENDARMERIE-POST AT BAM, AND MAY BE OTHER CHECKPOINTS ON THE ROUTE. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO STOW AWAY ON A TRUCK ON A SLOW CURVE OR AT A HALT. GENERALLY THERE IS LITTLE TRAFFIC, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT. THERE IS ALSO A SECONDARY ROAD NETWORK ON THE EASTERN PORTION OF THIS AREA WHICH CONNECTS WITH PAKISTAN. ONE GROUP OF PEOPLE ALONG THE EASTERN EDGE OF THE AREA, THE BALUCHI, MIGHT PROVIDE SUPPORT TO EVADERS. NOMADIC TRIBESMEN, THE BALUCHI MIGHT BE BARTERED WITH FOR SURVIVAL ITEMS AND TRANSPORTATION.

2. MIDDLE THIRD (APPROX 30 DEG N TO VIC TABAS, APPROX 33 DEG N): PERSONNEL IN AN EVASION SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE THIRD WILL BE FACED PRIMARILY WITH A DESERT SURVIVAL PROBLEM. THIS AREA HAS THE ADVANTAGE THAT THE RISK OF DETECTION AND AGGRESSIVE ENEMY REACTION IS GREATLY REDUCED. MOVEMENT SHOULD BE AT NIGHT FOR CONCEALMENT, TO KEEP WARM, AND TO CONSERVE WATER. THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE WILL STILL BE TO MOVE SOUTH AND THEN EAST, INTO PAKISTAN.

3. NORTHERN THIRD (VIC TABAS WEST-NORTHWEST TO TEHRAN) THIS LEG IS OVER EXTREME DESERT CONDITIONS, AND DESERT SURVIVAL IS AGAIN A CRITICAL CONSIDERATION. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT DELTA FORCE WILL BE ABOARD AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN THIS AREA. THEIR PLANNING AND TACTICAL ABILITIES SHOULD BE RELIED UPON. EVASION ON THIS LEG WILL CALL FOR A DECISION TO GO SOUTH AND EAST TO PAKISTAN, OR WEST TO TURKEY. THE ELBURZ MOUNTAINS, TO THE NORTH, ARE A POSSIBLE AREA TO
PROVIDE SHELTER AND SURVIVAL SUPPORT. INDIVIDUALS IN THE AREA OF THE CASPIAN SEA SEE THEMSELVES AS DIFFERENT, AND MIGHT BE LESS DANGEROUS TO ENCOUNTER THAN PEOPLE IN THE TEHRAN AREA. IF ABLE TO GET WEST OF TEHRAN, TRUCKS MOVING WEST THROUGH TABRIZ AND THEN TO TURKEY MIGHT PROVE USEFUL FOR TRANSPORTATION. IF MOVING EAST, STAY OUT AFGHANISTAN.

I. LONG RANGE EVASION, WESTERN AREA:

1. SOUTHERN ONE-QUARTER (COAST TO ZAGROS MOUNTAINS): THIS AREA IS POPULATED AND THERE IS A HIGH RISK OF BEING PICKED UP. EVADERS IN THIS AREA HAVE THE OPTION OF MOVING NORTH AND THEN WEST TO TURKEY, OR SOUTH ACROSS THE PERSIAN GULF TO SAUDI ARABIA. THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS OR SYMPATHETIC IRANIANS IN THE OIL OR SHIPPING INDUSTRY MIGHT PROVIDE SUPPORT. APPENDIX 1 CONTAINS USEFUL EXTRACTS FROM AN AREA TO THE EAST OF OUR AREA OF INTEREST. IT IS WRITTEN FOR AN AREA WHERE THE MOUNTAINS REACH ALL THE WAY TO THE SEA, WITHOUT A COASTAL PLAIN, BUT PROVIDES SOME INSIGHT TO THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE WESTERN AREA IN THIS PAPER, MOUNTAINS AND COASTAL PLAIN.

2. MIDDLE ONE-QUARTER (ZAGROS MNTS):

THIS AREA IS EXTREMELY RUGGED TERRAIN. AGAIN; USEFUL DETAILS CAN BE FOUND IN APPENDIX 1 OR 2. THERE ARE SEVERAL TRIBAL GROUPS IN THESE MOUNTAINS, ANY ONE OF WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE SUPPORT TO EVADERS. THE OBJECTIVE FROM THIS AREA IS TO MOVE NORTH AND WEST TO TURKEY; STAY OUT OF IRAQ. ALONG THE WESTERN BORDER OF IRAN, KURDS MAY BE ENCOUNTERED. THE KURDS ARE A SEPERATE ETHNIC GROUP WHICH CURRENTLY AT ODDS WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. KURDS COULD POSSIBLY BE RECOGNIZED BY THEIR DISTINCTIVE DRESS, WHICH MAY INCLUDE PANTALOONS AND FRINGED
TURBAN OR A DISTINCTIVELY SHAPED HAT WITH BRIMS ON THE FRONT AND BACK WHICH FOLD UP OR DOWN.

3. NORTHERN ONE-HALF (NORTH OF ZAGROS MINS). CONSULT APPENDIX 2 FOR GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION. (ALTHOUGH APPENDIX 2 IS WRITTEN FOR AN AREA WEST OF THE PRIMARY AREA OF INTEREST, IT PROVIDES USEFUL BACKGROUND DATA FOR THIS AREA AND THE AREA TO THE SOUTH.) IN THE AREA THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO MOVE NORTH AND EAST TO TURKEY. THE KURDS TO THE WEST AND THE TEHRAN - TABRIZ - MAKU HIGHWAY TO TURKEY MAY BE USEFUL.

IN THE MANZARIYEH AREA, WORKERS ON THE NORTH-SOUTH OIL PIPELINE WHICH RUNS TO THE EAST OF THE AIRFIELD MAY BE SYMPATHETIC. WORKERS BASED IN AHMADABAD, NORTH OF MANZARIYEH WERE FRIENDLY AND SUPPORTIVE OF THEIR AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS EVEN AFTER THE RECENT INCIDENT HAD BEGUN.

APPENDIXES: 1. EXTRACTS FROM SAID548-1
2. EXTRACTS FROM SAID428-1
Inland where approach is feasible the harsh, barren environment almost precludes extended-period evasion without outside assistance. In the mountains where the rugged terrain affords a reasonable amount of concealment, food and water are nearly nonexistent. In the populated valleys, where some food and water can be found, the risk of detection is high because of the meager concealment and the proximity of people to available sources of subsistence. The oppressive heat during much of the year, especially from June through September, makes physical movement during mid-day impracticable and intensifies the ever present risk of dehydration associated with the lack of readily accessible water. The rugged, northwest – southeast rending mountains and intervening valleys provide fairly good orientation but makes travel difficult when the evader must traverse the ridges. The evader can expect to encounter border guard patrols anywhere within the STUDY region or its adjacent coastal waters.

**5) TERRAIN**

Terrain in the STUDY region consists of rugged, mountain ranges which generally trend northwest – southeast and narrow, nearly flat-bottomed valleys located between the ridges. Elevations range from sea level along the PERSIAN Gulf to above 7,000 feet in the northeast. However most of the mountains have crests 3,000 to 5,000 feet in elevation and total relief is generally 2,000 to 5,000 feet. Drainage features in the region include numerous intermittent streams and a few small springs. Streams generally can be crossed throughout the year. They are commonly dry except during the high-water period (December through February). During this period, the streams are generally less than one foot deep,
except for brief periods of flooding following infrequent heavy rains. Streambanks are commonly low and sandy and streambeds are mainly coarse gravel, changing to sand and silt near the coast.

Terrain in the area consists of rocky mountains ridges and early flat valley plains. Elevation range from sea level along the coast to more than 4,500 feet in the northeast. Most mountain crests are generally 2,500 to 4,000 feet in elevation, and local relief is mainly 2,000 to 3,500 feet. Drainage features consist of two westward-flowing intermittent streams and their tributaries. The streams have characteristics similar to those described for the rest of the STUDY region.

(U) CLIMATE

This desert STUDY region features a predominantly clear and arid, but humid climate with 2 principal reasons. These seasons consist of comfortable period with infrequent rainfall which occurs from November through April and a hot to oppressively hot and humid season which prevails during the remainder of the year.

During the milder season, climatic conditions generally favor outdoor activities but occasionally temperatures drop to near freezing at sea level and several degrees colder at the higher elevation. Virtually all of the region's meager annual precipitation of about inches occurs during the months of December, January, and February.
SECRET

SECURITY

The internal security forces of Iran consist of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie, Iranian National Police Force, and Iranian Armed Forces. In combat, these forces maintain close control over the internal security of Iran. Controls include such measures as surveillance of possible dissident groups and a universal system of personal identification requiring both citizens and foreign visitors to carry individual identity documents.

The Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie is a rural police force, organized along military lines. The force is responsible for police protection, intelligence collection, and border control and anti-smuggling operations. Members of the force are stationed throughout the country in units of various sizes. Units engaged in border guard duties are deployed along frontiers, including coastal areas. Border guard units employ both light aircraft and boats, as appropriate, in the accomplishment of their mission. Uniforms worn by the gendarmerie are similar to those worn by the Iranian Army.

The Iranian National Police Force is responsible for protecting urban areas with over 5,000 residents. National Police Force personnel do not have as high a literacy rate nor are they as well trained as the gendarmerie. Within this force, morale is far from high and corruption and inefficiency are fairly widespread. Members of the National Police Force wear blue uniforms similar to those worn by U.S. police forces.

The Iranian Army is still the dominant element in the field of internal security. Units of this force assist police and gendarmerie in controlling disturbances and in maintaining an intelligence network. Army uniforms consist of an olive-drab uniform for winter and one of khaki for summer.
(8) CONCEALMENT

Concealment within the nearly barren STUD region is mostly poor; adequate concealment is available locally. Poor concealment is afforded by widely spaced desert shrubs along lower slopes of mountains. The shrubs are generally less than 3 feet high and spaced 15 to 100 feet apart. Poor to fair concealment is provided by shrubs and bushes in valleys along stream courses. These shrubs and bushes are commonly 3 to 5 feet high and closely spaced along most valley sides. Fairly good concealment is available in dense clumps and small patches of bushes, which occur along most low-lying stretches of the coast. The bushes are in thick clumps up to 30 feet in diameter and over 5 feet high, or in patches up to several hundred feet wide, composed of closely spaced individual bushes. In the mountains, surface irregularities provide much additional concealment and primarily consist of numerous rocky ridges, escarpments, and narrow valleys of tributary streams.
The overall population density is slightly less than 40 people per square mile but this figure decreases to about 12 persons per square mile in the desert area. Most inhabitants of the SUDY region reside in small villages or settlements consisting of a few dozen dwellings.

Arabs comprise the majority ethnic group residing in the SUDY region. The Persian minority consists mostly of government and military personnel. The Arabs are a very independent, tribal people, most of whom are peasant farmers. They do not consider themselves a component of the Iranian nation and resent efforts of the government to assimilate them into a nation-state. This attitude, however, may have been mitigated to a degree by the government's recent efforts to improve economic conditions. Although the Arabs feel little loyalty to Iran, the outward manifestations of discontent are minimal. Persian is the language taught in schools, Arabic is the language most commonly used. Both Arabs and Persians are followers of the Moslem religion.

The outside world is generally viewed with distrust and suspicion; however, strangers normally can be expected to be treated hospitably as long as local customs are respected. Basic social values are family loyalty, personal honor, and hospitality.
Terrain consists mainly of rugged mountains, scattered hills and intervening basins that trend northwest-southeast through the STUDY region. Elevations range from about 1,000 feet in the southwest corner of the region to 11,500 feet above sea level in the northeast. Most of the region, however, lies at elevations between 5,000 to 6,000 feet. The mountains are mainly rugged and steep crested; summits are rocky, and there are many "V" shaped narrow valleys. Mountain slopes are moderate to steep; average maximum local relief is about 2,500 feet. The flat to rolling plains in the northern part of the STUDY region range in elevation between about 4,000 to 5,000 feet above sea level. Numerous streams head in the mountains and flow outward in various directions; several converge at lower elevations and continue flowing westward and southward into IRAQ and the PERREAN Gulf, respectively. Generally, mountain streams flow swiftly between steep, rocky banks which become gorges in some places. As some streams leave the mountains they flow into braided channels where banks are commonly sandy but fairly steep; velocities are moderate, except during high water when some streams become swift and turbulent. High water is normally from December through June with a peak period associated with the spring rains from March through May. During the low-water period (August through November), all streams are greatly reduced in volume and many become dry river beds. Except in the flood stage during the period of high water, all streams should be fordable within the STUDY region.

Terrain within the SAFE Area is consistently mountainous though generally less severe than in other parts of the STUDY region. Elevations range between about 3,000 to 7,600 feet and the average maximum local relief is about 2,000 feet. Major drainage consists of several southerly flowing streams which converge in the southern part of the Area, creating some rugged terrain over which the evader may travel.
(U) CLIMATE

The climate of the XY region is characterized by cool, moist, partly cloudy winters and hot, dry, almost cloudless summers. Spring and autumn are transition seasons with spring characterized by an increase in rainfall and autumn marked by a gradual decrease in temperature.

During the winter (December through February), temperatures usually vary from the low 40's during the day to below freezing at night. Winter relative humidity averages between 70% and 80%, accentuating the colder temperatures. Snow covers the ground in the higher elevations for most of the season and accumulates to depths estimated near 12 inches by February. Snow cover usually disappears by mid-March.

Spring (March through May) is a season of frequent showers and thunderstorms and a gradual increase in temperature. The shower activity of the season frequently results in flash and local flooding.

Temperatures in the summer (June through August) average in the high 90's in the afternoon and frequently exceed 100°F. The almost cloudless skies and absence of precipitation combine with the heat of the day and chilly nights to make summer an extremely uncomfortable season.

In autumn (September through November) temperatures decrease and cloud and precipitation amounts increase toward the normals of winter. Autumn is the most favorable season for outdoor activity.
The Kurds and the Lurs, two distinct tribal descendants of original Iranian stock live within the STUDY region. The Kurds generally live in the north part of the region while the Lurs' domain is to the south. The Lurs in rural areas are primarily seasonal nomads, wintering in the plains and spending the summer in the mountains. The Kurds are mainly sedentary though nomadic element moves relatively freely into Kurdish territories in Iraq and Turkey. Both tribes speak separate dialects related to Persian, the most prominent language of Iran.

The Lurs, who generally follow Shah Islam, the predominant religion of Persia, are typically taller than most Iranians. They are much divided among themselves and held in contempt by neighboring peoples, particularly the Kurds. Kurds can contact with the Lurs, however, has shown them to be quite reliable. The Kurds follow the Sunni branch of Islam, a difference which plays a great role in social and political life in Iran. The Iranian government has found this to be difficult to control and assimilate. The army maintains numerous in Kurdish territory and maintains close surveillance of tribal activity. Kurds have played a Kurdish anti-government attitude so that pro-Soviet ideologies may be found among these tribesmen.

Kurds are generally viewed with suspicion among all tribal groups, through a newcomer can expect to be treated with hospitality if he is respectful of local customs. Iranians reputedly enjoy adventure and intrigue, either if associated with the possibility of personal gain.
CONCEALMENT

Concealment in the STAB region ranges from fair to poor. The best concealment is provided by open stands of deciduous trees and high brush combined with surface irregularities. Most trees in the region are widely spaced scrub oaks which average 15 to 40 feet in height and grow generally in gullies or in mountainous or hilly areas. Bushes and grasses growing to a height of 2 to 6 feet are found in areas that have intermittent supplies of water. Surface irregularities afford little concealment on the plains but furnish fair concealment from ground observation in the rugged hills and mountains which predominate in the STAB region. Concealment is poor in the flat valley areas which generally have little or no vegetative cover except where perennial streams can provide water for cultivation or brush cover. Numerous ruins and abandoned forts throughout the region may provide concealment and shelter in an emergency.

The evader will have to rely primarily upon scattered areas of tree cover among the surface irregularities for the best concealment opportunities.
### SECTION 01 OF C2

**SUBJECT:** RESPONSE TO CLIMATOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE REQUEST (U)  

1. **T**EMPERATURES — TEMPERATURE MEANS AND EXTREMES FOR AVAILABLE LOCATIONS ALONG THE ROUTE APE AS FOLLOWS:

#### TEMPERATURES

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3. (U) **Mechanical Turbulence Due to Upper Air Wind Flow Across and Overhead Terrain**: SACR 105-10 gives a SAC determined empirical relationship between wind components perpendicular to terrain and mechanical turbulence for P-52 type aircraft operating at low levels. SACR 105-10, para 3F, states these criteria:

1. Normal component equal to or greater than 25 knots and less
50 KNOTS AT RIDGE LEVEL.

1. Severe turbulence may be found up to 50 miles leeward of the ridge. From ridge level up to 5,000 feet above, severe turbulence may also be found at heights up to the tropopause in stable layers.

2. Moderate turbulence may be found up to 150 miles leeward of the ridge from the surface to the tropopause, especially in stable layers.

3. Normal component equal to or greater than 50 knots at ridge level.

4. Extreme turbulence may be found in or near the rotor clouds (roll clouds) found at or near ridge height on leeward side of the ridge.

5. Severe turbulence may be found at the tropopause up to 150 miles leeward of the ridge. The layer of turbulence may be up to 5,000 feet thick.

6. Moderate turbulence may be found up to 300 miles leeward of the ridge from the surface to 10,000 feet above the tropopause. The following data are given for the percent of observations equal to or greater than the stated wind speed at the average ridge height.

(Note: "GE" is the abbreviation for greater than or equal to.)

ROUTE FROM X TO P

1ST PART - SOUTH OF E-W RIDGE LINE

NOV AND DEC WINDS GE 25 KTS 5 PCT GE 50 KTS 0 PCT

2ND PART - NORTH OF THIS RIDGE LINE

NOV AND DEC WINDS GE 25 KTS 2 PCT GE 50 KTS 0 PCT

ROUTE FROM B TO H - MOUNTAINS ON 3 SIDES INFLUENCE THIS PART OF ROUTE.

NOVEMBER WINDS GE 25 KTS 15-20 PCT GE 50 KTS 0 PCT

DECEMBER WINDS GE 25 KTS 35-40 PCT GE 50 KTS 0 PCT

ROUTE FROM H TO M - THROUGH AND/OR ALONG EASTERN SLOPES.

NOVEMBER WINDS GE 25 KTS 22-30 PCT GE 50 KTS 0 PCT

DECEMBER WINDS GE 25 KTS 50-60 PCT GE 50 KTS 2 PCT

ROUTE FROM M TO E - NATURE OF TERRAIN IS GENERALLY MOUNTAINOUS.

NOVEMBER WINDS GE 25 KTS 25-35 PCT GE 50 KTS 1-2 PCT

DECEMBER WINDS GE 25 KTS 35-45 PCT GE 50 KTS 1-3 PCT

LOW-LEVEL PREVALENT WINDS, EXTREMES, AND DIURNAL VARIATIONS:

LOW-LEVEL WINDS OVER THE REGION ARE GENERALLY NORTHERLY (N-NW) DURING THE EVENING AND NIGHT TIME HOURS. DURING MID-MORNING TO EARLY AFTERNOON HOURS WINDS ARE GENERALLY S TO SE. GENERALLY, WIND SPEEDS ARE 5 TO 10 KNOTS FOR PREVALENT DIRECTIONS DURING BOTH DAY AND NIGHT SITUATIONS. WINDS ARE GENERALLY CALM 70-30 PERCENT OF THE TIME.
WINDS IN THE COASTAL AREA TEND TO BE WEST 70 PERCENT OF THE TIME.

ACTION ADDRESSEES

DO REF THE FINAL SECTION FOR DISTRIBUTION

7320

UNANN

G-4
### Exposure Weather - Yazd, Iran (Southern Mountains)

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### Exposure Weather - Qom, Iran (Northwest Desert)

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### Exposure Weather - Tehran, Iran (Northwest Desert)

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<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Minimum</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>Absolute Minimum</td>
<td>19</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Precipitation (Inches)</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Rainfall</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Snowfall</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Thunderstorms</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Duststorms</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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### Exposure Weather - Kazvin (Northwest Desert)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NOV</th>
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<th>JAN</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Maximum (F)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Maximum</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mean Minimum</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absolute Minimum</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Precipitation (Inches)</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>2.10</td>
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<tr>
<td># Days Rainfall</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Snowfall</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Thunderstorms</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Duststorms</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Less Than 0.5 Day
### Exposure Weather - Zanjan, Iran (Northwest Mountains)

<table>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Maximum (°F)</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Maximum</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>Mean Minimum</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absolute Minimum</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Precipitation (Inches)</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Rainfall</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Snowfall</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Thunderstorms</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Duststorms</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Exposure Weather - Tabriz, Iran (Northwest Mountains)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Maximum (°F)</td>
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<td>59</td>
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<td>Mean Maximum</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Minimum</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absolute Minimum</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Precipitation (Inches)</td>
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<td>0.88</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Snowfall</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Thunderstorms</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Duststorms</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Exposure Weather - Khvoy, Iran (Northwest Mountains)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Maximum (°F)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean Maximum</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Minimum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absolute Minimum</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Precipitation (Inches)</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Rainfall</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Snowfall</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Thunderstorms</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Days Duststorms</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Less Than 0.5 Day
Subject: Non-Standard Maps (Foreign Source)

Timeframe: November 1979 - December 1980

Summary:
1. J2 established the requirement for available large scale maps of selected cities and areas in Iran.
2. Large scale mapping of Iran by DMA had not been completed domestic Iranian maps had to be located and reproduced.
3. DMA searched all available sources including the Library of Congress to locate and subsequently reproduce any available maps.
4. Foreign Iranian maps, in many cases, were only in Farsi which made utilization difficult.

Comments:
1. In some cases foreign source maps may be all available.
2. You must have a capability to interpret foreign language to use the maps.

Recommendations:
Several relations and scales may be needed to obtain maximum information obtained all available maps on criteria.

Other Related Items:

[Signature] Classified by: [REDACTED] Declassified ON: 15 Jul 92
POINTS OF CONTACT:
DMA - Col. [Redacted] HQ DMA, 254-4426

ATTACHMENTS:
1. ARAK 1:50,000 reduced
2. Qum tourist (SEP)
Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis - Geologist/ERTS

TIMEFRAME: December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (TS) J2 obtained the Services of a geologist who did his doctoral research in Iran.

2. (TS) ERTS computer enhanced satellite coverage was obtained of proposed landing areas in the Great Kavir.

3. (TS) The geologist, employee of USGS, provided copies of his doctoral research material and direct interpretation of areas on ERTS.

4. (TS) Geologist's expertise was utilized in selection of Desert Track 1 and refinement of post 14 April 1980 LZ selections (e.g. LZ SUSAN).

COMMENT:

1. (TS) Geologist was compartmented from mission planners and given only materiel of area to be analyzed.

2. (TS) Geologist assisted in analysis of soil samples taken at Desert Track 1.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (TS) That knowledgeable geologists be utilized early in planning for terrain analysis and FWLA selection.

2. (TS) Geologists need not be completely read-on to program.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [redacted], Maj [redacted], Cpt [redacted], Cpt [redacted]
POINTS OF CONTACT:
USGS - Dr. [Redacted]

ATTACHMENTS:
- MFR, 11 Dec 80, Geologist's Comments on Landing Zones (U) [Redacted]
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Geologist's Comments on Landing Zones (U)

1. (TS) Analysis of LZ SUSAN follows:
   a. (TS) The area designated LZ SUSAN is relatively smooth probably with pebble or granular surface. North of the area designated SUSAN to the head of the fan the surface probably progresses from pebble to hand and possibly even boulder sized rocks. From the southern half of SUSAN to the toe of the fan (the extreme southwestern edges) the surface probably progresses from pebble, granular to fine soil (silt and clay). Presence of trails across center portion indicate nothing larger than pebbles, and that the entire fan has not been inundated in at least eight years. This indicates some degree of stability.
   b. (TS) The major concern with LZ SUSAN is the bearing strength of the gravel and fines (silts and clays) since LZ SUSAN is located on an alluvial fan. The area may be underlined with incompetent miocene rocks (mostly silts and clays) which have no bearing strength when wet.
   c. (TS) Seasonal moisture patterns in Iran indicate that the soil in the area would have greatest strength in the August to September time frame. Moisture begins to accumulate in late October/November and dry beginning late March/April. Rainfall in the SUSAN area is higher than Desert One but still extremely low, with less than .04 inch average in December, with .07 inch being the highest recorded in a 24 hour period. The highest recorded for the entire month of December was 3 inches. The fan on which LZ SUSAN is located is the northern half of the lowest terrain in the area. As such, the majority of moisture moving through SUSAN is in the form of runoff, surface and ground water, from precipitation and snow melt, in the Elburz Mountains to the North. During the wet season the water table rises and increases the bog area south of the toe of the fan. Water feeding the bog will come principally via the two well-defined primary drains along the western and eastern edges of the fan with an undetermined amount percolating through the fan as ground water.

A (CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, CIP
REVIEW ON 11 DECEMBER 2000

TOP SECRET

SECRET
(v) Presence of water at the toe of the fan indicates water may be percolating through the fan at this time. Landing on the south half of the fan at this time without prior reconnaissance would be questionable. Landing of low foot print weight aircraft (C130) on the northern half is possible but ground survey should be conducted before-hand for mission safety. Soil profiles 3 to 5 feet deep (not surface samples) are needed in order to determine bearing strength of SUSAN and the southernmost location that would withstand the parking weight of large aircraft. Soil profiles taken on LZ SUSAN must be sealed in plastic to avoid dehydration. Failure to do so would result in inaccurate analysis. As a minimum, multiple soil penetrometer readings should be taken.

2. (TS) The subject of NAMAK LAKE, specifically the area east of SARGADANI ISLAND vic coords 34 23N/051 55E, was surfaced. The geologist indicated this area has suitable strength to land any aircraft. He equated it to the BONNEVILLE Salt Flats and stated the salt was 3-5 feet to as much as 20 feet thick with very little micro relief. We are currently searching this area for suitability of fixed wing operations.
MSG 080
O 292200R NOV 79
FM CDR DELTA//BECKWITH//
TO COM JTF//MG VAUGHT//
BT
I O 5 2 2 4 5 4 8 2 4 3
SUBJECT: SI REP

1. (X15) NIGHT TNG CONTINUES FOR OUR HUNTER-KILLER TMS. THE
AIM OF THE TNG IS TO REHEARSE THE SKILLFUL TAKING-OUT OF PERS
AT CHECK POINTS AND SENTRY POSTS IN AND AROUND THE EMBASSY
COMPOUND. AL CONTINUES TO PROVIDE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE TO THE
ABOVE EFFORT. DUE TO THE PAUCITY OF HARD INTELLIGENCE AT THIS
TIME, I ENVISION WE WILL STUMBLE INTO CHECK POINTS AND SENTRIES
AS WE APPROACH TEHRAN VIA TRUCK.

2. (X15) THE PLANNING CONFERENCE CONDUCTED AT THIS LOCATION THIS
AFTERNOON BY YOU AND YOUR STAFF WAS VALUABLE, AND VITAL PARTS
OF THE PLAN ARE FALLING INTO PLACE; HOWEVER, WE STILL HAVE A
LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE WE CAN ACTUALLY MOUNT A RESCUE OPN TO
RECOVER OUR HOSTAGES. WE MUST NOT ALLOW MISSION SUPPORT, SUCH
AS HELOS, MC130 COMBAT TALONS AND SPECTRE GUNSHIPS, TO DICTATE
THE PHASING OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN INSTEAD OF SUPPORTING
THE PLAN.

3. (X15) THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS PROVIDED US WITH A VAST
AMOUNT OF INFORMATION AND I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE NO CHOKE
POINTS IN THE FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE; HOWEVER, MY MOST CRITICAL
EET'S REMAIN UNANSWERED. THESE ARE THE VITAL QUESTIONS WHICH MUST
BE ANSWERED TO REDUCE THE CURRENT RISK AND ACCOMPLISH OUR RESCUE
MISSION: A. ARE ALL THE HOSTAGES ACTUALLY IN THE EMBASSY COMPOUND
DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS? B. WHERE AND IN WHAT STRENGTH ARE
CHECK POINTS ALONG MAJOR ROUTES, IN TEHRAN, WHICH LEAD TO
THE EMBASSY COMPOUND? C. WHAT ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT CAN BE
PROVIDED TO DELTA BY IN-PLACE ASSETS? D. WHO WILL DRIVE THE
TRUCKS IF AND WHEN FRANKO OBTAINS THEM? E. ARE THERE ANY SHELTER
VICINITY OF THE COMPOUND WHICH DELTA COULD USE PRIOR TO THE
ACTUAL RESCUE? F. WHAT IS THE NIGHT TIME NO OF ROVING PATROLS AND
SENTRY POSTS IN AND AROUND THE COMPOUND? AGAIN, WE CANNOT
AFFORD TO STUMBLE INTO THE ENEMY.) G. WHAT IS THE STRENGTH OF THE
ENEMY INSIDE THE COMPOUND DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS? CAN THE
ENEMY REINFORCE THE COMPOUND IF SO, IN WHAT STRENGTH?

4. (X15) FROM THE OUTSET, I HAVE STATED THAT ANY PLAN DESIGNED TO
RESCUE OUR HOSTAGES HAS TO BE SIMPLE, AND PERMIT DELTA TO ACHIEVE
THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE AS IT ENTERS THE COMPOUND.
WE BELIEVE THE TROJAN HORSE CONCEPT
UP TO THE WALL IS VITAL IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH OUR MISSION.
WITHOUT THE SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE OF IN-PLACE ASSETS, WHO CAN
HELP ME AS WE TRANSIT THE CITY TO THE EMBASSY COMPOUND, THE
RISK REMAINS HIGH. AGAIN, HARD INTELLIGENCE IS THE KEY TO
OUR SUCCESS. I ALSO REALIZE I AM PREACHING TO THE CHORUS,
HOWEVER, OTHERS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN WHERE THE RUBBER MEETS THE
ROAD IN THIS TYPE OF SPECIAL OPN.
REVW 30 NOV 2009
BT

Debriefed by
DDO WMK
15Jul 95
16 January 1980

SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subj: Latest Intelligence from Iranian Naval Sources

1. The following is a summary of the key ideas received/exchanged during a two-hour discussion with him yesterday, 15 January.

   a. Concerns:

   (1) Mining. U.S. should down play talk of mining Persian Gulf as he feels this is one tactic which could be used by most any level of revolutionists or terrorists causing havoc and great difficulty in removal.

   (2) There is great concern over Soviet intervention in Iran at this time. As you know, the 1921 treaty with the USSR permits them to intervene when internal affairs become confused or when a third power comes in to attack Iran. The divisions now poised on the western border of Afghanistan conceivably represent such an intervening force.

   (3) TIMES' "Man of the Year" was a boom to the Khomeini regime and to the poor and ignorant of Iran who have been led to believe that Khomeini was pictured as the man of the year because of his great contribution to Iran. As TIME has put it, Khomeini was selected simply because he succeeded in making so much news during 1979. The Iranian masses, unfortunately, do not understand these nuances of our sophisticated press.

   (4) Do not count on Islam being a safeguard against a communist takeover. The masses to whom Islam principally appeals are the uneducated, primitive portions of the Iranian population who, in view of Khomeini’s abject failure economically, could be pursued to support communism or any other "ism" which promised to better their lot.

   (5) Food is getting scarce in Iran; in particular, meat is almost non-attainable. Prices have skyrocketed and queues are quite long.

   (6) Gas and naph supplies still appear to be adequate with the refineries in Tehran, Abadan and Tabriz working at capacity. The refinery at Esfahan is still out of...
SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

commission.

b. [Redacted] had the following recommendations:

1. There are currently over 100 officers and ratings from the Imperial Navy in this country. Would there be any possibility of them supporting the U.S. Navy in some manner: perhaps in the area of maintenance or logistics or perhaps administrative? Many of the officers have security clearances, particularly those who were working with harpoon and the mark-44 torpedo and other systems which were purchased from the United States. The intent is not to have them join the U.S. Navy but rather to support it during the interim period until they can return to their own country. One suggestion was that perhaps they could be used in our build-up at [Redacted], since it will be remote and lonely duty. These people, now unable to earn a living because of the anti-Iranian feeling plus their tenuous status, would be willing to do almost anything in order to provide support for their families.

2. A counter-move by the United States against some Soviet interest in the Western Hemisphere might prove to be a good negotiating chip in the current situation involving the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

c. At this point I entered a discussion with [Redacted] concerning the current stalemate situation regarding the hostages and suggested that perhaps the best action might come from an internally generated one by Iranians. I queried about the availability of naval officers still loyal to Iran who might be enlisted to participate in such an activity. He promised to give the matter serious consideration and get back to me. Since travel in and out of Iran is still fairly unrestricted, we should be able to get word to these people without a great deal of difficulty.

2. Following are some thoughts gained from a conversation with [Redacted] before the downfall of the empire. He arrived in the States [Redacted]. He has been out of Iran now for about two months.

a. The IIN is in exceedingly poor materiel condition. All of the senior talent has deserted or refused to serve. The fire control equipment in particular in the fleet is in a down condition.

b. Air Force is in very poor shape. During the Kurdistan uprising, the Air Force was ordered to fly against the rebels. Twenty-eight of the pilots refused to fly, whereupon they were summarily executed. Pilot availability is very poor, flying
time has been reduced below the safe proficiency level and in general the Air Force is considered to be unlikely to be able to react effectively against any crisis.

c. gave me the gist of an interview he heard with BAKHTIAR while he was still in France. According to BAKHTIAR he has formed a shadow government, has ministers to fill all of the posts, has created the skeleton framework for an armed force from people primarily in Europe and he claims further that he has an organization in country ready to react.

d. 's assessment was that Iran stood in very dire threat of being taken over by the communists. He felt the move to take the hostages was communist-inspired and felt further that KHOMENI was impotent to do anything about it. He suggested that anything that could be done to stimulate KHOMENI to shift his energies and his anger against the communists would be for the good of Iran at this point.

e. The executions are still in progress in country. Since most of the top leaders have been either executed or exiled, the thrust now is toward the less senior and middle grade officers, most of whom are still completely uncooperative with KHOMENI's regime. The people that we see on TV in uniform are phonies, they do not belong to the armed forces.

f. indicated that he would be happy to cooperate with intelligence in any way that he could, and if they are interested I will be happy to put them in contact with

Very respectfully,

F. C. COLLINS, JR.
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

Copy to:
Op-009B
28 September

Had extended conversations with [redacted], who has been in regular contact with a number of relatives in Iran. During our talks, we placed a call to, and spoke with [redacted], who resides on [redacted] in Northern Tehran. During the short time I spoke with him, and continually throughout the conversation, we were interrupted by loud explosions. Ali explained that an anti-aircraft gun had been emplaced next to his house. He reported that he goes up on his roof to watch "all the action," and that "the Iraqi jets fly right over" his house.

Ali also remarked that the traffic ban hadn't made movement any easier. In fact, pedestrians have "taken over the streets" and travelling by taxi takes even longer. Ali continues to work, and reported that many businesses continued to operate normally. He did say that there were shortages in many foodstuffs and commented that people were expressing great apprehension about the expected fuel shortages during the coming winter.
TO: DIA
SUBJECT: EES

Request action be taken to satisfy the following EES with action to continue until completion.

1) Request analysis of [deleted] by major source
   a) Student Announcements #1-3
   b) IRG Leadership
   c) Iran Foreign Ministry
   d) Religious Leadership

2) Request total evaluation of situation in the compound on the city street: main roads, airport. Differentiate between times of day and days of week.

3) Request analysis of Imagery of "Ranger" Containment area to determine if the (2) Ranger is or was previously reported.

4) Request hourly time analysis of the extent of military/civilian air traffic operating in the TEHRAN area during the hours of 2100 - 0800 by day of the week.

5) TR's on Road From Turkish/IRAN Border (Maku) to TEHRAN.
TOP SECRET

(3) Check Recent and Historical Coverage of MAN.TARIQ Airfield to determine location of reported Popup Site "just off the dirt northwest end of runway."
SECRET

D.1.18
D.1.12.8
D.1.12.8

BB

President

BB

G = 612
SUBJECT: PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. (G) WITH REGARD TO INFILTRATION, I SPENT THREE HRS
THIS MORNING WITH ASSET NAMED AL, AND MOST OF THE AFTERNOON
WITH ASSET NAMED FRANKO. BASED ON DETAILED MAP STUDY AND
ASSESS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE ON THE GROUND, I NOW BELIEVE THAT
THE BEST OPTION OPEN TO US AT THIS TIME, BASED UPON THE
CURRENT SITUATION, IS TO ENTER IRAN BY COMBAT TALON.
AIR LAND 35-40 KM EAST OF TEHRAN AND QUICKLY TRANSFER
PERSONNEL AND GEAR TO THREE TRUCKS WHICH CAN BE PROVIDED
BY FRANKO. MOVE BY TRUCK TO THE EMBASSY COMPOUND, CROSS
THE WALL AT TWO SEPARATE POINTS, RESCUE THE HOSTAGES AND
EXPERIENCE THE COMPOUND BY HELOS. IN THE EVENT THE MISSION GOES
SOUR AND EXTRACTION FROM THE COMPOUND BECOMES IMPractical,
DELTA WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MOVE TO THE STADIUM.
WE WOULD ALSO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO TAKE ONE OR TWO OF THE
2. Both assets believe that truck infiltration from Turkey or Pakistan to Tehran is too risky. Franko departed Tehran 10 Nov 79. This asset further recommended that three Delta personnel drive trucks from LZ to target. I will submit a proposal to you later which envisions five Delta personnel to precede force and get into position in-country. I further envision three Delta truck drivers, one Delta man in OP and one on LZ. This man to select LZ and link up trucks with Delta Force.

3. (u) I have requested an 18 wheel vehicle at this site to train selected personnel to handle trucks. Franko recommended we use large 16 wheel trucks, preferably Mack or Mercedes.

4. (u) Respectfully request someone be tasked to determine the availability of the M-202 Flash/Flame 66 mm incendiary rocket launcher. Total amount not known at this time but will be forwarded if item is available.

5. Last ten personnel arrived this site 191730 local Nov.

From Fort Bragg.

Rev: 29 Nov 2009
SUBJECT: HOSTAGE LOCATION

1. (D) OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS OF IST-EPS-1 ARE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT JTF HAS UPON THE CHANCE THAT HOSTAGES ARE LOCATED ON THE SECOND FLOOR OF THE CHANCERY. OPERATIONAL PLANS ARE BEING FORMULATED ON THIS ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION WHICH WAS PASSED BY J-8 TO DELTA OPERATIVES.

2. (S) ALL THAT DELTA-3-8 HAS SEEN HERE HAS BEEN J-8 ANALYST'S CONCLUSION, THERE HAS BEEN NO HARD INTELLIGENCE. DELTA'S OPERATIONAL ASSETS AVAILABLE FOR USE IN THE CHANCERY MISSION ARE LIMITED. HOWEVER, UNLESS YOU CAN SHOW HARD INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY A TESTED SOURCE WITH CONTINUOUS ACCESS, THE ENTIRE BUILDING WILL HAVE TO BE CLEARED. OTHERWISE, WE RISK MISSING A HOSTAGE IN THE CHANCERY AND MIGHT AS WELL CLEAR THAT FACILITY AT ALL. THIS INTEL EFFORT IS NOT AN INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE, IT IS A LIVE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EFFORT.

3. (C) PLEASE INFORM THAT YOUR ANALYSIS IS AN ESTIMATE, NOT A PROVEN FACT. THE CRITICAL EII IS - WHICH FLOOR DOES DELTA SEARCH FIRST - BASEMENT OR SECOND FLOOR. A PRIORITY MUST BE ESTABLISHED - NOT EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER FLOORS.

RVW 25 FEB 82
SECRET

FOR 210252 G-6

G-653

TO JA3//MC-3

ACTION

SECRET

 MESSAGE RECEIVED
[Redacted text]

SECRET

C-649

11-22-69

[Redacted text]