MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF AND SERVICE OPSDEPS

Subject: SNOWBIRD Training and Preparation Program

1. (TS) General: Operation SNOWBIRD, the planning and preparation of a joint task force to accomplish the rescue of the American hostages in Iran was tasked to the undersigned by competent civil authority on 26 April, 1980. In order to provide the best chance of securing operational security, a plan involving was approved on 23 May 80 and briefed to JCS on 3 June. Training and preparation for SNOWBIRD was placed under the . Since definitive intelligence has not been available, it was necessary for the Joint Task Force to design a number of possible options and train a wide spectrum of forces. To date, these forces include 2,477 personnel and 136 various aircraft. Most of these forces were incorporated into a July 80 training program that was briefed to the Service OPSDEPS on 2 July. This document recapitulates the major training events, lessons learned, costs and future needs to provide a reasonable assurance of future SNOWBIRD success. The HONEY BADGER exercises incorporated many of the training and validation tasks that had to be accomplished to prepare the Joint Task Force to execute SNOWBIRD Options One through Eight. One of the activities was to evaluate the feasibility of Option Nine. Before and during the July training, a number of increased aviation and communications capabilities were attained, a number of techniques were developed and a number of force deficiencies identified. These deficiencies are incorporated into the overall future training program. An additional, separate activity was the coordination and planning for Option VII and VIII, the use of . Finally, this document includes conclusions and recommendations concerning future actions for SNOWBIRD and Special Operations in general.

2. (TS) HONEY BADGER:

A. (TS) Training Program Description:

General: The Honey Badger Training Program was developed by dissecting the major SNOWBIRD Option I-IX training tasks. These tasks were then...
assigned to specific mission units, training areas identified and dates assigned. Initial training was for individual elements and then time was provided for necessary joint training. Throughout the period, feedback was provided to the Commander through observation and unit backbriefs. (See Inclosure 1)

B. (TS) Forces Involved:

(1) Dugway, Utah

- HQ Element
- 58th AVN (+)
- Blackhawk Helos
- CH-47Cs
- 1st SOW
- Pave Low Helos
- HH-53s
- HC-130s
- Delta Liaison

(2) White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico/Ft. Bliss, TX

- HQ Element
- Rangers
- 1st SOW
- MC-130s
- AC-130s
- EC-130s
- Delta Liaison

C. (TS) Additional Forces: The elements, though not an official part of HONEY BADGER, conducted simultaneous training at Pt. Huachuca, Arizona (ICE BOX).

D. (TS) TRAINEX PHOENIX

(1) (TS) General. TRAINEX PHOENIX was designed to provide a vehicle to consolidate all HONEY BADGER tasks. It did not attempt to depict a given scenario. Rather, it served to bring the entire force together to exercise joint tasks and concepts. The major lessons learned served as the planning basis for OPORD ICEBOX, the assault of and operation from Reese AFB, TX. The evaluations of BLACKHAWK and HH53 performance are discussed in Inclosures 10 and 11.
(TS) Specific Concept. The scenario required the seizure of two airfields (Fallon NAS, Tonopah Test Site) by elements of Rangers utilizing First SOW fixed wing assets. Once seized, Pave Lows, HH-53's, and Blackhawks would conduct extraction of personnel from a remote site, backhaul them to the extraction airfields and then return to base. Once the personnel were safely landed, they would be flown out and the Rangers would then extract. A C-141B also participated. (See Inclosure 2)

(a) Two launch bases were utilized. Helos departed from and returned to Dugway, Utah while Chinos and First SOW fixed wing assets utilized White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. This geographical dispersion provided realistic distances and climatic conditions comparable to Iranian/Mideast conditions. (See Inclosure 3)

(b) Several important sub-tasks were exercised within the overall program. Among them were:

Helos low level long distance navigation
Fixed wing low level penetration
Joint command/control
Air-Ground communications
Airfield extraction

3. (TS) Operation ICE BOX: SNOWBIRD Option Nine

The landing of an extraction force composed of light helicopters, hostage evacuation and finally, force extraction. The concept was first conceived by the Joint Task Force Commander in June. At that time, the techniques for were well-developed. Thus, the majority of effort was directed at acquiring and training an unit.

a. Planning: The operation was planned during the third week of June 1989. The major considerations were: aircraft availability, individual active Army aviator qualification, logistics support, unit and joint training tasks to be accomplished. An alternative, the OH58 was considered, tested and rejected. (See Inclosure 13)

b. Aircraft availability: Seventeen helicopters were received from the National Guard and three from National Guard. These aircraft were not reconfigured except for the installation of the aircraft to make them compatible with the
c. Logistical support: Eight NG instructor pilots, three officer and nineteen enlisted members of the National Guard. Their purpose was threefold: train and qualify 25 active Army aviators for the train 18 crew chiefs on the and provide organizational maintenance support during the individual and follow-on phase of the initial training cycle.

d. Aviator qualifications: The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was tasked to provide twenty qualified aviators, preferably graduates of the USAVNS Training Program. Five other aviators possessing needed skills, were requested from other units. The initial qualification phase was conducted at National Guard Training Site. The training was conducted in accordance with appropriate Army regulations and no problems were encountered. Special emphasis was placed on maximum gross operations and maximum performance of the aircraft. The initial qualification was completed on 9 July 1980.

e. Unit and joint training: Conducted at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona and referred to as Phase II, from 10-19 July, utilizing Post and range facilities at Fort Huachuca. The training concentrated on developing individual skills in night-flying and maximum performance operations. The First SOW, other USAF elements, and Delta provided CCT and Pathfinder support to standardize procedures and develop techniques. This proved worthwhile as evidenced by Operation ICE BOX which was conducted 20-21 July 1980. No shortcomings in regard to in-flight operations were noted in those areas where unit training had been completed.

f. Force preparation: As the capability began to emerge, attention turned to the rest of the force. MAC had been tasked in early July by JCS to train six to eight C-141B crews in and operations. Since these crews would not be ready until 1 August, a comprehensive exercise could not test this aspect. Thus, C-141B landings had to be planned. The operational concept was conceived on 10 July. Tasking was established on 14 July and permission granted to use Reese AFB, TX on 15 July. A reconnaissance was conducted on 16 July and the Operations Order was published on 18 July.
9. Operation ICE BOX 20-21 July: Since the option had never been integrated with the SNOWBIRD Task Force, the initial operation was a concept evaluation. The operation at Reese did not include full Delta participation, fighter support, hostage pick up, substantial OPFOR representation or full abort procedures. Additionally, realistic long flight legs and full force weight representations to include ammunition were not tested. Future trials of Option Nine must incorporate these aspects.

The operation was witnessed by...

The overall conclusion reached after the operation was that the Option Nine concept was valid and could be executed in less time than the planned... A large number of deficiencies and improvements were identified. See Inclosure 5)

4. (FO) Operational Requirements: As a result of the July training program, a significant amount of new operational techniques are required to assist in SNOWBIRD success. These techniques are translated into both training and resource requirements. Inclosure Six covers future training/operational requirements.

5. (FO) Material Requirements: The training program uncovered a number of significant gaps in resources that must be covered to permit the SNOWBIRD options to be fully exercised. Primary areas are:

- Communications for aircraft
- Ground mobility assets
- Weapons systems
- Avionics

These items are discussed in Inclosure Seven.

6. (FO) SNOWBIRD VII and VIII: SNOWBIRD VII and VIII envision... SNOWBIRD VII or SNOWBIRD VIII). SNOWBIRD VII would be transloaded to the... several days prior to launch. Once the ships were in position, Exfiltration would be to a friendly or neutral country or back to the ships. (Details are discussed in Inclosure Nine)
7. Future Training: August and September will be used to:

- Recover perishable skills
- Exercise new equipment
- Exercise new operational techniques
- Refine Option VIII and IX scenarios
- Gain helo proficiency

Special tasks and key dates are included in Inclosure Eight.

8. Costs. (See Inclosure 13) At the outset of the JTF mission in November of 1979, it was decided not to provide a budget for the tasks of force preparation and mission execution. The rationale for this decision was founded on reasons of operational security and the fact that at that time, Service budgets were sufficiently ample to absorb this unprogrammed activity. After the first attempt to rescue the hostages, the JTF realized that it would be unlikely to achieve the degree of operational security for force preparation that had been previously attained. DOD and Congressional press releases has made public several JTF personalities as well as a number of operational factors, [Additional redaction]

Additionally, the JTF, wholly dependent on service funding, realized that Service budgets would diminish as the end of the fiscal year approached, making it imperative for the Services to become more cognizant of JTF costs. Therefore, in May, an attempt was made to estimate JTF costs despite the fact that the lack of intelligence made it impossible to define a precise appropriate force structure or execution date. The estimate totaled $25 million, evenly split between the Air Force and the Army. This sum did not include funds to support intelligence activities since they had been provided by DOD.

On 3 June, the JCS was briefed on JTF concepts and force preparation. The decision was made to substantially increase JTF capabilities by the addition of a long range Army helicopter force composed of 30 UH60s and 12 to 16 CH47s. The essential modification of these aircraft substantially added to SNOWBIRD costs. On 2 July, the OPSDEPS were briefed on the July training program, another costly activity.

Being without a comptroller, the JTF is entirely dependent on Service input to determine what costs should actually be charged to SNOWBIRD. As of 2 August, informal coordination with the Services indicated that the Army had incurred $23.1 million and the Air Force had incurred $10.8 million in SNOWBIRD costs. $1.4 million had been allocated to fund SNOWBIRD intelligence activities by DOD.
In order to maintain proficiency in perishable skills, conduct remedial training and further develop a JTF capability to deal with multiple targets, it is essential to continue training both in August and in September. Additionally, it is necessary to procure equipment for the JTF in order to enhance the probability of SNOWBIRD success. Training costs through 30 September 80 are estimated at $4.37 million. Future procurement costs are currently estimated to be $20.2 million. Additional intelligence costs are believed to total $1.1 million. In order to pay back the Army for its funding beyond the original SNOWBIRD estimate of $12.5 million, it is necessary to allocate some $8.9 million. Therefore, a total of $34.4 million is required to continue SNOWBIRD preparation through 30 September 80. The JTF has been notified informally that these funds cannot be made available from the service budgets. Assuming an inability to cancel activity and procurement of a lesser priority, it is essential to request the Secretary of Defense to provide the necessary funding. Should these funds be denied, force proficiency will deteriorate, essential procurement will be delayed or cancelled and force capability development will be halted resulting in protraction of mission execution once the requisite intelligence and authority is granted. It is estimated that if the August remedial training is cancelled, the JTF readiness capability will deteriorate from a three week mission preparation period to a five week preparation period. No estimate of the penalty of September training cancellation is currently available.

9. Conclusions: (See Inclosure 14). Due to the lack of approval for the use of launch bases, the absence of an existing means to infiltrate the release force and the lack of total force proficiency, it is not possible to execute the SNOWBIRD mission at this time. Progress will be paced by, but is also dependent on procurement and training. It is believed that launch bases can be obtained, given approval to seek the necessary authority. Force proficiency must be maintained and improved or a substantial delay in mission execution will occur should it be ordered. Currently it is believed that the mission could be executed within three weeks given ... Although compromise of the mission through continued training and procurement activity is possible, there is no known disabling compromise to date.

The JTF staff of 32 personnel is inadequate to handle a number of administrative tasks such as budgeting, since operational functions must have the priority. Should additional administrative requirements be levied, an augmentation of both personnel and working space would be required.
The current relationship with [redacted] is unsatisfactory but a practical solution has been reached to support the mission. Currently, SNOWBIRD IX, the [redacted] is considered to be the most probable and is thus being used as a model for force structure and equipment decisions. Option X, designed for multiple, dispersed targets may be more appropriate and is currently under consideration as a model.

There have been a number of significant JTF achievements since November of 1979. The most important achievement has been the preparation of a joint force capable of performing a variety of missions on a world-wide basis. A heretofore unavailable capability has been developed and tested: a

The Army has benefited significantly in that the self-deployed status and communications of both CH47s and UH60s has been increased. Additionally, these helicopters are now capable of deep, low level nighttime penetrations using the JTF developed technique of PAVE LOW leads. The Air Force has benefited in that the JTF has developed a technique of hatch mounted SATCOM antennas for both C130s and C141s, it has equipped a number of aircraft with modern, secure voice communications sets and has provided an organized, special operations helicopter unit for long range extraction, a capability that has clearly been needed since the Son Tay Raid in 1971. The JTF has also increased the ranges of the Pave Low and MC-130 from [redacted], respectively. Finally, all Services have at hand a new capability developed by the JTF from a commercial line of sight radio, the PT 250, a secure voice, man-portable SATCOM.

The JTF experience indicates that the future should include the be able to quickly call for the aid of the enhanced capability UH60/CH47 elements from the 101st Airborne Division as well as the crew aircraft. It is also believed that the must have rapid, unfettered access to the highest echelons of the Armed Forces and the National should have a contingency fund equal to about 40% of its annual budget has experienced since November of 1979.

In the final analysis, it must be concluded that the United States is ill-prepared to conduct any sort of Special Operation. The Army has subjected its Special Operations forces to a 70% reduction from their pre-Vietnam level. A further cut of 10% is forecasted for FY 81. The Air Force
has cut its Special Operations forces by 75% during the same period.

Special Operations has been an unhealed casualty of the Vietnam war. The events of the last year have clearly indicated that immediate remedial action is essential. The JTF has accomplished much but the continued lack of an adequate national Special Operations capability may well plague the United States in the future.

10. (TS) Recommendations: (See Inclosure 15). It is recommended that the JTF be provided with $4.3 million to fund SNOWBIRD activities through 30 Sep. 80. It is also requested that JCS press the intelligence community to use all available resources to fulfill outstanding SNOWBIRD requirements. In order to secure authority and essential information concerning a launch base, it is recommended that the JCS approve a JTF approach to the and the dispatch of a site-survey team.

In order to further define the JTF relationship with other organizations, it is recommended that the ODSDEPS consider providing guidance as to a continuation or revision of JTF coordination with both the Department of State and the J-5 of the OJCS. Heretofore, the JTF has only been permitted to represent itself to the Department of State. Additionally, it has been restricted in its coordination with J-5.

Finally, it is recommended that the OPSDEPS consider actions to improve the national capability to conduct Special Operations. The DJS could be requested to task OJCS to identify specific deficiencies in the to support the armed forces in clandestine operations and make specific remedial recommendations. This action could be forwarded to the NSC by the JCS on or before 1 November 1980. The OJCS might also be tasked to identify
the necessary actions to expand and improve our mi
Special Operations capabilities by 1 October 1980. action could be presented to the Secretary of Defe the JCS by 30 October 1980.

JAMES B., VAUGHT
Major General, USA

Inclosures:
(1) H& Training Tasks
(2) PHOENIX OPORD
(3) PHOENIX Lessons Learned
(4) ICEBOX OPORD
(5) ICEBOX Hot Wash Up
(6) Operational Requirements
(7) Material Requirements
(8) Future Training Program
(9) Option VIII
(10) BLACKHAWK Evaluation
(11) PAVE LOW/HH53 Evaluation
(12) OH-58 Test
(13) Cost Data
(14) Conclusions
(15) Recommendations
Subject: After-Action Report, Army Aviation Participation in JTX Honey Badger, June July 1980

1. (U) This is an interim after-action report, consisting of all internal and external reports which will contribute to a final report to be completed at a later date. It is not intended for general dissemination, but for the use of agencies, directorates, and commands supporting the creation of Army aviation forces and units for conduct of Special Missions.

2. (U) The report is organized as follows:

   TAB A - Executive Summary of Army Aviation participation in JTX Honey Badger, extracted from a report to the Operations Deputies of the Services.

   TAB B - JTD Honey Badger Army Aviation evaluations. Conducted and reports prepared by US Army Aviation Board, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

   TAB C - 101 Aviation Group After Action Report, JTX Honey Badger.

   TAB D - Outline of Operation POTENT CHARGE, joint helicopter special missions doctrinal and procedural training and exercising.

4 Enclosures
a/s

Distribution-special
Subject: JTX Honey Badger After Action Report

1. Attached is the Executive Summary of Army Aviation participation in JTX HONEY BADGER, prepared as part of the JTX After Action Report to the Operations Deputies of the Services.
INCLOSURE ONE: HONEY BADGER TRAINING TASKS

INCLOSURE ONE lists principle training tasks by unit, date and location during HONEY BADGER.
INCLOSURE ONE: HONEY BADGER TRAINING TASKS

Training Plan

5 JULY
DEPLOY - SET UP (ALL)

6 JULY
NIGHT FIRING
NIGHT DRIVING
POW HANDLING
DZ MARKING
CONVOY MOVEMENT
DZ LOCATION (MC)
SUPPORT OF (AC)
TAC FORMATION/NAV (AC/MC)

6 JULY
LOW LEVEL NAV (BH/PL/HC-130)
LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)

7 JULY
LOW LEVEL NAV. (BH/PL/HC-130)
LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)
POL TECHNIQUES (BH/PL)
(R-9 SIMULATION)
IP INSTRUCTION ON TACTICS (BH/PL)

8 JULY
LOW LEVEL NAV (BH/PL/HC-130)
LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)
CAMY/CONCEAL (BH/PL)
POL TECHNIQUES (MC) HC

FT BLISS
DUGWAY
FT BLISS

9 JULY
DRY RUN

LONG RANGE PENETRATION (AC/MC)
FORMATION FLYING

10 JULY

LONG RANGE PENETRATION (AC/MC)

11 JULY
FULL REHEARSAL (SOW)
AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTION (AC)
DELTA ARRIVES

12 JULY
REVIEW AS ROLL (SOW)
AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTION (AC)
DELTA ARRIVES

13 JULY
BH/PL FAM (DELTA)
CONVOY PICKUP (DELTA)
EMBASSY ASLT (DELTA)
EMBASSY PICKUP (DELTA)
POL TECHNIQUES (HC/MC/PL/PL)
LZ ORGANIZATION (CCT)
AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTION (AC)

14 JULY
INTEGRATED OPS
LONG RANGE (TO DUGWAY)
AIRFIELD SEIZURE
DZ MARKING (CCT)
LZ MARKING (CCT)
NIGHT POL OPS (BH/PL/HC-130)
POL OPS (MC)

DUGWAY

9 JULY
INTEGRATED OPS (BH/PL/HC-130)
TRANSLOADING
CAMY/CONCEAL

10 JULY
INTEGRATED OPS (BH/PL/HC-130)
TRANSLOADING
CAMY CONCEAL

11 JULY
INTEGRATED OPS (BH/PL/HC-130)
LONG RANGE
POL OPS
LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)
CAMY/CONCEAL

12 JULY
INTEGRATED OPS (BH/PL/HC-130)
LONG RANGE (TO OG)
POL OPS (HC/MC)
LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)

13 JULY
HELO (-) INTERNAL TNG

14 JULY
HELO MAINTENANCE STANDDOWN
1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested: Determine the capability of the AC-130 to

2. Desired Goal: Show that an AC-130 can effectively

3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.
   Lighting - Night

4. Results: Mission was considered very successful. However,

5. Recommendations: a)

6. Additional remarks: Wearing night vision goggles (NVGs),
FLIGHT REPORT:  

EL PASO 9 Jul 80 AC-130H Mission.

The purpose of this mission was to determine how well the...

The rendezvous point was a preplanned intersection in El Paso. The AC-130H contacted the ground team on secure UHF about ten miles from the rendezvous point. The ground party had earlier displayed...

The vehicles were told to rendezvous at a certain location in the city and then proceeded north out of El Paso. During this time, to the west about ten miles to determine how easily th...

The exercise was terminated through contact on secure UHF.

The mission was very successful. The following problems with recommendations are attached:
PROBLEM 1: The [redacted] was two inches wide and about four feet long.

PROBLEM 2: This would be about 45° on opposite sides of the orbit. It would consist of about 30 seconds of the two minute orbit.

RECOMMENDATION:

PROBLEM 3: Separation

RECOMMENDATION
(PS) Operations Concept

TM Grab
TM Run
TM Stopper
TM Snuff
TM Cleancut
TM Slash
TM Pathfinder
TM Leap
TM Logroll
TM Freedom
TM Liberty
TM Snatch

Situation:

b. Friendly: Friendly assets have located Ambassador and are presently observing objective areas. The nation of Ford has authorized use of its Territory for launch and overflight.

Mission:

exfiltrates to launch base.
Concept of Operation:

Execution:

(1) TM Cleancut conducts: commencing at P-Hour to 1:20, Return

(2) TM Slash

(7) TM Logroll provides needed support to Teams Grab and Run.
(8) TM Pathfinder and TM Leap support as required.
(9) **TN**

Fire Support
Teams Stopper and Snuff support as required.

Coordinating Instructions:

(1) P Hour 160740Z July 80
(2) **Teams** will report status and number of pax
(3) Units will report key times per OPSKED.
(4) Northern Operation

**MC-130** airedrop [redacted] at Fallon 16/0740Z.
**AC-130** must arrive on station at Fallon 16/0740Z.
**MC-130** airdrop personnel at Fallon 16/0745Z.
Team Grab be in position to make extraction at Range 17 at 16/0830Z.

**MC-130** airland [redacted] at 16/0841Z.
**MC-130** airland second assault team at [redacted] 16/0844Z.
**MC-130** airland third assault team at [redacted] 16/0844Z.
**MC-130** airland at Fallon 16/0844Z.

**C-141** airland at Fallon 16/0900Z.
Team Grab first aircraft should arrive NET 160905Z at Fallon NAS.
C-141 departs with precious cargo as soon as all personnel are accounted for.
Team Grab depart Fallon for Michael AAF when released by CCT.
MC-130's will depart all Ranger assault personnel for Condron as soon as possible.

C-141 will return to Fallon after departure of MC-130's.

Onload jeeps and motorcycles used in the assault and recover at Biggs AAF.

CCT will control Fallon airfield for all exercise arrivals and departures.

(5) Southern Operations:

CH-47 or HH-53 16/0330Z.

Team Run be in position 16/0700Z.

MC-130 will

AC-130 must arrive overhead

MC-130 will airland first assault team at Tonopah 16/0835Z.

MC-130 will airland second assault team at Tonopah 16/0838Z.

C-141 will airland at Tonopah 16/0900Z.

Team Run first aircraft should arrive NET 16/0915Z at Tonopah.

C-141 departs Tonopah with precious cargo as soon as personnel are accounted for.

Team Run depart when released by

MC-130's will depart with all personnel for Condron as soon as practicable.

C-141 will return to Tonopah after departure of MC-130's.

and depart for Biggs AAF.

CCT will control Tonopah airfield for all exercise arrivals and departures.

Logistics:

As required

Command and Signal:

Commander will be airborne.

Annex K in effect.
INCLOSURE THREE: LESSONS LEARNED - TRAINEX PHOENIX

1. (S) Planning
   a. Unit planning staffs are inexperienced in joint planning.
   b. Planning at multiple locations demands that continuous liaison and coordination begin during the staff estimate phase and continue to the final mission brief.
   c. Subordinate units require concept briefs at least 24 hours prior to execution.

2. (S) Communications
   a. The CEOI OPSKED must be chopped and amended by all element staffs early in the planning process.
   b. The Services are not using the same NSA-generated callsign/suffix system. A standardized joint special missions system must be developed, and all elements must commence training using that system.
   c. Satellite communications systems, in particular those installed in special mission aircraft, need additional test and evaluation under type mission conditions.

3. (S) Execution
   a. Helicopter and fixed wing crews require considerable additional training on integrated joint ops.
   b. Air Force and Army helicopter crews need additional work on holding area coordination and link-ups. Joint doctrine needs development and dissemination.
   c. CCT and helicopter crews require additional training in air-ground communications, recognition signals, and terminal area coordination.
   d. Helo crews must be aware of passenger count and status and relay to CCT.
   e. Helicopter and fixed wing route deconfliction requires increased attention.
   f. Helicopter crews need additional training in blackout terminal ops.
   g. Immediate attention to acquisition of improved IR terminal lighting systems is required.
h. Red lights in aircraft and on runways are counterproductive to NVG use.

i. C-130/C-141 ramps require modification to provide for rapid unloading.

[Redacted] needs better mobility for rapid airfield seizure.

k. Blackout rapid ground refueling of helicopters requires additional work.

l. [Redacted] to coordinate inbound aircraft and initial ground forces is significant, and should be considered in planning.

m. All air and key ground units require secure comms.

C&C elements require redundant SATCOM.

f. Though excellent for its purpose, is slow in moving. Modification and purchase of additional are required.
OPORD ICEBOX

REF: JTD ORO GRANDE/MSG DTD 171515Z JUL 80

SUBJ: TEST OPORD FOR ICE BOX

1. This is a revised OPORD for ICEBOX. Some times have been revised. AC/MC-130 take off times have been added. Commanders should review this revision carefully and destroy referenced OPORD.

2. Revised OPORD follows:

Task Organization

I SOW
141 ELEMENT (OPCON)
CCT
AIR CAV DET.
RECON FORCE

1. Situation

A. Enemy Forces

1) Situation: Enemy currently holding area vicinity Reese AFB with light forces.

Two enemy F-4 on strip alert at Reese. Artillery fire can be expected after four hours.

3) Weather: High of 100 degrees F during day, low of 75 degrees at night. LIGHT WINDS, CLEAR NIGHT TIME SKIES.

4) Terrain: Flat, relatively populated area with little obstructions to vehicle or foot traffic.
3. Execution:

A. Concept of operation: 151445Z JULY 80.

B. SOW:

Deliver ground force
Provide gun ship support
Prevent enemy reinforcements
Extract all forces.

Priority of defense:
Provide coordinated aircraft loading and parking plans at Reese NLT 172000Z July. Assist in assembly and exercise positive control of aircraft at Reese AF.

Provide early warning radius of 40 KM.

From Reese AF

Conduct interdiction and denial OPNS in coordination with

F. Operations schedule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>CODE WORD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>210140</td>
<td>1ST AC-130 TAKE OFF</td>
<td>HAWAII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210145</td>
<td>2ND AC-130 TAKE OFF</td>
<td>CALIFORNIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210150</td>
<td>3RD AC-130 TAKE OFF</td>
<td>ARIZONA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210210</td>
<td>4ST MC-130 TAKE OFF</td>
<td>TEXAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210215</td>
<td>2ND MC-130 TAKE OFF</td>
<td>UTAH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210222</td>
<td>3RD MC-130 TAKE OFF</td>
<td>MONTANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210228</td>
<td>4TH MC-130 TAKE OFF</td>
<td>NEVADA</td>
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<tr>
<td>210234</td>
<td>5TH MC-130 TAKE OFF</td>
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<td>210240</td>
<td>6TH MC-130 TAKE OFF</td>
<td>UTAH</td>
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<td>210246</td>
<td>7TH MC-130 TAKE OFF</td>
<td>COLORADO</td>
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<tr>
<td>210400</td>
<td>1ST AC-130 CONTACTS</td>
<td>NANCY</td>
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<tr>
<td>210400</td>
<td>1ST MC-130 LANDS</td>
<td>JANICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210405</td>
<td>2ND AC-130 OVER REESE</td>
<td>KAREN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210405</td>
<td>IR LIGHTING INSTALLED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(5) Coordination instructions: OPCON of all elements minus passes to Cdr on landing in AO Sherman. OPCON of C-141 element passes to SOW upon arrival at All personnel to be briefed on MISSISSIPPI KITE.

4. Service support: Crash and medical svc at Reese (actual) provided. Logistics as required.

5. Command and Communications:

A. Command:

1) MG HAMMER
2) MG STONE
Initial OP location: ORO GRANDE. JTD WASH maintains communications with JTD ORO GRANDE 202200Z until 211300Z.

B. Command net structure (also see CEOI)
Primary: SATCOM Radio (secure)
Back up: HF Radio (secure)
- Commander-Fullback
- Deputy Commander-Cutlass
- Base (ORO GRANDE) - Rustic
- BANB COMD Post - Buckskin
- Forward OP (Reesor - Sundial)
- Huskey - Bullet
- Drummer
- Whip Cord
- Stake Out
- element-Custom
- Gum Tree
- Guide book

C. Code words in the operational schedule will not be reported unless there is an event that occurs plus or minus of fifteen minutes from the planned schedule.

The Air Cav element will not have secure comm.

6. Loading Plan:

The loading plan for the MC/EC-130 aircraft is as follows:

VCSL SLOTH 11 SLOTH 12 SLOTH 13 SLOTH 14 SLOTH 15 SLOTH 26
CALL SIGN
TRAINEY
LOAD 1 PAX 1 PAX 1 PAX
TIME 0100Z 0100Z 0100Z
BACK
HAUL 33 PAX 2 2 1/2 TON 1 2 1/2 TON 3 MEDICS
Sloth 27

Load 19 PAX

Load/Time
0100Z
Rangers BPQPPZ

Backhaul

35 PAX
1 2 1/2 TON

BT
#0328
INCLOSURE FIVE: Hot Wash Up

Subj: Concept Evaluation ICE BOX Hot-Wash Up

Ref: a. JTD ORO GRANDE MSG (TS) 191750Z JUL 80 Subj: (C) OPORD ICEBOX
    b. CEOI for ICEBOX (S) published 18/2300Z JUL 80

1. (C) An ICE BOX Hot Wash Up was conducted from 1100 hrs. to 1400 hrs. on 21 July 1980. Representatives from all elements were present. All aspects of the operation were debriefed in detail.

2. (S) The basic concept of Option Nine is considered to be validated. However, there are a number of aspects that were untested and a number of artificialities:
   a. (S) Intelligence inputs were light, did not challenge the force.
   b. (S) That intelligence input was required which greatly simplified activities.
   c. (S) No fighter coordination/participation was geared in the exercise.
   d. (S) The end task and most difficult situation was not addressed and, as such, the exercise was a simple concept validation.

3. (S) Errors - Communications:
   a. No FM net for ground to ground communications existed between forward and ground mission commander. Need to collocate fwd with OP indicated.
   b. A lack of experience at the radio console was noted, operators were not adequately familiar with the operation and/or terms or reference.
   c. Commanders were not the prime users of the command net. Unauthorized users entered the net.

4. (S) Errors - Operations:
   a. Allowance for adequate weapons/ammo was not made. Allowance for long range fuel requirements were not made. More airplanes are mandatory.
   b. Improvements in coordination are required.
c. Concurrent entry of an AO needs to be re-thought.

d. Adequate contingency for the Number Two MC-130 go-around did not exist. The aircraft was critical for provision of maximum force on the ground soonest. Better cross-loading/loading of an aircraft indicated.

e. The force lacked an internal command net. The airborne mission commander was not able to adequately control his assets.

f. Aircraft commanders were not able to monitor SATCOM adequately. SATCOM is clearly the best system and should be AVAILABLE to pilots at all times.

h. Permanent overt and covert lighting systems need to be provided for the 130's.

i. Navigation systems need to be improved in all aircraft. A dual INS system that will initialize earlier is required.

k. Rangers/need the new 60 mm mortar system.

l. Early decisions on ground refueling requirements and methods need to be provided.

m. Need a better comm link between air mission commander on the ground and CCT.

n. AC-130's need to be provided with automatic switching between upper and lower antennas in order to insure uninterrupted communications at high angles of bank.

o. An inflight refueling capability is required in the full Special Operations fleet.

p. A dedicated communications net is required on the control ships. Pilots comm should not be broken for the purpose of passing command and control traffic.
q. Better light suppression/attenuation systems are needed for the NVG equipment. An improved NVG system should be developed specifically for MAC operations in a mixed black light/white light environment.

r. More NVGs are needed for MAC crew members.

s. MAC comm capability is geared toward a peacetime environment. The systems need a complete upgrade to be up to tactical standards. A minimum of sixteen MAC aircraft must be upgraded with secure communications and at least sixteen full crews identified and trained in the Special Operations mission.

t. A better inter-team CCT communications needs to be developed. Portable radios units/headsets specifically tailored to the CCT role must be acquired.

u. The CCT needs a better form of ground transportation. Motorcycles are indicated.

5. (5) Training Requirements:

a. First SOW:

(1) Improved go-around procedures need to be incorporated. Better interface between pilot and navigation during go-arounds needs to occur.

(2) The capability for significantly compressed landings/off loading of 130's needs to be developed.

(3) Night, low level capability needs improvement. More training needs to be accomplished in the western United States.

(4) Gunships need bigger ranges in which to train so that they can exercise in more realistic profiles.

(5) C-130 and C-141 training needs to be integrated. MAC and TAC crews need more interface.

(6) A system for vectoring of MC-130 should be developed and crews trained. Such vectoring could significantly improve MC-130 landing accuracy.

(7) SCW/MAC CCT interface needs to be expanded for better flexibility and improved availability of controllers.
b. Rangers:

(1) More training in loading/unloading operations is required. Rangers need a C-141 hulk training aid dedicated to their training.

(2) Integrated Ranger training is required to improve interface and to provide the capability for faster and safer operations.

(3) Rangers need more PT-25 training from Delta.

c.

(1) Further Phase I (Basic Pilot Skills) training is needed. It is estimated that an additional two weeks training in fundamental airmanship is required.

(2) Coordination with the aviation center for clearance/waivers required for specialized training is necessary.

(3) Increased integration with Delta is required for an improved basis of understanding of procedures, marshalling and safety is required.

(4) More initial checkouts/increased personnel are required to provide increased depth within the organization.

(5) PPS-5 night vision goggles have little value when operating low level (200-500 ft) over built-up areas that are illuminated with normal city lights.

Dead reckoning is the best means of navigation in a city environment.

(7) Operating in the urban environment is very fatiguing. Pilot proficiency is reduced significantly after about one hour.

d. MAC: MAC needs to increase the emphasis on individual crew training in the Special Operations role. Nine crews will take part in specialized training at Michael AAF on 5-7 August. First SOW interface should be established.
e. CCT: The Combat Controllers Unit must be fleshed out. MAC CCTs are thirty six percent manned. First SOW CCTs are forty per cent manned. This critical shortage of personnel greatly limits flexibility and degrades operational capability. Additionally, increased emphasis should be placed on actual aircraft handling operations.

f. JCSE: JCSE Team training needs improvement. Communicators must be trained to

g. Command and Staff: In subsequent exercises the function should:

(1) Expand intelligence inputs and play into the system.

(2) Increase the administrative staff and capability so as not to have to draw on subordinate capability.

(3) Avoid split staff whenever possible.

(4) Provide mission equipment for personnel.

(5) Conduct CPX or command and control for command net subscribers.

(6) Commanders to take necessary actions to provide leave opportunity to personnel, conduct necessary maintenance and component training so as to be prepared for joint training on 25 August.
Operationaal Requirements

2. Develop a complete Option IX training plan utilizing real time/distance factors.

3. Develop a fighter exercise program to be integrated into Option IX training.

4. Develop improved fix wing go-around procedures.

5. Develop AC-130 live fire training to include procedures for initial targets.

6. Develop a technique to allow MC-130's during landing.


8. Expand Special Operations combat controllers.


10. Develop ground refueling program for Option IX.

11. Develop a ground transportation system for the CCT.

12. Develop a more efficient communications net for SNOWBIRD (TS) units.

13. Develop a more efficient JCSE organization/capability.

14. Increased proficiency in night operations with minimum light, pick up operations and procedures in hastily selected LZ's, and refine aircraft unloading and preparation in flight techniques.

15. Develop, coordinate & test the SNOWBIRD (TS) VIII Option
Below listed are the tentative costs/requirements connected with the SNOWBIRD (TS) Program.

**ARMY**

Items to be purchased

- Motor bikes: $21K
- WPNS (9 mm, 22 cal.): $20K
- MT-1 Parachute System: $49K
- Desert Uniform: $44K
- Chem lites/IR Filters: $2K

136K

Costs not already incurred

- Armored Vehicles (2 ea.): $68K
- Fuel Equip/Air Drop/Land: $90K
- Medical/Personal Gear: $20K
- Portable Aux Power Units: TBD

**USAF**

Items to be purchased

- Motor bikes: $2.8K
- NVG's from Army Stocks: $70K

Costs not already incurred

- Vertical Gyro mod: $152K
- H-130 Mods: TBD
- C-141B Mods: TBD

Communications: TOTAL 225K

Army Procurement: Costs $3.4 million

(Purchase or provide from existing assets)
### SATCOM Terminals

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Air Force Procurement: Costs $2.4 million

(Purchase or provide from existing assets)

### SATCOM Terminals

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<td>(ARC-164/MX-850 or WSC-3)</td>
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<td>10 for MAC C-141Bs</td>
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<td>10 for SAC/KC-135s</td>
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<td>4 Nestor Secure Voice Pallets</td>
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Future Training

1. (S) Key Dates
   11-15 August       RECON of training sites
   18 August          Planning conference
   2-5 September      ADVON deploy
   5-18 September     Startex

2. (S) Key Training Tasks
   a. C141B
   b. Mid-Air refueling
      On-load/off-load training
      Air-ground control
   c. MC-130
      Blackout landing
      On-load/off-load training
      Parking/extraction
   d. AC-130
      Air-ground OPS
   e. BLACKHAWK
      Blackout landings
      Low level flight with Pave Low
      Refuel OPS
      Air-ground comm w/CCT
      Field maintenance
   f. Pave Low/HH-53
      Blackout landings
      Low level flight w/Blackhawks
      Air-ground comm w/CCT &
      Field maintenance
Secure comm exercise
On-load/off-load training
Air-ground control
Low level NAV
Blackout landing

h. CCT

Air-ground comm/OPS
Fixed wing parking
Helo Pax accountability

i. JTF

Airfield seizure (simultaneous)
Long range penetration/C&C
Extraction
Options IX & X
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INCLOSURE NINE: SNOWBIRD OPTION VII AND VIII (TS)

1. Actions To Date

U. S. Navy ships identified are:

1. LPH
2. LHA
3. CV/CVN

It has been determined that on all vessels, movement of the HH-53H helicopter below decks requires removal of main rotor blades. Re-installation and tracking of the blades requires prohibitive amount of time. As a result, unless the HH-53H is equipped with a folding rotor head, it will not be tested on ships. The UH-60A

for conduct of flight operations.

b. Testing. TRADOC, in conjunction with MTMC has been directed to conduct a feasibility test of the UH-60A aircraft on Navy ships. Costs for the tests aboard USN ships are estimated at $10,000. Tests should be completed by 15 August.

Future Actions

A decision to test the has been made. Costs are estimated at $20,000 to $50,000 per day depending upon the impact.

TOP SECRET
After completion of feasibility testing, a decision on type will follow. If the...cost approximately $1 million. One week of unit training will require about $200,000 for unit expenses. Unit training costs are estimated at $0.5 million but will also adversely affect the primary mission.
INCLOSURE TEN: BLACKHAWK/CH-47C EVALUATION

1. **Objectives**
   a. Create Army aviation capability to support SNOWBIRD (TS).
   b. Create doctrinally sound, logistically sustainable long-term capability to successfully conduct special operations.

2. **Background**
   a. Past efforts in the area of Army aviation support of special operations have been limited by equipment shortcomings, organizational decisions, and resource limitations.
   b. Special operations support is normally characterized by the requirement for deep penetration, surprise, and complex tasks in the objective area. Until recently, the only assets available which were capable of the ranges and flight profiles meeting those criteria have been fixed-wing aircraft and a few air-refuelable heavy lift helicopters. The special operations aviation capability of the Army has been reduced to an aviation platoon in the Fifth Special Forces Group.
   c. Army aviation exists for the stated purpose of supporting the land battle with maneuver, combat support, and combat service support vertical-lift units, and limited fixed-wing special support. Special operations on land are normally conducted by Army ground forces. The only identifiable reason the considerable resources of Army aviation have not been fully integrated into joint air support of those operations in the past was that the helicopters did not exist in the inventory which could penetrate deep, with surprise, and conduct close combat operations in the objective area. Notably, the capability to conduct those operations with vertical-lift aircraft in any significant numbers has been virtually non-existent in any service.
   d. The key objective of the HONEY BADGER/Army Aviation effort was to create the basis for presenting the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a viable Army aviation contribution to joint air special missions in support of special operations. This was to include both modification of aircraft and conduct of individual and unit training which would yield a trained special missions-capable rotary-wing force. The secondary objective, as yet unfulfilled, is to integrate that force into a joint force consisting of Army and Air Force air and ground elements.
3. Concept

a. In early June, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, directed that the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) be designated the major Army organization which would provide special missions crews and aircraft to JCS.

b. A survey of all aircraft in the Army inventory, directed by the JTF Commander and conducted by the JTF staff in coordination with the Army staff, indicated that the UH-60A and the CH-47C-plus were the Army helicopters with the greatest immediate potential for special missions.

   (1) The UH-60 is a highly survivable, fast helicopter with an unusually good power-to-weight ratio and excellent high-density-altitude performance.

   (2) The CH-47C-plus has the highest useful load in the inventory, and has an exceptionally large cargo area with the longest center-of-gravity travel of any helicopter in the world. This makes it particularly suitable for long-range logistics haul.

c. Both the UH-60A and CH-47C-plus were found wanting in several areas when profiled against SNOWBIRD (TS) concepts. In coordination with ODCSOPS, DA; ODCSLOG, DA; and DARCOM, necessary modifications were identified and a program to conduct those modifications initiated. The decision was made to conduct the majority of the work at Norton AFB, in order that

   (1) Individual and unit training could be ongoing in the desert/mountain environment, and

   (2) For OPSEC purposes, the work could be advertised as part of the Honey Badger test and evaluation.

d. Terminal Training Objectives were extrapolated from the SNOWBIRD (TS) Concepts, then refined to reflect a set of capabilities which would allow considerable flexibility in future planning. Fundamentally, they yielded the following objectives.

   (1) UH-60. Full night vision qualification, night long-range flight in excess of [redacted] unfueled, at low level. Coordinated operations with HH-53C, H and CH-47C. Terminal operations blacked out and with IR searchlight.

   (2) CH-47C. Full night vision qualification, night long-range flight in excess of [redacted] unfueled, at low level. Coordinated operations. Fuel
(3) Pathfinders. Integrated operations with CCT, secure rapid refueling points, conduct fuel transfer ops, set up remote nav aids.

3. Execution.

a. Training. See attachment one.
c. Evaluation. See attachment two.


a. Joint training will be conducted at Hunter AAF during the period 4 to 14 August for the purpose of addressing deficiencies identified during Phase II in the areas of planning, coordination, and execution. Lead crews and IP's from 101 ABD, 1 SOW, USAAVNS, and USMC will conduct seminars and flight training to develop special operations joint doctrine. They will then return to train organizations to prepare them for Phase III, beginning 2 September.
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**Legend:**
- IP/P: Instructor Pilot/Pilot
- CP: Copilot
- H: Navigator
- CE: Crewchief
- PF: Pathfinder
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- CE - CREncieief
- PF - Pathfinder

1/ To be defined
2 Jul 80

TO: Task Force Commander, TTC Honey Badger
INFO: Test Director, TTC Honey Badger
FROM: USAVNEB Project Analyst
SUBJ: Emerging Results, LK-60A Aircrew Mission Effectiveness

1. The information contained herein constitutes emerging results found from analyzing fifteen (15) randomly selected UH-60A aircrews by USAVNEB observers with regard to the following measures of effectiveness (MOE) as related to mission effectiveness:

   a. Maximum enroute longitudinal course deviation: ±3 minutes (based upon estimated course leg times).

   b. Maximum lateral course deviation: ±1500 meters

   c. Course Altitude: 300-500 feet above ground level (AGL) and below 300 feet AGL where possible.

2. The information is provided in tabular format for the purpose of identifying collective mission effectiveness parameters assessed to data based upon the random selection of the 15 aircrews observed.

3. The observer's mission effectiveness data collection form from which this data was recorded and reduced is found at enclosure 1.

4. Although these objective findings may provide insight as to the unit's overall mission readiness at this time, it is paramount to consider the following comments based upon sound military judgment and experience:

   a. The average aircraft had negotiated route black at least one other time and at least five of the aircrews twice thus establishing a learning curve.

   b. Ambient light conditions, both moon phase and azimuth, were generally considered optimal; however, the observations were conducted under reduced visibility due to thunderstorms, rain showers and haze.

   c. Aircrews were not found to be standardized as to what percentage of the time they collectively or any one member thereof employed night vision goggles (i.e., aircrew deviation of the night NVPs were estimated from 2-6 hours).
d. Spacing of individual aircraft (sorties) was not necessarily optimal in as much as several aircraft caught up to each other during the conduct of the flight, in some cases reducing navigation to a "follow the leader" situation.

e. The number of observations for anyone aircrew varied significantly due to any of the below reasons:

   (1) Mission aborts - maintenance
   (2) Mission aborts - operations
   (3) Mission aborts - weather
   (4) Aircrew workload between short course segments too rigorous for data aggregation.
   (5) Partial lack of standardization in observer instructions.

5. Considering the aforementioned constraints, the objective data pertaining to the MOE found in paragraph 1 is tabulated at inclosure 2 using simple statistical procedures identifying central tendency.

6. The number of times that any given aircrew exceeded any given parameter found in the MOE is found below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCREW</th>
<th>LONGITUDINAL DEVIATIONS</th>
<th>LATERAL DEVIATIONS</th>
<th>VERTICAL DEVIATIONS</th>
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<td>500 FT AGL ON CRS/21.5 KM</td>
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**Totals:** 11 1 9

*Excluded, measured UFL in lieu of AGL.
7. It is anticipated that certain correlations may exist between the evaluated individual aircrew's effectiveness as related to the constraints previously discussed and the defined XCC. Hence, further covariance techniques could be applied to investigate a possible relation between two primary variables as deemed appropriate. The two variable of immediate interest would be (1) the number of times the particular aircrew previously negotiated the route and (2) the aircrew's prior aviation experience. Because of the manual effort involved and on site personnel constraints, a more detailed analysis will be provided upon request.
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COMMENTS:

1/ If on course, check "On", if off course indicate left (L) or right (R) in kilometers.
2/ Average altitude (AGL) estimated using radar altimeter.

Observer: _______________________________

Pilot: _______________________________

Copilot: _______________________________

Navigator: _______________________________

Crew Chief: _______________________________

Date: _______________________________
CREW INTEGRITY

How many times has this crew flown together as a mission crew?

Of these how many were under: NVG Daylight _______

NVG Night ______
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<th>S.D./ TIME</th>
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**NOTES:**
- All absolute values have been adjusted to the end of range (EC) or first step (STEP 1) before being used.
SECRET

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TO HQ CA WASH DC //DAMO-RCD//
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SECTION 01 OF 02

SUBJ: HONEY BADGER

1. THIS MESSAGE IS A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS WHICH RESULTED DURING
EVALUATION OF THE FINAL EXERCISE CONDUCTED DURING PHASE II.

2. PILOT MISSION BRIEFINGS

A. NORTH ROUTE
   (1) CONDUCTED BY 158 AVN BN
   (2) ADEQUATE WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS

B. SOUTH ROUTE
   (1) CONDUCTED BY USAF
   (2) UNSATISFACTORY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF WEATHER AND CH-47
   RAPID REFUEL CPNS. SITUATION. MISSION AND EXECUTION WERE PRESENTED
   IN A CONFUSED, UNCLEAR MANNER. NO LOGICAL FORMAT SUCH AS THE 5
   PARA FIELD ORDER WAS USED. NUMEROUS CHANGES WERE MADE DURING THE
   BRIEFING; VISUAL AIDS WERE PCCR.
   (3) EXTemporaneous briefings by PIG's of FIGHT LEADS MADE
   MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT POSSIBLE.

C. GENERAL COMMENTS CONSOLIDATED BY EVALUATORS PRESENT AT
   30TH PILOT MISSION BRIEFINGS:
   (1) NUMEROUS FREQUENCIES AND CALLSIGNS UNKNOWN; SOME CHANGED
   DURING BRIEFING.
   (2) SOME VISUAL AIDS WERE INADEQUATE.
   (3) OCCUPATION OF LZ'S WAS NOT PROPERLY BRIEFED.
   (4) LINK UP OF UH-60 AND CH-53 AT LZ SOUTH WAS POORLY
   PLANNED; CHANGED DURING THE BRIEFING.
   (5) FRIENDLY/ENEMY SITUATION WAS NOT BRIEFED.

ACTION: DAMO(12)
IMPO: SAPA(3) DALL(6) DAMI(6) DAVE(3) DAAC(6)
AOC-DAMI WATCH(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 37

MCN=80207/24141 TDR=80207/2249Z TAD=80207/2249Z COSN=PR8552

ARMY SECTIONAL MSG
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

(6) NO CH-47 FOP TERMINATION TIME OR SECURITY PLAN WAS BRIEFED.
(7) LZ SECURITY PLAN WAS NOT BRIEFED.
(8) LZ STATUS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WERE NOT BRIEFED.
(9) AUTHENTICATION TABLES WERE NOT BRIEFED/USED.
(10) THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES WERE NOT ADDRESSED:
(11) EVASIVE MANEUVERS
(12) INSTRUCTIONS FOR PASSENGER DEBOARDING AT AIRFIELDS
(13) INSTRUCTIONS IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF LEAD AIRCRAFT
(14) INSTRUCTIONS FOR LOST CONG
(15) DOWNED CREW RECOVERY PROCEDURES
(16) SIGNALS FOR FORMATION CHANGE
(17) JOINT OPERATING PROCEDURES / STANDARIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ARE ESSENTIAL TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

MISSION PLANNING WAS POOR DUE TO THE FOLLOWING:
A. NAVIGATORS BRIEFED SEPARATELY AND PRIOR TO PILOTS:
B. NUMEROUS CHANGES OCCURRED DURING PILOT BRIEFINGS.
C. 1:500,000 SCALE MAPS ARE INADEQUATE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAIL.
D. HAZARDS INFORMATION WAS NOT AVAILABLE.
E. COMPLETE, DETAILED CREW BRIEFINGS WERE NOT CONDUCTED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TIME.
F. NUMEROUS INADEQUATE AIR NAVIGATION CHECKPOINTS WERE PROVIDED. (PLANNERS SHOULD UTILIZE AN NVG SIPP DURING SELECTION OF CHECKPOINTS.)

MISSION EXECUTION
A. UH-60/CH-53 INGRESS TO HOLDING LZ'S
   (1) THIS PHASE WAS GENERALLY WELL EXECUTED. ENROUTE NAVIGATION/PILOTAGE GOOD.
   (2) SOUTH LZ WAS INADEQUATE: 1 INCH POWDERED DUST; SMALL;
   UH-60'S MADE A GO AROUND.
   (3) UH-60 CALL FORWARD PLAN WAS UNCLEAR.
   (4) UH-60/CH-53 LINK UP PLAN WAS POORLY PLANNED AND EXECUTED.
B. CH-53 INGRESS TO PIZ
   (1) GENERALLY GOOD
   (2) ONE AIRCRAFT MADE A GO AROUND
C. MOVEMENT TO AIRFIELDS
   (1) LACK OF A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND EXPERIENCE RESULTED IN MUCH CONFUSION AND DISORGANIZATION WHICH RESULTED IN RELIANCE ON RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.
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(2) NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF AIRFIELDS WERE FLYING IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS WITH NO CONTROL AGENCY RESULTING IN NUMEROUS OVERFLIGHTS. NOT ALL PASSENGERS EXITED HELICOPTERS AT APPROPRIATE POINTS ON AIRFIELDS DUE TO LACK OF PROPER PLANNING.
SECRET

FINAL SECTION OF 02

(3) Much of flying was conducted in excess of 1500 ft AGL.

(4) Confusion and disorganization resulted in pilots using position lights, unfiltered landing lights and excessive radio traffic.

(5) Aircraft often lost sight of each other during formation flying under NVG's resulting in strobe lights being used to regain contact between aircraft.

D. Refueling at CH-47 RRP's

(1) Enroute pilotage and navigation was excellent.

(2) North flight overflew the RRP site and circled the area ECP approx. 15 minutes to locate the proper area.

(3) One CH-47 at the south RRP had to be repositioned approx. 200 meters due to poorly selected terrain.

(4) RRP set up was completed in 15 minutes.

(5) Refueling, UH-60 with 500 lbs of JP-4 took between 6 and 11 minutes. One aircraft took 19 minutes due to crew chief being unfamiliar with the CCR nozzle.

(6) Numerous pilots recommended that UH-60 landings be accomplished at right angles to and behind CH-47's for safety in the event of requirements for go-arounds.

(7) One CH-53 experienced failure of the nose gear and utilized white light for 11 minutes to try to resolve the problem.

(8) One RRP pump failed; crew must release pressure in lines prior to changing pumps; time delay was negligible.

5. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

A. Navigation equipment on board aircraft occupied by observers worked well; generally navigation errors were less than 0.6 miles.

B. Joint operating procedures are needed for standardization.
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AND MISSION EFFECTIVENESS IN THE EVENT OF UNEXPECTED OCCURRENCES.
C. AS AMBIENT LIGHT CONDITIONS DEGRADE, FLIGHT ALTITUDES
INCREASE IN EXCESS OF 1500 FT AGL.
D. MORE PRACTICE IN FORMATION FLYING WHILE WEARING NVG'S IS
REQUIRED.
E. SOME CREW MEMBERS ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CCR NOZZLE
REFUELING.
F. CREW COORDINATION AND STANDARDIZATION SHOULD BE IMPROVED.
G. ALL CREW MEMBERS SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH NVG'S; NOT ALL
CH-47 ENLISTED CREW MEMBERS AND NAVIGATORS HAVE NVG'S.
H. EXTENDED RANGE FUEL SYSTEMS WORKED WELL.
I. A BLACKOUT CURTAIN BETWEEN THE COCKPIT AND NAVIGATOR
AND A COVER OVER THE DOPPLER WERE TESTED; CREW ACCEPTANCE WAS
GOOD. [REDACTED] HAS MATERIALS TO MAKE ADDITIONAL CURTAINS/COVERS.
J. COMPLETE TACTICAL MISSION BRIEFINGS TO INCLUDE GROUND
SECURITY PLANS ARE ESSENTIAL.
K. ADEQUATE TIME MUST BE PROVIDED BETWEEN BRIEFINGS AND
MISSIONS TO ALLOW FOR THOROUGH CREW PLANNING AND COORDINATION.
L. [REDACTED] SHOULD BE INSERTED INTO AT LEAST
MINUTES PRIOR TO CH-47 ARRIVAL.
M. NOT ALL UH-60'S REFUELED AT THE RRP. CREWS SHOULD
COMPLETE ALL REQUIRED TRAINING TASKS DURING EVERY MISSION TO
INCREASE PROFICIENCY AND CONFIDENCE.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. UH-60 HYDROMECHANICAL UNIT (HMU) AND APU PROBLEMS SHOULD
BE DIAGNOSED AND RESOLVED (RESULTED IN ENGINE FAILURES AND APU
FIRES/FAILURES, RESPECTIVELY).
B. LANDING LIGHTS FITTED WITH LIGHT DIFFUSERS OR MODIFIED
BY ADDITION OF A LIMITER SWITCH TO PRECLUDE INADVERTENT OPERATION
AND DAMAGE/MOTOR BURN OUT.
C. ADDITIONAL MISSION TRAINING OVER SHORTER ROUTES TO PERFECT
MISSION EXECUTION.
D. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT OPERATIONS.
E. ALL UH-60 AND CH-47 ACFT BE FITTED WITH CURTAINS BETWEEN
NAVIGATORS AND COCKPITS.
F. PROVIDE 48 HOURS OR MORE BETWEEN MISSION NOTIFICATION AND
EXECUTION.
7. TEST AND EVALUATION PCC IS

[REDACTED]
TO: Test Director, JCS Honeybadger  
FROM: Test Project Officer  
SUBJ: UH-60A Human Factors

The following human factors considerations concerning UH-60A have emerged from discussions with operational pilots:

1. Pilot/Copilot Seat
   a. Becomes uncomfortable after 2 hours flight. A sheep skin pad would probably be beneficial if added to the seat cushion.
   b. Adjustable kidney pads on P/C seats are too soft and lose resilience, thus becoming ineffective.

2. Navigator seat is too low and navigator must un buckle seat belt to see/operate Doppler, change radio frequencies, etc. Use of a crew chief/gunner seat and harness assembly or a monkey harness is recommended.

3. Some pilots are counter-balancing helmets by placing weight on the aft portion of their helmets to compensate for weight of NVG. Some are attaching elastic bands between the aft portion of their helmets and their pants belts to reduce neck strain. The formerly mentioned method is hazardous in the event of a crash.

4. Load bearing gear, pencils carried in sleeve pockets on Nomex uniforms, and other items catch on components of extended range fuel systems as crewmembers attempt to move front to rear of aircraft.

5. Cockpit ventilation is inadequate which causes added fatigue to crewmembers during hot weather operations. Additionally, pilots report that numerous P/C door vent windows do not operate properly.

6. Night operations at high altitudes will require keeping cargo doors closed for crew comfort.

7. Milk should not be placed in box lunches as it sours in hot weather prior to consumption.

8. Relief tubes would be extremely useful. Crewmembers are currently limiting fluid intake before/during extended flight to preclude necessity for urination.

9. The navigation light does not provide adequate lighting for NVG operations, the green does.
STAFF SUMMARY

H53 Participation in HONEY BADGER

Objectives:

1. Create a capability to support SNOWBIRD.
2. Establish joint operating procedures.
3. Train crews in the operation of the HH-53H and complete their basic training in the aircraft.
4. Evaluate the ability of the HH-53C and HH-53H to carry on sustained desert operations.
5. Establish logistic requirements for the aircraft.
6. Establish a sound, long-term capability to successfully conduct special operations.

Background:

As we enter the 1980s, the face of aggression and conflict is changing. Small nations and groups who are incapable of confronting the major powers militarily or economically have resorted to terrorist activities. Bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and the taking of hostages, are ways that small or weak organizations try to influence others. In response to this increase in unconventional activities, we must develop and sustain forces that are capable of performing at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. These forces must be capable of immediate response to crisis situations with a surgical application of power to accomplish a specific objective.

These missions, normally categorized as special operations missions, are characterized by a crisis environment, short warning times, deep penetrations, and complex, time-critical tasks requiring surprise. They are generally high risk, high cost, high payoff missions.

The forces needed to execute this type mission must be highly disciplined, dedicated, and skilled in the unique tasks required by special operations missions.

Concept:

When the decision was made by President Carter to develop a sustained Special Operations capability, the JTF began building a force structure to support this objective.
In May 1980, the Air Force Chief of Staff directed that the 1st SOW be given the responsibility of developing the needed H-53 resources. The Air Force inventory was examined and the newly designed and operational HH-53H, PAVE LOW, helicopter assigned to MAC, was identified as the resource. The PAVE LOW III's ability to penetrate hostile airspace, at night, low level, in adverse weather, coupled with its air refueling capability and cargo capability make it ideal for the special operations mission.

The H-53 airframe is ideally suited for the wide range of capabilities needed in the SO flight profiles. Unfortunately, the H-53 special ops experienced crew force has been diluted. In 1974, when the 21st SOS and later, in 1978, the H-53 squadron at Bergstrom AFB, were decommissioned, the aircraft were reassigned to other tasks and personnel were reassigned to other units in other aircraft.

HONEY BADGER:

The primary objectives of HONEY BADGER were to reconstruct the H-53 special operations capability and create a force that could be used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in joint air operations in support of special operations. The reconstruction had two main goals: The training of crews in the basic crew duties; and the modification and evaluation of the aircraft to function in austere environments. The operational objective was to integrate the helicopter resources into a joint force consisting of multiple service air and ground elements.

(TS) Several deficiencies in the weapon system and crew qualification were identified when they were profiled against SNOWBIRD concepts. Modifications to the aircraft and crew requirements were identified.

**Modifications**

The following modifications have been completed:

1) ALR-69, Radar warning receiver
2) ALE-40, CHAFF/FLARE dispenser
3) Internal fuel tanks
4) SUAR - ALTITUDE REFERENCE SWITCHING UNIT

The following modifications are in progress:

1) Night vision qualify the H-53 cockpit - under study
2) Nose gear stress problems - under study
3) Folding rotor-head - under study
4) Medical configuration of HH-53C (SLICK) - basic requirement is met. Looking at additional capabilities.
Crew problems developed as a result of the rapid transfer of the HH-53H from MAC to the 1st SOW. The rapid transfer was contrary to the system that had been established to equip, maintain, and man the HH-53H. Individuals were brought in TDY from 14 different locations to participate in the new organization. The 1st SOW is now in the process of assigning the people PCS to fulfill the manning requirement and continuing training to fully qualify the aircrews and bring the crew compliment up to 12 crews.

Crew Force Factors:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NVG Qual</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Assigned Pilots (PCS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Assigned Pilots (TDY)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Qualified Pave Low Aircraft Commanders</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Qualified Pave Low Co-pilots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pave Low Qualified Flight Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Total PL Qualified Crews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Pilots in Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Co-pilots in Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Engineers in Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Volunteers available but not yet assigned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accompanying the challenge of upgrading Pave Low crews is the problem of interservice operations. The different techniques, procedures, and habits developed by the Services adds to the complexity of training. Radio procedures, formation tactics, terminal area procedures and operations are all different for the participating Services. The unique tactics and procedures required by special operations need to be developed from the basics.

To help resolve some of the crew training problems, a Special Test Group made up of components from 101st AVN BN, 1st SOW, MAC and experienced Marine aviators whose task it will be to establish the joint procedures necessary to expedite the development of Special Ops helicopter forces, establish upgrade and continuation training programs, and provide a knowledge base for future development of principles and tactics is being convened in Washington on 6 Aug 1980.

(TS) Observation:

The evaluation of the exercise as a viable concept was successful. I attribute the success to the professionalism and skill of the individual aircrews and maintenance support people. Their response to unplanned and unbriefed events was the primary factor leading to the safe completion of the mission.
There are still several areas needing work both with the weapon systems and the crews. For the short term, the important thing to concentrate on is the qualification of a sufficient number of joint operations and trained crews to meet the special operations requirement.

\[\text{S} \]
1. Create a capability to support SNOWBIRD. In progress, crew training is continuing possible fruition in mid-September.

\[\text{S} \]
2. Establish joint operating procedures - Conference scheduled 7-8-9 August to establish procedures. The following week, 11-23 August, the procedures will be flight tested (POTENT CHARGE).

3. Train crews in the operation of HH-53H. In progress, the 1st SOW has nine crews qualified and has an ongoing training program.

\[\text{S} \]

\[\text{S} \]
5. Establish logistical requirements for the aircraft - in progress. Plan to establish a preventative maintenance plan and identify parts with low MTTF underway.

\[\text{S} \]
6. Establish a sound, long-term capability to successfully conduct special operations - in progress. POTENT CHARGE, unit training, and a training exercise beginning in September are all training exercises designed to enhance the SO capability and develop a force trained and structured to meet the special ops needs of the future.

\[\text{S} \]
7. Attachments:
   - Evaluation - HONEY BADGER, H-53 Participation w/Atchs
   - Aircraft Scheduling/Aircrew Training
The OH58 helo was initially examined as an available on-line small helo for JTF use. The principal value of the aircraft was its potential for and accordingly, the OH58 was tested with a view of determining its transportability and usage for the JTF mission. Inclosed are the results of that test.

It was concluded that the OH58, though relatively easy to load on a C141, was deficient compared to the for several reasons:

a. More could be loaded.

b. was easier to maintain.

c. was more survivable.

d. was more maneuverable.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT TEST DIRECTORATE

Subject: Test and Evaluation of Combat Loading OH-58A Helicopter with Short Skids on C-130 Aircraft

1. Introduction and Test Objectives:

a. On 18 June 1980, an OH-58A helicopter equipped with modified skids was test loaded aboard a C-130 aircraft. The skids of the OH-58A were specially designed and fabricated by Bell Helicopter Inc. at Amarillo, Texas. The skids were designed to reduce the height of the OH-58 sufficiently to permit loading aboard a C-130 without removing the main rotor blades and mast. The operational height of the OH-58A was reduced with these shortened skids from 115.3 inches to 107.0 inches.

b. The objectives of the test were: (1) to determine minimum essential assembly and disassembly required to load the OH-58, (2) to determine the problems encountered in load and off-load, (3) to make recommendations for further skid modification, and (4) to determine the time required to off-load the OH-58 and place it in operational configuration.

2. Preparation of the OH-58:

a. The assembled modified skids were mounted on the OH-58A in 30 minutes. This operation required the use of a five ton wrecker to lift the helicopter since the standard aircraft jacks will not fit under the OH-58 once the modified skids are installed.

b. The FM radio antenna connectors were removed from the vertical fin, three of the four vertical fin retaining bolts were removed and the fin was rotated 90 degrees to maximize tail boom ground clearance (see Figures 2 and 3). The tail rotor was aligned parallel to the tail boom and the main rotor was secured with the blade tie down. These procedures required four and a half minutes to accomplish.

NOTE: It was later determined that the vertical fin should be removed completely as it was very fragile when secure by only one bolt.
Loading Procedure:

a. A towing bridle was formed by securing a chain to each rear skid cross member (See Figures 4 and 5) and then to the C-130 winch cable. Ground handling wheels were placed on the skids and the aircraft was winched tail first to the top of the C-130 ramp. CAUTION: The main rotor must be controlled to preclude hitting the cargo compartment ceiling. Similarly, tail boom clearance at first the cargo compartment floor (See Figures 7 and 8) and then the ceiling (as the OH-58 is winched up the ramp) must be controlled to preclude damage.

NOTE: It was determined that the UHF antenna mounted on the OH-58 chin would not clear the pavement as the aircraft moved up the ramp, so it was removed (See Figure 6).

b. The OH-58 was winched into the cargo compartment until the forward rotor blade was behind the upper cargo compartment door of the C-130 (See Figure 12). The ground handling wheels were removed, the forward rotor blade was secured depressed six inches with a second rotor tie down and then the helicopter was secured in the cargo compartment of the C-130 with standard chains and a strap (See Figures 14 and 15).

Off Loading Procedure:

The aircraft tie downs were removed and the ground handling wheels reinstalled on the OH-58 skids. The helicopter was then pushed down the C-130 ramp and clear of the C-130. The vertical fin was attached, the FM radio antenna was reconnected, the UHF antenna was remounted, and the aircraft was flown. The entire procedure required seven minutes and could be further reduced by three minutes if the UHF antenna were relocated to preclude the necessity for removal and reinstallation.

Problems Encountered and Recommended Solutions:

a. Securing the towing chains to the aft skid cross member is hazardous. The chains could slip up the cross member and damage the aircraft fuselage. Addition of tow rings at the rear of the skids is recommended.

b. The shortened skids reduces UHF antenna ground clearance to four and a quarter inches which creates a flight safety hazard and dictates that it be removed prior to loading. Relocation of the antenna further forward on the chin or nose of the OH-58 is recommended as a solution to both problems.
c. The break-under angle between the C-130 ramp extensions and the runway (See Figures 19 and 21) creates a problem during off-load. As the skids negotiate this angle, the ground handling wheels lose contact with the ramp and for fourteen inches of travel, the aircraft weight rests on the forward and rear ends of the skids (See Figures 19, 20 and 21). The resulting high drag can only be overcome by gathering considerable momentum when pushing the helicopter down the ramp to preclude it becoming stuck at the bottom (See Figure 22). This problem could be reduced by either tapering the rear fourteen inches of the modified skids or by bending them up in a manner similar to the forward end. Longer ramp extensions for the C-130 would also alleviate the problem by decreasing the break-under angle.

d. The rear anti-collision light on the OH-58 cleared the pavement during load and off-load by only one half inch. It is recommended that it be relocated higher on the aft fuselage to preclude damage to it.

e. The ceiling lights on the C-130 cargo compartment are located along the aircraft centerline and represent the height restriction on the compartment. Loading the OH-58 off-center by about five inches increases masthead to ceiling clearance by about two inches which adds a significant safety margin. It is recommended that the OH-58 be loaded off-center to minimize the hazard to the ceiling lights on the C-130 and the masthead on the OH-58.

f. As previously mentioned, the OH-58 vertical fin is very fragile when secured by one retaining bolt and rotated ninety degrees. Removal of the fin reduces potential damage and adds only seconds to helicopter disassembly/reassembly.

6. Operational Evaluation. The following comments concerning the operational impacts of the modified skids are based upon a very limited number of flying hours (approximately four) but are nonetheless intuitively valid:

a. The low ground clearance (four and one quarter inches) on the UHF antenna is a hazard. Operating from soft or irregular surfaces would be dangerous. The antenna should be relocated from the underside of the aircraft.

b. The low ground clearance for the rear anti-collision light poses a similar problem to the UHF antenna. It too should be relocated.
c. Operation of aircraft is limited to hard, smooth surfaces. Since ground clearance is about four inches, small stones or sticks could puncture the fuel cell on landing.

d. The skids flex on hard landings. Flex beyond three or four inches results in damage to the underside of the OH-58. As a result, auto-rotations could be very dangerous and there is no margin of error for initial pitch pull.

e. The shortened skids permit operations closer to the ground, tree tops, etc., presenting a lower silhouette to the enemy.

f. The unfamiliar height presents an initial safety hazard to individuals accustomed to working around "normal" OH-58 helicopters.

g. The skids themselves present no new maintenance problems but the reduced aircraft height induces problems.

h. Fuel samples are very difficult to collect. A short baby food jar is about the only collection vessel that will fit under the aircraft.

i. The jacks for the aircraft will not fit under it with the shortened skids. A wrecker or crane must be used to lift the aircraft by the masthead eye. Alternatively, lower jacks could be built.

j. The engine and transmission are easier to reach and work on with the reduced height.

Summary:

a. The modified skids represent a milestone development in terms of OH-58 deployability. The addition of short skids, a process which requires one half hour, permits loading one OH-58 aboard a C-130 aircraft. The OH-58 can be unloaded and flown within five minutes after the C-130 stops. Previously, loading aboard the C-130 was possible only after the main rotor and masthead were removed - a four hour operation. After off-loading, another four and a half hours are required to reassemble the helicopter. The short skids introduce some potentially severe hazards and operational constraints.
on the aircraft. These must be carefully weighed against the mobility gains. A compromise would be to deploy the aircraft with the short skids and send the normal skids in a follow-on support package. The aircraft would thus be more immediately available for missions, with some constraints on landing surfaces, but could be rapidly converted to normal skids. The net saving in maintenance time would be about eight hours and a true air rapid deployment capability would be gained.

5. While this test was conducted on a C-130 aircraft, the same height restrictions exist on C-141A aircraft and thus the increased OH-58 rapid deployment capability applies to it as well.
INCLOSURE THIRTEEN: COSTS

Background:

The JTF program was formalized by a memorandum from the [Redacted] dated 6 June 1980 utilizing the [Redacted]. Within the memo, the Army and USAF costing data was fixed at 12.5M per service.

The overall program was to be supported by each service as service-specified requirements arose. The JTF has heretofore been denied a budget and has been wholly dependent on Service funding.

General Cost Summary:

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Specific Data is Inclosed
### Costs to Date

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### Future Costs

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**Total** 57.0M
### ORIGINAL COST PROGRAM

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### COSTS TO DATE

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TOTAL JTF TRAINING/PROCUREMENT COSTS
(as of 30 July)

ARMY

Training: 6.3M*
Procurement/Related Costs: 16.8M
TOTAL: 23.1M

* Includes 4.73M MAC ASIF Costs

USAF

Training: 2.1M
Procurement/Related Costs: 8.7M
TOTAL: 10.8M
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* Includes 4.73M MAC ASIF Costs
**SECRET**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SNOWBIRD PROCUREMENT (as of 30 July)

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**REQUIRED PROCUREMENT**

* (Additive)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>3.6M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>16.5M*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes Acft Mods
Assumptions:

1. Force structure (full time)

- JTF HQ
- 1st SOW
- Ranger Bn
- ELEMENT DELTA
- 158 AVN BN (+)
- JCSB DET

(As required)

- E3-A
- F-14 ELE
- C141B ELE
- RORO

2. Exercise Program
   JTF exercise each quarter (5 days)
   Sustainment at home station
   No Cost to JTF

3. Procurement funding completed 1 Oct 80

4. Sustainment costs within normal unit training.

5. JTF Training Costs:
   - 30% of sustainment
   - 50% of Army blade-hours

6. MAC ASIF rates remain unchanged.

7. JTF Training is within CONUS.

8. No new forces added.

9. No JTF overhead included.
1. JTF not staffed to monitor costs.
2. JTF was denied a budget.
3. Costs are scenario dependent.
SNOBIRD FUNDING THROUGH 30 SEP

TRAINING 4.3M
1.1M
COST OVERRUN TO SERVICES 8.8M
PROCUREMENT/MOD 20.1M

TOTAL 34.4M
## FUTURE JTF TRAINING COSTS FY 80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>TRAINING</th>
<th>COST (APPROX)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug-30 Sep</td>
<td></td>
<td>MISSION</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9 Aug</td>
<td>DELTA</td>
<td>PATHFINDER OPS</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7 Aug</td>
<td>C141B</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8 Aug</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>SITE RECON</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-20 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>NIGHT OPS</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-23 Aug</td>
<td>101st/SOW</td>
<td>JOINT INSTRUCTOR TNG</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-13 Aug</td>
<td>USN PKG</td>
<td>AIR SUPERIORITY</td>
<td>740,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-18 Sep</td>
<td>JTF TRAINEX</td>
<td>JOINT TRAINING REHEARSAL</td>
<td>3,600,000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>4,370,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Assumes 100% above line costs.
** 2.1M ASIF
    .6M Air Superiority
    2.7M
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical fabrication and tests of infiltration vehicles</td>
<td>$400K</td>
<td>Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of</td>
<td>$500K</td>
<td>Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Country support</td>
<td>$550K</td>
<td>In Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procurement (Army)</strong></td>
<td>$500K</td>
<td>Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procurement (Army)</strong></td>
<td>$250K</td>
<td>In Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procurement (Army)</strong></td>
<td>$211K</td>
<td>In Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2.41M</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. JTF not prepared to execute SNOWBIRD
   a. Lack of definitive intelligence
   b. Lack of launch bases
   c. Lack of infiltration means
   d. Lack of force proficiency

2. JTF readiness is paced by intelligence action initiatives which are thus far projected to cost $2.415 million ($1.4 million already approved).

3. Launch base availability, while not certain, is believed to be obtainable.

4. Delay in intelligence actions, training or JTF training will delay mission achievement if the.

5. Force proficiency hinges on perishable skills and requires periodic training.
   a. If 1, 2 & 3 are met, 4 can be attained in three weeks (as of 1 Aug).
   b. If 1, 2 & 3 are met, 4 can be attained in four weeks if the scheduled training program is slipped to 18 Aug.
   c. If 1, 2, & 3 are met, 4 can be attained in five weeks if the scheduled training program is slipped to 1 Sep.

6. No known disabling compromise of SNOWBIRD to date. Situation tenuous.

7. JTF staff inadequate to provide definitive cost data, R&D monitoring and other administrative type functions. Additional requirements will require substantial staff and working space augmentation. (2 additional spaces in J-4 complex ($26K), 7 officers and one clerk typist).

8. Current DOD/CIA relationship for SNOWBIRD is unsatisfactory but practical in view of existing conditions.

9. SNOWBIRD IX is the most probable option and is currently being used as the target for force readiness, procurement and force structure. This can quickly change with new intelligence input.
10. **Non-SNOWBIRD Achievements:**


   b. Development of

   c. Development of a joint helo

   d. Development of a man-packed SATCOM terminal from a commercial, LOS radio.

   e. Raised the UH60/CH47 NATO self deploy status from 2/4 to 30/16, two to five years ahead of schedule.

   f. Enhanced RDJTF capability by qualifying two UH60 companies and one CH47 company in flight/desert/mnt. Ops one year ahead of schedule.

   g. Provided a long range helo extraction means to special operations forces.

   h. Produced hatch mounted SATCOM antennas for C130/C141 A/C.

   i. Enhanced special opns secure voice capability on a variety of A/C.

   j. Installed secure HF radios on CH47, UH60 Army A/C.

   k. Equipped 6 secure UHF packages for C141B A/C.

   l. Added a hand-held, reliable privacy net for Rangers.

   m. Extended the ranges of Pave Low and MC-130 from and and to and

**For Future Consideration:**

(5) should probably include:

- DELTA
- 1/SOW
- Rangers

As required:
A mission support fund

60% yearly force sustainment
40% contingency

- Unconstrained access to JCS, DIA, Nat'l WX Svc, etc.

- The nature of RICE BOWL, SNOWBIRD and any future such activity is to attempt the recreation of an action capability for the United States, a capability that has been defunct since the Vietnam War.
INCLOSURE FIFTEEN: RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPSDEPS Recommendations to JCS:
   a. JTF to be provided with $34.3 million by 11 Aug to fund SNOWBIRD activities through 30 Sep 80.
   b. Press intelligence community to use all available resources to fulfill SNOWBIRD requirements.
   c. Grant of authority to approach [redacted] and [redacted] to select
   d. JTF 1-79 to be dissolved between 1 and 15 Nov 80.
   e. Phased in beginning 15 Aug 80, SNOWBIRD mission passed to [redacted] on 1 Nov 80.

2. OPSDEPS Considerations:
   a. Require OJCS to identify specific deficiencies in the ability to support the US Armed Forces in the special operations field and specific remedial recommendations to be approved by the JCS and presented at an NSC meeting prior to 1 Nov 80.
   b. Require OJCS to identify necessary actions to expand and improve US Armed Forces capabilities to conduct special operations. Actions to be presented for OPSDEPS approval by 1 Oct, presentation to JCS by 15 Oct, SECDEF by 30 Oct.
   c. Provide guidance on advisability of closer JTF contact with Dept of State regarding press releases and JTF actions (previously denied).
   d. Provide guidance on advisability of closer JTF contact with J-5 (previously restricted).
INDIAN OCEAN/PERSIAN GULF DEPLOYMENTS
TASK FORCE 70

24 SEP 80

EISENHOWER TG 70, 9
AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED
24 F-14 4 E-2C
21 A-7E 4 EA-6B
10 A-6E 10 S-3A
4 KA-6D 6 SH-2H
1 US-3A

SCHEDULE
ON STATION ARABIAN SEA

4 P-3C
1 US-3A
4 P-3B
4 S3A
4 EA-6B
4 KC-135

MILITARY OPTIONS — AIRCRAFT LOCATIONS
EUROPE

4 MC-130 (NOT AAR)
6 KC-135

FLEET MARINE FORCE SEVENTH FLEET (2,915 USMC PERSONNEL)

SHIPS
ARG ALFA
ARG BRAVO

AIRCRAFT
4 CH-53D
4 CH-53D
12 CH-46F
12 CH-46F
4 AH-1T
4 AH-1T
1 UH-1N
1 UH-1N

TROOPS EMBARKED
31ST MAU (ARG ALFA)
1,716 TROOPS (ARG ALFA)
1,716 TROOPS (ARG BRAVO)
1,197 TROOPS

ARG ALFA SCHEDULE
24 SEP
19-25 SEP ENROUTE AUSTRALIA
30 SEP-10 OCT TRAINING ANCHORAGE, ASINARA BAY, ITALY
27 SEP-1 OCT VISIT AUSTRALIAN PORTS

LANDING FORCE SIXTH FLEET (1,725 USMC PERSONNEL)

SHIPS
GUADALCANAL (LPH-7)
NASHVILLE (LPD-13)
PENSACOLA (LSD-30)
LAMOURE CNTY (LST-1194)
BARNSTABLE CNTY (LST-1197)

AIRCRAFT
4 CH-53D
12 CH-46E
4 AH-1T
2 UH-1N

TROOPS EMBARKED
32ND MAU
1,725 TROOPS

SCHEDULE
17-25 SEP UPEKEEP TOULON
30 SEP-10 OCT TRAINING ANCHORAGE, ASINARA BAY, ITALY

MIDWAY TG 70, 1
AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED
18 F-4 4 EA-6B
18 A-7 3 RF-4B
4 A-6 4 SH-3
3 KA-6 1 C-2
4 E-2B

SCHEDULE
PORT VISIT MOMBASA

4 AC-130 (NOT AAR)
4 MC-130 (NOT AAR)
3 MC-130 (AAR)
Subject: Iran Situation Report as of 0500 24 September 1980

(U) Significant Events:

(U) Iraq has publicly announced its objectives in undertaking hostilities against Iran. It seeks the restoration of the border along the Shat al Arab waterway prior to the 1975 Algiers Accord. This would give it complete control of the channel up to the Iranian shore. Baghdad also demands the return of the three Gulf Islands (Greater and Lesser Tunbs, Abu Musa) to its Arab claimants, Ras al Khairan and Sharjah, two small sheikdoms of the United Arab Emirates. The islands were seized by the Shah in 1971.

(U) The city of Abadan, Iran's principal source of refined petroleum products, is reported in Iraqi news bulletins to be surrounded by Iraqi troops who have also severed the highway leading north to Ahwaz.

(U) Other unconfirmed press reports indicate that oil storage tanks at the Abadan refinery are burning and that the refinery has been shut down. Radio Iran counters these reports claiming that its 92d Armored Division has driven off the Iraqis.

(U) Iran's intransigence regarding Iraq's airspace strikes has been continuing. In the last few weeks, the north-south runway has been extended an additional two miles, and preparations for the construction of a major new airfield have been described.
(U) The Iran-Iraq conflict has apparently halted further consideration of the hostage issue by the Majlis for an indefinite period. Yesterday Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani said the Iraqi attacks were part of "a large US plot and will have an impact on the destiny of the hostages." Tehran Radio announced the Majlis had decided that the problem of the hostages spies has been frozen indefinitely." Also yesterday the militants holding the hostages announced that hostages in six cities were being transferred.
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 5 - 17 AUGUST 1980

5 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

6 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

7 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

8 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

9 Aug - (U) An Iranian-sponsored conference to protest Israel's declaration of all of Jerusalem as its official capital was convened in Tehran. In a speech to the conference, Ayatollah Khomeini criticized the Soviet Union for its intervention in Afghanistan and for supplying arms to Iraq. Khomeini also called for the export of the Iranian revolution to "all Islamic countries."

10 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

11 Aug -

12 Aug - (U) Former Education Minister Mohammad Ali Raja'i was appointed Prime Minister of Iran.

13 Aug -

13 Aug - (C)

14 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

15 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

16 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

17 Aug - (U) The British Embassy in Tehran temporarily suspended operations and withdrew most of its staff and their dependents.
18 Aug - (U) Unconfirmed reports claim that LTG Hassan Yazdi, Chief of Communications under the Shah, committed suicide. Yazdi was being sought by Iranian authorities for alleged participation in last month's coup attempt.

21 Aug - (U) According to Iranian state radio, Ayatollah Khomeini's doctors have appealed to the public to refrain from making unscheduled calls on the Iranian leader in order to safeguard his health. Khomeini has been quite active lately, and his increased involvement in governmental affairs may have aggravated his cardiac ailment.

21 Aug - (U) The Soviet Union has agreed to an Iranian demand to close one of its consulates in Iran. Moscow announced that it was closing its consulate in Esfahan.
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 22-28 AUGUST 1980

22-28 AUG -

22 AUG - (U) The revolutionary courts in Khuzistan, Iran banned all activities by the Tudeh Party, the Fedayeen, the Mujahedin, and the Paybar in two of the provinces larger cities, Abadan and Khorramshahr.

25 AUG - (U) The militants threatened to kill the American hostages if the US attempts another rescue, and claimed that the Americans have again been relocated in order to prevent a second attempt.
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 30 AUGUST-11 SEPTEMBER 1980

30 AUG - (U) The Iranian Army and Revolutionary Guards launched attacks upon Kurdish positions in and around the city of Mahabad in an attempt to regain control of the city from Kurdish insurgents.

31 AUG - (U) Prime Minister Rajai presented his cabinet for Majlis approval; however, Bani Sadr announced he had not approved the cabinet as required by the constitution.

2 SEP - (U) Iran's Revolutionary Prosecutor-General ordered officials of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party to report within 48 hours for questioning on the party daily Mardom, and the government closed one of the party's publishing offices in Tehran.

3-4 SEP - (U) No significant activity.

6-11 SEP -

7 SEP -

10 SEP - (U) The United Kingdom closed its embassy in Tehran. British interests in Iran will be represented by Sweden.
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 12-22 September 1980

12 SEP - (U) Ayatollah Khomeini stated the hostages could be released if the US returned to Iran the property of the late Shah, cancelled all financial claims against Iran, promised not to intervene politically or militarily in Iran, and unblocked Iranian assets presently frozen in the US.

12-22 SEP - (U) Border clashes continue along much of the central and southern border regions. Iraqi forces reportedly seize several Iranian border positions and Iranian forces reportedly attempted to retake some of the disputed territory.

17 SEP - (U) Baghdad abrogated the 1975 Algiers Accord and claimed sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab river which forms the southernmost portion of the border.

21 SEP - (U) Iranian gunboats fired on a merchant ship in the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq reportedly attacked and drove off one Iranian gunboat and destroyed the other.

22 SEP -
- Intelligence

- Operations
  -- Deployments today:
  1. 2 C-141 deliver/DELTA and return
  2. 1 C-141
  3. 1 C-130
  4. 2 C-141
  5. 1 C-141

  -- Employment today:
  1. 3 EC-130 transport fuel to Refuel Site
  2. 3 MC-130 transport DELTA
  3. 8 RH-53

  -- Operational Readiness:
  1. DELTA Inplace
  2. Rangers Inplace
  3. [redacted] Inplace
  4. EC-130 3 FMC
  5. MC-130 4 FMC
  6. AC-130 1 NMC for brakes
  7. RH-53 3 OR 1 PMC autopilot ALR-46
  8. C-141 8 FMC NIMITZ
  9. KC-135 1 FMC 2 enroute

- Special Problem Areas: None
The compound is located in downtown Tehran in the midst of a heavily populated and central area with a large population in close proximity. Several high-rise buildings in the area provide advantageous points for viewing the interior of the compound. It is a sports complex with large stadium and several playing fields located north of the compound across Roosevelt Avenue.

Activity levels at the embassy are largely regulated within the compound itself. Surveillance is continuous.

Weather at this time of year is in transition from cold wintry weather to the long hot summer period. Skies are generally clear to partly cloudy. Average low temperatures of 40°F increasing to 60°F and highs of 50°F increasing to 90°F. The chance of precipitation decreases from an average high of 7 days in March to 1 day in June. With this decrease in rainfall and increasing gusty surface winds, blowing dust or sand reduces visibility 1-2 days during the month.
SUSPECTED HOSTAGE LOCATIONS

Although all hostages were reportedly seen in the Chancery by the IRC team on 14 April 1980, it would be dangerous to presume all hostages are being permanently held in this location.
IRANIAN AIR DEFENSE SUMMARY

1. Air Defense - General:
   a. The primary air defense system in Iran is the HAWK.
   b. (S/NOFORN) Other ADA systems are primarily the 23-mm Soviet built ADA gun and the 35-mm Swiss Oerlikon ADA gun.
   c. Other SAM systems known to be in the Iranian inventory are the British Rapier, the US Tigercat (land-version of the Seacat) and the SA-7.
2. (TS/SCI) I-HAWK SAM System:
   a. (CONFIDENTIAL) The improved HAWK is a dual-thrust, single-chamber, solid-propellant, surface-to-air missile capable of delivering high-explosive, blast, fragmentation, and incendiary effects over a maximum range of about 60 kilometers at altitudes from...
   b. (CONFIDENTIAL) The HAWK system's track-on-jam and home-on-jam capabilities make it even more effective against electronic jammers.
   c. 
   d. (TS) Iran's HAWK systems were only in the initial stages of deployment at the time of change in government, and an integrated command and control capability is unlikely. Furthermore, they were extremely dependent upon the US for spare parts and for maintenance technicians to maintain the apparatus. Since mid-February 1979, required maintenance probably has not been performed and spare parts are probably in short supply.

3. (TS/SCI) Rapier SAM System:
   a. (CONFIDENTIAL) Rapier is a far-weather, mobile, surface-to-air missile system designed for point defense of airfields and battlefields against high-speed low-flying tactical aircraft.
   b. (CONFIDENTIAL) A Blindfire radar guidance system for poor weather operation has been developed and is offered as an optional add-on unit to the Rapier system.
   c. (CONFIDENTIAL) There are currently 250 Rapier missiles and 52 missile launchers in Iran. The Rapier is designed for point defense of airfields. It has a maximum intercept range of 50 kilometers and a maximum intercept altitude of... The maximum acquisition range for the Blindfire radar is 15 kilometers. It has a visual target system which is radar assisted.
Tigercat SAM System:

a. (STRONG) Tigercat is a missile designed for close-range defense of small tactical targets, such as airfields, against low-level airborne attacks. The missile also has a limited capability against surface targets. Tigercat is principally a surface-to-air missile with an integral, two stage rocket motor. It delivers a HE warhead to a maximum slant range of kilometers and a maximum intercept altitude of kilometers.

b. (S/HOFORM) The Tigercat missile is identical to Seacat. It has a cylindrical body flared to a square cross section at the wing roots. The forward half of the missile body is built up from sections of light alloy castings. The welded high-tensile-strength steel of the integral two-stage, solid propellant rocket motor forms the structure of the aft part of the missile body.
5. **SA-7 (GRAIL) SAM System:**

   a. (U) This man-portable, shoulder-launched, surface-to-air missile system exists in the basic SA-7a version and a slightly modified version designated SA-7b.

   The operator aims the missile in its launch tube at the target and fires when the heat-seeking missile locks on to the infrared radiation from the target. The SA-7 is effective against helicopters and slow-flying aircraft at low altitudes, but the limitations of the uncooled infrared detector and slow missile velocity prevent it from being effective against high-speed targets.

b. (S/NOFORN) The Iranian SAM system is based primarily on I-HAWK, but also includes Rapier, Tiger, and SA-7, is supplemented by Swiss Oerlikon 35-mm radar- or visually-controlled ADA guns, as well as ZU-23-2 and ZSU-23-4 Soviet-supplied ADA guns.

6. **Anti-aircraft Guns:**

   a. (U) The Swiss twin 35-mm anti-aircraft gun, 1 ZLA/353 (Oerlikon-Contraves), is a gas-operated, automatic weapon with a cyclic rate of fire of 550 rounds per minute per gun -- a total cyclic rate of 1,100 rounds per minute for the weapon. Each gun has a hopper which accommodates 56 rounds. A "ready-round" container with 63 rounds is positioned behind each hopper. The total of 238 is assembled in 34 clips of 7 rounds each. The HE projectile has a self-destruction fuze which operates after the round is in flight from 8 to 10 seconds.
(1) (U) Electronic fire control with a Superfledermaus radar is provided for fully automatic elevation and traverse. Furthermore, the weapon can be either power operated or manually controlled by one man, independent of the fire control system.

(2) (U) By means of an electro-hydraulic mechanism, a feature of this weapon, it is possible to go from the traveling position to the firing position in approximately three minutes, or from firing position to the traveling position in approximately four minutes.

(3) (U) The 35-mm Oerlikon AA gun has a maximum vertical range of and a maximum horizontal range of when the Superfledermaus fire control radar system is being utilized. The tactical AA range is defined as the range at which an aircraft could expect to receive AA fire with a reasonable probability of hit. If only the back up optical-mechanical fire control system is being utilized, then the range is . The Superfledermaus can be employed with the fire control system is all weather capable and has a maximum detection range of .

b. (U) The Soviet twin AA gun ZU-23, first shown in 1964, is a dual purpose weapon suitable for employment in both an AA role (as its "ZU" designation implies) and in an equally formidable direct-fire ground role against personnel and light armor. It is mounted on a towed light two-wheel chassis with disc-type wheels which tilt outward at the top when the weapon is emplaced, thus providing freedom of movement around the gun as well as removing the weight of the gun from the wheels when firing. AA fire-control is by means of an optical-mechanical computing sight.

c. (U) The Soviet self-propelled antiaircraft weapon system, ZSU-23/4 is mounted on a full-tracked chassis. The weapon system consists of quad-mounted 23-mm automatic guns with a radar as part of the on-carriage fire control. The weapons are similar to those of the towed ZU-23, with modified (liquid cooled) barrels and different flash hiders. The entire turret is enclosed except for a cutaway portion on the forward end of the turret for gun elevation. The chassis is basically a modified ASU-85 using a flat track torsion bar suspension system, with six single road wheels on each side. The vehicle is not amphibious.
SUBJ: Qasr Prison (Rqmt no. 302)

(U) Qasr Prison is located north of the US Embassy as indicated on the accompanying map. It is the National Police Prison, and can house at least 2500 prisoners. After the revolution in mid-February, the prison was used to incarcerate, try, and in most cases execute many of the senior civilian and military officials of the Shah's regime. Around June 1979, there were complaints about the poor administration of the prison by the revolutionary committee in charge, and most of the prisoners were reportedly transferred to Evin Prison. Qasr was subsequently left in the hands of the police.

(U) Evin prison is a former SAVAK (secret police) prison located in northern Tehran, approximately one mile west of the Royal Tehran Hilton Hotel (exact location unknown).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Coordinates</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qom Ammunition Depot</td>
<td>34° 33' 52&quot; N, 50° 32' E</td>
<td>6-10 Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzarieh Artillery Range</td>
<td>34° 59' 39&quot; N, 50° 42' 12&quot; E</td>
<td>750 Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzarieh Artillery Range</td>
<td>34° 59' 39&quot; N, 50° 42' 12&quot; E</td>
<td>750 Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qom-Rood Post</td>
<td>34° 44' 00&quot; N, 50° 21' 00&quot; E</td>
<td>6-10 Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taf Rood Post</td>
<td>34° 44' 00&quot; N, 50° 30' 00&quot; E</td>
<td>6-10 Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saveh Post</td>
<td>35° 01' 00&quot; N, 50° 21' 00&quot; E</td>
<td>6-10 Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darand Post</td>
<td>35° 16' 00&quot; N, 50° 26' 00&quot; E</td>
<td>6-10 Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 minutes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jafar-Abad Post - 34-47-00N 050-34-00E

Forces: 6-10 Gendarmerie

Reaction: Located approximately 10 miles inland in trucks could probably react in 30 minutes

Manzar-Ijeh Air Traffic Control Radar

Forces: 24-8 personnel, 6-8 vehicles

Reaction: Located approximately 10 miles inland in trucks could probably react in 30 minutes

Tehran/Mebrad

Forces: 60-100 personnel, 40-60 vehicles

Reaction: Located approximately 1 hour inland in trucks could probably respond in 1 hour

Tehran/Ghaleh

Forces: 60-100 personnel, 40-60 vehicles

Reaction: Located approximately 1 hour inland in trucks could probably respond in 1 hour

A selected stage in approximately 5 minutes, approximately 1 hour. It is also recommended that forces

He will be in contact with the American forces by radio at 7:00 A.M. Vehicles were unarmed. The following

BRANCH CHIEF

SECRET

SECRET
Date 7-7-79

To: General Knight

Subject: "I have no opinion"

Attached is a copy of the report pursuant to which MA passed "in lieu" summary proceedings.

G

Chloe, 605 Hillside Ave

502-77
--- In-place, operational, tactical F-14 sites:
+ Bushehr - 3 ea.
+ Vahdati - 3 ea.
+ Tehran -- 2 ea.

--- In-place, operational training sites:
+ Beheham ---- 3 ea.
+ *Hashimabad -- 3 ea.
+ Aemnan Range - 1 ea.

--- Sites near completion:
+ Kharg Island --- 1 ea.
+ *Bandar Mashur - 1 ea.
+ Avhaz --------- 3 ea.
+ Tehran --------- 2 ea.

--- Sites requiring little preparation:
+ Chah Bahar ---- 2 ea.
+ Bandar Abbas - 1 ea.
+ *Zulayde AB --- 3 ea.
+ *Bandar Mashur - 1 ea.
+ *Shahroki AB --- 2 ea.
+ Isfahan -------- 2 ea.

* Data not previously known to DIA.

--- Evaluates HMK crew ability as poor and indicates that the Raytheon Training Program was never completed. It suggests that at best, crews could probably man 8 batteries, but more probably, no batteries are operational.

--- Also provided airfield, AAA gun, and EW radar information which is being evaluated.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ATT: NSA BQ, NSA DC, NSA MD

SUBJECT: RE: PPS 10-12

DATE: 30 Jan 2023

PSA:

1. NSA BQ

2. NSA DC

3. NSA MD

CLASS: SBU

NOTE: THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT IS PROTECTED FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. REPLY WITH A SINGLE BUSINESS DAY DELAY.
SECRET

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1. LAYOUT TO BEGIN AT (1) 32-45.XRI, 52-01.765, (2) 32-45.587, 51-04.281
2. **SECRET**
3. **SECRET**

INFORMATION

*SECRET*
Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Mehrabad Layout and Defenses

TIMEFRAME: July 1980 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (U) In late June 1980, JTD considered Mehrabad to be a prime option to be the J2 focal point for Mehrabad intelligence and air defense.

2. (U) was detached from Air Staff.

3. (U) J2 obtained...

4. (U) J2 mapped Mehrabad defenses and passed information to all prime using agencies (101st, ISOW, DELTA, AWACS).

5. (U) A complete-scale model of Mehrabad was built for study by possible attacking forces. J2 created grid maps and identified threat positions and weak points.

6. (U) J2 obtained collateral material from...

7. (U) J2 provided suggested ground routing from Mehrabad to the Embassy and MFA, time schedules and possible reacting forces analysis to the J-3 planners.
J2 maintained daily files and capability estimates (DIA and 

COMMENTS:

1. (S) Despite heavy concentration of AA, Mehrabads night defensive capability was not insurmountable. Prior to the war, Iranian AAA reaction times and general reaction capabilities as a whole would probably have allowed a successful assault on Mehrabad.

2. (U) After the onset of the war, Mehrabads reaction capabilities were considerably improved. As a result, the risk level to an assault on Mehrabad was correspondingly higher.

3. (S) With the higher risk and the reported hostage moves, an assault on Mehrabad was essentially discarded. The concept was replaced with a plan utilizing AC-130's and Cobras to With the removed, the environment over Mehrabad was operable

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (S) J2 request an update analysis from DIA and at least once a month.

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: 

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Mehrabad Grid with Threats (old)
2. New Mehrabad Grid (night readable)
3. Sample Intel Report on Mehrabad
4. Tehran Airfield Facility Report
SUBJECT: Tehran/Mehrabad Reaction Study

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

1. (TOP SECRET) The enclosed study provides an analysis of the probable Iranian reaction to a US attack on Tehran/Mehrabad Airfield. The following assumptions are made:

   - The attack occurs between 0001 and 0400 hours.
   - The attack occurs on a Friday.
   - Iranian communications remain intact.
   - Iranian electric power system is not disrupted.
   - The attacking force is not detected prior to D minus 15 minutes.
   - There are no disruptive environmental factors, such as rain, snow, high winds, dust storms, etc.

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) The enclosed overlay is keyed to the Tehran and Vicinity (Special) 1:50,000 map sheet and depicts the probable route(s) from installations in Tehran from which Iranians may send reinforcements to Mehrabad.

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) The detailed Tehran city study, with photos and overlays provided previously, supports this Tehran/Mehrabad Reaction Study.

2 incl

as

G

COL, USA
Chief, Middle East Branch
Western Division
Directorate for Research

WORKING PAPER
GROUND DEFENSE

- Revolutionary Guards - est 50 men
- Airbase Guard Force - est 50 men
- Air Defense Forces - est 125 men

These forces could be directed by the [REDACTED] or his designated representative [REDACTED]. While the Revolutionary Guards would technically come under his control, they are likely to respond in an independent, spontaneous manner to an attack on Mehrabad.

The expected actions taken by these forces against an attacking force are described below.

- Revolutionary Guards: The first armed force to react to an assault on Tehran/Mehrabad Airfield would be the Revolutionary Guards assigned to the facility. They would react almost instantly with vigor and spontaneous uncoordinated action. While we are uncertain of their number, we would expect the estimated fifty Revolutionary Guards to be armed with UZI sub-machine guns and G-3 semi-automatic rifles. Their force would likely be scattered in and around the airfield. Their reaction would likely be offensive in nature and serve to bring them in contact with the attacking force. If the first wave of Revolutionary Guards is beaten back decisively, any succeeding attacks are likely to be less determined.

It is pointed out that, while the Revolutionary Guards at Mehrabad are imbued with revolutionary zeal and dedication to the revolution, their experience lies mostly in conducting administrative and security checks at Mehrabad against unarmed civilians. They have little, if any, actual combat experience against an organized military force.

- Airport Guard: At the time of attack, their numbers would probably be approximately fifty. Airport guard individual responses, while at their posts, would probably be to report to the guard commander and remain at their posts for further orders. The response of the guard force commander to a significant US presence at the airfield would probably be to have his personnel assume defensive positions and wait for guidance from the airbase commander. The chief effect of airport guard actions would be to serve as a "tripwire" for alerting the military chain of command. Both in the short-term and long-term, military impact of these guards on US force activities would probably be negligible.
Air Defense Forces

Estimated 428 men, are deployed in cantines near their gun positions. These forces could be brought to bear rapidly against ground targets, providing the targets were illuminated. It probably has a small guard force (less than 25 men) deployed at night which would probably assume defensive positions around the facility and await further orders, rather than join in repelling an attack on Mehrabad. It is possible a contingency plan for reinforcing the strike force at Mehrabad includes however, their combat effectiveness as infantry is considered low. If such a plan does exist, arrival of these troops (estimated 50 - 100 men) at the Mehrabad main terminal area is estimated to take 45 - 60 minutes after the force is notified. These artillermen would be armed with G-1 and G-3 rifles, .50 caliber machineguns, 90 mm rocket launchers, M-79 grenade launchers, and 57 mm recoilless rifles. We do not believe that Iranian plans to defend Mehrabad include the use of pre-planned artillery fires from areas around the airport. Positioning of field artillery pieces would probably exceed 120 minutes, and adjusting fire would be nearly impossible.

Potential Reactions

US actions at Mehrabad not only would prompt Iranian military reaction but also would initiate immediate Iranian reporting to higher echelons requesting reinforcements. While there is some chance that delay in notification might result, because of confusion or lack of clear guidelines in an emergency, the increased awareness of potential US actions leads us to believe that, under all but extreme conditions, reporting by Iranian forces would be fairly effective. Within the capital district, we would expect potential reinforcements to arrive at Mehrabad using the existing city streets, converging on the airfield at the critical Shahyad Monument interchange. Also, its likely that all available reinforcements will not be focusing attention solely on the Mehrabad complex. Diversionary tactics could cause potential reinforcements to be dispersed elsewhere.
PRINCIPAL REINFORCEMENTS

The main elements capable of swiftly responding to a hostile threat at Mehrabad Airport are:

- The Gendarmerie are certain to have at least two companies on standby alert, and up to two more companies (200 men) capable of reinforcing the airport security forces. Their mode of transportation to the airfield would be by truck. Gendarmerie elements would be armed with G-3 semi-automatic rifles and between 5 and 10 50-calibre machine-guns or Specter Force personnel would be armed with G-3 rifles, 9mm machine-guns, RPG-7 and M-79 grenade launchers. These reinforcements after notification would have elements of two other understanding units respond within about 90 minutes of notification.

- Revolutionary Guards "Strike Forces" are reportedly garrisoned in approximately 500 men are likely to react to a raid on Mehrabad. Assuming 30 minutes to form up and load after notification and 45 minutes' travel time to the airport, lead elements of this force (100 men) would probably close on Mehrabad about 75 minutes after notification.

- Ground forces could play a role in reinforcement activities; however, locations of the division units east of Tehran would severely hampers their ability to mobilize. It appears likely that at least one unit from each company (500 men) would be maintained in the garrison. Their movement to the airport would take considerably longer.

Other military installations in Tehran:

- These units would possess anti-tank missiles (RPG-7) and rocket launchers, and larger calibre automatic weapons (.50 calibre machine guns).

- Military installations would contribute significant military force to repel any attack on Mehrabad. Also, personnel manning police stations and gendarmerie posts (3 - 5 men) are not expected to respond to an attack on Mehrabad; they will defend their own areas and await further orders. They would not be a military threat to any attacking force at Mehrabad.
REACTION OF THE POPULATION

Certainly the largest, and perhaps the most significant, external consideration of an attack against Mehrabad is the local civilian population and their reaction to the military activity there. Within 15 minutes after the first exchanges of fire, curious Iranians will arrive outside the airfield and will cluster around the Shahyad Monument, immediately east of the airport entrance. Within one hour, their number could likely swell to 50,000 people. They would not attack US forces unless provoked; however, inadvertent, careless, or deliberate shots fired into the crowd would provide martyrs and this aggressive action would turn the curious passive throng into a mob with aggressive intentions against the US force without regard to its personal safety. The outpouring of civilians into the streets near the airfield would make vehicular movement extremely difficult, especially in the area of the Shahyad Monument. The probable effect of the crowds around the airport would be to stow the response times given for those units arriving at the airport any later than 30 minutes after the initial exchange of fire and possibly to block any movement around the Shahyad Monument after one hour.

AIR DEFENSE - IIAF Aircraft
Therefore, in response to a mission requirement at Mehrabad, between 30 and 40 F-4 aircraft, configured for ground attack or a mix of air and ground munitions, could be available from Shahroki, Tabriz, and Vandaq. In addition, unless neutralized, about 10 additional F-4's could be available from Mehrabad, including laser designator aircraft. However, it is unlikely that all of the available aircraft from the western bases would be sent to Mehrabad and leave the Iraqi border essentially undefended. It is more likely that the aircraft at Tabriz and Vandaq would be left in place for the defense of the border with Shahroki and in response to Mehrabad. Bushehr aircraft would probably respond with about 10 F-4's configured for air intercept. If the air intercept aircraft were configured for ground munitions, they would already be in place at Tabriz and Vandaq because of their relatively high altitude, because the Mehrabad air base continued to need air intercept support.

Assuming that the Warning Communications System (WCS) is intact, it could arrive at Mehrabad Airbase within 5 minutes and 10 minutes. An additional 10 to 15 aircraft could respond between D + 1 and D + 4 hours. Loss of communication and/or delay in passing the alert through the WCS could significantly extend this response time. This response time assumes a flight speed of 600 mph and aircraft alert status of 5 minutes and 10 minutes. These aircraft, unless configured for a preplanned ground support mission, would probably be configured for an air intercept role with 2 AIM-9 and 4 AIM-7 missiles and possibly with external fuel tanks. These loads could probably be changed to ground munitions in about 1 1/2 hours for alert aircraft. (US crews estimate that it takes between 30 and 45 minutes.) Uploading cold non-alert aircraft would take considerably longer. They would also be required for target identification for TISE and can carry AGM-65A/Maverick, AGM-84 Harpoon, BLU-109, AGM-62R, GP bombs, BLU-113 air-dropped 500 lb bombs, and LAU-3/A launchers for air-to-ground missiles.

The decision to upload ground munitions has traditionally been very highly centralized in the IIAF. View of two previous air attacks and the recent counter attack on Sarhroki, it can be expected that the decision to upload ground munitions to respond to an attack at Mehrabad would be delayed until the situation were clarified. An additional problem involving delivery of ground ordnance in the Tehran area would be the lack of means to direct the attack against specific ground targets. Loss of ground-to-air communications would further exacerbate the direction of attack aircraft. The IIAF pilots would probably have no aversion to delivering ground ordnance against hostile elements at Mehrabad Airbase.

The F-14, while principly an air interceptor in the IIAF and not capable of delivery of ground munitions, would be employed at Mehrabad using 20 mm cannon. The presence of the F-14 makes this possibility unlikely, but it cannot be completely discounted. As many as four F-14's could probably respond to Mehrabad, with probably an additional six aircraft arriving within D + 4 hours.
The I-HAWK SAM system provides a good all weather ADA capability. The I-HAWK acquisition radar range extends to 100 km and the maximum engagement range of the system is approximately 40 km. The quality of the Iranian crewmen against high performance aircraft, especially in an ECM environment, is poor; but could be expected to be better against low slow flying aircraft. The I-HAWK system can be fired from a "cold start" by using power overrides, within 15 minutes from receipt of an alert.
The Rapier system, if augmented by the Blindfire radar, is an all weather, short range, point defense missile system. Each Rapier can fire up to 64 missiles loaded. The maximum engagement range is 10 km. If the Blindfire were present, it is about 30 km. The system cannot fire at targets within 200 yards of the launchers.

SA-7

While Iran has 1,500 SA-7 SAM's in the inventory, no data is available to indicate SA-7 deployment locations. However, these man-portable, infrared-seeking missiles are used in point defense of vital areas such as airfields. Their presence at Mehrabad Air Base cannot be completely discounted.

OERLIKON, twin 35 mm AAA Guns

This gun system is an all weather, short range, point defense weapon that can also be used against ground targets. The maximum AAA range with radar is 12 km (without radar) and the maximum horizontal range is 1.5 km. In 3-man crew, this system could be expected to engage hostile air or ground targets and could react with a non-alert status.

ZU-23-2 twin AAA guns

This gun is a short range, point defense AAA weapon that can also be used in direct fire roles against ground targets. The maximum AAA range is 2.5 km and the maximum horizontal range is 7 km. The gun is sighted optically and is operated by 5-man crew. The crew could be expected to engage hostile air or ground targets within 200 yards of the firing area if the crew were not on the gun.

Command and control of the Rapier and AAA assets at Mehrabad was probably exercised by the Airbase Operations Center.
Entering the Iranian aircraft in and out of Mehrabad (D) is meant to be impossible. The nature of the crowd is likely to change from passive observer to aggressive mob, as the operation progresses. The number of troops which could be brought to the airport could vary dramatically, depending on such uncertainties as crowd control, trafficability of the roads, weather, and effectiveness of the Iranian C system. As the confrontation were to continue beyond hours, a war way as soon as (24-36-48) could be admitted to Mehrabad to engage the
Subject: Recurring Intelligence Reports

Timeline: November 1979 - December 1980

Summary:

J2 developed several intelligence report formats to be used by DR [redacted] for the intelligence that was focused specifically on various events. These formats were developed over a period of time in cooperation with DR [redacted].

Classified By: DISA
Declassified On: [Redacted]
2. (U) J2 also received several reports from DIA and Department of State (DOS) in originators' formats:

   a. (U) DIA Iran Situation Report, Daily (Attachment 6):
      DIA provided this report to J3, OJCS. The report summarized significant military and political activities in Iran for the previous 24 hours.

   b. (U) DIA Soviet Activity in the Indian Ocean, Daily (Attachment 7):
      DIA provided this report to J3, OJCS. The report included:

   c. (S) DOS Iran Working Group SITREP, Daily (Attachment 9):
      DOS provided this report to DOD and other federal agencies. The report included significant political, economic, and military activities in Iran for the previous 24 hours.

3. (U) JTF/J2 began issuing a Daily Intel Summary (not content to this report, changed as the situation)
Subject: Iran Situation Report as of April 21, 1980

(U) Significant Events:

--(U) Early returns in the first round of Iran's national assembly election held on Friday indicate that the Islamic Republic Party is headed for control of the election. IRP candidates have apparently secured two-thirds or more so far on the first ballot. So far Bani-Sadr supporters have won only 5 seats. The Interior Ministry has announced that if the third round results are filled by the first ballot, the Majlis can begin its duties "immediately." Amid reports of election irregularities, President Bani-Sadr declared that the election results would be set aside if fraud and serious misconduct had occurred. Final results were released on Thursday, with a run-off election scheduled for the last week of April.

--(U) In Kurdistan, the Kurdish Democratic Party has called for a general strike, sit-ins, and demonstrations on the site of the Interior Ministry order closing polling stations in three Kurdish towns. A KDP representative reportedly won the election in Mahabad, although it is not yet clear whether the authorities will validate the Mahabad returns. In addition, the KDP has reportedly signed a pact with the Komala Party, the people's Sacrifice Guerrillas, and the followers of Sunni leader Sheik Hosseini for coordinating "military and political action" against the central government.

--(U) In an interview with Newsweek magazine, Iran's Budget and Planning Minister, Ezzatollah Shahabi claims to have visited recently with each of the American hostages being held at the US Embassy. Shahabi, a member of the Revolutionary Council, stated that the hostages are in good physical condition, but that many are "suffering from psychological pressures or depression." Some of the hostages--those considered "disruptive" to the militants, and individuals accused of espionage--are kept in solitary confinement Shahabi admitted.

(U) Significant Military Activity:

--(U) Tehran radio broadcast reports that a new commander of the Iranian Gendarmerie has been appointed. The report claims that Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, the Interior Ministry supervisor, appointed EG Qasem Ali Zahirnezad to head the Islamic Republic Gendarmerie.
(U) According to PARS, the office of Ayatollah Shariat-Madarı has denied a Reuters claim that the Ayatollah had left Iran for Pakistan. Reuters had reported that Shariat-Madarı was in Islamabad to attend an international Islamic conference. His office, however, maintained that the Ayatollah was at his residence in Qom.
IRAN WORKING GROUP

SITREP NO. 551

(2) Situation in Iran as of 0500 TST, January 9, 1981

(U) Major Demonstration in Mashad Supports Bani-Sadr

Islamic Revolution, the newspaper which supports President Bani-Sadr, reported on January 9 a major demonstration in his favor by thousands of people in the holy city of Mashad, following news of Iran's reportedly successful Gulf war offensive against Iraqi forces launched last Monday. The demonstration followed a speech at the city's army barracks by Supreme Court President Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshiti, which praised the offensive but did not mention Bani-Sadr by name. The paper said: "A soldier at the barracks who loudly sang 'May Bani-Sadr be blessed' was purportedly arrested. However, when the audience left the barracks, they reportedly took to the streets where they were joined by the citizenry.

(U) Shah Receives Support of Iranian Women in Overthrowing the Khomenei Government

In his first message to Iran since coming of age last October, the 20-year-old Shah Reza II has called for the assistance of Iranian women in overthrowing the Islamic government of Ayatollah Khomeini. In a message released on the anniversary of Iranian Women's Emancipation Day (January 7), the son of the deposed king contrasted "the chains of slavery imposed on women by national reactionaries" with the equality guaranteed by his father's constitution. The message urged the women of Iran to "shake off their yokes, unmask the diabolical plots (of the reactionaries) and set an example of resistance to the people.

(E) President-Elect Reagan Scorned by Tehran Radio

A January 8 Tehran radio commentary has strongly criticized what it has termed the tough policies of President-elect Reagan, saying that Mr. Reagan's "slogan of militarism" meant he was "doomed to meet the same ignominious fate" as Presidents Nixon and Carter. This would happen because U.S. imperialism, faced with growing liberation movements, was in the throes of decline, said the state-owned radio, which does not necessarily reflect government views. (Recent commentaries have focused upon Mr. Reagan's charge that the captors of the hostages were "barbarians".)

Reagan on the Hostage Negotiations: Meanwhile, the President-elect told reporters on January 8 that he was quite sure that he could carry out any accord that President Carter reached with Iran on the hostage crisis. However, he added that he did not want to "sign a blank check" by agreeing to honor a settlement before the terms were known. Reagan said: "I'm
I'm quite sure that any agreement would be one that, yes, I could carry out. On the other hand, I don't think anyone should be asked to sign a blank check. So, I can't give you an unequivocal 'yes.'
SECRET

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY (U)

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY PRESENTS THE VIEW OF A SUBORDINATE INTELLIGENCE
SECTION WHICH DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO ALL ACTIVITIES OF THE
ATOMIC BOMB AND SNOWBIRD OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURES WOULD THEN BE LOST
IN THE SELF-LAID BODILY EFFORTS. THE TWO CRITICAL MISSILE-RELATED
FAILURES WERE:

A. MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS

DELTA REPEATEDLY AND CONTINUALLY STATED THAT THE TWO
MOST ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION WERE
ALL OTHER REQUIREMENTS WERE SECONDARY TO THESE TWO. UNFORTUNATELY,
BOTH REQUIREMENTS WERE, AT BEST, ONLY PARTIALLY ANSWERED.

B. NUMEROUS OTHER INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
EXISTED TO SUPPORT ALL PHASES OF THE RESCUE OPTIONS. THESE WERE
FULFILLED MOST ADEQUATELY AND IN A TIMELY MANNER.

C. DELTA IS FULLY AWARE OF THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES OF
INCORPORATING THE DETAILED REQUIREMENTS OF A SURGICAL GROUND FORCE
INTO THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS OF A MASSIVE NATIONAL EFFORT.
DELTA EEF/OIR WERE FAR TOO NUMEROUS AND DETAILED TO EXPECT COMPLETE
ANSWERS TO ALL. THE ASSAULT ELEMENTS HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT
THESE QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED AND ANSWERED. THE PASSAGE OF TIME
GENERATED MORE AND MORE REQUIREMENTS FROM THE ASSAULT FORCE. AS
INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE CAME IN, IT GENERATED MORE REQUIREMENTS
FROM ALMOST EACH INDIVIDUAL ASSAILTER. AS DIFFERENT OPERATIONAL
ELEMENTS BECAME INVOLVED, REQUIREMENTS COMPOUNDED THEMSELVES AND WERE
BEING PASSED FROM DELTA TO 101ST CHANNELS DURING
SNOWBIRD. THE EFFORTS TO COPE WITH THIS FRAGMENTATION WERE
COMMENDABLE.
PERSONNEL DEVOTED TO INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DURING BOTH THE
PRISONER'S STATEMENT AND SNOWBIRD OPERATIONS. THE JOBS, SKILLS, REFLECTED BY THESE
PERSONNEL INCLUDED TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE, ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS, AND
SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE.

DELTA INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE AUGMENTED BY A
NUMBER OF ASSETS PLACED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF OR ATTACHED TO THE
ORGANIZATION. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND THE AMOUNT OF EFFORT VARIED
WITH THE IMMEDIACY OF PENDING OPERATIONS.

SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS:

A. COMMUNICATIONS: A VARIETY OF SECURE COMMUNICATIONS WAS
REQUIRED FOR BOTH INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC. DELTA
IMPLEMENTED KY-3 AND KY-70 SECURE TELEPHONES, SECURE TELETYPE, AND
SECURE SATCOM TO PASS TRAFFIC.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THESE LATTER ARRANGEMENTS WERE
TEMPORARY... DELTA HAD BEEN, AND STILL IS, SEEKING SUCH COMMUNICATIONS
ON A PERMANENT BASIS ALONG WITH A "GRAY" TELEPHONE. EQUALLY IMPORTANT
WAS THE FACT THAT DELTA DID NOT HAVE DIRECT INTERFACE WITH THE DCS
SYSTEM AND THEREFORE COULD NOT ALWAYS COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH OTHER
ELEMENTS OF THE JIF. COURIER RUNS WERE NOT WELL-ESTABLISHED AND THE
LACK OF SECURE FACSIMILE EQUIPMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTED TO UNIMPAIRED
RECEIPT OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

B. SECURITY:

DELTA BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED
THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

(A) (U) EARLY ASSIGNMENT AND UTILIZATION OF AN OPSEC AND
SECURITY CELL RESIDING WITHIN THE J3 OR J2.

(B) (U) FORMULATION OF AN OPSEC PLAN FOR EACH FACET OR PHASE OF
THE OPERATION, WHETHER THAT BE A TRAINING PHASE, A LOGISTICS PHASE,
OR THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION.

(Ç) (U) APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF THAT PUNISH-
MENT TO ALL COMPONENTS OF THE JIF WHEN SECURITY VIOLATIONS OCCURRED.

(D) (U) FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF STANDARD SECURITY
PRACTICES SUCH AS PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE ACTIONS, PUBLICATION
OF A CLASSIFICATION GUIDE, USE OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL FOR
SECURITY MONITORING ALONG WITH CI ASSETS, ETC.

(E) (U) APPROPRIATE EDUCATION FOR PERSONNEL AND ELEMENTS THAT
ARE NOT SECURITY CONSCIOUS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT
ACCLIMATIZED TO WORKING WITH ACTUAL CONTINGENCIES.

(F) (U) ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS (SNOWBIRD), DELTA WAS FACED WITH
PROVIDING ALL OPSEC COVER FOR FORT BRAGG BASED REHEARSALS ON
EXTREMELY SHORT NOTICE. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN AN OPERATIONAL NECESSITY,
BUT OPSEC COVER WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE WITH OUR LIMITED
CI ASSETS. OTHER PROBLEMS STEMMED FROM HAVING TO BRIEF APPROXIMATELY
FIFTY PILOTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN, DIVERTING
THE ATTENTION OF THE FORT BRAGG COMMUNITY AND LOCAL PRESS AWAY FROM
THE PRESENCE OF UH-60S, ETC., AROUND DELTA, SECURING
ALL ON EXTREMELY SHORT

UNDERSTOOD THAT CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WERE NO LONGER SPEAKING FOR
DELTA. THE INCIDENT IN BROWNSVILLE, TEXAS LED TO MANY CALLS AND
QUESTIONS TO DELTA ABOUT OUR PROPOSED ACTIVITIES AND BROUGHT ADDITIONAL
COMMENTS ON DELTA'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT SPECIAL OPERATIONS. WITH THE
PASSAGE OF TIME THESE PROBLEMS APPEARED TO DIMINISH. HOWEVER, THE
PERCEPTION OF THE ASSAULT ELEMENTS ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE
OPERATION AND SPECULATION HEARD FROM FRIENDS AND OTHER SOURCES ON
POST WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIVITIES IN NEVADA WERE NOT LIKELY TO HAVE
INCREASED THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE CHANCES FOR MISSION SUCCESS.
THE HOLLOWAY REPORT MAY HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF
OVER EMPHASIS ON OPSEC. THAT MAY BE A VERY VALID COMMENTARY ON THE
NATIONAL LEVEL ACTIVITIES AND ATTENDANT INTERFACE. IT WAS NOT OVER
EMPHASIZED AT DELTA. THE OPSEC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELTA AND
PAMPERER'S WAS IN OUR OPINION, EXCELLENT. THE SAME WAS NOT TRUE
WITH RESPECT TO OTHER ARMY UNITS.
5. (U) REQUIREMENTS AND PRODUCTION:
A. (U) INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE ADDRESSED TO THE JTF
FORMALLY THROUGH MESSAGE TRAFFIC OR WRITTEN DOCUMENTS AND INFORMALLY
THROUGH MEETINGS AND TELEPHONE CALLS (SECURE). DELTA EE/OM LISTS
WERE PERIODICALLY REVIEWED FOR FulfillMENT.
B. (U) DELTA HAD NO REQUIREMENT TO PRODUCE ANY FORMAL DOCUMENTS
BUT INSTEAD CONCENTRATED ITS PRODUCTION ON THE USE OF ESTIMATES
AND BRIEFINGS TO THE TROOP ELEMENTS, AND OTHER INVOLVED IN SUPPORT
OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN.
C. (U) IT WAS LEARNED THAT DELTA HAD TO BE REPRESENTED AT MOST
BRIEFINGS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS CONFERENCES TO ENSURE THAT THEIR
NEEDS WERE BOTH UNDERSTOOD AND MET. IT WAS ALSO CRITICAL THAT DELTA
PRODUCE ITS OWN ESTIMATE OF THE INTELLIGENCE SITUATION BECAUSE OF
THE UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS AND IDIOSYNCRACIES OF THE UNIT. ALTHOUGH
THE JTF J2 DID EXTREMELY WELL AT PREPARING ESTIMATES, DELTA
PERSONNEL WERE ABLE TO ADD TO THESE ESTIMATES AND TO FORMULATE
ALTERNATE POSITIONS WHICH BETTER MET THE NEEDS OF THE DELTA FORCE.
6. (U) INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE: NORMAL UNIT SOP WAS FOLLOWED.
7. (U) EXTERNAL/LATERAL INTERFACE:
A. (U) EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE WAS KEPT TO A MINIMUM
BY DELTA DURING THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. THIS UNDOUBTEDLY
HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON DELTA'S PROGRESS IN ITS NORMAL MISSION,
BUT IT WAS UNDERTAKEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC AND THE UNIT WILL RECOVER
FROM THIS PROTRACTED DECREASE IN INTELLIGENCE LIAISON AND COORDINA-
TION. DELTA RECEIVED AdVERSE FEEDBACK FROM SEVERAL AGENCIES WHO
WERE CONFUSED BY PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE JTF THAT IMPLIED THAT THEY
WERE REPRESENTING THIS UNIT OR IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE ACTING ON DELTA'S
REPRESENTATION. THESE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN RECTIFIED WITH MORE COORDINA-
TION AND PLANNING AMONG ALL CONCERNED UNITS.
B. (U) LATERAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE WAS MINIMAL DURING RICE
BOWL DUE TO THE LACK OF SMALL SIZE OF DEDICATED INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS
AMONG THE OTHER UNITS SUBORDINATE TO THE JTF. SUCH INTERFACE DID
OCCUR DURING RICE BOWL ALTHOUGH ON AN INFREQUENT BASIS. DURING
SNOWBIRD, INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT Assigned TO SUBORDINATE UNITS
INCURRED AND THERE WAS A CONSEQUENT RISE IN THE AMOUNT
COORDINATION BETWEEN DELTA AND THESE UNITS. HOWEVER, THIS COORDINATION
WAS STILL OF A Rather SPORADIC NATURE AND COULD HAVE BEEN MADE BETTER
THROUGH PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCES CONVOKED BY THE JTF.
8. (U) STAFF INTERFACE:
A. (U) DURING RICE BOWL, THE INTERFACE BETWEEN DELTA AND J2
ELEMENT WAS MUCH BETTER THAN DURING SNOWBIRD. DELTA STATIONED A FULL-
TIME INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE WASHINGTON, DC AREA DURING
THE FIRST TWO MONTHS OF RICE BOWL AND THERE WAS A DELTA REPRESENTATIVE
ALMOST IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE JTF AFTER THAT WHO ALSO LOOKED
AFTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
B. (U) DURING SNOWBIRD, MUCH LESS CONTACT AND INTERFACE OCCUR-
RED BETWEEN THE DELTA INTELLIGENCE SECTION AND THE J2 ELEMENT.
DURING CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SNOWBIRD, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RETRAINEDLY CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF DELTA. REPORTS FROM JFK CENTER FILLED THE RUMOR MILL CONCERNING "DELTA" RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE. THE ASSIGNMENT OF FORMER DELTA PERSONNEL TO THE
This may have been due to the comparative lack of urgency associated with diminished chances of attempting another rescue. There was less
FREE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC, BUT IT IS DELTA'S OPINION THAT THERE WAS A GREATER NEED FOR A FREER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND TO KEEP DELTA APPRISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

ALSO NOTED THAT THE MOST CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE NEVER SATISFACTORILY ANSWERED.

B. THAT THE BUREAUS DISCIPLINES FUNCTIONED EXCELLENTLY AND FILLED ALMOST ALL REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON THEM. THEY ARE THE PRINCIPAL VEHICLE PROVIDING INFORMATION AND A RESCUE OPERATION.

C. ALSO NOTED THAT THE INTELLIGENCE SECTIONS OR ONE THAT WORKED ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS HAD A LOT OF INFORMATION AT THEIR DISPOSAL. BUT THAT A DEDICATED SECURITY AND PROTECTION MUST BE INTEGRAL TO THE JOINT STAFF PLANNING, WITHOUT WHICH, THE RESULTS OF FREQUENT COORDINATION MIGHT HAVE BEEN MISSED BETWEEN ALL CONCERNED INTELLIGENCE SECTIONS. THIS MUST OCCUR ON A DAILY BASIS, THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY MATTERS OF THE JOINT STAFF." This intelligence section holds the utmost respect for the J2 and his efforts. He assumes a task which would have AS OVERWHELMED MANY LESSER MEN. THE ACCOMPLISHMENT WAS A GREAT DEAL WITH LIMITED RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL. DELTA ONLY SAW A SMALL PART OF THE BIG PICTURE. MANY OF THE ABOVE POINTS MAY SEEM TOTALLY UNFOUNDED DUE TO OUR LIMITED PERSPECTIVE. THEY ARE NOT MEANT TO BE CRITICAL OF ANY PERSON OR ACTIVITY, RATHER TO EXPRESS OUR OPINIONS CANDIDLY.

REVW 15 JAN 01.
WARNING INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

USSR:
A MILITARY OPTION(U)

5 FEBRUARY 1980

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TOP SECRET
Warning Intelligence Appraisal

USSR: A MILITARY OPTION (U)

PREPARED BY

This is a Department of Defense Publication Produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency

TOP SECRET
USSR: A MILITARY OPTION (U)

Summary
Recent Soviet military activity in that area are in the early stages of preparation to take action in Iran. DIA believes these activities reflect intent to be prepared to intervene militarily in Iran, should the Soviet leadership elect that course of action.

Discussion of military Activity
Mobilizations and deployments to initial staging or defensive locations occur regularly throughout the year for purposes of realistic training and operations readiness. However, Soviet activities
must be viewed in the context of the Iranian situation. If viewed separately, the factors discussed are not conclusive. 

We conclude these events represent an "exercise" only in the sense of conducting such exercises with masking — to allow undetected transition to an improved level of readiness for military operations.

Therefore, we believe readiness for threat of war or for intervention could be reached in well under thirty days.

**Outlook**

Assuming continued preparations, DIA believes Soviet forces will reach readiness for threat of war within the next few weeks, but will need to take other detectable measures before reaching full readiness. DIA will keep the close attention necessary to assure tracking for Soviet activities opposite Iran.

Recent Afghanistan experience suggests that the US intelligence community
WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: Iranian Air/Air Defense Summary

Airfields and radar sites are commonly protected by a variety of these air defense weapons. These air defense weapons are primarily deployed along the Iraq-Iran border and the Persian Gulf. Similarly, the air force is arrayed to protect against a threat from Iraq or the Persian Gulf.

2. **Air Force:**

   a. The current air force inventory includes 190 F-4, 135 F-5 and 77 F-14 fighter aircraft.

   Generally speaking, aircraft can deploy from normal base areas to any other base in the country, including civilian airfields and dispersal bases.

   b. **F-4 Capability:** The Iranian F-4s are the most versatile aircraft in the Iranian air force. Pilots are well trained and competent; however, training has been very limited since the revolution. This has undoubtedly degraded pilot proficiency.

   Heat seeker Sidewinder AAM as well as electro-optical and laser guided bombs are available. Ability to employ the electro-optical and laser guided bombs is estimated to be very limited. The F-4 can be aurally refueled. (OR rate for the F-4 is estimated at 40 percent.)

   **Weapons:** Laser Guided Bombs (10 F-4Ds)

   KMU-351 B/B (MK-84, 909 kg)
   KMU-388A/B (MK-82, 227 kg)
Anti-Personnel Bomb - BLU-1B

Rockets

LAU-3/A Launcher
69-mm Rocket

20-mm Cannon (M-61A1)

Air-to-Air Missiles

4 Aim-7E Sparrow
4 A-m 9E Sidewinder

The F-5 cannot be aerially refueled.

Weapon Systems:

General Purpose Bombs

M-117
MK-81-84

Anti-Personnel Bomb BLU-1B

Rockets

LAU-3/A
69-mm
127-mm Zuni

20-mm Cannon

Air-to-Air Missiles

2 Aim-9E Sidewinder

d. F-14 Capability: The cutoff of spare parts from the US and the collapse of the Iranian logistic system has led to cannibalizing F-14s and support equipment to keep some of Iran's 77 F-14s flying. However, DIA estimates that some of the electronic systems are not functioning. DIA estimates 5-10 percent of the F-14 fleet is operationally ready.
(U)

Another factor limiting the use of Iran's F-14s is that only a few Iranians have received extensive training on the plane. When the Shah was overthrown, less than 100 pilots and instructor-pilots had been trained to fly the F-14. Of these, reportedly some 20 instructor-pilots had completed intercept training, and only three had finished the complete air defense/air superiority course and were operationally qualified. Only some 15 other instructors had completed the initial training as weapon systems officers, and none of these had advanced beyond the first phase, which covered only simple intercepts, i.e., firing one missile at a time against a single target.

We estimate that the already limited skills of pilots and weapons officers have atrophied.

The Iranian Air Force may have a limited capability to engage opposing aircraft with Phoenix missiles. We estimate some Phoenix missiles are operational. Iranians conducted only two live firings of Phoenix missiles before the revolution -- both during 1977 in the US. On the other hand, US military experts estimate that as many as 200 could be operational.

The F-14, however, contains electrical circuits permitting the flight crew to check the missile from the cockpit. Presumably Iranian crews could determine if they had a malfunctioning missiles before they entered combat.

Weapons Systems:
6 Aim 54A Phoenix
20-mm Cannon

(TOP SECRET)
Air Defense - General:

a. The primary air defense system in Iran is the HAWK. Other SAM systems known to be in the Iranian inventory are the British Rapier and the US Tigercat (land-version of the Seacat).

b. Other ADA systems are primarily the 23-mm Soviet built ADA gun and the 35-mm Oerlikon ADA gun. Capability to operate these systems is probably fair, but given command and control problems, they are probably not much of a threat.

c. Air Defense Radar Network - Many of the radars in the Air Defense Radar Network probably are partially or completely inoperative. The Iranians probably have comprehensive coverage at all altitudes of the Soviet border area, but the mountains mask some radars at low altitudes; levels at which aircraft are difficult to fly in mountainous terrain. Temperature inversions over the Gulf and coastal areas (called ducting) cause multiple targets or false targets to appear on radar screens. This problem is severe (a 95 percent probability of occurrence) below 2,000 feet and serious (a 60 percent probability of occurrence) above 2,000 feet. These conditions will worsen over the next month as temperature inversions increase.

5. HAWK SAM System:

a. The improved HAWK is a dual thrust, single chamber, solid-propellant, surface-to-air missile capable of delivering high explosive, blast fragmentation warhead to a maximum intercept range of about
routine adjustments and calibration. Since mid-February 1979, the required maintenance probably has not been performed and spare parts are probably in short supply.

Rapier SAM System:

Rapier is a fair-weather, mobile, surface-to-air missile system designed for point defense of airfields and battlefields against high-speed low-flying tactical aircraft.

b. [S/NOFORM] A Blindfire radar guidance system for poor weather operation has been developed and is offered as an optional add-on unit to the Rapier system.

c. [S/NOFORM] There are currently 250 Rapier missiles and 52 missile launchers in Iran. The Rapier is designed for point defense of airfields. It has a maximum intercept range and a maximum intercept altitude. The maximum acquisition range for the Blindfire radar is . It has a visual target system which is radar assisted.

Tigercat SAM System:

a. [S/NOFORM] Tigercat is a missile designed for close-range defense of small tactical targets, such as airfields, against low-level airborne attacks. The missile also has a limited capability against surface targets. Tigercat is principally a surface-to-air missile with an integral, two-stage rocket motor. It delivers a 18.1 kg HE warhead to a maximum slant range of and a maximum intercept altitude.

b. [S/NOFORM] The Tigercat missile is identical to Seacat. It has a cylindrical body flared to a square cross section at the wing roots. The forward half of the missile body is built up from sections of light alloy castings. The welded high-tensile-strength steel of the integral two-stage, solid propellant rocket motor forms the structure of the aft part of the missile body.
9. Anti Aircraft Guns

The Iranian SAM system based principally on I-Hawk, but also including Rapier, Tigercat and SA-7, is supplemented by Swiss Oerlikon 35-mm radar- or visually-controlled ADA guns, as well as ZU-23-2 and ZSU-23-4. Soviet-supplied ADA guns. These ADA guns are normally deployed around IIAF bases, I-HAWK and radar sites, and key government installations.

a. (U) The Swiss twin 35-mm antiaircraft gun, 1 ZLA/353 (Oerlikon-Contraves), is a gas-operated, automatic weapon with a cyclic rate of fire of 550 rounds per minute per gun -- a total cyclic rate of 1,100 rounds per minute for the weapon. Each gun has a hopper which accommodates 56 rounds. A "ready-round" container with 63 rounds is positioned behind each hopper. The total of 238 is assembled in 34 clips of 7 rounds each. The HE projectile has a self-destruction fuze which operates after the round is in flight from 8 to 10 seconds.

(1) (U) Electronic fire control with a Super-fledermaus radar is provided for fully automatic elevation and traverse. Furthermore, the weapon can be either power operated or manually controlled by one man, independent of the fire control system.

(2) (U) By means of an electro-hydraulic mechanism, a feature of this weapon, it is possible to go from the traveling position to the firing position in approximately 3 minutes, or from firing position to the traveling position in approximately 4 minutes.
b. (U) The Soviet twin AA gun ZU-23, first shown in 1964, is a dual-purpose weapon suitable for employment in both an AA role (as its "ZU" designation implies) and in an equally formidable direct-fire ground role against personnel and light armor. It is mounted on a towed light two-wheel chassis with disc-type wheels which tilt outward at the top when the weapon is emplaced, thus providing freedom of movement around the gun as well as removing the weight of the gun from the wheels when firing. AA fire-control is by means of an optical-mechanical computing sight. 

(1) Characteristics and Performance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calibre</td>
<td>34-mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum range (horizontal)</td>
<td>7,000m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical AA range</td>
<td>2,500m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectile weights (HEI-T)</td>
<td>188 grams</td>
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<tr>
<td>(API-T)</td>
<td>190 grams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuze type</td>
<td>Point detonating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor penetration (est)</td>
<td>24mm @ 500m/19mm @ 1,000m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 degrees obliquity (API-T)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air transportable</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire control (AA)</td>
<td>Optical-mechanical computing sight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-carriage</td>
<td>Telescope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-carriage</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire control (ground)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Soviet self-propelled antiaircraft weapon system, ZSU-23-4, was first observed in the 7 November 1965 Moscow Parade. Since that time the weapon has undergone several modifications. Mounted on a full-tracked chassis, the weapon system consists of quad-mounted 23-mm automatic guns with a radar as part of the on-carriage fire control. The weapons are similar to those of the towed ZU-23, with modified (liquid cooled) barrels and different flash hiders. The entire turret is enclosed except for a cutaway portion on the forward end of the turret for gun elevation. The chassis is basically a modified ASU-85 using a flat track torsion bar suspension system, with six single road wheels on each side. The vehicle is not amphibious.
Characteristics and Performance:

**Vehicle (modified ASU-85 chassis):**
- **Length overall (w/gun):** 6.5 m
- **Weight:** 20.5 mt
- **Height overall (radar up):** 3.75 m
- **Speed:** 50 km/hr
- **Cruising range:** 450 km
- **Maximum gradeability:** 30 degrees
- **Fording depth:** 1 m
- **Armor thickness - (current)**
  - **(hull):** 8.3 mm
  - **(current):** 9.2 mm
- **Engine:** 6 Cyl - 260 hp - diesel

**Armament (quad 23-mm gun):**
- **Elevation/traverse:** -8 degrees to +87/360 degrees
- **Rate of fire (cyclic):** 800 to 1,000 rds/min/barrel
- **Muzzle velocity:** 930 m/s
- **Maximum range (horizontal):** 7,000 m
- **Designed max self-destroying range:** 3,500 m
- **Tactical AA range:** 3,000/500 m
- **Weight of projectile:** 188 grams/190 grams
  - **Fuze type:** Point detonating
- **Armor penetration degrees obliquity (API-T):** 24 mm @ 500 m/19 @ 1,000 m
- **Onboard ammo load:** 2,000 rds

**Fire control radar (GUN DISH):**
- **Range (acquisition/tracking):** 12-15 km 10-13 km
- **Accuracy (range/angle):** 10 meters/4-6 mils
- **Resolution:** 75 meters

**Optics:**
- **System tracking rate (horizontal/vertical):** 70 degrees per sec/60 degrees per se
- **System target speed capability:** 450 m/s
- **Land navigation system:** Yes
- **Air transportable:** Yes
- **Crew:** 4
The ZSU-57-2 is a twin 57-mm self-propelled AA gun. It served in 1957. A comparatively lightly armored open-topped turret with dual 57-mm S-58 guns is mounted on a modified T-54 chassis. The weapon is estimated to have mobility comparable to that of a medium tank. The twin guns have an automatic computing sight with manual inputs and manual and electro-hydraulic tracking systems. East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Vietnam, Egypt, Iran, Finland, Iraq, and Syria have the ZSU-57-2.

The computing sight mechanism is capable of establishing the proper lead for targets within the limits of 0 to 5,500 meters range, 0 to 90 degrees dive to 70 degrees climb angle, and with speeds of 0 to 680 knots (780 mp). The sight is designed to include target course angles of up to 360 degrees. Initial range information is obtained by use of an off-carriage hand-held 1-meter base stereoscopic rangefinder, or by estimation.

(1) (SUNOFROM) Characteristics and Performance:

Vehicle (modified T-54 Chassis):
- Length overall (w/gun): 8.5 m
- Weight: 28 mt
- Height: 2.75 m
- Speed: 50 km/hr
- Cruising range: 420 km (main tanks)
- Maximum grade ability: 30 degrees
- Fording depth: 1.4 m
- Engine: 12 cylinder, 512 hp, diesel

Armament:
- Gun: Dual (57-mm gun (Model S-68))
- Elevation: -5 degrees to + 85 degrees
- Traverse: 360 degrees
- Rate of fire (cyclic): 105-120 rd/min/barrel
- Muzzle velocity (AP-T)(HE-T): 1,000 m/s
- Maximum range (horizontal): 12,000 m
- Designed maximum self-destruction range: 7,400 m
- Tactical AA range: 4,000 m
- Weight of projectile (HE-T) (AP-T): 2.8 kg.
- Fuze type: Point detonating; proximity possibly available
Armor penetration: 0
degree obliquity (AP-T) 102 mm @ 500 m/96 mm @ 1,000 m
Onboard ammunition load: 316 rds
Air transportable: Yes
Fire control (AA):
Off-carriage: Hand-held rangefinder
On-carriage: Optical-mechanical computing sight
Tracking rate (horizontal): 0.2 to 30 degrees per second
Tracking rate (vertical): 0.3 to 20 degrees per second
Fire control (ground):
Crew: 6

10. (U) Air defense systems: FLA, GCI, and Air Defense Radar System. This enclosure is a synopsis of land-based radar activity and location in Iran.
Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Airfield Data

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (U) Airfield and Seadrome Stations of the World (AASSOTW) data was the basic source for Iranian airfield studies.

2. (U) An index of selected countries in the Middle East containing basic data for immediate reference.

3. (U) J2 requested complete AASSOTW data on specific airfields as required in the form of DIA Installation Support Packages.

4. (U) Additional photographs and special project analysis was requested as required.

COMMENTS:

1. (U) DIA could provide AASSOTW data folders in a relatively short time (within one day) if necessary.

2. (U) [Search by coordinate of AASSOTW identified airfields not depicted on maps.

RECOMMENDATION:

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED:

[Redacted]
SENNAN NEW AIRFIELD

BE Number: 0420008905

Geog coords: 35.24.00 N, 053.10.37 E

Graphic reference: 3MDE-82300-6439-4

Location and landmarks: 12 miles SE of Semnan, 112 miles east of Tehran, 196 miles SE of Esfahan

Runway length: 11,500 ft
Runway width: 100 ft
Runway surface: concrete
VAYQAN AIRFIELD

BE Number: 0340008818

Geog coords: 38 04 20N 045 40 30E
Graphic references: ONC G-4, JOG NJ 38-07

Location and landmarks: 4 miles S of Vayqan village, 7 miles E of Lake Rezaiyeh, 29 miles W of Tabriz, 43 miles NE of Rezaiyeh

Runway length: 3,100'
Runway width: 150'
Runway surface: graded earth
TIMEFRAME: November 21, 1989

SUMMARY:

J2 targeted the DB5A to satisfy intelligence requirements. Justification was supplied to subsequent changes due to national priority.

2. J2 did not supply justification for subsequent changes in targeting or exploitation.

The J2 problem set for DB5A was not created for management of collection initially. The controller set priorities with the ability to have targets (push) for special reasons.

CIA personnel are not allowed to add targets or change priorities of the J2 problem set without J2 approval.

COMMENTS:

J2 maintained constant liaison with the

abreast of developments.

One J2 person was primarily responsible for monitoring and managing collection.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That DIA be tasked to identify an individual to manage collection and targeting for special operations.
SUBJ: STANDBY DECOMPARTMENTATION AUTHORITY (U)

CURRENT SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST AREA PRESENTS POSSIBILITY THAT WILL BE REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF ANY U.S. MILITARY ACTION IN THAT REGION.

IN VIEW OF THE AFOREMENTIONED, DIRECTOR DIA HAS EXERCISED THIS PREROGATIVE AND ADDITIONALLY, SUB-DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO THE
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S
Both the government and the "students" have stated they plan to put the remaining hostages on trial for espionage. Although the label "students" is used in the media and in this report when referring to the individual captors, the label is not correct. The "student captors" force consists of a group of senior medical, engineering, and religious students belonging to a mohamedin faction within the mslf. Several leftist students have been arrested as members of the student force. A party may be forming in certain of these groups.

The compound is surrounded by a great deal of mixed business and residential buildings. The compound is in the midst of population centers. The road access from the north and south is relatively easy. The road access is also from the north and the surrounding buildings are in close proximity to the compound. The weather at this time of year is comparable to NW United States/ Denver Colorado with clear crisp days, occasional mist/rain in the city and snow in the nearby mountains. Winter temperatures ordinarily range between 20 and 40 degrees Fahrenheit at night raising to the mid fifties during the day.

- Students as before
- External reaction forces. Reinforcements for the student guards and Pasdaran are available from several locations and organizations. Principal forces and their estimated reaction times once they have received notification or heard a major disturbance in the vicinity of the compound are shown below.

--- Within 5-7 minutes fire from the chancery and weapons positioned in surrounding buildings.

--- Within 10-15 minutes reinforcements from student HQs and Pasdaran Komiteh strength 75-100 from nearby Komiteh stations.

--- Within 15-20 minutes 100-300 Pasdaran and the beginnings of local crowds.
-- WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES PASDARAN REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.

-- WITHIN 30-40 MINUTES PASDARAN BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

-- WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.

-- WITHIN 60 MINUTES, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT [REDACTED] COULD REACT AND ATTEMPT A LAUNCH AGAINST ANY ORBITING AIRCRAFT.

-- WITHIN ONE HOUR IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HELICOPTERS FROM OR FIGHTERS FROM [REDACTED] COULD LAUNCH AND ATTEMPT TO INTERDICT THE FORCE.
(Eyes Only)

(BJ Johnson)

Handle Via

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

ABU Tuttle

[Redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 94
DERIVATIVE CL BY multiple sources
☐ DECL ☐ DECLASSIFIED TO
REVIEW ON 0 Apr 2
DECEIVED FROM

Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Johnson, J-5

FROM: Michael Berta

SUBJECT: Damage Assessment

Attached is a final of the Iranian Damage Assessment. Please provide your clearance to me by COB TODAY, 19 May. (TS)

Attachment

(CODEWORD ATTACHMENT)
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I. This assessment addresses four areas of potential compromise and damage to U.S. operational and intelligence capabilities:
   -- Operational Plans
   -- Photographic Systems
   -- Cryptological Systems
   -- Clandestine Assets and Methods

II. Operational Plans

Summary: According to a Joint Staff assessment, the Iranians obtained a set of documents containing call signs, staging areas, in-country land and air routes, briefing codes, and satellite photography, from which they could reconstruct the major elements of the in-country rescue plan. To determine the potential for compromise, a copy of documents and photography containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian hands was provided to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of the operation. With access to limited press reporting, they were able to piece together the general in-country operational concept and the following specific factors:
   -- Identification of [redacted] as a refueling point
   -- Identification and coordinates of warehouse (staging area)
   -- Location of main Joint Task Force
   -- Identification of [redacted] as alternate JTF, HQ
   -- Tactical Air Support was provided for
   -- Identification of SFOD-DELTA and Ranger Forces
   -- DELTA reception party—tied to the hideout area and warehouse

Portions of the plan that probably cannot be determined from the lost documents are:
   -- The role of the C-141 aircraft, where they are located, or if they had an in-country role.
IV. Cryptological Systems

Summary: One of the helicopters left on the ground intact contained a tactical secure voice encryption equipment along with some other U.S. cryptosystems. They were all destroyed along with the helicopter.
V. Clandestine Assets and Methods

Summary: Based on the documents left behind in the helicopters and the reports appearing in the news media, the concepts and mechanisms designed to support the operation are in the public domain. Disclosures of the fact that The collection capability previously used in Iran has had to be restructured, and certain of the formerly successful methods and assets have been discontinued. Thus far, however, no specific officers, agents, or other support personnel or equipment have been compromised by name or precise location.

Conclusion: None of the primary assets or personnel could be used again. In addition, significant restructuring of support mechanisms and new personnel with markedly different backgrounds and profiles would be required for any future operation. Mechanisms will probably be less inclined in general to cooperate in U.S. intelligence operations in Iran.
SUBJECT: Damage Assessment - Operation RICE BOWL

1. Purpose. To conduct a detailed analysis of the equipments and information that were available at Desert Track One after U. S. forces departed and make a damage assessment.

2. Background.

   a. Items of all classified documents/equipment were available in the undamaged helicopters (numbers 7 and 8), except the classified communications equipment, PARKHILL, the unclassified backpack UHF satellite ground terminal (PSC-1) and the AN/WSC-3, UHF satellite terminal, that were located only in helicopter Number One. This helicopter was destroyed by Iranian aircraft. Classified documents, equipment and sensitive information left at Desert Track One are depicted in TAB A.

   b. Documents contained navigational data, call signs, frequencies, units, landing zones, satellite photography, annotated maps and listed foreign countries and facilities in foreign countries.

3. Discussion. The following is a damage assessment of those classified and sensitive documents/equipments that are, or could be, in the possession of the Iranian government:

   a. Operational Security. The compromise of these documents has a major impact on our ability to conduct another similar rescue mission.

      Analysis of captured documents readily reveals staging bases, navigation routes, hide out sites, primary and secondary landing zones, approximate time of departure from helicopter security area, route to warehouse, that a rescue attempt was to be made at the Embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and primary and secondary exfiltration airfields.

      These were identified by country and assigned code words on the knee board cards. Other specific locations identified were:

      Furthermore, was identified as the primary site for the JTF and as the alternate JTF site.

      Classified By: JCS
      Declassified ON: QADR
Virtually all of the major elements of the plan after Desert Track One could be deduced from the documents. TAB B lists the information that the Iranians can be expected to know. The significant information that they probably do not know about the mission after Desert Track Number One is as follows:

- The Assault Plan or its details/techniques.
- The role played, if any, by...
- The mission or location of the C-141 aircraft, specifically if they were to have an in-country role.
- The route to be flown or destination of aircraft upon departing exfiltration base.
- The details of Escape and Evasion Plan, although some facilities and units are identified.
- The size, composition or identity of the reception committee or other support elements in-country (infiltrated/indigenous).
- The arrangements, methods or cover used to secure ground transportation and the warehouse.

b. Communications Security.
c. Satellite Photography. Minimal security damage is assessed from the compromise. The Iranians do not have the technical capability to make an accurate assessment of the photography. Such confirmation would be useful to the Soviets, but would not provide them a new or significant advantage.

d. Potential International Political Ramifications. Specific locations in some countries were compromised and their role in the operation identified. was identified as the primary CITF site and the alternate JTF. were identified but their purpose not directly revealed. However, analysts unfamiliar with the operation have concluded from available compromised documents and press coverage that was used for refueling.

- Other countries, without specific locations, that were identified as being possibly associated with the rescue operation were: No positive conclusion can be reached from the compromised documents, what purpose, if any, these countries or facilities in these countries, were to serve.

The Iranians have reported that they found money at Desert Track One, which could implicate the. This money undoubtedly resulted from participants being permitted five hours liberty at

- The primary political impact will be determined by how the Iranians choose to reveal and exploit this information. It will be necessary to determine what actions if any, should be taken to notify these countries to defuse any action the Iranian government may take.
Unit
C-130

Classified or Sensitive Equipment/Data

Unknown. Inventory is being taken, but because this aircraft was totally destroyed, no analysis of documents/equipment is necessary.

Helicopters
Secure Voice Communication Equipment

* - PARKHILL (Helo #1 only)
   - NESTOR

Other Commo Equipment

* - AN/WSC-3 UHF Satellite (Helo #1 only)
    - PT-25 UHF - Unsecure radio
* - PSC-1 UHF - Backpack Satellite radio (Helo #1 only)
    - Motorola 350 - Hand-held radio
    - PRC-90 - Survival-radio

"BLUE BINDER"

- EMERG LZs Location
- Tehran maps

TACAIR Information Sheet (Call Signs/Frequencies, CAP reference pts; TACAIR ACFT, including C-130's, nav pts; i.e. Helo Hide, Warehouse, Manzariyeh)

Brevity Codes (Codewords for JASK, FA, etc.)
C-141's, EC-130 (ABCCC) etc.

Code Words for 24 April

Flight Route Maps

CVW-8 Card of the Day

DELTA FORCE

Complete inventory is being taken. Preliminary inventory indicates that some night visual devices, made weapons, and communications equipment were lost/destroyed in EC-130 fire.

*Assigned SFOD-DELTA

SECRET
WHAT IRANIANS KNOW (CAN LEARN) FROM DOCUMENTS/EQUIPMENT IN THEIR POSSESSION*

Majority of the Aspects of Operations in Iran

All geographic locations -- hiding point, ground route into and in Tehran, warehouse, staging area, objectives (Embassy & MFA), primary and alternative LZ's, extraction bases (primary and alternate).

Duration of the Operation was over several days.

A reception committee was provided to escort assault team. Size of reception committee probably would not be known.

Approximate time of the assault -- After last guard watch ending at 2100Z -- helos would support extraction - at Delta's call.

Rangers were planned for use at the refueling point and the extraction airfield -- navigational aids were provided for at these points.

Communications would be secure and satellite communications would be utilized.

TACAIR was to be provided by various types of aircraft -- Fire support net singled out Specter (AC-130) -- Coordinates of key geographic locations were reported on the TACAIR -- Info Sheets indicating US willingness to use force in rescue effort.

E&E was a feature of the operation, with the port of JASK possibly involved -- desert safe haven identified, but location was not revealed.

Specific locations in other countries were identified --

Specific countries, without locations, were identified, These countries were named on the TACAIR information, Brevity codes and code words for 24 April knee pad cards.

Participants (SFOG-Delta, Rangers, CCT), aircraft types/roles/missions, movements, routes.

Location of potential Iranian air elements that could react were identified.

That the U. S. had the most confidence in the assault portion of the operation.

*Supplemented by initial press reports.
WHAT THE IRANIANS PROBABLY DO NOT KNOW

- The Assault Plan or its details/techniques.

- The role played, if any, by

- The mission or location of the C-141 aircraft, specifically if they were to have an in-country role.

- The route to be flown or destination of aircraft upon departing exfiltration base.

- The details of Escape and Evasion Plan, although some facilities and units are identified.

---

31A04
MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Hamilton

Return

(U) Attached will be sent back to Bill Odom
to complete his report 'if you see

moabication'.

V.R.

Phil Shumaker

HAND CARRY

Concealed

Call 78863 for pickup

Classified By:
Declassified ON:

JCS
OADR

CLASSIFIED
CONMITTED
DERIVATIVE COPY
DECL

REVIEW ON
DERIVED FROM
MEMO TO:

Ken Jones

(U) Bill Adams's drafting on left side ... our attempt to amend for accuracy and balance are reflected on right side in memo to Bill.

Do you wish to add or delete anything?

[ ] See enclosures

[ ] Release memo to Col. Adams as is and add "What meaning?"

Discuss.

J. S. PUSTAY, Lt Gen, USAF
Assistant to the Chairman
Handle Via Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

[Redacted]

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

(Security Classification)
TOP SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 403  CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET  NO. PAGES 6

FROM: [Name]  (Extension)  (Room Number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO (Agency) - DELIVER TO:  Dept/Room No.  Extension

RG. J.H. Johnson JCS-33  2C 8C7  7 2608 8 6901 1 5381

SENSITIVE - CONTAINS CODEWORD - EYES ONLY

REMARKS: Please hold in your respective ops centers, recipients have been notified and will pick up.

Handle Via [Redacted] Channels

Please Notify [Redacted]

TOP SECRET
Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
MEMORANDUM FOR:  General Johnson, J-3

FROM:  Michael Berta, S

SUBJECT: Damage Assessment

Attched is a draft of the Iranian damage assessment. Please review the draft and send your line-in/line-out comments to Bill Odom by COB, 15 May.

Attachment
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT (TS)

Summary and Conclusions

This assessment addresses four areas of potential compromise and damage to U.S. operational and intelligence capabilities:

-- Operational Plans
-- Photographic Systems
-- Cryptological Systems
-- Clandestine Assets and Methods

II. Operational Plans

Summary: According to the JCS assessment, the Iranians captured a complete set of plans, messages, call signs, etc., which would reveal the operational plan and command and control locations, staging points, etc. To determine the damage, JCS gave a "blue binder" containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian hands to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of the operation. Within five hours, they were able to piece together the entire operation concept and phasing including:

-- Identification of
-- Identification and coordinates of warehouse (staging area)
-- Location of main Joint Task Force (and port)
-- Location of alternate JTF CP
-- Involvement
-- DELTA reception party -- tied to the warehouse and hideout area.

In addition, media stories and security leaks also compromised the operational plan; however, only the parties that obtain access to...
the "blue binder" would be able to confirm the accuracy of the media reports.

Conclusion: This compromise severely reduces the chances of a successful subsequent rescue attempt with the same or analogous scheme of operations.

III.

IV. Cryptological Systems

Summary: One of the helicopters left on the ground intact contained two secure voice encryptors, the Nestor and the Parkhill.
This helicopter was available for entry for twelve hours. It was subsequently destroyed by the Iranian Air Force.

Most probably both the Nestor and Parkhill were destroyed along with the helicopter. Both encryptors are for tactical application. The Nestor is older and was probably compromised during the Vietnam era. The Parkhill is newer and has not been previously compromised.

V. Clandestine Assets and Methods

Summary:
Conclusion: Any of the previous assets or personnel could not be used again. In addition, significant restructuring of support mechanisms and personnel profiles would be required in any future operation. Would probably be less inclined to cooperate with any future U.S. rescue plan.
6 May 1980

To:

From: JOHN JOHNSON

1. Thought I would try my hand at a reformed damage assessment along the lines of our discussion yesterday.

2. My hope is that we can use it for purposes of discussion in our alarming groups and that our final output would put stress on conclusions and contain less substance - particularly as in para. 5.

3. Bill Odum has a copy.

Regards,

Jane Zeebo

TOP SECRET
CONSEC Damage Assessment

1. There were a number of classified U.S. cryptosystems subject to compromise in connection with Operation RICE BOWL. Compromised intelligence data indicates that some U.S. communications security is not proper.

2. There remains one area of concern. A PARKHILL equipment was carried on helicopter #1. However, the equipment was not tested for security. It is imperative that security of the equipment be tested. Though there is no evidence..."
6. CONCLUSIONS

a. If the PARKHILL were acquired by the Soviets, they are likely capable of exploiting this high technology equipment in efforts to improve their own communications security or for communications intelligence purposes against U.S. targets.

b. If the PARKHILL equipment is acquired by the Soviet Union or other technologically advanced hostile government, the loss would be serious.

c. Potential exploitation of PARKHILL by the Soviet Union could plausibly contribute to the effort to compromise the United States against the threat of terrorist endeavors, including and not limited to the difficulty in achieving electronic protection of PARKHILL cryptographic systems to keep them non-reconlogable. This could be considered to represent a nuclear case situation.

In summary, the potential for significant damage to U.S. communications security is confined to the loss of PARKHILL and then only to its entry into sophisticated hands. Maximum immediate damage from the loss of PARKHILL is confined to those messages transmitted on or before 24 April operation. There is no current indication that any other U.S. cryptographic systems operating anywhere in the United States.

The portion of this damage assessment addressing the PARKHILL security is currently sensitive and must be treated accordingly. There has been no public acknowledgment or disclosure of Parker security compromise. Any revelation of this fact can be expected to result in intelligence efforts to acquire this equipment or its replacement if this eventuality is likely even though the acquisition has not already been...
### TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER

- **ON**: Col. W. Harris  
  **OFFICE**: Office Desk  
  **ORG/AGENCY**: OPG/OMCS  
  **PHONE**: 695-2291

- **EFFECTIVE**: NSC's Damage Assessment (U)
- **ASSIGNMENT**: Top Secret, Controlled Distribution  
  **PAGES**: Two (2)

- **DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS**:
  - Hold for normal duty hours
  - **IMMEDIATELY**

  **NOTE**: Furnish after duty hour contact telephone number for each addressee requiring after hour delivery

### TRANSMIT TO

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<td>NSC</td>
<td>Col. William Odem, N</td>
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| MARKS |
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM ODOM, NSC

SUBJECT: NSC's Damage Assessment (U)

The following comments are offered with regard to the NSC's Summary and Conclusions of the damage assessment of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt:

a. Para II: Change to read:

"According to a Joint Staff assessment, the Iranians obtained a set of documents containing call signs, staging areas, in-country land and air routes, briefing codes, and from which they could reconstruct the major elements of the in-country rescue plan. To determine the potential for compromise, a copy of documents containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian hands was provided to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of the operation. With access to limited press reporting, they were able to piece together the general in-country operational concept and the following specific factors:

- Identification of as a refueling point
- Identification and coordinates of warehouse (staging area)
- Location of main
- Identification of JTF, HQ
- Tactical Air Support was provided for
- Identification of SFOD-DELTA and Ranger Forces
- DELTA reception party -- tied to the hideout area and warehouse
b. Add the following before conclusion of Para II:

"Portions of the Plan that probably cannot be determined from the lost documents are:

- The role of the C-141 aircraft, where they were located, or if they had an in-country role.
- Although [REDACTED] were identified on codeword cards, the role they were to play cannot be determined.
- Identity and number of reception personnel.
- The exfiltration route from the extraction base or destination bases.
- Techniques of assault on the Embassy/Ministry of Foreign Affairs or extent of knowledge on hostage locations and references.
- How supporting TACAIR was to be employed.

(c) Para IV: Delete "probably" - sentence to read "The Nestor is older and..."

Very respectfully,

Philip J. Hutler

Classified by DOD Dir TS-50001.2(M1)
Review on 15 May 2000
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM ODOM, NSC

SUBJECT: NSC's Damage Assessment (U)

The following comments are offered with regard to the NSC's Summary and Conclusions of the damage assessment of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt:

a. Para II: Change to read:

"According to a Joint Staff assessment, the Iranians obtained a set of documents containing call signs, staging areas, in-country land and air routes, briefing codes, and satellite photography, from which they could reconstruct the major elements of the in-country rescue plan. To determine the potential for compromise, a copy of documents and photography containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian hands was provided to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of the operation. With access to limited press reporting, they were able to piece together the general in-country operational concept and the following specific factors:

- Identification of [redacted] as a refueling point
- Identification and coordinates of [redacted] (staging area)
- Location of main [redacted]
- Identification of [redacted] as alternate JTF, HQ
- Tactical Air Support was provided for
- Identification of [redacted] [SFOD-DELTA and Ranger Forces]
- DELTA Reception party -- tied to the hideout area and warehouse"
b. Add the following before conclusion of Para II:

"Portions of the plan that probably cannot be determined from the lost documents are:

- The role of the F-141 aircraft, where they were located or if they had an in-country role.

- Although some personnel were identified on the original codeword list, the role they were to play cannot be determined.

- The identity and number of reception personnel.

- The actual routes from the extraction base or

- Destination base point.

Techniques of assault on the Embassy/Ministry of Foreign Affairs or extent of knowledge on hostage location and references.

(j) - How supporting FACAL was to be employed.

(c) Para IV: Delete "probably" - sentence to read "The Nestor is older. He may be compromised during the Vietnam"

Very respectfully,

Philip D. Thwaites

Classified by DOD Dir TS-50001.2(M1)
Review on 15 May 2000
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
NSC ADVISOR

Attached is a think piece on Iranian reaction to the possibility of the Shah's leaving the United States for a destination other than Iran.

STANSTFIELD TURNER

Attachment
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: IF THE SHAH LEAVES THE US

1. The following is a preliminary evaluation of the reaction in Tehran if the Shah decides to leave the US in the near future. We are in the process of contacting our sources in order to solicit their views.

2. We believe that the Iranians are likely to attempt to increase pressure on the US whether the Shah leaves or stays. But his departure is likely to lead to immediate, adverse consequences for the hostages—and possibly other Americans in Tehran. So long as the Shah stays, the possibility will remain that the Iranians might be willing to release some additional hostages in hopes of gaining their ultimate goal, the extradition of the Shah, or some other significant concessions from the US. Moreover, the continued presence of the Shah might leave the door open for some future negotiations to secure the release of all the hostages or at least their transfer to Iranian government control.

3. The Shah's departure would introduce a new and dangerous uncertainty into the situation, fueling Iranian paranoia and anger over what they would regard as a US attempt to circumvent their expected victory. Moreover, an important issue in the current crisis is the Iranians' fear that somehow the US is seeking to undermine their revolution; they could very well interpret his departure from the US as the first step in a new US-backed plot to overthrow the Iranian revolution. If a third country agrees to receive the Shah, the Iranians would assume that country was acting at the US' behest and was subject to US influence.

4. In the immediate aftermath of the seizure of the US Embassy both the "students" and the Khomeini regime might have interpreted the Shah's departure from the US as an act of good faith on our part. Now, his departure to a third country would increase their frustration and probably lead to an early decision to try some or all of the remaining
hostages. The "students" have already said that if the Shah leaves the US, they will put some of the hostages on trial for spying. Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council—even if they wanted to prevent the trials—seem to be powerless to stop them.

5. If the hostages are subject to trial for espionage, our concern must turn to the possible sentences that will be imposed on them. While there is an outside chance that some of the hostages will be found innocent or guilty of only minor offenses, we believe that those put on trial would already have been designated as "guilty of serious crimes against the Iranian people." We do not know what penalty is imposed by "Islamic Justice" for spying. Moreover, we have no reporting that addresses the circumstances under which any trials would be held or likely sentences.

6. We believe, however, that the following break-down covers the most likely possibilities.

A. The Khomeini regime orders the hostages removed from the Embassy compound for trial elsewhere under official auspices:

   --"students" agree.

   --"students" refuse and a stand-off occurs.

   --"students" refuse and the regime uses force to gain its way. The hostages may be caught in cross-fire or shot by the "student" captors.

   --"students" refuse and open trials under their control. (See II)

B. "Student" controlled trials held on Embassy Compound:

   --they try publicly to humiliate in some fashion after lengthy media exploitation, and

   a. sentence the hostages, but release them to the government for expulsion. A possible face-saving arrangement, but it assumes that the regime can control the captors and that publicity and any gestures the US is willing to make will be satisfactory.
b. sentence and present the regime with a fait accompli requiring it to implement the sentences or take responsibility for a less revolutionary attitude. Also a face-saver--primarily for the "students"--with the same assumptions.

c. sentence and announce that those found guilty will be imprisoned by the "students" on the Compound for the length of their sentences or until the Shah is returned.

d. sentence and execute some or all of the hostages before any outside force (regime or US) could intervene.

C. Results of trial under Khomeini regime auspices:

--trial, lengthy media exploitation, public humiliation of hostages and

a. expulsion. Again assumes that publicity and US gestures will be enough.

b. sentence to physical punishment/imprisonment/execution but delay while giving the US a final chance to return the Shah.

c. sentence to physical punishment/imprisonment/execution and implement some or all sentences without allowing the US a final opportunity to bend.

D. Possible venue of government imprisonment:

--internment on Embassy compound with

a. "students" allowed to maintain control.

b. other forces providing guards.

--internment in another private location, perhaps outside of Tehran (i.e., Qom)

--incarceration in special area of an Iranian prison or jail.
--imprisonment among other political prisoners, leaving US personnel fully vulnerable to the privations and harassment inflicted on Iranian detainees.
# Iran: Central Government Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditures</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By sector:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General services</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National defense and</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic services</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By type:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total revenues</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income taxes</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs duties</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption tax</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Data converted at 70.553 rials = US $1 in 1976, 70.579 rials = US $1 in 1977, and 70.475 rials = US $1 in 1978 and in 1979. The fiscal year starts on 21 March of the designated year.
Warning Notice,
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Damage Assessment - Operation RICE BOWL

1. Purpose. To conduct a detailed analysis of the equipment and information
   that was available at Desert Track One after U.S. forces departed the scene
   and make a damage assessment.

2. Background.
   a. TAB A depicts the units left at Desert Track One that contained
      classified or possibly sensitive equipment/information.
   b. TAB B lists the individual units and addresses the likelihood of
      accessibility of classified or sensitive equipment. This TAB also addresses
      helicopter #6 which remains in the desert, south of Desert Track One. All
      classified and sensitive information has been reported to have been removed
      from the helicopter.
   c. TAB C depicts only those units which contained classified information/
      equipment or sensitive information that possibly could have been compromised.
   d. TAB D lists the documents and equipment which possibly were compro-
      mised and briefly states the damage assessed as a result.

3. Discussion. The following is a damage assessment of those classified or
   sensitive documents/equipments contained in TAB D:
   a. JTF-79 CEQI extracts consisting of pilot's personal knee board cards
      containing call signs, frequencies, types of radios, location of mission sites
      in Iran and identifies participating units such as SFOD-D and Rangers.
   - Politically sensitive is the identification of stations/locations in
     foreign countries, which, in the hands of the Iranians, could be used to
     allege cooperation by these countries with the United States. Foreign
     countries identified include...
   - Operational security has been seriously compromised because primary land-
     ing zones, staging bases, and other facilities needed to support the
     rescue operation have been identified.

ssified by: DoD Dir 5001.2(M-1)
iew: 2 May 2000
b. TACAIR Information consisted of aircraft call signs and frequencies plus geographic coordinates of reference points in Iran.

Although no classification is noted on the document entitled "TACAIR INFORMATION", compromise of this document is extremely damaging to national interests as it identifies the location - geographical coordinates of numerous sites, to include the warehouse, which the raiding party was scheduled to utilize, and it indicates the possible intent to accomplish air raids by tactical aircraft.

c. CVW-8 Card of the Day, classified CONFIDENTIAL, details the call signs and frequencies in use by ships assigned to the U.S. for the period 0400, 24 April 1980 to 0400, 25 April 1980. Compromise of this document is not considered damaging to national security as the information reflected is changed daily and thus was overtaken by events.

d. Navigation Card, which details coordinates and navigational data for the route to Tehran and Manzariyeh is considered classified. The card contains no information of a politically sensitive nature. Compromise of this item would not endanger national security or interests.

e. The document identified as "Watch Schedule for Hideout Security" contains the guard watch schedule to be utilized by the team at the hideout location. Although the document is unclassified and contains no information of a politically sensitive nature, it does provide the last names of the U.S. team members involved in the watch.

f. Document entitled "Codewords for 24 April 1980" details codewords in use on day indicated which could be used to identify such things as Soviet aircraft, USAF aircraft, and specific countries such as...

This information is politically sensitive as it links the above countries, although indirectly to the operation.
He can be expected to be curious but, we believe, not to the extent that he would seek Soviet assistance. Additionally, his possession of the photographs will confirm the suspicions he has expressed many times regarding the "overwhelming imaginative U.S. capability to take photographs anywhere in the world at any time."

- h. Two types of classified secure voice equipment were accessible, PARKHILL and NESTOR.

- PARKHILL equipment was installed only in helicopter #1. While not permanently installed, its inconspicuous appearance amongst all the other equipment in the helicopter may have precluded its removal during the approximately twelve hours helicopter #1 was accessible.

- If it was recovered from the helicopter,

- The loss of NESTOR equipment, carried by all of the helicopters, is considered minimal because it was compromised many times in Southeast Asia.

- Compromise of PARKHILL and NESTOR message traffic.
- The secure IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) authentication equipment, of which at least one piece of equipment was compromised, is of minimal consequence. This equipment was compromised many times in Southeast Asia. Acquisition of the key used in this operation would not affect security of past or future transmissions.

- Two unused "one-time" crypto pads were subject to compromise.

4. USS NIMITZ communications frequency codes were carried by all the helicopters. The security compromise is minimal because the codes can be easily changed.

Summary. Damage resulting from equipment and information probably now in Iranian hands, with the exception of PARKHILL, is assessed as minimal.

Identification of the location in Tehran of the warehouse is damaging from an OPSEC viewpoint because it revealed the method of operation for approach to the embassy. In addition, although the immediate members of the Tehran team are now accounted for, continued investigation could lead to the "business activities" that procured the trucks and warehouse and possibly to the individuals who participated in country.

- The identification of foreign countries in U.S. communication codes could be used by Iran to embarrass some of the countries in the region by allegations of cooperation with the U.S.

-- PARKHILL was removed from helicopter #1 before it was straffed and burned and Iran chooses to give it to the Soviets.

-- PARKHILL was not removed and Iran gives Soviet technicians access to the remains.

4 Enclosures a/s
Unit
C-130
Helicopters

Tab A

Classified or Sensitive Equipment/Data

Unknown. Inventory is being taken, but because this aircraft was totally destroyed, no analysis of documents/equipment is necessary.

Secure Voice Communication Equipment

- PARKHILL (Helicopter #1 only)
- NESTOR

"BLUE BINDER"

- EMERG LZs Location
- Tehran maps

Call Signs/Frequencies

TACAIR Information Sheet

Mission Plans

Communications Electronics Operating Instructions (Brevity Code)

USS NIMITZ Frequency Codes

Flight Route Maps

Other Commo Equipment

- Whiskey-3
- PT-25 UHF - Upsecure radio
- PSC-1 UHF - backpack radio
- Motorola 350 - hand-held radio
- PRC-90 - survival-radio

Communication Equipment

Special Equipment, i.e., night visual devices

Weapons, i.e., Inventory is being taken and will be available in approximately one week.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Likelihood of Accessibility of Classified or Sensitive Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>None — destroyed by fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helos #1, 2, 4</td>
<td>Destroyed by IAF — accessible during the twelve hours between departure of last C-130 and the arrival of IAF aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helo #3</td>
<td>None — destroyed by fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helo #6</td>
<td>None — crew removed classified data after forced landing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helos #7, 8</td>
<td>Probably intact and accessible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELTA FORCE</td>
<td>Unknown but assumption made that some equipment left behind at desert site. Inventory of equipment lost will be available later.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unit
Heros #1, 2, 4
(About 12 hours).

Classified or Sensitive Data Likely Accessible
Secure Voice Equipment
- PARKHILL
- NESTOR
"BLUE BINDER" (contained photographs)
Call Signs/Frequencies
Mission Plans

Heros #7, 8
(Intact)

"BLUE BINDER"
Call Signs/Frequencies
Mission Plans

Unknown: Preliminary inventory indicates the loss of the following communication equipment: (all unclassified).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AN/PRC-77</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/PRC-66</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC-1 (prototype satellite terminal)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT-25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/PRC-74</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/WSC-3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOI-18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>JTF-79 CEOI Extract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Brevity Codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Route Books with Maps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>CVW-8 &quot;Card of the Day&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Call Sign Extracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Watch Schedule/Hideout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>USS NIMITZ Frequencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>TACAIR Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Pilot Mission Briefing Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Foreign Sites (includes foreign stations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Identifies location of other countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Last names of some helo crews (identification of persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Identifies warehouse exact location. Reveals &quot;business activity&quot; could be to people involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Security Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Nestor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Blue Binder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Handle Via
Channels

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Warning Notice
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Top Secret
(Security Classification)
20 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHAIRMAN, JCS
NSC ADVISOR

Attached are our latest evaluations of the readiness of each of the Iranian armed services.

STANFIELD TURNER

Attachment
17 November 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of Iranian Navy

The operational capability of Iran's Navy* has declined steadily during 1979 because of poor maintenance and a lack of military discipline. The Iranians appear incapable of maintaining the ships on their own and a general shortage of parts has adversely affected the operational readiness of the ships. In addition, political interference, and the attendant confusion in lines of authority, at the bases, has hampered the Navy's effectiveness.

The Navy has held two exercises since the summer, but they were not large scale. In September, the exercise was a meager show, with fewer than 10 ships—mostly patrol craft—participating.

This past week, the Navy held another exercise.

*An attachment is a map showing the Iranian Naval Bases and our estimate of the ships based there.
The Iranian Navy's nine guided-missile patrol boats, which were purchased from France, probably are in the best condition of all Iranian ships. We believe that the French continue to assist in maintaining these boats at their home port of Bushehr. The Iranians successfully fired a Harpoon-missile from one of these boats in October 1978 and probably could fire others now. Last summer, only one of these ships was armed with missiles—the missiles were said to be stored at Bandar Abbas.

The Navy also has three destroyers. Two destroyers are of US origin and one is a former British destroyer. These ships are equipped with Standard surface-to-surface missiles purchased from the US. Each ship has four launchers and carries one reload for each launcher. Maintenance of these missiles is difficult, however, and the systems probably have deteriorated since the advisors were withdrawn in early-1979.

The Iranian Navy has a very limited mine-clearing capability which is comprised of two coastal minesweepers and two smaller inshore minesweepers. They are based at Karoun Marine, a facility near the Shatt al Arab—the river which forms part of the border between Iran and Iraq—primarily to clear mines from the river. We would rate the mine-clearing capability of these ships as poor because they receive the lowest priority in the Navy for personnel and training. The Navy also has six RH-53D minesweeping helicopters which are based at Bushehr. All of these helicopters have been grounded, however, because of poor maintenance and a shortage of spare parts. We do not believe that the Navy has any mines or mine-laying capability of its own.

*A fifth minesweeper is based in the Caspian Sea and is used primarily as a training ship.*
The Iranian Air Force has remained intact since the fall of the Shah, but its ability to operate effectively has been severely impaired. Maintenance and supply problems have reduced the number of serviceable aircraft and curtailed pilot training. Although flying squadrons have remained fully manned and pilots report for duty, their training is far from adequate. Revolutionary committees control most Air Force units.

Iran's F-4 Phantom fighters would be less of a threat to maritime aircraft than its F-4 and F-5 aircraft, which are more numerous, in better condition, and more familiar to Air Force personnel. Most of Iran's surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) probably are not operational.
Even though the F-4s and F-5s have been in Iran's inventory for about 10 years, we are uncertain how many the Air Force could effectively put in the air in an emergency situation. The Iranians apparently are experiencing shortages of spare parts for and maintenance difficulties with both aircraft.

F-14 Fighter Aircraft and Phoenix Missiles. The cutoff of spare parts from the US and the collapse of the Iranian logistic system has led to cannibalizing F-14s and support equipment to keep some of Iran's F-14s flying.

1. These aircraft are generally equipped with the same electronic and armament subsystems as are comparable US aircraft.
Another factor limiting the use of Iran's F-14s is that only a few Iranians have received extensive training on the plane. When the Shah was overthrown, less than 100 pilots and instructor-pilots had been trained to fly the F-14. Of these, reportedly some 20 instructor-pilots had completed intercept training, and only three had finished the complete air defense/air superiority course and were operationally qualified. Only some 15 other instructors had completed the initial training as weapon systems officers, and none of these had advanced beyond the first phase, which covered only simple intercepts, i.e., firing one missile at a time against a single target.

Because little training has been conducted since the revolution, we estimate that the already limited skills of pilots and weapons officers have atrophied.

The Iranian Air Force has only marginal capability to destroy opposing aircraft with Phoenix missiles. (TSU NF)

But of the missiles. Other sources have noted that, because the ground-based test equipment for the missiles has not been functioning properly, maintenance checks have not been performed that would attest to their reliability. The F-14, however, contains electrical circuits permitting the flight crew to check the missile from the cockpit. Presumably Iranian crews could determine if they had a malfunctioning missile before they entered combat.
Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (SAMS). The Iranians may be able to fire a few missiles in an emergency situation, but they were having difficulty mastering the I-HAWK even before the revolution. The status of Iran's British-made Rapier low-altitude SAM system for airfield defense is not known.

Air Defense Radar Network. Many of Iran's radars probably are partially or completely inoperative, but coverage is still active in some areas.
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of Iranian Ground Forces

Ground force capabilities remain limited despite some improvement in discipline and operational readiness in recent months. Army units, and are experiencing maintenance and supply problems. Several units, particularly those fighting against the Kurds, suffer from low morale. 

The military would be hard pressed to defend against a full-scale Iraqi or Soviet attack. In the northwest, the Army's position would deteriorate quickly should the Kurds press their attacks. The ground forces appear capable of suppressing Arab opposition in the southwest oil fields as long as Iraq does not increase its aid to the dissidents. (S/NF)

Ground Forces

The regular Army numbers about 150,000 men, down from approximately 300,000 prior to the revolution. The bulk of the Army's combat strength is garrisoned along Iran's border with Iraq and the Soviet Union. Many artillery and support units are near the larger towns in the interior. Except for numerous small units dispatched to fight the Kurds, no major ground force redeployments or exercises have occurred since the revolution.
Although the Army was well equipped as of late October, the Army had been severely weakened by poor maintenance and a lack of spare parts. We expect this situation to deteriorate further with the cut off of US supplies.

Morale is low among many Army units, particularly true for those units fighting in the northwest against the Kurds. Units generally seem slow to carry out directives from Tehran and small numbers of officers and troops have been executed for refusing to obey orders. Although the Revolutionary Committees have assumed a lower profile within the ground forces, they continue to interfere with the military chain of command.

Dismal as the Army's current situation is, it does represent a slight improvement over the chaotic conditions prevailing earlier this year. The Army has demonstrated the capability to deploy and support units in Kurdish areas despite severe logistic problems; units continue to fight despite low morale. These improvements are probably only temporary. Capabilities likely will begin to decline again as logistic and supply problems become more serious.

Two paramilitary forces, the Gendarmerie and the Revolutionary Guards, supplement the Army. Both groups are lightly armed. The Gendarmerie, approximately 75,000 strong before the revolution, are responsible mainly for border and rural security. Their ranks have been reduced by desertions, however, particularly in Kurdish areas. The Revolutionary Guard is composed mainly of ethnic Persians fiercely loyal to Khomeini. The Guard reportedly has about 20,000 full-time members and has assumed the bulk of the security duties in Tehran, in Kurdish provinces, and in the southwest. The Guards have caused considerable resentment throughout Iran against the government because of their brutal treatment of the citizenry.

Ground Forces in Selected Areas
The Revolutionary Guards are the most active security force in the city. There were 4,000 Revolutionary Guards garrisoned in Tehran with some 3,000 additional Guards undergoing training at military installations in the city. The Guards provide security for many important installations and are the regime's quick reaction force for disturbances in Tehran. (S/NF)

Northwest Army: The position of the ground forces is primarily in northeastern Iran. Troops stationed in the area are completely occupied in suppressing the Kurds. An additional 17,000 troops and 8,000 Revolutionary Guards have been brought in as reinforcements. Kurdish rebel forces have remained largely intact despite the government's offensive early this fall. The Kurds are engaged in interdicting roads, ambushing convoys, and other activities at border posts.

Southwest Oil Fields. The ground forces are capable of suppressing Arab opposition in the southwest oil producing areas as long as Iraq does not increase its assistance to the dissidents. An armored division is the main government force in the province. It was reinforced by Revolutionary Guards during the summer. The Guards have concentrated on controlling the local population and protecting oil facilities while the armored division concentrates on securing the border with Iraq.
Arab opposition in the southwest is much less developed than the Kurdish rebellion further north. Small groups of Arab guerrillas are mining roads and sabotaging oil facilities. Occasionally they ambush small groups of Revolutionary Guards. Iraq is supplying arms to the guerrillas and began providing guerrilla training to Iranian Arabs this summer. Iraq has used militia and special forces units from its armed forces to support Palestinians in Lebanon and could decide to introduce similar forces into Iran in support of the Arabs. Iranian forces would be hard pressed to control the situation if the Arab guerrillas were reinforced by Iraqi "volunteers."

Regular Iraqi ground forces have not assumed a threatening posture toward Iran. Were they to do so, the Iranians could not successfully defend the oil fields against a full-scale Iraqi attack. Iraqi forces could achieve a four to one advantage in men and equipment over Iranian units defending the oil fields and still have sufficient forces to hold the rest of the border with Iran. In the past, Iran counted on its superior Air Force to offset Iraq's edge on the ground, but the Air Force is likely to be little help in its current weakened condition. Moreover, Iranian armored units have no mobile surface-to-air missile system like the Iraqi SA-6, leaving them vulnerable to Iraqi air strikes. The Iranians do have sufficient air power to inflict serious damage on Iraqi oil facilities.

Attachments
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Iran's Oil Revenue Needs

In a just-released Congressional Research Service study, concludes that "3.3 million b/d appear likely to become over time more a floor than a ceiling" for the Iranian oil production. We believe the study (a) underestimates Iran's oil income and the potential for further oil price increases, (b) overstates Iran's hard currency needs, and (c) does not take into account other steps the Tehran government can take to cut revenue requirements, such as devaluation of the rial.

Oil Revenue Needs: With anticipated expenditures of $28 billion at most and non-oil income of $5 billion, the Iranian Government will need to export about 2.5 million b/d of crude (at today's prices) to satisfy budgetary requirements. This export requirement would be cut further by any future oil price increases, as seems likely. Besides cutting expenditures further, a budget shortfall could also be filled by some combination of (a) local borrowing achieved by increased commercial bank reserve requirements, (b) devaluation, which increases the rial revenue derived from oil, (c) drawdown of foreign exchange reserves, which total about $12 billion, and (d) the outright printing of rials.

These factors, particularly the likelihood of continued real oil price increases, lead us to believe that the Iranians can get by with substantially less than 3.3 million b/d in crude and product exports. Through some combination of an austere budget, the drawdown of some reserves, the printing of some rials, and the continued increase in oil prices, it is possible to envision revenue needs requiring less than 2 million b/d in petroleum exports in the next year or so.
Government Budget: In August, Iran's Revolutionary Council added $312 million to the Bazargan government budget request, bringing the proposed budget to $34.9 billion in fiscal 1979 (21 March to 20 March 1980). This budget, however, is in effect a paper exercise, with little likelihood that the projected expenditure level will be reached. Half the fiscal year had already passed when the budget came out, and by then almost all development projects had ceased and were under review. Settlements of past claims, renewals or cancellations of old contracts, and negotiations of new agreements will probably take another three to six months at least. Thus, much of the $12.8 billion slated for capital expenditures is unlikely to be spent. Current expenditures are set at $22.1 billion. The bulk of these payments would be in rials and hence that would not require hard currency income in a crisis situation. The government, for instance, could print rials, although it would then have to cope with potentially severe inflationary pressures. In sum, we believe that government expenditures not exceeding $28 billion a year are highly probable.

Direct Hard Currency Needs: Hard currency needs for financing merchandise and service imports are going to be considerably smaller than government revenue requirements for budget purposes. Merchandise imports for 1979 are likely to be on the order of $7-$8 billion, down from around $16 billion in 1978. Net services may total $1 billion, while hidden capital outflows may add another $5 billion at most to hard currency needs. Overall, Iran will need less than $15 billion, while oil revenue should amount to more than $21 billion this year.

Oil Revenue: Current Iranian oil prices average $20.95 per barrel on term contracts. Spot oil prices now run as high as $45 per barrel. With its mix of spot, term, and product sales, Iran is earning an estimated $80 million a day in revenue. This assumes 500,000 b/d spot sales, 2.7 million b/d term crude sales, and 200,000 b/d in product sales. Yearly revenue at these levels would total over $29 billion. A further oil price increase in December or next year would, of course, increase oil revenue. A 1 million b/d drop in Iranian oil exports--other things being equal--would cause at least an average $5 per barrel oil price increase. Thus, if term crude exports dropped by 1 million b/d, Iran would still be able to earn around $70 million a day, or $25 billion a year.

Non-Oil Income: Given the present state of the economy, non-oil income from tax collections, tariffs, and government agency profits should be considerably lower than in past years. The Bazargan government estimated this income at $8.8 billion, about the same as in fiscal year 1977. Non-oil income may, however, be as small as $5 billion.
AC-130 STRIKE
AGAINST
SEPAH SQ PTT ANTENNA

OBJECTIVE:  Render Sepah Sq. PTT antenna inoperable.

CONCEPT:  One AC-130H gunship ingresses low level to target from the east using Dosanh Tappeh airdrome and Bamavand Rd. to assist navigation in locating pinpoint target. Once over target, gunship establishes left orbit and commences attack with 20mm guns (2). Two orbits expected to render antenna system inoperable.

TACTICS:

- Ingress Altitude: 400 ft. AGL
- Attack Altitude: 200 ft. AGL
- Firing Zone: 40 degree fan maximum north and south
- Bank Angle: 30 degrees
- Rate of Fire: 2500 rds. per min.
- Firing Time: 10 seconds per burst 1/
- Orbits/Time on Target: 2/4 minutes
- Rounds Employed: 3,000 (20mm)

1/ Aim point is base of tower. Pilot walks burst in pattern up then down antenna slightly to ensure total burst coverage (antenna 70-75 ft high)

ACCURACY:

- Burst Pattern: 5 mils (30 ft cone)
- PK: 0.956 ea. 750 rd. burst

EXPECTED DAMAGE:

- Collateral: Minimal
- Antenna: Inoperable

RATIONALE: Antenna dish orientation requires two attack fans (tab) to minimize collateral damage. 20mm guns are area weapons. Firing tests against OH-50 drones resulted in their complete destruction after single burst. No weapon reloading required enabling continuous fire each fan while minimizing on-target time. 20mm projectiles also minimize collateral damage to roofs of commercial/residential area in portion of south fan. High probability of destruction expected against any electrical cabling associated with antenna, antenna dishes and horns rendering system inoperable. Secondary munition is 40mm misch metal if required.
2 MINUTES PER ORBIT

- NORTH FAN = PARKING AREA & STREET
- SOUTH FAN = COMMERCIAL & SOME RESIDENTIAL
- FIRES APPROX. 800 RDS. EACH BURST USING VERTICAL WALK (20MM)
- FOUR BURSTS EXPENDS AMMUNITION
- 20MM MINIMIZES COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO ROOF TOPS
- USE 40 MM MISCH METAL AGAINST ANY UNDAMAGED PORTIONS IF REQUIRED
- 15-20 RDS. EACH FAN BURST
1 mil = 1 FT per 1000 FT

(Φ)
(Φ) Table 1. 20MM Probability of Kill (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Empty Truck</th>
<th></th>
<th>Truck with Combustable Load (POL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROUND</td>
<td>PK</td>
<td>ROUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center of burst 5 mils from target with 6,000 foot slant range</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>750</td>
<td>.956</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center of burst 5 mils from target with 11,000 foot slant range</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The attached memorandum provides recommendations regarding the reintroduction of American news personnel into Iran. The recommendations are listed in three paragraphs. The first recommends against the reintroduction, the second provides a list of possible concessions to be sort from the Iranians in exchange for allowing the reintroduction; the third provides suggestions regarding the status of the three Americans held in the Iranian Ministry of Affairs.
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Iran, Reintroduction of Media (TS)(C)

1. (TS) The reintroduction of selected American media into Iran will complicate any future rescue operations by increasing the number of potential "replacement" hostages available. I recommend against it.

2. (TS) However if the decision is made to reintroduce American media recommend all or most of the following conditions be posed to the Government of Iran prior to reintroduction.

   a. Guarantee of personnel safety.
   b. Guarantee of freedom of movement.
   c. Guarantee of unrestricted departure.
   e. Guarantee of immediate access to all American hostages by media reps and American medical team.
   f. Guarantee of scheduled weekly access to all hostages and USG personnel being held in MFA.
   g. Recognition of Mr. Laingen, and party as official USG representatives with full diplomatic immunity including freedom of movement and freedom of private communication and continuing access to the compound hostages.
   h. Recognition of the fact that the failure to fulfill any and all of these guarantees is a purposeful abrogation of the civil and religious responsibilities of the Government of Iran.

3. (TS) If the decision to allow American media to reenter Iran is made without extracting any of the above suggested or alternate concessions recommend that every effort be made to clarify the official position of the Iranian Government regarding the status of Mr. Laingen, Howland and Tomseth. It is readily apparent that the militants do not control the fate of these three gentlemen, but the civil government, particularly the foreign ministry, does. The return of Mr. Laingen, Howland, and Tomseth to the USA for "discussions" or their amalgamation with the compound hostages would substantially ease any future rescue operations.

JAMES B. VAUGHN
MGEN USA

TOP SECRET
SUBJECT: Iran Situation Report as of 1800 25 Nov 79 (U)

Significant Events:

In a melange of statements given in press interviews, Bahi-Sadr indicated:

--- Iranian-US relations have not only been severed but have also become hostile.
--- He does not believe that the US will attempt to free the hostages by military action.
--- The US must return the Shah, as it is "too late" now for any plan to send him to a third country.
--- A US declaration condemning the Shah's alleged crimes would give Iranian authorities "a good disposition for discussions."

Significant Military Activities:
It appears that some effort may have been made to disperse naval vessels from the vulnerable river area into the Persian Gulf coastal bases.

-- (U) Press reports indicate Sirjan Naval Support Base and the Iranian Air Force have been placed on full alert. Sirjan provides support services for the Iranian Navy.

-- (U) Iranian Oil Minister Noifar threatened to cut off oil shipment to countries that permit the US to freeze Iranian assets in overseas branches of US banks.

-- (S/W/NF/RN) Iranian radio has been surfacing reports that the Kurdish Democratic Party has agreed to a 20-day cease-fire because it allegedly supports Khoneini's action of confronting the US.

-- (U) Significant Iranian Propaganda:

-- (U) Various Iranian spokesmen continue to harp on the alleged US-Israeli conspiracy involved in the takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca in an effort to inflame Moslem opinion against the US.

-- (U) Iranians are also claiming that they have the support of Iranian Kurds and Afghan dissidents for their actions against the US.

(U) Late Item:

-- (U) A press report of Iraqi origin indicates that on 23 November a passenger aircraft loaded with Iranian pilgrims returning from the Hajj was almost shot down by Iranian air defense forces as it tried to land at Bandar Abbas. The aircraft was reportedly engaged by Iranian ground and naval forces because it had not given advanced notice of its intent to
WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: Iran Situation Report as of 0500, 26 November 1975 (U)

- Significant Events:
  - Iran's announcement on 23 November that it will not repay its foreign debt has caused widespread confusion among international banks holding letters of credit and among firms with contracts to export goods to Iran.

- Significant Military Activities:
  - (S) Carrier Task Force 70 reported an Iranian war ship was located in the Gulf of Oman, just south of the Hormuz Strait, on 25 November.

- (U) Comments on Iranian Press:
  - (U) Oil Minister Moinfar today issued a threat saying that any country that opposes the Islamic Republic of Iran will be left without Iranian petroleum.
  - (U) The Arab People's Congress yesterday issued an appeal to all Arab countries to break off all political, diplomatic and economic relations with the US. (Note: The Congress was founded in Libya in 1977 by the Rejectionist Front composed of Arab states opposed to Egypt's peace moves with Israel. They include: Libya, Algeria, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO.)

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 26 Nov 93
Review on: 26 Nov 93
WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: Significant Military Activities (U)

Carrier Task Force 70 reported an Iranian war ship was located in the Gulf of Oman, just south of the Hormuz Straits, on 25 November...
Objective: One SEAL platoon paratroop into DZ located adjacent to. Platoon splits into two squads and squads place demolition charges on critical components. Squads withdraw to DZ and are recovered. Helo from.

Required: 1 SEAL platoon (located).
1 MC-150 aircraft (located).
1 SH-3G (located on)

Hours from notification until departure for target:
2 hours on route to objective
4 hours on target

Tanker will be required.

Tanker support would be required to operate from

Unable to rehearse help recovery with help that will conduct actual operation.

Crop duty period will have to be extended. Augmented crew will be required.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 120285
CONDUCTED ON 12-06-93
DEROGATIVE COPY
DECL GRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW ON 08-05-93
SUBJ: HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT UPDATE

1. ACCORDING TO VARIOUS MEDIA SOURCES, HOSTAGES ARE BEINGDETAINED AT
SEVENTEEN LOCATIONS. NEITHER THIS OFFICE, THE MEDIA, NOR DOS HOLD
INFORMATION TO SUPPORT SUCH A DISPERSION.

2. REVIEW OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION OF A CREDIBLE NATURE, EVEN
WHEN STRETCHED TO ITS LIMIT.

4. ALL OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION, FRAGMENTARY AS IT IS, IS SUPPORTIVE
OF HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FIVE MONTHS.

(A) THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF THE HOSTAGE SITUATION THE MILI-
TANTS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO LOSE OR SHARE CONTROL OF THE
HOSTAGES WITH ANY EXTERNAL ENTITY.

(B) IN THE PAST, THE MILITANTS, CLERICS, AND IRANIAN OFFICIALS HAVE
SUBJECT: Intelligence Collection and Reporting Support Plan for Iranian Military Contingency - Project RICE BOWL (TS)

1. The purpose of this plan is to provide a coherent flow of intelligence information to the JCS and operating forces involved in executing contingency operations regarding Iran. The plan is organized into four phases under the codename Project RICE BOWL.

2. Intelligence tasking and reporting associated with this operation will be keyed administratively to the codename RICE BOWL in order to maintain proper flow of the information and appropriate security control. Intelligence collection operations will be tasked in four time-relevant phases. These are:

   PHASE I - Pre-Operation Buildup Monitoring
   PHASE II - Pre-Operation Execution Monitoring
   PHASE III - Execution of the Operation
   PHASE IV - Post-Operation Monitoring

   At Attachment I is a list of indicators to be monitored to detect Iranian or other hostile states' prior knowledge of U.S. military operations or options being considered against Iran. Appendices A, B and C contain detailed tasking instructions and requirements for relating to this plan. Appendix D details the reporting procedures.

3. What follows is an outline of the activities that would be in effect under each of the four time-sequenced phases of this plan.
PHASE I - Pre-Operation Buildup

B. Fleet assets in Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean will be tasked for priority reporting on Soviet and other foreign reconnaissance activities in the vicinity of Diego Garcia.

PHASE II - Pre-Operation Execution

B. Continue to report indications of actual movement of U.S. hostages.

C. Continue accelerated reporting from Fleet on Soviet monitoring and reconnaissance activities.

PHASE III - Execution of the Operation

A. Continue as in Phase I and II with foreign press reporting.
PHASE IV - Post Operation

All sources will focus on reporting international reactions to U.S. operations in Iran with special emphasis on:

- Reaction of the Moslem world to U.S. operations with special concern for expanded acts of terrorism or internal political turmoil.
- Military and political reactions of the Soviet Union.

1 Attachment
Indicator List w/3
Appendices, A,B,C
to follow
WORKING PAPER
SUBJECT: Warning Indicator List - Project RICE BOWL

1. **PURPOSE:** To identify for intelligence collection and reporting purposes key indicators of Iranian or other "hostile states" to include USSR, Iraq, Afghanistan [REDACTED] having prior knowledge of U.S. military options and operations focused against Iran.

**INDICATORS**

A. Ministry of Defense Indicators

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

**SOURCES OF REPORTING**
APPELLIX A

Project RICE BOWL

HUMINT Tasking Plan

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) HUMINT collectors to include CIA/FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Intercept Service), COMNAVINTCOM, CINCPACFLT, and Naval Ocean Surveillance Center (NOSIC) will be tasked as appropriate to provide information on worldwide reactions to U.S. operations. An Alert Message (Tab A) will be sent to advise the addressees of the purpose and activation of Project RICE BOWL at such time as approved by the Iran Task Force (ITF).

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) HUMINT tasking will be initiated only during the final or post-operations phase. It will be focused on assessing the political/military/economic reactions of the world community. Reporting will emphasize the following types of information:
   a. Political/military reactions of the USSR, Iraq, Afghanistan and
   c. Reactions of Third World to U.S. operations.
   d. Threats and terrorist activities in other countries, particularly from Moslem countries, which could endanger U.S. personnel in those areas.

3. (U) Reporting procedures will be in accordance with guidance in Appendix D - Operational Intelligence Reporting Procedures.
FROM: SSO DIA
TO: COMNAVINTCOM
CINCPAC
CINCPACFLT
CINCEUR
CINCUSAREUR

SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SUBJ: PROJECT RICE BOWL

1. [SECRET/LIMDIS] PROJECT RICE BOWL IS ACTIVATED UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE FOR HUMINT COLLECTION REPORTING. THIS CODENAME APPLIES TO U.S. OPERATIONAL PLANS/INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE IRANIAN-U.S. SITUATION AND WILL BE USED FOR ALL COMMUNICATIONS, REPORTING OR REFERENCES TO THESE PLANS.

2. [SECRET/LIMDIS] EACH HUMINT TASKING IN SUPPORT OF RICE BOWL WILL INCLUDE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS, I.E., CONTINUOUS, PERIODIC OR ONE-TIME REPORTING OR NEGATIVE REPLIES. ALL RESPONSES TO TASKING
WILL BE BY MESSAGE IR. WITH AN OPS IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE— ADDRESSED TO DIA ATTN: ITF IRAN TASK FORCE.
ALL MESSAGE RESPONSES WILL CARRY AS THE SUBJECT: PROJECT RICE BOWL AND WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST SECRET/NOFORN/LIMDIS.
SECRET LIMDIS

SUBJECT: URGENT SPOER - 79 - PROJECT RICE BOWL (TS)

I. A.

JUSTIFICATION


ANY MOVEMENT OF U.S. FORCES INTO THE AREA MUST AVOID DETECTION. THE TACTICAL COMMANDERS MUST BE AWARE FOR PLANNING TO AVOID ALLOWING ANY PRE-WARNING OR ALERTING INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN, AND TO AVOID THREAT SYSTEMS IN THE AREA.

B. (S) GEOGRAPHICAL AREA:

U.S.
ALL OF IRAN, IRAQ, KUWAIT, AND THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE GULF OF OMAN. PRIORITY-1 IS ASSIGNED.

C. WEAPONS INTEREST:

LAND AREA: IRAN, AS LISTED BELOW AND OTHER:
N 478A, N 412Z, J 301Z, J 307Z, AND 0417Z

LAND AREA: IRAQ - B 301Z, B 301B, B 301A, B 318A, B 321Z, B 323Z,
B 324B, B 326B, B 326A, B 329A, B 335Z, B 346Z, B 347B,

WATER AREA:
(U) 1. DURATION OF SPOER: DURATION OF OPERATION, TO BE NOTIFIED LATER.

(C) 2. USERS: REPORTING MAY BE IN INTEL FORMAT UNLESS THAT WILL CAUSE A DELAY. PRIMARY REPORTING IS TO DIA IRANIAN TASK FORCE.

(C) 3. REQUEST ADVISE PROJECT RICE BOWL COMMANDER, DIA IRANIAN TASK FORCE OF CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO THIS SPOER.
APPENDIX D

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTING PROCEDURES

1. (TS/RELDIS) Operational intelligence reporting in support of the Iranian military operations will be in the same four phases as outlined for collection. For reporting purposes only, Phase I - Pre-operation Buildup is subdivided into two segments - the planning and the pre-positioning stages. All reports will be transmitted via established security means under the codename RICE BOX.

2. (TS/RELDIS) The planning stage of Phase I will continue until start of deployment of U.S. military force elements...

ea. Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to the JCS Planning Staff. 
f. JCS Planning Staff will relay essential data/material to force planning cells.

3. (TS/LIMITED) The second segment - pre-positioning - of Phase reporting emphasis will be the same as above.

a. Current intelligence will report by TV to appropriate SSO or DIA for relay via direct TV to JTF Headquarters and principal force staging locations.

b....

c. ...

d. ...

e. Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to the JCS Planning Staff.

f. JTF Headquarters will relay by broadcast mission essential data to all principal force staging locations.

4. (TS/LIMITED) The Second Phase - Pre-Operation Execution - Reporting will be the same as before with the exception that primary emphasis will be placed upon reporting of detection of U.S. launch force or its execution of operations. Reporting will be via the
fastest reliable secure means to JTF Headquarters for conversion of mission essential data to a brevity code for broadcast transmission to operating elements. Priority for transmission will be placed on information indicating detection of U.S. force launch activity and location of U.S. hostages.

a. _______ will report via direct _______ Headquarters and/or collocated

c. _______will report via direct _______

d. _______will report via direct _______

e. Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to JCS Planning Staff.

f. JTF Headquarters will _______

5. (TS/SCI) The Third Phase - Execution

Upon request from JTF Headquarters through JCS coordinating staff, _______ will direct selective _______ to pass data directly to JTF Headquarters for broadcast of mission essential data. Reporting will continue as in previous phases but with the exception that priority will be given to the _______ and the status of U.S. operational support
sites. Reporting will be the same as described above (paragraph 4). Brevity codes will not be used if the rapid receipt of the data is critical to a successful extraction/survival rate.

5. (15/TO) The total post-operations phase will extend for approximately six weeks. Reporting will focus on... and will be provided to the JCS Planning Staff and JTF Headquarters in accordance with procedures followed in Phase I. Defense Attaches and Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to JCS Planning Staff.
SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION ASSESSMENT(S)

REF: DODG 090037Z AUG 70 SAB (DETAILED AND JCS ONLY)

1. (C) THIS OFFICE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE CONTRADICTORY REPORTING ON
HOSTAGE LOCATIONS, RUNNING THE EXTREME FROM 12-18 SITES THROUGHOUT
THE COUNTRY TO A RECENT REPORT INDICATING THAT MOST HOSTAGES ARE
BEING HELD IN ONE LOCATION IN TEHRAN, PENDING THE INITIATION OF TRIALS.

2. (C) HOSTAGE DISPOSITION FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IS PROJECTED
AS FOLLOWS:
(A) WITHIN TEHRAN
(1) MFA BUILDING
(2) EMBASSY COMPOUND

3. (C) THIS ASSESSMENT IS BEING PROVIDED TO JTF UNITS FOR PLANNING
PURPOSES.
SECRET

TRANSMITTED TO

C - 131552Z

SIPRI: HOSTAGE LOCATION ASSESSMENT(S)

REF: MTG 23037Z AUG 70 SAB
(TOTAL: DELTA AND JCS ONLY)

1. (FOPO) THIS OFFICE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE CONTRADICTORY REPORTING ON
HOSTAGE LOCATIONS, RUNNING THE EXTREME FROM 12-18 SITES THROUGHOUT
THE COUNTRY TO A RECENT REPORT INDICATING THAT MOST HOSTAGES ARE
BEING HELD IN ONE LOCATION IN TEHRAN, PENDING THE INITIATION OF TRIALS.

3. (FOPO) HOSTAGE DISPOSITION FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IS PROJECTED
AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WITHIN TEHRAN:
(1) MFA BUILDING
(2) EMBASSY COMPOUND

4. THE FOLLOWING GENERIC DESCRIPTION
APPLIES FOR PLANNING PURPOSES TO ALL TARGETS - TWO-TO-THREE STORY
MASONRY BUILDING WITHIN A WALLED COMPOUND, LOCATED IN A SUBURBAN
ENVIRONMENT. APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME FROM
AN ADEQUATE FIXED WING INSERTION SITE AND 30 MINUTES
DRIVING TIME (OR 12 MINUTES HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME) FROM THE
NEAREST POTENTIAL FIXED WING EXTRACTION SITE.

5. DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS THIS OFFICE WORKING WITH
DNA WILL INITIATE ACTION TO PRODUCE A TARGET PLANNING GRAPHIC ON
EACH LOCATION AND ASSOCIATED AIRFIELDS/LANDING ZONES. COPIES WILL
BE PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE.
PAGE 4

LOCATIONS AS HOSTAGE DETENTION SITES.

A. MFA (3)

5. ... PLANNING ASSESSMENTS OF THIS TYPE WILL BE DISSEMINATED PERIODICALLY AS NEW DATA IS RECEIVED. COLLECTION EFFORTS ARE ONGOING AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL HOSTAGE RELEASE IS EFFECTED.

6. ... THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES PARTIAL RESPONSE TO DELTA MSG 0156, DIG 151430Z OCT 69, SUBJ: CONSOLIDATED 2100H PARA FOUR.

REVW 21 OCT 69
BI
#0394
SUBJ: AIR DEFENSE UPDATE (U)

1. The Tehran's defense situation has improved gradually particularly since the 22 SEP onset of hostilities with Iraq.

(U) WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR OTHER INCREASES IN AIR DEFENSE THREATS.
SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT NO. 7
B JCS/SCI/MEM/6145/06 102-2582 AUG 65, SUEJ: 95-90 DAY SITUATION PROJECTION.
C JCS/SCI/MEM/6145/06 32-19352 SEP 65, SUEJ: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.
D JCS/SCI/MEM/6145/06 171-2932 SEP 65, SUEJ: LOCATION DESCRIPTIONS.
E JCS/SCI/MEM/6145/06 211-2532 OCT 65, SUEJ: LOCATION ASSESSMENT UPDATE.

PAGE 1 OF 1

BACKGROUND SUMMARY:
A. REF A PROVIDED INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICTING FORCES INTERACTING WITHIN THE HOSTAGE CRISIS.
B. REF B PROVIDED 95-90 DAY SITUATION PROJECTION LIKELIHOOD OF HOSTAGE RELEASE PRIOR TO 4 NOV 66.
C. REF C PROVIDED JTF ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL/MILITARY SITUATION, GENERIC TARGET ANALYSIS AND SOVIET REACTION POSSIBILITIES.
D. REF D PROVIDED GENERAL DESCRIPTIVE DATA.
E. REF E PROVIDED MOST CURRENT JIF ASSESSMENT OF HOSTAGE LOCATIONS.

MSS THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS AND COMBINES VARIOUS FACETS OF THE REFERENCES AND PROVIDES A 90-45 DAY SITUATION PROJECTION, RISK ESTIMATE AND THREAT REACTION ASSESSMENT.

SHORTHORTLY AFTER THE APRIL RESCUE EFFORT THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP...
Although some of the Iranian leadership would like to end the crisis, a ready solution is not apparent. Complete acceptance of Iranian demands by the US is not likely unless there are guarantees that all hostages will be released simultaneously and without delay. Acceptance of this direct approach by the Iranian revolutionaries is questionable unless it includes a major political facesaving device such as the appointment of a U.N.-sponsored international commission of inquiry. If a quick resolution of the crisis is in the offing then a rapid sequence of events can be expected within the next 10 days. If, however, the situation has not been resolved by the 4-7 November time frame, pressure will again build within Iran to prolong the situation and extract additional concessions from the US.

7. The exchange of this message recognizes the possibilities of the continued detention of some of the hostages and reviews:

- Terrestrial factors related to each potential insertion zone.
- Provides a detailed risk assessment for each potential LZ, summarizes Iranian reaction capabilities, reviews Iranian air defense environment, and includes a threat summary for each hostage detention site.
The following risk assessment based on a force size of 40-150 and an active time frame is provided for comparative purposes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUGAR</th>
<th>KATHY</th>
<th>PEGGY</th>
<th>MARY</th>
<th>PATTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>MOL</td>
<td>MOD-HIGH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW-HIGH</td>
<td>LOW-HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MOD-HIGH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page six AUSIZE of T.C.R for reaction.

- Regular Army:-nil-low-mod-low-mod-high
- Air Force: low-mod-high-low-mod

To (15) this paragraph provides an estimate of Iranian reaction capabilities keyed to each potential LZ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15-20 min</th>
<th>SUGAR</th>
<th>KATHY</th>
<th>PEGGY</th>
<th>MARY</th>
<th>PATTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL SECURITY FORCES IN -</td>
<td>LOCAL SECURITY FORCES IN -</td>
<td>LOCAL SECURITY FORCES IN -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30-49 min: none

45-60 min: none

All security forces lead possible pers. none security element of rev 63 from nehrabad

rev 24 oct 63

SECRET
The Iranian air-defense environment is described below. The primary focus for AAA/SLAM activity in Tehran is...
Within 2-3 min: Possibility of revolutionary guard reaction forces. Guards estimated at an additional 300-400 personnel.

- Possibly 12-15 militants are inside. The guards are probably armed with pistols while guards at the walls are armed with automatic weapons. The number of guards estimated at 50-60 personnel.

11:11:00

COLLECTIVE STRENGTH OF 50-60

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT NO. 7

GUARD REACTION FORCES...

2:00 PM
SECRET

- Within 6-8 min: Greater Back-up units and additional crowds.
- Within 30-45 min: Casual Padjadjaran forces and mobs of 2-5,000.
- Within 30-45 min: Arrival of elements of the regular army and air force.


- The guards are inside the building at 315 ft level at both West and East ends. No exterior sandbag positions or machine guns have been noted. There is probably a roving guard force of 4-5 lightly armed soldiers (conscripts) within the MFA squads.

- External reaction/reinforcement possibilities include:

Page Six RAIZIC 9937

- Within 5-15 min: Special from Police Headquarters or War Ministry.
- Within 30-45 min: Loyal Padjaran forces (12-15).
- Within 60-90 min: Padjaran squads begin to arrive.

- Probably 12-16 guards inside.

2-4 moving within walls, 2-4 external, armed with pistols and rifles plus 2-3 observation snipers, half-block to block distant. No sandbag positions or machine guns have been seen or reported. The size and composition of external reaction force is unknown at this time, but one probably exists. Reaction/reinforcement possibilities include:

- Within 15 min: Padjadjaran reaction force estimated at 500-600 personnel.
- Within 20 min: Off-duty Padjadjaran and supportive militants react with fire.

SECRET

#3937
C 1. Our primary assessment follows: T. We believe a militant cadre remains in direct control of the hostages with principal security provided by Revolutionary Guard personnel.

2. The following estimate of hostage disposition—estimate of hostage disposition is provided for planning.
   A. Ministry of Foreign Affairs—3

3. (STG) Evaluation of possible Charlie/ Delta type facilities is on-going and results (if positive) will be provided as obtained.

REVW 1 DEC 80
SUBJ: HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT

REF: (A) TOP SECRET LIMUS JIR CITE DE CITE DE BAKUBBID BAKUBBID DEC 68 (INITIAL)

1. (U) THIS HOSTAGE LOCATION ASSESSMENT IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION AND PLANNING PURPOSES AND SHOULD NOT BE REF (A).

2. (U) BACKGROUND: THE CONTINUING STRUGGL FOR SUPREMACY BETWEEN PRESIDENT BAHJAT-ALI WITH HIS ODDITIES FOLLOWERS AND THE HARD-LINE MUSLIM CLERGY HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY

PAGE 2


A. (U) FOR THE PAST THREE MONTHS PRIME MINISTER RAHIL HAS CONTINUED TO SUBMIT LISTS OF NAMES FOR APPOINTMENT TO CABINET MINISTER POSITIONS. BAHJAT-ALI'S DISAPPROVE THE LARGE BULK OF THEM DECLARING THEM JUST 50 TOO RADICAL.

B. (U) REF. (A) RAHIL HAS TAKEN THE CREDITS OF THE CDR. THEY CLAIM TO HAVE LARGE ODDS IN THE FIELD TO DEFEAT THE CLOSED FORCES, THE CHANCE THAT.would be THE CRIME. THE HOSTAGE ISSUE.

C. (U) FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR, THE most EFFECTIVE OF THE INFIGHTING will BE LARGELY BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTERS COALITION AND THE DISAPPROVING MINISTERS. THE LATTER IS EXPECTED TO OUTNUMBER THE FORMER.
SECRET

It is almost certain that a process similar to the one used in Iranian politics, which includes the use of hostages as a means of securing political goals, is currently underway. This process, which involves the use of hostages in order to exert pressure on governments and achieve political objectives, is neither new nor unique to Iran. It has been employed by various groups and regimes around the world, including Islamic fundamentalists, as a means of acquiring concessions and exerting influence.

In the case of Iran, the use of hostages as a political tool is well-documented, with the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran being a prime example. The hijacking of the U.S. embassy led to a prolonged standoff and international tensions, with the United States remaining steadfast in its demand for the release of the hostages.

While the specific objectives and methodology may vary, the underlying principle remains the same: the use of hostages as a means of achieving political goals. The threat of violence, as well as the specter of further hostage incidents, serves to undermine international stability and security.

These events highlight the importance of diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes peacefully and the need for international cooperation to prevent the hijacking of embassies and other diplomatic missions. It is crucial to maintain open lines of communication and to engage in constructive dialogue in order to address the underlying causes of such incidents and to prevent their recurrence.
B. (18) IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT ALL HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN CONSOLIDATED IN ONE LOCATION FOR ANY PROTRACTED PERIOD WITHOUT THE PROBABLE LEAD TO THE POTENTIAL FOR A SECOND RESCUE ATTEMPT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER SUICIDE ATTEMPT SUCH AS COMMITTED 7 NOVEMBER EFFORT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES THREATENING MILITANT AND CLERGY CONTROL AND NECESSITATING THAT THEY KEEP THE HOSTAGE POPULATION IN THE SAME TIME, THE POTENTIAL RESOLUTION OF HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE NECESSITATES THAT THE
6. OUTLOOK: ALTHOUGH DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS ARE APPARENTLY PROGRESSING, THE PACE WILL CONTINUE TO BE EXTREMELY SLOW WITH NEITHER SIDE, PARTICULARLY THE IRANIAN PARTIES FEELING PUSHED FOR TIME. THE QUESTION OF RELEASE OF IRANIAN FUNDS AND USE DECLARATION OF FUTURE CLAIMS AGAINST THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT ARE AREAS WHERE THE IRANIANS ARE INCLINED TO HAGGLE AND SEEK ABSOLUTE GUARANTEES (OR POSITIVE ACTIONS) BEFORE ANY MAJOR RELEASE OCCURS. A SMALL SCALE NOMINAL RELEASE IS POSSIBLE BUT IT IS ALSO HIGHLY POSSIBLE THAT SOME IRANIAN HARDLINES, ASIDE/SEPARATE FROM THE GOVERNMENT WILL SEEK TO DETAIN SOME OF THE HOSTAGES (POSSIBLY THE "SPIES," WAR CRIMINALS AND ACCUSED FELONS) INDEFINITELY AS A GUARANTEE OF U.S. GOOD FAITH.

EVE 17 DEC 80
EI

SECRET
EVIN PRISON-TEHRAN, IRAN, 354840N 0512300E

PRISON BUILDING-95X73 METERS
WALLED PRISON COMPOUND-116X88 METERS
WALL AROUND COMPOUND IS APRX 1 METER THICK AND IS VARYING IN HEIGHT.

A SECURITY BLDG IS ADJACENT TO THE SOUTHWEST PORTION OF WALLED COMPOUND.

AN ADMINISTRATION BLDG IS ADJACENT TO SOUTHWEST CORNER OF WALLED COMPOUND.

A SECONDARY 1 METER THICK WALL RUNS PARALLEL TO THE WESTERN SIDE OF WALLED COMPOUND AT DISTANCES FROM 15-20 METERS.

TERTIARY 1 METER THICK WALL SURROUNDS COMPLEX AT DISTANCES VARYING FROM 150-610 METERS.

ALL WALLS APPEAR TO BE OF CONCRETE BLOCK CONSTRUCTION.

NO GUARD TOWERS ARE VISIBLE ALONG ANY OF THE WALLS OR COMPOUND.

THERE IS ONLY ONE ENTRANCE TO THE PRISON AND IT IS THROUGH THE TERTIARY WALL IN THE SOUTHWEST QUADRANT.
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDESTFOR: USS LASALLE, USS AINSWORTH, USS MILLER, and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa. USS AYLWIN departing Persian Gulf enroute outchop to Mediterranean.

-- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA PVST Pusan, Korea until 13 December 1979.

-- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally Three (1 ART) deployed to Four AC-130H at

-- Fourteen B-52H aircraft from Ellsworth AFB, SD have deployed to Guam as a portion of a CINCSAC directed Operational Readiness Inspection. The first cell of three bombers was airborne at 092000 EST. The last cell will close at 111200 EST. (Fact Sheet at Tab I-3)

-- One of two E-3A aircraft deployed to Sigonella is flying today on an eight-hour mission in the warm-up is complete. Selected equipment and majority of personnel will be returned to or (Tab B)

-- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

-- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carryer aircraft attacks and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.

-- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 016 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- An oiler, amphibious ship, and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.

-- In the Red Sea, an auxiliary is in the strait, a light frigate and three auxiliaries are in the south, and a frigate and auxiliary are transiting southerly in the central area.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- The situation at Tabriz remains extremely confused. Press reports indicate some local units have joined the dissidents.

-- Former Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr said Iran has lost its chance to bring the Shah to justice and should release the hostages.

(C) The Argentine Combattante missile patrol boats should not be underestimated.

Prepared by
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792
WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  - USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.
  - MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE, USS AINSWORTH, USS MILLER, and
    USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER
    returning from port visit in Mombassa. USS AYLWIN
    departing Persian Gulf en route out of port to Mediterranean.
  - Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.
  - USS CORAL SEA PVST Pusan, Korea until 13 December 1979.
  - USS FORESTAL has inched up to Sixth Fleet.

- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally
to Three (1 ART) deployed to
Four AC-130H at

- Fourteen B-52H aircraft from Ellsworth AFB, SD have
deployed to Guam as a portion of a CINCAC directed
Operational Readiness Inspection. The first cell of
three bombers was airborne at 092000 EST. The last
cell will close at 111530 EST. (Message at Tab I-4)

- Two E-3A aircraft closed at Sigonella, Italy at 090313
EST. While deployed, they will conduct training missions
with the Sixth Fleet, other U.S. forces, and with forces
from NATO and other friendly countries. The first mission
is scheduled for tomorrow, 11 December. (Tab B) (Execute
and PA Guidance messages at Tab H)

- Warm-up is complete. Ten C-141 loads of
equipment and personnel have been delivered. Six of these
were warm-up and four were pre-positioning E-3A support.
Selected equipment and majority of personnel will be
returned to

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carrying aircraft attacks
  and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.

- MINING OPERATIONS: Summary and legal discussion at Tab C.

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 014 & 015, TAB I-1)

- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.

TOP SECRET

COPY # 8 OF 8
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- An auxiliary and amphibious ship have left port in Aden and joined with a guided missile cruiser off the coast of Yemen.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- Relations between Iraq and Iran are expected to continue to deteriorate.

-- Revolutionary Guard forces in Kurdistan are also wrought with problems. These problems will likely grow with Kurd successes and harsh mountain weather.

-- According to press reports, pro-Shariat-Madari forces sent five jet fighters screaming over Tabriz. This lends to support early reports that some air force elements had joined the disidents.

Prepared by
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792
10 December 1979
WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa; USS AINSWORTH off Oman enroute Persian Gulf. USS AYLWIN and USS MILLER in port Bahrain. AYLWIN will remain in Persian Gulf until MILLER is repaired or AINSWORTH arrives.

-- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA off Korea. ETA Subic Bay is 9 Dec 79.

-- USS FORRESTAL has inchopped to Sixth Fleet.

-- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to Three (1 ART) deployed to Four KC-130H at .

-- Two E-3A at Langley AFB, Va awaiting direction to forward deploy to Mediterranean area or . In anticipation of E-3A deployment, two C-141's will aboard E-3A direct support personnel and equipment at . Four C-141's have delivered E-3A comm, logistics, and base support to . Subsequent E-3A support aircraft will plan to transit . (Details at Tab B).

-- The six missions for warm-up have closed at .

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

-- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carrier aircraft attacks and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.

MINING OPERATIONS: Summary and legal discussion at Tab C.

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 013, TAB H-1)

-- USS SAN JOSE has delivered mines to USS MIDWAY and RH-53 tail rotor and extended range tanks to USS KITTY HAWK.

-- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts. USS MILLER in port at Bahrain for repair to compass and fire control systems.

-- USS MIDWAY starboard catapult repaired. Number two main engine should be repaired by 081300EST.
SOVIET TATTLETAII ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

--- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAW and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper has moved toward the Strait of Hormuz and a cruiser has withdrawn toward the Gulf of Oman.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

--- DIA papers on Iraqi intentions toward Iran and Egypt/Libya relations are at Tabs H-4 and H-5.

--- At the moment, Tabriz appears to be quiet, however, tension is high.

Prepared by:
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792
8 December 1979
DEPLOYMENTS:

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa; USS AINSWORTH off Oman enroute Persian Gulf. USS AYLWIN and USS MILLER in port Bahrain. AYLWIN will remain in Persian Gulf until MILLER is repaired or AINSWORTH arrives.

-- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA off Korea. ETA Subic Bay is 9 Dec 79.

-- USS FORRESTAL has inchopped to Sixth Fleet.

-- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to. Three (1 ART) deployed to Four AC-130s at

-- Two E-3A at Langley AFB, Va awaiting direction to forward deploy to Mediterranean area (Details at TAB B)

-- The six missions for warm-up have arrived. The first follow-on C-141 off-loaded on 6 Dec. Two C-141's are scheduled daily through 11 Dec. (Status report at Tab B)

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- MINING OPERATIONS: (Details at TAB C)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 012, TAB B-1)

-- USS SAN JOSE transporting mines to USS MIDWAY and RH-53 tail rotor and extended range tanks to USS KITTY HAWK. ETA is 071230EST.

-- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts. USS MILLER in port at Bahrain for repair to compass and fire control systems.

-- USS MIDWAY mechanical problems with starboard catapult and number two main engine should be repaired by 070800EST.
SOVIET TATTLETAIl ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, CG, MSF, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups.

Other deployments have remained rather static for the past several days.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- CJCS and ACJCS questions on Iraqi intentions toward Iran and Egypt/Libya relations have been answered by DIA with papers at Tabs H-4 and H-5.

Recent joint cruise of these internal squabbles, the current US/Iranian crisis will not benefit.

Prepared by: OJCS/OPG EXT 51/26/7 Dec 79
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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS:

- KC-135 Tankers: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally deployed to [redacted]. Three (1 ART) deployed to [redacted].
- The last two of the six [redacted] warm-up missions have departed CONUS. The final mission is scheduled to close at 061100 EST. Status report at TAB B.
- Two F-111s have been directed to deploy from Tinker AFB to [redacted]. They depart Langley today and arrive 070300 EST. One supporting KC-135 will arrive on 8 and 9 Dec. (2 total). Airlift support for the deployment is limited to two C-141 sorties per day and will close on 11 December. Deployment concept at TAB B.
- USS KITTY HAWK: (TG 70.2) on station in Arabian Sea.
- USS MIDWAY (TG 70.1) on station in Arabian Sea.
- USS CORAL SEA: Enroute Subic Bay, RP. ETA is 9 Dec 79.
- Pacific MAU: EVST Subic Bay, RP.

MINING OPERATIONS: (Details at TAB C-1)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 010, TAB H-1)

- USS MIDWAY starboard catapult estimated in commission time is now 060800 EST. MIDWAY airwing remains fully capable of executing Option ALPHA.
- USS SAN JOSE is transporting tail rotor and six extended range fuel tanks for RH-53.
- USS KNOX anchored at Diego Garcia awaiting arrival of parts and repair personnel aboard USS DIXIE. DIXIE ETA Diego Garcia is 15 Dec. Repairs will take additional 2-3 days.
- USS MILLER mechanical problems will prevent relief of USS AYLWIN as originally planned. AYLWIN will be retained in Persian Gulf until MILLER is repaired or USS AINSWORTH arrives.
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted]. (TAB B & I-2)
- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK are on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- USS FLASHER arrived to relieve USS PINTADO.
- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER departed port Djibouti. USS LASALLE is in port Bahrain.
- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- Pacific MAU departed Subic Bay enroute Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay.
- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINC PAC SITREP 024 TAB I-1)

- USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.
- USS STEIN limited to 15kts pending propeller inspection.
- RH-53 status: 3 FMC, 1 MC, 2 non-mission capable (one for power supply and one for hydraulic).
- E-3A Status: 1 FMC, 1 MC (Auxiliary Rotodome Drive).

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

- A DDG, FFG, MSG, and AGOR and their supporting auxiliaries are in the vicinity of the USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups.
SOVIET TITTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic) (Cont'd)

---

In the Red Sea, two auxiliary patrol boats, an amphibious transport vehicle, and two trawlers are near the gulf.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

---

On 17 Dec meeting with Swiss Ambassador, Ghotbzadeh said question of trying the hostages was the most difficult he has had to discuss with Khomeini. Ghotbzadeh said he was unable to convince terrorists to forgo trials. Also "Student Statement 75" affirmed stance that if Shah is not delivered, "the least we can do will be to put the American spies on trial."

Swiss Ambassador was denied request to visit US charge. Problem stems from occupation of Foreign Ministry by Iranian volunteers for Lebanon. Ministry now guarded by a "new type of militia" numbering about 150.

Ethnic Arabs are continuing anti-American campaign. On 18 Dec a bomb was thrown against pipeline and starting a fire. Other bombs were disarmed.

Revolutionary authorities destroying evidence of the crimes.

Prepared by: [Redacted] Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 19 December 1979
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 December 1979.

- **DEPLOYMENTS:** (Overview Graphic)

  -- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] One is scheduled to fly today (18 Dec). (Tab B)

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK are on station in Arabian Sea.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is in port Djibouti. USS MILLER is in port Bahrain.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU is in Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is operating in the South China Sea. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.

  -- Shore based aircraft

    --- [redacted] 7 P-3; 3 KC-135.

    --- [redacted] E-6B/EC-130.

- **OPTION PAPERS:** (Option TABs)

- **OPERATIONAL READINESS:** (CINCPAC SITREP 023 TAB I-I)

  -- USS KNOX is in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.

- **SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES:** (Overview Graphic)
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic) (Cont'd)

-- Two Soviet IL-38s surveilled the carrier battle groups during deployment --

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- Confusion as to the timing for hostage release and/or trials continues. Ghotbzadeh said he would "consult" with the students. Khomeini's statements have supported the students. Expect an "international team" will visit hostages over Christmas. This morning, press reports students saying Ghotbzadeh's statements were irresponsible.

-- Press reports a grenade exploded during a military training session with young girls, killing one and seriously wounding thirteen.

-- Yesterday USCINCSO reported leftist student activity protesting the Shah's arrival. There was no damage.
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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS\(^{(c)}\) (Overview Graphic)
  
  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK are on station in Arabian Sea.
  
  -- MIDESTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is operating in the Gulf of Aden.
  
  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  
  -- Pacific MAU is in Subic Bay.
  
  -- USS CORAL SEA is operating in the South China Sea. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.
  
  -- JCS 151801Z Dec 79 (TAB H) directed the deployment of E-3A aircraft and necessary support elements to Two E-3A aircraft closed at 160745 EST and 160815 EST Dec.
  
  -- Shore based aircraft
    
    -- 7 P-3; 3 KC-135; 1 US-3A.
    
    -- 4 AC-130.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 022 TAB I-1)
  
  -- USS KNOX is in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.
  
  -- One US-3A aircraft at Diego Garcia is down for electrical problems. ETR unknown.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting auxiliaries continue operations in the vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups.

-- The Soviet minesweeper normally stationed in the Strait of Hormuz conducted refueling operations in the vicinity of the KITTY HAWK BG and operated near the MIDWAY BG on 16 Dec.

-- An amphibious ship, two guided missile cruisers, and an oiler are near Socotra Island.

-- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, and a light frigate, a frigate, and an auxiliary are in the south.

-- Two Soviet IL-38S and two AN-12 CUBS operated in the vicinity of the carrier battle groups on 15-16 Dec.

(S) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab E)

Prepared by

Commander, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792
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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 December 1979.

- **DEPLOYMENTS:** (Overview Graphic)
  - USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.
  - MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa.
  - Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.
  - USS CORAL SEA is enroute Subic Bay. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.
  - Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to Three (1 ART) deployed to Four AC-130H at
  - The third E-3A demonstration mission is scheduled for today. Primary mission objective will be to operate with USS NIMITZ and USS ALBANY in an anti-air warfare role (TAB B).
  - JCS 142144Z Dec 79 (TAB H) was an alert order directing USCINCEUR to prepare to deploy 2 E-3A aircraft and support to conduct training, orientation, and demonstration operations. Anticipate unit will move tomorrow, 16 Dec 79. Detailed procedures for cover and deception, press guidance, communications, and mail forwarding were developed and are included at TAB C.

- **OPTION PAPERS:** (Option TABs)

- **OPERATIONAL READINESS:** (CINCPAC SITREP 020 TAB I-1)
  - USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia. Repair parts arrived on the USS DAVIS. While repair has begun, exact in-commission date is not yet known.
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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is enroute Subic Bay. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.

-- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to Three (1 ART) deployed to Four AC-130H at

-- The two E-3As deployed to Sigonella flew their second interoperability demonstration yesterday. The next mission is planned for tomorrow, 15 Dec. Proposals to deploy the 2 E-3A to are being staffed. (Tab B)

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 018 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.

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SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting auxiliaries continue in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- An amphibious ship, two guided missile cruisers and an oiler are near Socotra Island.

-- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, a light frigate, frigate, and auxiliary are in the south.

-- There have been no aerial surveillance flights since 14 Dec.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab E)

-- Press reports that twelve western ambassadors met with Gotbzadeh yesterday to organize a committee to visit the hostages within 48 hours.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting auxiliaries continue in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- An amphibious ship and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.

-- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the vicinity of the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, a light frigate, frigate, and auxiliary are in the south.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab E)

-- Unrest in Tabriz continues with at least one-half million people, including hundreds of uniformed military, demonstrating their support for Shariat-Madari.

-- There was no significant military activity to report.

-- DIA prepared a special report on Libya's potential for military support to Iran (Tab I-2). While Qadhafi may wish to provide military aid and does possess vast quantities of Soviet supplied weapons, he lacks the logistical capacity to transport or support more than a token force.

Prepared by: [Redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE, USS AINSWORTH, USS MILLER, and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa.

-- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is departing Pusan, Korea today for operations in the East China Sea enroute Subic Bay. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.

-- Aircraft: Four ARTS augmenting six KC-135s normally to Three (1 ART) deployed Four AC-130H at

The four AC-130's at have been flying sorties to Korea as well as in and around A summary of recent missions is contained at TAB 1-2.

The two E-3A's deployed to Sigonella stood down yesterday. The second mission is flying today in the Western Mediterranean basin. Mission objective is to again demonstrate E-3A system interoperability with USN aircraft and ships (TAB B).

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABS)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 018 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.

SPECIAL ITEM: The "ENERGY DETERMINATION" a US owned, Liberian registered, 320,000 ton tanker experienced an explosion while transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Reported conjecture is that the explosion was internal and tore a 60'X 60' hole in side. The Omani Navy has recovered 37 of 38 crewmembers (TAB I-3).
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

--- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

--- An amphibious ship and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.

--- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the vicinity of the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, a light frigate, frigate, and auxiliary are in the south.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab B)

--- The story that the hostages will be released on Christmas eve is circulating diplomatic circles in Iran.

--- Rail shipments into Iran from Eastern and Western Europe and the Soviet Union have virtually ceased.

Prepared by: Lieutenant Colonel, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792
WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE, USS AINSWORTH, USS MILLER, and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombasa. USS AYLWIN departing Persian Gulf enroute outchop to Mediterranean.

-- USS PASSUMPSIC (Oiler) is departing Arabian Sea and will be replaced by USS WHITE PLAINS. USS DIXIE is inbound to Diego Garcia.

-- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA PVST Pusan, Korea until 13 December 1979.

-- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally. Three (1 ART) deployed to Guam as a portion of a CINCSAC directed Operational Readiness Inspection. The first cell of three bombers was airborne at 092000 EST. The last cell closed at 111121 EST. (Fact Sheet at Tab I-3)

-- Fourteen B-52H aircraft from Ellsworth AFB, SD have deployed to Guam as a portion of a CINCSAC directed Operational Readiness Inspection. The first cell of three bombers was airborne at 092000 EST. The last cell closed at 111121 EST. (Fact Sheet at Tab I-3)

-- One of two E-3A aircraft deployed to Sigonella flew a maritime mission yesterday in and demonstrated E-3A system interoperability with USN aircraft as well as with the USS FORRESTAL, USS NIMITZ, and USS ALBANY. (Tab B)

-- Warm-up is complete. Repositioning of selected E-3A equipment and personnel is on hold pending discussions with the Government of (Tab C).

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

-- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carrer aircraft attacks and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC STREP 017 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- An oiler, amphibious ship, and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.

-- In the Red Sea, a light frigate and four auxiliaries are in the south and a frigate and auxiliary are transiting southerly in the central area.

-- A guided missile cruiser has left the Sechelles and is transiting northward.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- The situation in northwestern Iran remains unstable.

Prepared by Harold E. Watson
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792
WORKING PAPER  
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two B-52A and two KC-135 aircraft are at [deleted] (TAB B & I-2). One unilateral flight was conducted on 30 Dec. No flight activity scheduled for 31 Dec.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is inport Djibouti.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU is inport Singapore.

-- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 036, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 021, TAB I-2)

-- 4 of 6 RH-53 FMC. One down for flight controls and one down for excessive low frequency vibrations.

-- JP-5 status [deleted] 17,123,400 gallons.

-- KITTY HAWK boiler causualty corrected.
SECRET

SOVIET TATTLETAIl ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile destroyer and a minesweeper continue surveillance operations against USS MIDWAY while a guided missile frigate and an intelligence collector are surveilling KITTY HAWK.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Secretary General Waldheim is scheduled to leave for Iran today in an attempt to secure the release of the hostages. Both Khomeini and the militants at the embassy have flatly rejected the visit.

TOP SECRET

Prepared by: [Redacted] CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 31 Dec 79
TOP SECRET

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A and two KC-135 aircraft are at (TAB B & I-2). One unilateral flight was conducted on 28 Dec

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is operating in the Gulf of Aden.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU enroute to Singapore for port visit (ETA 31 Dec)

-- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 034, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 01 TAB I-2)


-- 3 of 6 RH-53 FMC. One down for flight controls, one down for excessive low frequency vibrations, and one down for engine change. Replacement engine scheduled for transport from Diego Garcia via WHITE PLAINS (ETR 5 Jan ).

-- JP-5 status 17,257,600 gallons.

COPY # OF 7
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile destroyer, a minesweeper, a guided missile frigate, an intelligence collector, and two auxiliaries remain in the vicinity of TF-70.

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Certain consumer items are in extremely short supply in Teheran and hoarding has become a problem. Rice and sugar are difficult to obtain and detergent soap sells at inflated prices.

Prepared by: CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 29 Dec 79
WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT 23 Jan 80. NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A and two KC-135 aircraft are at (TAB B & I-2). An E-3A/TF 70 interface training mission was flown yesterday from to the Indian Ocean. The E-3A spent nearly four hours on station with TF-70.

-- Four KC-135's at Diego Garcia supported E-3A operation.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- MIDESTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is operating in the Gulf of Aden.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU enroute to Singapore for port visit (ETA 31 Dec)

-- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

-- CINCPAC has forwarded a Turnover and Logistic Support Plan for Battle Groups deployed in the Indian Ocean (Tab I-4).

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABS)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 033, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 018, TAB I-2)

-- Boiler repairs to the USS LASALLE completed. Maximum speed is 17 kts.

-- USS KITTY HAWK reports casualties to two boilers. Maximum speed is 28 kts. ETR unknown.

The DDG joined with a minesweeper, guided missile frigate, and intelligence collector in the vicinity of the USS MIDWAY and KITTY HAWK Task Groups.

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- The coup in Afghanistan has apparently been successful, probably with Soviet backing. Prime Minister Amin has been executed and replaced by Vice Prime Minister Babrak.

-- Statements regarding hostages, trials, and a grand jury are still confusing. Beheshti said hostages would be released after a trial designed to lay bare US involvement. Qotbadeh said if US continues pressure, especially economic blockade, he would go ahead with spy trials. A coordinating committee and Revolutionary Council has been formed.

There may have been an Iraq/Iran border skirmish yesterday. Iranian press reports Iraqis crossed the border and used heavy weapons.

-- The British Embassy reduced its diplomatic representation from twenty personnel to eight. The staff numbered 67 a year ago.
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 December 1979.

**DEPLOYMENTS:** (Overview Graphic)

--- USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT 23 Jan 80. NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80.

--- Two E-3A and two KC-135 aircraft are at (TAB B & I-2) An E-3A/TF 70 interface training sortie is scheduled for 26/27 Dec; takeoff from Wadi Kena at 261700 EST. Plan for 3 hours on-station time and three refuelings.

--- Four KC-135's at to support E-3A operation.

--- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

--- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in port Djibouti.

--- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic. San Jose departing Arabian Sea enroute Subic Bay.

--- Pacific MAU departs Hong Kong tonight enroute Singapore for port visit. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay until 29 Dec then visit Dumaguet PI.

--- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

--- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

--- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 031 TAB I-1, CINCEUR 016 TAB I-2)

--- USS KNOX has been repaired and is enroute MODLOC. ETA 27 Dec 79.

--- USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.

--- USS RAY limited to 28Kts due to problems with port engine main reduction gear. ETR 24 Jan 80.

--- RH-53 Status: 5 FMC, 1 down for hydraulic system.

--- E-3A status: 2 FMC.

--- AC-130: 4 FMC.
- There are 594,000 gal of ___ at ___ -- enough for 8
  Fuel testing should be completed on 28 Dec
  79.

(5) SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

- A MSF, AGI and FFG are continuing surveillance of TG 70.
  A DDG remains on barrier patrol in the Strait of Hormuz.
- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

- Three American clergy who visited Embassy saw only 43
  hostages. There is no explanation of the discrepancy between
  50 reported by State and 43 sighted by the clergy.

- Ayatollah Beheshti, General Secretary of the Revolutionary
  Council, said Iran could not negotiate under pressure and that
  hostages would not be released until after "Grand Jury" proceed-
  ings. Also said may have difficulty obtaining hostage release
  even when and if Khomeini orders it.

- Armed Forces Chief of Staff was removed and Major General
  Hadi Shadmehr recalled from retirement to replace him.

- Iran's Oil Minister has stated Iran does not intend to
  cause a crisis in the industrialized world. However, if revolution
  is threatened, the regime is prepared to suspend all oil exports.

Prepared by: [Redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 26 Dec 79
DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT 23 Jan 80. NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80.

- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). The third mission was flown yesterday with [redacted] accompanying flight. Planning continues for a joint US/ demonstration flight.

- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in port [redacted].

- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic. San Jose departing Arabian Sea enroute Subic Bay.

- Pacific MAU in port Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay. Options for port calls which would put MAU closer to Indian Ocean have been developed. (TAB I-3)

- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 027 TAB I-1)

- USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.

- USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.

- USS RAY air search radar inoperative. ETR 1 Jan 80.

- RH-53 Status: 5 FMC, 1 limited by windshield distortion with night vision devices, OK for day operations.

- E-3A status: 2 FMC.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A MSF, AGI and FFG are continuing surveillance of TG 70. A DDG remains on barrier patrol in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Press reports that Gotbazedeh resigned yesterday.

-- Khomeini met with the Revolutionary Council on 20 & 21 Dec. While the hostage situation was discussed, there have been no public announcements of any meeting details.

-- Troubles continue in Iran's provinces.

Prepared by: Lieutenant Colonel, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 22 Dec 1979
WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on
21, December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship
nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT
23 Jan 80. Dept of State has asked USMISSION NATO to
advise DPC permanent representatives that US will tempo-
orarily deploy a Med CVBG to the IO. (Messages at TAB H)

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at (TAB B & I-2)
A crew orientation mission was flown yesterday. Planning
continues for a joint US/ demonstration flight.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in
Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and
options.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in
Gulf of Aden.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will
remain in Subic Bay. Options for port calls which would
put MAU closer to Indian Ocean have been developed. (TAB I-3)

-- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 026 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR
31 Dec.

-- USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations
and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will
be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.

-- USS MIDWAY port catapult track seal has been repaired.

-- RH-53 status: 4 FMC, 2 non-mission capable (one for
phase maintenance and one for hydraulics).

-- E-3A status: 2 FMC.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Two IL-38 MAY aircraft operated in the vicinity of the KITTY HAWK and MIDWAY Task Groups yesterday.

-- A MSF and FFG are continuing surveillance of TG 70. The DDG has assumed a barrier patrol in the Strait of Hormuz.

Other Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean remain rather static. Locations are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Several sources expect Ghotbzadeh to resign in the near future.

-- Terrorists occupied the Iranian Embassy in Stockholm following the arrest of Iranian Ambassador to Sweden.

-- Kuwaiti press reported Khomeini was to decide the fate of hostages after yesterday's hearing the Revolutionary Council' views.

Prepared by: Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 21 Dec 1979
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2) Orientation flight planned for officials yesterday cancelled due to late arrival and disposition of VIPs.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- MIDEAFTOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Gulf of Aden after port visit Djibouti.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU enroute Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 025 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.

-- USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.

-- USS MIDWAY port catapult down for track seal. ETR 201300EST.

-- RH-53 status: 4 FMC, 2 non-mission capable (one for phase maintenance and one for hydraulics).

-- E-3A status: 1 FMC, 1 MC (auxiliary rotodome drive)

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Two IL-38 MAY aircraft operated in vicinity of KITTY HAWK TG today.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic) (Cont'd)

A DDG, FFG, MSE.

The amphibious ship and two guided missile cruisers near Socotra Island were joined by an FPL and aux.

In the Red Sea, two auxiliaries are in the southern strait: an amphibious landing ship, AGOR, and two auxiliaries are near Dehalak Island.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE:

Yesterday, a spokesman for a group of pro-Khomeini Iranians in Australia said his group had been briefed that eight hostages would be tried for espionage. The remainder would be released.

The Kurdish Democratic Party announced the termination of the cease fire agreement. A clash between Kurds and Revolutionary Guards in Sanandaj resulted in 18 guards killed and two others wounded.

Prepared by:
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 20 Dec 1979
SECRET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force.

- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

- Charge Laingen was contacted by State at the Foreign Ministry. There has been no further reporting on the alleged trial of LtCol Roeder.

- In an American television interview, Secretary General Waldheim said his impression was that Khomeini was primarily a spiritual leader and not involved in day to day politics. Consequently, while Waldheim claimed the Revolutionary Committee was desirous of ending the crisis, he was less sanguine that the terrorists would agree in the near future.

- A Jerusalem domestic television service reported yesterday that "Egypt has put a large airbase at the disposal of the United States." They also commented negatively that the US had refused Israeli offers of bases but had begun a buildup in Egypt without informing Jerusalem.

- The Soviet Union continues to battle in Afghanistan having taken control of all major towns and cities but still receiving heavy resistance in many areas.

- Rumors persist that 1000 tanks will move into Afghanistan to end the opposition by the end of January.

Prepared by: LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 7 Jan 80.
TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

AS OF: 0700 5 Jan 80

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
on 5 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is
enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at (*). (TAB B 1-2).
First, * familiarization mission flown yesterday.
Controllers did well controlling intercepts and
who also flew, was extremely pleased. A second,
* familiarization flight is being flown today. Planning continues for
a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 13 or 14 Jan.

-- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from Keflavik,
Iceland to (*). ETA 7 Jan 80.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian
Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- MIDDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red
Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU departed Singapore. ETA Subic Bay is 7 Jan 80.

-- USS CORAL SEA is import Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 041, TAB I-1,
CINCEUR SITREP 026, TAB I-2)

-- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max
speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego
Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.

-- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing gear strut,
one flight control rod must be repaired.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force.

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Soviet CUB aircraft transitting the Arabian Sea were again escorted by TG 70 aircraft.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- The militants have demanded that the Iranian Foreign Ministry hand over U.S. Charge Bruce Laingen for questioning. They also announced that LtCol Roeder will be tried based on his Vietnam service.

However, it is doubtful that Khomeini can control the terrorists. They will probably insist on trials.

Prepared by: LTCOL, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 5 Jan 80.
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
OVERVIEW FOR USE BY THE ACTING CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON JANUARY 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS:
  - USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) departed Italian ports last night enroute Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.
  - Two E-3A aircraft are at . (TAB B & I-2). First familiarization mission scheduled for today. Possible DV flight on 6 Jan. JCS 032341Z Jan 80 directed USCINCEUR to plan for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 13 or 14 Jan.
  - JCS personnel and satellite communications terminal have arrived.
  - Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from Keflavik, Iceland to ETA 7 Jan 80.
  - USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
  - Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - Pacific MAU inport Singapore. JCS 032104Z Jan 80 released MAU to continue to outchop and requested JCS be informed of composition of inchopping MAU if MAU directed to IO.
  - USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS:
  - OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 040, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 025, TAB I-2)
    - RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
    - LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.
    - RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing gear strut, one flight control rod must be repaired.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, auxiliary, and two oilers are in close vicinity of Task Force.

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Soviet CUB aircraft transitting the Arabian Sea were escorted by TG 70 aircraft.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- The Soviet Embassy in Tehran was stormed for the second time in three days, but the crowd was turned back. The Soviet Ambassador in Tehran met with Khomeini yesterday to protest the first attack on the embassy. Press reports stated the Ambassador dropped broad hints concerning helping leftwing Fedayeen guerrillas and other rebels:

-- Tehran radio is appealing to other Muslims to unite behind Iranian foreign policy objectives.

Prepared by: LTCOL, USAF CJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 4 Jan 80.
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
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(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
on 3 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN
39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth
Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and
CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian
Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted]. (TAB B &
I-2). Two flights flown on 2 Jan. Next sortie scheduled
for 4 Jan as first familiarization mission.

-- AC-130 personnel (144) depart [redacted] today returning
to [redacted] after holidays at home station. ETA [redacted]
040630 Jan 80.

-- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from
Keflavik, Iceland to [redacted].

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in
Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and
options.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER
is inport Djibouti.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU is inport Singapore.

-- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 037, TAB I-1,
CINCEUR 022, TAB I-2)

-- MIDWAY port catapult repaired.

-- RAY has one gas turbine down, max speed 19 kts.
Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25
Jan.

-- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.

-- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing
gear strut, one flight control rod must be repaired.
SOVIET TATITLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, auxiliary, and oiler are in close vicinity of Task Force. An oiler and

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Soviet IL-28 MAYs conducted thirteenth mission against TF 70.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

Prepared by: LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 2 Jan 80.
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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 January 1980.

- **DEPLOYMENTS:** (Overview Graphic)

  -- **USS NIMITZ** Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.

  -- Two E-3A aircraft are at **[REDACTED]** (TAB B & I-2). No flights on 1 Jan. Two flights scheduled for 2 Jan.

  -- **USS MIDWAY** and **USS KITTY HAWK** continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

  -- MIDESTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is import Djibouti and USS LASALLE is import Bahrain.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU is import Singapore.

  -- **USS CORAL SEA** is import Subic Bay.

- **OPTION PAPERS:** (Option TABs)

- **OPERATIONAL READINESS:** (CINCPAC SITREP 036, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 021, TAB I-2)

  -- JP-5 status **[REDACTED]** 17,018,400 gallons.

  -- MIDWAY port catapult reported down for maintenance. ETR 2 Jan.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- In the northern Arabian Sea, USS KITTY HAWK reported that a miscellaneous
missile destroyer continues close surveillance of USS MIDWAY as the intelligence collector, which joined the
destroyer 31 Dec, eventually faded from MIDWAY radar yesterday evening. A fleet minesweeper continues
surveillance operations in the vicinity of the task
groups.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview
Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

Prepared by: CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 31 Dec 79
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
AS OF: 0700 9 Jan 80

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at TAB B & I-2. They are flying an orientation mission today. Planning continues for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 12/13 Jan.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for RM-16 (see RH-53 information below).


-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 045, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 030, TAB I-2)

-- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.

-- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Yesterday, during turn-up, one aircraft rotor head shifted with blades folded causing extensive damage, ETR is unknown. A second helo has a damaged main landing gear strut, ETR 12 Jan. Third helo has several discrepancies, ETR unknown. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- IL-38s flew a recce mission of TF-70 yesterday.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- The World Liberation Movements conference sponsored by the Embassy terrorists has elected Ayatollah Mousavi Khoeni, a spiritual leader of the terrorists, Chairman. Abu Jihad of the PLO was selected Deputy Chairman.

Prepared by: LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 9 Jan 80.
TOP SECRET

AS OF: 0700 8 Jan 80

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(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). The fourth, a familiarization mission was flown yesterday with excellent results. Planning continues for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 12/13 Jan.

-- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft arrived today.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.


-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU arrives Subic Bay today.

-- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINC PAC SITREP 044, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 029, TAB I-2)

-- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.

-- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. During turn-up, one aircraft rotor head shifted with blades folded causing extensive damage; fourth aircraft can be repaired through cannibalization.

-- An F-4J crashed after launch from MIDWAY. Both crewmen recovered with no injuries.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force.

--- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

IL-38s are flying a recce mission of TF-70 today.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

- Laingen remains at the Foreign Ministry. There is no further information concerning Lieutenant Koeder.

--- Domestic violence continues throughout Iran.

- Eight Western journalists were expelled from the city and all three U.S. TV networks had satellite feeds from Tabriz interrupted.

Khomeini remains unperturbed by the disorder and retains the belief that the nation can be distracted from internal problems by anti-U.S. hysteria. The hostage drama plays a central part. They also feel Khomeini is cut off from the realities of life and remains sure of his infallibility.

--- Khomeini announced he would take a vacation from 12-27 January.
WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- **USS NIMITZ** Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. Nimitz group chopped to CINCLANT at 051901Z Jan 80. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at NAS Sigonella (TAB B & I-2). A second familiarization mission was flown Saturday but no fighter activity was conducted due to poor weather at fighter bases. A simulator tape demonstrated aircraft capabilities and procedures. The third familiarization flight flew yesterday and a fourth is flying today. Planning continues for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 12 or 13 Jan.

-- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from Reykjavik, Iceland to ETA 7 Jan 80.

-- **USS MIDWAY** and **USS KITTY HAWK** continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- **MIDEASTFOR:** On station in Persian Gulf. **USS GLOVER** in Red Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- **Pacific MAU** enroute Subic Bay. ETA is 8 Jan 80.

-- **USS CORAL SEA** is import Subic Bay.

**OPTION PAPERS:** (Option TABs)

**OPERATIONAL READINESS:** (CINCPAC SITREP 043, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 028, TAB I-2)

-- **RAY** has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with **DIXIE** at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- **LASALLE** has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.

-- **RH-53:** 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing gear strut, one flight control rod must be repaired.
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  
  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.
  
  -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS in Red Sea enroute Suez.
  
  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  
  -- Pacific MAU enroute Okinawa.
  
  -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.
  
  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.
  
  -- E-3A information at TAB B.
  
  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 067, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 050, TAB G-2)
  
  -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 1 Feb.
  
  -- RH-53: 7 of 8 FMC. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received. 2 of 8 HF comms in up status.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)
  
  -- A CG and a FFL remain in the Strait of Hormuz. AGI/MAX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF.
  
  -- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE:  (TAB D)

The tracked vision of the Rapier was developed for the Iranian Army.

Prepared by: CDR, OSN
OJCS/OPG Exé 52791, 31 Jan 80
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS in Red Sea enroute Suez.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU enroute Okinawa.

  -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.

  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.

  -- E-3A information at TAB B.

  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 067, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 050, TAB G-2)

  -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 1 Feb.

  -- RH-53: 7 of 8 FMC. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received. 2 of 8 HF comms in up status.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- A CG and a FPL remain in the Strait of Hormuz. AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF. A

  -- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.
The tracked vision of the Rapier was developed for the Iranian Army.

Prepared by: CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 31 Jan 80
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
WORKING PAPER
( Destroy when no longer needed )

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.
  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  -- Pacific MAU enroute Okinawa.
  -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.
  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.
  -- One E-3A deployed to Ciampino, Italy conducted ground display for Italian Minister of Defense on 29 Jan 80 (TAB B).
  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 066, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 049, TAB G-2)
  -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 1 Feb.
  -- RH-53: 7 of 8 FMC. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received. 4 of 8 HF comms in up status.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)
  -- A CG and FFL anchored in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF. A
  -- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.
Since the American Embassy takeover, Agusta Bell has been withholding delivery of CH-47 helicopters to Iran.

Prepared by: [Redacted] CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 30 Jan 80
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.


  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU in port Eniwetok for turnover today.

  -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.

  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.

  -- One E-3A deployed to Ciampino, Italy will conduct ground display for Italian Air Force Chief of Staff today. (TAB B)

  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 065, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 048, TAB G-2)

  -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 5 Feb.

  -- RH-53: 6 of 8 FMC. Seventh aborted flight check yesterday; ETR unknown. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received.

- SOVIET TATTLETAILS ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- A CG and FFL anchored in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF. A Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Final results of Iran's Presidential Election reveal Bandi-Sadr received 75.7% of the votes cast. Sixty percent of the eligible voters participated. The next electoral step is to select the National Consultative Assembly in late Feb or early Mar.

-- A Mexican TV crew was attacked while filming a demonstration in front of the American Embassy when a rival group attacked. There was one slight injury.

-- Canada has closed its embassy in Tehran and withdrawn its diplomats; Iranian hostages are freed.

Prepared by: [Redacted], USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 29 Jan 80
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 January 1980.

- **DEPLOYMENTS:** (Overview Graphic)

  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.


  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU in port for turnover tomorrow.

  -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.

  -- USS CORAL SEA port visit Singapore. ETD 28 Jan.

  -- Report of Air Force activities at TAB B.

  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- **OPTION PAPERS:** (Option TABs)

- **OPERATIONAL READINESS:** (CINCPAC SITREP 064, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 047, TAB G-2)

  -- RAY completed repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia and is enroute MODLOC. ETA 1 Feb.

  -- RH-53: 6 of 8 FMC. Expect seventh to be up today. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received.

- **SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES:** (Overview Graphic)

  -- A CG and FFL anchored in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF. A Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

  -- Two IL-38 MAYs flew a reconnaissance mission against the NIMITZ and MIDWAY today. (TAB D)
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Reports on Khomeini's health are extremely confused. Tehran radio reported he was improved and out of intensive care.

-- Bandi-Sadr has received over two-thirds of the votes cast. He has promised to resolve the hostage crisis and has played down the importance of that crisis vis-a-vis the possible threat from the USSR. While the press reports he has taken a more militant position in the last day or so, it is believed that he wants to quickly resolve the crisis and rebuild the country.

-- Afghan Army officer senior to Soviet military delegation led by two of attacks against Pakistani ground forces after attack does not appear to have originated with the insurgents.

-- Iran had made an attempt in October 1979 to seize the Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa and Tunbs and turn them over to the USSR. However, this attempt has not resulted in any significant action.

-- Iranian press reports the conviction and execution of four Iranian Air Force personnel for stealing weapons and supplying them to the insurgents in Tabriz.

-- Press reports six Afghan guerilla bands have agreed to have 150,000 dedicated to forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw.

Prepared by: LtCol, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 28 Jan 80
Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options except certain RH-53 options; RH-53 status below.


-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU enroute (not shown) for turnover on 29 Jan.

-- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.

-- USS CORAL SEA port visit Singapore. ETD 28 Jan.

-- One MC-130 (AAR capable) will arrive Hurghada from today.

-- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 062, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 047, TAB G-2)

-- RAY under repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.

-- RH-53: 5 of 8 FMC. Sixth aircraft scheduled for flight check on 27 Jan. Seventh is still undergoing extensive rotor repair. Eighth requires periodic inspection. Maximum effort is being dedicated to delivering parts and effecting repairs. ETRs for seventh and eighth are unknown.

COPY #7 OF 7
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A CG and FFL on station in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TG.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Although all of the votes are not in from Iran's first Presidential election, Bandi-Sadr has claimed victory after receiving approximately 80% of the votes in Tehran. He said his first priority would be the reconstitution of Iran's economy. "Reportedly he would seek a solution to the US hostage problem.

-- Official Tehran press continues to report Khomeini's health is improving.

-- Iran Air seeking spare parts for commercial aircraft and MT9D engines. After being refused, they approached [redacted] were again refused. Source reported Iranians as "almost frantic" in their request.

Prepared by: [redacted] LtCol, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 26 Jan 80
WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options except RH-16 options. See RH-53 status below.


-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- CINCPAC proposal to conduct MIDWAY/CORAL SEA turnover on 5 Feb two days early, has been approved. (Messages at TAB E).

-- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.

-- ARG/MAU exercise information has been revised. (TAB F)

-- USS CORAL SEA port visit Singapore. ETA 25 Jan.

-- One MC-130 (AAR capable) is returning to Hurlburt from

-- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 061, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 046, TAB G-2)

-- RAY under repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.

-- RH-53: 3 of 8 FMC. Of five down, two require engine turn-up, one has flight control vibrations, one is still underway extensive rotor repair, and one requires periodic inspection. Maximum effort is being dedicated to delivering parts and effecting repairs. ETRs are unknown.
SOVIET TATITLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A CG and FFL are moving from the Task Force toward the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- During the morning of 23 Jan, poor sea manners by Soviet AGI 477 required evasive maneuvers by JOUETT to avoid collision. This ship has displayed poor sea manners before; but this instance was considered dangerous.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Doctors treating Khomeini said his condition is satisfactory and improving and hope he can be transferred from intensive care to the ordinary heart treatment area today. However, intelligence reports indicate that Khomeini is in critical condition.

-- Today is election day for Iran. Bandi-Sadr is the leader, but no candidate is likely to achieve an overall majority. If necessary, a run-off election will be held on 8 February.
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  -- USS NIMITZ has relieved the USS KITTY HAWK and has been redesignated TASK FORCE BRAVO and TG 70.2. KITTY HAWK is enroute Subic Bay and has been redesignated TASK FORCE DELTA and TG 70.4.
  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options except RH-16 options. See RH-53 status below.
  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  -- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.
  -- ARG/MAU exercise information has been revised. (TAB G)
  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute Singapore. ETA 25 Jan.
  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABS)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 060, TAB H-1, CINCEUR SITREP 045, TAB H-2)
  -- RAY under repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.
  -- RH-53: 3 of 8 FMC. Six helos on KITTY HAWK crossed deck to NIMITZ. Of the three down helos from KITTY HAWK, two expected to be FMC today, the third was one which experienced rotor damage and requires extensive maintenance, ETR unknown. Two helos which were brought by NIMITZ require maintenance and inspections; ETR unknown. Maximum effort being made to return 6 to FMC as soon as possible.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)
  -- The AUX in the Strait of Hormuz joined the FFL, AGI, and support ships in the vicinity of the Task Force. The FFG is following the KITTY HAWK out of the Arabian Sea.
-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Major news out of Tehran concerns Khomeini's health. Press reports cancellation of all engagements until 9 February. Khomeini was visited by 3 of 6 heart specialists on 18 Jan and has had a specialist with him since the trip. Khomeini is reported to have had. Tosis of the brain, general heart weakness, and extreme fatigue. He also was treated for symptoms of Parkinson's disease.
WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) will relieve USS KITTY HAWK at 2300 EST tonight. KITTY HAWK will depart station tomorrow.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.

  -- ARG/MAU exercise information at TAB G.

  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute Singapore; ETA 25 Jan.

  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 059, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 044, TAB I-2)

  -- RAY under repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.

  -- RH-53: 5 of 8 FMC. Five transferred from KITTY HAWK to NIMITZ. Sixth will transfer when repairs and flight check complete. ETR 23 Jan. Two RH-53 on board NIMITZ are NMC. Parts on request. ETR unknown.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- A CG replaced the DDG and joined an FFG, PFI, and AGI in the vicinity of the Task Force.
Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

Winter weather and heavy snow have hampered operations in the northeast. Helicopter and vehicle, and resupply operations are restricted.

Bandi Sadr appears to be the front runner for Friday's presidential election. Habibi, however, has picked up endorsement by Khomeini's party and leading clergy. A likelihood for widespread boycotts confuses the issue.

Japan continues to have the economic/political dilemma over the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Project at Bandar-e-Khomeini. The total loss would bankrupt the Japanese firms and deplete the government's export insurance account.

Prepared by: LtCol, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 23 Jan 80
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WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) arrived on station in Arabian Sea.
  -- MC-130 completes training at [redacted] and returns to [redacted] today (TAB C).
  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  -- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.
  -- ARG/MAU Employment information has been presented in a separate folder.
  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute Singapore.
  -- B-52 Indian Ocean Surveillance report at TAB I-3.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
  -- "Persian Gulf Carrier Aircraft Operations", and "B-52H Sea Surveillance" options have been added to Options section.

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 058, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 043, TAB I-2)
  -- RAY undergoing repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.
  -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC. One has flight control vibrations. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board KITTY HAWK. ETR for both is 23 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ; both are NMC, ETR unknown.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, FFL, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Two Soviet IL-38 reconnoitered the NIMITZ group yesterday.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Bandi-Sadr has said if he is elected President, Iran will boycott the Moscow Olympics.

-- An aircraft supply company there has a stockpile of Boeing Defense and spare parts for Boeing transport aircraft.

-- Yesterday, Iranian students took over the Iranian Embassy in Ankara, Turkey as a protest of Turkey's arrest of 80 Iranians.

-- Rumors that our hostages will be released soon after the election continue to circulate among diplomats in Tehran.

Prepared by: LtCol, USAF
OJCS/OFG EXT 52791, 22 Jan 80
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WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

A -- This morning two B-52s flew a sea surveillance mission from [REDACTED] into Arabian Sea.

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan.


-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

-- USS FANNING departed Mombassa enroute MODLOC. ETA 232300EST.


-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU departed Subic Bay for turnover at Eniwetok on 29 Jan.

-- Papers on "Marine Amphibious Unit and Amphibious Lift" and "Sustained MAGTF Deployment Capability" at Tabs I-5 & I-6.

-- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute Singapore.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 057, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 042, TAB I-2)

-- RAY undergoing repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.

-- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board KITTY HAWK. ETR 23 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

- SOVIET TATTLETALE ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, FPL, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Japanese press reports there are 400 terrorists in AM EMBASSY complex. Terrorists claim all hostages are at embassy.

-- In a major concession, Khomeini has approved a plan to amend the new constitution to allow the Sunni sect equal status with the majority Shiite sect. This may help heal the rift with Shariat-Madari.

-- Both Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh have attacked the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan. Khomeini has remained silent on the subject.

SPECIAL ITEMS OF INTEREST: "Sixth Fleet Schedules" (TAB I-3), "USS SARATOGA Readiness Status" (TAB I-4), "Marine Amphibious Unit" and "US Amphibious Lift" (TAB I-5) and "Sustained MAGTF Deployment Capability" (TAB I-6).

Prepared by: LtCol, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 21 Jan 80
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan.
  -- Deployment of E-3A detachment from [redacted] to [redacted].
  -- Deployment of MC-130 to [redacted] 20-22 Jan. (TAB C)
  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
  -- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.
  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
  -- USS CORAL SEA in Phattaya for port visit (ETD 20 Jan 80).

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABS)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 055, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 040, TAB I-2)
  -- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board KITTY HAWK. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)
  -- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force.
  -- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

Great Britain has dispatched a hastily assembled task force to the Mediterranean to fill the gap created by the Nimitz task force departure. The British force consists of an amphibious warfare ship, three guided missile frigates and two support ships.

Iran has 55 ZSU-23/4's in its inventory.

SPECIAL ITEMS OF INTEREST: "Sixth Fleet Schedules" (TAB I-3), "USS SARATOGA Readiness Status" (TAB I-4), and "Marine Amphibious Unit" and "US Amphibious Lift" (TAB I-5).

Prepared by: [Redacted] CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 19 Jan 80
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan.
  -- Deployment of E-3A detachment from to complete.
  -- Deployment of MC-130 to 20-22 Jan. (TAB C)
  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
  -- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.
  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
  -- USS CORAL SEA in Phattaya for port visit.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABS)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 054, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 039, TAB I-2)
  -- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS which will join KITTY HAWK today. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.
- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)
  -- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force while the
  -- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

- SPECIAL ITEMS OF INTEREST: "Sixth Fleet Schedules" (TAB I-3), "USS SARATOGA Readiness Status" (TAB I-4), and "Marine Amphibious Unit" fact sheet (TAB I-5).

Prepared by: [Redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 18 Jan 80
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 January 1980.

- **DEPLOYMENTS:** (Overview Graphic)
  - USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.
  - The second E-3A is enroute to ...
  - Deployment of MC-130 to ...
  - USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
  - USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.
  - Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
  - USS CORAL SEA is enroute Phattaya for port visit.

- **OPTION PAPERS:** (Option TABs)
  - Naval quarantine of Straits of Hormuz option paper has been revised. (TAB OPTION-1)

- **OPERATIONAL READINESS:** (CINCPAC SITREP 053, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 038, TAB I-2)
  - RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS enroute KITTY HAWK, ETA 18 Jan. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

Without radar tracking, the ZSU 23-4 is assessed to have good effectiveness using optical sight during day given adequate warning. However, in the absence of warning and fire control radar, the ZSU 23-4 would be marginally effective against a surprise A-6 strike at dawn or AC-130 strike at night.

-- Iran will attend the Islamic Conference in Pakistan on 26 January. Libya, Algeria, and Syria have indicated they will not attend. Conference is to consider Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Prepared by: LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 17 Jan 80
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 January 1980.

**DEPLOYMENTS:** (Overview Graphic)

--- **USS NIMITZ** Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.

--- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). E-3A from Tinker arrived last night. First E-3A departs [redacted] from [redacted] today, second on Thursday. Two KC-135s returned to [redacted].


--- **USS MIDWAY** and **USS KITTY HAWK** continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

--- **USS FANNING** port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.

--- **MIDEASTFOR:** On station in Persian Gulf. **USS GLOVER** in Red Sea.

--- Logistics support ships, as shown on graphic.

--- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

--- **USS CORAL SEA** is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

**OPTION PAPERS:** (Option TABs)

**OPERATIONAL READINESS:** (CINCPAC SITREP 052, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 037, TAB I-2)


--- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS enroute KITTY HAWK, ETA 18 Jan. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.
An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force.

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

A fact sheet on the ZSU 23-4 is at TAB E. An analysis of ZSU 23-4 effectiveness against A-6 and AC-130 aircraft is being prepared.

French press reports that more US hostages may have been moved to Tehran's Evin Prison.

Press also reports that Panama and Iran are negotiating the extradition of the Shah.

ABC/TV reports Khomeini has accepted SYG Waldheim as an acceptable mediator between the US and IRAN.

A recent article by a DIA research analyst on "Iran and the World's Oil Supply" is attached at TAB E.

Prepared by: LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 16 Jan 80
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 1980.

**DEPLOYMENTS:** (Overview Graphic)

---
USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.

---
Two E-3A aircraft are at __________ (TAB B & I-2). Aircraft rotation begins today with an E-3A departing Tinker AFB at 1230EST. First E-3A departs tomorrow, second on Thursday.

---
Deployment of MC-130 to __________ paper has been updated (TAB C) KC-135/MC-130 aerial refueling training paper at TAB I-3.

---
USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

---
USS PANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.

---
MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

---
Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

---
Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

---
USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

**OPTION PAPERS:** (Option TABs)

**OPERATIONAL READINESS:** (CINCPAC SITREP 051, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 036, TAB I-2)

---

---
RH-53: 5 of 6 PMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS enroute KITTY HAWK, ETA 18 Jan. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.
SOVIET TATTLER ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- The provincial scene is relatively quiet. The government seems to be in control in Tabriz and shops are open.

Prepared by: [Redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 15 Jan 80
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on
14 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. TG chopped to PACOM at 140200EST. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [REDACTED] (TAB B & I-2). The second TF 70/E-3A mission resulted in 17 successful intercepts. TADIL-A/LINK-11 interface was unsuccessful and HF or UHF secure comm could not be established between E-3A and TF-70 units.

-- [REDACTED] reports that his counterpart has no objection to MC-130 arrival on 20 Jan. No objection to night and low level flight training was expressed.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for HM-16 (see RH-53 information below).

-- USS FANNING port visit Mombasa, ETD 19 Jan 80.


-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 050, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 035, TAB I-2)


-- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. The fifth aircraft was expected to be repaired last night. The sixth aircraft is awaiting parts which are expected to arrive on 18 Jan with repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

--- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force.

--- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

--- While the UN Security Council voted 10-2-2 to impose economic sanctions against Iran, the Soviet veto overturns the vote. Consequently, State has initiated an offensive to persuade friendly nations to carry out the UN sanction as if it had not been vetoed.

--- However, the terrorists at the Embassy have reiterated their claim that the Shah must be returned to Iran before the hostages are released.

Prepared by: [Redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG EXT 52791, 14 Jan 80
WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 January 1980.

- **DEPLOYMENTS:** (Overview Graphic)
  - **USS NIMITZ** Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.
  - Two E-3A aircraft are at **XXX** (TAB B & I-2). The second TF 70/E-3A mission flew last night. The final familiarization flight was successfully flown yesterday.
  - **USS MIDWAY** and **USS KITTY HAWK** continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for HM-16 (see RH-53 information below).
  - **USS FANNING** enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.
  - **MIDEASTFOR:** On station in Persian Gulf. **USS GLOVER** in Red Sea.
  - Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - **Pacific MAU** in port Subic Bay.
  - **USS CORAL SEA** is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the **MIDWAY**.

- **OPTION PAPERS:** (Option TABs)

- **OPERATIONAL READINESS:** (CINCPAC SITREP 049, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 034, TAB I-2)
  - **RAY** max speed 22kts. Scheduled for repair with **DIXIE** at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - **RH-53:** 4 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. The fifth aircraft is expected to be repaired today. The sixth aircraft is awaiting parts which are expected to arrive on 18 Jan with repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- The UN vote on sanctions against Iran was delayed for the second time pending SYG Waldheim's action on the Iranian "proposal."

-- Iran has formally requested extradition of the Shah from Panama.

-- Press reports that 11 members of the Moslem People's Repub-
  lican Party which supports Shariat-Madari were executed yesterday in Tabriz.

-- DIA reports US oil consumption dropped by approximately 1
  million barrels per day in October and that world oil
  supplies were plentiful.

-- Press reports that 16 Jan 80, the anniversary day of
  the departure of the Shah, has been declared "Shah
  burning day" by the Islamic Republican Party.

Prepared by: LTCOL, USAF
  OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 13 Jan 80
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 January 1980.

**DEPLOYMENTS:** (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [Blank] (TAB B & I-2). An [Blank] familiarization mission flew yesterday. The second TF 70/E-3A mission will be flown tonight.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for HM-16 (see RH-53 information below).

-- USS FANNING enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.


-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

**OPTION PAPERS:** (Option TABs)

**OPERATIONAL READINESS:** (CINCPAC SITREP 048, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 033, TAB I-2)


-- STEIN completed repair at Diego Garcia and is returning to Arabian Sea, ETA 16 Jan.

-- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. Two aircraft ETR today. All parts to repair aircraft with damaged rotor system are enroute to Diego Garcia. WABASH will transport parts to KITTY HAWK, ETA is 18 Jan 80.
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 January 1980.

**DEPLOYMENTS:** (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80. Message being prepared which directs NIMITZ to arrive Indian Ocean NLT 212300 EST Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). An unfamiliarization mission flew yesterday and one is flying today. A second TF 70/E-3A mission will be flown on 12/13 Jan.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for RM-16 (see RH-53 information below). This morning, MIDWAY, BAINBRIDGE, and PARSONS conducted a sprint northwest toward Gulf of Oman and flight operations upon arrival in entrance to Gulf.

-- USS FANNING enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

**OPTION PAPERS:** (Option TABS)

**OPERATIONAL READINESS:** (CINCPAC SITREP 047, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 032, TAB I-2)


-- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. One aircraft in phase maintenance, ETR 12 Jan. One aircraft main landing gear being replaced, ETR 12 Jan. All parts to repair aircraft with damaged rotor system have been located and delivery is being expedited, ETR unknown. Most downing discrepancies are found as a result of turn-up or daily routine maintenance rather than incident to flight.
SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- The FFG that has been patrolling the Strait of Hormuz has joined with the DDG, AGI, and AUX in the vicinity of the Task Force.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Western journalists have learned that Iranian television is making technical preparations to cover a trial of one American hostage which is expected to take place in four or five days.

-- The USS RICKETTS reported an Iranian C-130 made two passes at 300 feet, 1000 yards offset, parallel to ship.

Prepared by: 0JCS/OPG Ext 52791, 11 Jan 80
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80. Commander TG 20.3 an battle staff offloaded at Ascension Island where they will remai until TG chops to CINCPAC.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at (TAB B & I-2). Ambassador Atherton flew yesterday. An familiarization mission is flying today. A second TF 70/E-3A mission will be flown on 12/13 Jan.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for RM-16 (see RH-53 information below).

-- USS FANNING enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.

-- MIDESTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

-- Naval blockade/quarantine information has been updated. (TAB I-3

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 046, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 031, TAB I-2)


-- LASALLE #1 boiler repaired, max speed 15 kts.

-- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. Most parts have been located and are enroute Squadron personnel can make all repairs when parts are available. Repairs must be completed prior to KITTY HAWK/NIMITZ cross deck.
A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force.

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

Ayatollah Beheshti, Secretary of Iran's Revolutionary Council, stated that there has been some movement in the hostage situation but results may be several weeks away.

Terrorists at the US Embassy issued a statement condemning the Sa'ud family of Saudi Arabia as US "puppets" and called for Arab Muslims to overthrow the Sa'ud family.

A DIA assessment of Iran's transportation system is at TAB I-4.

Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 10 Jan 80.
SUBJECT: Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB)

TIMEFRAME: September 1980

SUMMARY:
1. [U] J2 representatives conducted a site survey of the DITB at Echterdingen AAF, FRG and
2. [U] The DITB represents a capability to receive digital imagery at a location remote from fixed installations.
3. [U] The DITB is moveable with a great amount of airlift and ground support.
4. [U] The entire DITB is not necessary to receive and process.
5. [U] The DITB is in the test phase— not even a prototype.
6. [U] The DITB is due to be headquartered at Ft. Bragg.

COMMENTS:
1. [U] Support requirements are extremely heavy.
2. [U] While the DITB is not always completely broken
3. [U] Upon receipt, for the program to be completely
   refurbished by the manufacturer and returned to Ft. Bragg, NC.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. [U] That Special Operations personnel contact the Army Space Program Office and get a determination of the DITB to return immediately.
2. [U] That Special Operations personnel become briefed and familiar with the capabilities and requirements of the DITB.
3. (U) That the DITB be included for utilization in long range planning if reliability is improved.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J-2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Captain [redacted]

POINTS OF CONTACT:
1. ASPO: Col [redacted]/LTC [redacted] 274-9527/28
2. Engineer Topographic Lab, Ft. Belvoir, VA: Mr. [redacted] 664-3653/5819
3. DDPSOP: CPT [redacted] - AV 833-0676

ATTACHMENTS:
1. JTF REQUEST MEMO - 11 Aug 80
2. JTD MFR: Subj: DITB; dated 15 Sep 80 (TSR)
SUBJECT: Potential Use of JITB

REMARKS: Faced memorandum request Director, DIA concurrence on dispatch of Joint DIA Team to Europe to assess the value of predeploying key elements of the DITB to North Africa, against the possibility of another deployment.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Potential Use of DITB

1. (TS) This office has been informed by [REDACTED] that the DITB (Digital Imagery Test Bed) has been deployed to Europe to support the theater exercise program and will remain in Europe until October.

2. (U) As you may know, during the previous deployment an Imagery Readout Team was moved to Europe and subsequently to the forward staging base to update the force prior to launch. It is possible the DITB holds a potential to further improve the availability of photo intelligence to forward deployed forces, if the need arises.

3. (TS) Recognizing this potential, we would like to suggest that a joint JCS/DIA imagery interpreter team visit the DITB site in Europe and assess the value of forward deploying key elements of the system to a secure US controlled location in North Africa “for climatic and operational testing,” so that it would in fact be available to support another forward deployment if needed.

4. (TS) This concept has been discussed with Mr. [REDACTED] (DC-5C) and Col [REDACTED] project manager. They recommend that the survey team visit the European site in mid-August to allow sufficient time to reprogram the projected October return of the DITB to the CONUS, without attracting undue attention.

5. (TS) Request your concurrence in the visit of a survey team and identification of the DIA team member.

[Signature]

RICHARD V. SECORD
Major General; USAF

CLASSIFIED BY: JCS, 3/3/79
REVIEW ON: 11 AUGUST 1980

CONFIDENTIAL/TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL SECORD

SUBJECT: Joint JCS/DIA Visit to the DITB (U)

1. (U) I concur with your suggestion for a joint JCS/DIA image interpreter visit to the DITB. The system does offer a significant potential to support tactical forces, an assessment of a further deployment of the system to test its ability to support a contingency force from a forward base area in a desert environment appears to have considerable merit.

2. (U) I offer Major [REDACTED], USAF, as the DIA member of the team. Major [REDACTED] is the Chief of DIA's Priority Exploitation Branch and it was he and his organization that provided DIA image interpreter support to the forward deployed forces during the previous contingency operation. Major [REDACTED] can be reached on extension 56726.

JAMES L. BROWN
Major General, USAF
Assistant Director
for JCS Support
Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB)

Inclosed memorandum provides JTD comments concerning possible use of DITB at a Forward Operating Base.
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB) (U)

1. (TS) DIA and JTD representatives recently investigated the capability of the DITB to support the JTF during deployment to a desert Field Operating Base (FOB). The representatives inspected the equipment at Echtersdngen, FRG, and conducted a detailed debriefing of the personnel operating the system. The team also traveled to [] with DITB personnel for an on-site survey of a potential FOB.

2. (UB) DITB support at an FOB could provide the JTF commander and operational forces with the most current imagery of operational areas prior to mission launch. This capability would be a substantial asset, if the DITB reliability could be assured.

3. (UB) The following factors, however, militate against the DITB being able to perform reliably for an extended period at a desert site:

   a. The primary components of the DITB consist of commercial test-bed components, not designed for extended use.

   b. The system has not operated for an extended period, nor has it been tested in an extreme desert environment.

   c. Malfunctions in the system hardware and software components occur on an almost daily basis significantly degrading its timeliness in processing imagery.

   d. The ability to obtain and maintain the required electrical ground at the desert site is questionable.

   e. Support for the DITB at the desert site would be extensive, i.e. one entire large aircraft bunker.

   f. Per phonecon, 20 Sep 80, LTC [redacted] LTC [redacted] provided the following additional information:
(1) Software gaps cause the system to be yellow possibly as much as 70% of its operating time. These gaps in software are corrected by the contractors, but the effect of the correction on other software sub-routines is unknown until another gap develops.

(2) Only in the last few days has the system come up fully green; nevertheless, the system reporting time is still running in excess of 2 hours.

(3) Although the system has never been unable to perform its mission, it is not always timely, especially if it requires retransmission of data.

4. (U) Based on these factors, the DITB is not sufficiently reliable and timely to warrant the expenditure of funds and commitment of critical support assets to deploy and maintain it at a POB. If the DITB's reliability is significantly improved as a result of its planned refurbishment program, we will re-evaluate its capability to support the JTF.

RICHARD V. SECORD
Major General, USAF
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Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB) (U)

1. (U) Capt [redacted] and Maj [redacted] conducted a site survey, received operational and capability briefings of the DITB as deployed to Echterdingen Airfield, FRG. (See Incl 1)

2. (U) The DITB has the capability to receive, manipulate, and process:

3. (U) Both soft and hard copy exploitation have advantages and disadvantages which are discussed at Inclosures 3 and 4.

4. (U) A breakout of minimum manning required for a 60-90 day operation of the DITB by equipment and possible personnel sources is at Inclosure 5.

5. (U) Requirements in addition to normal personnel and logistic needs (e.g. latrines, messing, billeting, mail, etc) are listed at Inclosure 6. This list is not final but as comprehensive as possible.

6. (U) The main cost for the operation of the DITB at [redacted] will be in transportation (at least 1 C-5 sortie), POL and contractor support to DRSEM and DEMONS. An itemized projection of possible 60-90 day cost is at Inclosure 7.

7. (U) Discussion:

a. (U) While the DITB does represent a tremendous technological capability, this capability must be viewed within the scope of its original design mission. The Digital Imagery Test Bed has certain inherent weaknesses as a Test Bed.
b. (TSO) The equipment in DEMONS and DRSEM is off the shelf commercial components that were installed in vans for one purpose - to put on the Oct 79 demonstration at the Engineer Topographic Lab (ETL) and show the technical feasibility of TACIES, an Army proposed system to provide national imagery to Army users. It has never been run for a period as long as 60-90 days.

c. (U) TSC-86 (MOD) is due for a complete refurbishment after the European deployment with a projected availability date of early Feb 81. The DITB OIC, LTC [redacted] was very cautious in giving any projection for how long the TSC-86 will continue to function. It is probably the weakest link.

d. (TSO) The DRSEM is also scheduled for major contractor work (contract completion and modification) after the European deployment and is also scheduled to be available in Feb 81. The electrical equipment ground will be a problem. DRSEM was designed for a 0.1 ohm ground but has operated as high as 20 ohms. Grounding at [redacted] required extensive preparation and a ground resistance low enough for this equipment to operate may not be achievable even though other electrical and radio equipment does work.

e. (TSO) The hangar/facility at [redacted] will require some engineer construction and modification which should be accomplished prior to the movement of any of the vans.
Deployment will require the use of 1 entire large hangar and some surrounding area which will then become separately secured within the large compound. This hangar will also be the quarters for the DITB personnel.

f. (U) The hard copy system has no integral capability to provide enlargements.

g. (U) The DITB has never been operated in the desert environment and this is no guarantee the system will function.

h. (U) If deployed, it will set back the program development and homebasing at Ft. Bragg by 90 days.

i. (U) Both the TSC 80 and DRSEM are dependent on one air conditioning unit each for system cooling. Failure of either air conditioner will cause the system to be inoperative until repaired.

j. (U) The DEMONS LASERPAX was down when we visited, had been down for 3-4 days, but was brought up by the time we left. It was still not operating 100%.
k. (U) Both DRSEM and DEMONS require contractor support for maintenance and operation.

l. (U) Inclosure 8 is a summarized listing of advantages/disadvantages.

8. (U) POCs:

DITB:  LTC Capt KY3-2254 (Echterdingen)
ETL:  Mr. (DEMONS) 664-3653/5819
DDPSOP:  CPT CPT AV 833-0676 (DRSEM)
ASPO:  COL 274-9527/28

9. (U) REQUIREMENTS:

a. AN O-5 be site OIC
b. Contract manager

c. Money controller

d. Operations schedule (timetable for operation)

10. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. (U) That the DITB be deployed in view of the requirement for immediate imagery and the technical feasibility of the systems to provide this support to the JTDB.

b. (25R) That the DITB configuration be limited to the minimum essential equipment (a soft copy package - TSC 80; DRSEM, DEMONS) to satisfy the intelligence requirement.

c. (U) That due to the severity of the environment for both personnel and equipment, a schedule for the operational envelopes to allow for periods of initial set-up, system shut down and reset (2-3 duty, off/day to monitor facility) and subsequent phase-up (full) operational capability.

d. (U) Investigate further the feasibility of creating a hard copy back up to the DEMONS utilizing the ESS augmented by an Ad Hoc darkroom (projection printer and processor).

e. (U) That a DITB PM be designated as ground site OIC.
SOFT COPY (DEMONS)

ADVANTAGES:

1. NRT
2. Unlimited zoom (up to 1 pixel x 512)
3. Roam
4. Gray scale enhancement
5. Rotation
6. Accurate Locator
7. Can provide LASERFAX "SHIPS" of CRT display

DISADVANTAGES:

1. Environmental control (temperature & humidity)
2. LASERFAX reliability
3. Contractor support
HARD COPY (DRSEM + ES-59 + MAGIIS)

ADVANTAGES:
1. Provides hard copy film (pos or neg)
2. Possibly better enlargements w/Ad Hoc darkroom
   (no inherent enlargement capability)

DISADVANTAGES:
1. Longer processing time and requires ES-59 operators
2. Requires fabrication of an Ad Hoc darkroom to enlarge
   and reproduce selected areas
3. No enhancement
4. Requires consistent water supply
5. Requires effluent disposal
6. Requires large quantities consumable supplies for ES-59
   and darkroom
7. If MAGIIS is used – a unique power source is needed
   34 KW at 400 cycles - a non-standard virtually unavailable
   aircraft APU
8. Contractor support...
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

MIL/CIV

1. TSC-86 (MOD)
   4/0
   (SATCOMA)

2. DRSCS
   3/2

3. DEMONS
   3/2

4. SPARES VAN
   0/1

5. CES-59
   2/0

6. MEGS
   3/0
   requires 30 KW 400 cycle

7. Generator/air conditioning
   3/0
   repairmen

8. Site Cdr/Admin NCO
   2/0
   2/0

9. Additional area contractors for set-up.
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

- Concertina wire
- Picketts
- Sodium chloride
- Copper sulfate
- TA 312's/MD-1
- Additional 8' dish
- 30' gal water trailer
- Secret-clearance guards
- Colloid lock
- MTHC equipment
- Funny
- Air-conditioners
- Ground disturbance
- Gun
- Radar
- Interception tower
- Antennas (6) 45 foot monopoles
- Antennas (6) 6 foot monopoles
- Solar arrays
- Antennas (6) 25 foot monopoles
- Antennas (6) 10 foot monopoles
COST

- Contractors 60-90 days = 12k - 18k
- Contractors 71-124 days set up = 1.4k - 2.8k

Based on at least $58/hr/person
18 hr/day/60-90 days

20mil loc - quarters & rations avail 19.2k - 28.8k (20 pax)
1/2 std rate ($16.00/day)
60-90 days

DIESEL
- Consumption 40 gal/hr
- 12 hrs/day 960 gal/day
- 3-5 days 57,600-86,400 gal

TOTAL
- Employment/re-deployment

- Fund Cite

- UNI expenses - spares = 10k
- Disposable supplies
- (unprojected)

TOTAL
- 322k
ADVANTAGES:

- Can provide launch assistance
- Support for various problems which can be overcome

SUPPORT PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ITS WHICH CAN BE OVERCOME:

- [List of issues and solutions]

[Further information or details]

[Diagram or visual representation]
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MEMO TO HOLDERS

1 OCT 1981

Subject: Document Distribution and Releasability

1. (S) This document was produced to insure that the DOD intelligence experiences of the Iranian Hostage Crisis are available for review by properly cleared DOD officers with a valid NEED-TO-KNOW. In keeping with this philosophy, releasability has been divided into two major areas as outlined below.

a. Material related to events which transpired between 4 Nov 79 and 26 Apr 80 (Chapters 1-8, and 10-14) is considered appropriate for review, study, and retention (narrative/index portions only) by the Senior Intelligence Officers of the following organizations:

- OJCS/J-3/SOD 
- DIA/JSJ-1
- CIA/DDD

b. Material related to events encompassing the time frame 27 Apr 80 through 20 Apr 81 is considered sensitive and distribution is restricted to:

- OJCS/J-3/SOD
- DIA/JSJ-1
- CIA/DDD

2. (C) The following guidelines for classification review and regrading are provided IAW DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation, October 1980, para 1-600c.

a. Confidential and Secret material may be reviewed at the three year point for downgrading and cannot retain its original classification more than six years.
b. Top Secret material may be reviewed at the six year point for possible downgrading and at four year intervals thereafter until twenty years. The Top Secret classification cannot be prolonged beyond twenty years.

c. Top Secret Sensitive material may be reviewed at a ten year point for deletion of the sensitive handling restriction. It will be reviewed at the twenty year point for downgrading to Secret and at five year intervals thereafter.

d. Top Secret Codeword material will remain classified Top Secret throughout the twenty year limitation unless specifically regraded by the originating agency. DIA, DMA and Review and regrading at the twenty year point must be made by the originating agency.

3. (U) This document classified by Director, J-3, OJCS, Standard Review Date is 15 July 2001.

PHILIP C. GAST
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director for Operations
Preface

1. (U) The intent of this document is to capture the scope and depth of the intelligence effort that went into preparing for the American Military Rescue Attempt of 24 April 1980 and to document the extent and complexities of preparation for follow-on efforts.

2. (U) When the Joint Task Force (JTF 1-79) was formed in November 1979 and assigned the mission to be prepared to conduct a rescue mission, intelligence was recognized as a most important factor. This awareness continued throughout the lifespan of the JTF. Accordingly, operational planning was hindered or assisted by the availability or lack of reliable intelligence data.

3. (S) During the Nov 79 - Apr 80 time frame (OPERATION RICEBOWL), planners were able to concentrate on developing a specific scenario. The rescue operation was terminated solely due to mechanical problems which reduced the number of flyable helicopters below an acceptable level.

4. (S) On the other hand, during the May 80 - Jan 81 time frame (OPERATION SNOWBIRD),

5. (C) Due to the extended period of time to be covered in this review and given the fact that two distinct sets of circumstances prevailed, the review has been divided into several Parts/Sections.

   a. The review begins with an Executive Overview and a short historical survey of events leading up to the Embassy takeover; this is followed by a summary of the takeover and the fifteen months of captivity as reconstructed from the hostage debriefings.
b. The major portion of this history has been divided into two time segments (pre and post raid). These sections along with their supporting pictorial material trace, in capsule form, the ebb and flow of most of the intelligence events, actions, and initiatives which transpired during the entire fifteen months of the hostage situation.

c. Following the pictorial portion of each section, the reader will find an index to the supporting files which have been retained at OJCS/J-3/SOD to provide examples of the quality, divergency, and depth of the massive collection, analytical and production effort that went into supporting rescue preparations.

d. Other major sections of this document include copies of JTF component intelligence histories and summaries of DMA and [REDACTED] during the hostage situation.

e. Introductory comments by the Commander of the Joint Task Force can be found immediately following this preface.

f. Observation and comments of the JTF/J-2 can be found in Section 12.

Eugene F. Hobbs, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
MEMORANDUM TO READER

Subject: Commander's Comments

1. (S) After being tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 Nov 79 to develop a means for rescuing the hostages from Iran, I conducted a comprehensive review of capabilities available to accomplish such a mission. Those we had were adequate for conducting limited rescue operations in a friendly environment; however, they were totally inadequate for the mission that I had been assigned.

2. (S) In the ensuing months, we developed what we considered a small but competent force to meet these goals. Since we had general intelligence information with respect to hostage location, i.e., Embassy Compound, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), we were able to devote our efforts to a single mission scenario: a long-range helicopter infiltration into Tehran. In retrospect, I continue to believe that had it not been for the mechanical failure of three helicopters, we would have succeeded in our initial effort.

3. (S) Following the attempt in April 1980, the circumstances surrounding the hostages changed.

4. (S) The JTF had to assume that sufficient intelligence data would eventually become available and that, in order to be ready to properly execute the orders of the President, a force trained throughout the spectrum of potential mission scenarios had to be developed. This force would become proficient in a wide range of capabilities.
5. (S) However, in spite of the best efforts by many dedicated intelligence personnel, the net product of the intelligence community was dangerously unsatisfactory. Prompt corrective action must be taken or future planning efforts will prove equally frustrating and future operations froth with the seeds of disaster.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA COMJTF
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Executive Overview

1. (TS) Shortly after the hostage seizure incident occurred, a small planning cell was convened (in OJCS spaces), augmented by two officers from the ground force, and began to formulate concepts for a series of rescue options. The planning group began receiving DIA intelligence support immediately, although the complete array of national intelligence capabilities was not fully integrated for several weeks.

2. (U) During this early period, the organizational and planning framework of an existing JCS CONPLAN was employed. This included the coordination of intelligence, selection of the rescue forces, structure of the JTF, and concepts for operational planning, force deployment, mission execution, and supporting cover actions.

3. (U) When COMJTF received his tasking on 12 November 1979, the rescue planning cell became the nucleus of the JTF staff. The immediate DOD objective in November was to field an emergency rescue capability quickly. The question of how to insert and subsequently recover the ground rescue force from a hostile environment arose immediately and became the most vexing difficulty COMJTF would face.

4. (TS) Intelligence collection began immediately. However, significant planning and intelligence collection problems were created by the continuing changes in political perceptions surrounding the plight of the hostages. Concurrently, conceptual plans were developed by the JTF staff and reviewed by the CJCS. On 19 Nov 79, COMJTF recommended a helicopter option as having the greatest potential for success. By 27 Nov 79, a viable concept had been developed.

5. (S) Each of the JTF force components—with the exception of the helicopter contingent—already had small intelligence sections who had worked several similar situations in conjunction with the members of the JTF/J-2 staff during the preceding 2 1/2 years. A USMC intelligence officer was assigned to support the combined USN/USMC helicopter contingent. He was provided intelligence support directly from the JTF. In the JTF headquarters itself, the intelligence section remained small throughout the period, beginning with one officer on 5 November and increasing to three in the course of planning for the first attempt, and five during follow-on efforts.
6. (U) Strict adherence to OPSEC criteria was maintained throughout. Only key individuals outside the JTF were aware planning was underway. Most of the intelligence officers from staffs and agencies outside the JTF were not briefed on the operational planning, although most individuals working JTF-related intelligence requirements on a continuing basis eventually were able to deduce for themselves the type of mission they were supporting.

7. (U) Most intelligence requirements were formulated by the JTF J-2 in anticipation of JTF needs. Requirements came in from the field components by message or hard copy courier delivery.

8. (U) The following comments extracted from the JTF (Operational) Capabilities Review provide a framework for the balance of the JTF Intelligence History.

EXTRACT:

(U) Overall intelligence support for mission planning, training and execution was responsive, professional and generally adequate with one major limitation...

a. (U) Throughout the entire period, rescue planning was severely constrained by inadequate

b. (U) DIA acted as broker for most general intelligence

Requirements, satisfying in excess of 700 specific re-

quests, largely of an analytical nature.

2-2
c. The DMA provided mapping, charting and geodetic support, producing no less than twenty-four special map and photo products designed to satisfy tactical requirements including data reduced coordinates for use in the navigation systems of all mission aircraft.

h. All of these agencies, including CIA, provided specific points of contact or permanent liaison officers which greatly simplified coordination.

END EXTRACT
HISTORICAL Background (U)

1. (U) In late 1977 and early 1978, a series of growing and frequently violent demonstrations erupted in Iran. These demonstrations, while widely separated geographically, had a single underlying motif: popular dissatisfaction with the rule of the Shah. By mid-1977, intelligence sources and analysts had begun reporting and evaluating the manifestations of discontent in Iran. These were repeatedly characterized as serious but by no means fatal for the monarchy. This line of reasoning persisted through the first six months of 1978.

2. (C) Following a disastrous fire at the Rex Cinema in Abadan in August 1978 which killed at least 377 people, government investigators promptly arrested five radical Islamic Marxists. The Iranian underground opposition spread the rumor that the blaze had been set by Savak with the intent being to blame the revolutionary elements. The opposition groups seized on this incident declaring the fire victims "martyrs" and the victims of the Shah's secret police. Thereafter stability went downhill and the momentum swung against the monarchy when Ayatollah Khomeini shifted the site of his exile to Paris during October.

4. (U) In early December Iranian troops fired on hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Tehran who had taken to the streets for religious observances of Muharram, despite a government ban on such activities. Combined with a drastic strike-induced decrease in oil production, these actions served as further harbingers of the Shah's demise. On 16 January 1979 the Shah abdicated and departed Iran, leaving responsibility with a weak provisional government. Two weeks later Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile and the process of 'Islamification' began.

5. (U) On the afternoon of 11 February 1979, Iranian troops began withdrawing from security positions around the US Embassy in Tehran. Within twenty-four hours their places
10. (SNFD) The February takeover was viewed by many only as a disturbing aberration. Since the situation was resolved with relatively little bloodshed and in rather rapid fashion, the Ambassador's decision on minimal resistance was seen as correct. It seemed that such armed hooliganism was simply a risk which the Embassy staff had to endure in a revolutionary environment. In the eight months which followed, the Embassy staff was aware that repetition of the February takeover was always a possibility.

12. (C) Although the Bazargan provisional government existed until two days after the hostage seizure, the locus of decision-making in Iran had become personalized in the brooding figure of Khomeini and his various politico-clerical-revolutionaries from early March onward. Meanwhile, the exiled Shah and his entourage moved from Egypt to Morocco to the Bahamas to Mexico. US-Iranian relations during the period were characterized by a continuing downslide.

13. (U) In May the US Senate formally condemned the ongoing wave of summary executions being meted out to former members of the imperial bureaucracy. In retaliation, Tehran spurned the US Ambassador-designate, cancelled a $9 billion arms deal, and repealed the 1947 Status-of-Forces Agreement with the US.

14. (SNFD) On 28 June 1979, the Director, DIA expressed his concern about serious gaps in collection capabilities in writing to the DCI. The Director, DIA perceived information gaps in five major areas:
16. (C) The intelligence picture of radical groups within the fragmented post-Shah political picture was a blurred one. The Fedaveen-E-Islam (devotes of Islam) which flourished in the decade following World War II was a general prototype for a proliferation of religiously oriented terrorist organizations. Although the original Fedaveen movement was decimated by Savak during the mid-1950's, its successor--under the sponsorship of Ayatollah Khalkhali--provided a link with the past as well as legitimizing violence and torture as a political instrument of the Islamic revolution.

17. (SECRET) The largest known leftist radical group, the Mujahedin, combined a variety mixture of Islamic Marxist theo-

18. (SECRET)....
SECTION 4

RECONSTRUCTION OF EVENTS BASED ON HOSTAGE DEBRIEFINGS

1. Chronology of Events

a. (U) At approximately 1025 hours on 4 November 1979, demonstrators were observed climbing over the main gate of the Embassy. They succeeded in opening the gate, allowing a large group of chador-clad females, carrying placards and banners, to enter the Embassy Compound. National police in the area did not move to stop the intruders. Part of the crowd collected in front of the chancery, others went directly toward the residences. One group broke off from the others and proceeded to the rear of the chancery and began a forced entry through the basement. Another group had gained entrance to the consulate and forced an entry through an unbarred, second story bathroom window.

b. (U) Word of the presence of demonstrators on the compound quickly spread among Embassy personnel, but there was no panic. The chancery and consulate buildings were secured. Off-duty Marines in the Bion Apartments were called and told to remain where they were. They were subsequently captured. Telephone contact was established with the Charge at the MFA where he had a 1000 hours appointment. Telephone contact was also made with the DOS Operations Center in Washington, D.C.

c. (U) The Regional Security Officer (RSO) instructed the on-duty Marines to initiate the established emergency defense plan. Upon learning that some of the crowd had penetrated the basement of the chancery, the RSO went down, had a discussion with the student leader, convincing him to withdraw the group. Meanwhile, all Embassy personnel in the chancery had moved to the second floor.

d. (U) The RSO departed the chancery with the group's leaders through the window the penetrators had used and went to investigate the situation at the consulate building. He found the building secure after an attempted penetration through a second floor unbarred bathroom window was thwarted by a Marine guard. The RSO then returned to the chancery with the student leader.

e. (U) Due to a lack of demonstrators near the consulate, most of its occupants were able to escape in small groups. The last group of five were subsequently captured a few blocks from the compound by a combination of students and Pasdaran. National police in the area did not interfere. This group of Americans was taken to the Ambassador's residence which apparently had been predesignated as a hostage assembly point.
f. (U) During this time the RSO, after entering the chancery, received permission from the Charge' to go back outside and attempt to diffuse the crowd in front of the building. He left his flak jacket and weapon with the Marine guard and again departed the chancery building. The RSO began a dialogue with the student leaders along the lines of allowing them to conduct a sit-in. During these discussions, two older individuals emerged from the crowd. The crowd now contained a number of males, some of whom were carrying clubs painted with "Down With America".

g. (U) The two older individuals ushered the student leader aside, took the RSO's radio and told him to have the door to the chancery opened. The RSO told his captors such a decision would have to come from the Charge'. The RSO then shouted to the Marine inside the building who had been covering him to call the Charge' and tell him it was just like February 14. This had no immediate result, and the RSO was led away to the building behind the Motor Pool, tied, and placed under armed guard.

h. (U) Approximately ten minutes later he was taken back into the basement of the chancery through the original penetration point. Inside the building the students had started a fire on the first floor to dispell the effects of a tear gas grenade which was accidentally discharged.

i. (U) The RSO was led to the second floor and used to communicate with the people in the secure area. After some delay, during which the situation was discussed via telephone between those in the secure area and the Charge', the Charge' made the decision to open the door. This order was passed and the door was opened. As portions of the chancery came under student control, they were ransacked and defaced. Attempts to coerce Americans to open safes, often at gun or knife point were common. The takeover was completed by 1500 hours.

j. (U) As the Americans were captured their hands were tied with pre-cut, pre-knotted nylon rope and they were blindfolded. During the initial capture of each group, particularly those who held out in the secure and vaulted areas, a certain degree of roughness was experienced after capture. Initially, all the Americans were confined to either the Ambassador's residence or one of the staff cottages. During the next three days, a general screening and identification process of the Americans was conducted by the Iranians. This sometimes included being brought back to a work area and being asked to open safes. It was not until the second day that Koob, who had been at the ICA offices off the Compound, was caught and taken to the Compound.
Beginning on 6 November the militants relocated some of the Americans to one of two private residences in northern Tehran. Eventually more than twenty male Americans were rotated through these two buildings, with a normal off compound population averaging 8 to 9. All the Americans were returned to the Compound by mid-December.

1. (U) During the third week of November, thirteen of the original 63 compound hostages were released and it became evident that the MFA trio of Laingen, Howland, and Tomseth had lost their freedom of movement. Another six Americans assigned to Embassy were lucky enough to have been off the Compound at the time of the takeover and with the assistance of the Canadian Ambassador remained out of sight and eventually were able to leave the country undetected with Canadian assistance.

m. (U) During the period mid-December through mid-March, American hostages were held in the Ambassador's residence, the furniture warehouse, and the chancery, with a single staff cottage used once. By mid-March all the Americans were being held in the chancery, where they remained until the night of 25/26 April when all but five were relocated off the compound.

n. (U) Dispersions out of Tehran began that night with some 35 hostages moved by closed vans in small convoys to the cities of Tabriz, Hamadan, Qom, Esfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, and possibly Jahrom. Ten were held in Evin Prison in Tehran for a few days and then dispersed. Five were flown to Mashad, and the others moved to a small town a few hours from Tehran.

o. (U) Reconsolidation into Tehran began in early June and continued until late August. By 1 September all American hostages were in Tehran, with the majority (44) held in the Komiteh Prison, near the MFA. Five were held in the chancery and three at the MFA.

p. (U) During the last week of October 1980, approximately a dozen of the senior officers were relocated to the Evin Prison complex. By the end of the first week of November, the compound had been emptied of Americans with the former chancery detainees being relocated, the women to Evin and the men to Komiteh.

q. (U) Assembly of the hostages at the pre-release site, a complex in northern Tehran, began in mid-December and was concluded by 24 December with the exception of the MFA trio. The MFA hostages were taken to Komiteh prison on 3 January and remained there until 15/16 January when they were taken to the pre-release site.
r. (U) Beginning on 19 January, the Americans were told individually, they were candidates for release and their answers to questions about the conditions of their captivity would have an impact on their chance for release. They also were read an article from an English language edition of an 18 January Tehran newspaper which summarized the ongoing negotiations. Each was briefly interviewed by a female militant and answered with noncommittal responses. The interviews were filmed "for the student records". Following the interview, each American was given a general physical exam by the Algerian doctors and returned to their room.

s. (U) At approximately 1900 Tehran time (1030 EST) on 20 January, the Americans were told they had an hour to pack. Within 15 minutes, the guards came back and told them they were leaving. The Americans were blindfolded, placed on several buses and driven to Mehrabad Airport. One American, Metrinka, was pulled off the bus before it left the site and beaten because he replied to some profanities made by a militant. He was delivered to the airport separately in a sedan.

t. (U) The trip to the airport took approximately thirty-five minutes. The Americans waited on the buses between 15-45 minutes before being taken off one at a time and ushered through a human corridor of approximately fifty militants. None of the returnees claimed to have been hit or swung at during the movement to the aircraft, but the militants chanted fanatically "Down With America".

u. (U) Hostage treatment during captivity varied but included beatings, long periods of solitary confinement, extended periods of being tied or handcuffed, mock firing squads, in several cases denial of medical attention or medication, and threats of being thrown to the crowd or shot. Individuals receiving serious abuses appear to fall into three categories: those who were known or suspected to be associated with the CIA/intelligence; those who attempted escape; and those who antagonized their captors.

2. (C) Control, Direction and Support:

2. (U) The militants exercised direct physical control of the Americans from capture to release. The Americans were blindfolded and tied upon seizure and a no-talking rule was imposed. These restrictions remained in force for the first three months. Thereafter, the no-talking ban was lifted between roommates. However, the blindfold rule was applied on all movement out of a cell or room and the hands tied procedure was enforced on any out-of-building transfers. Physical security was high throughout, but varied with time, location and prisoner. During the
first few months it was not uncommon for Americans held in isolation to have an armed militant guard present. By March this procedure had been dropped, with unarmed guards in the hostage hallways and armed guards at key entry and control points and external perimeters.

b. All external moves, even trips from the chancery to Mushroom Inn and the Ambassador's residence for showers, were accomplished in cars or vans and under guard. All off-compound transfers were accomplished in vans with the windows blacked out. Circuitous routing was often used to confuse the Americans as to distance and direction. This practice continued until 24 December 1980 when several Americans were moved from one building within the pre-release compound to another. The Americans were blindfolded, hands tied, placed in a closed vehicle and driven around for approximately 20 minutes, then brought back to the building adjacent to their point of origin. Transfer from the pre-release site to the airport was done under blindfold and vehicle darkened conditions only. Hands were not tied.

c. The militants were controlled and responded to direction from a hardline faction of the Islamic religious hierarchy. The continuing presence of Mullahs at the compound and various detention sites confirmed the extent of their involvement. The Mullahs in turn controlled revolutionary guard entities throughout the country. Rapid development, coordination, and implementation of the Tehran uprising was clear evidence of this interface. Some of the detention sites were guarded by members of the revolutionary guard, and some are believed to have been Basij training sites, others being Mullahs' homes. The extended use of Komiteh Prison, which is run under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, controlled by the clerics, is further evidence of their involvement.

d. Although the militants accomplished much of their own housekeeping chores, they did receive support at least tacitly from secular segments of the Iranian Government structure. Such support included news coverage, radio and TV broadcast time and support (all key events were videotaped by technical teams from the Government-run TV), as well as telephone, water and power service. Revolutionary guards maintained security around the Compound, but allowed free movement to the militants. The militants were given small arms training either by the revolutionary guard or the conventional army. They were provided very sound security advice by knowledgeable
persons throughout and given the means and guidance to carry it through. They received support, at least indirectly, from the conventional military elements immediately after 25 April 1980, when measures were initiated to deter another rescue attempt. In addition the militants received substantial information, moral and psychological support from Iranian student groups in the United States.

e. (C) In summary, the events of the fifteen months of the Iranian hostage situation bear the hallmarks of an orchestrated campaign of psychological warfare designed to enhance the influence of the Islamic revolutionary hardliners, humiliate the United States, and purge American influence and values from Iranian society.
NOTE TO READERS:

The following "Chronology of Events" is a running account of events as reported at the time. It was largely prepared from "open sources" or initial intelligence indications.

Since the intent of the listing was to capture the tenor of the prevailing atmosphere and document the complexity of the situation, no attempt has been made to go back and "correct the original listing."

For this reason some contradictions exist between what was "reported" and actual events; however, these "contradictions" are few.

The most notable being a 4 Nov 80 claim that the militants transferred responsibility for the hostages to the Iranian Government on 3 Nov 80. This was in physical relinquishing of the hostages to any country or militant organization in the fifteen months following the initial seizure. The militants maintained custody throughout
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1 NOV Approximately 300 Iranian "students" swarmed over and seized the US Embassy Compound in TEHRAN and demanded return (extradition) of the Shah to IRAN. Hostage total estimated at 60-63 AMCITS and 20-30 FN.

7 NOV Students/militants threaten to kill hostages if US takes armed action.

8 NOV Iranian Red Cross doctor permitted to visit some of the hostages (no useful data obtained).

10 NOV Four foreign diplomats (French, Swedish, Algerian, Syrian) visit compound and see most hostages. Diplomats are told that 4-5 hostages are being held outside of Compound and could not be seen during visit for security reasons. Hostages seen at Ambassador Residence, servants' quarters, Consulate, and staff cottages.

11 NOV Papal Nuncio visits Compound and sees 11 hostages.

12 NOV Militants claim to start a five day hunger strike. No further data obtained.

14 NOV Militants reject conciliatory statements by Foreign Minister and vowed to hold hostages for two or three years, if necessary.

15 NOV Militants reject Foreign Ministry statement that some of the hostages might be released, noting that no individual has the authority to do so.

16 NOV Militants release three NBC film crewmen briefly held for filming the Compound.

16 NOV Larger than normal crowds on this date, a Friday, starting a pattern noted throughout the hostage crisis.

16 NOV KHOMEINI issued decree asking students to release blacks and women.

17 NOV Spokesman for the militants reiterates earlier threat that hostages' situation would worsen if Shah leaves US.

18 NOV LAINGEN believes 16 to be released.

19 NOV Three hostages released (GROSS, QUARLES, MAPLES).

20 NOV Ten hostages released (MONTAGNE, TEDFORD, WALSH, JOHNSON, WALKER, ROLLINS, WILLIAMS, ROBINSON, HUGHES, VINCENT).

( ) NOV Massive demonstrations at Embassy to commemorate beginning of Muharram, a major religious holiday.
22 NOV  Release of five non-Americans from Embassy announced.

3 25 NOV  Militants blame US/Zionists for attack on Grand Mosque in MECCA, SAUDI ARABIA.

25 NOV  Congressman HANSEN sees 19 hostages.

27 NOV  Militants claim that Embassy grounds and walls have been mined.

27 NOV  Indications of "staking" within Compound noted.

27 NOV  Rumors that some hostages have been moved to prison noted.

29-30 NOV  Massive marches on most holy days of Muharram. Marches take place on TAKHT-E-JAMSHIDI AND ROOSEVELT. Remainder of Tehran.

1 DEC  Rumors through Canadian press that 12 hostages have been moved to prison on outskirts of TEHRAN. Denied by students.

1 DEC  Responding to statements by GOTBZADEH that US Charge LAINGEN and his two colleagues could leave IRAN, the militant have said that they should be put on trial instead.

1 DEC  Rumors through TOKYO and BRUSSELS that one hostage was dead.

1 DEC  Militants produce document allegedly identifying two hostages as CIA spies (KALPE, DAUGHTERTY). Supposedly admitted that he was Students also state that HOWLAND and TOMSETH should be tried.

2 DEC  Militants are vague on continuing reports that some of the hostages have been moved. Militants claim hostages are in the Compound. Canadian ambassador to visit LAINGEN, TOMSETH, and HOWLAND.

4 DEC  Spokesman for militants announces that eight of the fifty hostages have been singled out for intensive interrogation in preparation for possible espionage trials. West European source claims that all hostages are in the Compound.

7 DEC  Militants name another hostage as a spy.

8 DEC  Two University of Kansas faculty members meet with militants, but do not see hostages.

12 DEC  Militants deny announcement by GOTBZADEH that international observers could visit hostages.

13 DEC  KHONEINI gives permission for neutral observers to visit hostages; militants agree.
14 DEC PLOTKIN makes statement calling for return of Shah.

14 DEC GALLEGOS interviewed by US media/Iranian TV. He mentions MUSHROOM location.

16 DEC Militants reject opinion of International Court calling for release of the hostages.

18 DEC Despite fact that Shah has moved to PANAMA, militants threaten to "at least" try hostages if US does not return the Shah.

21 DEC Militants accept order from KHOMEINI that US clergymen may visit hostages on Christmas.

24-25 DEC Four US clergymen visit hostages and conduct services for them in three groups. Services conducted at three locations: ambassador Residence, Consulate (staff cottages). Forty-three hostages seen and an additional two accounted for. Five hostages were not seen and did not provide messages for their families: AHERN, BELK, KALPE, METRINKO, DAUGHERTY.

25 DEC TEHRAN TIMES newspaper publishes list of 41 (40) hostages' names. UPI reprints list. Many errors noted in list.

25 DEC Iranian Foreign Ministry official states that three hostages, two women and one black male, will be released soon.


27 DEC According to DOS, students state that they are holding 49 AMCITS.

27 DEC HONG KONG IIR: media source claims that five hostages have been moved to prison in northern TEHRAN.

4 JAN Conference of World Liberation Movements sponsored by militants begins.

4 JAN Militants demand that US Charge' LAINGEN be turned over to them for questioning.

4 JAN Militants announce that USAF LtCol ROEDER would be tried for crimes he allegedly committed while serving in VIET NAM.

5 JAN Foreign Minister GOTBZADEH refuses militants' demand that the US Charge' be turned over to them and seeks KHOMEINI's guidance on the situation.

6 JAN No decision by KHOMEINI on status of US Charge'.
8 JAN  KHOMEINI cancels all appointments from 12-27 January.

9 JAN  Massive Anti-American demonstrations during Islamic holy day.

10 JAN  Student delegation visits KHOMEINI.

10 JAN  Ayatollah BEHESTHI, Secretary of Iran's Revolutionary Council and confidant to KHOMEINI, stated that there was a change in attitude toward the hostages. He also announced that the US Charge' would not be transferred from the Foreign Ministry to the Embassy.

10 JAN  Students admitted that ROBERT BLUCKER has been ill.

11 JAN  Militants state that they know of no change in attitude regarding the hostages.

13 JAN  JOHN THOMAS (AIM) visited Embassy Compound and obtained letters from some hostages for their families.

14 JAN  First good data obtained on location of LAINGEN at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

16 JAN  Three of four black US ministers may have visited the Embassy Compound.

17 JAN  Tehran Radio broadcasts statement by GHOTBZADEH denying that KHOMEINI agreed with proposal for UN Secretary General WALDHEIM to mediate hostage issue.

18 JAN  All US press personnel depart Iran based on orders of the Revolutionary Council.

18 JAN  Team of heart specialists visit KHOMEINI in Qom. KHOMEINI's rest period which is due to expire on 27 Jan, is extended to 9 Feb.

18 JAN  World Court in session at the Hague sets 18 Feb as deadline for release of the hostages.

18 JAN  Letters from 17 hostages arrive in CONUS via international mail.

21 JAN  Japanese press reports that there are approximately 400 militants in US Embassy, and that decisions are made by a leadership council.

22 JAN  [Redacted] in Tehran reports that some personal effects of hostages are being seized and transferred to US Embassy Compound. Rumors continue to circulate that hostages will be released in early February following arrival of UN investigative commission.
23 JAN Militants accuse press attache BARRY ROSEN of spying and claim his guilt will be clear once he is put on trial. In interview with AFP correspondent, "students" maintained their intent to hold all hostages until Shah is returned. "Students" indicated they no longer made any distinction among hostages as "all were guilty" of contributing to the system that kept the Shah in power.

24 JAN Clerics are looking for a way out of the hostage situation. Majority of hostages would be released in 2-3 months, but 4-6 hostages who were identified as "spies" would be held indefinitely.

25 JAN Initial reports of balloting in Presidential election give BANI-SADR approximately 80% of vote. KHOMEINI reportedly improving in Tehran hospital.

26 JAN BANI-SADR announces he is not prepared to accept parallel government in form of militants at US Embassy.

28 JAN Militants insist that one of the characteristics of the revolution is "that all decisions should not necessarily be made through government channels."


30 JAN Militants reportedly increase number of guards around US Embassy, but state that escape of 6 AMCITS with Canadian staff will not affect treatment of hostages.

31 JAN BANI-SADR states that criminality of Shah is the main issue vis-a-vis US and that hostages' situation could be settled even if Shah is not physically returned to Iran.

1 FEB A western diplomat in Iran indicates that BANI-SADR will be in a strong position to free the hostages following legislative elections scheduled for 15 Feb. Militants, however, reiterate their position that they will not release the hostages without a direct order from KHOMEINI.

4 FEB Revolutionary Council spokesman HABIBI states that an international commission will meet in Tehran to investigate the Shah's role. No date or composition of the commission was announced. Additionally, the militants announce that 50 Americans (unidentified) have been invited to Tehran to examine evidence of the former regime's crimes.

5 FEB BANI-SADR endorsed by KHOMEINI as Iran's first president.

14 APR  ICRC visits all 50 U.S. hostages in U.S. Embassy.
14 APR  Iran announces second round of Parliamentary elections will take place on 2 May.
15 APR  Militants at the U.S. Embassy announce that Amnesty International and other human rights groups may be allowed to visit the hostages.
16 APR  Revolutionary Council announces it is considering postponement of the second round of Parliamentary elections for an additional week.
16 APR  Charge' LAINGEN informs DOS that MFA-3 have been moved to a new room in the MFA.
17 APR  Further sanctions against Iran ordered by President CARTER. President announces that next step might be some sort of military action.
18 APR  Iran grants visas to hostage Kevin HERMENING's parents, who plan to fly to Iran immediately.
19 APR  Four relatives of hostages announce they will travel to Europe to gain support for release of hostages.
19 APR  Serious clashes occurring on Iranian campuses in response to Revolutionary Council's call for purging of the educational system of U.S. influence and anti-revolutionaries.
20 APR  Militants announce they will allow Mrs. TIMM to visit her hostage son (Kevin HERMENING).
21 APR  Clashes between leftists and Islamic fundamentalists continuing on Tehran University campus.
22 APR  Iranian campus unrest calms as leftist political groups close their offices.
22 APR  EEC announces it would delay implementation of sanctions against Iran until after 17 May 80.
23 APR  BANI SADR proclaims the first stage of an Islamic cultural revolution in Iran's universities.
24 APR  U.S. ATTEMPTS TO RESCUE HOSTAGES.
25 APR  Militants announce they will kill the hostages if U.S. attempts another rescue.
26 APR Ayatollah KHALKALI visits "Desert One" to survey U.S. aircraft/equipment. BANI SADR states U.S. servicemen killed in the rescue attempt will be returned without pre-conditions.

26 APR Militants at the U.S. Embassy announce they will move hostages to various locations within Iran.

27 APR (SUNDAY) Iranians display remains of U.S. servicemen at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. First indications that return of the bodies to U.S. will not be a simple affair.

27 APR Militants announce that some hostages have been moved to Tabriz.

27 APR KHOMEINI orders BANI SADR to convene a conference in Tehran of international organizations and representatives of various countries to witness U.S. crimes against Iran.

28 APR Militants announce that hostages in Tabriz are being held in the former U.S. Consulate. DOS again makes telephone contact with Charge' LAINGEN.

28 APR Archbishop CAPUCCI enroute to Tehran to take custody of the bodies of the U.S. servicemen.

29 APR Militants announce that three separate shooting incidents involving passing cars occurred at the Embassy in the morning.

29 APR Iraqi intelligence agents fail in an attempt to assassinate-foreign minister GHOSTZADEH in Kuwait.

30 APR Reports continue to arrive stating hostages have been dispersed to various cities in Iran.

1 MAY Several thousand Iranians demonstrate in front of former U.S. Consulate in Tabriz, where militants announced some hostages are being held.

4 MAY Iranian foreign ministry reaffirms that Iranian Parliament will decide on the fate of the hostages.

4 MAY The date of Iran's proposed conference of international representatives postponed until 15-17 May.

4 MAY Archbishop CAPUCCI receives the remains of dead U.S. servicemen.

British SAS attacks Iranian Embassy in London and frees hostages being held by Iranian arabs.

The bodies of the eight U.S. SERVICEMEN ARRIVE AT Dover AFB.

Militants claim hostages have been moved to thirteen cities in Iran.

Second round of Parliamentary elections commences.

KHOMÉINI authorizes BANI SADR to name a prime minister.

Iran newspaper reported yesterday that the Iranian militants holding hostages intend to rotate them among a number of cities.

Voting yesterday in the runoff round of elections for new parliament reported to be low.

Intense fighting between government troops and Kurds continued in several cities in Iran's NW.

Italian journalist Oriana FALLACI quoted an U/I source as saying that one AMCIT hostage has attempted suicide three times and may be dead. U/I hostage reportedly one of those kept in strict confinement in basement of occupied Embassy. FALLACI is a highly respected journalist in Europe and U.S. and although report is unsubstantiated, she has been accurate in the past.

Swiss Embassy made approaches to Iranian authorities about Cynthia DWYER, an AMCIT held incommunicado - advised by foreign ministry that Mrs. DWYER was under arrest - NPI.

GHOTBZADEH has claimed that more than 1200 U.S. firms have secretly offered to do business with Iran since CARTER severed economic ties.

BANI SADR's efforts to appoint a new prime minister appear to have hit a snag.
13 MAY  BANI SADR stripped Ayatollah KHALKHALI of his title as an Islamic Judge because of KHALKHALI's order to demolish the tomb of the deposed Shah's father.

13 MAY  Reuter reports that Cynthia Dwyer is now being held in EVIN prison, transferred two days ago.

14 MAY  Revolutionary Council failed for the second consecutive time to form a Provisional Cabinet - setback for BANI SADR.

14 MAY  GHOTBZADEH to head the Iranian delegation at the Islamic Conference scheduled to begin 17 May in Islamabad.

14 MAY  BANI SADR claimed that "96 Americans have landed in various parts of Iran with the intention of carrying out acts of sabotage within the next two weeks.

14 MAY  Iran announced that an international conference "to investigate U.S. interventions" would be convened in Tehran on 2-5 June.

14 MAY  PARS reports the Revolutionary Council ratified a protocol for Iranian-USSR economic and technical cooperation.

16 MAY  Situation in NW Iran continues to deteriorate.

19 MAY  GHOTBZADEH speaking to delegates attending Islamic Conference in Islamabad had harsh words for both U.S. and USSR.

20 MAY  Australia's Foreign Minister announced yesterday an immediate embargo on all exports to Iran except food and medicine.

21 MAY  European economic sanctions announced.

23 MAY  Swiss embassy contact all AMCITS to urge them to leave the country within two weeks.

24 MAY  International Court of Justice judgement in favor of U.S., return of hostages and reparations ordered.

27 MAY  GHOTBZADEH met with ambassadors of twelve countries - offered no forecast for release - 1 to 3 months.
30 MAY Free Voice of Iran calls for rebellion against KHOMEINI.


4 JUN Two members of American delegation reported to have visited the Compound to deliver letters to the hostages.

5 JUN International conference on "America's Crimes" concluded with a strong condemnation of U.S. intervention and rescue attempt.

6 JUN Press report release Re: BANI SADR's 3 point plan for release of hostages.

7 JUN Swiss Embassy has sent two notes to Iranian authorities RE: Cynthia DWYER, no response to date.

8 JUN

10 JUN Ayatollah KHOMEINI reported to be extremely ill.

10 JUN QUASHQA'I tribesmen have gained the support of Pro-Bakhtiar tribes.

11 JUN FM GHOTBZADEH arrived Oslo for meetings with European socialist leaders.

12 JUN Rally by Moslem leftists in AMJADIEH Stadium ended in serious rioting with up to 300 casualties.

12 JUN Iranian military stated it had smashed a plot by an army unit in Kurdistan to overthrow the government.

12 JUN Press states 180 members of the MAJLIS have had their credentials approved - giving the legal quorum; now need six jurists appointed to the twelve man council to start.

16 JUN Tehran radio reports that Ayatollah KHOMEINI has ordered a purge of all non-Moslems from Iran's State-run radio and TV networks.
First report that the Revolutionary Council is working on a plan for submitting the hostage crisis to the National Assembly. The Revolutionary Council is dividing the hostages into categories based upon the person's position at the Embassy and the date of arrival in Iran.

Nine hostages have been heard from since the rescue operation.

BANI SADR's power struggle with the Islamic Fundamentalists has become a personal battle with Dr. Ayat, a prominent member of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP).

Participating nations of the Venice Summit released a joint statement "vigorously condemning the taking of hostages and the seizure of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel in contravention of the basic norm of international law and practice."

Two armed men, reportedly members of a previously unknown clandestine Iranian organization called "RED JUNE", entered the home of the ex-Shah's sister in New York. They were thwarted by security guards.

Mrs. TIMM granted permission to visit her son in Iran. She is contemplating another visit.

Mrs. TIMM is enroute to Tehran for her second visit.

Former Shah gravely ill. Underwent surgery to drain fluids from his left lung.

A group of militant Iranian students, "The Association of Iranian Islamic Students in France," occupied Iran's Paris Embassy in what was called a protest against the policies of FM GHOTBZADEH.

Press reports from Cairo indicate the Shah slipped into an "intermittent coma." Shah's condition reported to be critical as a result of surgical complications and infection. Richard QUEEN moved to hospital in Tehran.

Shah's conditions reported to be "satisfactory" and spokesman denied reports of coma.

Richard QUEEN released for medical reasons.

Major coup attempt in Iran stopped.

QUEEN arrives Zurich.
14 JUL  QUEEN now in Air Force hospital.

14 JUL  A Tehran newspaper, Azadegan, published what is said was an excerpt from the interrogations of a hostage about the operations of the CIA in Iran.

16 JUL  Revolutionary Council imposed a 48 hour ban on all departures and arrivals through Iranian land, air, and sea frontiers.

18 JUL  Richard QUEEN arrives Andrews AFB.

18 JUL  Iranian borders reopened.

18 JUL  According to DOS, letters have been received from approximately twenty hostages.

18 JUL  An attempt was made on the life of former Iranian Prime Minister BAHTIAR at his daughters home in Paris. He was not injured. A group calling itself "Guardsmen of Islam" has claimed credit for the assassination attempt.

23 JUL  Reuter reports a "violent explosion" shook a shopping area in the center of Tehran killing five and injuring seventy-seven. Blamed on terrorists.

23 JUL  BANI SADR offers Prime Minister post to Ahmad KHOMENI, son of Ayatollah KHOMEINI. The Ayatollah rejected the offer.

23 JUL  Former Iranian diplomat Ali TABATABAI shot and killed in Washington by unknown gunman. TABATABAI was the leader of the Iran Freedom Foundations, an anti-Khomeini group.

24 JUL  Saudi newspaper reports the Iranian government will release the hostages at the end of Ramadan. Iranian government is reported to see the hostages as "a burden...although beneficial at the beginning.") Report appears to be wishful thinking, despite its widespread nature.

24 JUL  Twenty soldiers and airmen were executed on charges of involvement in the attempted coup. This is the second group of plotters to be executed.

25 JUL  

5-18
4 AUG  Reuter reports that in a perceived retaliation for the arrest of the student demonstrators in the U.S., Iran's Parliament has postponed a scheduled debate on the hostages. Additionally, Parliament President Rafsanjani states Parliament will also postpone discussions about the letter from the U.S. Congress.

5 AUG  Reuter reports 250,000 people demonstrate at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran to protest detention of the Iranian protesters in the U.S..

6 AUG  Ayatollah KHOMEINI in his "Jerusalem Day" message called for the Majlis to practice greater cooperation and castigated both Islamic hardliners and moderates for infighting and squabbling. He also addressed need for fence mending among Islamic nations, a revitalization of revolutionary fervor and a renewed dedication to Islam.

7 AUG  DOS receives first TELEX since January from Bruce Laingen, sent directly from the Foreign Ministry in Tehran.

10 AUG  Official expressed "profound concern" over the continued holding of U.S. hostages in Iran, warned that the strong support thus far enjoyed by Iran could end if the hostage crisis is not resolved before September.

11 AUG  DOS had a one-hour conversation with the group at the Foreign Ministry, the first since 22 July.

11 AUG  The Iranian Ambassador in Moscow confirms press reports that Tehran plans to close the Iranian Consulate in Leningrad.

14 AUG  According to Pars, nine ambassadors of the non-EC European nations met with Parliament President Rafsanjani and presented him with a memorandum which expressed the deep concern of their governments over the continued detention of U.S. hostages. Rafsanjani replied that appeals based upon international law were groundless. He further stated that if the U.S. genuinely wished to resolve the crisis, it should return the Shah's wealth and treat Iran on a basis of full equality.
17 AUG  In a letter condemning the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh ordered the Soviet Union to reduce its diplomatic staff in Tehran and to close down its Consulate in either Rasht or Esfahan.

18 AUG  Iranian Parliament President Rafsanjani reportedly stated that the U.S. hostages "did not constitute an urgent problem" and that Parliament will deal with the issue "when it has nothing more to consider."

20 AUG  The Majlis voted to reply to the letter from 187 U.S. Congressmen that urged the deputies to give top priority to consideration of the hostage situation.

20 AUG  Pars reports Bani Sadr formally appointed Mohammed Ali Rajai as Iran's new Prime Minister.

21 AUG  Tehran press reports claim Soviet Union agreed to close its Consulate in Esfahan. Moscow reportedly is upgrading its Consulate in Rasht to a Consulate-General.

21 AUG  Prime Ministers of Italy and Denmark sent personal messages to Iranian Prime Minister Rajai appealing for a resolution to the hostage situation.

23 AUG  Reuter and CBS report a Soviet offer to sell arms to Iran after Iran complained about Soviet arms sales to Iraq. Iran turned down the Soviet offer.

23 AUG  DOS had a one and one-half hour conversation with the group at the Foreign Ministry, the first since 11 August.

25 AUG  Time magazine reports Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh wrote the Majlis urging that it not put American hostages on trial. Among remaining issues mentioned by Ghotbzadeh that exist between U.S. and Iran were the return of Iranian assets and a U.S. pledge of non-interference.

26 AUG  In statement #142, broadcast by Tehran radio, the militants repeated earlier threats that if the U.S. attempted another military operation to rescue the hostages, they would be killed.
- In an interview on Tehran radio, Chief Iranian Hostage Negotiator Behzad Navabavi declared that Iran had "in general" accepted the latest US proposals, "what is left is agreement between US banks and the central Bank of Iran for the transfer (release) of Iran's frozen assets."

16 JAN

According to White Press Secretary Jody Powell, the US sent a draft agreement to Algeria for relay to Iran. Powell stated, "if they agree with it, then we will have an agreement."

- Earlier, President Carter ordered 2.2 billion dollars in frozen Iranian assets transferred to London as a first step toward freeing the hostages.

- A senior Iranian official in Tehran said the hostages had been "prepared for departure" and could leave as soon as its assets were transferred to an escrow account in Algeria.

- Iran News Agency (PARS) reported that an Algerian airline had been asked to make a plane available to transfer the hostages from Iran if the release goes ahead.

17 JAN

Secretary of State Muskie summoned Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to DOS to demand an end to the mounting Soviet propaganda campaign claiming a US invasion of Iran was imminent. DOS spokesman stated the campaign "appeared designed to affect the outcome of the hostage negotiations."

- In Tehran HASAN AYAT of the IRP claimed "an early release of the hostages is not possible."

- Tehran radio quoted an official source in Prime Minister Rajai's office in denying rumors on the release of the hostages during the current week.

- Chief Iran Negotiator Nabavi, according to PARS stated a settlement had not yet been reached and charged the US had transferred only part of the amount agreed to.

18 JAN

A PARS news report stated that a team of Algerian doctors had been dispatched to Tehran to examine the hostages if they are to be freed.

C 19 JAN

DOD debriefing team moved to Andrews AFB in anticipation of hostage release.
20 JAN: Team on board AF 43 at 1130 EST. President Reagan sworn in at 1200, watched on TV aircraft by JTF/J2, who was advise actually departure was at 1233 and 1241 due to technical problems.

Hostages were advised to assist and moved to Tehran Airport with only 10-15 minutes warning and arrived at aircraft between 1120-1140 EST.
1. (TS) On 4 November 1979 as a result of the takeover of the US Embassy Compound Tehran, a JCS planning team was formed to assemble all available data about the compound and the situation and to review the possibilities and problems associated with conducting a rescue mission if the situation would warrant and the NCA so direct. This team initially consisted of four planners (Ground UW, Air Special Ops, Navy UW, and Intelligence) from the JCS Special Operations Division, who routinely worked problems of this type as a team. This group, along with Service special operations and special planner POCs, provided the cadre for the JTF Staff which was formally constituted on 12 November 1979.

2. (U) The planners faced many challenges including limited intelligence. Iran was surrounded by countries which were not likely to support US staking bases or troop concentrations. The mission objective was located approximately 350 nautical miles from the northern portion of the Persian Gulf, 700 miles from the Straits of Hormuz and 900 miles from the nearest carrier launch point. Anti-American sentiment prevailed throughout Iran and was particularly strong in the capital city of Tehran. The highways and streets of Tehran are poorly laid out and traffic congestion inhibits easy movement within the city.
3. (U) The Tehran Times heralded the Embassy takeover in its 5 Nov 79 issue with the headline, "Marines Fight 3-Hour Losing Battle With Moslem Students." The lead article summarized the events of the takeover and stated the takeover was accomplished by a group calling itself "Moslem students loyal to the Imam," and that the act was an expression of opposition to American domination. The article stated the takeover began around 1030 in the morning, when 400-500 students marching in the streets swarmed over the compound in a prearranged plan. The article said a student spokesman claimed the action was supported by a number of political organizations and that the "Assembly of Experts," a group of senior clerics, supported the action by a majority vote.

4. and assemble copies of all available maps, charts and city plans as well as request blueprints of the Compound from the State Department. DIA was able to respond quickly to this request for basic data because the Tehran Embassy had been the subject of contingency planning several times during the preceding two years. In addition,
6. (S) During this timeframe, DMA was responding to numerous requests for special products and off the shelf material. This product was modeled after several DMA had made during the previous three years to support crisis reaction exercises and false alarms in other parts of the world. This product was to be the first of many that DMA was to produce. It was produced in both photo and paper (litho) form and delivered to the JCS and Ground Force planners on 10 November. At the same time DMA produced a 1:50,000 composite map reduction of four 1:25,000 sheets produced in May 1979 which provided the most accurate and current data on Tehran. These two products,
along with a composite 1:250,000 JOG--which underwent only one revision during the entire period--became the basic planning references for all forces and staffs.

8. The Soviet treatment of the incident ran a dual track. As of 14 November, TASS had only reprinted reports from Tehran and Washington. However, Soviet treatment on the radio, particularly their clandestine radio broadcasts such as the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party and the National Voice of Iran, claimed the demands of the Iranian people were justified. Clandestine broadcasts continued throughout the next fifteen months and often included numerous unfounded warnings of impending American military intervention.
9. ([u] Since undetected closure of the rescue force was paramount to success, many ideas for the clandestine introduction of the force were discussed and examined during the first several weeks. Intelligence played a role in providing assessments of detection during most of these discussions; however, it was usually operational or logistic considerations and the lack of a specific execution window that negated many of these options.

10. ([c]) It is essential to the understanding of the reader to know that planning was not a straight line equation. The tempo of the crisis evolved from a two-three day short term outlook with a need to react immediately, to a mid-range outlook which necessitated a viable plan be developed which would allow for a near unilateral US action in a

11. ([u] Substantial attention was given during this time to an examination of ongoing US military actions with the
Intent to determine what the Soviet perceptions might be at this time.

12. (TS) By 14 November a secure teletype network had been established between the JTF (Headquarters) and the Ground Force planners. This link was used for both intelligence and operational traffic and eventually expanded to include other JTF elements as they were activated. This network was complemented by the JTF and the Ground Force planners. In addition, equipment and activated a similar dedicated link between the team and the JTF HOS.

13. (TS) On 14 November 1979, the JTF dispatched its first intelligence summary. This summary was in fact the first of a series of intelligence assessments to be prepared and disseminated by the JTF. This first assessment concluded the situation was the result of detailed planning and although the students were the instruments, they had the active support of elements of the Iranian Government and the religious leadership. Shortly thereafter, the JTF
began transmitting a daily intelligence situation summary to all assigned forces and continued this procedure until 21 Jan 81. The last intelligence message disseminated to the JTF forces on this network went out on 3 Feb 81 and was a summary of the hostage debriefings. This message closed with the observation that the events of the past fifteen months bore the hallmarks of an orchestrated campaign of psychological warfare designed to enhance the influence of the Islamic revolutionary hardliners, humiliate the United States, and purge American influence and values from Iranian society.

14. (S) On 16 Nov 79, a select weather team from Air Weather Service (AWS), a component of the Military Airlift Command (MAC), began supporting the JTF Staff with climatological, solar/lunar, and forecasting information for planning. An Air Force weather officer was assigned to provide support to the JTF Staff under the staff direction of the JTF/J-2.
16. (TS) By mid to late November, it became apparent that the Iranians were using misinformation as a major defensive tool. Rumors of mining the compound walls and stories of the hostages being relocated to Evin Prison were fed to the population and media. The Iranian use of misinformation and security deception continued throughout the fifteen months even to the point of the hostages boarding the Algerian aircraft to the televised chanting of "large crowds" which actually consisted of less than 80 militants.

17. (TS) During this early period, core formed two small teams to examine the feasibility and requirements associated with a force of the rescue force or some of their essential equipment. One team was tasked with examining a... using... The other team was to examine how the force could move within the environment and... Both of these teams required and received extensive intelligence support. Both drew on the knowledge of military personnel that were familiar with the two environments. After an effort of approximately two-three weeks, work ceased on the... but was resurrected and reexamined several more times in the future, particularly after the April rescue attempt. Work was continued by the... environment movement team with two principal options under consideration: one using
military vehicles flown in from CONUS and the other using

18. (TS) An extensive list of alternative operations was explored. Paradrop on the first night of a two-night operation was considered along with the option of landing at an airstrip and extracting the force and the hostages. Disadvantages of these options included risk of injury to personnel during the paradrop which would add liabilities to the force and the inability to locate a drop zone which was terrain suitable, operationally secure and close enough to the city to allow timely closure used during both entry and exit.

20. (TS) After a review of the risks and difficulties associated with the various scenarios, CONJTF reported to CJCS that the
operational and security problems associated with these concepts could not be resolved to make the plans militarily feasible. He recommended that a helicopter option be pursued as it held the greatest potential, especially for a quick safe extraction out of the urban environment of Tehran.

21. (TS) CJCS subsequently approved the development of a concept utilizing helicopters and directed that an emergency plan be refined in the event a near term rescue attempt was required. Unfortunately, there was no single long range helicopter unit available with the operational expertise required for this mission. Therefore a composite unit had to be formed. On 20 Nov, the CJCS directed the formation of a combined USN/USMC helicopter detachment. A USMC intelligence officer was assigned and special procedures were initiated to provide the unit intelligence data.

22. (TS) Intelligence was heavily tasked to respond to a growing list of essential elements of information (EEI). A flat, firm, and isolated drop zone (DZ) had not yet been identified.
A helicopter drop off point for the rescue force and a hideout site for the helicopters were also planning considerations that required extensive study and resolution.

24. (TS) During this same time (20-28 Nov), the first major challenge was undertaken. This involved the movement of six RH-53D's to a carrier group in the Indian Ocean under the RH-53's. The RH-53S were transported to with supporting personnel and equipment. This equipment included USMC range extension auxiliary fuel tanks for the helicopters. Four C-5s and five C-141s were used for the lift. The first C-5 arrived at 86 hours after departure from Norfolk. All helicopters were test flown and declared mission ready eight days after the JCS ordered the deployment. Although
there was speculation by the press on the departure from Norfolk. The real purpose of the deployment was not revealed.

25. (S) The aircraft carrier USS KITTY HAWK took the helicopters on board at night on 28 Nov as she sailed within 100 nautical miles of [classifier] on route to her station in the Arabian Sea. Consideration was given to deploying the rescue force and the helicopter crews that would actually fly the rescue mission to [classifier] to board the KITTY HAWK along with the helicopters. However, planning, intelligence, and training were judged insufficient and it was determined that the crews should continue training in the United States and deploy at a later date.

26. (S) Another study effort that required intelligence support was an examination of the [classifier] with the intent to identify ways and means to [classifier]. Much of this effort was accomplished through the efforts of an intelligence specialist from [classifier] and drawing support from DIA via the JTR.

28. (S) The intelligence staff continued to serve as management point for staff interface with the Air Force weather officer who was tasked to support planning. In addition to weather forecasts and climatological studies, the weather...
officer provided projected daily solar data defining hours of
darkness and projected daily moon rise-moon/moon set tables

29. (S) (TS) By 24 Nov, a search had begun at an abandoned air
field or unimproved landing zone (LZ) that could be used for
refueling the helicopters.

Consultations also were conducted with US military
personnel in the region, geologists, and other people who were knowledgeable of the area. The search
started with the entire area within the helicopter range/time
envelope and applying successively more stringent criteria
to those sub-areas that might be suitable.

31. (S) The area for a refueling site was primarily defined
by helicopter range capability. An area about 100-150 miles
in diameter was identified approximately 500 nm inland.
There were other factors which limited the geographic area within which refueling could be conducted. The time from an aircraft carrier to the Tehran area was estimated to be about eight hours. The requirement to avoid Iranian and Soviet detection at that time, the helicopters would have to depart just before dawn or after dark. This would not allow sufficient time to reconnoiter the target, rescue the hostages, fly to a preplanned airfield, and depart Iran in C-140s while still under the cover of darkness.

5. During the week of May 10, 1980, a hurried study and the J-2 recommended to CONUS that any existing but non-operational Iranian airfield be considered for use as the insertion site. One field was located about 70 miles from Tehran and was formerly used by the Iranian air force. The runway was 6,000 feet long, with a parallel taxiway that could accommodate several parked aircraft. It was expected that only a minimum number of caretakers, if any, would be present and, although there were some armed forces...

32. (TS) COMJTF obtained approval from CJCS to plan for the use of the airfield and selected elements of a US Army Ranger
battalion were identified as the security force. The Raider Commander and a small staff joined the JTF planning cell, and the JTF secure communication network was extended to include this unit as well as the ground surgical force, and both the fixed wing aircraft and helicopter units.

33. Throughout this period the JTF staff continued to search for a suitable landing/refueling site. One possible airfield was found which supported an Inactive Iranian Air Force Electronic Warfare Training Range. As a result of these consultations and continuing analysis of the JTF determined that it would be feasible to use the airfield and conduct patient care operations with little opposition.
Intelligence indicated that even if the rescue forces could reach the Embassy Compound walls undetected, enter the compound, and release the hostages, there was a high probability that Iranian elements could react with force and fire.
39. (TS) COMJTF requested that the feasibility of incorporating secure UHF into the helicopters be reexamined. This was discussed at length. The UHF secure voice system on the RH-53 left much to be desired, although identical to the system on board MC-130 aircraft. Transmissions were lengthy due to the keying period considered by the helicopter crews difficult to understand. It was decided that the helicopters would continue with unsecure radios and make calls only when necessary for emergencies or when vital information had to be transmitted.

41. (TS) However, beginning on 27 Nov, indications were noted on imagery that the Iranians were preparing anti-helicopter measures.

42. (TS) In order to support the operational concept of operations (which called for a long range helicopter penetration, mid-point ground refueling
exfiltration, the J-2 section prepared a comprehensive basic intelligence package which would be the intelligence annex to the OPLAN/OPORD if one was to be executed. Copies of this document were provided to the SIO of the various JTF forces as a means of consolidating the fragmentary data provided previously and to insure a common reference point.

Throughout the crisis, DIA and Army and Air Force analysis teams supported the planning effort by satisfying intelligence requirements. First and second phase analysis was accomplished by DIA teams at the Pentagon.
44. By 28 Nov 79, DIA had obtained sufficient current and historical data from... other collectors that they...

45. By the end of November OPSEC planning considerations had been addressed in the context of conceptual planning and several general and many specific procedures had been developed and documented for use. All JTF staff and force members were extremely conscious of the dangers of a compromise and there was total agreement on the need to maintain a strong OPSEC posture.

46. During these early weeks, the intelligence staff interviewed numerous military personnel who possessed unique knowledge about Iranian military capabilities. The range of individuals included Army officers who had been advisors to... flying units, and members of OSI and other...
50. (TS) On 12 Dec, after an analysis of all options and confirmation of Iranian measures, the......from the......was selected as the primary LZ. This required new planning, coordination, and training on......part of the rescue force, the......and the......

51. (TS) On 14 Dec, unsure that......could be used in Iran, COMJTF requested and received CJCS permission to develop a concept which called for......to be flown at an airfield located approximately......was examined as a possible entry point. It was a support field for the IAT. Like......complex, training had terminated and only a small security and caretaker force remained. It was estimated that......could land at this field under......and official......were abundant in the Iranian Armed Forces and so it was determined that if this option was selected......would be......

On 16 Dec, members of the Ground Force began training on......while......of the airfield continued.
52. On 27 Dec, OSD formally requested that DOD authorize the transfer of COMJTF also requested that the intensity of the support efforts. At that time, only a limited number of were working on the rescue requirements.

53. On 29 Dec, the JTF disseminated intelligence assessment #4 which consolidated and superseded data previously provided in a number of messages covering the period 14 Nov through late Dec.

This assessment was periodically updated or superseded by future editions throughout the crisis. These numbered assessments were supplemented by special assessments usually relating to projections of events for the upcoming 30-45-60 days. A brief listing of the subjects covered provides an appreciation for the variety of analytical estimates prepared:

a. Hostage Assessment 29 Jan 80

b. Short Term Assessment 4 Feb 80

c. (Iranian) Media Analysis 5 Feb 80
d. Impending Change Indicators 9 Feb 80

e. Analysis of Student/Military Options 9 Feb 80

f. Hostage Location/Situation Projections 16 Feb 80

g. Contributing Factors Assessment 23 Feb 80

h. Operational Assessment 26 Feb 80

i. Political Forecast Message 19 Mar 80

l. (Hostage) Transfer Projection 03 Apr 80

n. Threat Review 22 Apr 80

o. Intelligence Analysis (Mission Critical Factors) 22 Apr 80

54. Throughout the crisis there were many supportive actions provided by or through the efforts of DIA that normally do not come to mind in the normal course of intelligence which, however, warrant recognition. It was the DIA which provided multiple copies of the complete holdings of handheld photography that were on hand when the crisis began.

Other valuable contributions included continuing updates on key locations of concern to the crisis, monthly updates/projections of historical dates, holidays andl observances, and frequent updates which have lent impetus on operational planning, intelligence collection or analysis.
55. (S) A major area of concern which was never completely solved was the problem of preparing the forces for possible

Although improvements were introduced throughout the fifteen months even up to January 1981 and many initiatives were taken, a comprehensive and viable concept never was reached.

56. (S) During late December as the concept of operations became refined and most planning, training, intelligence and support actions were well underway, the JTF prepared a mission OPLAN IAW JOPS. However, it contained far more detail than normally found in a plan and in fact the intent was to include virtually all information necessary to support execution if the National Command Authority directed a rescue mission be
launched. In essence the document was closer to an OPORD than an OPLAN. Accordingly, the Intelligence Annex was very extensive. During this same time frame DIA prepared a detailed plan for coordinating DOD intelligence support should the mission be directed. The DIA plan was not implemented as a single entity in April of 1980 because most of the actions called for had been implemented and were operative beginning in January, with refinement occurring as time passed.

In late January, a series of memorandums/papers which provided background information such as Iran--The Captors: The US Embassy in Tehran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard were distributed.

58. (S) Periodically during the crisis the JTF intelligence staff provided executive information packages to senior DOD officials as companion documents to summaries of Operational Concepts and Deployment timetables. These were updated as the situation changed or the concern of senior officials peaked. Between January and March, this package underwent three major revisions.
59. On 4-5 Jan, COMJTF conducted a planning conference to review operational details and intelligence requirements. Areas of special intelligence interest were: the refueling airfield; the extraction airhead; the continuing search for a desert landing, operating site; reconnaissance of the ground force drop off point; helicopter hide location and updates on conditions within.

During the first tentative desert site had been isolated on photography and an intensive historical review of the area was initiated as well as a controlling analysis of the historical review of the weather for the area was also initiated and weather data for the area was examined daily.

This site was but one of three that were under study during this time, the other two were eventually eliminated due to questions regarding soil stability and/or proximity to human habitation.
61. Subsequently, the CJCS, with SECDEF concurrence.

NCA approval was sought but the mission was postponed due to concern that the mission, if detected, would upset negotiations for hostage release, which were at a delicate stage. Therefore, planning and training were to continue for the airfield seizure option.

62. In late Jan 80, COMJTF asked each staff section to prepare a capabilities/confidence factor assessment which would reflect the increasing capability to accomplish the mission as well as highlight areas which needed additional emphasis. The intelligence staff identified nine areas which could be assessed against the information needs. After reviewing the nine factors and assigning percentages to each, the most critical EEI for each was identified and restated to the appropriate intelligence agencies. The nine areas were as follows:
63. (C) As indicated above, the JTF periodically reviewed outstanding information needs and restated these to the appropriate agencies. This action continued throughout the crisis.
During the week of Jan 80, the agency had previously conducted planning using a model of the facility. It was judged that the facility had no more than one security force could take them by surprise, overrun the site, and completely secure the area very quickly. A road would be established in case of discovery to stop vehicles. Should anyone approach the...
individuals would turn them away or hold them if they became suspicious. The force could be warned by secure voice if compromised.

66. As the situation dragged on, it became apparent that part of the Iranian bag of tricks was fundamentally psychological warfare, and perhaps there was a way to assist or speed the release of the hostages through peaceful means by applying psychological as well as economic and diplomatic pressure.

67. Recognizing that precision navigation and landing was a crucial factor in mission accomplishment, DMA (DMAAC), through the DMA POC, was requested...

68. Intelligence production encompassed a wide variety of efforts, most of which have been identified previously; however, a few somewhat unique endeavors warrant mention.
These individuals as well as the military personnel screened by the intelligence staff for use as driver/monitors during the mission were identified early on, briefed, trained and placed on call to assist in preparations as needed. They deployed to the forward launch site and would have been on the in-country evacuation aircraft to assist in identifying and handling the hostages.

In early February, the JTF began with JCS concurrence, to plan for the extraction of the three US diplomats held hostage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Since the entire surgical
force was already committed to the rescue of the hostages in the Embassy Compound, other forces had to be employed. Non personnel chosen were skilled in special operations. Qualified individuals were identified and immediately commenced planning and training for the mission. For a Feb, a detailed model of the MPA complex was provided to assist in the planning phase.

71. (C) In mid-February, intelligence indicated that some of the hostages

72. (C) During this time frame, the JTF intelligence section researched and prepared, with photo support from DIA, three mission study books. These included:

- A target familiarization book for use by the gunship personnel (20 cys).
- An emergency HLZ and fixed wing LZ photo reference and study book for use by the helicopter and fixed wing extraction aircraft crews (16 cys).
73. (S) Periodically opportunities for intelligence collection or perception management were recognized and attempts were made to capitalize on these opportunities.

74. (S) Other opportunities included providing suggestions to SECDEF concerning possible interface of political and military planning such as obtaining concessions from the Iranian Government prior to the reintroduction of any US media in early 1980. Others included inputs to strategic/political ploys to put the militants at ease. These included suggestions that various Government spokes persons refrain from making statements to the media regarding the locations or conditions of hostages. Other functions performed by the intelligence staff in support of...
the first rescue mission included providing study material and assistance to DOD and other agencies.

75. (TS) During the course of reviewing the various intelligence and media traffic, it became apparent that many incidents of false or fallacious reporting and speculation periodically occurred which could have an impact on mission decisions once the deployment decision had been made. In an effort to offset this danger, the intelligence section prepared a "CRY WOLF List" which catalogued eleven of these activities/reporting situations which, if taken out of context, could create undue concern and possibly cause a precipitous decisions. A memorandum containing the list and amplifying data was provided to CJCS on 20 April and a copy sent to SOWF affirming this action. The list proved to be invaluable tool during the deployment and mission...
However, the analysis stated the mission could be compromised if care was not taken during all phases. The judgment was that most events en route to Tehran would go undetected, or if detected, reporting would probably not reach the proper authorities quickly enough to allow for effective countermeasures to be taken.
replies were evaluated and considered in the final development of the JTF/J-2 Risk Assessment which was disseminated to the JTF components during the final planning conference.

83. (C) On 12 Apr CJCS instructed COMJTF to begin planning for deployment. CJCS also requested that COMJTF recommend a planning date for mission execution. This date was not intended to be a firm date for execution but only a date on which to back plan deployment. COMJTF recommended Thursday, 24 Apr based on time needed for Desert One specific training, and the time required to deploy the force without jeopardizing OPSEC. The desire to conduct the mission during the Iranian weekend made the forces should be in place at the staging sites preferably three to six days after mission launch to allow personnel to adjust themselves biologically and psychologically and time enough to ready the mission aircraft and other equipment. The CJCS also instructed that great effort be made to compartmentalize the planning in an attempt to minimize the people internally and externally who might assume or know that plans were underway to deploy.

84. (C) Enemy frame preparations were made to assemble the and had been selected and trained to rescue force from the drop
On 16 Apr COMJTF notified all forces to prepare to move to a new training location in the desert and to be prepared to conduct an extended exercise. On the same day JCS notified SHAPE, EUCOM, MAC, REDCOM, and JFC that eleven C-130s would deploy to...
86. (TS) On 16 Apr an advance contingent of JTF personnel, including JCE, ECM, JCE, and JTF communications officer; two weather officers; and a Ground Force advance party deployed to the principal staging site. Arriving on 17 Apr, this group activated the JTF HQ Command Center, coordinated JTF base support requirements, established weather/communication equipment/support procedures, and initiated a [redacted] pattern.

87. (TS) The JTF had CIA and DIA support, previously evaluated friendly, Iranian and Soviet satellite monitoring. Movement plans had been formulated and were executed to spread aircraft movements and make them look routine, or exercise associated, [redacted] had been identified early in the program (Dec 79) as a probable staging base and actions began to build up at [redacted].

88. (TS) Throughout the intervening months (Dec-Jan-Feb-Mar-Apr), a [redacted] established for tactical and strategic air operations in this area using E-3As, KC-135s, and MAC transports, including C-130s, C-141s, and occasional C-5s. The

At one point, [redacted] C-130s were deployed to the area and worked training sorties with the CONUS-based C-130s in-flight-refueled across the North Atlantic non-stop to Rhein Main and then flew through Europe to the [redacted] site. A JTF planner deployed to Europe to
monitor the C-130 unit to watch for signs that the aircraft were routed across the mid-Atlantic and through the Mediterranean.

89. (TS) The aircraft deployed on 15 Apr 80, one via CONUS and Europe, and another to conduct training 17-18 April. Operating in the Arabian Sea, the activity was extended and missions actually were flown daily 19-24 Apr from a forward staging site to support the SAC was directed to increase their tanker presence by 18 Apr. to support F-111 training and exercises in the Mediterranean Sea area. They were then to reduce their presence and build back up to support the mission.

90. (TS) On 18 Apr the MAC airlift began. It was carefully scheduled to maintain a two-way flow of aircraft and ground time was scheduled to minimize exposure to possible Soviet and to minimize cause for The helicopter crews were moved separately and subsequently flown aboard the Nimitz by Navy CH-46 helicopters under the

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TOP SECRET
91. [TS] One of the JTF/J-3 members was in place at the staging base to monitor movements and to work with the US military mission in. The Chief of the mission was informed that a build up at the site was in progress and it was of special importance. Short notice were obtained without undue speculation through his good offices. COMJTF and staff deployed on the 19th. The because of the unique configuration, were flown non-stop using in-flight refueling from the CONUS on 22/23 Apr 80. This schedule was designed to to enable at least 48 hours for crew rest and physiological adjustment. were used to enable them to move without attention. They transited along flight information region boundaries to avoid the requirement for diplomatic clearance.

92. [TS] The major staff elements along with the weather support detachment and the diason team became operational at the main reduction site.
93. (TS) Intelligence regarding the status of the Iranian Armed Forces, gendarmerie, police and Pasdaran had not changed during the deployment. Analysis indicated that all or most of the hostages had been held.

94. (TS) Even as the rescue force was preparing for their pre-dawn flight to the final staging base, these reports together with an independent J-2 evaluation were passed to the Ground Force S-2 who in consultation with the rescue force.

95. (TS) Debriefing of the hostages after their release revealed that they had been consolidated in the Chancery during the first half of the night and remained there until the day after the rescue attempt when most were moved off the Compound and out of Tehran.

96. (TS) Throughout the launch of the rescue force, the subsequent evacuation, desert one and follow-on recovery of the force and support support entities, the intelligence apparatus that had been created continued to operate.
of its first requirements was to monitor Iranian reactions to the attempt. This included determining the disposition of Iranian personnel, degree of damage done due to the attempt, assessed material that was compromised when the Iranians searched the abandoned helicopters, and

Request for the next narrative section that shows the damage report released on 20 Jan 81.
97. (29) OPSEC Postcript. During the Nov 79 - Apr 80 time frame, the J-2 section often provided OPSEC and security advice to the Commander, the staff and field elements. Since each unit was highly attuned to the need for security as was virtually every member of the staff and supporting agencies/offices, this effort involved alerting forces to potential risks, and advising of protective or preventive actions. "All Hands" OPSEC messages were disseminated to all elements of the JTF on a periodic basis usually keyed to an impending event or in reaction to an alleged violation, or spate of rumors circulating in the press or on a given installation. OPSEC was extremely effective during the Nov 79 - Apr 80 window, but was sorely tests from May on and required the dedicated efforts of a dedicated staff section separate from the J-2.
PICTORIAL REVIEW
(4 Nov 79 - 25 Apr 80)

REVOLUTIONARY BANNER
WALL MURAL - U.S. EMBASSY COMPOUND
WALL MURAL - U.S. EMBASSY COMPOUND
AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT (IRAN & AREA)
U.S. EMBASSY PLANNING GRAPHIC
U.S. EMBASSY DIGNITARIES
MFA PLANNING GRAPHIC
MFA CONTEST GRAPHIC

DESCRIPTIVE TEXT ON U.S. EMBASSY GRAPHIC
PRC MISSION
HELICOPTER MISSION
HELICOPTER ROUTE GRAPHIC
BACK SIDE - ENLARGEMENT OF EXTRACTION AREA
AIRFIELD HOPPER GRAPHIC

ARTIST CONCEPTION - LAUNCH OF RESCUE MISSION
ACTUAL MISSION
ACTUAL MISSION
ACTUAL MISSION
ACTUAL MISSION

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET
FILE REFERENCE INDEX
(5 Nov 79 - 26 Apr 80)

Material Held OJCS/J-3/SOD

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- Tehran Times 5 Nov 79
- Radar/Air Order Battle
- Photo-Targeting/Collection
- Basic Airfield Data
- Iranian Air Force Summary
- Non-Standard Maps
- Special Map Production
- Special Photo Grids
- Map/Map Related Delivery
- Militant Data
- Soviet Media
- Perception Considerations
- Intelligence Communications
- Recurring Intelligence Reports
- Weather: Darkness/Moonlight
- Model Construction
- Misinformation in Press
SECRET

HELIQUPTER/CVA TRANSFER
TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 27 Nov 79

BASIC INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE
PHOTO ANALYSIS

DIA AIR DEFENSE SUPPLIES
DIA STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

OPSEC PLANNING

I-HAWK DEBRIEFING
TRANSLATION DEBRIEF
IRANIAN RADAR OPERATIONS

IRANIAN NAVAL ACTIVITY

IDENTIFICATION OF SOVIET VEHICLES
PRE-RAID INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

SATRAN SUPPORT

SECRET
KEY DATE SAMPLES

ESCAPE AND EVASION PLANNING

ANNEX B TO JTF OPERATIONS PLANNING 1-80

DIA INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

DIA MASTER LANDING ZONE SEARCH

IRANIAN MILITANTS

EMBASSY OCCUPATION FORCES

REVOLUTIONARY GUARD

EXECUTIVE INFORMATION PACKAGE

JOINT TASK FORCE CONFIDENCE ANALYSIS

REQUIREMENTS SAMPLE NOV 79 - APR 80

REQUIREMENTS SAMPLE MAY 80 - JAN 81

HOSTAGE DATA CORRELATION

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

VIDEO: NETWORK NEWS

DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY GEOETIC DATA POINT REDUCTION

DOCUMENT TRANSLATIONS

HOSTAGE DEBRIEFING CONCEPT

HOSTAGE DEBRIEFING MEMORANDUM

CONTROL OF U.S. DOD DRIVERS/MONITORS
SECTION 9
INTELLIGENCE ACTIONS
REVIEW
(26 Apr 80 - 20 Jan 81)

1. (TS) On 26 Apr 80 the NCA met with COMJTF and the DCI and directed the DCI to find the hostages and the COMJTF to prepare It was from these two directives that all else followed.

2. (TS) Shortly after the rescue attempt (26 Apr 80), the militants stated that the hostages had been dispersed throughout Iran to prevent another rescue attempt.

3. (TS) On 2 May 80 COMJTF issued a Concept Paper which stated the mission, listed assumptions, directed priority of effort, and provided planning guidance. For planning purposes, COMJTF assumed dispersion of the hostages. This paper was followed on 4 May by a tasking document which, among other items, identified the principal responsibility of the J-2.
5. (TS) In early May COMJTF and key members of the JTF staff met with the CJCS to review the situation. Several subjects were discussed and COMJTF provided the CJCS a series of short background/option papers for his information and consideration. The subjects of these papers were:

a. Hostage Location Assessments

b. Civilian Offers of Assistance

c. Interim Non-violent Options

d. Prospective Timing Considerations

e. Infiltration Possibilities

f. Closure Options

g. Extraction Considerations
another major tasking of COMINT to the X-2 in early May was to develop a concept.

Intelligence based on the ground

Quote: Obviously the most essential action that must be accomplished before any viable rescue plan can be developed is to fulfill basic, critical ERI:
A. Exactly where are the hostages being held?
B. What is the threat, size, composition, and capability of the forces which are securing the hostages, and forces which can react to our effort?
C. What active and passive measures are the Iranians employing which could interfere with infiltration and extraction?
This face-to-face interaction was extremely significant and provided data and insights that would not have been available through an intermediary. It also allowed for much more rapid acquisition and analytical correlation of the data.

10. (b) Based on the assumption that dispersion had occurred and planning would have to proceed in accordance with this
assumption, the JTF/J-2 in conjunction with DIA and DMA began
the assembly of information, assimilation of data and prepara-
tion of area orientation packages to support insertion and
tactical planning. Key areas of interest were

In addition, a major search effort was begun

to locate remote communications insertion zones close to the most
likely hostage detention sites.
hostages. During June and July both [redacted] and the JTF devoted considerable time, energy, and initiative to develop, test and prepare to implement/deploy these systems/capabilities/strategies. Key ingredients to the implementation of these various strategies was [redacted] and in some cases authorization by the Department of State.

12. Working on the presumption that eventually the JTF/J-2, with the active support of the DOD Intelligence Community, began a comprehensive planning and production effort. Some of these efforts included a detailed analysis of the should the need arise for an emergency seizure of the facility in support of an emergency rescue effort. Specialized assistance was provided by the J-2 to the New Helicopter Force Element to assist in target training, area orientation, urban route and tactics planning. This latter included an extensive effort by DMA to provide a detailed Vertical Obstruction Analysis of the Tehran area similar to a DIA effort on the Persian Gulf.
13. (TS/SCI) A separate effort was initiated to locate and validate several remote landing areas within helicopter/vehicle striking distance of each suspected detention city. In all cases, a prepared, undefended site with reasonable access to the secondary road net was found very quickly. However, due to the terrain, population and radar constraints of the Tehran area and refueling needs of the helicopters, it was necessary to find an area remote enough from Tehran to avoid radar and population detection, yet close enough to allow rapid and undetected closure.

a. The search for such a site was begun on 2 May 81, and after reviewing six possible areas, several possibilities were identified and One site in particular was more promising.

b. was accomplished by three independent teams (2 DIA and 1 DMA).

that the area was probably suitable, but safety considerations dictated that be obtained to determine the actual extent of usability of the area.
c. In supporting the overall evaluation of the LZ, DMA also conducted a line of sight analysis to determine if activity at the LZ could be observed from the two nearest points of possible human presence. The analysis showed the candidate area could not be seen from either point.

14. (TS) Beginning in June 1980 and carrying through to December, the JTF/J-2 prepared for COMJTF signature a number of memorandums on a variety of intelligence and intelligence related subjects which were forwarded through the JCS/J-3; Director, Joint Staff; and the OpsDeps (acting as a Special Ops Review Group) to the CJCS and SECDEF. One series provided the results of the Executive Intelligence review meetings which were initiated by COMJTF and held in JCS spaces on a monthly basis. Attendees routinely included COMJTF, DEPCOMJTF, JTF/J-2; USA/ACSI, DIA General Officer and DIA POC.
Other attendees included

The following brief listing of the subjects and dates and
substance will provide the reader with a perspective on the dialogue.

e. Intell Review (Meetings), 24 Jul 80.....First meeting
little positive action.

f. Mission Approval, 23 Jul 80
Action was disapproved

28 Jul

Asset Approval, 2 Sep 80
Action suspended

i. (2nd) Executive Level Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 4 Sep
80.....The country support and reconnaissance effort deemed
non-effective.

j. Memo: In-Country Support Requirements, 12 Sep 80....
Revised requirements for action.

k. (3rd) Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 9 Oct 80...Status:

l. (4th) Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 12 Nov 80...
m. (5th) Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 9 Dec 80. . . . Near term termination of situation not envisioned; however,

27. (TS) Beginning in July, employment of an AWACS platform was incorporated into follow-on rescue planning in a Combat Surveillance, Air Defense Suppression Command and Control role. The Intelligence teletype network was expanded and an intelligence support cell was instituted at the AWAC base to support mission planning and exercise interface.

28. (TS) During the July through September 1980 time frame, the JTF/J-2, through the OSD Office of Research and Engineering worked with a DARPA civilian contractor. Although the effort was extensive, the product was marginal; however, the product quality would increase substantially.

29. While investigating the Digital Imagery Transformation Capability, JTF/J-2 reps were advised by DARPA reps of a separate project which using interactive videodiscs would allow an individual to "drive" a prefilmed route without ever having been to the location. JTF/J-2 did not pursue this capability since there was no possibility of driving through Tehran to
obtain the required film. However, this capability could be
used to survey approach routes to key US overseas facilities,
such as embassies, nuclear storage sites, etc. and establish
a library on selected locations to be used in the event of a
contingency.

30. (TS) During the July through December time frame, the JTF/J-
J-2 was involved in a number of other excursions on a variety
of subjects relating to intelligence. Some of these are sum-
marized below.

b. (C) On 30 July, COMJTF requested DIA provide an assessment
of the number of non-US military personnel who
had access to CINCS and any intelligence associated with it. The DIA
provided a list and no evidence of unauthorized
personnel. As a follow on to this action DIA, at the request of COMJTF, coordinated
with the FBI. The FBI assessment was the same as that of DIA.

All information was provided freely. NOTE: Review of FBI data in
March 1981 indicated virtually all data was incorrect.
c. A fallout of the FBI activity was the acquisition of Iranian propaganda and guerrilla warfare manuals that were circulating within the Iranian student community in the United States. At the request of the JTF and DIA split the translation effort. One document contained a five-page highly stylized version of the rescue attempt as reconstituted by the Iranian authorities and the world media which did not contain any new or particularly revealing data.

d. In Aug 80, the JTF debriefed [REDACTED]. This debriefing provided valuable information not contained in DOS initial debriefs. In addition, a reserve Army officer, was brought on duty (at the request of the JTF) for two weeks with Army and DOS concurrence and made available to the intelligence analysts of DIA and the JTF Ground Force planners for detailed discussions.

31. On 11 Aug 80, the JTF requested Director, DIA authorize the visit of a JTF imagery specialist survey team to the DITB (Digital Imagery Test Bed) site in Europe to evaluate the feasibility of the DITB being used to support Snowbird(s) Intelligence Flow to deployed/deploying forces. The Director, DIA approved the survey which was conducted in mid-August. The survey team reported the reliability of the DITB (at the time) to be less than desirable and if deployed to a potential
staging/support base, could, given its long lead setup time, provide an indication of an impending mission. Consideration of its use was discounted at the time with the recommendation that it be based at Fort Bragg where it could provide support to contingency forces without risk of compromise.

32. It is possible need to have some Farsi-fluent linguists aboard the aircraft should a second mission be launched. JTF-I began August 1980 with the assistance of a linguist team and began training service personnel in Farsi.

AVIATION Support Team for Foreign Languages

33. (S) With the advent of the Iraq/Iran conflict, concern for the changes in the Tehran environment became paramount. Since media reporting was inadequate and no in-country assets were in a position to provide this data, two actions were initiated.
34. As noted in paragraph 11, the JTF had suggested several
proposals to assist...

On 24 Sep 80, the DIA
Intelligence Policy Review Council provided a formal view on
the proposals to the Director, Joint Staff for consideration
by the OpsDeps. Three of the five proposals were recommended
outright with the others recommended for action pending CIA
agreement. Four days later, on 28 September, the OpsDeps
recommended...

Between 28 Sep and 6 Oct 80, the JTF
prepared and forwarded a series of papers again summarizing
the lack of positive movement during the preceding five months
regarding the technical initiatives. These papers were not
forwarded beyond JCS/J-3 due to the prevailing impression that
(6) During September, the JTF/J-2 was advised of several affluent civilians outside of the government that wanted to help in some manner but did not want to initiate actions that would have a detrimental impact on hostages, the negotiations, intelligence actions or operational planning. During private meetings with these individuals it was determined that their assistance was purely humanitarian actions such as the distribution of clothing, medical and recreational items.

36. (TS) During the Nov 79-Apr 80 time frame, almost all training was mission-directed and based on actual conditions in the target area as provided through the JTF intelligence structure. During this period, virtually all training exercises were unit functional or integrated mission training/rehearsals. From May 80 through Sep 80, this was not the case. Detailed operational plans did not exist, although a wide
variety of training exercises were conducted against generic target environments to develop or prove out operational concepts. The first fully integrated large scale exercise of a rehearsal nature working against the actual constraints of a real Iranian location was undertaken in Sep 80 and based fully on the results of a detailed intelligence analysis of the principal target environments. Two other major exercises were conducted in the fall of 1980. These were less realistic in terms of definitive intelligence on the training targets.

37. JTF planners were always concerned about Soviet actions and perceptions regarding Iran and the impact these could have on rescue planning. Examples of J-2 involvement included providing analysis of possible Soviet reactions.

38. During Nov 80, the J-2 drafted two papers on intelligence actions that could be taken prior to the initiative of an event (seizure of U.S. Embassy) which would simplify contingency planning should a hostile situation erupt. Both of the memorandums were formalized in December and forwarded by JCS/J-3 to the Director, DIA for consideration. The subjects and dates of the memorandums were:
a. Pre-Incident Intelligence Preparations, 8 Dec 80

b. Intelligence Capability

During Nov 80, the JTF again advised DIA of the need for
the JTF to have representation on any hostage debriefing team.

In December the JTF, working with DIA, DOS and the USMC,
identified a composite debriefing team and drafted a joint de-
briefing form which covered the main concerns of the agencies;

department representatives.

On 20 Jan 81, a few minutes after President Reagan
took the oath of office, the hostages left Tehran, the
debriefing team arrived at Andrews AFB, reaching Wiesbaden six
hours before the hostages arrived. Intelligence debriefings
began on the second day and each team consisted of a DOS and
DOD representative with the rest of the hostage. The DOD de-
partment being lead debriefer. Summary of the debriefs were
prepared on the same day and the full report completed
within 7 days. The average debriefing time was approximately
45 hours per returnee and it was only through the use of
the prepared Joint Debriefing Form and some background briefings

given by the JTF reps to the other debriefers that the fifteen
months of captivity could be treated in such a short time frame.

The results of these debriefings and a comparison of
reported intelligence versus actual events was presented to the
following DOD officials on the dates indicated.

a. OpsDeps 4 Mar 81
b. Dir, DIA 23 Mar 81
c. Service Intel Chiefs (MIB) 26 Mar 81
d. Service Chiefs and CJCS 15 Apr 81
e. DepSecDef 27 Apr 81
f. DIA/Dep Dir for Collection (ADM Tuttle) 5 May 81

8 May 81

43. (TS) The briefing resulted in an awareness that each of the
intelligence collection means, technical and human, have weak-
nesses and limitations which must be recognized when using the
output product. However, it was HUMINT that contained the
greatest potential for danger as it was (is) highly susceptible
to providing "wrong or misleading information". The subsequent
paragraphs summarize the intelligence assessments produced
between May 80 and Jan 81 and provide an appreciation of con-
flicting opinions and data.

44. (TS) Beginning in late May 80 and continuing until Jan 81,
the JTF/J-2 presented briefings to the OpsDeps, Service Chiefs
and CJCS as part of the COMJTF Periodic (Monthly) Updates. The briefing summarized both the situation in Iran and the status of various collection initiatives.

45. (S) On 30 May the intelligence staff disseminated Intelligence Assessment #6, the first comprehensive assessment since the April attempt. This message reviewed the nature of competing Iranian entities to include their suspicions and perceptions of the situation. The assessment closed by stating the most likely scenario for the next 60-90 days was that the Iranian Parliament would adjourn at the start of Ramadan on or about 14 July without having taken any definitive action on the hostage question, and that the basic problem remained the need to convince the hardline clerics including Khomeini and Behesti that it was in their best interest to release the hostages.

46. (S) During the ensuing months, the J-2 periodically disseminated other assessments regarding the situation. Several of these are listed below:

- a. Hostage Assessment Update 23 May 80
- b. (Iranian) Coordination Assessment 11 Jun 80
- c. Hostage Location Assessment 10 Jul 80
- d. Addendum to Hostage Location Assessment 21 Jul 80

...The lead paragraph of this message stated that a review of previous assessments compared to data
again pointed out that most of the previous assessments (since April), although essentially correct.

The Addendum closed with the following revised estimate of hostage locations as of the third week in June.
49. (TS) In mid-August the JTF published a 60-90 day situation projection which closed with the statement that "No political breakthrough is likely prior to the U.S. Presidential elections while extensive deception actions will continue to be employed." A companion message (Commanders Estimate) closed with the following statement:

50. (TS) In early September, the JTF issued another 60-90 day situation projection which led off with the following statement:

"... The American-Iranian hostage situation remains as it did in November (79) and during the intervening months, it is a political problem without a political solution. Political solutions are the product of compromises. In the current situation,
the positions of the opposing parties, the USG and the Iranian entities, are non-negotiable....Although a humanitarian solution is possible the political impasse is likely to continue past 4 November before a major change."

51. (TS) The Projection summarized the hostage situation as follows:

a. Dispersion outside of the Embassy Compound must be accepted as fact; planning must consider multiple targets.
52. (TS) In late October the JTF/J-2 distributed Intelligence Assessment #7 which reviewed and combined various facets of the assessment/projections issued since Assessment #6 of 30 May 80. Assessment #7 provided a 30-45 day situation projection, threat detection estimate and threat reaction assessment.

The lead paragraph began: "Shortly after the April Rescue effort the Iranian Revolutionary Leadership began an extensive deception program to forestall a follow on (rescue) attempt."

53. (TS) Subsequent to Assessment #7, the JTF/J-2 periodically prepared and disseminated supplemental estimates as follows:
there had been no large concentration of hostages in the Compound since 25 April and the five that remained past that date had departed the Compound by early November. The bulk of the hostages had been held in Komiteh Prison in downtown Tehran from July, through the first half of December.

56. (TS) On 20/21 Nov 80 [omitted] in response to JTF request, provided their assessment of the likelihood of full or partial release of the hostages prior to 1 Dec, 1 Jan or 1 Feb.

a. DIA stated, "Release of all hostages prior to 1 February 1981 appears unlikely, the hostages remain under physical
control of the student militants, and would remain so until release at the departure airport."

On 28 November the JTF disseminated a hostage location message which stated:

A maximum of five (5) hostages on the Compound during the time frames (a) and (b) that as of 20 Nov 80, hostages were
ERTS IMAGERY - BLACK AND WHITE COPY
"ORIGINAL IS COLOR"
USED TO CHECK WATER/AIRFET
WESTERN SOURCE DEBRIEFING

SOWBIRD CONCEPT
REQUEST FOR CIA SUPPORT
BACKGROUND OPTION PAPERS
SR-71 CONSIDERATIONS
SFOD CRITICAL NEEDS
INTERVIEW OF DOD PERSONNEL FOR
HUMINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE
DIA OVERVIEW STUDIES
PHOTO ANALYSIS - PERSIAN GULF
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY HYDROLOGICAL DATA
AIR DEFENSE ANALYSIS
RADAR OVERPRINT STACKING GRAPHIC
AIRFIELD SEIZURE OPTION JAN 81
MEHRABAD LAYOUT AND DEFENSES
HELICOPTER ATTACK TRAINING
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY TEHRAN:
LANDING ZONE SUSAN - GEOLOGIST ANALYSIS
DIA - TERRAIN ANALYSIS LANDING ZONE SUSAN
DIA - LINE OF SIGHT ANALYSIS LANDING ZONE SUSAN
EXERCISE INTELLIGENCE
SOVIET MILITARY ACTION
SECURITY GUIDANCE NOV 80
PRE-INCIDENT PREPARATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS
HOSTAGE DEBRIEFING REPORT
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW BRIEFING
NOTE: The comments and suggestions contained in the next few pages are based on the observations of the J-2 of JTF 79-1 and have been prepared in a form that would allow for the comments to be presented to students at the various intelligence and service schools in a quest lecture format.

1. Perhaps the best place to begin is with a quick review of the principal constraints that affected intelligence and in turn operational planning. Many of these restraints or similar ones are likely to occur in some form in future crises, whether it be a hostage situation or an unexpected third world brush fire contingency. The principal constraints were:

a. Extremely limited in-country HUMINT assets. The major control element operations collapsed when the Embassy was taken over on 1 Nov 79. This problem persisted throughout the Nov-Apr time frame, although a small capability was eventually established. This lack of HUMINT capability is illustrated in the following:
e. Limited availability and extreme difficulty in locating qualified linguists.

f. Severe restrictions on coordinating hostage data and political strategies with DOS. In addition, DOS was extremely reluctant to cooperate or pass data to DOD.

g. Extreme conservatism

h. Occasional competition with national requirements and the overriding need to insure that mission preparations were not compromised.

2. (U) It is essential to understand that the "Iran hostage problem" was not a single problem, but a series of "problems" with varying constraints contrasted against changing political
and operational perceptions. These perceptions underwent several major modifications during the planning months and had an impact on the degree of intelligence support required and rendered.

a. [Without exception, the] DOD intelligence agencies (DIA, NIMA, and service intelligence elements) all were "in harness" early on and provided highly useful data. However, given that the objective area was known to be hostile and its surrounding environment non-permissive, reliable data and acquisition of an in-country support structure was difficult to obtain and long in forthcoming.

b. [Redacted]

3. Organizationally, there is little reason to deviate from the standard staff organization that makes the J-2 directly responsible to the commander and charges the J-2 with coordinating all intelligence support with staff, service or unit points of contact or liaison officers from the supporting...
Designation of these officers is essential, and a standing DIA Intelligence Task Force is mandatory.

a. LNO's should be accredited to the JTF and not to another intelligence agency. Accreditation (subordination) of one intelligence agency to another has an extra divisive effect and may rob the J-2 and the Commander of another comparative analysis on key subjects.

b. The JTF/J-2 and DIA Task Force must consist of knowledgeable professionals who can think creatively and whose collective experience includes an awareness of the mission/force needs as well as all facets of intelligence collection, analysis and production. The JTF/J-2 staff should be organized on a functionally integrated basis, not purely by discipline. It is essential that the J-2 staff have a clear understanding of the complementary overlapping of responsibilities and the need for centralized coordination. The basic need of the JTF J-2 is to have the cooperative support of the intelligence institutions, and the assignment or attachment of "creative, flexible, and highly qualified team" professionals who are dedicated to the mission, not to their personal aggrandizement or perpetuation of their parent organization.

c. This brings me to what I perceive to be the functions of the J-2 of a JTF, the intelligence officer of a crisis
tasking and final analysis must be highly centralized and integrated to be responsive both in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

- Regardless of the extent of decentralization of any of these functions, it is the responsibility of the SIO or J-2 to be the focal point for intelligence and to provide the quality control assurance that the principal and subordinate commanders deserve.

- The SIO has a responsibility to support the commander and mission planners and inherent in this responsibility is the requirement to do everything he can to enhance mission success and reduce the loss of life.

4. (SG) We can never be fully prepared for a specific crisis but we should be fully armed with an inventory of proven capabilities and imaginative and professional collectors, analysts, and managers to tackle the job. We may be critically limited in some of these areas.

   a. DOD HUMINT has been allowed to wither on the vine, it needs to be re-thought and revitalized.

   c. We have very few true multi-source analysts who actively seek to correlate the various intelligence disciplines.
d. We do not have a means to ensure that the experiences, problems, and solutions of this task force and others are passed on and infused into the corporate body of upcoming intelligence officers.

5. (TS) Although we can never be fully prepared for a specific crisis and we have some weaknesses, there are some things that can be done. We can study the potential areas of operation, the geography, the climate, the LOC network, the enemy force composition and capabilities and his command and control. The single best way to do this is to use actual data in the development and play of all exercises. If political or security considerations dictate otherwise, then institute a regular program of having a planning team assemble and review the holdings on a given contingency area, examine the information against a given scenario, identify the deficiencies, then develop and test procedures to fill the voids. Prior preparation of this type will pay substantial dividends in terms of cutting reaction time when an incident occurs and greatly increase the ability to provide reliable quality control of crisis generated information.

6. Since the business of intelligence is to provide reliable and complete assessments in the face of incomplete data, the function of analytical correlation is extremely important. A key element in developing any analytical
The correlation is to know the weaknesses of each type of data or collection means and know how to offset these by another means or discipline.

a. Photography: The axiom one picture is worth a thousand words is true, but one picture can provide a very misleading impression. Never settle for a single photograph or analysis from a single photograph. Remember that any picture by itself is merely a momentary glimpse at a situation. However, in can expand your perspectives and substantially increase the confidence factor regarding the nature of the activity or inactivity in the area under study. The warning here is that subtle chances can and do go unnoticed during daily reporting, but can be identified in the course of periodic comparative analysis. Sometimes going back several months, or in some cases several years, will allow you to learn things that have been obscured because of vegetation growth or conversely can point to a high degree of terrain stability or periodic (seasonal) instability indicating that the area may be highly suitable or only periodically of value as a fixed-wing landing zone or vehicle avenue of approach/egress.

b. Hand Held Imagery: Although the preceding comments relate to aerial or overhead photography, they are just as applicable to hand held imagery. Hand-holds have several advantages over aerial imagery that are not readily evident.
e. HUMINT: (3) Turning now to the subject of HUMINT reporting. Many cases can be made for and against HUMINT. However, it would be short-sighted and extremely lopsided to make a blanket statement that HUMINT has no value or conversely that it is always essential. Some degree of objective evaluation can be accomplished if the main functions of HUMINT are examined separately. Most of the functions of HUMINT can be divided into one of four areas: Support (i.e., acquisition of safe houses, vehicles, etc.); Surveillance (maintaining observation of a person or facility); Reconnaissance (conduct a route reconnaissance, survey a potential LZ/DZ, etc.); and fourth, Penetration of a target organization.

(1) Regretably, it is this last (penetration) which is the most difficult and the most susceptible to the vagaries of human nature. We can prepare and train reliable observers to accomplish the first three functions (reconnaissance, surveillance and support) prior to a crisis and launch these observers when necessary and expect a good return on the investment. However, the likelihood of developing a reliable network of penetration agents before an incident occurs is far less likely and the potential for developing a truly reliable informant network during a crisis is even less likely.
(2) Recent events ranging from Vietnam to the revolution in Iran have indicated that HUMINT (informant) reporting has often consisted of fabrications, assumptions, speculations, and suppositions by foreign national sources and their untested/field-developed sub-sources. Even the best and most honest HUMINT sources can be of minimal value due to inadequate pre-mission preparation and inherent possibilities of misinterpretation due to the vagaries of different languages, and cultural mores.

(a) Although a source may be cited as untested or newly-developed and his information is caveated as raw and unconfirmed, there is a human tendency to accept, at least partially, the essence of the report if it appears creditable.

(b) It is essential that the development of any penetration be paralleled by the employment of a or independent non-human means to verify or refute the agent reporting. Without verification by some other means, it is extremely difficult in the short term to evaluate the accuracy of HUMINT reporting.

(c) Given that most analysis is intuitive and based upon fragments of data provided by the various intelligence disciplines, none of which can communicate a story line quite like HUMINT, many analysts and operators are apt to lend greater weight to selected HUMINT reports than they warrant simply because the
report "explains things". This is the single greatest danger to effective analysis. If the report is not provided by a reliable or neutral (non-involved) observer with natural access and the information is not supported by a non-HUMINT source, treat it with great skepticism.
BRIEF RESUME OF JTF-79 HELICOPTER DETACHMENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DURING DEPLOYMENT PHASE OF OPERATION RICE BOWL
(17-27 APRIL 1980)

1. DEPLOYMENT OF INTEL SECTION. The intelligence officer deployed to NIMITZ with previously assembled briefing materials, charts, etc. from Andrews AFB on 17 April aboard MAC C-141 aircraft. Following enroute stops at MCAS Yuma (pick-up of flight crews) and Norton AFB, Hickham AFB, Anderson AFB, Clark AFB, and mission personnel debarked at military terminal on 20 April. By 0800Z the Helo Detachment had been lifted to NIMITZ by Navy HH-46 and was preparing to establish shipboard operations.

2. SHIPBOARD PREPARATIONS. The majority of 20 April was spent establishing liaison with Flag Intelligence and preparing a secure area for the conduct of mission briefings. CO NIMITZ provided the ready room of VS-24 for the Detachment's working spaces and the ships Marine Detachment commenced 24 hour security on a 'pass only' access basis. No ship's personnel were authorized access to the spaces and Helo personnel were briefed by both the intelligence officer and Colonel PITMAN on the necessity of avoiding unwarranted conversations with members of ship's company. The ready room was set-up to display the maximum number of charts, graphics, and overhead views of various mission locales. Each crew was issued complete new sets of JG A's, TPC's, OMC's, crew packets; Emergency LZ binders and briefed on the location of the incoming intelligence message files. The intelligence section published its first IntRep containing information gleaned from Flag Intel's 20 April Admiral's brief.

3. SHIPBOARD ACTIVITIES

a. 21 April 80 - I considered it important to establish a routine of briefing intelligence daily while aboard ship. In conjunction with the 8-1 a regular all hands meeting was organized for 1500Z. During this meeting all ops and intel information was briefed and discussed. On 21 April I went over the Iranian air defense picture in detail. IntRep 02 was messaged to Site ALFA concentrating on Soviet Naval Activity which might bear on RICE BOWL. It bears mention that NIMITZ and CTF 70 were exceptionally responsive to our concerns for the latest information.

b. 22 April 80 - Activities revolved around the preparation of detailed route studies. Each critical mission area was briefed for both ops and intel and inflight procedures (altitudes/ formations) prescribed for those segments of the route which passed near inhabited areas and Gendarmerie
posts. Intel summaries for Desert Track, Helo Hide/Transfer Point, Staging Site, and approach and retirement lanes for both the Embassy and MFA were briefed. IntRep 03 was messaged to Site ALFA. Weather was briefed in detail, and checkpoints for possible Close Air Support or Fighter cover were developed in connection with NIMITZ continued to provide outstanding support regarding.

b. 23 April - Crew preparations were centered on maintenance but pilots continued to work mission routes. Evening briefing centered on Weather.

c. 24 April - Mission prebrief was scheduled for 1100Z to accommodate projected 1505Z mission launch. At 1930Z we were still awaiting mission weather. Consequently, I utilized previous contacts with Flag Metro and prepared to brief their forecast. We received JTF weather while brief was in progress (see separate paragraph on weather support which follows). Following mission brief Each aircraft commander checked his crew to ensure that all mission essential materials were in hand. Each flying officer and NCO signed hand receipt for No important intel questions surfaced at final brief. Crews departed for aircraft in Hanger Bay #3 at approximately 1330Z. Aircraft were brought on deck at approximately 1420Z and launched, as planned, commencing at 1505Z. IntRep 06 messaged at 1150Z.

4. ACTIVITIES DURING MISSION. Intel Officer observed launch from O-10 level Flag Signal bridge. Marine Detachment patrolled ship to ensure no unauthorized photography of movement or departure of aircraft. Immediately following successful launch of all eight helos, residual staff officers set watch in Flag spaces on 08 level provided by ComCTF 70. About 30 minutes after launch, I began briefing the Marine SAR pilots who had flown to NIMITZ the previous day. Their CH-53 (provided from the OKINAWA's Amphib Ready Group operating with CORAL SEA) was standing by to support any overland recovery which might not be accomplished by our helos.
Following brief and map issue to SAR crew, I returned to our Flag.Bridge CP to monitor mission progress. Tracking of mission was by reference to a complete route map with projected time/distance ticks between Turn Points. Crew/plane assignments were grease penciled on a backlit glass. Comms were being handled by CDR with assistance being provided by one of NHQ's communications officer. Reception varied from fair to poor and many transmissions were pieced together by conversations between everyone in the room on a "what did you get out of that?" basis.

As problems developed inbound to Desert Track, we kept in touch with the SAR crew. Meanwhile Helo #5 aborted due to gyro failure and returned to the ship. Upon safe recovery, all classified material was removed, the aircraft was refueled, repaired, and stood by to assume longrange SAR responsibility.

Immediately upon receiving the mission recall order, I began an initial assessment of what classified materials might be compromised at Desert Track. This preliminary assessment was first passed to Gen. by secure voice and then by message to . Later in the day a more substantive assessment was developed and messaged; however, there was little real change in the type and quantity of what was presumed to be in enemy hands.

ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING THE MISSION

a. Crewmembers of #5 were debriefed.

b. Unused map products which had no identifiable connection with the mission were segregated and later given to Flag Intel for use aboard ship.

c. Representative intelligence materials and message traffic folders were sorted for retention.

d. All non-essential mission materials such as duplicate copies of graphics, excess photos, and the like were collected in large bags, taken to the ship's incinerator, and burned.

e. By late on 25 April all of these tasks had been accomplished and for all practical purposes the Intelligence Section was out of business aboard NHQ.
5. ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING DEPARTURE FROM NIMITZ. The intelligence officer and Deputy for Helo Ops (Colonel [redacted]) departed NIMITZ by COD E-2 on the morning of 26 April and arrived at [redacted]. A representative from the Defense Attache Office arranged for the intel officer to arrive London transferred to Pan American and arrived Dulles at 1630 - all times local. Residual intelligence material was left aboard NIMITZ in locked guarded container for shipment with remainder of on-ship Helo Detachment equipment and aircrew personal effects. These arrived aboard MAC aircraft with escort on 29 April. On same date, I received those turned-in by Helo personnel [redacted]. These had been counted and inventoried by [redacted] and in turn delivered them to the designated DA custodian.

7. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Intelligence Support to the Helo Detachment by the embarked intelligence element was excellent. In particular, provided every possible assistance. In any future operation of this type, a similar liaison element should be established.

b. Weather support was provided by JTF on a daily basis. Weather summaries were keyed to mission route segments and proved to be of high quality. Pilots made extensive use of the climatological data prepared in predeployment weather packets. Weather information was also made available by NIMITZ's metro officer although in a more generalized format. Daily intelligence briefings contained weather information in the following format:

(1) Brief description of overall weather patterns expected during next 24-48 hours

(2) Specific analysis of weather along flight routes including temperatures at critical locations, wind speeds and directions, visibility, cloud cover, and density altitudes.

(3) Pertinent astronomical data.

(4) Weather in immediate vicinity of NIMITZ.

In summary, weather support to the Helicopter Detachment was satisfactory; however, the inability to accurately predict dust storms along the inbound track contributed to the loss of timing during the mission.
c. Intelligence support from and JCS was timely, accurate, and of considerable assistance to the Helo Detachment. The flow of current information was smooth and no problems were encountered. Prior planning provided a solid mechanism for such support.

d. Intelligence support by NIMITZ and embarked Flag Staff was of the same highly professional quality. No request was handled in less than an outstanding manner.

8. CONCLUSIONS

a. That all intelligence related products taken to NIMITZ and those subsequently received by message were accurate.

b. That intelligence support to the Helo Detachment from outside agencies was of uniformly high quality.

c. That classified material and mission-associated knowledgeability was protected during the period prior to launch and that no compromise of the mission to ship's company occurred.

d. That classified material fell into enemy hands at Desert Track #1. An assessment of the degree of compromise is appended.

e. That no amount of additional intelligence could have materially affected the conduct of the mission from launch to abort.
CONFIDENTIAL

30 April 1980

AIDE MEMOIR (Personal for MGen VAUGHT)

SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF COMPROMISE (U)

1. The following assessment of the possible compromise of classified material at Desert Track #1 is based on my debriefing of the pilots and crewmembers of the JTF Helicopter Detachment conducted at [Camp Upshur, Quantico, VA] on 29 April 1980.

2. Background. Each aircraft carried an Emergency LZ mission binder which contained the below listed classified items:

   a. Map of Tehran with emergency LZ's highlighted and identified by photography and data reduced geo-ref coordinates. The photographs had been sanitized by removal of all classification and caveat markings.

   b. Route segment for the Helicopter approach to Tehran and egress to Manzariyah or Kara' airfields. These were degraded mosaics overprinted with navigational information such as distance ticks and turn point headings. Classification of the products was SECRET and SECRET NOFORN.

   c. Photo maps of Desert Track and the Transfer Point/ Helo Hide Site. These were similar to the route segment graphics mentioned above and were also classified SECRET NOFORN.

3. Discussion. In addition to the Emergency LZ binders, each pilot personally prepared a knee board checklist of information which he determined might be required during the mission. These knee board notes included extracts from the CEOI (call signs/frequencies) and a listing, with coordinates, of critical areas/where close air support might be required. These critical areas included Desert Track, the Helo Hide Area, the Delta Staging Site (Warehouse), the Embassy Compound, Manzariyah, Semnan Airfield, Kara) and several identifiable road junctions. The knee board notes carried no classification markings. No photographs were part of this package. Aircraft #1 (carried three radios, W-3 (with Parkhill); PSC-1; PT-25 and one day's keying material for 24 April 1980. Aircraft #5 (carried a PT-25.) of the eight aircraft launched, six landed at Desert Track. Number 6, went down enroute with bad rotor blade but crew and all classified material was retrieved by #8 and continued to Desert Track. Number 5 (aborted due to gyro failure and persistent vertigo in dust storm. Number 5 returned to NIMITZ and all classified material was recovered.
At Desert Track, Helicopter 1 was determined to be unflyable and was rigged for demolition by the ground force. Classified material was removed to #1. Following the crash between #1 and the EC-130, the crews of the remaining helos were instructed to shut down their aircraft and proceed to the HC-130s for exfiltration. All pilots indicated that they expected to be told whether their aircraft would be destroyed or if they should return and strip them of classified material, Night Vision goggles, etc. However, based on guidance from COMTF, the fixed-wing aircraft were instructed to launch immediately in order to avoid damage from ammunition which was "cooking off" in the burning fuel bird. Consequently, when the force departed Desert Track, aircraft #4's 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, were intact. The next morning, Iranian F-4's strafed the area destroying #4's 1, 2, and 4, but leaving #7 and #8 apparently untouched.


a. That the radios and classified material in aircraft #1, 1, and 4 were destroyed during the stafing attack and not compromised.

b. That the material in #1 had already been removed and that, in any case, the aircraft was destroyed by the Iranian F-4's.

c. That all material in #3 was destroyed in the fire which consumed the aircraft following its collision with the refueler.

d. That #5 returned to NIMITZ with its radios and classified intact.

e. That #6 retrieved all classified material prior to the crew's pickup in #8.

f. That #7 and #8 remained intact on the LZ with at least one Emergency LZ binder and probably with one or more sets of personal kneecap notes. These materials have been compromised and are in enemy hands.
LARGE METAL BOX

Photo Packet (24”x36”)

Photo Strip: Various segments of total route (incomplete)

- Nain Photo Grid (15)
- Manzariyeh Photo Grid (15)
- Embassy Photo Grid (25)
- DIA Radar Coverage Graph (1)
- DIA AAA/SAM OB Graphics (1 set)
- Caravansarai Photo Grid (25)
- Tehran City Map, paper, (10)
- Tehran City Map 1:25K (4 sheets, paper) (10)
- Semnan Photo Grid (10)
- Dasht Mountain Photo Blow-up (3)
- Tehran Hawk Site Overlay & Photo (1)
- Gendarmerie Map plotted for route (1)

- Mehrabad Photo Grid (1)
- Overlay, annotated, Compound (1)
- WX Packet, updated (2)
- Embassy and Vic. Misc Photos
- Faintee-Talkie (100 paper)
- Time Zone Conversion Sheets (25)
- Data Reduced Coordinates, RP's (3)
- Tehran East Approach (10 spares)
- Tehran-Kara (10 spares)
- Tehran-Manzariyeh (10 spares)

Miscellaneous Admin Supplies

Intel Message Traffic (incomplete, needs updating)
Route Books, Blue Binder (7): 1 each A/C + Master
Contents:
   a. Strip Map by Route Segment, Flip
   b. Tehran-Karaj
   c. Tehran-Manzariyeh
   c. Photo and Description: Namak A/F

Weather Binder (1)

Crew Working Packets (6)
Contents:
   a. Total TPC Route Coverage
   b. Total QNC Coverage
   c. Tehran-Photo Grid
   d. Main Photo Grid
   e. DUD Flight Info Pubs (4)
   f. Tehran City Map, Special 1:50K
   g. Tehran City Map, Street version

Spare Photo Strips and Maps for packets, Misc.

Complete Mission Map Set in Packets (1 per crew) (6)
Spare Working Maps as follows:

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T S E R E T

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY PRESENTS THE VIEW OF A SUBORDINATE INTELLIGENCE SECTION WHICH DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO ALL ACTIVITIES OF THE AJTNC AND REFLECTS PERCEPTIONS DEVELOPED UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS.

1. INTRODUCTION:


THERE WAS INDEED ENOUGH INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT A RAID WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED BY SHORT, VIOLENT ACTION AND WITH ONLY A POSSIBILITY (VERSUS PROBABILITY) OF SAVING HOSTAGES. HUMINT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BRIDGE THAT GAP IF THERE HAD BEEN ASSETS TO CALL UPON. BUT THESE ASSETS WERE SORELY LACKING AND THERE WAS ALMOST A TOTAl VOID OF RELIABLE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AS OF 13 JAN 81.

2. (EXTRA-MISSION INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS:

A. CORDELTA REPEATEDLY AND CONTINUALLY STATED THAT THE TWO MOST ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION WERE:

ALL OTHER REQUIREMENTS WERE SECONDARY TO THESE TWO. UNFORTUNATELY, BOTH REQUIREMENTS WERE, AT BEST, ONLY PARTIALLY ANSWERED.

B. NERROUS OTHER INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS EXISTED TO SUPPORT ALL PHASES OF THE RESCUE OPTIONS. THESE WERE FULFILLED MOST ADEQUATELY AND IN A TIMELY FASHION.

DELTAS IS FULLY AWARE OF THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES OF INCORPORATING THE DETAILED REQUIREMENTS OF A SURGICAL GROUND FORCE INTO THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS OF A MASSIVE NATIONAL EFFORT.

THEY WERE FAR TOO NUMEROUS AND DETAILED TO EXPECT COMPLETE ANSWERS TO ALL THE ASSAULT ELEMENTS HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT THESE QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED AND ANSWERED. THE PASSAGE OF TIME GENERATED MORE AND MORE REQUIREMENTS FROM THE ASSAULT FORCE AS INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE CAME IN, IT GENERATED MORE REQUIREMENTS FROM THE ASSAULT ELEMENTS BECAUSE SUCH REQUIREMENTS COMPOUNDED THEMSELVES AND WERE BEING PASSED TO DELTA AND 101ST CHANNELS DURING SNOWBIRD. J2'S EFFORTS TO COPE WITH THIS FRAGMENTATION WERE COMMANDABLE.
FOOTLOCK #3 (Continuation of Storage in #2)

Working Maps/Spares

Crew Working Maps, paste ups, entire route, by crew (6)

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ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE

Commsurate with the need, Delta used up to 9 full-time personnel devoted to intelligence and security during both the Rice Bowl and Snowbird options. The job skills reflected by these personnel included tactical and strategic intelligence, counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, order of battle analysis, and special forces operations and intelligence.

B. Delta Intelligence personnel were augmented by a number of assets placed in direct support of or attached to the organization. The number of personnel and the amount of effort varied with the immediacy of pending operations. Included in this support

SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS:

A. (TS) Communications: A variety of secure communications was required for both intelligence and operational traffic. Delta utilized KY-3 and KY-70 secure telephones, secure teletype, and secure Satcom to pass traffic.

It should be noted that these latter arrangements were temporary. Delta had been, and still is, seeking such communications on a permanent basis along with a "gray" telephone. Equally important was the fact that Delta did not have direct interface with the DCS System and therefore could not always communicate directly with other elements of the JTF. Courier runs were not well established and the lack of secure facsimile equipment both contributed to untimely receipt of certain information.

B. (TS) Security:

(1) (TS) The best thing that can be said about overall security and OPSEC measures was that they were always weighed on the side of mission accomplishment rather than stringent security. However, Delta always felt that there was a great amount of luck involved with the fact that there were no major compromises of security or OPSEC. Many problems could have been circumvented with proper planning and implementation of security and OPSEC measures.

(2) (TS) Rather than dwell on the numerous instances of poor security, Delta believes that the problems could have been reduced through implementation of the following measures:

(a) (U) Early assignment and utilization of an OPSEC and security cell residing within the J6 or J2.
(b) (S) Formulation of an OPSEC plan for each facet or phase of the operation, whether that be a training phase, a logistics phase, or the actual conduct of the operation.
(c) (U) Appropriate punishment and announcement of that punishment to all components of the JTF when security violations occurred.
(d) (S) Formulation and implementation of standard security practices such as personnel security clearance actions, publication of a classification guide.

(e) (U) Appropriate education for personnel and elements that
ARE NOT SECURITY CONSCIOUS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT ACCLIMATED TO WORKING WITH ACTUAL CONTINGENCIES.

(263) DURING CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SNOWBIRD, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE REPEATEDLY CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF DELTA. REPORTS FROM JFK CENTER FILLED THE RUMOR MILL CONCERNING "DELTA" RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE. THE ASSIGNMENT OF FORMER DELTA PERSONNEL TO THE HAVE CAUSED CONFUSION AT VARIOUS DELTA POINTS OF CONTACT DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE VARIOUS AGENCIES IN QUESTION MAY NOT HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WERE NO LONGER SPEAKING FOR DELTA. THE INCIDENT IN BROWNVILLE, TEXAS LED TO MANY CALLS AND QUERIES TO DELTA ABOUT OUR PROPOSED ACTIVITIES AND BROUGHT ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON DELTA'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT SPECIAL OPERATIONS. WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME THESE FACTORS APPEARED TO DIMINISH. HOWEVER, THE PERCEPTION OF THE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE Operation AND SPECIFICALLY THE JTF, THE 3rd ID AND OTHER SOURCES ON Post Will Be Respectably DETERIORATING. SUCH DETERIORATION WAS LIKELY TO HAVE INCREASED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE CHANCES FOR MISSION SUCCESS.

The Holloway Report was critical of certain aspects of the over-emphasis on OPSEC. THAT MAY BE A VERY VALID COMMENTARY ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL ACTIVITIES AND ATTENDANT INTERFACE. IT WAS NOT OVER EMPHASIZED AT DELTA. THE OPSEC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELTA AND THE RANGERS WAS IN OUR OPINION, EXCELLENT. THE SAME WAS NOT TRUE WITH RESPECT TO OTHER ARMY UNITS.

5. (S) REQUIREMENTS AND PRODUCTION:

(A) (S) INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE ADDRESSED TO THE JTF FORMALLY THROUGH MESSAGE TRAFFIC OR WRITTEN DOCUMENTS AND INFORMALLY THROUGH MEETINGS AND TELEPHONE CALLS (SECURE). DELTA EE I/O IR LISTS WERE PERIODICALLY REVIEWED FOR FULFILLMENT.

(B) (S) DELTA HAD NO REQUIREMENT TO PRODUCE ANY FORMAL DOCUMENTS BUT INSTEAD CONCENTRATED ITS PRODUCTION ON THE USE OF ESTIMATES AND BRIEFINGS TO THE TROOP ELEMENTS AND OTHER INVOLVED IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN.

(C) (U) IT WAS LEARNED THAT DELTA HAD TO BE REPRESENTED AT MOST DEBRIEFINGS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS CONFERENCES TO INSURE THAT THEIR NEEDS WERE BOTH UNDERSTOOD AND MET. IT WAS ALSO CRITICAL THAT DELTA PRODUCE ITS OWN ESTIMATE OF THE INTELLIGENCE SITUATION BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS AND IDIOSYNCRASIES OF THE UNIT. ALTHOUGH THE JTF J2 DID EXTREMELY WELL AT PREPARING ESTIMATES, DELTA PERSONNEL WERE ABLE TO ADD TO THESE ESTIMATES AND TO FORMULATE ALTERNATE POSITIONS WHICH BETTER MET THE NEEDS OF THE DELTA FORCE.

6. (U) INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE: NORMAL UNIT SOP WAS FOLLOWED.

7. (S) EXTERNAL/LATERAL INTERFACE:
A. (15) EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE WAS KEPT TO A MINIMUM BY DELTA DURING THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. THIS UNDOUBTEDLY HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON DELTA'S PROGRESS IN ITS NORMAL MISSION, BUT IT WAS UNDERTAKEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC AND THE UNIT WILL RECOVER FROM THIS PROTRACTED DECREASE IN INTELLIGENCE LIASON AND COORDINATION. DELTA RECEIVED ADVERSE FEEDBACK FROM SEVERAL AGENCIES WHO WERE CONFUSED BY PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE JTF THAT IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE REPRESENTING THIS UNIT OR IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE ACTING ON DELTA'S BEHALF. THESE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN RECTIFIED WITH MORE COORDINATION AND PLANNING AMONG ALL CONCERNED UNITS.

B. (16) LATERAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE WAS MINIMAL DURING RICE BOWL DUE TO THE LACK OR SMALL SIZE OF DEDICATED INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS AMONG THE OTHER UNITS SUBORDINATE TO THE JTF. SUCH INTERFACE DID OCCUR DURING RICE BOWL ALBEIT ON AN INFREQUENT BASIS. DURING SNOWBIRD INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ASSIGNED TO SUBORDINATE UNITS INCREASED AND THERE WAS A CONSEQUENT RISE IN THE AMOUNT COORDINATION BETWEEN DELTA AND THESE UNITS. HOWEVER, THIS COORDINATION WAS STILL OF A RATHER SPORADIC NATURE AND COULD HAVE BEEN MADE BETTER THROUGH PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCES CONVENED BY THE JTF.

C. (15) UNIT/J-STAFF INTERFACE:


B. (16) DURING SNOWBIRD, MUCH LESS CONTACT AND INTERFACE OCCURRED BETWEEN THE DELTA INTELLIGENCE SECTION AND THE J-2 ELEMENT. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE COMPARATIVE LACK OF URGENCY ASSOCIATED WITH DIMINISHED CHANCES OF ATTEMPTING ANOTHER RESCUE. THERE WAS LESS FREE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC, BUT IT IS DELTA'S OPINION THAT THERE WAS A GREATER NEED FOR A FREER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND TO KEEP DELTA APPRISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

D. (15) ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:

A. (15) THAT THE MOST CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE NEVER SATISFACTORY ANSWERED.

B. (15) THAT THE HUMINT OPERATIONS DID NOT FULFILL EXCELLENTLY AND FULLFILLED ALMOST ALL REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON THEM BUT THAT HUMINT OPERATIONS DID NOT FULFILL.

C. (15) THAT ONLY AN ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE SECTION OR ONE THAT WORKS ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS WITH A UNIT CAN PROVIDE IT WITH ITS MOST CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYTICAL SUPPORT.

D. (15) THAT A DEDICATED SECURITY AND OPSEC ELEMENT MUST BE INTEGRAL TO THE JOINT STAFF FROM THE ONSET OF ITS PLANNING.

E. (15) THAT FREQUENT COORDINATION AND INTERFACE BETWEEN ALL CONCERNED INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS MUST OCCUR FOR ALL INTELLIGENCE AND
Perhaps reflected on the volume of message traffic on record. The best history of U2 and U4 liaison is overwhelmed by many lesser men. He accomplished a great deal with limited resources and personnel. Delia only saw a small part of the big picture. Many of the above points may prove totally unfounded due to our limited perspective. They are not meant to be critical of any person or activity, rather to express our opinions candidly.
SECRET

STG 251622Z JAN 62
TO INFO [STU SOV]

Sect 1 of 2

MSG 0116182 NOV 62 SUBJ: NOTC

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW:

The SSO was involved at the outset in preparing, planning and execution of rescuing the American hostages in Iran. This involvement comprised both the Ricebowl and Snowbird plans for the potential rescue of the hostages. This particular mission, so closely guarded, created new and complex issue for this unit. Personnel security clearances, adequate secure communications and properly secure facilities were but a few of the immediate and pressing problems that had to be overcome in an extremely short amount of time. Initially this unique situation caused the servicing SSO a great deal of consternation. Moreover, this had the potential of disclosing to Forssom Headquarters and other higher headquarters as well the possibility that the Ranger Battalion was involved in a "Super Secret Mission" which at that time could only have been what it truly was - planning a rescue attempt of the American hostages in Iran. Thus, from the very beginning operations security became a way of life for the Ranger Battalion, living under this new environment created more unique and complex issues that were foreign to previous methods of operations. All and strict absolute "need-to-know" were rigidly enforced. The total number of officers in the battalion with initially, Ricebowl and subsequently, Snowbird access was restricted to the bare minimum. Consequently internal battalion operations, both day to day and long range, suffered from officers and NCO's responding only to orders and not fully understanding the scope, however small or large, of what was being asked of them to accomplish. Responding to the challenge however, all hurdles were successfully negotiated, although at times the premium price was paid in terms of personal sacrifices.

2. (TS) MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS.

As one of the ground elements this unit's primary concern was with security of airfields. Airfields both in terms of the generic sense and also landing strips designated by.

Therefore, our interest fell into the tactical intelligence area, that was: terrain, weather, and Iranian forces. Of the three, Iranian forces was the most difficult and illusive. Simply stated, insufficient data on enemy forces was commonplace. For whatever reasons, national level intelligence information was not detailed, analysis 6. Number and location of all types of Iranian forces. The more complex the airfield, the less likely you were to have the necessary data. Other than information provided from CIA, the information was slow, conflicting and sometimes just not available. Frankly, the
REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION: CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THAT OUR NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGENCY COULD NOT OR WAS RESTRICTED FROM FUNCTIONING IN A MANNER THAT BENEFITED ALL CONCERNED.

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE.

The [REDACTED] was the Intelligence Officer of the Mission. He served in this capacity until approximately 25 March 1958 and was the only Intelligence Officer with Ricebowl access in the Battalion. He was the Battalion Intelligence Officer, responsible to the Operations Section and continued to be a Planner for Ricebowl and Snowbird. Like [REDACTED] was the only officer in the Intelligence Section with Snowbird and Ricebowl access. The Assistant Intelligence Officer and Intelligence NCO simply responded to instructions and guidance from the SIO.

4. SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS
   A. PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.

   The extremely high classification of Ricebowl and the SCI associated material was difficult to adjust too primarily due to lack of a proper physical structure (see Para B) and properly (SI cleared) individuals. The company commander selected for the Ricebowl Mission did not have a clearance at the outset of the mission. Not having previously operated on missions such as this one, no previous requirement existed to have all key members of the battalion cleared. This situation was corrected by obtaining billets for all key members. There was however the normal delay associated with obtaining clearance.

   B. PHYSICAL SECURITY.

   Inspite of the noted problems this unit insured the highest degree of security awareness through the personal efforts of all personnel with access.

   C. OPERATIONS SECURITY.

   More time was consumed by this Intelligence Officer on this subject than all the others combined. During Ricebowl planning every personnel departure and every troop movement from Fairfield was supported by an Intelligence Officer. This was difficult and as noted, time consuming. Where as the mission should have originated from the controlling headquarters passed to Shoein in the unit.
It was left up to each unit to do as each unit saw fit. It was not until late into the [SNOWBIRD] planning that the coordination between headquarters improved. Although the optimum was not achieved all units became more aware of the need for a consolidated approach. This was a difficult area and all services were hampered by lack of practical experience in working with each other. And in some cases the rapid changing developments precluded adequate time to plan for.
4. COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS.

Lacking adequate communications to deal with a crisis of this proportion, the NSE was tasked to provide a radio-link between all stations associated with Ricebowl/Snowbird. The communication systems provided by NSE proved adequate for the mission (Parkhill, WSCS, AN/UGC-12). It should be noted however, that this equipment is not organic and unless this equipment is retained at this location, this headquarters is not able to communicate with the rest of Washington or the headquarters in any future matters. The communications system that is now established must remain in place for this unit to be responsive in crisis situations.

The NSE element was colocated in the rooms obtained from the

This arrangement was satisfactory and provided for two-way communications between the operators and ranger personnel.

5. REQUIREMENT AND PRODUCTION

Assist in planning and production of the unit, and tactical maps were the primary requirements of this unit. In addition, terrain models were of extreme value. The availability of maps was not as prompt as this unit would have liked, however, as previously stated, it was compensated in most every respect. As for maintaining current on the situations the traffic provided by headquarter was adequate. A point of criticism—there was a great deal of material simply reprinted from press releases. This did not add to the overall value of the intelligence data provided this unit. What was needed was data that had been analyzed and proven to be to the best of the analyst ability, factual information.

Moreover, this would have provided a more condensed intelligence summary. Production by this unit relied completely on the information provided by briefings on the current situation, as it developed in both Ricebowl and Snowbird were derived from information provided by during FTX's the intelligence section of this unit provided scenarios, constructed target cites and supervised the OPFOR in preparation for mission planning.

6. INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE

Staff interface, with respect to Ricebowl and Snowbird, was limited to initially the CO, XO, S2 and S3. Following the first rescue attempt, this was expanded to include the S1 and S4. The small number of staff officers with access limited the personnel available for planning and created a management problem. In that, staff officers with access were performing their normal duties in addition to all the necessary planning for Ricebowl and Snowbird.

7. EXTERNAL LATERAL INTERFACE

For the most part, for whatever reason, lateral intelligence staff coordination was almost non-existent. The only exception being that during Snowbird.

SECRET

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

REFERENCE: YOUR NOG 230, BIC 1, 71C

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A INTELLIGENCE HISTORY OF OUR ROLE IN MISSION PLANNING FOR PROJECT SNOWBIRD:

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW:


   RANK/NAMES: M. W. J-2
   DUTY ASSIGNMENT: COMMUNICATION
   ASSIGNED UNIT:

   A:
   B:
   C:

   BASED UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE J-2 AN ADDITIONAL PERSON WAS READING FOR THE PROJECT. SERVED AS THE SECURITY ADVISOR FOR HANDLING MATERIAL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR OUR FACILITY. A LATER DATE AS THE 3-2 OF

2. UPON RETURN TO FT. CAMPBELL THE FIVE PERSONNEL WERE TO ESTABLISH A SECURE WORK AREA TO HANDLE SNOWBIRD INFORMATION PLUS A COMMUNICATION CENTER. THE AREA WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (SSO) OF THE 21ST AVIATION (S-2). THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MATERIAL, AND THE ACTUAL MISSION REQUIRED STRINGENT SECURITY AS TO PREVENT COMPROMISE. BECAUSE OF THE AREA LOCATION (SSO FACILITY) IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A COMPELLING NEED REQUEST WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THOSE PERSONNEL, WHO DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO SNOWBIRD MATERIAL.

3. AFTER ESTABLISHING THE WORK AREA, RETURNED TO DURING THE PERIOD OF 25 AUG-62 TO ACCOMPLISH BACKGROUND RESEARCH ON SNOWBIRD OPERATIONS. THE WEEK WAS DEVOTED TO READING THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE TECHNICAL ONES AND THE INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTED THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN. LATER HE RECEIVED BRIEFINGS ON THE GENERAL SNOWBIRD OPTIONS TO GAIN KNOWLEDGE ON LOCATIONAL OPTIONS, AND ROUTES OF MOVEMENT.
IN AN EFFORT TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE EXERCISES, REAL WORLD MISSION, PERSONNEL OF THE 101ST AVIATION GROUP, 3-2, SPENT SEVERAL DAYS AT HURLBURT FIELD WORKING WITH THE 1ST DETACHMENT, 7TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING. THIS MONTH PROVED TO BE INVALUABLE SINCE THIS UNIT HAD PLANNED AND EXECUTED THE RICEBOWL OPERATION. DURING THIS PERIOD WE PLANNED AND EXECUTED TWO MAJOR EXERCISES, POTENTIAL CHARGE AND POISON DART WHICH PROVIDED "WALK-THRU" PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. ALSO, DURING THIS PERIOD IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE A-2 OFFICE OF 1 SOW TOOK THE MOST UP TO DATE DATA BASE AVAILABLE, BOTH BECAUSE OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT WITH RICEBOWL AND CONTINUATION WITH SNOWBIRD. THIS DATA BASE WAS LATER Copied AND SENT TO 5-2, 7TH AND 15TH.

FROM 3-10 OCTOBER THEY TRAVELED TO Ft. BRAGG, NC TO VISIT THE FLIGHT CREWS AND MEMBERS OF (DELLA) DELTA HAD APPROVED TO BRIEF IF 5-18 CREW MEMBERS ON THE EMBASSY COMPOUND ASSAULT. AFTER WORKING WITH THE FLIGHT CREWS, THEY WORKED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF TO UNDERSTAND THEIR NEEDS AND PROCEDURES FOR PLANNING MISSION. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE ESCAPE AND PLAN THAT WAS DESIGNED FOR THE RICEBOWL OPTIONS.

(6) DURING NOVEMBER ATTENDED AN E&E CONFERENCE HOSTED BY KABC. THIS CONFERENCE DISCUSSED THE E&E OPTIONS FOR EACH SNOWBIRD PLAN. E&E KITS WERE DISCUSSED AT THIS CONFERENCE; THE FORMAL E&E PLAN IS STILL BEING DRAFTED.

MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION IS TO SUPPORT THE TASK FORCES OF THE 101ST AVIATION GROUP. WE PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING, MAPS, PHOTO PRODUCTS, CLIMATE INFORMATION AND TERRAIN ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATION.

(2) THE INTELLIGENCE IS DEVELOPED FROM DAILY REPORTS FROM SUCH AS SIT REPS, ETC. THE (INTELLIGENCE) AS MENTIONED ABOVE PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR OUR INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE WHICH WE UPDATED AND SUBMITTED ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) TO FILL THE GAPS. IF EITHER OF THE ELEMENTS 5-2'S HAD QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MISSION OR IRANIAN CAPABILITIES THEY WERE SUBMITTED TO THE S-2 AT THE S-2 FACILITY FOR ANSWERS. IF RESEARCHING OUR DATA BASE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION AN EEI REQUEST WAS CREATED AND FORWARDED TO J-2. ON ALL OCCASIONS J-2 WAS VERY RESPONSIVE ON FINDING THE ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS. MOST EEI'S TO DATE RELATED TO THE TEHRAN AREA SPECIFICALLY THE MFA COMPOUND AND THE U.S. EMBASSY.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF FOR SNOWBIRD CONSIST OF FIVE
MEMBERS. THOSE ARE MOSSAD MEMBERS OF THE AVIATION GROUP AND THE REMAINING TWO ARE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE FORCES.

(2) THE AVIATION GROUP'S STAFF RECEIVES THE INTELLIGENCE MESSAGES, TAKES THIS INFORMATION AND DEVELOPS AND UPDATES THE DATABASE. THE GROUP'S STAFF ALSO SERVES AS A FOCAL POINT FOR THE TASK FORCE PERSONNEL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, PRESENT BRIEFINGS, AND DEVELOP ZII'S TO SATISFY MISSION REQUIREMENTS. THE SECTION ALSO REQUESTS AND DISTRIBUTES MAPS AND PHOTO PRODUCTS FOR REAL WORLD AS WELL AS EXERCISE PLANNING.

D. SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS:

(1) DUE TO THE ACTUAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE INFORMATION WE RECEIVE FROM SOME SOURCES, WE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH OUR SECURE WORKING AREA IN THE 201ST SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (SSO) BY DOING THIS WE PREVENTED THE NEED OF GUARDS SINCE THE SSO MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR STORAGE.

(2) ESTABLISHED OUR "POINT TO POINT" SECURE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, THE SAFES FOR STORAGE, AND MAPS WERE ALL LOCATED IN THE ROOM PROVIDED BY THE SSO. THE SSO PROVIDED A SINGLE ROOM FOR OUR USE AND RESTRICTED ACCESS TO OUR PERSONNEL.

(3) ALL PERSONNEL WHO WORKED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE POSSESSED CLEARANCE. COMPULSORY NEED REQUESTS WERE SUBMITTED TO OIC AT TF MEADE TO ENABLE PERSONNEL TO BE CLEARED. THIS WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN OBTAINING THE CLEARANCES FROM OIC.

(4) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF HAD TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE THE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT SINCE UNLIKE OTHER UNITS, WE WERE NOT PROVIDED ANY PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THE EQUIPMENT.

E. REQUIREMENTS AND PRODUCTION:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF HAD FEW PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS. EXCLUDING THE SECURE AREA IN THE SSO, THE SECTION REQUIRED TWO SAFES TO SECURE MESSAGE TRAFFIC, MAPS AND CHARTS, AND CRYPTO MATERIALS. NO MATERIAL WAS UNSECURED EVEN THOUGH WE SECURED THE ENTRANCE TO OUR WORK AREA.

(2) AS A SEPARATE ENTITY, WE DID NOT PREPARE SPECIAL PRODUCTS. THE JISO FURNISHED A COPY OF THEIR DATA BASE ON WHICH WE WERE TO BUILD AND CONTINUALLY UPDATE. WE DID PREPARE WEEKLY SUMMARIES TAKING KEY ELEMENTS FROM SITUATION REPORTS, OBSERVATIONS, AND ASSESSMENTS TO PROVIDE THE COMMANDER AND KEY PLANNERS AN UP TO DATE REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN.
SINCE THIS ORGANIZATION DID NOT HAVE ANY DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE DEVOTED FULL TIME TO RECEIVING AND SENDING TRAFFIC.

F. INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE:

1. PRIMARY STAFF INTERFACE WAS BETWEEN THE OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. THE LOGISTICAL OFFICER PLAYED A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE IN MISSION PLANNING; HOWEVER, HE DID NOT HAVE AN OPERATIONS CLEARANCE AND DIDN'T HAVE A NEED TO KNOW ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION.


3. EXTERNAL INTERFACE:

1. OUR INTERFACE WITH THE 1ST SOW WAS EXTENSIVE ON 26 AUG, BG 330 WENT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AND MET WITH THE 1ST SOW'S COUNTERPART FROM THIS ORGANIZATION. AFTER MEETING, WE TRAVELLED TO HURLBURLT FIELD. FLAT 7 WAS TO SPEND THE NEXT MONTH RESEARCHING THIS UNIT'S DATABASE (WHICH WOULD LATER BECOME THE BASIS FOR THE 101ST SOW'S DATABASE) AND THEIR EXPERIENCE DURING THE RED BOWL OPERATION.

2. WE WORKED FOR DAYS EXCHANGING IDEAS ON PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE STAFFS. WE DECIDED UPON THE USE OF THE SINGLE DATABASE, SINCE DURING THE CURRENT MISSION OUR HELICOPTERS WOULD FLY TOGETHER. WE SENT A MESSAGE BACK TO BG CAMPBELL ESTABLISHING A FILE SYSTEM THAT WAS IDENTICAL TO 1ST SOW'S. THE IDEA WAS THAT IF WE DEPLOYED TO SEVERAL FORWARD OPERATING BASES WE WOULD BRIEF TOGETHER UTILIZING PERSONNEL FROM BOTH ORGANIZATIONS AT EACH LOCATION. SIMILAR FILES WOULD FACILITATE RESEARCH INTO THE DATABASE.

3. WE ALSO DEVELOPED AN UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MAP REQUIREMENTS FOR EXERCISE AS WELL AS FOR DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS. THE EXERCISE REQUIRED THOUSANDS OF CHARTS WHICH MEANT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MAP DEPOT. THIS DEPOT WAS MANNED BY BOTH AIR FORCE AND ARMY PERSONNEL WHO HANDLED ONC, IPC, JOG, AND SMALLER SCALE MAPS.

4. DURING THE MONTH, BG SPENT AT HURLBURLT, HE PARTICIPATED IN THREE TRAINING EXERCISES. THIS PARTICIPATION INCLUDED WRITING SCENARIOS, DEVELOPING THREAT, AND FORMAL BRIEFS.

5. OUR PARTICIPATION WITH DELTA CONSISTED OF ONE WEEK 9-16 OCT 88 IN WHICH UH-60 FLIGHT CREWS WERE BRIEFED ON
THEIR PORTION OF THE COMBINED ASSAULT. AFTER SATISFYING
THE NEEDS OF THE FLIGHT CALLS, OPERATIONS WORKED WITH THE
DELTA INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND THEIR ACTIONS IN THE FIRST
ATTEMPT AND THEIR SYSTEM OF COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND
STORAGE OF SNOWBIRD INFORMATION.

A. UNIT INTERFACE:

1. INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE BEGAN WITH THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
THE STAFF RECEIVED ON AUG 1978. AN EXTENSIVE BRIEFING WAS
PROVIDED TO BRING US UP TO DATE ON THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO
THE FIRST RESCUE ATTEMPT AND THE EVENTS FOLLOWING. WE WERE
AMAZED AT THE LACK OFastically
BRIEVED THE EXTENSIVE EFFORT THAT WERE BEING UNDER TAKEN
TO

2. THE MAIN EXTENT OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE AND THE

3. WAS THE FOCAL POINT FOR WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT,
RADAR COVERAGE, MILITARY FLIGHTS, AND ESCAPE AND EVASIONS
PLANS.

4. PERHAPS OUR GREATEST INTERACTION INVOLVED THE INTELLIGENCE
PORTIONS OF TRAINING EXERCISES. WHILE OTHER MEMBERS
SUPPORTED FROM THE PENTAGON, WAS AT THE FIELD
SITE COORDINATING BRIEFS AND INSURING PHOTOGRAPIC
SUPPORT. AS AN AVIATOR, PROVIDED DETAILED
INFORMATION ON AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT AND RADAR COVERAGE THAT
WOULD AFFECT FLIGHTS INTO AND OUT OF IRAN.

5. WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF IMAGERY, MAPS, AND
SPECIAL REQUESTS REQUIRING THE WORK OF DIA PHOTO
INTERPRETERS. PROVIDED COVERAGE OF LANDING
ZONES, BOTH LOCATIONS AND DEMONSTRATIONS, AND TARGETS FOR
HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. WHILE OUR PRIMARY CONTACT WAS WITH
THOSE INDIVIDUALS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE J-2 STAFF SHOULD
BE COMMENDED FOR THEIR EFFORTS PROVIDED IN THE SNOWBIRD
MISSION.

I. ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:

1. PROBLEM: SECURITY CLEARANCE

A. DISCUSSION: AVIATORS POSSESS A SECRET
SECURITY CLEARANCE WHICH WOULD SUFFICE FOR NORMAL
DUTIES. HOWEVER, THOSE AVIATORS CHOOSEN TO WORK ON
THIS PROJECT REQUIRED ACCESS TO TOP SECRET MATERIAL
TO SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION. WE BEGAN
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS TO INITIATE BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATIONS. BUT FOUND THAT THIS WAS DRAWING
MORE ATTENTION THAN WE DESIRED. DUE TO THIS ATTENTION,
I RECOMMENDED TO (REDacted) THAT WE STOP THIS PROCESS AND
GRANT A "ONE-TIME ACCESS" TO THE AVIATORS. THIS WAS
ACCOMPLISHED BY (REDacted) ON 17 OCT 80.
(2) PROBLEM: TRAINING - INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE

(A) DISCUSSION: DURING THE TRAINING FOR "SNOWBIRD OPTIONS," INTELLIGENCE SEEMED TO TAKE A "BACK SEAT" TO OTHER REQUIREMENTS. AFTER ROUTES WERE PLANNED FOR AN EXERCISE, THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE ASKED TO DEVELOP A "THREAT" WHICH DEPICTED THE ESTABLISHED ROUTE. LATER WHEN THE THREAT WAS ESTABLISHED FIRST, THE "THREAT" HAD TO BE CHANGED TO ENABLE MISSION PLANNERS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TRAINING. THIS THREAT WAS AS REALISTIC TO THE REAL WORLD THREAT IN IRAN AS WE CHANGE THIS THREAT NEGATED THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TRAINING SINCE THE THREAT IN IRAN WOULD NOT CHANGE.

(B) RECOMMENDATION: INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THOSE THAT ARE OBTAINED DURING TRAINING EXERCISES.

(3) PROBLEM: INTELLIGENCE - TRAINING SUPPORT

(A) DISCUSSION: DUE TO THE MINIMAL STAFFING OF THE J-2, AND THEIR TOTAL DEDICATION TO LOCATING THE HOSTAGES, SUPPORT OF THE TRAINING EXERCISES WAS OFTEN LACKING. IF THE SOW HAD NOT ESTABLISHED ITS OWN MAP DEPOT, WE WOULD HAVE WAITED UNTIL THE ELEVENTH HOUR TO RECEIVE MOST MAPS AND CHARTS. SITE SURVEYS TO DETERMINE TRAINING LOCATIONS WHICH ARE ALWAYS ACCOMPLISHED AT THE LAST MINUTE REQUIRING "EMERGENCY" SMALL SCALE MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHY REQUESTS. THIS CERTAINLY CREATED AN UNFAVORABLE OPSEC SIGNATURE. BY WAITING UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MINUTE, WEATHER OUT, AND SOMETIMES FLOWN OVER THE WRONG TARGET.

(B) RECOMMENDATION: ESTABLISH PERSONNEL TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR REALISTIC SCENARIOS AND THREAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH MISSION TRAINING. SHOULD ESTABLISH A MAP DEPOT FOR SUPPORT OF REAL WORLD AND EXERCISE PLANNING. SHOULD ALSO DEVELOP A "FILE" OF FIELD SITE PHOTOS TO PREVENT LAST MINUTE COORDINATION FOR PHOTOGRAPHY.

(4) PROBLEM: COMMUNICATION CENTER

(A) DISCUSSION: DURING THE "SNOWBIRD MISSION," THE 101ST S-2 WAS NOT PROVIDED ANY COMM CENTER PERSONNEL) UNLIKE OTHER UNITS TO MAN THE EQUIPMENT. The INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL HAD TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE COMM CENTER EQUIPMENT, OFTEN OVER FIFTY PERCENT OF THIS INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL'S TIME WAS SPENT PREPARING FOR
SECRET

During exercises when some personnel were deployed to field sites, this increased to one hundred percent. No center personnel, except the SO personnel had clearances which prohibited utilization of some unit personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: Higher headquarters should provide the equipment and personnel to accomplish our assigned mission.

PROBLEM: Compartmentation

DISCUSSION: During the Snowbird mission, much of the operations were compartmented which was rightfully so. However, I developed through exchanges with my counterparts, a better understanding of my mission and new ideas/techniques for accomplishing them.

RECOMMENDATION: During the planning for execution of an option, conferences of key intelligence personnel should be conducted periodically to update, refine, and develop new ideas. The conferences I attended at seem to have "new" personnel at each meeting rather than developing some continuity.

PSC this HQ is AUTOVON
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS CTR - 3rd OPERATIONS WING, TAC
HIGHLY SECURED FLORIDA 32944

CC

SUBJECT Intelligence History (U)

10 JTF/J-2

1. (U) Attached is the intelligence history requested in your 011610Z Nov 80 message.

2. (U) The comments and recommendations contained in this history are valid and serve to illustrate both positive and negative areas. Many of the problem areas could be alleviated or the impact reduced by the earlier involvement of intelligence personnel.

3. (U) Higher headquarters assistance will be required to implement some of the recommendations outlined in the history.

4. (U) Although some paragraphs and subparagraphs in this history are unclassified, care must be taken if such paragraphs and subparagraphs are separately extracted. Any implication or reference to Ricebowl/Snowbird (S) will probably make the extracted information classified.

5. (U) This cover letter is downgraded to SECRET upon removal from attachment.

Colonel, USAF

1 Atch

1 504/A-2 Intelligence History (TS)

Classified by J-3, OJCS
Review on 30 January 2001
Extended by J-3, OJCS
Reason: Para 2-301 (c) 6

This document has 44 total pages including this cover letter.

81-DOS-014

COPY 2 OF 2

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Classified by J-3, O:
Review on 30 January
Extended by J-3, OJCS
Reason: Para 2-3C1(c)
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I. (U) Introduction and Overview

A. (U) This Intelligence Historical Report is a consolidation of data provided by all Joint Special Operations Wing (JSOW) intelligence personnel who participated in Ricebowl, Snowbird (S) and Honey Badger/Elite Guard activities. Although we attempted to follow the suggested report outline, at times we deviated to assure historical accuracy or to assure significant information was not omitted to preserve report format integrity. For these same reasons there is, at times, some redundancy of information. In each instance where a major problem area was identified, a recommendation and/or possible solution was included.

B. (U) The report was written from a component perspective and includes an evaluation of both positive and negative factors which contributed to overall intelligence activities. In no way should any part of this report be construed as a criticism of any organization or individual. The sole intent of this candid appraisal is to provide a baseline which intelligence personnel can use at some future time.

C. (U) Comments in each section of this report are divided into the four major phases of JSOW intelligence involvement covering the period between 13 November 1979 and 15 December 1980. A brief summary of each phase follows:

1. Initial JSOW intelligence involvement in contingency planning for possible missions into Iran began approximately two weeks after the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized. On 13 November 79, the element began training to support Ricebowl. In February 80, personnel of JSOW (IN) who had been in-briefed at the Hurlburt Field Air Force Special Operations Base (AFSOB) both intelligence personnel were on call and one was in-briefed on potential missions.

Initially, the first missions being planned at were punitive strike against Iranian military installations and oilfields. As the ‘Threshold’ concept crystallized, the element began planning to support Ricebowl. In February 80, personnel of JSOW (IN) who had been in-briefed at the Hurlburt Field Air Force Special Operations Base (AFSOB) were subsequently assigned to the AFSOB.
3. 

Deployment to ____________ and ____________ in mid-April. A-2 personnel prepared for deployment to ____________ and ____________. All A-2 personnel deployed with their respective forces; i.e., ____________ with ____________, and ____________ personnel to ____________. Upon arrival at ____________, communications were established with ____________. Advised that he had deployed his intelligence NCO, was sent forward to support Nite One operations along with ____________, and ____________.

4. ____________ upon return to home station after the aborted rescue attempt. A-2 duties primarily involved monitoring message traffic and writing inputs to after-action reports until late May. At that time, the intelligence function was reorganized to support project ____________ and ____________ operations and ____________. (contingency planning)

I-l continued.
II. (U) Mission (Intelligence) Requirements.

A. Initially, intelligence personnel provided support for AC-130 Gunships. It was not until several days after deployment that any 1st SOW intelligence personnel were tasked to support possible AC-130 missions into Iran. The involvement of an SOS (SOS) navigator (Nav) planner was both flight planning and assessing all threats. After returning, assistance with mission planning to ensure the flight routes were adjusted to consider threats on both deployment to an FOL and employment into Iran. From his in-brief, until returning to Fairchild Field on 30 Mar 80 and later, the mission planned with HOS/OS was for AC-130 operations to Iran. On 15 Feb, 1st SOW/INT replaced the in-briefed SOW/GYN at Nellis Air Force Base. It was assigned to the A-2 upon their return to

2. (U) Problem Areas and Lessons Learned.

a. Problem: Late participation of air component intelligence. As stated in the para above, intelligence personnel were not briefed on the Iranian missions until several days after the operations planners. Prior to intelligence augmentation, a Nav planner only had to flight plan, but also analyze and assess all threats and intelligence estimates. Through no fault of his own, the Nav planner was not properly trained in assessing or analyzing intelligence information. As a result, numerous changes were made in the flight routes after assessed Iranian air defenses. If the mission would have been executed without intelligence augmentation, serious problems could have surfaced. In addition, an operational readiness suspense for mission execution was levied on operations planners several days prior to augmentation. As a result, valuable time which could have been utilized for research, analysis, and threat assessment was lost. Recommendation: Initial personnel tasking for possible contingency operations should always include air component intelligence representation.

B. (U) AFSOC Special Operations Base (AFSOC)

1. (U) From 9 Jan to 19 April 80, the primary functions per-
formed by the A-2 were:

a. (U) Mission Planning

AFSOB intelligence personnel (A-2) provided AC-130 and MC-130 planners with detailed penetration analysis, threat assessments, and flight route evaluations for all phases of the mission. It was vital that Joint Task Force (JTF) forces penetrate Iranian airspace and proceed to the objective areas without being detected. Therefore, not only were conventional Iranian military forces and equipment considered in the penetration analysis, but also paramilitary/gendarmerie posts, civilian population centers, and lines of communication.

(2) (TS) C-141 planners were TDY to Hurlburt for approximately two weeks of interface and mission planning during the pre-deployment phase. A-2 provided threat assessments, capabilities and estimates, but flight route analysis was not provided since the C-141 mission planners did not develop a finalized flight route prior to deployment.

b. (U) Presenting daily briefings to the COMAFSOB and staff to include current intelligence, estimates, threat analysis, and intelligence product status.

c. (U) Requisitioning aeronautical maps and charts, order of battle charts, and other intelligence products from JTF/J-2 for mission planning and execution.

d. (U) Assembling 150 Evasion and Escape (E&E) kits for AC-130 and MC-130 aircrews.

e. (TS) Tailoring, annotating, and tabbing 16 Redbooks (Iranian Facilities of Critical Concern) for the AC-130's.

f. (U) Providing exercise and rehearsal maps and charts for AC-130 and MC-130 crews. Although not specifically tasked to participate in exercises/rehearsals, A-2 requisitioned all available maps, charts and photo products required for 1 SOW assets.

(S) (TS) Special Support to Desert One Site Survey Mission.

a. (TS) In late March, it was directed to provide intelligence support to aircrews. The JTF/J-2 was tasked to provide a Search and Rescue (SAR) force with a Fulton recovery capability for emergency use at the Desert One Site.

B. (TS) JTF/J-2 pre-packed the required intelligence data to support this mission. Upon arrival in Europe, boarded a Combat Talon departing for which was to be the forward support base. Upon arrival at the initiated point to point intelligence message service from JTF/J-2 through the JCSE element, to assure crews had the most current intelligence to support the mission. He also supported all normal mission planning and briefing
requirements. At no time were any personnel advised of any information concerning Ricebowl or the actual activities of the personnel. The few then forward deployed to were provided point of contact

After the redeployment to all mission maps and charts, intelligence data, and other planning materials were either burned or returned to who then returned all remaining materials to JTF/J-2. No mentionable problems were encountered.

3. (U) Problem Areas and Lessons Learned.

a. (U) Problem: Late participation of air component intelligence personnel. The tasking for the organization of an A-2 staff came approximately seven weeks after operational tasking. As a result, the A-2 was initially behind the power-curve. For example, JTF/J-2 was not aware of the large numbers of maps, charts, other intelligence products required to support AC-130 and MC-130 aircrews during all phases of mission planning and mission execution. As a result, initial J-2 procurement and production requirements had to be altered. Although all J-2 requirements were met, this intelligence logistics problem could have been alleviated, if air personnel had interfaced with the J-2 during the early stages of planning. Earlier tasking for air component intelligence would have also resulted in more effective initial interface with operations planners and staff. Recommendation: Earlier involvement of air intelligence personnel.

b. (U) Problem: Lack of established courier schedules.

(1) (U) Due to the extremely sensitive nature of the intelligence materials and later the risks of transporting classified by commercial air, most classified material was transported on military air. Normally this meant T-39 support between Andrews AFB and Hurlburt/ Eglin AFB or 1 SOW MC-130/AC-130 support. This system did meet the needs, but it did have inherent shortcomings.

(a) (U) If 1 SOW was tasked with providing the airlift, it required the use of mission tasked aircraft for administrative flights. This impacted on both operations and maintenance.

(b) (U) T-39 support was on an as required basis. Fortunately, there was a high enough priority available to get this support when it was really needed. However, the increased priorities meant deviating from normal activities and attracted further attention to Hurlburt Field.

(c) (U) Due to lack of scheduled military airlift, materials that needed to be transported but were not "mission essential" were held until an aircraft was scheduled. While this delay was not critical, it could have been avoided.

(2) (U) Recommendation: Establish scheduled military airlift as soon as practicable. Suggest that the controlling headquarters establish a courier schedule using dedicated, non-mission aircraft. This schedule should include each major unit on a weekly or bi-weekly basis, and be
available to support emergency requirements. The routine nature of such a schedule would also negate highly visible, unscheduled flights which can create OPSEC problems.

C. (S) Deployment to

1. (S) In mid-April, A-2 personnel prepared for deployment to Nine mobility boxes were needed to support the large numbers of maps, charts, and other intelligence projects required for the mission. Although A-2 personnel deployed with their respective forces, the required intelligence products to support the MC-130s were requisitioned, packaged, and transported by the A-2.

2. (S) Intelligence activities which impacted directly on mission accomplishment included:

   a. (U) Final mission planning with operations personnel.

   b. (S) Presenting briefings to COMAFSOB, staff, and mission planners on current intelligence, estimates, and threat assessments.

   c. (U) Providing required maps, charts, photos, and target products to mission planners and aircrews.

   d. (S) Conducting aircrew study sessions with AC-130 crews. The study sessions included detailed concept of operations, target priorities, and responsibilities for AC-130's tasked with fire support at Every AC-130 had a primary area of responsibility; however, they were also tasked with being prepared to support any area of operation in the event of changes in target priorities, air aborts, or other unforeseen problems.

   e. (U) Coordinating a SERE/SAR plan to include briefings, Aircrew Evasion Plans of Action (EPA's) and providing individual E&E kits.

   f. (S) Presenting pre-mission briefings to AC-130, MC-130, C-141, and KC-135 aircrews and passengers.

   g. (U) Providing liaison to JTF.

3. (U) Problem Areas and Lessons Learned.

   a. (S) Problem: A copy of a draft E&E annex was provided to the A-2 the night prior to forward deployment from . This did not allow adequate time for crew study. In addition, only one copy of the annex was available; it had to be deployed to and also briefed to the aircrews at . Since the required E&E portion of the pre-mission briefing was the only portion of the briefing that could not be completed before leaving the US, the late receipt of the annex proved to be a problem.
Recommendation: Although this handicap was resolved as well as possible, the A-2 believes that this important annex should be provided, even if in draft form, prior to deployment to facilitate coordinated Evasion Plans of Action and associated crew study time.

Problem: The lack of hard copy message traffic for A-2 at J-2. Although message traffic was available for review at J-2, the heavy volume of traffic to be screened, the inordinate amount of time required to hand copy pertinent intelligence data, and the difficulty in securing transportation made intelligence updating a most difficult task and wasted valuable man-hours. Recommendation: During future contingencies, the communications center use 6-ply paper or possibly use a tape from on-line perforation of selected copies of incoming message traffic, thus allowing for additional copies to be made.

c. Lesson Learned: All A-2 intelligence personnel were designated classified couriers for deployment and redeployment. This proved to be a very effective measure during a deployment stopover at Ramstein AB. There were no security police available to guard the aircraft, so a classified courier had to stand guard over the classified material in the aircraft. Since all intelligence personnel were couriers, shifts could be scheduled, thus allowing all personnel to get a shower and/or some sleep.

D. OSD/DET-1

1. The primary mission requirements levied on A-2 after the hostage rescue attempt included all functions and duties performed by the A-2 prior to the aborted mission. However, when the hostages were dispersed to several locations and the options became more complex, the and operational requirement of the rescue force had to be expanded to meet these new mission demands. Consequently, additional intelligence requirements were levied on A-2. These included:

a. Providing support to HH-53 helicopters. In May 80, HH-53s (both modified Pave Low and Slick) arrived at Hurlburt Field. Several Snowbird ( ) options for utilization of these air force assets. A-2 was tasked to provide the HH-53's all intelligence support necessary for mission execution.

b. Providing intelligence support to KC-135 and C-141 mission planners and crews. A-2 was tasked to provide all required maps, charts, photos, and other intelligence products to KC-135 and C-141 mission planners and crews during planning conferences held at Hurlburt Field. This included both "real world" rehearsals and Honey-Badger/Elite Guard directed exercises. Additionally, the A-2 provided intelligence information for mission planning to include threat assessments, estimates, and capabilities, since these assets did not have indoctrinated, organic intelligence support.
(U) Providing majority of maps, charts, photos, and other intelligence products to the 101 Airborne Division (ABN Div) for Snowbird (S) operations, rehearsals, and exercises. A-2 assisted the 101 ABN Div's-2 in providing intelligence support to 101 ABN Div's crews as required during joint helicopter operations and planning conferences. Additionally, A-2's data base was reproduced and disseminated to the 101 ABN Div's-2 to insure both units were working with identical background information. In addition, the S-2 received explicit instructions on procedures to update the data base.

(U) Providing maps, charts, photos and intelligence products required during planning conferences and exercises for the 552 AWACS and 39 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) mission planners. A-2 support also included threat assessments, analysis, and estimates used in mission planning.

(U) Providing maps, charts, photos and other intelligence products requested by the Rangers, Rangers, and Delta when required.

2(U) As a result of numerous Snowbird (S) options and Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises, A-2 was tasked to identify and provide the majority of maps, charts, photos, and related products to not only 1 SOW, but all air assets involved. This included both "real world" and exercise requirements. Essentially, all intelligence information required by units participating in planning conferences held at Hurlburt Field were supplied by the A-2 with the assistance of J-2.

3. (U) Problem Areas during Exercises and Rehearsals and Lessons Learned.

a. (U) Problem: Late J-2 participation in Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises. Prior to September 80, J-2 did not actively participate in exercise planning due to other "real world" requirements. As a result, A-2 was often tasked with identifying, ordering, and disseminating the vast majority of aeronautical charts, photos, and other related products for all air assets (excluding naval) participating in exercises and rehearsals. This entailed requisitioning and maintaining over 100,000 charts and approximately 5,000 locally produced photos or photo mosaics. In addition to the inherent problems associated with this tasking (maintenance of stock levels, storage, keeping current inventories, etc.), other related problems areas were:

(1) Short suspense for requisitioning requirements. Many exercise locations were not identified to 1 SOW by the Joint Test Directorate (JTD) until a short time prior to the exercise start date. As a result, A-2 had to increase the priority of the map requests, and in several cases, the suspense could not be met.

(2) Changes/cancellations of exercises. In several instances, late changes in exercise locations, the number and type of participating forces, lateral units altering needs or actual exercise cancellation resulted in thousands of charts and photos being requisitioned,
but not used. For example, A-2 requisitioned over 100,000 charts after unit requirements had been determined; however, only about 30,000 were used.

(3) [Secret Operations Security (OPSEC). The requisitioning of extremely large numbers of charts, the priority of the telephonic order requests to United States Geological Survey (USGS) (no secure telephone capability) and the lack of an OSD/Det 1 map and chart account (1 SOW/IN's account was used) posed potential/possible OPSEC problems.

b(0)8) Recommendation: Future exercise/rehearsals of the Honey Badger magnitude should include more higher headquarters intelligence involvement. JTD was in a better position to be the focal point in providing maps and charts to all participants. This would also eliminate most of the potential OPSEC problems and possibly some of the waste inherent in Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises. It should be noted that in September 80, J-2 involvement (primarily by did help to alleviate some of these problems.
III. (U) Organizational and Personnel Structure.

A. (U)

1. [Redacted] 1 SOW intelligence personnel deployed to [Redacted] on 13 Nov 80 reportedly to support AC-130 Gunship missions in [Redacted]. These personnel were:

a. [Redacted] G
b. [Redacted] NCGIC
c. [Redacted] Intelligence Specialist
d. [Redacted] Intelligence Specialist

[Redacted] was the only individual briefed on the Iranian missions due to stringent OPSEC measures. Since the missions were used primarily as [Redacted], it was determined that only two intelligence personnel were required. [Redacted] remained at [Redacted] and [Redacted] returned to Hurlburt Field in late November 79 and [Redacted] remained at [Redacted] until 24 Dec 79. At that time, all 1 SOW personnel with the exception of ferrying crews and a minimum number of maintenance personnel returned to Hurlburt Field. On 3 Jan 80 [Redacted] returned to [Redacted] to provide intelligence support for the Iranian missions and the [Redacted] as required. [Redacted] was replaced by [Redacted] who had been indoctrinated at Hurlburt Field on 15 Feb 80 and returned to Hurlburt Field on 3 March 80.

B. (U) Hurlburt, AFSOB.

1. (U) [Redacted] SOW/IN) was directed to report to JCS/SOD on 8 Jan 80 for further instructions.) On 9 Jan, he was directed to establish an intelligence operation to support AC-130 and MC-130 aircraft tasked to support a contingency operation in [Redacted]. [Redacted] directed [Redacted] SOW/IN) to report to the Pentagon on 10 Jan. With assistance, all available intelligence information, photos, maps, charts, and other intelligence products were transported back to Hurlburt Field. Effective 14 Jan an AFSOB intelligence function (A-2) was operational at Hurlburt Field. A-2 immediately started analyzing, assessing, and disseminating necessary intelligence information to operations planners.

2. (U) In late January, [Redacted] arrived at Hurlburt Field for two weeks of mission indoctrination. [Redacted] was added to the A-2 staff to facilitate crew coordination with the four crews. This insured that [Redacted] would have organic intelligence support if they separately deployed to a forward operating location (FOL). Although [Redacted] did not have JTF-dedicated communications, all necessary maps, charts, photos and other intelligence products for the [Redacted] were requisitioned and maintained by A-2.

III-1

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3. (U) Upon his return from Guam on 20 Feb 80, [redacted] was assigned to the A-2 staff. [Redacted], who replaced [redacted] was also added to the A-2 staff when AC-130's redeployed to Hurlburt in early March.

4(U) The final A-2 staff prior to deployment included:
   - Chief
   - AC-130 and Security
   - AC-130 and Targets
   - MC-130 and Requirements

5. (U) The A-2 staff was augmented prior to deployment by the following individuals:

   a. (U) Although A-2 personnel did have primary areas of responsibility, all intelligence personnel had the expertise to support any of the aircraft.

C. (C) Deployment:

1. (C) All intelligence personnel deployed with their respective forces, i.e., 1 SOW/DIR and 1 SOW/DORI support. [Redacted] assigned an EC-79 support. She was not fully briefed into Ricebowl and was used to find exact coordinates for some of the initial coast-in points. She did not deploy to an FOL.

A. (C) Although intelligence personnel deployed with their respective forces, i.e., 1 SOW/DIR and 1 SOW/DORI support, she was not fully briefed into Ricebowl and was used to find exact coordinates for some of the initial coast-in points. She did not deploy to an FOL.
On certain occasions, special A-2 augmentation was required to provide sufficient support for mission operations. When the A-2 support was insufficient, additional intelligence requirements were identified, leading to the development of additional A-2 options as the A-2 options became increasingly complex. Therefore, compartmentalization of intelligence requirements was also necessary to maintain integrity.

As the HH-53s were new to special operations and required additional training, two Honey Badger mission support teams were developed, with the intelligence requirements of each team being unique. The decision was made to establish a function to support projects Honey Badger and Snowbird (S), with additional intelligence augmentation to meet the new intelligence requirements.

Since the HH-53s were new, the decision was made to train additional personnel in the use of the HH-53s, and when return from both Nite One and Nite Two operations, upon return from both Nite One and Nite Two missions, two missions would have redeployed back to Hurlburt Field.
approximately three months of mission indoctrination and enhanced intelligence interface. [Redacted] was integrated into the A-2 staff during this period.

3. (U) The A-2 staff as of 15 Dec 1980 consisted of:

- Chief
- [Redacted]
- Augmentee, when required.
IV. (U) Security and Communications:

A. (U) Security:

a. (TS) Security measures/precautions used for the deployment were extremely effective. First, only a very limited number of personnel were knowledgeable of the Iranian option(s). Second, a planned mission off the AC-130s were to fly in search of Iranian boats.

b. (TS) All planning for the Iranian missions was accomplished in a restricted area with only personnel cleared for the project having access.

2. (U) Hurlburt Field AFSOB:

a. (S) Security measures/precautions used at the AFSOB were again effective. The number of in-briefed personnel were restricted to mission essential only. Secondly, further restrictions were imposed for access to intelligence traffic.

b. (U) The only major problem in security was the lack of a totally secure facility; however, twenty-four hour manning was established to provide additional protection.

3. (TS) The security of the base was good due to its isolated location. One SOW crew was physically separated from the rest of the base population at all times. Physical security was provided at the AFSOB hangar (location of all mission materials) initially by the four intelligence personnel and later by security police patrolling outside. Access to the AFSOB hangar was controlled on a need-to-know basis.

b. (TS) The security at was again, good due to its physical location. The mission crews and support personnel were isolated next to the inactive runway. The only security problems at were the curious local natives who would at times cross the perimeter fence to look at the equipment and talk to the people. They were easily, but tactfully escorted back outside the perimeter fence.

4. (U) OSD/Det 1:

a. (U) With the establishment of Det 1, another location was used for operations planning. This facility was considerably more secure than the previous facility. Twenty-four hour manning was also continued.
b. 

The primary OPSEC problem was speculation due to large numbers of army forces, helicopters, and equipment deployed to Hurlburt Field on several occasions. Although army forces have participated in exercises at Hurlburt Field, they were always announced. In addition, Hurlburt Field was naturally suspect after the aborted attempt. Another problem involved Honey Badger planning conferences held at Hurlburt. On more than one occasion, "real world" references were made during these conferences, thus some personnel cleared for Honey Badger only were inadvertently exposed to Snowbird (S) information. When A-2 personnel were aware of these compromises, personnel involved were directed to sign inadvertent disclosure statements or indoctrinated into the Snowbird (S) compartment if a need-to-know was established.

B. (U) Communications:

Due to the sensitive nature and the level of classification of intelligence and operational data needed to support Ricebowl, a dedicated secure communications net was needed to interface all the different service organizations. JSCC of the U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM) was tasked with providing a communications network and personnel to support JTF.

There was no dedicated or tactical communications supporting the deployment. The only secure method available to exchange information was AUTOSEVOCOM.

3. (G) Hurlburt AFSOB. The AFSOB terminal for the communications net was manned by four JCSE personnel (three communications specialists and one crypto maintenance specialist). They provided all direct hard copy message traffic support between JTF and lateral support to other involved units. Additionally, they provided and maintained the Parkhill encryption system which allowed secure voice communications to involved agencies.

   a. (IS) The A-2 staff deployed to Hurlburt on April 19, 1980, and set up operations in a dedicated hangar on the operations end of the airfield. The only communications available at the AFSOB were one direct "line" (field phone) to JTF (Forward) and two "base phones" (rotary dial). All telephones were initially deployed communications personnel. All incoming and outgoing communications went through JTF located at the opposite end of the base. The AFSOB personnel were required to go to JTF to read all message traffic.

b. (G) There was a JCSE element forward deployed to Hurlburt which received message traffic forwarded from Hurlburt AFSOB. This message traffic was invaluable to forward deployed A-2 personnel. Equipment used was basically the same as at Hurlburt AFSOB with the addition of a UHF satellite radio (MSC-3) and associated gear to provide secure long range voice communications.
5. Det 1 Operations: The establishment of in Washington D.C. and the involvement of several new units required expanded communications. The communications equipment remained the same as at Hurlburt AFSOB with the addition of the WSC-3 radio and associated crypto gear to provide secure voice SATCOM capability. There was always at least one WSC-3 at Hurlburt Field, but during exercises this number would increase to meet the demands for required communication nets.

6. (U) Problem Area/Lessons Learned:

   a. Problem: While deployed to , the A-2 received no hard copy message traffic. Recommendation: Enough copies of incoming traffic be made to provide them to component units. This can be done by using six-ply paper, making additional copies of selected traffic from paper tape obtained from on-line reperforation or a photo copy capability.

   b. Problem: No dedicated record communications available to the deployed AG-130s. Comment: When the Gunships initially deployed to they were not a part of the JTF force package. Recommendation: As soon as a unit is tasked for a special project, dedicated tactical secure record communications, possibly via UHF satellite links, should be established.

   c. Lesson Learned: Perhaps the most valuable lesson learned was the need for a dedicated voice and record communications system (such as DACOM) separate from normal service communications channels. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of most special operations missions, we urge that a similar communications network be established for future operations of this scope and nature. Recommendation: One possible improvement that could be added would be a secure portable facsimile capability similar to DACOM. This added capability would have been very useful to transmit flight routes, Nav Logs, diagrams, photos, etc.

   d. Comment: The JCS personnel TDY to Hurlburt Field from MacDill AFB were invaluable to the AFSOB and Det 1 staffs. The vast majority of all their people performed well beyond their assigned duties. Because of their willingness to "pitch in" to get the job done, they took much of the routine work load off the limited AFSOB/Det 1 staffs.
V. (U) Requirements & Production

A. (U) All maps, charts, photos and other supplemental intelligence products were transported by operations planners from the Pentagon. Since the operations planners signed for the products, they maintained overall control. Initial products included OB charts, and aeronautical maps and charts for deployment from Hurlburt and employment into Iran. As the mission options changed from punitive strikes to a rescue operation, additional charts and photography were couriered from the Pentagon by the SOW/REC and DO. These products included photos of Mehrabad and the embassy in Tehran, and maps and charts for employment to Tehran.

B. (U) Hurlburt Field AFSOHB

1. (U) Rehearsals/Exercise

   a. (U) Maps and charts for exercises and rehearsals were provided by A-2. This included appropriate numbers and scales required for deployment from Hurlburt to the exercise objective area.

   b. (S) Photo products of objective areas were also provided to AC-130 and MC-130 crews when made available by JTF/J-2.

2. (U) Aeronautical Charts

   a. (U) The A-2 provided the AFSOHB staff, MC-130, and AC-130 chart requirements to JTF/J-2. The following criteria was used in identifying the required number and scale of charts needed:

      (a) (U) JOG's (1:250,000)

         1. (U) AC-130 - Four per crew
         2. (U) MC-130 - Three per crew
         3. (U) Ten additional copies of each JOG
         4. (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: 120

      (b) (U) TPC's (1:500,000) & ONC's (1:1,000,000)
1. (U) AC-130 - Two per crew
2. (U) MC-130 - Two per crew
3. (U) 25 additional copies of each TPC & ONC
4. (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: TPC-20; ONC-13
(c) (U) JNC's (1:2,000,000)
1. (U) AC-130 - One per crew
2. (U) MC-130 - One per crew
3. (U) 15 additional copies of each JNC
4. (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: Four
(d) (U) GNC's, GLC's & GLLC's. (1:5,000,000)
1. (U) AC-130 - One per crew
2. (U) MC-130 - One per crew
3. (U) 25 additional copies of each GNC, GLC & GLLC
4. (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: GNC-two;
   GLC-one; GLLC-one.
(e) (U) Some of the "additional" charts were used in
mission planning, while other extras were given to KC-135 and C-141 crews.
(b) Photos, OB charts, and other intelligence products
requisitioned by A-2 and provided by JTF/J-2 included:
1. (U) Four Bluebooks (Extraction Sites). One Bluebook
was provided to each AC-130 crew.
2. (U) 17 Redbooks (Iranian Facilities of Critical Concern).
One Redbook was used as a master by the A-2 staff. The AC-130's required four
per crew. Distribution per crew follows:
   (a) (U) Fire Control Officer (FCO)
   (b) (U) Navigator (NAV)
   (c) (U) IR Sensor Operator (IR)
   (d) (U) VLC TV Sensor Operator (TV)
3. (U) 150% kits. All products contained in the E&E
   kits (except TPC's) were provided by JTF/J-2; however, assembly of the kits
   was accomplished by A-2.
(c) The E&E kits for AC-130 aircrews contained the following:

Annotations

(a) (TS) Embassy (photos and photo paper products w/grids)
(b) (TS) [redacted] (photos)
(c) (TS) Order of Battle charts (Iran)
(d) (TS) Radar Detection Range charts (Persian Gulf)
(e) (TS) Acquisition and Tracking Radar Range charts
(f) (TS) Photo strip maps
(g) (TS) [redacted] (photos & photo paper products w/grids)
h) (TS) [redacted] (photos)

(Persian Gulf)

(TOP SECRET)

V-3
(U) Message Traffic

(a) (TS) Intelligence message traffic provided by JTF/J-2 was timely, informative and invaluable. This information was essential for the success of any contingency operation. The following reports were received by A-2 on a daily or as available basis:

2. (TS) Iranian Military Activity Report

(Probably single most important message.)

3. (TS) Imagery Analysis Report

4. (TS) Iranian Situation Report

5. (TS) SATRAN Report

(b) (TS) Other pertinent information was received as threats assessment, weather, etc. as it became available.

C. (TS) Comment: Overall, intelligence support received from JTF/J-2 was superior in every respect.

C. (TS) 05D/Det 1

1. (U) After the aborted rescue attempt, the decision was made to destroy most of the classified mission material at Heliport. However, the A-2 determined that at least one copy of every map, chart, photo and other intelligence product would be maintained. As numerous Snowbird (S) options surfaced, this proved to be an effective decision.

2. (TS) After the initiation of Project Honey Badger and as several different Snowbird (S) options surfaced, additional intelligence products were required to support all of the possible contingencies. The following requirements and products were requisitioned or produced to support mission demands:

a. Maps and Charts

   (1) (S) Snowbird (S) Contingency Operations

   (a) (U) Aeronautical Maps and Charts

   1. (U) During May 80, a decision to maintain selected worldwide contingency charts for planning and operational purposes for tasked 1 SOW assets was implemented. The initial stock consisted of the following:
NR SHEETS  TYPE CHART (CODE)  QUANTITY MAINTAINED
10  Global Loran (GLC)  150
26  Global Navigation (GNC)  390
105  Jet Navigation (JNC)  1575
111  Operational Navigation (ONC)  3150
108  Tactical Pilotage (TPC)  3125

2. (JS) As a result of the additional map requirements, the Carpenter Shop built specially designed map storage racks which provided adequate storage. Initial requirements were based on SOW augmented forces only. As mission requirements increased, a decision was made to maintain contingency maps at this location for other air assets (101 ABN Div, MAC, SAC, etc.) supporting Snowbird (S). This resulted in five additional major chart requisitions through 8 Oct 80. Additional charts were ordered to establish the following inventory:

TYPE CHART (CODE)  NEW QUANTITY MAINTAINED
Global Loran (GLC)  150
Global Navigation (GNC)  350
Jet Navigation (JNC)  2100
Operational Navigation (ONC)  5400
Tactical Pilotage (TPC)  6450

3. Coordination with JTF was made to store specific Joint Operations Graphics Series 1501 Air (JOG-A) and special purpose charts at the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) for rapid deployment to Hurlburt should the need arise. This was necessary because of the large numbers and storage space requirements.

4. The total number of charts on hand and being maintained for worldwide contingencies was approximately 18,000. Maintenance consisted of maintaining an adequate stock level, ensuring new editions of required charts are ordered, and disposing of obsolete charts. Periodic inventories were also necessary to insure all required numbers of charts were maintained.

(b) (U) Special Produced JNC's.

1. (U) On 2 Jun 80, reported to JTF/J-2 for instructions and liaison with DMA personnel prior to departing for DMAAC in St. Louis. He was tasked with producing a special map and chart product depicting the Iranian radar threat on a 1:2,000,000 scale product. Radar overlays (at different altitudes) aligned to the 1:2,500,000 Iranian road map were provided by Aeronautical Center (DMAAC) of DMAAC Crisis Management Team. Identified as the map project officer for the center and provided all necessary interface with production personnel, cartographers, administration, etc. was totally knowledgeable of all facets of the center's activities and was instrumental in the successful
completion of this project.

3. (TS) Although numerous minor production problems occurred, i.e., combining four JNC's into one chart, producing radar overlays for a newly active radar color selection, aeronautical update data; sufficient priorities had been established to overcome all problems. In essence, a new chart, printed on both sides of the paper, was produced. The exceptional professionalism displayed by all-DMAAC personnel, especially in St. Louis, is most noteworthy. It should be noted that although all the work was done in St. Louis, the actual chart printing was accomplished at DMA facilities in Maryland.

4. (S) DMAAC personnel were not overly inquisitive, and other than the fact they were working on a classified Iranian chart, there was no danger to operational security.

5. (U) These charts were very useful to the A-2 personnel; however, it soon became apparent that they would have to have more radars depicted. The basic low-level chart only showed EW coverage. The majority of the options called for I SOW aircraft to pass in close proximity to other radars (ATC, ASR, etc.).

7. (C) Since the predictions were done by self-taught individuals, selected electronic warfare officers (EWO) assigned to 1 SOW evaluated the updated predictions for accuracy. The initial predictions were done on a 1:1,000,000 (QNC), then reduced to the 1:2,000,000 scale (special JNC). Once the prediction was drawn on the special JNC, an acetate overlay was made, and finally the prediction was transferred to the special radar map.

8. (U) The assumptions used to do the radar predictions follow:
   a. (U) The radar was always given the benefit of doubt when resolving conflicts.
   b. (U) The antenna-height was always higher in the predictions than was the case for the actual radar. This built in a "pad" for the predictions to compensate for inaccuracies or incomplete data.
   c. (U) The 1:2,000,000 scale final product would be used only to identify areas of possible exploitations. All final route evaluations would be done in conjunction with assigned EWO's.
9. (U) Since there was only one modified radar map initially produced, it could be controlled. Because of the inherent errors in the final product, anything other than rough, initial planning could have resulted in serious errors. For that reason, intelligence personnel always were present when mission planning was being done.

-TO: (U) Recommendation: Future operations of this type should have similar maps produced as soon as possible. They are extremely helpful in initial mission planning.

(c) (S) There were also JTF specially produced maps that were requisitioned by A-2. These maps were tailored to meet the demands of various Snowbird (S) mission requirements. The following special maps and charts were acquired from JTF; initial requisitions were for mission planning only:

2. (S) Environ of Tehran - a 1:100,000 scale topographical map of Tehran and vicinity. Used primarily for E&E planning.

3. (C) Special JOG of Tehran and vicinity to include Manzariyeh and Semnan New Airports. This special produced chart was extremely useful for mission planning. A-2 requisitioned 100 copies of this chart to be used for mission planning and execution.

4. Special JUG A/Photo Paper Product, Syez Susan, dated 7 Nov 80. This chart with photos was extremely useful in mission planning for contingencies involving Susan.

5. (S) Planning Map West consisting of a Tehran city map and photo paper product with grids (approx. scale - 1:50,000).

(a) (S) As a result of numerous exercises and rehearsals which tested the operational capabilities of tasked units as well as the feasibility of contingency options, A-2 was required to requisition and maintain a total of approximately 108,000 maps and charts from both the DMA and USGS. It should be noted that the A-2 usually supported all participating units. The following lists show the number and type of maps and charts requisitioned by A-2 for support of scheduled exercises and rehearsals:
b. (U) Photos and Photo Paper Products

(1) (U) Snowbird (S) Contingency Operations

(a)(S) As previously stated A-2 retained one copy of every photo/photo-paper product used in the aborted attempt to rescue the hostages. However, as new developments occurred resulting in several different Snowbird options, new photos/photo paper products were requisitioned or forwarded from JTF/J-2. The following products were provided by JTF/J-2:

1. (photos)
2. (photos)
3. (photos)
4. (photos)
5. (photos)
6. (photos)
7. (photos)
8. (photos)
Exercise/Rehearsal Photos and Photo Paper Products.

(a) (U) Special photo paper products were requisitioned from JTF/J-2 specifically for planned exercises and rehearsals. These products were extremely effective and valuable for mission planning and execution. Listing follows:

1. (U) Reese AFB
2. (U) Kirtland Aux
3. (U) Condrum AAF
4. (U) Cannon AFB
5. (U) Michael AAF
6. (U) Nuclear Range Test Site (NRTS)
7. (U) Indian Springs Aflfd

(b) (U) Although the special photo paper products provided by JTF/J-2 were extremely useful, they were not produced for every exercise or exercise location, particularly the initial exercises that JTF/J-2 did not participate or provide support. As a result, A-2 requested tactical aerial photography and the required number of prints for most exercise objective sets. In most cases, the request was not fully satisfied, particularly the number of prints requested. Thus, 1 SOW/DOR was tasked with providing last minute support, which resulted in extremely long duty days for the individuals cleared for Honey Badger/Elite Guard.
A total of approximately 5,000 prints were reproduced by 1 SOW/DOR of the following exercises operating areas:

1. (U) Terry Aux mosaic prints
2. (U) Terry Aux mosaic
3. (U) Terry Aux 9X9 prints
4. (U) Reese to Parasail mosaic prints
5. (U) Reese to Parasail 9X9 (1-4)
6. (U) Reese to Parasail 18X20
7. (U) Reese to Parasail mosaic
8. (U) Reese mosaic prints
9. (U) Reese mosaic 1:15,000
10. (U) Reese mosaic
11. (U) Parasail mosaic
12. (U) Parasail mosaic prints
13. (U) Melrose range
14. (U) Dugway Dirt Strip (5X7) (ground and air)
   a. (U) Ground North
   b. (U) Air West
   c. (U) Air East
   d. (U) Air North
15. (U) Dugway intersection 1:1700
16. (U) Marrion DZ NS
17. (U) NAS Fallon - 1:20,500 - 1:14,000
18. (U) B-70
19. (U) Field 1 1:17,500
20. (U) Terry Aux 1:14,000

V-11
<table>
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<th>Location</th>
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<td>Dugway Dirt Strip</td>
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<tr>
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<td>B-5</td>
<td>1:17,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hurlburt mosaic</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Problem:** When tactical photography was scheduled by [illegible], in some instances not enough prints were made available to the 1 SOW. When we tried to reprint enough copies from a print, there was a 40 to 60-per cent loss in resolution. **Recommendation:** After all participants have identified their photographic requirements and the tasked reconnaissance (Recce) has been identified, suggest direct liaison between 1 SOW and tasked Recce units be authorized, if we are to be responsible for final photo products. We would prefer to have the Recce aircraft recover at Hurlburt for film loading, debriefing, and subsequent film processing at 1 SOW/DRIB. By using this approach we can control or modify photo scales and numbers of products. If it is not feasible for the Recce aircraft to recover at Hurlburt, tasked Recce units should be advised to forward original negatives, pilot's log and mission maps to Hurlburt.
c. (U) Point Positioning Data Bases (PPDBs) and Projected Map Displays (PMDs).

(1) (U) With the assignment of Pave Low (HH-53) helicopters to the 1 SOW, the A-2 section immediately identified and then established new intelligence requirements needed to support the Pave Lows. In addition to changing the numbers of maps and charts required, especially large scale charts, the primary new requirements involved PPDBs and PMDs. These new requirements posed no major problems. Actions taken are outlined below:

(a) (U) The PPDBs were a product with which we were familiar. To assure proper support the following actions were taken:

1. (U) For various Snowbird (S) options, we continually reviewed the PPDB inventory already maintained at the wing imagery interpretation shop (1 SOW/DORI). The wing was already on distribution for all Midwest PPDBs in conjunction with our Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) contingency requirements. Since we had previously used the few available Iranian PPDBs to evaluate coverage of the AC-130 and MC-130 routes planned for Ricebowl, the only new action we took was to review coverage of adjacent countries which could be used to support a forward launch base for the Pave Low and army helicopters.

2. (U) Several additional US PPDBs were ordered to support Pave Low participation in various Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises.

(b) (U) PMD requirements were a completely new concept to A-2 personnel. However, as a result of this requirement, all assigned A-2 personnel became familiar with many of the unique Pave Low intelligence/mission planning factors. To assure proper PMD support, the following actions were taken:

1. (U) With the assistance of JTD we acquired 36 Iranian PMDs for OT&E. The films were checked out on the Pave Low platform utilizing the onboard computer readout and subsequently validated. For OPSEC reasons, all Iranian PMDs were stored in the A-2 area with other Snowbird (S) intelligence data.

2. (U) Required US PMD coverage to support Pave Low participation in Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises was initially supplied by the TDY intelligence NCO deployed with the Pave Low aircrews. As these PMDs became unusable due to prolonged use, and new exercise areas were identified, required PMDs were ordered and maintained by 1 SOW/DORI.

d. (U) Intelligence Data Base.

(1) (U) Due to the lack of an Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) and the amount of pertinent intelligence information derived from all available sources, the requirement for the construction and maintenance of an Intelligence Data Base File surfaced. This Data Base proved to be an invaluable asset that became the standard resource
used not only by A-2, but other units including JTF personnel during planning conferences held at Hurlburt Field.

(2) (U) The Data Base consisted of all-source intelligence information, although JTF/J-2 message traffic was its primary source. The Data Base was organized into the following categories:

- (a) (U) Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAAOB)
- (b) (U) Air Order of Battle (AOB)
- (c) (U) Electronic Order of Battle EOB & Signals
- (d) (U) Naval Order of Battle (NOB)
- (e) (U) Ground Order of Battle (GOB)
- (f) (U) Surface to Air Missile Order of Battle (SAMOB)
- (g) (U) Airfield
- (h) (U) Air Traffic Control (ATC) Radars
- (i) (U) EW/GCI Radars
- (j) (U) Installations
- (k) (U) Hostages
- (l) (U) Soviet Union
- (m) (U) Other Mideast analysis
- (n) (U) Essential Elements of Information (EEIs)

(3) (U) As stated in para above, the Data Base became the standard resource utilized by both air and ground assets during planning conferences. It would have also been the standard resource for all air component assets deployed to FOLs. Since A-2 was tasked with providing support and/or supervision of intelligence personnel for most air components involved, use of this data base would have insured that all of these assets were being provided with not only standardized, but also updated intelligence.
e. (U) Order of Battle (OB) Status Boards.

(1) (U) In addition to the Intelligence Data Base File, A-2 also produced intelligence OB status boards. These boards proved to be extremely useful during staff briefings and mission planning. It allowed the intelligence briefer to immediately answer most questions concerning OB or airfield status.

(2) (a) The status board was divided into two parts: Airfields and EOB.

(a) Airfields consisted of NAME/AOB/STATUS/AAAOB/SAMOB/SAMOB/

(b) The EOB consisted of NAME/TYPICAL/LAST DATE ACTIVE.

g. (U) Fighter/Transport Aircraft Analysis.
(4) The graphs and charts described in this section were compiled in response to requests by the commander and staff at Hurlburt. Although initially time consuming, the graphic portrayal of data contained in the IMFA and IMA had several advantages. It facilitated very rapid responses by the A-2 staff to questions from commanders, mission planners, and operations personnel. They also enhanced the routine intelligence update briefings which were initially presented on a daily basis, then on as needed/request basis (2-3 times a week). Additionally, the charts allowed the A-2 staff to identify flight patterns, trends, and predict near term activity levels. In summary, the benefits derived from the use of the graphs were well worth the time expanded to prepare them.

h. Mobility Boxes/Equipment

(1) The following comments and observations concerning mobility equipment are a consolidation of the lessons learned by A-2 personnel. They evolved over the total time of involvement by A-2 and cover the intelligence operations at the AFOSI and exercises.

(2) The Directorate of Intelligence at Hurlburt Field was tasked with providing A-2 personnel required mobility equipment, if it was in the directorate's inventory. Items borrowed for the A-2 staff included Ni-Cad battery powered microfiche readers, two drawer safes, mobility (nesting) boxes, and general intelligence mobility supplies. While packing for deployment, the A-2 staff used all available nesting boxes from the Directorate of Intelligence.
(3) While nesting boxes provided enough cubic feet to mobilize the required amount of materials, they were not well suited for operational use or forward staging. For example, all required intelligence supplies, documents, etc. were packed into one container. It was very difficult to find, issue, or control any given item when everything was packed into one box. In addition to the problems with the nesting boxes, the A-2 staff did not deploy with any field tables or desks, since they are normally not part of the wing's intelligence mobility package.

(4) As a result of the problems in mobilizing the A-2 and problems encountered during the various exercises, the A-2 staff designed mobility boxes to support SOW airframes. A total of 24 boxes in three different styles were produced. There were 20 airframe support boxes, three general supply/support boxes, and one box for rolled/oversized photo products and acetate overlays.

(5) It was decided that it would be virtually impossible to attempt to design boxes to support an unknown number of operating locations. For that reason the philosophy used to develop the support boxes was to tie the design to the airframes. For example, one aircraft support box has enough compartments and space to transport the required materials (maps, charts, mission books, E&E kits, target folders, etc.) for 2-3(1 SOW) airframes. All of the boxes are heavy duty and should withstand bare base operations well. Recommendation: Intelligence personnel assigned to units with potential tasking address the aforementioned problems now.
VI. Internal Staff Interface:

A. (U) AFSOB:

1. Interface between the intelligence personnel and the rest of the Hurlburt AFSOB staff was excellent after the initial late involvement problems were overcome. Once the A-2 function became operational, it was fully integrated into all aspects of the Ricebowl operation. The operational planners actively sought intelligence participation when evaluating proposed missions. The resulting procedures developed for mission planning for both the MC and AC-130s were to have a navigator, an intelligence representative, and an electronic warfare officer develop flight routes in a joint effort. This team approach allowed a single well-informed product to be produced. Before intelligence involvement numerous changes to the flight plans and Nav logs were required. A route was adjusted to avoid threats.

2. One of the largest contributing factors to smooth and efficient internal staff interface was the extremely small number of individuals at the AFSOB. Initially, there were less than 15 "fulltime" people for all systems making coordination and planning fairly straightforward, thus allowing the procedures for close interface to be established. However, the small number of people was also one of the most difficult problems at the AFSOB. Many of the traditional staff functions could not be filled. Administrative, plans, and supply support was done on an ad hoc basis by the individual that was best suited and/or had time to work the problem. This became a problem area when interfacing was required with other Hurlburt Field base agencies. Establishing the A-2 function is one example of this type of problem. The A-2 personnel were normally assigned to the 1st SOG (Director of Intelligence). They used the directorate for all supplies and general intelligence support.

B. (U) - The close working relationship that was established during the pre-deployment phase continued at both bases.

C. (U) Det 1 - When Project Honey Badger was initiated, the limited AFSOB staff was rapidly overwhelmed. In order to support the large number of personnel (both PCS and TDY to Hurlburt Field) and aircraft involved in the exercises, the AFSOB staff was augmented by base staff agencies. Augmented staff personnel were indoctrinated on exercise information only. Initially, the A-2 staff had little involvement in exercises other than ordering maps and charts. Because of the limited A-2 exercise participation, little, if any, interface with the augmented staff was required. The interface with the Snowbird (S) mission planners remained.

VI-1
Lesson Learned: In order to preserve OPSEC, the A-2 personnel had to obtain many intelligence and support documents so as not to compromise the true nature of Ricebowl/Snowbird (S). This same type problem occurred in all other AFSOB/Det 7 staffs. To preclude these types of problems in future exercises/operations, a Special Operations Mission Planning Division (DOS) was established. Included in this division are two intelligence personnel (with augmentation as required) to provide intelligence support to mission planners and key wing staff.
VII. (U) External-Lateral Interface:

A. (U) In general, external-lateral interface was good to excellent once the initial contacts were established.

1. (U) Military units that the A-2 staff had regular interface with were:

a. [Redacted]

b. [Redacted]

c. (U) 701st ABN Div.

d. [Redacted]

e. (U) 41 Reconnaissance, Weather, Rescue Wing (RWRW).

f. (U) 437th Military Airlift Wing (MAW).

g. (U) 1550 ATTW.

h. (U) 39 ARW.

i. [Redacted]

j. (TS) Delta.

2. (U) Other organizations regularly contacted by A-2 personnel include:


b. (U) United States Geological Survey, Denver, CO.

All other organizations and agencies were contacted through [Redacted].

B. (U) Interface with the [Redacted] began in late Jan 80, with the arrival of a replacement, [Redacted], who came TDY to I SOW for indoctrination and was integrated into the A-2 staff. His assistance was invaluable to the A-2. We strongly recommend that in future operations of this type, involved intelligence personnel for like systems (Combat Talons and I SOW Combat Talons) work together as much as possible.

C. (U) Interface with [Redacted] was good. Due to the difference in the tasked mission between the Rangers and I SOW, interface usually occurred only during exercises. A-2 personnel attempted to respond to all requests from [Redacted] (large scale maps and 1 SOW produced photography). Likewise, he was very willing to answer any questions concerning the operations to help the A-2 Staff. Face-to-face
contact and working together during exercises was essential in establishing this relationship.

D. (U) With the exception of the sister Combat Talon unit in the Pacific, the A-2 personnel had more interface with the [101 ABN Div/S-2] personnel than any other unit. The S-2 for the [101 ABN Div] became the point of contact between army aviation intelligence and the A-2.

1. (S) Initial contacts with [ ] During the meeting at [ ], it was mutually agreed that much closer interface was required between army aviation intelligence and A-2 personnel. In response to an A-2 invitation, [ ] made the first of numerous liaison visits in late Aug 80. During the initial visit, countless details were agreed upon and preliminary arrangements made to combine the intelligence support for both army and air force components. During subsequent visits, the joint requirements were further refined. Due to the magnitude of intelligence support and materials required for joint army/air force helicopter operations, and the need for additional army intelligence participation, [ ] deployed TDY to Hurlburt in Sep 80 to augment the A-2 staff. During the second week of Oct 80, [ ] arrived TDY for additional support. They both received orientation into air force intelligence operations and provided A-2 personnel with an introduction to army helicopter operations. The final intelligence augmentation from the 101 ABN Div was [ ] the S-2 for [ ].

2. (U) During the initial intelligence planning for joint operations, it became apparent that both services were not "speaking the same language." (This problem also surfaced in the A-3/S-3 operations). Because of this and other problems inherent in joint operations, the USAF/USAF Joint Helicopter Operations Directive was developed. One section of this directive was the intelligence briefing outline that was used for briefing all army/air force helicopter crew members. All joint pre-mission intelligence briefings were prepared and given by a team of air force and army intelligence officers.

( ) Additional support provided to the [101 ABN Div/S-2] was in three primary areas: training, data base familiarization, and maps and charts.

a. (U) Since all intelligence personnel that came TDY as augmentation to the A-2 staff were fully trained with operational experience, the term "training" is perhaps misleading. The term is used in this report meaning that individuals had to learn the unique or specialized procedures developed in support of this mission. For example, A-2 personnel had prepared a detailed data base and wall charts from available intelligence documents and message traffic. Because these data bases were the primary source of intelligence used during mission planning, all intelligence personnel had to be thoroughly familiar with the system and how the data was extracted.
b. \text{The 101 ABN Div/S-2} was not involved in the Snowbird (S) programs for nearly the amount of time as the A-2 and was virtually starting from scratch. Therefore, A-2 personnel duplicated much of the data base for subsequent transporting back to Ft Campbell.

c. We were directed to order both "real world" and exercise maps and charts for army aviation. It was also agreed that we would provide temporary storage of "real world" maps and charts until they could provide proper storage for them. Additionally, 1 SOW provided exercise photographic support to the army aviation units when requested.

d. Problem: One of the problem areas that was identified soon after the interface began was SAR and E&E training. Due to the mission of 101 ABN Div, very little SAR or E&E training was given to crewmembers. It was necessary to give some basic, fundamental training to army personnel, because they were being tasked to operate much farther away from friendly support than normal. A-2 personnel tailored several of their aircrew training briefings to include DD Form 1833 (Personal Authentication Card) accomplishment. These briefings were presented on request to army aircrews by 1 SOW personnel. This problem could surface again in future long range joint operations. Recommendation: Train selected army aviation units likely to be tasked for joint, long range missions in appropriate E&E/SAR subjects.

4. In summary, the interface and rapport developed between the personnel of 101 ABN Div/S-2 and 101 ABN Div/S-2 was outstanding.

E. AWACS intelligence interface started in Oct 80 with the orientation visit by \text{AWACS intelligence} to the 1 SOW. Prior to the visit, the A-2 staff at Hurlburt Field provided support to AWACS planners on an ad-hoc basis during their involvement in exercise mission planning. During the visit, AWACS mission planners usually deployed with one AWACS intelligence officer to provide intelligence support to their planners. She was given an in-depth orientation in the operation and function of the A-2. Additional support given to AWACS intelligence personnel included selected data base holdings and copies of locally generated intelligence products.

F. [Redacted] for the 41 RWRW at McClellan AFB, CA arrived at 1 SOW for his initial in-briefing and orientation in Mid-Oct 80. He became the intel point of contact for all HC-130 assets and was tasked to support them during real-world operations. During subsequent update visits, [Redacted] became an extremely dependable intelligence asset who was also qualified to provide limited support to our Pave Low helicopters.

G. Intelligence interface with MAC C-141 A/B and C-5A airframes was thorough for the 437 MAW. [Redacted] received his indoctrination into Snowbird (S), orientation, and extensive training during early Oct 80. During a subsequent TDY, [Redacted] worked closely with the A-2 staff in developing required support for tasked MAC airframes.
The primary HH-53 Pave Low intelligence representative was originally from the 1550 ATTW and provided exercise intelligence support only from 5 May 80 to the first week of Jul 80. Due to the lack of HH-53 expertise on the A-2 staff, he was in-briefed into SNOWBIRD (S) in early July 80. During his entire time TDY to the 39 SOW and subsequent PCS to the wing, he had been fully integrated into the A-2 staff. His experience and expertise in providing intelligence support to the HH-53 was invaluable.

Liaison between the 39 ARRW, Eglin AFB, FL was through the 39 ARRW, in order to maintain sufficient UPSEC and to lower the signature of the number and frequency of incoming intelligence personnel. Requested staff support by his unit. Support provided to included updated briefings and maps and charts support for exercises involving 39 ARRW HC-130's.

Intelligence interface with NRO personnel was very limited. However, on occasion provided limited numbers of maps and charts and some locally produced photography to planners during exercise planning sessions. The only actual mission planning interface took place at the sponsored E&E conference.

Interface with SOW/A2 personnel was also somewhat limited. For the most part, the SOW/A2 personnel interfaced with the Delta's JTF liaison officer and/or operational personnel. Although this limited contact (mostly at sponsored E&E conferences) could not be construed as a problem, more face-to-face would have been beneficial.

Because of numerous difficulties in rapidly obtaining sufficient quantities of maps and charts, A-2 requested JTF/J-2 (Lt Col) to authorize direct liaison in ordering these products. The previously established procedure where JTF acted as the "cut out" for ordering maps and charts was not responsive enough to meet exercise requirements. Additionally, due to the large number of maps involved, storage, and transportation would have compounded this problem.

Arranged the initial contact between DMA and DMA. Arranged the necessary DMA contacts and procedures allowing A-2 personnel to get the map orders into the system with sufficient priority to meet short deadlines. The primary POC for DMA, provided outstanding support in meeting these requirements.

Normal requisition channels were used when enough lead time was available for exercises. These channels were also used to build up the maps and charts required for mission execution and planning for most air elements to include army aviation units.

The primary point of contact at USGS for maps and charts was at Denver, CO. We had superlative support from the services of USGS. USGS products were used for large scale coverage of exercise areas due to a lack of DMA produced 1:50,000 scale maps. Normally had very short deadlines, because the exact
Location of a site usually was not determined until after a site survey was done. This did not leave much time (24-72 hours) in which to identify, order, and receive the required maps and charts. USGS and always came through when needed.

N. (U) Experience during this project has shown the necessity for all intelligence personnel to fully understand each other's requirements and methods of operations. This type relationship can be established only through face-to-face contact. The lateral unit interface should begin as soon as the units are identified and staffs selected. Lessons learned include:

1. Virtually all the options supported by 1 SOW had a Joint Service Force Package (i.e.: ranger, army aviation, 1 SOW, MAC, TAC, etc.). It is critical that all intelligence personnel from all units use the same intelligence and intelligence assessments to support their units. Periodic meetings by lateral component intelligence personnel will enhance the probability that all intelligence players are "singing from the same sheet of music." This is particularly vital to those units with similar roles or flight routes.

2. The number of intelligence personnel involved in operations of this nature are normally kept to absolute minimum numbers. Many of the options developed during Ricebowl/Snowbird (S) had a force mixture operating from a main base and numerous forward bases. Because of the limited number of intelligence personnel dedicated to any one weapon system and the diversity of operating locations, the A-2 staff realized that intelligence support would truly have to be a joint effort. For example, the 101 ABN Div/S-2 and his staff could fully support their rotary wing aircraft operating from a single location. However, when tasked to operate from two or more locations, they relied on supporting augmentation from collocated A-2 personnel supporting Pave Low helicopters. The same concept was used by 1 SOW intelligence personnel when tasked to operate from multiple locations. While the 101 ABN Div and 1 SOW intelligence were used as an example, this concept was and can be applied to all air component intelligence personnel.
VIII (U) 1st SOW/ JTF Interface

A. (C/TS) Deployment: Although the deployment to Iran was JCS directed, the AC-130's initial Iranian mission was to prepare for punitive strike operations. Therefore, JTF/J-2 (Ricebowl) did not have direct intelligence interface. When the AC-130's were tasked to support the rescue mission, intelligence requirements were handled by 1st SOW/A-2 personnel at Hurlburt.

B. (S/TS) 1st SOW/A-2. After initial contact was established in Jan 80, there were no interface problems with J-2. In every instance, all J-2 personnel immediately responded to any and all A-2 requests. As previously mentioned throughout this report, the timeliness and quality of support was outstanding. All JTF/J-2 personnel were apparently directed to provide guidance, be helpful and supportive, without being overbearing, toward subordinate units during Ricebowl and Snowbird (S) activities. The professionalism exhibited by all J-2 personnel from 9 Jan 80 to 15 Dec 80 was exceptional.
IX. (U) Analytical Observations:

A. (U) The following observations are not to be construed as an in-depth analysis of intelligence activities supporting the numerous missions covered in this history. It should also be noted that no attempt was made to prioritize the following observations:

Overall, all [ ] requests were responded to in a detailed and exceptionally timely fashion. However, I believe that one minor area which can be improved in the future concerns performance data, types, model numbers, etc., of U.S. equipment sold to foreign countries. Perhaps US-intelligence organizations should make a more concerted effort to include this data in standard intelligence publications, once a system is sold to a foreign country. From my perspective, it appeared that performance data, etc., on US-produced equipment was the most difficult information to obtain. In some instances, contractors were to be interviewed, R&D elements queried, or foreign military sales (FMS) organizations questioned. Suggest this type of data be included in regular intelligence publications in a more detailed manner.

2. (U) In addition to the excellent support from higher headquarters, this intelligence organization received outstanding support from all air component commanders. This support established a baseline for all air intelligence activities. As a result, the operations/intelligence interface during all operations or exercises was the best I have observed.

3. (U) Although OPSEC considerations for operations like Ricebowl and Snowbird (S) require that indoctrinated personnel be kept to a minimum, we must be flexible enough to augment if required. As the operations changed from one to maybe two FOLs, or as in the case of some Snowbird (S) options, multiple FOLs; personnel requirements must increase to assure high-quality intelligence support to operational elements. Although a required flexibility was built into Ricebowl intelligence planning, in retrospect I believe that the A-2 should have had at least two more intelligence personnel assigned. I also believe J-2 forward (and who did a superb job) exceeded their maximum capacity. If the operation had been delayed or extended for any period of time, the physical and mental capacity of all intelligence participants would probably have been overtaxed. In the future, if a large operation is envisioned, we must carefully plan intelligence personnel augmentation.

4. (U) A "cadre" of talented people have been either exposed to or trained to support very unique operational requirements. Hopefully, some of these people would be used in some future operation, rather than re-orienting totally new personnel.

B. (U) However, the most significant intelligence accomplishment was the fact that photo products and other intelligence data were made available to mission crews and not just commanders, missions planners, and intelligence personnel. By bringing intelligence data out from behind the "green doors," we were able to provide quality support and enhance the probability of mission success.
2. Early in the planning efforts, direct liaison was established between DMA and the Special Operations Division (SOD), J-3 OJCS. The SOD was the tasking element within OJCS. A lesson learned early in the process was that close coordination in the selection of targets was essential during the planning. The planners traditionally are working with intelligence analysts who are examining for their own needs. They are most familiar with the inventory and the specific that will best serve their needs.
5. During the course of the hostage situation, [SOD] requirements often developed for precise point positioning data. DMA's St. Louis facility produced the data. This was acceptable and the project was completed.
8. DMA was asked to perform an analysis of a specified open clear area with a view to answering the question, "Can C-130 aircraft land here?" A DMA terrain analyst was tasked and completed the analysis in about two days. The DMA analysis was used as an independent means of comparison to the work of another organization (identity unknown). The analyses were reported to be compatible.

9. The matter of technical security and decompartmentation was of prime concern to DMA throughout the hostage situation. The end product, in order to be most useful, should be classified as low as possible. Close coordination with all concerned must be constantly maintained in order to reach the best balance between security and operational usefulness of products.
ating on the morning of 22 April with the helicopter pick-up of a product at DMA's Washington production facility. This product had been in work around the clock throughout the previous weekend.

DMA support to the hostage situation resumed during May 1980 on much the same basis. Some existing products were revised and reprinted and numerous new projects were initiated. The intensity was not as great as earlier, but again DMA had one or more projects underway nearly all the time. Requirements for procurement and distribution of domestic mapping were more extensive.

LESSONS LEARNED

DMA has a wide range of capabilities to support the planning efforts inherent to such situations:

a. The full range of standard DMA products.

b. Extensive library holdings of non-DMA products. These can be xerographically reproduced in black and white if only a few copies are required. They can be lithographed in black and white if many copies are needed. If full color copies are needed, a few can be provided in the form of photographic color prints. If several hundred full color copies are needed, DMA has the capability to color scan,
Within DMA, there is a "crisis support" organization including selected personnel with necessary management and technical skills to respond as required. This proved advantageous for two reasons: (1) When tasked for a project, there was no question of priority or urgency, and (2) From an operational security viewpoint only the minimum essential number of people became involved.

COST

During the period from November 1979 to January 1981, DMA generated approximately 70 products along with Special Data in support of the hostage situation. Resource expenditure was 24 man years and material at a cost of $609,600.
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