DIALOGUES
OF
PLATO:
VOLUME III.

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PHILEBUS,
A
DIALOGUE
CONCERNING
THE CHIEF GOOD OF MAN.
THE FIRST PART.

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PHILEBUS,
A
DIALOGUE
CONCERNING
THE CHIEF GOOD OF MAN.
TO
THE HONOURABLE
Mr. TOWNSEND,
AND TO HIS SONS, (WORTHY OF
THEIR FATHER AND THEIR NOBLE ANCESTRY,)
The Right Hon. Mr. THOMAS TOWNSEND,
AND
CHARLES TOWNSEND, Esq;
THIS TRANSLATION OF
THE PHILEBUS OF PLATO
IS
MOST RESPECTFULLY OFFERED
BY
their much obliged,
and most obedient Servant,
FLOYER SYDENHAM.

At neque nos agere hæc, patriæi tempore iniquo,
Postumus æquo animo; neque Memmæ clara propago,
Talibus in rebus, communi d'esse saluti.
THE PROPER SUBJECT OF THIS DIALOGUE IS THE CHIEF
GOOD OF MAN: THE DESIGN OF IT IS TO SHEW, THAT
MAN'S CHIEF GOOD IS MORAL VIRTUE. — THE SUBJECT IS INTRO-
DUCED, BY STATING THE DIFFERENT OPINIONS OF SOCRATES AND
PHILEBUS, CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THAT GOOD, WHEREIN THE
HAPPINESS OF MAN IS TO BE FOUND; — OPINIONS, WHICH, IT
SEEMS, THEY HAD JUST BEFORE SEVERALLY AVOWED. — PHILEBUS,
A MAN STRONGLY PREPONSESSED WITH THE DOCTRINE OF ARISTIPUS,
HAD ASSERTED, THAT THIS GOOD WAS PLEASURE, — MEANING PLEA-
SURABLE SENSATION, OR PLEASURE FELT THRO' THE OUTWARD SENSES.
ON THE OTHER HAND, SOCRATES HAD SUPPOSED THE SOVEREIGN
GOOD OF MAN TO BE PLACED IN MIND, AND IN THE ENERGYS
OF MIND ON MENTAL SUBJECTS. — PHILEBUS, IN SUPPORT OF HIS
OWN ASSERTION, HAD BEEN BARANGUING, FOR A LONG TIME TOGETHER,
AFTER THE MANNER OF THE SOPHISTS; UNTIL HE FOUND
HIS SPIRITS AND IMAGINATION, OR PERHAPS HIS STOCK OF PLAUS-
FIBLE ARGUMENTS, QUITE EXHAUSTED. HE HAD THEREFORE DES-
FIRE.
fired his friend Protarchus, a young Gentleman, who appears to have been a Follower of Gorgias, to take up the Controversy, and carry it on in His Stead and Behalf. Protarchus had consented, and had engaged himself so to do. Immediately on this Engagement, at this very point of time, the present Dialogue commences: accordingly, it is carried on, chiefly between Socrates and Protarchus. But, as Philebus is the Principal Person, whose Opinion combats against That of Socrates,—and as no higher a Character is given to Protarchus, than That of Accessary, or Second to Philebus, in this argumentative Combat, the Dialogue, now before us, very properly, and consistently with the Rule¹, which Plato seems to have laid down to himself in naming his Dialogues, hath the Name given it of Philebus.—In all the printed Editions it is intitled A Dialogue concerning Pleasure. The general Account of it, just now given, shows, that with equal reason it might be intitled A Dialogue concerning Mind. But, in truth, neither Pleasure, nor Mind, (considered as intelligent,) is the principal Subject, herein treated of. Inquiry indeed is made into the nature of Pleasure, and the nature of Mind; but this is done with no other apparent or professed View, than to make it evident, that Neither of them, singly, and separately from the Other, can ever constitute the Happiness of such a Compound-Being as Man. Not, that the

¹ See the Synopsis, or General View, page 22.
Drift of these Inquirys is meerly Negative, or tends only to show, What is not the Chief Good of Man. For the Insufficiency of either Mind alone, or Pleasure alone, to Human Happiness, being in the course of the Dialogue acknowledged by Both Partys, naturally leads them to inquire into the essentiel nature of that Chief Good;—and What it is, which either constitutes or produces the Happiness of Man.—If then this Inquiry appears to be made in the Philebus, and if the Dialogue is found to end with the Result of such Inquiry, we presume, that the Title, given to it in this Translation, is the fittest, and the most worthy of it, as being expressive of the principal Subject, therein treated of. Ficinus, however, intitles it de Summo Bono, concerning the Sovereign Good, (absolutely and universally,) without specifying its particular reference to the Human Nature. And it must be admitted, that he is very excusable in so doing. For the Principle of That which will appear to be the Chief Good of Man, will appear also to be the Esſence of Good, Good Univerſal, and the Good of Every Being in Nature.—Be it observed, however, that, if the proper Title of this Dialogue be That, which is given it by Ficinus, it will follow, that the peculiar Design of it is to investigate the Divine Nature; and to point out to us, in What the Esſence of the Supreme Being consists. But This is the great Design of Plato in all his Writings: every One of them hath This End ultimately
mately in View; and All of them conspire together to accomplish it. Perhaps indeed The Philebus contributes more to it than any One other Dialogue. For in What Part of Nature, in What Rank of Things, thro What Medium, doth the Divine Being appear so conspicuous, as he does in the Mind, Heart, and Life of a wise and good Man? No other Being, (with whom We are acquainted here on Earth,) besides Man, appears to partake of those pure Forms, the Objects of the Divine Mind: no other Being, than Man, appears to be endued with Conscience, —that is, with a Feeling of God within him, or in his own Heart: and the Life of no other Particular Being, besides an honest and good Man, is a visible Display of thorow Integrity and universal Benevolence. By purifying our Ideas, we are, in some measure, united to the Divine Mind; by purifying our Hearts, we are united to the Divine Will; and by the Purity of our Lives, led in the constant Prae Life of Universal Justice, we partake of the Divine Goodness, and enjoy the Happiness of that Participation. Thro Wisdom and thro Virtue, thus it is, that a Man knows and feels within himself Truth and Good, never ceasing to spring up; and thus he not only draws from, but continually drinks at their pure Fountain. — Now 'tis well known, that the rational and usual way of discovering the Virtue of some particular River-waters, and how far they are corrupted by any extraneous Filth,
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gathered in their Course, is to take out some of the Water; and to let it settle; then to draw or pour it off from the Sediment it has deposited; and then to strain or filter it. When all this is done, but not before, just Experiments may be made, to prove What are its inherent Qualities. And these Qualities being thus fairly ascertained, if afterwards we can trace the River upward to its Source, we may then discover, how much of its original and native Spirit the derived Stream has lost; and we may then reasonably conclude, that some subtle Particles of Earth and Air were so intimately mingled with it in its downward Flow, as not to be separable from it by the known Methods of Purification. In like manner we are first to become acquainted with the Virtue of our own peculiar Nature, its proper End, and true Good,—by separating in our Minds and viewing it apart from those foul Dregs of Evil which are mixed with it,—before we can, in the ordinary way of Reason, find the Fountain, from which our own Virtue, Good, and End, are derived; and before we can discover the nature of its everliving, pure, and undefiled Water.—Hence it appears, that, however the remote and ultimate Design of this Dialogue may be, (and most willingly we acknowledge that it is,) to lead us to a discovery of That which is absolutely and universally The Sovereign Good, yet the proximate and immediate Design ought to be, and is, to make us acquainted with the Nature and Essence of That which is the
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the Chief Good to Us.—It remains farther to be observed, on the Subject of this Dialogue, that the Investigation of the Chief Good of Man rightly sets out with the consideration of Pleasure,—a Good, which presents itself to our View the very First; as it is the most obvious of any, common to all Sentient Beings, and the only Good felt, even by Such of them as are Rational, before the Dawn of Reason.—Our Searches are then naturally led thro' every Order of Good, which hath any Pretensions to be of the Final Kind, or Good for its own sake. We meet with All of these in this Dialogue; and find their Values, relative to Man, severally ascertained. Viewing the Philebus in this light, we may intitle it, not improperly, a Dialogue concerning Good,—that is, Good in general. Mr. J. Petvin has accordingly given it that Title, in his Letters on Mind, page 17. And in our Synopsis, page 18, we have followed his Example.—Thus much may suffice concerning the Name, the Title, the Subject, and the Design of this Dialogue: and if the Account, thus given, of these Articles of it be true, the wonderful Propriety of the Introductory Part,—as relative, not only to the Subject and Design, but also to the larger and argumentative Parts, the Body of it, and to the conclusive or finishing Part, the ἐνεκεχωρα and the Soul of it,—will justly be admired.—But no man can form a right Judgment of any Work, before the Work is finished; unless he has seen the
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The Plan or Model of it; or unless he has been otherways informed of the Purposes, to which all the Parts of it are meant to serve. 'Tis necessary therefore to a just Discernment of the Excellence of this Dialogue, in the masterly Composition of it, that a Reader, to whom it may be quite new, should be made acquainted, beforehand, with so much of the Conclusion, as will shew the Connection of the larger Parts, and also of their Sub-divisions, and the Reference which they all have to the principal Design. — In the Conclusive Part then of the Dialogue, all the Kinds of Good, which are pursuable as Ends, (and one or other of which is actually pursued, as Such, by Every man, in the general Course of his Life,) are enumerated in Order, according to the relative Value of Each of them to Man; — an Order, settled by Socrates, in consequence of his whole preceding Argumentation. — First in Rank, and alone, stands Measure, — the Essence of all Good, and the Principle of all Moral Virtue; — running thro' every Kind and Species of it; and guarding every Moral Action from those Excesses on the one side, and those Defects on the other, which it is ever in danger of. — In the Second Rank of Goods appear Symmetry and Beauty,—the Symmetry of a Man's whole Conduct as ruled by Measure, and the Beauty thence resulting;— together with Sufficiency and Fulness,—a sufficient and full Possession of all things requisite to Practical Virtue. — The Third Place is held by Mind, (considered as Intelligent,)
gent,) and Wisdom (considered as Speculative).—The Fourth Place is filled by Sciences, and Arts, and Right Opinions. — In the Fifth Rank we find the Pleasures, which we feel from Things Corporeal, thro' the outward Senses of Sight, Hearing, and Smelling;—Pleasures, which are neither preceded, accompanied, nor followed by any Pain, either of the Soul, or of the Body. — In the Sixth and last Place, far behind all the other Goods, we discover, in a tumultuary Group, the Pleasures enjoyed by Animals of all Kinds,—the Pleasures of the Taste and of the Touch;—Pleasures, attended all of them, with Pain, either past, present, or to come.—Now those Six Kinds of Good, valued often for their own Sakes, without regard had to any farther Benefits, expected to accrue from them, are reducible to those Three, the Examining of which constitutes the Body of this Dialogue,—Virtue, Knowledge, and Pleasure. — This threefold Examination is set on foot, by supposing a Contest to have happened between Socrates and Philebus, concerning Pleasure and Knowledge,—Whether of these Two was the Chief Good of Man.—For neither Sophists nor Philosophers, in that age, seem to have thought of Virtue, as a fit Competitor with Either of the Two for so high a Character, until the Superiority of Virtue to Both the Others was shown by Socrates.—The Contest is supposed to have continued for some time, and to remain at last undecided; as every contested Point for ever must; if
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it be controverted in a declamatory way; unless the contending Partys are bound to abide by the Decision of some Authoritative Judge; or unless they will submit, by Agreement, to some Referee or Umpire. — The Mode therefore of Disputation is here changed,—from the Dogmatical, positively asserting, and flatly contradicting,—to the Dialectic, questioning and answering: for in this Socratic way of arguing, the Respondent, if in the wrong, may be confuted out of his own mouth.—To effect this Change, it was necessary to change the Person also of the Advocate for Pleasure,—from Philebus, a peremptory and fierce Dogmatist,—to Protarchus, who was candid, and gentle, and could hearken coolly to the Reasoning of an Adversary. This Change of Person gives occasion for a fresh Stating of the Controversy. And such an Occasion was necessary to be contrived; because it was necessary for the Readers of the Dialogue, to be informed, what Points were to be debated on. The like necessity occasioned most of the ancient Dramatic Pieces to be introduced by Prologues; in which the Audience were made acquainted with the Foundation of the Fable, then to be represented. But in this Dialogue, to state the Controversy, after it had been long on foot,—to propose the Points distinctly and at large, as at the first Opening,—to make this Repetition appear natural and proper, required much more Address, than to make a Prologue, giving only a simple Narrative.
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of what had passed previous to the Drama. From these observations, a judicious Lover of Dialogue-Compositions will have pleasure in perceiving, with what Art Plato, the greatest Master in this Kind of Writing, has introduced his Dialectic Inquiry into the nature of Pleasure and the nature of intelligent Mind, Two of the Three Things to be examined.—With no less Art has he opened a Way for inquiring into the nature of the remaining Third, Moral Virtue; and for manifesting the superior Value of This, compared with Knowledge and with Pleasure. For, however the clear Reasoning of Socrates might be alone sufficient to make that Superiority appear evident to Persons attentive to his Reasoning,—yet no little Skill or Address were requisite to raise a proper Degree of Attention to an Hypothesis so paradoxical,—as it must seem to the Company, then around Socrates,—the Frequenters of the Lyceum; None of whom, 'tis probable, had ever considered any of the Moral Virtues, otherwise than as Means, subservient to the acquisition of Knowledge, or the enjoyment of Pleasure. But the Introduction to the Dialogue procures their Attention, and consequently prepares the Way to the Reasoning of Socrates on this additional Third Subject, by suggesting a Possibility, that the Chief Good of Man might consist neither in Knowledge nor in Pleasure, but in some Other Thing (not
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(not naming it,) hitherto perhaps unthought of. The Possibility of This, being tacitly admitted, raises their Expectation of some new plausible Hypothesis, and serves for a sufficient Ground to an Inquiry, at that time, new to the World.—On comparing the particular Account, now given, of the Introduction to this Dialogue, with the Extract, given just before, of the Conclusion,—every good Critick will admire the singular Art of our Author, in the Construction of the Whole. For he will perceive, that the Beginning regards the End, and is connected with it, by those intermediate Links, that form all the Middle Part, the Argumentative. And now indeed 'tis high time to give the Reader a Foretaste of the copious Entertainment, he may expect in this rich Repast.---The Argumentation is divided into Three Parts, like Three plentiful Courses at a bounteous Table; Each being composed of a well-consothing Variety. For tho' the nature of Pleasure, and the nature of Mind, are severally considered in the First Part, as well as in the Second; yet in the Second Part only is Pleasure accurately and thorowly examined: the principal Subject of the First Part is Mind; which great Subject is there treated of in such a manner, as to insinuate, unperceived and secretly, what in the short Conclusive Part of the Dialogue will appear openly,—that "Mind is both the Cause and the Principle of that Best of human things, Moral Virtue. ---The
---The First of the Argumentative Parts of the Dialogue layeth the Foundation of these Inquirys in the Samenesses and Differences of Things. For Sameness and Difference are found together in all things;---Difference of Species, where a Sameness is of the Kind,---Accidental Difference, (or perhaps, sometimes, only Numerical,) where a Sameness is of the Species. The Philosopher's Design, in laying this Foundation, seems to be none other, than to confute the Opinion of Philebus; who made no difference between any one Pleasure of Sense and any other, except what arose from their differing in Degree; that is, from the More and the Less of Pleasure: as tho Things, agreeing in some Genus, differed only in Magnitude or Quantity, One of the Accidental Differences, belonging to Individuals of the same Species. But a much greater Difference than This, being shown by Socrates, between Things differing in their essiential Qualitys, (as being of different Genera, tho perhaps agreeing in some higher Genus,) prepares the way for that clear Distinction, made afterwards, between the Fifth and the Sixth Rank of Goods, --- between the pure and harmless Pleasures, and Those to which is annexed always Pain, and frequently Destruction.---The principal Design, however, of beginning the Argumentation in this way, is to unfold the nature of Intelligence (or intelligent Mind) and Science, (or real Knowledge,) by revealing at once their
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their Principles: from which it will appear at the same time, how much the Sources of Pleasure differ from those of Mind.—Now the Principles of Mind are by the Pythagoreans termed Unity and Number. Plato in this Dialogue, by the words One and Many, means the same Principles: he means One divisible into Many, Each of which Many is One; just as every Number is divisible into Unites: and he means Many united, or combined in One; just as a certain Quantity of Unites combined together makes some One certain Number. But neither Infinite Number, nor Indefinite Multitudes, are Objects of the Mind; they are but obscure Objects of Imagination which is boundless, or of Sensation blind and undistinguishing.—Sensë perceives, clearly and distinctly, One Thing or Being at a time, and no more;—a One, which is not divisible into Many Ones, Each of them, by its self, a whole entire Thing or Being;—but a One, divisible only into Parts, not One of which Parts is any Thing or Being, independantly, or subsisting by its self.—But 'tis the nature of Mind, to perceive, at one and the same time, Many Things or Beings compriz'd, all of them, in One.—Individual Beings therefore, of whatever Species and Kind they are,——being infinite, and divisible only into Parts, and those again into Parts smaller, ad infinitum,—fall under the Perception of Sensë only, and not under the Cognizance of the Understanding. The Objects of Mind are those Universals which run thro all things; and, besides these, the Genera and the Species
Species of things; a Genus, together with all its Species, numbered by the Mind; a Species, common to all the Individuals of it, Many Ones without Number; to which numberless Many no Mind descends: for Mind dwells for ever in the Region of Numbers definite and certain. It is only by knowing these Principles of Mind, One and Many, or Unity and Number, that we can distinguish between Mind and Sense, or between Science and Sensation: and 'tis necessary to the right understanding of this Dialogue, accurately to settle the Bounds between them. What these Bounds are, appears from the Account above given. It appears, that in Man Mind and Intelligence begin from, and end with, the least One and Many,---the lowest Species,---That, which borders on Infinity: and it appears, that Sensation, and the Use of the Organs of Sense, begin with the Infinity of Things individual, and never end, but with the Extinction of all outward Sense.---Mind, says Aristotle, is the Beginning or Principle of Science. It must be so, if the very Essence of Mind, considered as intelligent, is

For the sake therefore of Readers unacquainted with Plato, we have gone a little out of our way; by inserting, in this summary Account of the Matters, contained in The Philebus, and of their Order, an Elucidation of Plato's Doctrine concerning the difference between αἰσθητὰ Things Sensible, and νοητὰ Things intelligible; whereas the proper place of it would be among the Explanatory Notes to the Second Part of this Dialogue.

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One and Many united.——But the consideration of Mind, as One and Many, reaches not to the whole nature of Mind; not showing it to be the Cause and Principle of Virtue. After this therefore, the great Philosopher takes a wider Scope, for the Ground, on which to build his Inquiry; so as that all the Kinds of Good, enjoyed by Man, may be therein included. He proceeds to consider next, the nature of the whole Universe, as divisible into Four Sorts of Things.——Of the First Sort are all Such, as are Objects of any of the Five Senses, or which any way affect the Sensitive Soul;——the Qualitys, and Quantitys, and all other Attributes of Corporeal Substances, considered as they are in themselves, apart from those Substances, of which they are the Attributes. And because the Nature of all these Attributes of Body is indefinite and general, Each admitting an infinite Number of Degrees, (as may appear from the instances of Hot and Cold, Soft and Hard, Great and Little, High and Low,) this First Sort of Things is termed Infinite. To this Sort belong all the Materials, employed by Plastic Nature, in the Generation, Growth, and Maintenance of all Natural Beings;——not only Such of those Materials, as are Particles of the Four Elements of all Compound-Bodys, but Such also, as are minute Mixtures of those Elementary Particles. Among the Infinites are also to be ranked all the Materials, made use of by Man, in any of the Works of Art; whether the Materials
Materials are taken from Natural or from Artificial Forms, from Such of either Kind as are destroyed, whether by Violence or by Time.—Things of the Second Sort are those Bounds, which are set by Plastic Nature, and Those also by Artift-Man, to the infinite Materials above-mentioned;—by Nature, in the creating of Her Beings,—by Man, in the framing of His Works:—Bounds, set to those Primary Qualitys of Body, Hot and Cold, Moift and Dry, by mixing Part of Each of the Four Elements with its Contrary, in a degree proportioned to the nature of That Form, which is intended to be made:—Bounds, set to those other Qualitys of Body, termed Secondary, by means of Compound-Mixtures, in such Proportions to each other, as accord to the nature of the whole Compound-Body:—Bounds, set to Quantitys, by definite Numbers:—Bounds to the Activity, Passivenesfs, and other relative Attributes of Corporeal Substances, by intermingling these Substances in certain Quantitys, adapted to the Natures, Uses, or Ends of the intended Corporeal Forms.—To this Second Sort of Things is given the general Term Bound, because Bound is common to them all: and to This Sort belong the Genera, or Generic Powers, of all corporeal Beings; and their Species, or Specific Forms;—those Powers and those Forms, by which the Nature of each of those Beings is determined,—by which it is effentially distinguished from all others of different Kinds or of dif-

—end of page 20—
ferent Species,—and from which the Being receives its true Definition and proper Denomination.—But these Genera and Species, these Numbers and Proportions, which every where, in the Sensible World of Nature, bound the Infinitude of Things, we are, on the one hand, not to confound with those Intelligible Forms, the eternal Ideas of the Divine Mind; and on the other hand, we are to separate them λόγω (or consider them apart) from the Individual Beings, which are endued with any of these General Powers, and invested with any of these Specific Forms. For the Archetypal Forms, the Divine Ideas, belong to the Fourth Sort of Things; as we hope to make appear in Note 167: and the Individual Beings of Nature, copied from those original and eternal Forms, belong to the Sort of Things, to be mentioned next.—For the Third Sort comprehends all Forms Corporeal; the Substratum or Substance of which Forms is the First or Common Matter,—That Infinite, which is the Ground of Infinity in All of the First Sort of Things; the Bounds to which Infinite are every where set by the great Mind of Nature:—it comprehends all the Beings of Outward Nature, produced into Existence successively in Time, flourishing for a while, and then perishing; and all the Beauty, spread over these temporary Beings, varying and changing, as the Forms of these Beings are changed or vary:—it comprehends all the Performances, Operations, and Works of Human Artists,
Artists, making use of such of those infinite Materials above-mentioned, as are within their Power; to form or fashion irregular Figures according to their own Minds; to give Measure to Motions, Harmony to Sounds, and Meaning to Voices articulate; or to amend the decayed but mendable, and recover the hurt but recoverable, Works of Art or Nature. And rightly are all Things of this Third Sort, placed by Plato after those of the First and Second Sorts; for, in the Order of Nature, they actually come after: Infinitude and Bound must be presupposed in Nature, before any temporary or transient Form, where Infinitude receives a Bound, can be generated, produced, or made.

Beings of the Fourth Sort are such, as give Existence to those of the Third Sort; to the external, changeable, and temporary Forms;—namely, the Mind of Nature, to Nature's Works;—and the Minds of Men, to the Productions of Human Art.—To this Fourth Sort of Being Plato gives the general Denomination of Cause: concerning which it may at present suffice to say, that the Final, the Formal, and the Efficient Causes of all Things existing are comprehended therein: for a more explicit and particular account of it, we refer the Reader to Note 167; in which Note some Reasons also are assigned, to show, why Cause is spoken of the Last of the Four Sorts of Beings, or Things, in the Universe; altho in the Order of Nature it is evidently the First. —— Our Philosopher's Design, in making
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making this Division of Things, is to lay before us the nature of Pleasure, the nature of Intelligent Mind, and the nature of Moral Virtue:—it is to show, that all the Pleasures of Sense belong to the First Sort of Things, the Infinite;—all the Energys of Mind, to the Fourth Sort, Cause;—and all the Virtues peculiarly Human, the Moral Virtues, belong to the Second Sort, Bound;—and that Man, the Subject at once of Moral Virtue, Knowledge, and Pleasure, belongs to the Third Sort; as Man is One of the Beings of Nature, in Every one of whose Beings the Infinity of Matter is bounded by Form; but of these Beings Man is the Only one, capable of enjoying all the Three Kinds of Good, Pleasure, Knowledge, and Moral Virtue.—Here it must be observed, that, if the First of the Argumentative Parts of this Dialogue has been now represented rightly, and the Drift of the Argumentation been well explained, no Conclusions, regarding Pleasure, can be drawn from it, beside these;—first, that Pleasure is infinite in its own nature;—and secondly, that 'tis divid-ible into Many;—but whether these Many are many different Kinds and Sorts of Pleasure, as Socrates had intimated before; or whether they are an infinite number of particular and distinct Pleasures, differing only in Quantity, or Degree of Pleasure, but alike in This,—that All of them are good, and conducive to the Happiness of Man, as Philebus had asserted,—hath not as yet appeared.
appeared.—The Second Argumentative Part of the Dialogue, in making a particular and minute Inquiry into the nature of Pleasure, distinguishes all those agreeable Sensations, called by the general name of Pleasure, into certain Sorts, very different, one from another. But, previously to the making of any Distinction into Sorts, in order to shew, that such a Distinction is founded in Nature, Three Points are proposed to be considered. — The First is,—of what Kind the Beings are, which are susceptible of Pain, as well as of Pleasure. Now on this Head, 'tis evident, that all such Beings are Animals; that is, Beings Corporeal, animated by Sentient Souls; but whose Bodys are generated, gradually grow to their mature State, last for a time by means of Nourishment, and at length decay and are dissolved;—Bodys, which, all the time they last, undergo continual Changes of their State, thro' the alternate Emptiness and Repletion of their inward Receptacles or Vessels, which contain the Matter of their Nourishment;—Bodys, which require frequent Supplies of Food, to fill the place of what passes away from them, in natural Excretions, by various Outlets.—The Second Consideration is,—at what Times such Animals feel Pleasure, and at what Times they feel Pain. And on this Head, 'tis evident from our own Experience, (for Man is an Animal of this Kind,) that a Retention of whatever ought to be excreted and thrown off, (as for
for instance, internal Air and other perspirable Fluids, after they have been duly circulated thro' the Body,) is always followed by Pain or Uneasiness; and that every due Excretion, and every natural Evacuation, is attended by a total Ceasation of Pain, or by a Relief and Ease, so agreeable to nature, as to be often termed a Pleasure. Again; from the Emptiness, consequent to these Excretions and Evacuations, we feel Uneasiness and Pains arising in the Body; and on the other hand, we feel, that Pleasure accompanies the timely taking of nutritious Food, by which all the empty Vessels are replenished.—Thirdly,—since every Animal consists of a Body and of a Soul,—and since the Soul in Animals of the more perfect Kinds, chiefly in Man, is the Seat of Imagination, Memory, Passions, and Affections, as well as of Sensation,—it is considered, in what Part of its Composition such an Animal feels Pain and Pleasure. And on this Head, 'tis found also from Experience, that the Body, animated throughout with Sentient Soul, may feel either Pain or Pleasure, and yet, the Memory and Imagination, the Passions and Affections of the Soul, may all the while lie dormant and unmoved;—that, on the other hand, the Soul may feel either Pain or Pleasure, when the Body is sensible of neither, and even when the Organs of Sensation are totally untouched:—that sometimes the Soul and the Body are pained or delighted,
delighted, Both of them together;—and that again, at other times, opposite Feelings at once prevail, Pleasure in the One, while Pain is in the Other.—These Considerations are made the Ground of many Distinctions, laid down by Socrates, between the several Pleasures, which we receive from external Things, by means of our outward Senses.—The First Distinction is between the Pleasures, which are perfectly pure, unmixed with any Pain, either subsequent or precedent,—and the Pleasures on the other hand, whose Presence is preceded by Pain, in proportion to their Magnitude, or which at their Departure leave a Sting behind them, a Regret of their Absence and a Longing for their Return. — After this, other Differences, equally wide, are shown by Socrates, and admitted by Protarchus to be real, between the harmless Pleasures and the hurtfull; between the gentle, and the fierce; the true Pleasures and the false; the right Pleasures and the wrong; Those which are consistent with Rational Delights, and Those on the other hand, which exclude for a time, and at length banish for ever, all Mental Objects, and all Self-Enjoyment.—When the Pleasures of Sense have been thus sifted; and a Separation has been made of the pure from the impure; Distinctions are laid down between the different Arts, exercised by Man, as they are more or less built on Science; and as they have more or less of Certainty in their
The Argument.

their Performances: some Arts depending chiefly on Sagacity and Experience; while others proceed with the assurance of Truth in all their Operations. A Distinction is also taken between some Sciences, and others bearing the same Name;—a Distinction, with respect to the difference of the Subjects, in which they are conversant;—as, for instance, between the Arithmetick of Mathematicians, the Subject-Matters of which Science are invariable Numbers, Each consisting of Monads, all of them, equal,—and, on the other hand, the Arithmetick, which is used in Common Speech, and applied to Things Corporeal, Each of them One, but variable, and of unequal Value.—By these Distinctions the Philosopher leads Protarchus to recognise the superior Excellence of the Science of Mind above all others,—a Science, conversant in those Subjects only, which are the same for ever. And thus also are we led to a discovery of the nature of pure Mind, as it is the Seat of eternal Truth, and the Fountain of all real Science, of all true Art, and of all Right Opinions.—In the Third and last Argumentative Part of this Dialogue, those Moral Truths are shown, which it is the whole Intent of it to show, in the following Order:—the First is, that neither Pleasure alone, nor Theoretical Wisdom or Knowledge alone, is sufficient for the Happiness of any Man.—The Second is, that the best and happiest of all human Lives is That Life, in which the best and highest Science, the
Knowledge of True Good, produceth into habitual and constant Practice the Moral Virtues; Each of them, attended by a peculiar Satisfaction; and All of them, embracing such purer Pleasures of Sense, as Outward Nature presents to them on every Quarter, and for which They alone have a true unadulterated Taste: — a Life, in which the Prime Science, just now mentioned, rightly estimating the Value and the Use of every other Science and of every Human Art, entertains them all, together with their concomitant Delights; assigning to Each his proper Place, and Time of Exhibition; — receiving also frequent but short Visits from the groffer Pleasures of Sense,— from Such, as are necessary to the support of Life and Health and Strength; — but constantly refusing ever to admit Such, as interrupt and hinder the Arts in their Exercises; Such, as drive the Sciences into Oblivion; Such, as impair the Health of the Body, and diminish every Faculty of the Soul; Such, as profess Enmity with sober Reason, and are utterly incompatible with the Science of True Good. —— The Third Moral Truth is this, that in a Life, where Pleasure and Knowledge are thus amicably joined, and operate together for the Good of the whole Man,— a Life, where all the Parts of it are exactly proportioned and fitted to each other,— Symmetry, Harmony and Beauty appear throughout. —— The last and highest Truth, no less Theological than Moral, is This, that the Cause of
the Happiness found in such a Life, is the Same with the Cause of Harmony, Symmetry, and Beauty thro' the Universe; and the Same with the Principle and Essence of Moral Virtue;—namely, Measure its Self, and Truth its Self,—the Idea of Good, the great Object of the Divine Mind;—in which Universal Idea the True Measures of All things are contained.—Thus have we endeavoured to point out the Method of this Capital Dialogue, the Philebus; and the Series, Order, and Connection of its Argumentative Parts.—As to the Epilogus or Conclusion of it, where the Particular Matters, reasoned in it, are summed up and recapitulated, enough has been said before, for the Purpose of this Argument.—The apparent Form of the Dialogue is Dramatic; the Genius of it, Didactic; and the Reasoning, for the most part, Analytical. 4

4 See the Synopsis, page 7.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

SOCRATES,
PROTARCHUS,
PHILEBUS.

SCENE,
THE LYCEUM.

¹ For the Characters of Protarchus and Philebus, see the Argument of this Dialogue, pages 5, 6, and 13.
² See Note on the Scene of the Greater Hippias.
PHILEBUS.

Socrates.

Consider now, Protarchus! What the Doctrine of Philebus is, which you are taking upon yourself to second and support; and What things, said by Me, you are going to controvert, if they should be found Such as are not agreeable to your Mind. Will you permit me to state, in a summary way, the difference between My Positions and those of Philebus?

Protarchus.

By all means.

The Beginning of this Dialogue supposes, that much Conversation had passed, immediately before, between Socrates and Philebus: concerning which Conversation, or rather Controversy, the Reader is referred to the Argument, page 5.

The restrictive Clause, which concludes this Sentence, is perhaps intended to suggest a Thought, that Protarchus, when he undertook to controvert the Position of Socrates, had not examined it sufficiently; nor had considered, whether he was, or was not, of the same Opinion Himself. The Possibility of such an Intention may appear from the Two next Notes.

Socrates.
PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

Philebus then says, that The Good of all Animals is Joy, and Pleasure, and Delight, and whatever else is

3 This Part of the Sentence, to give it a literal translation, runs thus,—that 'tis good for all Animals to rejoice, and (to feel) Pleasure and Delight, &c.—But in translating it, we chose to give it That Meaning, which is rightly presumed by Socrates to be agreeable to the Sentiments of Philebus: for otherwise, there would be no opposition between the Opinion of Philebus and his own. Pleasure might be a good thing; and yet Knowledge might be a better.—But from what follows in this Dialogue it appears, that, in the Opinion of Philebus, Pleasure and Good are Terms synonymous, and signify the same Thing: the Consequences of which Opinion are these;—that all Pleasure is good; and that no other thing is good, beside Pleasure. See Note 35.—Now Socrates knew, that the Term Pleasure had a vague Meaning: that often it meant some agreeable Sensation, felt by the Soul from Things Corporeal, thro' the medium of her own Body and its Organs of Sensation,—whenever any such Organ, either of the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, or Feeling, meets with an Object suitable to it;—whether the Sensation refreshes, or exhilarates, or soothes the Animal-Spirits; and whether it irritates, or convulses, or softens the Whole or any Part of the Nervous Frame; he knew that every one of these different Sensations in the Soul, by means of the Body, was termed Pleasure:—that the same Term often signified an agreeable Passion, felt by the Soul immediately, and arising in her thro' her own Facultys of Memory and Imagination, whenever these Facultys exhibit to her, as if present, any future Object, suited to those Bodily Organs of Sense, thro' which she has heretofore received any Pleasure, of the Kind before-mentioned.—

He
is congenial to them, and harmonizes with all other Things of the same Kind. And what I contend for is, that

He had heard the Term *Pleasure* sometimes used, to express a delightful Sensation, felt by the Human Soul, when some Object, suited to her higher Facultys of *Reason* and *Understanding*, presents itself to her View;—any *Truth* of *Science*, whether Speculative or Præctic;—any *Regularity* or *Order* in the Works of *Art*, or in those of *Nature*.—He had heard the same word, *Pleasure*, made use of at other times, to express the heart-felt *Satisfaction*, enjoyed by All of Human Kind, and by Many of the Brutal, in gratifying their natural and social *Affections*;—and not infrequently, to express a Kind of *Exultation*, felt by Virtuous Souls, on reading or hearing the recital of *noble* and *generous* *Affections*, performed by Any of their own Species:—or to express certain *Feelings* of the same Kind, but sinking deeper, and diffused thro the whole Soul, from a *Consciousness* of her own *Right Conduct*, in acting bravely and honestly, or in benefiting Those with whom she is connected.—He had heard the Term, *Pleasure*, applied by Some to That *Cheerfulness*, — That sober and innocent *Gaiety* of Spirit, — naturally flowing from a social and benevolent Disposition of Mind:—and by Others perhaps in His time, as afterwards it was applied by *Epicurus*, to the constant *Serenity* and *Tranquillity* within every Soul, conscious of no Injustice,—freed from all permanent Passions,—unmolested by her own Body, as well as by Things which concern that Body,—and at liberty to enjoy her Self.—Nay, 'tis probable, that in That philosophic Age and Country, as well as elsewhere since, Those *rapturous* and *elevated* Sentiments were sometimes termed *Pleasures*,—Those, which the Soul feels but rarely, and only for a few precious Moments of time,—when, insensible of her
Body, and of the World without, she is retired to that secret and sacred Place within her Self,—where, with her Eye clear, and brightened by the Light of Universal Mind, there present, she beholds and converses with those fair and perfect Ideas, which That Light enables her to see,—and where she finds her Self, for the time, in so godlike a State, as to want Nothing to compleat her Happiness. Now it may be reasonably supposed, that Arisippus, the First celebrated Teacher of the Doctrine espoused by Philebus, did, at different times, use the Term Pleasure homonymously, to mean these different Enjoyments,—viz. Sensual, Rational, Moral, Social, Intellectual, and That also which approaches to Divine Happiness;—by such a fallacious and sophistical Variation, endeavouring to support his favourite Doctrine,—“that Pleasure was the only Good of Man, eligible for its own sake, and therefore to be proposed as his only End.” This Supposition seems probable, because the Epicureans afterwards, who adopted for their own That Doctrine of Arisippus and his Followers, (from the Country of their Founder termed Cyrenaicks,) were so unsettled in their use of the word Pleasure, as to attribute to it, on different occasions, those several Meanings above-mentioned.—To be convinced that the Epicureans were thus unsettled, we have only to compare the Epistle of Epicurus to Menoeceus, with some other Sentences of that Founder of the Epicurean Sect, recorded by Laertius, but more fully by Cicero in Disputat: Tusculan: L. 3, §. 18. See also Seneca in his Treatise de Vital Beata, Cap: 6, 12, 15, and 19. and his Epistles 66 and 78.—But, whatever Expressions were used by the Cyrenaicks, we see, that Socrates, in the Sentence now before us, to prevent all Ambiguity and all Prevarication, uses other Terms, beside Pleasure; he couples with it Joy and Delight; and by the Words, “whatever else is congenial,” we presume he means Cheerfulness, Ease, Tranquillity, Complacency, and Self-Satisfaction. Thus he allows the utmost Latitude of Meaning
Meaning to That Hypothefis, which Protarchus undertook to vindicate; and gives all possible Advantage to his Adverfary's Caufe. For, though it might fairly be supposed, (what afterward appears, more than once, in the course of this Dialogue,) that Philebus had principally in his view Sensual Pleasures, of the graver Kinds,—the word Delight is added by Socrates; because it is a Term, generally applied to the Pleasures we receive thro our Eyes and Ears: and the word Joy is put first, because of its more extensive Meaning; as it includes every Feeling attendant on the Soul's Perception of Objects agreeable to her Nature: and if we understand the words,—"whatever else is congenial,—to mean such Feelings as Mental Tranquillity, and Self-Satisfaction, we have then all thofe several Meanings, in which we said the Term Pleasure was homonymously used.—Farther; that Plato, in the latter, the et caetera—Part of the Sentence now before us, had a View to thofe Sentiments or Feelings last mentioned, thofe of a truly philofophic Soul, is probable from a passage in his Cratybus,—a Dialogue, in which is taught the Nature of Things, as well the permanent as the transient, by a supposed Etymology of Names and Words;—in that Dialogue, (pag: 419 of Stephens's Edition,) he briefly recites and explains all the agreeable Sensations or Affections of the Soul. The Three first, there enumerated, are the very fame which are here specified,—ίδιων, χαρά, τέφρα,—Pleasure, Joy, Delight: the Fourth he there terms ἔυφροσύνη, Cheerfulness,—a Word, which, according to the Genius of that Dialogue, he supposes a contraction of ἔφροσύνη, and derived ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν πράγματος τῆς ψυχῆς συμφύσεως, from the easy Flow of the Soul, when she is amiably carried along with the natural course of things.—Now in this ἔυφροσύνη, this Cheerfulness, all the remaining good Affections or Feelings of the Soul, before mentioned, we presume to be included; not only, because Cheerfulness arises naturally in the Soul from a Consciences of her having and enjoying the natural, rational, and social,
that those Things are not the Best; but that to discern, and to understand, and to remember, and whatever Affections,—but also, because a constant Cheerefulness can never be maintained without frequently enjoying some or other of those godlike Feelings.

The Hypothefis, here set up by Socrates, in opposition to the Sentiments of Philebus, seems to be the same with the Doctrine, said to have been taught, an age or two afterwards, by Herillus of Carthage. For this Herillus, who had been a Disciple of Zeno the Citeean, Founder of the Stoic Sect, is reported by Cicero, (whether justly or not, may well be questioned,) to have held, that Science or Knowlege was the Chief Good of Man. But whatever was the Meaning of Herillus, when he set so high a Value on Science, it will soon appear, that Socrates himself entertained no such Notions on this Subject. It will appear afterwards, that this Hypothefis, which he here gives out, as if it were his own, is introduced by him for the sole purpose of explaining rightly that ancient Doctrine, —"that Mind is the Highest and the Best of Things,"—by suggesting to our thoughts the Distinction, mentioned in our Argument and Notes to the First Alcibiades, between Mind Intelligent and Mind Intelligible. And lastly it will appear, that Mind, in this latter Sense, is Good its Self, and Beauty its Self; the Cause, (Final as well as Formal) of Beauty, Harmony, and Good, throughout the Universe; and in Man, who partakes of it, the Principle and Cause of his Chief Good, which is Moral Virtue. —The Terms made use of in this place by Plato, are very remarkable: they are—not φαντάζεσ αιτίοις,—the former of which frequently means Moral Wisdom, or Prudence, the Habit of discerning what is Good in all Moral Actions, That Habit, which is the Leading or Prime Virtue,—and by the latter frequently is meant Mind Intelligible.
That which is the Fountain of Good, the Cause of Beauty, the Measure of all things, and the sole Principle of Virtue: now, here he can neither mean Virtue, nor the Principle of Virtue; because we shall find, in the Conclusion of this Dialogue, that he rates These above all other Goods:—his words in this passage are—

τὸ φῶνων καὶ τὸ νοεῖν,—that is,—the actual Discernment or Knowledge of what is the best way of acting in any Affair under immediate deliberation,—and the actual Perception of any Truth, then presented to the Mind.—Nor does it invalidate the Justice of this Remark, that in repeating the Hypothesis proposed by Socrates, the terms ἐγνώσεις and ἔπειτα are sometimes used by Socrates himself, as well as by Protarchus. For, the Hypothesis being once stated in precise and unambiguous Terms, and its Meaning consequently settled, and equally well understood by Both the Parties, they might thenceforward safely indulge themselves in a Liberty of changing the Terms for Variety's sake, and of using such others, as often conveyed the same Meaning.—It is well known by the learned in the Writings of ancient Greek Philosophers, that by the term ἔπειτα they mean the Intellect, the intelligent or percipient Principle in the Soul, more frequently than they mean Mind Intelligible and Eternal.

—And as to the other term ἐγνώσεις, omitting many Passages in Plato's Phædo, where it signifies the Energy of the Mind in discerning what is Good, we need only refer to Two Passages in his First Alcibiades; in the former of which, the term, used by Plato, is τὸ φῶνων, which we have translated by the word Intelligence, page 320 of that Dialogue: in the latter, Plato's term is ἐγνώσεις, Ours is Wisdom, page 321; which word we have there chosen, because the Intelligence, there spoken of, is That of the Divine Mind.

5 To remember does not here mean a retaining of the Impressions made by Sensible Objects in the Imagination; as it may seem to do from what is said of the Memory hereafter in this Dialogue. For the
whatever is of Kin to them, Right Opinions, and True Reasonings, are better things than Pleasure, and more

the Souls of Brute Animals have this retentive Faculty, as well as those of Men. The Passage now before us hath relation only to the Human Mind. Here therefore is to be understood the Mind's retaining those Mental Objects only, which she had before conceived, by learning from Others, or thro' her own Force and Virtue, as Minerva was said to have been born of Jupiter alone. This account is agreeable to the Definition, given us by the anonymous Writer of the Life of Pythagoras in Photius. Μνήμη μν ἐν ἐς τὰ πάντα ὡς ἐμαχαί τιν. Now Memory, says he, is a Keeping of those Things which a Man has learnt: And still more does it agree with that of Porphyry, in his Ἀριστοκράτης, §. 16. Ἡ μνήμη ὡς ἐς ψυχαίσιν σωφροσ, ἐκακα μελετηζέντων. The Memory is not a Preservation of Fancies, or the Traces of Sensible Objects left in the Imagination, but of Things which have been studied, or to which the Mind has before applied her self. Aristotle includes both Sensible and Mental Objects in the account which he gives of Memory: and his account of it we shall endeavour to explain and justify, in a Note to that Passage of the present Dialogue, above referred to: for we think it a Subject of the last Importance to a Knowlege of the Soul of Man.

That is, of Kin to a Discernment of what is just and right in Morals, founded on what Mr. Hutehson terms the Moral Sense;—of Kin to a Perception of what is true in Metaphysicks, founded on the Principles of Knowlege; and of Kin also to a Memory of what the Mind has either of her Self discerned thro' her own natural Feelings,—or has of her Self perceived thro' her own Principles, the Principles of Knowlege,—or has learnt from Others, who, for the Rectitude
and the Truth of what they taught, must have secretly appealed to those natural Feelings and to those untaught Principles.

7 What the Kindred is between real Knowledge and Right Opinion, —in What they are alike, and in What they differ,—is shown by Plato himself, near the conclusion of his *Meno*.

8 That true Reasonings are of Kin to Knowledge, no Man needs to have it proved to him. They are the ordinary Means, by which every Art receives Improvement; altho' the first Invention of it may be owing to Sagacity, or Chance: and they are the only Means of advancing in any Science, after the first Principles or Axioms of it are established.—Having explained, sufficiently, (it is hoped,) for the present, the Hypothesis, proposed by Socrates, in which he enumerates the principal Affections of the Human Mind; (for we know not by what other common name to call the Impressions, made on the Mind by Mental Objects,—the Depth and Duration of those Impressions,—and her own Energies, or the Motions within her Self, to which those Impressions give Rise;) we presume, that our philosophical Readers will not be displeased at stopping here a while, to observe the just Order of the Parts in this Passage.—

In the first place are ranked the discerning of what is right, and the perceiving of what is true: and these are the Mind's primary and chief Affections; whether they spring up spontaneously therein from Natural Feelings and First Principles, thro' Mental Introspection, Self-Reflection, and untaught Reason, — or whether they are raised by due Culture of the Mind, good Discipline, and wise Instruction.—In the next place stands, what cannot be in the Mind till after the two former, the retaining or remembering of what we have so discerned and felt, so perceived and understood.—After this, come Right Opinions: for these are founded on remembering what we have heretofore discerned and perceived, of Good and Truth, when this remembrance is applied rightly to Actions, or Things, of which we have no certain Knowledge.—Lastly are placed.
more eligible to all Beings universally, that is, to Such as are capable of receiving the participation of them; and that to all Beings, which have that capacity, the actual Partaking of them is of all things the most advanced True Reasonings: and rightly are they placed the last in this List of Mental Affections. For tho the Justice of all Reasoning depends immediately on the self-evident Principles of Mind and of all Science, yet the Truth of what we reason, or prove by reasoning, depends on the Truth of the Premises laid down. For be our Conclusions ever so justly drawn, yet the Premises being always Propositions,—and these Propositions being always, except in Geometrical Reasoning, nothing more than Opinions expressed in Words, the Truth of which is not yet proved, and only taken for granted,—the Truth of the Reasoning depends on the Rectitude of those Opinions.—As to the two Mental Affections, here first mentioned, the Discernment of what is just, and the Perception of what is true, Whether of these Two is, in the Order of Things, of superior dignity to the Other, will appear in the concluding Part of this Dialogue.

9 Or, of receiving a Share in them; for the words of Plato in this place are,—αὐτῶν δυνατά μεταλαβεῖν.

10 Or, the actual holding of a Share; for the word, used here by Plato, is,—μεταξεῖν.—Ficinus is the only one of the Translators from the Greek, who has interpreted this Passage rightly. Cornarius, it seems, discerned no difference between the meaning of μεταλαβεῖν, and that of μεταξεῖν. So that His translation represents Plato as guilty of a most insipid Tautology in this Sentence. Which Error of his seems to have been the consequent of another, committed by him, in his referring the word μεταξεῖν to the preceding
advantageous, not only to those Beings which are, but to those also which are to come. — Do we not, O Philebus!

preceding word δυνατὸς. It is true, that the *Verbal Adjective* δυνατὸς governs, as the Grammarians speak, a *Verb of the Infinitive Mood*: but the Verb, governed by it here, is μεταμορφέων, a word to be understood from the preceding Part of the Sentence. The *Infinitive* μεταμορφέων, in this latter Part of the Sentence, hath the Office of a *Noun Substantive* in the *Nominative Case*; just as sapere has in this Verse of Horace.

Scribendi recte, sapere est & principium & fons.

and the mark of a *comma* should, in like manner, be printed immediately before it in the next Edition of Plato.

"Whatever is good, is certainly advantageous to the Being which enjoys that Good. But no Good can yield any Enjoyment, or be of any Advantage, to the Being to which it reaches, unless such Good be agreeable to the Nature of that Being. — Farther: Whatever is agreeable to the Nature of any Being intelligent and sentient, — that is, to any of its Powers of Perception or Sensation, — is an Object of infinitive Love or Desire to the Being possessed of such Powers. If then the Ways, thro which such an Object reaches to such a Being, are free and unobstructed, — that is, if the Mediums of Perception or Sensation are in a State of agreeableness and fitness to That Being, which is the Subject of this Love or Desire, as well as to That which is the Object, — thro these Ways, and by these Means, the Desire and the Object of it meet together, suited to each other, — the One, disposed to be gratified and to enjoy, — the Other, to gratify and to be enjoyed. — If the Object also of the Desire be either intelligent or sentient, as well as the Being which is the Subject of that Desire, in this case both

F

the
the Beings feel that natural Delight or Pleasure, which arises, thro' all Nature, from the Congress of congenial and corresponding Beings, if they are either intelligent or sentient. — What we principally aim at, in making this last General Observation, will easily be seen in our Notes to the finishing Part of this Dialogue. Our immediate Drift at present is only an Appeal to the Experience of intelligent Readers, for the proof of joys or Delights purely Mental; such as have no relation or reference to the Body; and in which no Corporeal Feeling, present, past, or future, has any Share. We have the assurance also of Reason, that it must be so, and cannot be otherwise. For, as every Animal, or Sentient Soul, naturally desires, pursues, and catches at Sensible Good, so the Rational Soul of Man, when disentangled from Sense, and freed from Passion, naturally loves, follows after, and embraces when found, every Truth, every Intelligible or Mental Good: because Truth is no less agreeable to the Rational Nature, than Sensible Good is to the Animal. —— If then Protarchus, when he took upon himself to be an Advocate for Pleasure, had included, in his Meaning of that word, all such Pleasures as are purely Mental, his Opinion fairly and rightly understood, could not have been different, in the main, from This which Socrates here professes,—that, in every particular case, to discern what is Best in Action, and to perceive what is True in Speculation, is the Chief Good of Man; unless, indeed, it should afterwards come into question, whether of the Two Kinds of Pleasure, the Sensual, or the Mental, was to be preferred. For if it should appear, that in This Point they were Both of the same Mind, the Controversy between them would be found a mere Logomachy, or Contention about Words; such a one, as the Epicureans pretended, (and perhaps with reason,) was between Them and the Stoicks, when They (the Epicureans) maintained, that the true Happiness of Man was placed in that joy or Pleasure, (for they make use of Both these words,) which arises from the habitual Practice of Virtue,
Virtue, and inseparably attends it; while the Stoicks insisted, that it lay in Virtue only, abstracted from all its natural Issue and all its constant Retinue. See Seneca, in Epift: 6, and 13.—A contention This, of the same Kind, as That would be between Two Persons, One of whom asserted, that to a Musical Ear the proper and true Good was Harmony; while the Other contended, that the Good lay not in the Harmony its self, but in the Pleasure which the Musical Ear felt from hearing it:—And, to add another Simile, which, as well as the former, tends to illustrate the concluding Part of this Dialogue, such a Contention is like a Controversy amongst Three Persons, One of whom having asserted, that to all Animals, living under the Northern Frigid Zone, the Sun in Cancer was the greatest Blessing,—and Another of them having asserted, that not the Sun was that chief Blessing to those Northern Animals, but the Warmth which he afforded them,—the Third should imagine, that he corrected or amended the two former Assertions, by saying, that those Animals were thus highly blest, neither by the Sun, nor by the Warmth which his Rays afforded them, but by the Joy or Pleasure which they felt from the Return of the Sun and Warmth. For

Wits, just like Fools, at War about a Name,
Have full as oft no Meaning, or the same.

See Sir William Temple, on the Gardens of Epicurus, in his Misfellanys, Part 2d.

All intelligent and rational Beings are here plainly meant. By Those who are, we suppose are meant Such as are immortal, and always are, Such as in Pagan Language are called Gods: and by Those who shall be, we understand Men, Such rational Beings only, as are born Mortal. See the Sixth of Mr. Petvin’s Letters concerning Mind. What occurs hereafter in this Dialogue confirms the truth of our Supposition.—If then we are not mistaken in the Sense of the Passage now before us, it means, that those
Philebus! You and I, severally lay down some such Hypotheses as These?

Philebus.

Exactly such, O Socrates!

Socrates.

And will You, Protarchus! take up the Controversy, as I have just now stated it?

Protarchus.

Of necessity I must. For Philebus, the Champion of Our Side, is tired and gives out.

Socrates.

Now it is right and proper for us to discover, by all means possible, the full Force and Meaning of Both those Hypotheses; and not to give over, till we have determined the Controversy between them.

Protarchus.

Affections of the Mind, before mentioned, are, above all other things, good and advantageous,—not only to the Gods, who, being invested with Bodys uncompounded, and subject to no Change or internal Motion, feel neither Pain nor Pleasure, in which the Body hath any Share,—but likewise to Men, susceptible of Pain and Pleasure corporeal.—The first Part of this Proposition, That concerning
Protarchus.
I agree with you, it is 13.

Socrates.
Let us agree in This too, besides.

Protarchus.
In What?

Socrates.
That we should, Each of us 14, endeavour to set forth, what State and what Affection 15 of the Soul is able,

concerning the Gods, we shall find agreeable enough to the Sentiments of Socrates, on the supposition of any such Beings as are above described: but the latter Part, That concerning Man, will soon appear to be expressive, not of his real Opinion, but of an Hypothesis, introduced by Him into the Field of Debate, to combat against the opposite one of Philebus; that Both of those Hypotheses being defeated, each by the other, a Third might, without any Opposition, assert a juster Claim to the Matter in Dispute, the Character of being the Chief Good of Man.

13 Use is made of this First Preliminary Article, afterwards in the Course of the Dialogue, both by Socrates and by Protarchus. The Foundation of it we shall find anon to be a prior Engagement, entered into by Socrates himself, during his Dispute with Philebus.

14 The Greek of this Sentence, in all the Editions of Plato, is αὐτῶν ἐκάτερος. But all the Translators interpret, as if they read in the M.SS. ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος; a Reading, which is clearly agreeable to
to the Sense of the Passage, and makes it easier to be understood. In the printed Reading the word αυτων must refer to ηγεων, which is more remote, and has been rather implied than expressed; αυτων κατεργος will then mean the Argument of Each: but to say, the Argument should endeavour, is in a Stile too figurative and bold, to be used by any Prosaic Writer.

15 In the Greek,—ἐξ衫ον καταςεργον.—All the differences between ἐξ ησι and κατὰκατεργον are accurately shown by Aristotle, in his Categories, Cap. 8. and in his Metaphysics, Lib. 4. §. 19. In the Sentence now before us, the difference between them is this;—καταςεργον ἡσον, an Affection of the Soul, is the Soul’s present but transient State;—ἐξ ησι, a State of the Soul, is the Soul’s permanent Affection.—Thus we say of a Man, that he is in a joyous State of Mind, when the Joy, with which he is affected, is of some standing, and is likely to continue: but, of a Man, in whose Soul Joy is just now arisen, we say, that he is seized (that is, affected suddenly) with Joy. And thus again we say, that the Mind is in a thoughtful State, when it has been for some time actually thinking, and is not easy to be diverted from thinking on: but when a Thought arises suddenly within us, in an unthinking State of Mind, and amidst the wanderings of Fancy, we say, that a Thought strikes us, that is, suddenly affects our Mind. It must not, however, be concealed, that ἐξ ησι and καταςεργον, which we have here translated by the words State and Affection, usually mean Habit and Disposition. But the affinity between This their usual Meaning, and That which they have in the Passage now before us, will appear, from considering,—that, as the Soul acquires certain Habits of acting, thro frequently-repeated Acts of the same Kind,—so she is fixed in some certain State, thro frequent Impressions made on her where she is passive, or thro frequent Energys of her own where she is active,—a State, to which those Impressions from without, and those Energys within,
able, according to our different Hypotheses, to procure for every Man a Happy Life. Is it not our Business so to do?

**Protarchus.**

Certainly it is 16.

**Socrates.**

within, gradually lead her;—and also that, in like manner as some certain previous Disposition of the Soul is necessary to every single Act which is voluntary, so is it also necessary to the receiving of every Impression from without, and to the performing of every Energy within.—These Observations will perhaps be of Use to us, in the conclusive Part of this Dialogue.

16 This other Preliminary Article sets the Two Hypotheses in such a Light, as to make it easy to compare them together; and contracts the Controversy between them to this single Point,—What is the Best State of a Man’s Soul, and in What Manner it is Best for him to be affected;—in other words, with What Habit and Disposition of Soul a Man is happiest;—whether with That Habit and That Disposition, which the Enjoyments, so highly extolled by Philebus, create and form within him; or whether with Thofe, which he acquires and possess through the Mental Exercises, recommended by Socrates. That this is the true Light, in which alone the Subject can be rightly viewed, will be found, by considering,—that Happiness can only consist in a certain State or Habit, and in a certain Affection or Disposition, of the Soul; and that Whatever placeth the Soul in this State, or produces in the Soul this Habit,—Whatever affects the Soul in such a manner, as contributes to bring it into this State, or to maintain it therein,—Whatever
difpofeth the Soul to acquire easily this Habit, or advanceth the Progress of the Soul towards it,—Every such Thing is to be ranked in the number of a Man’s Greatest Goods. Whether Happiness be to be found in Speculative Wisdom, or in Pleasure, or in some other Possession or Enjoyment, it can be seated no where but in the Soul. For Happiness has no Existence any where, but where it is felt and known. Now ’tis no less certain, that only the Soul is sensible of Pain and Pleasure, than it is, that only the Soul is capable of Knowledge, and of thinking either foolishly or wisely. To determine therefore the Controversy, whether Speculative Wisdom or Pleasure, constitutes Human Happiness, or is a Man’s Chief Good, it must be thorowly considered and known, How, or in What manner, the Soul is affected by speculating or thinking wisely,—and How, by enjoying Pleasure;—to What Habits these different Affections severally difpose and lead the Soul;—and also, into What State the Soul is brought by a Life of mere Speculation; and into What, by a Life of mere Pleasure. Unless these Points are examined and settled, the Controversy concerning a Man’s Chief Good, can never be determined: which, it was agreed in the First Preliminary, was right and proper to be done. For, without the settling of these Points, every Man’s Opinion of Good will be governed by his own Sentiments, or by what He himfelf takes a Fancy to, and not by the Sentiments or Fancies of any Other Man. Difference of Opinion indeed on every Moral Subject must be endless, without some Standard of Moral Truth be fixed: and on this Subject, of Human Happiness, there can be no true Standard, which agrees not with the Common Sense of all Men, and with Universal Experience. To Common Sense therefore and the Experience of all Mankind an Appeal is to be understood, and tacitly is made, in the whole following Inquiry.

Socrates.
Socrates.

Well then; You say, that 'tis That of rejoicing; We, that 'tis That of understanding and thinking rightly.

Protarchus.

True.

Socrates.

But what if there should appear some Other 17, preferable to Both of these, but more nearly of Kin to Pleasure? Should we not, in this case, be, Both of us, confuted, and obliged to yield the Preference to a Life, which gives the stable Possession of those very Things 18, wherein you place Human Happiness?

17 That is,—some other Life, or some other State of the Soul throughout Life, preferable to That of Speculation, as well as to That of Pleasure; — some other Affection also of the Soul, preferable to any of her Energys, exercis'd in meer Thinking, as well as to any Sensation, which she feels, of meer Pleasure.

18 The last Five words in our Translation of this Interrogatory Sentence, we acknowledge to be not authorized by any words in the Greek. We have added them, by way of explaining, what, in our apprehension, Plato means by ταῦτα, these things, For we suppose them to be the very same things, mentioned by him before, in representing the Opinion of Philebus. And our supposition is founded on this reasoning: — Since Pleasure is generally transient and of short duration, a Life the most nearly of Kin to a Life of Pleasure, but preferable to it, must in all probability be Such a Life, as will fix the Inability of Pleasure, and secure its Continuance.

G How-
However, at the same time it must be agreed, that a Life of Pleasure would be found more eligible than a Life of Knowledge or Intellection.

**Protarchus.**

Without doubt.

**Socrates.**

But if that Better State of the Soul should appear to be more nearly allied to Knowledge, in that case, Knowledge would be found to have the advantage over Pleasure, and Pleasure must give place. Do ye not agree with Me, that these things are so? or how otherwise say ye that they are?

"The Reader will be curious to know, what this Third Kind of Life, or State of the Soul, is, which Socrates here supposes may be found preferable to the other Two Lives, to a Life of Speculation, and to a Life of Pleasure. And since our Author, after he has raised this Curiosity, delays to gratify it, till he proves the Truth of this Third Hypothesis; which is not done, till we arrive at the last Part of the Dialogue; we are willing to prevent the Reader’s Impatience, that he may not gallop over all that is between; by letting him know thus long beforehand, that ’tis a Life of Practical Virtue, but yet preceded by Speculative Wisdom; and that, in such a Life, the State, which the Soul is in, is the Habit, (or having) of Virtue, and a constant Disposition to act with Honesty and Goodness; and constantly attended by Joy, Delight, or Pleasure, of such a Kind, as is stable and durable, as being rational and virtuous.

**Protarchus.**
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

To Me, I must confess, they seem to be, as you represent them.

SOCRATES.

But to Philebus how seem they? What say You, Philebus?

PHILEBUS.

To Me Pleasure seems, and will always seem to be the Superior, whatever it be compared with. And You, Protarchus, will be at length convinced of it, your self.

PROTARCHUS.

After having resigned to Me the Management of the Debate, You can no longer be the Master of What should be yielded to Socrates, and What should not.

PHILEBUS.

You are in the right. But, however, I have discharged my Duty; and I here call the Goddess her Self to witness it.

In defending, to the utmost of his Power, That Cause, the Defence of which he had undertaken,—the Cause of Pleasure; which he here dignifies with the name of the Goddess, whom he supposed to preside over it, that is, Venus. From hence it is evident, what Kind of Pleasure Philebus meant.

G 2

PROTARCHUS.
Phys:bus.

Protarchus.

We too are Witnesses of the same; and can testify your making of the Assertion, which you have just made. But now, as to that Examination, O Socrates! which is to follow after what You and I have agreed in, whether Philebus be willing to consent, or however he may be disposed, let us try to go thro with, and bring to a Conclusion.

Socrates.

By all means, let us; beginning with that very Goddes, who according to Him is called Venus, but whose true name is Pleafure.

Protarchus.

Perfectly right.

Socrates.

21 A stroke of Raillery, this, on the solemn manner, in which Philebus had invoked Pleasure as a Goddes.

22 That is,—to go thro with an examination of the Three Hypotheses, proposed before; and thence to draw our Conclusions, and demonstrate — Which of the Three Lives is, in the order of things good and desirable as Ends, the First,— and Which of them is the Second.

23 That is,—examining in the first place the Hypothesis of Philebus, by inquiring into the nature of Pleasure.

24 The ancient Greek Poets had great authority with all the People of Greece, but with None a greater than with the Sophists: for it was no small part of the business of these Men, to please and
and flatter the People, by supporting their Prejudices or pre-conceived Opinions.—Intelligent Readers of Homer need not be told, that Venus, in his Iliad, the Deity who presides over the Mysteries of Love, is that Power in Nature, which attracts the Two Sexes to each other, couples them together, and produces mutual Pleasure from their mutual Embraces.—Some of the Poets, who came after Homer, mean by Venus the same attractive Power; as, for instance, Sappho in her elegant Ode to that Goddes, and Euripides in his Hippolytus.—Others of them personify, by the name of Venus, the σωφροσύνη, the Venerable Congress its self, or the mere Pleasure felt therein; as, for instance, Minnervmus in these celebrated Verses of his—

Τις δὲ χάρις, τις τε τεχνίαν, ἄτερ κρυσέως Ἀφροβίς;
Τεχνίαν, ἄτε μὲν μικράτα παῦτα μέλες.

In citing which lines, some ancient Authors give us the word βίος, instead of χάρις. To include the Meaning of both these words, we have thus paraphrased the Distick;—

Where grows a Pleasure, not in Venus’ Reign?
Where smiles a Grace, not One of Venus’ Train?
In Venus’ Blessings, when I lose my Share,
Let me not live;—Life is not worth my Care;
It is not Life, to live unblest by Her.

This latter Venus, this Goddes of Philebus, was by the Roman People worshipped under the name of Venus Volupta: and accordingly Lucretius, in the beginning of his fine Poem, where he imitates the first Lines in Homer’s longer Hymn to Venus, invokes that Goddes, as hominum divnumque voluptas; and in Lib. 2, v. 172, hails her dux vitae, dia voluptas.—And indeed, thus to deify Sensual Pleasure, is not disagreeable to the Orphic System of Theology; one Part of which attributed Divinity to every Virtue, Force, or Power, whether active or passive, in every Being throughout.
throughout nature, whether rational, animal, or merely vital; calling them all ἐγκέκλημα ζῶν, Mundane Deitys, tho of different Ranks and Orders, according to the natural Dignity of the Being, possessed of such Forces, Powers, or Virtues. The other Part of this ancient Theological System of the Universe (for the best way to understand thoroughly all Parts of it, is to divide it first into Two,) considered, as more eminently and in a higher sense Divine, those things only which are divine by nature, inasmuch as they are eternal, and the Causes of those several Virtues, Powers, and Forces, which are possessed by all the Individuals of every Sort and Kind, in their natural and sound State. These divine Causes were called by the Orphic Theologers ὑπεξεισόμει ζῶοι, Supra-Mundane Deitys, ranked according to the Dignity of those Virtues, Powers, or Forces, of which they are the Causes. And considering farther, that all those Causes, whether Formal or Efficient, whether Intelligible or Intellec3ive, meet together and con- centre in The One universal and divine Mind, they held the Unity of this Supreme Cause of All things. — But, as they supposed or pretended, that the Bulk of Mankind or the Multitude, being under a necessity of living a Life wholly outward and sensual, without leisure to look into Themselves, were little capable of apprehending the nature of those Divine Causes, — and still less so, the nature of that Cause of Causes, the μέτεγέν µετὲρ, καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τα, Mind its Self,— they declined troubling the Vulgar with these Mysteries of Nature; and framed a Religion, suited to Vulgar Apprehensions; exhibiting to them, for Objects of their Worship, Images and other Representations (Some, proper and naturally expressive, Others, figurative, symbolical, or allegorical) not only of those external things which they saw, heard, and felt, and of whose Powers and Virtues they had experience, — but even of those truly Divine Causes, the eternal Ideas of the Supreme Mind, inconceivable (as perhaps...
They might imagine) by the Sensual Populace, who seem to have no communication with them, and know of no Ideas superior to their own.—In evidence of this, it will be sufficient to cite the Testimony of Varro, the most learned of all the Romans: his words are these;—Apud Samothraces, multis indiciis collegi, in simulacris aliud significare caelum, aliud terram, aliud exempla rerum, quas (1. quae) Plato appellat ideas. caelum cuin Jupiter, terra Juno, Ideae Minerva intelligitur: caelum, quo fiat aliquid; terra, de qua fiat; exemplum, secundum quod fiat. Thus Varro apud Augufiinum de Civ. Dei, L. 7. Cap. 28. — 'Tis indeed highly probable, that the Chief Priests of the Orphic Religion, thro whose Hands in succession were transmitted the Secrets of it, communicated those Secrets to a few Others; chiefly to the Governors amongst the People, Such as they deemed worthy of being ἀλεξάνδρη, perfected in the Mysteries of Nature, and instructed in the deep Meaning of the ἱερεῖ λόγος, and the other Orphic Verses. But the rest of the People, the Governed, were all the while kept in the most brutifh ignorance of the Divine Nature by their Priests and Statesmen, whose Political Maxims in point of Religion are expressed by Varro in these words, as they are delivered to us by the old Bishop of Hippo in his work above cited;—Multa sunt vera, quae non modo vulgo seire non et utilis, sed etiam, tametsi falsa sint, alter existimare populum expedat. Et ideò Graeci teletas, ac mysteria, taciturnitate parietibusque clauserunt.—“ Many things are true (in nature) which it is not only of no use to the Vulgar to have the Knowlege of, but even tho they (i. e. the common Opinions concerning them) should be false, it is expedient that the People should believe them true. And for this reason have the Greeks concealed their secret doctrines in silence, and inclosed with walls their religious mysteries.” — To the Orphic Divines succeeded the Pythagorean Philosophers; who, as they
they followed the former in their Tenets, pursued a like Method of handing down those Tenets to Posterity; in delivering them to all their Disciples at first thro Symbols and Enigmas, and in revealing afterwards the naked Truth to a chosen Few, Such as they deemed fit to be entrusted with it.—But Socrates used a Method of teaching, quite different, a Method, suitable to his Mind,—simple, yet comprehensive, like the Mind of Nature,—plain and clear, tho sublime and deep, like those πατηματικα συμβόλα, the First Principles of Things. He neither concurred with the Political Priests and the Statesmen, in keeping the People ignorant of those truly Divine Things, which of All things it most concerns All men to be acquainted with; nor did he follow the example of the Orphic Theologers and the Pythagoreans, in delivering his Doctrine, explicitly indeed to Some, but figuratively and obscurely to a much greater Number. His Disquisitions were carried on openly, in Places the most frequented by the Publick, to be heard by every Man who chose to hear; and the Subjects of them were always either Such, as related immediately to Morals and Politicks, or else Such, as laid the only solid Foundation of those Sciences in the Science of Mind, that is, in the Science of Things eternal and divine. Laying aside all Inquiries into Nature, considered merely as Corporeal,—or into the Mechanical Forces, by which some Bodys attract or repel, move forward, retard or turn aside, generate, nourish or destroy, change, vary, or in any way affect Other Bodys,—as being, if rightly considered, all of them only passive, mere instruments in the hands of active, intelligent, and designing Nature, whose secret ways, after all our Searches, are past finding out,—and many of them being also instruments in the hands of Human Artists,—he did not acknowledge true Divinity in any of these Bodys or Natural Things themselves, nor in any of those blind Powers or Forces, with which they are invested by the Laws of Nature. Now
Socrates.

The Fear 25, which I have always in me, concerning the proper Names of the Gods 26, is no ordinary Kind

Now seeing that One of these Powers in Things corporeal, the Objects of Sense, is That of producing Sensual Pleasure in Sentient Beings, on the occasions mentioned in Note 11, Socrates could not, consistently with himself, admit such a Pleasure, or the Power which immediately produced it, to be, either of them, truly Divine.

25 Meaning possibly That Kind of Fear, which always attends on Reverential Awe,—the Fear of doing or saying any thing wrong, in the opinion of Those whom we honour.—But we rather think, it means That rational or prudential Fear, which is necessary to guard us against Evils in our own Power to prevent, by using due Care and Precaution. See the next Note.

26 That is, Names, significant of their Natures.—It is indeed possible, that Socrates might here allude to that vulgar Superstition, Instances of which occur often in the ancient Poets,—a Fear of displeasing the Gods, in giving them Names or Titles offensive to them. But the Philosopher's own Mind was far superior to such religious Fancies: and yet he appears to be very serious in this Sentence. We presume therefore, that he means a Fear of mistaking the Divine Nature: for to have right Notions of This, is of the utmost importance to Private as well as Public Virtue: to entertain any Error concerning it, diminishes the Happiness of Human Life: and if the Error be Capital, as it is, if what is opposite to the Divine Nature be taken for it, such an Error is utterly destructive of all Virtue and all Happiness.
of Fear; it surpaßeth the greatest Dread, to which the Soul in any other case is subject. Hence in the present

27 That is, — not usual or common amongst Mankind, — not incident to ordinary Men. — See Dr. Forster's 1st Index to his Edition of Five Dialogues of Plato, where he cites this very Passage.

28 For the Objects of Fear to ordinary Men, such as are of meaner Rank, and governed by their Passions and ignorant of their true Selves, are only things, which threaten Evil to their Bodys, chiefly Death, extreme Poverty, and great Corporeal Pain. To Those of higher Rank, the great Vulgar, governed mostly by a Sense of Honour, but as ignorant of Themselves as the meaner Sort, the Objects of Fear are not only Such, as are just now mentioned, but also, and principally, the Loss of that Honour which is given to them by Others; because on this Honour depend all the Advantages, which they have beyond the Vulgar, in Outward Life. But as all these Advantages, together with the Life itself in which they are found, appeared in the eyes of Socrates but Trifles, when compared with Mental or with Moral Good, so he considered the Loss of them as comparatively but a trifling Loss. He knew, that all Mental and all Moral Good depended on the Stability of Knowledge and of Virtue; — that the Stability of Virtue depended on the Knowledge of Good and Evil; — and that the Stability of all Knowledge depended on the Principles of Mind, the Cause of all Truth and of all Good; — that these Principles therefore were of all things the most Divine; — that consequently to err concerning These, was to err concerning the Divine Nature; and that an Error of this Kind must be fatal to the Mind of any Man, to all his Knowledge and
and to all his Virtue. Such Errors were the sole Objects of Fear to the Mind of Socrates.—Farther; as the Vehemence of any Man’s Fear must always be in proportion to his Sense of the Importance of its Object;—and as no Object of the Multitude’s Fear can, even to Them, appear of Importance equal to That of the Object of the Philosopher’s Fear, as it appeared to Him, —Plato uses no Exaggeration or Hyperbole in the Sentence now before us.—The Accuracy of the principal Terms, or Nouns, in this Sentence, is also very remarkable. The former, which we have translated Fear, in the original is δέος: the latter, which in our translation is Dread, in the original is φόβος. Now φόβος always means an irrational Passion, seizing the inferior Soul, without being authorized by Reason to do. And accordingly, the Stoicks number it amongst the Passions or Perturbations of the Soul, and define it by ἄλογος ἐκκλίασθε irrational or blind Assent. See Mr. Harris’s Note 48. to the Third of his Three Treatises. Δέος is by some old Grammarians distinguished from φόβος in this point only,—that the latter means a Fear which suddenly seizes the Soul, on the Opinion of Evil imminent or at hand; and the former, a constant or settled Fear of Evil remote. This we believe a true, but not the only true, distinction between φόβος and δέος. For, besides their difference with respect to their length of time, and to the apparent distance of their Objects, they seem to differ in the nature of their Objects, and in the nature also of the Beings, subject to those Passions.—The Objects of φόβος are whatever things we imagine to be evil, or from which we may receive Evil, whether they be animate, as Sharks and Tygers, Banditti and Tyrants, or inanimate, as Fires and Earthquakes, Famine and Pestilence. The Objects of δέος are Beings whom we deem superior to our selves, either in Wisdom, or in Knowledge, or in Authority. In proof of this, see the Passages, cited out of Homer by Plutarch in Vita Cleomenis, pag.
So, in Plato's *Theaetetus*, pag: 189, σέσος is opposed to καταφερόω. — The Subjects of φίλες are all Brute Animals, and Man also, in as much as he partakes of Soul irrational. The Subjects of δέος are Human Beings only; unless there be in some Brute Animals an Instinct equivalent to Reason, so far as to inspire them with a Reverence for Man, as a Being by nature Superior to them in Sagacity and Counsel. This Kind of Fear, or reverential Awe, we see in Children toward their Parents, in the Younger toward the Advanced in Age, in Disciples toward their Masters, in Subjects toward their Magistrates and Princes, and in the People of all Countrys toward the Objects of their religious Worship. Of this rational Kind was the Fear, which Socrates says he had in him continually: but of all the rational Kind, This of Socrates was the most rational, — as not only deriving its first Origin from Reason, or the Rational Principle within him, which he had cultivated more rightly perhaps than any other Man,—but as having also the Sanction of that cultivated Reason to approve it,—and indeed taking its immediate Rise from a just Sentiment of what is really evil to the Soul of Man, together with a Sense of the great Danger of a Man's falling into it,—a Sense, productive of that Caution, which effectually secures a Man against it; because Real Evil is always in a Man's own Power to avoid. This Kind of Fear the Stoicks defined by εὐλαβεία εὐκλείας Rational Aversion; but to avoid using the word Fear, they termed it Caution; thus confounding the Cause with the Effect, or the Sentiment with the Energy which it produces.—What confirms the Account, given in this Note, of the δέος of Socrates, is the Definition, given us by Andronicus of Rhodes in his Treatise περὶ πατόρ, of One of the Two Species, into which he divides εὐλαβεία Caution; from which it appears to be the very same with the δέος, here professed by Socrates: for it is this,—εὐλαβεία τῶν περὶ θεῶν ἄμαστημάτων,
present case with regard to Venus 29, whatever Name be agreeable to the Goddess, by That would I chuse to

Caution to avoid Errors about God. If it be objected, that by αμαζωμάτων in this definition, Speculative Errors concerning the Nature of the Divine Being are not meant, but Practical or Moral Offences against God;—we reply, First, that the very Distinction, made in this Objection, is founded on One of the most Capital Errors concerning the Divine Nature. For that, on this Subject, there is no Opinion, which is merely Speculative, or which has not a necessary Influence on Practice; as we hope to make apparent in our Notes to the latter Part of this Dialogue. — And farther we reply, that this continual Fear, this constant Apprehension of Danger, in the Mind of Socrates, had a View to nothing but the Integrity of his own Life and Manners. For if ever any Man was, Socrates was One of the peccare timentes,—Those who fear to do amiss,—spoken of by Horace, in Epist. ad Pisonem, v. 197. Indeed, 'tis evident, that he feared nothing else: and he knew, that το σειαων, the nature of Universal Justice, was materially the same thing with το ὅσιον, the nature of Sanctity; or, as Andronicus terms it, ἀγνεώς, Purity; agreeably to This of Sophocles,—ἐσεπτών ἀγνεών λόγον, "Εγών τε πάντων — Religious Purity of all my Words, and Actions. Soph. in Oedip: Tyr. v. 884.—Those of our Readers, who are conversant with Plato, well know, that he frequently puts ὅσιον καὶ σειαων together in the Mouth of Socrates. See likewise Notes 287, and 301, to the First Alcibiades.

29 What the Orphic Theologers meant by the allegorical Deity of Venus, is explained towards the End of Note 94 to the Banquet. And how highly Socrates Himself thought of this Venus, the
to call her. But as to Pleasure, how vague and various a thing it is, I well know. And with This, as I just now said, ought we to begin; by considering and inquiring into the nature of Pleasure, first. For we hear it called indeed by One single Name, as if it were One simple Thing: it assumes, however, all sorts of Forms, even such as are the most unlike, one to another. For observe; we say, that the Intemperate Man has Pleasure; and that the Temperate Man has Pleasure also,—Pleasure in being what he is, that is, Temperate. Again; we say, that Pleasure attends on Folly, and on the Man who is full of foolish Opinions and foolish Hopes; that Pleasure attends also on the Man who thinks wisely,—Pleasure in that very Mental Energy, his thinking wisely. Now any Person, who would affirm these Pleasures to be of similar Kind, would be justly deemed to want Understanding.

Protarchus.

The Pleasures, which You mention, O Socrates! are indeed produced by Contrary Causes; but in the

the Beauty of Nature, in its perfect Original at least, — in That Mind, of which Outward Nature is (as it were) the Image,—appears from what he says in the Person of Diotima, page 160 of that Dialogue.

39 See general Proofs of This, near the beginning of Note 3.
Pleasures themselves there is no Contrariety. For how should Pleasure not be similar to Pleasure, its Self to its Self, the most similar of all things 31?

SOCRATES.

Just so, Colour too, my Friend, differs not from Colour, in this respect, that 'tis Colour, All 32. And yet we, All of us, know, that Black, besides being different from White, happens to be also its direct Contrary. So Figure too is all One with Figure, after

31 This was the very Language, or manner of expression, used by a Sect of Philosophers, called Cyrenaicks, from Cyrene, the native City of Aristippus, their Master. For the Cyrenaicks held, says Laertius, μὴ διαφέρειν ἡσόν ἡσόν, that Pleasure differs not from Pleasure. Whence it appears probable, that Philebus derived his Notions and Expressions on this Point from Some of the Disciples of Aristippus, if not from Aristippus himself. For this Philosopher, after he had for some time conversed with Socrates, for the sake of whose Conversation he came to Athens, departed thence, and went to Εγίνα; where he professed the Teaching of Philosophy, and where he resided till after the Death of Socrates.

32 That is,—as the Translations of Ficinus and Cornarius rightly explain it,—every Colour is a Colour. For Colour is a General Thing, a Quality of all Bodys visible, the Nature of which Quality All the Species of Colour, and the infinite Degrees and Mixtures of them All, partake of. See Notes 14 and 26 to the Μήνα.
after the same manner, in the General. But as to the Parts of that One General Thing, Some are directly Contrary to Others; and between the rest there happens to be a Kind of infinite Diversity. And many other things we shall find to be of this Nature. Believe not then this Position, that Things the most Contrary are all of them One. And I suspect, that we shall also find Some Pleasures quite contrary to Other Pleasures.

Protarchus.

It may be so. But how will That hurt My Side of the Question?

Socrates.

33 See Note 31 to the Meno.

34 Socrates had here, probably, a View in general to the Doctrine of the old Physiologers, All of whom, says Aristotle, held that the World was compos'd from Contrary Principles; — not such Principles, as Form and Matter: for, to speak properly, Matter is not contrary to Form, but is quite otherwise, easily recipient of all Forms, and gives not the least opposition to any Form whatever. That, which is often called the Stubbornness or Untractableness of a Subject-Matter is in fact the Stubbornness of some adhesive Form, which then invests it, and is not easily made to quit its Hold, and give way to Another, a new Comer: — not such Principles neither, as those of Democritus, Solid Body and Empty Space; which are no otherwise opposed to each other, than as Something is opposed to Nothing, or Being in general to
Non-Being: as may appear on comparing what Aristotle says of them in his Physicks, Lib. 1, Cap. 6, where he is pleased to call them Contrarys, with his own account of Contrarys in his Treatise on the Categories, Cap. 11.—Nor yet by Contrary Principles did the more ancient Physiologers mean Identity and Diversity: for these are so far from contending with each other, as Contrary Things do when they meet, that they exist amicably together always in every Form of Nature, and together constitute the very Essence of Mind: inasmuch as without both of them united, no particular Forms ever could exist; nor could Mind, or Form universal, whether considered as Intelligent, or as Intelligible, ever have a Being. — By Contrary Principles they plainly meant Contrary Powers in the Nature of Things;—Powers, perpetually at Variance, but controlling each of them its Contrary, and each of them by its Contrary controlled: thro' which mutual Contest, and Equality of Strength in the contesting Powers, every Part was kept in Equilibrium, and the Whole preserved firm and intire. Now this Whole, consisting thus of Contrary Parts, they call'd One Thing; how justly we shall see anon, when we are led by Plato more deeply into the Subject. — But the present Passage seems to have an especial reference to certain Positions of Heraclitus in particular. For, if Aristotle has given a just representation of them, they were such as these;—that the same Definition suited Contrary Things; and that Contradictory Propositions were both of them true:—that therefore Contrary Things had one and the same Essence; and Contrarietys, or Contrary Qualities, belonged to one and the same Thing:—whence it followed, that one and the same Thing might be both Good and Evil; and farther, that Good and Evil were the same Thing. See Aristotle: Physic: L. 1. C. 3. Topic: L. 8. C. 5. & Simplic: Comment: in Physic: fol: 18. a.—And that Plato and Aristotle may not be thought to have mis-represented any Sentences or Words of Heraclitus,
Heraclitus, expressive of Notions so absurd, if understood strictly and literally, it is certain, that those absurd Notions were attributed to Heraclitus by Many Persons: as we learn from Sextus: Empiricus, pag: 53. Edit. Lips. For this able Advocate for the Doctrine of Pyrrho mentions it as a main Objection, made against that Doctrine, that it led the way to the Doctrine of Heraclitus; as if, from perceiving in the same Thing those Contrary Appearances, which render the real Essence of it and the Truth concerning it uncertain, it was an easy Transition to pronounce dogmatically, that in the same Thing Contrarieties really met, and Contradictory Positions were Both of them indubitably true. Now it seems strange, how any man, not wholly unacquainted with the Character of Heraclitus, which sufficiently appears from his Epistles extant, could ever imagine him to have held Tenets, so inconsistent with the Principles of Wisdom and Goodness: much less can we think it possible, that Plato and Aristotle so greatly mistook the true Meaning of his obscure Writings. However, we think it probable, that the Authority of these Two great Philosophers led into this Mistake many Persons, who understood not Their Manner of teaching, from a want (perhaps) of such a Greatness of Soul, as begat and formed in Them that Manner. Both of them appear inspired with the Love of Truth alone; superior, on the one hand, to a blind Reverence for Those who preceded them in the Study of Wisdom,—superior also, on the other hand, to that Spirit of Detraction, (however often they have been accused of it,) thro which, Men of Little Souls aim at establishing their own Reputation on the Ruin of that of Others. Accordingly they, Both of them, speak with great Respect of all the prior Philosophers; assuming, and transplanting into their own Systems, the Doctrines which originally sprang from Them; at the same time, that they treat their inaccurate Expressions and crude Conceptions with great Freedom, to guard their own Disciples
Disciples from being mis-led by the authority of Great Names. Happy had it been for the philosophizing Part of mankind, had their Successors followed them in this their Manner.—For Proof of this in the Case now before us, we refer to a *Dissertation on the Doctrine of Heraclitus*, lately published.—But however probable it is, that *Plato* in this Passage alludes to the common Doctrine of all the ancient Physiologers, or to the supposed Notions of *Heraclitus* in particular, yet there is reason to think, from what follows in the introductory Part of the Dialogue, that he had more immediately in his View certain *Logical Sophisms*, introduced among the Athenian Youth by some of the Scholars of *Zeno* the *Eleatic*, Such as *Pythodorus* and *Callias*. For *Parmenides* of *Elea*, having discovered the *Principles* of all Reasoning to be *Unity* and *Multitude*, *Sameness* and *Difference*; and having thus raised the Theory of Reason into a *Science*; imparted his Discovery to *Zeno* his Countryman. And *Zeno*, being a Man of a most acute and subtle Wit, on That *Science* built the *Art* of Logick or *Dialectic*. He contrived Rules, according to which all Rational Argumentation ought to proceed;—Rules, to regulate Logical Debates,—to restrain a wandering from the Subject,—to keep close to the very Point in Question, by distinguishing the nature of it from other things, which in some respects resemble it, and may be easily mistaken for it,—to guard against the being deceived by Fallacys and all erroneous Argumentation, whether wilful or undesigned, on the Part of the *Questioner*,—and on the Part of the *Respondent*, to make his Answers with Simplicity, and Strictness, and without Prevarication. These Rules were afterwards augmented and improved by *Socrates*, in his daily Exercise of conversing on philosophical Subjects, either with *Sophists* or with his own *Disciples*. *Plato* has, in his Dialogues, exemplified these Rules, and appears to have practically brought them to Perfection: and *Aristotle* has, in his Logical Treatises, methodically
In that You call them, dissimilar as they are, by another Name; (shall we say?) for all pleasant things You call good. Now that all pleasant things are pleasant, admits of no Dispute. But tho many of them

and scientifically committed them to Writing, with the utmost Subtilty, Acutenfs and Precision, yet at the same time with the most compleat Comprehensiveness, and all the Perspicuity which so abstracted a Subject will admit of.

35 In the Greek,—ἐνίεν ἰγον ἱματιν. That is,—by another Name, common to them all, beside That of Pleasure.—The word ἰγον,—shall we say?—is, without reason, as it seems to Us, suspected by H. Stephens and many Others not to be genuine. We suppose it used here interrogatively, and implying a Doubt in the Mind of Socrates, whether Protarchus would call the Term Good a Name or Noun Substantive, (that is to say,—a Noun, denoting a Substance,) as well as the Term Pleasure; or whether he used the Term good as an Epithet or Attributive only, denoting an Attribute of some Substance. In order to understand the Difference, on which this seeming Doubtfulness is founded, it may be useful to observe, in the first place, that Attributes of Substances, or, in other words, the Propertys, Accidents, Conditions, and Circumstances of Beings, are found in Every one of the Nine Categories, into which is divided (as Mr. Harris very justly says, in his Philosophical Arrangements, B. 1. Ch. 2,) Attribute in general.—For instance; the Attributes, pleased, delighted, joyous, denote certain Feelings, Sensations, or Sentiments, attributed, Some of them, to Beings merely Sentient, Others, to Beings which are also Rational; and the Attributes, denoted by those Terms,
rank under the Category of Passion; for they are Attributes of a Soul, moved or affected in a particular manner. But the Attributes, pleasant, delightful, and others of like Kind, denote certain Facultys or Powers, belonging to Things not within our Selves, often to Things Inanimate and merely Corporeal, as Colours, Sounds, and Odours,—such Powers in Them, as are able to excite delightful or pleasing Sensations in all Sentient Beings: now these Powers, which we rightly attribute to those External Things, rank under the Category of Quality.—Let it be observed, in the next place, that every Attribute of Substance, under whatever Category it ranks, every Property, Accident, Condition, or Circumstance of Being, by abstracting it in our Minds from the Subject to which it is attributed, (to borrow the elegant expression of Mr. Harris in his Hermes, B. i. Ch. 4,) we convert even into a Substance. Thus from every pleasing Sensation, Sentiment, Feeling, or Affection, by a Creation as it were of our own, arises in our Minds the abstract Form of some particular Pleasure. And from many particular Pleasures, of whatever Kind or Kinds they may be, as many as we have conceived the Notions of, assembled together and united in our Minds, we form a general Idea of it, Pleasure. And thus again, we abstract the Powers of exciting Delight, or Pleasure, from the Things invested with such Powers, and comprehend them in One General Idea, to which we give the Name of τὸ ἀρ�, or τὸ ἀρτιβόλον, The Plesant, or The Delightful.—In applying the observations above made, and the Instance just now produced, to the Attributive Term good, we are to remark, that this Term has a double signification. For it is often used to denote some Quality in the Substances or Things themselves, to which it is attributed, whether they be natural or artificial,—a Quality, respecting the End for which they were designed by Nature or by Man. In natural Substances, good Corn is Corn good for Food; a good Horse is a Horse good to carry, or to draw; and
and a *good Man* is a Man endowed with *quality*, fitting him for the *ends* of his being: in things *artificial*, *good bricks* are bricks good for *building*; and a *good house* is a house fit for the *habitation* of those, for whose habitation it was built. The same attributive term often also denotes a *quality* or *power*, in outward things, by which, when they are possessed, used, or enjoyed by us, they contribute to our *well-being*;—a power, with which they are invested, thro' a *fitness* of their nature to some part of our own. Now such *qualities*, *powers*, and *fitnesses* in them, are by us called *good*, with respect only to our selves; as they are the *means*, the mediate or instrumental causes, of something desirable to us.—Taking the attributive term *good* in the former of these two significations, and abstracting the *quality*, denoted by it, from the *subject* in which the quality inheres, such quality, thus abstracted, we term *goodness*;—the goodness of that being, to which we ascribe it:—and if the *subject* be a *living* or actively *substance*, such abstract quality is also termed *virtue*. —Note, that in all these cases, by the terms *goodness* and *virtue* is meant the natural or right and proper state, habit, or constant *disposition* of some particular being. And because the natural and right state of a man's *soul* is a constant disposition to embrace truth, to act honestly, and to do good to all, evil to none, such a disposition is the *virtue* or *goodness* of a man. —From the *goodness*, by which individual good beings are good, —a goodness relative only to the design and end of each particular nature,—a goodness confined and partial,—we attain, thro' induction, to some idea of goodness absolute, extensive as being its self, and *universal*. —But if we take the attributive term *good*, in its other sense,—in that, which it evidently presents to us in the passage now before us, namely, for a *quality* or *power*, not in our selves, but in other beings or substances, whether they be natural, artificial, or abstract, (of the latter of
of which three Kinds is Pleasure,) — a Quality or Power, by which they are conducive to our Well-Being,—this Quality of theirs, considered in its First Abstract, or as immediately separated by the Mind from the Being or Substance to which is attributed, is not our Good in the general; neither is it our Greatest or Chief Good; but simply a Good, that is, some Particular Thing, conducive to our Well-Being.—It is from Many of these Particular Things, which are Good for Us, collected together and united in our Minds, that we acquire the Idea of our own Good in general;—an Idea, in which are comprehended all the Kinds of Good relative to our Selves: It is from comparing together these different Goods relative to our Selves, that we form a Judgment, Which of them all is our Greatest Good, or the Best for Us, according to the Experience we have of those several Goods, joined to the Knowledge we have of our own Nature.—Good therefore, in the Abstract, considered as relative only to our Selves, signifies either some one Particular Species of what is good for us,—or the Whole of our Good, comprehending all its Species,—or That, among the several Species of our Good, which is the Chief and Greatest.—Now the First or immediate Abstract of any Quality or other Attribute, being only the Attribute, considered (ἀνεγέρθαι) apart from its Subject, has the very same Meaning with the Attribute, considered, as actually it is, in its Subject.—Admitting therefore, that the Quality or Attribute good belongs to Pleasure in general, (and This is acknowledged by Socrates himself before the End of the Dialogue,) if we consider this Attribute of Pleasure in the Abstract, we find, that 'tis only one Particular Good, namely, Pleasure;—a Good, relative only to the Sensive Soul, which is only a Part of the Human Nature. Since there is then no real Difference of Meaning between good the Attributive Term, and Good the Substantive, when used in this Sense, Socrates could have no Objection to the Use
Use of either indifferently on this occasion. But if by the 
Noun or Substantive Term Good in this place we understand 
either the Chief Good of Man, or his Good in the general, the 
Whole Genus of Human Good, it makes a great Difference, 
whether, in calling Pleasure Good, we use the Attributive Term, 
or the Substantive. For if by the Substantive Good the Whole of 
Human Good is meant, if Socrates here doubts whether Pro-
tarchus meant it so, and if Protarchus should avow This to be 
his Meaning, it follows, that in His Opinion, the Terms Pleasure 
and Good might be used reciprocally, and that Either might be 
affirmed of the Other; for that, to Man Pleasure is Good, and 
Good is Pleasure. But whether the Whole, or the Chief and Greatest, 
Good of Man be meant by Protarchus, the Article τo, The, 
should here, as well as before in stating the Matter in Dispute, 
to state it rightly, have been prefixed to the Substantive Term 
Good. This is a just Remark, made by Aristotle: for he seems 
to have had this Dialogue in view, in his Prior Analytike, L. i. 
C. 40, where he observes, that the Terms ἄγαθὸν and τὸ ἄγαθὸν, 
Good and The Good, in syllogising, ought not to be used indif-
ferently; but that, Which soever of the Two conveys the 
Speaker’s Meaning, That alone should be made use of and ad-
hered to. See Part of this Passaige in Aristotle, to which we 
refer, cited by Mr. Harris in his Hermes, B. 2. Ch. i. We do 
not, in seconding this Remark, mean to charge Plato with 
a want of Precision or Accuracy in this respect; neither do we 
think that Aristotle, in making the Remark, had any such In-
tention. We apprehend, on the contrary, that Aristotle was in-
depted, for so just a Criticism, to his thorough Acquaintance with 
Plato’s manner of Dialogue-writing. He well knew, that this 
Great Matter in that Species of Composition, always attributed 
to every Person in his Dialogues whatever was proper and pec-
culiar to the Character,
not only in the *Sentiments*, but even in the *Diētion*. He must have perceived, that, in the present case, 'twas the intention of *Plato* to charge *Philebus*, and Others of the same *Sect*, with a loose and sophistical way of reasoning on the Subject of *Good*. For they appear to have used the Fallacy of changing a *Particular* Term for a Term which is *Universal*, or *vice versā*, by the fly insertion or omission of the definite Article *The* before the word *Good*. With this View has *Plato* in the Beginning of this Dialogue, where *Socrates* states the Opinion of *Philebus* concerning the *Chief Good of Man*, omitted the Article τὸ, *The*, before the word *Good*; as appears from a literal translation of that Passage, to be seen in Note 3. That 'twas omitted *purposely*, to imitate *Philebus*, and to represent him as having, in his Panegyrics on Pleasure, made the same omission *fallaciously*, appears, we think, from the very word, which has given occasion for this long Note. The Interrogative ὃς ἦν; *shall we say?* shows, that *Socrates*, discovering the Fallacy of *Protarchus*, tried to bring him to declare openly his secret Meaning, and to avow, that Pleasure was, in his Opinion, τὸ ἄγαρδιν *The Good* of Man, that is, either the Whole of his Good, or his Chief Good. For the Article, τὸ, *The*, prefixed to an *Attributive* Term, is always equivalent to the Abstract Substantive, in its General Idea; it means the Ideal Perfection of the *Attribute*, or the *Excellence* of it in its own Kind. Thus, *The White* means either Whiteness its Self, or *purely* white: *The Round* means either Roundness its Self, or perfectly round: *The Beautiful* means either Beauty its Self, or absolutely and completely beautiful: and τὰ ἄγαδιν, *The Good*, without a particular reference to Man, either means Good its Self; comprehending all the *Kinds* of Good, or else it means *perfectly* and purely good, etc.
them are evil, and many indeed good, as I readily acknowledge, yet All of them You call Good; and at the same time, you confess them to be dissimilar in without deficiency, and without the least mixture of any Evil. (In how sublime a Sense the Platonicks use the word ἄγαθόν, and indeed Plato himself in his Republic and elsewhere, we shall have occasion to observe in the Notes to the latter Part of the present Dialogue.) By Analogy therefore, in this Dialogue, (where, as Proclus, in his Commentary on Plato's Republic, pag: 426, rightly observes, it is obvious for Every one to discern, that the Subject of Inquiry is not—to ἀπλὸς ἄγαθόν, What is simply or absolutely The Good; but τὸ ἐν ἦμιν ἄγαθόν, What is the Good of Man,—
tὸ μετέχτων ἄγαθόν, The Good, which Man partakes of;) the Substantive Noun Good, the spoken absolutely, means either the Whole of Human Good, or, at least, That which so greatly excels the rest of Human Goods, as to be justly filled, by way of eminence, The Good, i.e. relative to Man. — It will appear, however, in the last Part of this Dialogue, that The simply and absolutely Good, Good its Self, is the Cause of Good to every Being,—is the Good of the whole Universe,—and is the Sovereign Good of Man in particular. It will appear likewise, that this Good its Self, this Cause of all Good, this Good Universal, co-incides with The Good in the first-mentioned Meaning of the word Good; for that 'tis Goodness absolute and perfect, Goodness its Self; that 'tis the Cause of whatever Goodness or Virtue any Particular Being is endued with; in fine, that 'tis Goodness Universal, as extensive and comprehensive as Universal Being.

Socrates here, by the words evil and good, evidently means evil and good to the Whole Man. For, that Pleasure is the only Good, and Pain the only Evil of all Animals, considered merely as
in their natures, when a man forces you to this confession. What then is That, the Same in every Pleasure, in the evil Pleasures equally with the good, from which you give to all Pleasures the denomination of Good?

**Protarchus.**

What is That, O Socrates! which You say? Do you imagine, that any person, after having asserted, that Pleasure is the Good of Man, will admit your Supposition? or will suffer it to pass uncontradicted, that only Some Pleasures are good, but that Other Pleasures are evil?

**Socrates.**

as *Sensitive* Beings, cannot be questioned. And thus is detected another Fallacy of Philebus, in this Position of his, — that the Good of all Animals is Pleasure, &c. in which he confounded the Nature of Man with That of Brute-Animals; These being, in all appearance, capable of no higher nor happier a Life, than the Life of Sense; whereas the Point in controversy between Socrates and Philebus regards Human Life only, or Man, considered in the Whole of his Nature.

37 In the Greek it is—καθέστω—that is, according to the Definition or Account of them, before given. For Protarchus, in his Answer to the Sentence, wherein Socrates gave an Account of their different Natures, did in effect admit That to be a true Account: see Page 44.

38 See Plato *de Republica* Lib: 6. pag: 505, Edit: Steph:

39 In the Greek,—ἡδόνα ἐν τῷ πάθει,—literally—that Pleasure is the Good.—At length Protarchus, finding that his Fallacy, taken K 2

Notice
PHILEBUS.

Socrates.

However, you will acknowledge, that Pleasures are unlike, one to another, and some even contrary to others.

Protarchus.

Notice of in Note 35, was detected by Socrates, here explicitly avows his Meaning to be,—that Pleasure is the sole Good of Man, valuable for its own Sake, by using in this Sentence the Substantive Noun παθάραν.—A learned Reader must have perceived, that, in translating this Sentence into English, we have made no scruple to add the two words—of Man. This addition is authorised by what was observed near the End of Note 35, agreeably to the observation of Proclus, there cited.—"Tis worth remarking, on this occasion, that Eudoxus, a celebrated Astronomer, about ten Years Junior to Plato, tho he entertained the same Opinion with Arisippus on this Point, yet appears not to have prevaricated, like the Cyrenaicks; but to have expressed his Meaning in plain Terms, when he asserted ἕσομεν ἐναὶ παθάραν ἐλλόγων καὶ ἀλόγων, that Pleasure was the Chief or Supreme Good of all Animals whether Rational or Irrational. For, that by the word παθάραν he meant the Chief Good, is evident from the other Attributes which he assigned to Pleasure; those of μάλτω κατιστών, and ἔξετικα, of all good things the most eligible, and the most excellent. See Aristotle, in Ethic: Nicom: L. 16, C. 2. The same Author, in the same accurate Treatise, L. 1, C. 12, says of him, that he pleaded handsomely, καλῶς συνηθέσας περὶ τῶν ἀριστών τῆς ἱδέας, for giving Pleasure the Preference to all other Good Things. This singular Ingenuousness of Eudoxus was very laudable, but is easy to be accounted for: since we learn from Aristotle, that he was a Good Man, and a Lover of Truth; and Diogenes Laertius reports
Protarchus.

By no means; so far as they are Pleasures, every One of them.

Socrates.

We are now brought back again to the same Position, O Protarchus! There is no Difference between Pleasure and Pleasure; all Pleasures are alike, we must say: and the similar Instances, just now produced 40, in Colours and in Figures, have had, it seems, no Effect upon us. But we shall try, and talk after the manner of the meanest Arguers, and meer Novices in Dialectick.

Protarchus.

How do you mean?

of him, that after he had been a Scholar of Archytas the Pythagorean, he became an Auditor of Plato's Lectures. It is probable therefore, that he had been favoured with the reading of Plato's Philebus; or, if not, yet that he had heard the Divine Philosopher explain the Force of the Article τὸ prefixed to ἀγάμοι, by which, this Word, of its Self a meer Attributive, becomes an Abstract Noun; and it is distinguished as Such, in the Dialogue now before us, where the Sophistry of the Cyrenaicks is thus detected.

40 See above in Page 63.—In the Greek of this Sentence, we are inclined to read ἡ τὰ, (one word,) instead of ἡ τὰ, in Stephens's Edition and the Basili, or, (what is much worse) ἡ τὰ in Aldus's.
I mean, that if I, to imitate you, and dispute with you in your own way, should dare to assert, that Two things, the most unlike, are of all things the most like to each other, I should say nothing more than what You say: so that Both of us would appear to be rawer Disputants than we ought to be; and the Subject of our Dispute would thus slip out of our hands, and get away. Let us resume it therefore once more: and perhaps by returning to Similitudes, we may be induced

41 The Sense and the Reasoning require a small alteration to be here made in the Greek Copies of Plato, by reading, instead of τὰ ὁμοιά, —τὰ ὁμοιώτατα, Similitudes, or rather τὰ ὁμοια, Similes. —Similes, of the Kind here meant, are by Aristotle, in his Art of Rhetorick, L. 2, C. 20, Edit: Du Vall, justly styled τὰ Ἀυτοτάκα, Socratic, because frequently employed by Socrates. They are not such as Those, for which the Imagination of a Poet skims over all Nature, to illustrate some Things by superficial Resemblances to them in Other Things: neither are they Such, as the Memory of an Orator ransacks all History for, to prove the certainty of some doubtful Fact by Examples on Record, which agree with it in a few Circumstances: but they are Such, as the Reason of an accomplished Master of Dialectick chooses out from Subjects near at hand, to prove the Truth of some uncertain or controverted Position, by the Analogy it bears to some other Truth which is obvious, and clear, and will be readily admitted. Such a Simile, bearing the plainest and most striking Analogy with what is to be
induced to make some Concessions, Each of us to the Other.

Protarchus.

Say how.

Socrates.

Suppose Me to be the Party questioned; and suppose Yourself, Protarchus, to interrogate Me.

Protarchus.

Concerning what?

Socrates.

Concerning Prudence, and Science, and Intelligence, and all the rest of those Things, which in the begin-

be proved, is actually produced, immediately after this preface to it, by Socrates. But not a Word is there, in what follows, concerning Similar Pleasures; and τὰ ὁμοία, alike or similar, cannot be joined with, or belong to, any preceding Noun, beside ἕστοιχος.—As to the word returning in the present sentence, it refers to those Similes, produced before, of Colour and of Figure.

42 For, by the following Simile, Protarchus might be rationally brought to concede to Socrates, that Some Pleasures were evil; and that, consequently, not all Pleasure was good; and Socrates himself, on the other hand, would be obliged to own, that Some Kinds of Knowledge also were evil; and consequently, that he must yield up the Hypothesis for which he had hitherto pleaded, and confess, that Knowledge was not That Sovereign Good they were in search of.
ning of our Conversation I said were good, when I was asked what Sort of a Thing Good was; must I not acknowledge These to be attended with the same Circumstance, which attends those Other things, celebrated by You?

Protarchus.

What Circumstance?

From this Passage it appears, that the unwritten Altercation between Socrates and Philebus, immediately previous to this Dialogue, began with some such Question as This,—"What is the Chief Good of Man?"—a Question, proposed to Socrates by Philebus as bluntly and as pertly, as That, proposed to him by Meno, which opens the Dialogue, called after Meno's Name. Hence we infer, that the Scene of the Philebus, as well as That of the Meno, is laid in the Lyceum. See Note 1. to the Meno. A Critical Reader of Plato's Dialogues, who knows that, in conversation between Man and Man, to put a philosophical Question suddenly and abruptly, with a view of exhibiting the Knowledge of the Questioner, is a distinguishing Mark of Sophists, and of Pedants in Philosophy,—a Reader, who knows and considers This, will observe, that Plato, tho in the Meno he has thrown a strong Light upon this ungracious Characteristic, by placing it in the Front of that Dialogue, yet in the Philebus, one of his Capital Performances, he has judiciously withdrawn it from full View into the Back-Ground; by which Conduct and Disposition, the Commencement of this Dialogue is more polite and elegant than That of the Meno, where the Subject is intruded on us without any Kind of Introduction.

Socrates.
The Sciences, viewed all of them together, will seem to Both of us not only Many and of Diverfe Kinds, but Dissimilar too, Some to Others. Now if, besides, there should appear a Contrariety in any way, between Some of them and Others, should I deserve to be disputed with any longer, if, fearful of admitting Contrariety between the Sciences, I were to assert, that no one Science was Dissimilar to any other Science? For then the Matter in Debate between us, as if it were a meer Fable which has no Foundation, would come to No-

The Sciences differ, according to the difference of their Subjects. So that Two Sciences, whose respective Subjects are contrary, each to the other, are Themselves also Two Contrarys. If then Mind and Body, the Subjects of Two different Sciences, commonly called Metaphysicks and Physicks, are, in any way, contrary to each other, those Sciences, of which they are respectively the Subjects, must be contrary to each other, in the same way. 'Tis certain, that no Contrariety happens between Mind and Body, considered as Two different ὑποίκες, Beings, or Substances; because no ὑποίκη, no Substance, or Being, is contrary to any other ὑποίκη. But, on account of the contrary Qualities of Mind and Body,—as the one is eternal and invariable, the other variable and perishable,—Mind and Body, considered in this way, are Two Contrarys: and therefore the Sciences, of which they are the Subjects, are contrary also, each to the other.
thing and be lost; while We saved our Selves by an Illogical Retreat. But such an Event ought not to happen, except this Part of it, — the Saving of our Selves. And now the Equality, which appears thus far between Your Hypothesis and Mine, I am well enough pleased with. The Pleasures happen to be

45 That is, — saved our selves from being openly defeated, by running away from the Argument, and retiring into the impregnable Fort of a Truth not to be contradicted: and Such a Truth is This, — that Science differs not from Science, considered in the general, or simply as Science. — For when Things, of any Kind whatever, are contemplated in their Genus, where they are united, they lose all their Specific Differences, and appear to the Mind as One Thing. Now of Science in general the Subject is Being in general, that is, all Kinds of Being, taken together, united in the Mind, and contemplated as One. The Division of Science attends the Division of Being; the several Kinds and Sorts of Being, when Being is divided naturally and rightly, distinguish the several Kinds and Sorts of Science; and our distinguishing justly one Kind or Sort of Science from another, depends on the Distinctions, made by Nature, between the several Kinds and Sorts of Being.

46 This Phrase, — "the Saving of our selves," — seems here, with an elegant facetiousness, turned to another Meaning, than it bore in the preceding Sentence: for it here signifies the Saving of our selves from Falshood, — not by flying to Paralogisms and Sophisms, — nor by striving to stand our Ground longer than it is tenable thro' sound Logick, — but by yielding up Both our Hypotheses to Right Reason and Truth, if These should happen to be against us.
found Many and Difimilar; Many also and Diverse are the Sciences. The Difference, however, between Your Good and Mine, O Protarchus! let us not conceal; but let us dare to lay it fairly and openly before us Both; that we may discover, (if Those who are closely examined will make any Discovery,) whether Pleasure or Wisdom ought to be pronounced the Chief Good of Man, or whether any Third Thing, different from Either: since it is not, as I presume, with This view that we contend, that My Hypothesis, or that Yours, may prevail over its Antagonist; but That, which hath the Truth on its Side, we are Both of us to contend for and support.

Protarchus.
This is certainly our Duty.

Socrates.
But this Point farther we should, Both of us together, settle on the surest Ground.

Protarchus.

47 That is—let us not have recourse to Subterfuges and Evasions, as Protarchus had hitherto sophistically done.
48 Or,—let us be bold, in not concealing, but laying it down fairly between us Both. — In the Greek,— μη ἀποκρυπτομένω, κατατιθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον τολμῶμεν, ἂν τν ἐλεγχόμενοι μνῦτωσι, πότερον κ. τ. λ. Cornarius and Stephens were of opinion, that
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

What Point do you mean?

Socrates.

That which puzzles and perplexes all Persons, who choose to make it the Subject of their Conversation; —nay sometimes some Others, who have no such intention, are led to it unawares, in Conversation upon other Subjects.

Protarchus.

this Passage wanted Emendation, to make it intelligible. But if we suppose the two former Participles used instead of Gerunds, or instead of the Infinitive Verbs to which they are paronymous, there is no necessity for any alteration. And to justify our supposition, we need only cite a similar Enallage, in the Oration of Lysias peri traumatos eX peveias,—ex aixovetai [says he of his Prosecutor] traumad ^e oioxai on ta /apatia, he is not ashamed to call [or, he is not ashamed of calling] a few black and blue spots under the eye a Wound. — Granting, however, that those two Participles have no other Place or Power in the construction of this Sentence, than Such as Participles usually have, yet the printed Text is still found, if we suppose an Ellipsis of the word /nvew, (governed of telumowyv,) immediately after the word /nvow, from which the word /nvew is to be supplied. — Concerning words, not expressed, but tacitly understood from the word immediately preceding, see Leisner in Praefat: ad Bos in Ellipsis Graecas.

49 By these last Persons Plato means Men of good natural Abilities of Mind, tho not readily disposed to philosophie.
Protarchus.

Express what you mean in plainer Terms.

Socrates.

I mean That, which fell in our way, but just now⁹, the Nature of which is so full of Wonders. For that Many are One, and that One is Many, is

For when such Men are debating calmly and rationally on any Point whatever, in weighing the Force of each other's Arguments, they cannot help now and then recurring, by way of Appeal, to those Principles of Reason, from which all just Argumentation depends, and to which it owes all the Force it has. Now the nature of these Principles of Reason is the very Point, coming on to be considered.

⁹ The Analogy, just before shown, between Science and Pleasure, in the Divisibility of Each of them into Many Species, and also in the Difimilarity between the several Species of Each, must there seem pointed out by Socrates, meerly to illustrate what he had said of different and dissimilar Pleasures. He there indeed professed nothing more. But we here find, that the principal Design of that Simile, or Comparison, was to lead the way to the Disquisition, we are now entering into, concerning the nature of One, comprehending many, and of Many, comprehended all of them in One;—a Disquisition, necessary to the Knowledge of Mind. For the nature of Mind cannot be known without the Knowledge of such a Comprehensive One; and until the nature of Mind be known, it cannot be determined, whether the Chief Good of Man is placed in the Energys of Mind, or whether we are to look for it somewhere else.
PHILEBUS.

wonderful to have it said; and Either of those Positions is easy to be controverted 51.

Protarchus.

51 The following Disquisition concerning One and Many seems to have been first set on foot by Pythagoras, and to have arisen in His Mind from His Speculations on That Part of Nature which is stable and invariable. His Disciples transmitted what he taught them on this Head, together with all his other Doctrines, to Their Successors in teaching, under the Seal of Secrecy, as They had themselves received it. In this manner the Philosophy of Pythagoras, or his Way of considering the Nature of Things, was for a considerable time kept, as if it were sacred, amongst his Followers, entirely hidden from all other Men. During the time of this very reserved Conduct of the Pythagoreans, it appears that Diocetas, a Philosopher of That Sect, made no Secret of their Doctrine to Parmenides, a Man of an illustrious Family and ample Fortune at Elea in Lucania. Parmenides had been before instituted in the Knowledge of Nature by Xenophanes, who then lived at Zancle in Sicily: and he is said to have attended the Lectures of that Philosopher there, (as it was but a short Voyage from Elea to Zancle,) until he became acquainted with Diocetas above-mentioned; whom he took into his own House at Elea, together with Aminias, who in all probability was a Pythagorean also; especially, if what is reported of him be true, that His Advice and Arguments determined Parmenides never to engage in Public Affairs. From thenceforward these Three Philosophers led the Pythagorean Life together, in a Community of Studys, and of all external Commodities. This Circumstance in the Life of Parmenides corresponds to what is by Some reported of Xenophanes, that he was a Pythagorean himself at first, and lived in Community with Parmeniscus and Orestades; but that he afterwards quitted their Society, and proceeded to speculate
on Nature by Himself in his own Way. And this Report concerning Xenophanes is confirmed, and made highly probable, by the Agreement of His Philosophy with That of the Pythagoreans, in the General Representation which it gave of Nature: for in Both was taught the Unity of all things;—in Both, the Principle of this Unity, TO\textsuperscript{'EN}, The One;—in Both, the Essence of this One, \(\lambda \text{\iota\kappa\sigma\nu}\), \(\varepsilon\iota\nu\varphi\sigma\iota\mu\nu\omega\), Reason, Mind, and Wisdom. That this was the Doctrine of Pythagoras, is clear from Porphyry's Life of that Philosopher: and that it was no less the Doctrine of Xenophanes, may be fairly gathered out of Cicero, Laertius, and Sextus Empiricus.—But whoever was the immediate Master of Parmenides, in the Pythagorean Doctrine of Nature, this great Philosopher of Elea seems to have strengthened the Foundation of it, by considering the Mind of Nature as the only True Being, — The One immoveable,—the sole Principle and Cause of everlasting Stability and Sameness to all the Kinds and Species of Things; and the sole Fountain to all Particular Minds, of their Ideas. For these Ideas of theirs are no other than their mental Perception, Intelligence, or Apprehension, of the Kinds and Species of Things which are in Nature. As therefore the Kinds and Species of Things are ever the same in Nature, the same also are the Ideas of them in Human Minds, thro all successive Ages. On good Grounds therefore Parmenides seems to have imagined, or rather we may say to have divined, that, Whatever was the Immediate Cause of our Ideas, and whatever was their Nature, they owed their Immutability, and their Sameness in all Particular Minds, to the same Principle and Primary Cause, to which were owing the Constancy and everlasting Sameness of Nature in all her ordinary Productions. It must be confessed however, that the more ancient Pythagoreans appear to have philosophised, no less than the Eleaticks, concerning the Species and the Kinds of natural Things: which Kinds and Species, or rather our Ideas of them, they termed Monads. They considered them as leading to the Knowledge of Universal Nature;—seeing, that in This all those Kinds
Kinds and Species of Things are comprehended;—and to the
Knowledge also of Nature's Cause; which they justly presumed to
be One all-forming Mind, — One Great Idea, in which the
στερματικοὶ λόγοι, or Embryo Forms of All things were included,—
One all-efficient Soul, pregnant with the Powers and Virtues of
every Kind of Being, to which it imparts Soul or only Life.—
But, as some very important Points, relative to these Pythago-
rean Monads, are, soon after the Passage now before us, brought
into Question, — Points, which have been litigated ever since,
and remain unsettled to this day,—it may not be improper to
assign the reason of those Names, by which they are now com-
monly called, Genus and Species; and at the same time to give
some account of their Natures, so far as all Partys are agreed
concerning them.—It cannot be doubted, but that Men always
have observed, of the Beings around them,—as well of Those
which move freely from Place to Place, as of Those which are
fixed by Nature to one Spot of Ground,—that they live and
flourish only for a time; and that, whilst Some of these Beings
are perishing, or decaying, Others of them are rising into
Form, or growing. They must also always have observed, that
these New Beings resembled the Old ones, from the Seeds of
which they were generated or sprang, in the outward Structure
of their Frame, in the visible Disposition of the Parts of that
Frame, and in the apparent Powers and Uses of those Parts. They must have always known and distinguished these
Beings, Some from Others, by certain characteristic Features,
which are continued the same from Generation to Generation.
For different Features, Figures, and Appearances, continued on
thus for ever with the same Differences, evidently denote different
Sorts of Being. Now these different Sorts of Being, thus easy to
be distinguished by the Eye, the Pythagoreans termed, in a pecu-
liar and eminent Sense, ἀφώ, Forms, (a Word, derived from ἀφέω,
to see;) because their visible Form, or Aspect, shows at first sight,
to all Persons who have before seen any Others of similar Form, to What Sort of Beings they belong, and from What Race they are descended.—An Oak-Tree, for instance, sprung from an Acorn, resembles not only The Oak, that produced The Acorn from which it sprang, but also all Other Oaks, so greatly, as to be known at first Sight to be an Oak, by every Person who has observed the constant Differences between Oaks and Other Trees, in their external and superficial Form. The Difference between One Oak and Another, in the Height or Largeness of the Tree, or in the Size, Intervals and Number of its Branches or of its Leaves, never occasioned any Person to mistake an Oak-Tree for a Tree of some Other Sort. The Form therefore, peculiarly belonging to an Oak, being constantly and invariably the Same in All Oaks, was called by those Philosophers the οὐσία of an Oak.—In a few Ages after That of Pythagoras, the Grecian Philosophy travelled to Rome, assumed a Roman Garb, and spake the Latin Language. In this Language, every such οὐσία or Form, as we have just now endeavoured to delineate, — every Form, common to Many Individual Beings, to All of the same Sort, and of a similar Appearance,—took the Name of Species; a Name given to it with the same Propriety, with which in Greece it bore the Name of οὐσία; the Word Species being derived from the old Latin Word specere, to behold.——Thus much for the Term Species; and thus much, at present, as to the Nature of those everlasting Forms or Beings, to which That Name is now generally given.——As to the Other Name, given by the Pythagoreans to their larger Monads, That of γένος, or Kind, we premise, after the same manner in which we began our account of Species, that Men in all Ages,—such Men as made Observations, ever so slight, on those Productions of Nature, which occurred daily to their Eyes,—must have observed farther, of those οὐσία, those Species or Forms of Natural Things, (Each of them common
to many Individual or distinct Beings,) that, tho they differed outwardly, or to the Eye of Sense, One Species from Another, yet Several of them were alike accompanied by some unseen Power within them,—a Power, which enabled such Individual Beings, as were invested with certain Specific Forms, to perceive Sensible Objects around them, and to move of Themselves from Place to Place, Some on Earth, Others in Water, and Others in the Air. Appearing therefore to operate alike within them all, so as to beget in them a Capacity of perceiving external Objects, and a Capacity of Self-Motion, (tho, in Beings of different Species, with different Degrees of Motion and Perception,) it could not but appear to be One and the Same invisible Power,—an inward Principle of Sense and Local Motion,—a Principle, everywhere called Animā, that is, Soul. And thence the Beings, which partook of it, were called Animals, as having Each of them an Animā, or Soul.—Men, who were disposed to make such Observations, must have also taken notice of several Other Beings, produced by Nature, differing in their own Species, or outward Forms, and all of them apparently void of Soul, but all of them agreeing with all the Species of Animals, in having a Power within them, as invisible as Soul;—a Power, which enables them to receive Nourishment, and thence to grow, or increase in Size, and in the Virtues respectively belonging to their several Species; (unless their Growth be obstructed by some Accidental Cause;) but which Power gives them not those Capacitys of Perception and Self-Motion, with which Animal-Forms only are endued. This Power in them, this Principle of their Growth, was commonly called Life; and all those Species of Being, which were observed to partake of this Power only, and not of Soul also, were called simply quae, Vegetables, or Sprouts of Nature.—Thus it was discovered by ordinary Observation, that all the ζωα, or Living Things, with which Man is acquainted, are divisible into Two Sorts,
PHILEBUS.

Sorts, ἐννουξα and ηννουξα, that is, into Such as, besides Life, partake of Soul, and Such as partake of Life only, and not of Soul; each Sort being One, comprehending Many distinct Species; in the same manner, as each Species is One, comprehending Many distinct Individuals.—We mention these Two comprehensive Sorts of Being, the Animal and the Vegetable, as an undisputed Instance of different Beings, the Essential Difference between which, tho' obvious to be marked, lies deeper than the Difference between their Outward Forms.—In Each of them there appears to be a Series of regular Gradations,—in the Animal Sort, rising to Souls Rational,—in the Vegetable, or meerly Vital, descending to Minerals or Fossils; for These also (in their native Beds) seem to partake of Life.—But to settle the Bounds of Soul, or those of Life, in the several Species of Being, is foreign to the present Subject. Thus much, however, we may say with Propriety, as well as with Certainty,—that different Degrees of Life, Self-Motion, and Perception, distinguish different Sorts of Being;—that Each of these Sorts is One, apart by its Self, and distinct from Others; — and that in Each of these Ones, Many Species or different Outward Forms are comprehended.—Now to these larger and more comprehensive Ones or Monads, which are distinguished, each from others, by a different Degree of some internal Power, apparent only from its Effects, — (a Power, which it communicates, thro' each of its Species, to the multitude of Individuals in those several Species,—) to these Monads the Pythagorean Philosophers gave the Name of γεμιν, Kinds; and the Romans after them, accordingly, the Name of Genera;—Names, which, in a proper Sense, signify distinct Families, descended from One common Ancestor, like so many Branches, sprouted forth from One common Stock;—Tribes also, in Each of which are comprehended Many such out-spread Families;—and Nations also or People, Each comprehending Many such Tribes. The Names therefore of γεμιν and
and Genera were, in a figurative Sense, applied to those comprehensive Sorts of Being; because every One of them, like a large and widely-extended Family, Tribe, or Nation, is distinguished from Others, not thro' any external Marks, visible to Sense,—but by being known, thro' Reason and Experience, to contain Many subordinate Ones, of Kin to each other, thro' such a Community of Kind, as it were a Rife from One Root in Nature, common to them All.—Such seems to have been the Origin, and such the Meaning, of the Terms Genus and Species, when they are used in a philosophical Sense, or applied to the Forms produced by Nature. Only a little more remains necessary to be said on this Subject; and we shall resume it in the same way, in which we began and proceeded.—After that Men in all Ages, such Men especially as were given to make Observations, had once begun to speculate concerning the Species and the Kinds of Natural Things; (for now that we have explained the philosophical Meaning of these Terms, we shall not scruple to use them in that Sense;)—when they had observed of many Individual Beings,—of such as were distinguished, one from another, not by any essential and constant Marks, and only by Differences afterwards termed accidental,—that they wore One and the Same Specific Form, in viewing which Form all those little Distinctions were disregarded, sunk and lost;—when also they had observed, that many different Species were of One and the Same Kind, in considering which Kind all Difference between them disappeared;—they were naturally led to carry their Speculations farther on Both those Points. In making nicer Observations on the various Productions of Nature, and on the more minute, yet constant and everlasting, Differences of Form in those Productions, they increased the Number of Forms Specific: what they at first looked on as a peculiar Species, which admitted no essential Difference between the Individuals that partook of it, they perceived:
ceived to have the nature of a Genus, or general Kind,—in this respect, that 'twas common to many different Species: and afterwards, on nearer and nicer inspection, discovering every one of these different Species to be divided into many Subordinate Species, or to contain different Forms, the same always from generation to generation, and always with the same Specific Difference from each other, they called these Forms more special; and to those, which comprehended these, they gave the Name of Genera, or Kinds, with regard to the Species contained in them, and the Name of Species still, with regard to the Kinds, in which they were themselves contained. As Children first distinguish Birds from other Animals, by their Flight, their Wings and Feathers: afterwards, by degrees, they acquire the Knowledge of the several Species of Birds; they learn to distinguish Hawks from Doves, &c. while only Men, from Study or Experience, know the different Species of Hawks, and those of Doves, &c. — But the amusing work of distributing the Forms of Nature into proper Classes, according to Genus and Species, the Pythagoreans and Eleaticks seem to have left to the curious Spectators of outward Forms. To such Objects (however beautiful be their Aspect, or however wise contrivance be their Frame, and however good the Ends, to which their Frames are fitted,) those Philosophers preferred the Study and Contemplation of an Object by far the fairest, noblest, and most divine, Nature's Self; deeming lesser Objects unworthy of their View or Attention, farther than as useful and perhaps necessary for the Direction or Guidance of Men's Minds to the Knowledge of the Universe, or Whole of Things. For they contemplated The All, ἰ'ν πᾶν, as One Thing, or Being, ἰ' ὁ, involved in whose Principles lye all the Kinds and Species of Things; which from those Principles, as from their Root, arise, shoot forth, and are expanded. They viewed it also as the Great Whole, ἰ' ὁ ὅλον, whose Parts, taken together, contain.
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

Do you mean such Positions, as This,—that I Protarchus, who am by nature One Person, am also

the numberless Individuals of all those Kinds and Species. They considered, that from the Substance of the Universe, all those Individuals derived the Substance of their Particular Beings;—that into That Substance Universal, when they fell to pieces, all their Parts returned and were resolved; and that out of these Fragments of Being, new Beings continually were compos'd, framed and formed, by an all-efficient all-forming Cause in Nature,—new Beings,—yet still the same in their Kinds and Species, endued with the same Degrees of Life, the same Kinds of Soul, the same Limits of Reason, and the same over-clouded Minds, with the Beings which preceded them. — Hence they argued, that from this Great Cause, thus full of ever-active Virtue, and thus for ever energising in the same way, all Beings received, not only their outward Forms, and inward Frame of Parts, but also whatever Kind of Soul, or Degree of Life was in them; in a word, all the Powers and Capacities, whether active or passive, with which they were severally endued: and hence they argued farther, that this Cause of all things was, Himself, Universal Life, Universal Soul, and Universal Mind; imparting Himself, and his own eternal Forms, together with the Powers which attend them, vital, active, sentient, and intelligent, in various Degrees, to all the Parts of Nature. So that, according to those great Philosophers, the right Theory of Nature, and of Nature's Forms, is, at the bottom, a Theory of Mind, a Theory of One and Many, Same and Different: and these Principles of Mind, and of Mental Forms eternal, are also the Principles of Nature, and of Her ever-lasting Forms, the Species and the Kinds of Things.

Many?
Many ? and such as these Others,—that my Self, and
other Persons the reverse of Me,—the Great also and
the Little, the Heavy and the Light, are One and the
Same? with a thousand Positions more, which might
be made, of like Kind?

SOCRATES.

The Wonders, Ο Protarchus! which You have now
spoken of, relating to the One and Many, have been
hackneyed in the Mouths of the Vulgar; but by the
common agreement, as it were, of all men, they are
now laid aside, and are never to be mentioned 52:

for

52 It was observed in Note 50, that the Disquisition, now
upon the carpet, concerning One and Many, is introduced for the
fake of unfolding the nature of Mind. And this Purpose it na-
turally effects; because Mind, considered as unmixed with Body,
and consequently as unconnected with Sense, is pure Intelligence;
and the only Objects of pure Intelligence are those Intelligible
Beings, Genus and Species, or every One and Many. And hence
it is, that Mind, being the Higheft Genus, or the Firft One and
Many, is, in its Self, its own primary and proper Object, in
which all other Intelligibles are comprehended. For Mind its
Self, considered as Intelligent, is the intelligent Comprehension of those
higher Genera, in which are included all the subordinate, quite
down to the lowest; and in which lowest are virtually contained
all ἄν, or Forms, as well the more as the least Specific.
Rightly therefore does Plato begin this Inquiry, by throwing
for they are considered as childish and easy objections, and great Impediments also to Dialectic Reasoning on the Subject. — 'Tis now also agreed, never to introduce into Discourse, as an Instance of One and Many, the Members or Parts, into which any single Thing may be considered as divisible. Because, when a Respondent has once admitted and avowed, that all these [Members or Parts] are That One Thing, which is thus at the same time Many, he is refuted and laughed at by his Questioner, for having been driven to assert such monstrous Absurdities as these,—that a Single One is an Infinite Multitude, — and an Infinite Multitude, only One.

Protarchus.

out of the way, as foreign to the Subject, all those Things, which are not Objects of the Mind, but merely of the Senses or Imagination; — in the first place, all Individual Persons, whether considered singly, or compared, Each with Other; — in the next place, all those Attributes, which belong only to Things Corporeal, such as their Magnitude, and their Sensible Qualities, compared with Those of other Things of the same Species; and lastly, all Wholes, consisting of Parts, none of which are, themselves, distinct Beings, — Parts, infinite in Number; — and such a Whole is every Individual, or distinct οὐσία, whether Animal or Inanimate, the Substance of which, or the Substratum of whose Form is Matter; because Matter, if not actually, yet in thought or imagination at least, is infinitely divisible.

53 The Absurdity of representing the Body of any Animal, and its Members, as an instance of One and Many, is heightened by considering
Protarchus.

What other Things then, not hackneyed among the Vulgar, nor as yet universally agreed on, do you mean, O Socrates! relating to this Point?

Socrates.

I mean, young Man! when a Thing is proposed to be considered, which is One, but is not of the Number or Nature of Things generated and perishable. For as to the Ones of this latter Sort, 'tis agreed, as I just now said, to reject them, as unworthy of a serious confutation. The Ones, which I mean, are considering the Members themselves, not as Members, but as Parts only, of the Body to which they belong: because as entire Members or Limbs, they are not, what they are as Corporeal Parts, — that is, infinite in Number. Accordingly, Plato's own words, in the first part of this Paragraph, are, —μέλη καὶ ἄμα μέγα — Members, which at the same time are Parts, &c. — But we have translated the words μέλη and μέγα disjunctively; so as to comprehend, not only all Animals, whose Members are dissimilar and heterogeneous, but also all other Things Individual and Corporeal, whose Parts are similar and homogeneous; following herein, as we apprehend, the Intention of our Author, rather than his Words; as indeed we generally do, when a literal translation would not fully and clearly express his Meaning.

This excludes all Individuals of every Kind and Species.

That is, when they are proposed in conversation, as Instances of Things which are, Each of them, One and Many; whether
PHILEBUS.

are such as Man, Ox, Beauty, Good. When These, or Such as these, are proposed for Subjects of Debate, much

whether they are proposed as Objections to the Truth of the Doctrine, or as Exceptions to the Universality of it; and whether they are meant to try the Ingenuity of the Respondent, in distinguishing rightly between these false Instances and the true; or, as the Sophists meant them, to show the Proposer's own Knowledge and Skill in making the right Distinction, and to expose the Ignorance of Such as wanted that Skill; or whether with a view of guarding the Doctrine against Error, Fallacy, and Misapprehension; and indeed this last seems to have been the laudable Design of Zeno the Eleatick, who first taught the Art of detecting all Sorts of Sophisms.

Of the Four Instances, here brought, the first Two are taken from among such Species, as admit of no Division into any subordinate Species, and are divisible only into Individuals; and and the latter Two, (in the Greek, τὸ κάλε, and τὰ καλὰ,) are the Chief among such Universals, as are most properly so termed, Such as extend to All things, and of which All the Works of Nature participate, whatever be their Kind or Species. For the Charm of Beauty is spread over all the Face of Nature, thro' the Order and Harmony of all its Parts; and the Power of Good is infused into all Beings, by means of their mutual Fitness, for the Supply of each other's Wants.

In the Meaning of these Words are included all those Species and Kinds of Things, which, in the Order of Universality, lye between Forms the most Specific, such as Man, and Ox, (for, with relation to their several Individuals, these Forms are also Universals), and those absolute Universals, such as Beauty and Good, which accompany
much serious Attention is given them; and when they come to be divided, any One of them into Many, much Doubt and Controversy arise.

**Protarchus.**

Upon what Points?

**Socrates.**

In the first place, Whether such Unitys 58 should be deemed to have true Being 59. In the next place, How accompany the Principles of the Universe, penetrate the inward Essences of all Beings, and pervade all outward Nature.

58 These Monads, so termed by the Pythagoreans (as appears from Plutarch: de Placit: Philos: L. 1. C. 3, and from the Anonymus Life of Pythagoras in Photius,) are here by Plato termed ἑώρητε, because in Each of them Many meet and are united. In the next Sentence, however, the Pythagorean Term is made use of.—They were named Μωράτες, either because they lye in the (Human) Mind, ξαγμόνας, separately and singly; or because Each of them always μὲνει remains That One which it is.

59 Democritus held, that the only Things which were true, (or had True Being,) were Atoms and Vacuum. This we are told by Sextus Empiricus, pag: 399, Edit: Fabricii. And to confirm it, he cites the following words from that great Philosopher's own Writings,—εῇ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν τα ἄτομα μόνον, καὶ τὸ κείτων. What Democritus meant by True Being, will be inquired into on a fitter occasion. But his manner of expressing himself in That, and
such other Sentences of his, seems to have given the first occasion of questioning the Reality of Things Universal. For then began the Controversy, stated by Porphys in these words, — περὶ γενόν τε καὶ εἴδων, ἡτα υφεστηκέν, ἡτα ἐν μόναις τιλαις ἐπιφοιτεῖν καταί. Whether they have real Subsistence, or whether they have their place in meer Nations only. Porphys. Isagog. Cap. i. This Controversy lasted, until Religious Faith put an End to all Philosophical Doubts and Inquirys. New Controversys of a different Kind then succeeded; and the only Subject of these was the Meaning of several Articles of that Faith. And when these Controversys were silenced by the prevailing Party, armed with Power to suppress all Opposition to its own Decisions, the Ghost of Philosophy arose; and in his Train appeared the Shadows of old philosophic Controversys; for the ruling Powers permitted no free or fair Inquiry into the Foundation of Truth, or the Principles of Things, —Inquirys, which are the Life and Soul of Philosophy, rightly so called. Accordingly, in those days, the Followers of Dr. John Duntze, of Merton College in Oxford, (commonly called Duns Scotus,) and the Followers of William of Okeham, were divided on this very Subject, —whether Universals were Real Beings, or whether they were only Names, and denoted nothing but what was meerly notional, Creatures of the (Human) Mind.—A Dispute somewhat similar to This, happened, toward the Close of the last Century, between Mr. Locke and Bp. Stillingfleet. — And Disputes of this Kind never will have an End, till it be settled and agreed, What is True Being, and What is the Essence of Mind and Reason: for till then it cannot be ascertained, whether any and what Share of True Being is to be allowed to Entia Rationis; or whether the Truth of Being belongs not, rather, to Them only,—to Such of them, we mean, as are the Same in Every Mind.
How it is, that these Monads, every One of them being always the Same, and never generated, nor ever to be destroyed, have, notwithstanding, One and the Same Stability, common to them all. And lastly, Whether

This Second Question supposes the First Question decided, in favour of the True Being of the Monads. For, if Universals are held to be only Names, invented to denote unreal Fancies, or factitious Notions, it is trifling and idle to inquire, whence they derive Stability; This being an Affectation, or Property, of Real Beings only,—unless it be as meerly nominal, notional, or fantastic, as those Things are, to which it is attributed.—The Sentence, now before us, in the Greek is printed thus; — πῶς αὖ ταῦτας, μιᾶς ἐκάστην ἔσαν αἰ̃ τὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ μῆτε γένεσιν μῆτε ὀλέξθεν προσθερομένην, ὡμοὶ εἰσαί βεβαιόττατα μιᾶ ταὐτίν. The Greek Text must here be faulty; and to make good Sense of it, 'tis necessary to make a small alteration or two,—by reading ἔρχεται instead of ἐσαῖ, and ἵ ἀὐτήν instead of ταὐτίν. In translating this Passage, we have presumed, it ought to be so read; and the Meaning, intended to be conveyed by it, we suppose to be This;—"it must needs seem strange, that distinct Beings, not generated, Some of them by Others, but All equally eternal, without Inter- community or Interchange between them, should, nevertheless, have one and the same Nature, That of Monad or Unity, and one and the same Property of their Being, That of Stability."—In this place, the Question is only stated, and the Reason of Doubting shown: but the Doubt is easily solved, and the Question answered, on the Principles of that Philosophy, which we are endeavouring to illustrate, because it seems to illustrate all Nature. For it follows from the Principles of it, laid down...
Whether we should suppose every such Monad to be dispersed, and spread abroad, amongst an Infinity of Things generated or produced, and thus, from being One, to become Many;—or whether we should suppose it to remain intire, its Self by its Self, separate and apart from that Multitude. But of all Suppositions, This might appear the most impossible, that One and the Same Thing should be in a single One and in Many, at the same time. These Points, O Protarchus!

in this Dialogue, that all the several Monads of different Orders, that is, all the Kinds and Species of Things, whether more or less general or special, derive their Beings from One its Self, the great Mind of Nature, by the Pythagoreans called emphatically The Monad;—and that in this Mind, being Universal, They, being all of them Universals also, tho of different Extent and Comprehensiveness, lye as it were enveloped; and consequently are exempt from all Motion, Alteration, and Destruction.

61 In the Greek we here read, — αὐτὸν αὐτὸς χωρίς. But 'tis presumed, that we ought to read, — αὐτὸν ἐφ' αὐτὸς χωρίς.

62 If the Monads, so much spoken of in the time of Socrates, should have been admitted to have both a true and a stable Being, by any Disputants who were unacquainted with the Ground of their Reality and Stability, for the sake only of a thorow Inquiry into their Nature, in that Age of philosophical Inquiries, — a Third Question is then asked, the right Answer to which must put an End to all Doubts concerning the Nature of the Monads, — Where is their Place of Residence? or, Where are they to be found? — And the first Doubt, which, in considering this
this Question, naturally occurs to all Minds uninformed in the Principles of Things, is This, — Whether the Monads exist only in Outward Nature, that is, in the respective Individuals of each Kind and Species,—either by being divided amongst them, (as it must be supposed, if every Individual is only participant of some Species and of some Genus,) or by being multiplied into Many, (which must be the Case, if in Each Individual be found the whole entire Species and Kind, to which it belongs,)— or whether they are seated only in the Human Mind, being placed there by her Self, thro a Power which she has of collecting the Images of those scattered Individuals into separate Assemblies, according to their Agreements and Disagreements;—or else, whether each Monad exists in a Multitude of Individuals, at the same time that the Whole of it hath its Seat, apart from those Individuals, and alone by its Self, in the Human Mind. — That there is, in Nature, some invariable Cause of That invariable Agreement between all the Individuals of their respective Kinds and Species, cannot be doubted by any Person, who knows that no Thing exists without an adequate Cause of its being What it is. Neither can any such Person doubt of there being, in all Human Minds, some One uniform Cause of That constant Uniformity in them All, thro which, All of them in the same Manner, and with equal Facility, tho not perhaps with equal Quickness, assemble together and unite Many Individuals in One Species, and Many Species in One Genus. — Now it is most certain, that the Human Mind is not the Cause of any Similitudes, or Agreements, between the Individuals. Nor is it less certain, that the Individuals themselves are not the Cause of their own Union, or even of their Assembly, in the Human Mind.—The Platonic Philosophy professes to obviate this Doubt, by teaching, that the Cause of all the Similitudes and Agreements between Individuals, in Outward Nature, is the Cause also of their Assembly and of their Union, in Human Minds;—that this Com-
mon Cause of Both is The One Mind and Soul of the Universe, framing All Things together, fitted to each Other; framing the Organs of Sense, in All Animals, fitted to Outward Things, so as to transmit all necessary Notice of them to the Seat of Sensation; framing the fair Grounds of Imagination, fitted to receive, hold, and retain their Images; framing the deep Cells of Memory, fitted for Her Office, which is to rouse those Images from their dark Dormitorys, and call them up to be reviewed when Occasion offers; endowing also Some Beings, over and above Others, with Powers to segregate, congregate, and unite those Images, that is, with Minds fitted to the Monads:—by teaching farther, that these Monads have their true, their stable, and eternal, Being, in pure Mind alone, The Mind of Universal Nature, whose Ideas they are, and in whom they are pure, and unmixed with Body:—that the Resemblances of these Ideas are formed in Matter by the Presence of That Great Mind throughout Matter, investing every Portion of it with such a Form, that is, with the Resemblance of such an Idea, as That Portion of Matter is pre-disposed to receive: (for pre-disposed it is, in some certain way, by its being the Relicks or the Corruption of some preceding Form, which is departed; or by its being the Flower and Farina of some elder Form, which is still living, and arrived at its Maturity:)—that the Images of those Outward Forms, with which Matter is invested, entering into Human Imaginations, are there assembled in separate Parcels, according to their Similaritys and Dissimilaritys; assembled thus distinctly by the Human Mind, thro her Power of seeing the Samenesses and the Differences of Things; (a Power, This, essential to her Nature; because Sameness and Difference are the Principles of all her Intelligence and Knowledge, whatever be the Objects of it;)—and that the same Mind, afterwards, combines together and unites the Similar Images, thro that unifying Power, which also is essential to her Nature, for that She her Self
Self is a Monad.—Thro these her native Powers it is, (according to this ancient Doctrine,) that, in beholding Each of those distinct Assemblages, she sees, arising in her Self, the Idea of a Species, from which all Accidental Differences are excluded; — and that, whilst she beholds together all congenial Species, there is at once presented to her the Idea of a Genus, in which all Specific Differences disappear; tho they are, All of them, in that Genus virtually contained.—Thro the same comprehending and unifying Powers it is, that, by degrees, she comes to view within her Self the larger Monads, the more general Ideas; to contemplate even her Self, and her own Being, in which all her general Ideas are united: the Human Mind may therefore properly be called her own most general Idea, or the Idea of all her Other Ideas; these being seen, All of them, in One, seen in her Self; thus found to be a Monad. — Hence it may appear, that, tho the Human Mind seems to form or create her own Ideas Special and General, by comparing together Things more or less similar, and by overlooking or not attending to their Diflimilaritys, yet She no more creates them, than she creates her Self; and that her seeming Powers of creating are only, in reality, her Powers of energising, dormant in her, till awakened and roused by Outward Objects.—The original and eternal Seat therefore of all Ideas can only be That Universal Mind, which is never dormant, but for ever is and must be in Energy. For, considered in his own simple Essence, abstracted ἀπὸ ὅλου from the Universe which he fills, and from the Matter of it which he forms, He himself is Wisdom, the actual Intellætion of Himself, that is, of the fair Ideas, involved in the prolific Unity of his Essence; and actual Intelligence is the Energy of Intelle<e1> exchanged, as he is the Efficient Cause of all Outward Forms, creating them after those his own fair Ideas, it is evident, that he never ceases operating, from the never-ending Effects of his Operation:
tion: — and considered again, as being within every Particle of Matter, and intimately present to every Living Form, supporting it in Being for a convenient time, and healing the Breaches made in it by Mischance, he is the Energy, the Life and the Soul of the Whole World; the Fountain of all Particular Souls and Lives, with their blind or unconscious Energies; the Fountain also of all Particular Minds, with their Ideas, and all their Energetic Powers,—namely, the Power of perceiving those Ideas, and their Relations to each other, — the Power of comparing, joining, and dividing them,—the Power of raising up, or discovering, Some by the means of Others,—and the Power of comprehending and uniting all of them in her Self. — Thus is to be solved the Doubt, or Question, proposed in the Sentence now before us; and the seeming Absurdity, mentioned in the latter Part of it, is thus to be reconciled to Truth and Nature. For every Genus, and every Species of Things, is, in the Divine Mind, each of them, a Monad, its Self by its Self, separate and apart from the Multitude of its Resemblances or Copies in Outward Nature, to all of which it is the sole Original.—By these Copies the Monad, the Ideal Form, is as it were multiplied: but, as it is multiplied in Matter, — a Subject, not only in its Self incapable of perfect Form, but also, in many Particles of its Mass, (the Dregs and Drofs of some prior Forms,) repugnant often to the Admission of any new Form, or refusing to assimilate and unite with any Neighbour-Form to which it is conveyed,—it becomes like a fine Picture, copied upon a rough Ground, and with coarse Colours; the Daubing satisfies only vulgar Spectators, who never saw better Painting.—In the Human Mind, the Idea returns again to its Monad-Nature; tho still falling short of Perfection, because it is there mixed with some (at least) of those Corporeal Images from without, by which it was first excited in that Mind. Notwithstanding which impure Mixture, it proves so fair a Copy,
as to have been mistaken for an Original by Some Persons who pass for Connoisseurs. Indeed, the more that a Human Mind is conversant with abstrac Science, which rejects those Images, the nearer Approaches do her Ideas make toward Purity and Perfection,—toward an exact Likeness of their true Originals. For every Particular Mind partakes of the Whole Essence of Universal Mind, from whom she is derived: but, being derived into Body, the Activity of her Powers is suppressed; and she is, at first, only in Capacity, what the Fountain-Mind is in Energy, that is, contemplative of her own Ideas, and operative outwardly according to those Ideas; these being the only Patterns she has, to copy after in her Works, and the only Rules she has, to direct her Operations.—In fine, to conclude our summary Comment on this Passage, regarding the Seat of these Monads, the Kinds and Species of Things,—it appears, that the original Monads, and the Two several Sets of Forms, copied from them, the Corporeal and the Mental, must have Three different Seats, where they severally reside, suitable to their different Natures:—that the Seat of the Originals is Inward Nature, or the True Intelligible World, Universal Mind; in whose Unity all these Monads are eternally united:—that the Seat of their Corporeal Copies is Outward Nature, or the Sensible World, the Image of the Mind within, impressed on Matter; thro the emanant Virtue of which Mind, this Visible World is a Whole, and all the Parts of it, tho incessantly interchanged in their Forms, are everlastingly held together:—and that the Seat of the Mental Copies of the original Monads is the World of each Particular Mind, opening to Each of us gradually, as our Reason travels on, by the Light of Intellig: but that the Seat of what are now commonly called Our Ideas, (which ought to be, and by nature are, true Copies of the Original and true Monads) is the World of Imagination and Opinion; a Private World, to every Man his own; a World, whose Parts are all unconnected, without any
Protarchus! which regard Such Instances as I have mentioned, and not Such as were mentioned by You, they are These, which, for want of being rightly settled, create all the Difficultys and Doubts we meet with in Dialectic Inquirys, but when once they are settled rightly, they clear the Way with Eafe.

Protarchus.
Then, it seems, we are to labour these Points first.

Socrates.
I should think, we ought.

Protarchus.
And that We consent to it, you may take for granted,—all of Us here. Philebus indeed 'tis best perhaps, at present, not to discompose, by asking him Questions, now that he is quiet.

any fixed Bounds, and without any Principle of Unity or Stability,—until our Minds rectify their wrong Opinions, and establish on a firm Foundation such as are right, by frequently withdrawing from the Objects of Sense that crowd the Fancy, and from the Din of Rumours that cloud the Understanding, to visit the Regions of Science; where all is still and quiet; and where every Idea is for ever settled, distinct and clear; being inlightened by That, which throws Light on all intelligible Things, That intellectual Sun, in whom the Fountains of Being, of Identity, and of Diversity are all united.

Socrates.
Socrates.

Very well: but in what way shall we begin the Discussion of these Points, in so wide a Field of Controversy? Shall we begin thus?

Protarchus.

How?

Socrates.

We say, in speaking of these Monads, (Each of which is One, but on a Logical Examination of it, appears to be divisible into Many,) that they run throughout every Sentence in our Discourse, every where and always: and that, as their Being shall never have an

End,

63 On this Passage we can give no better Comment, than what Mr. Harris has written in his Hermes, B. 3, Ch. 3. concerning Words, the Symbols of general Ideas: to which therefore we refer every Reader, who is inquisitive into the Truth of Things, represented by Words in every Language; and shall only add This Observation, — that, altho Particulars are often the Subjects of our Discourse, yet, in every thing we say of them, we use General Terms; appealing to those General Ideas, which are the same in the Minds of All men, of the Speakers and of Those to whom they speak: for 'tis only thro general Ideas, that the Hearers can understand What Relations, Qualities, Actions, Passions, or extrinsic Circumstances, are attributed to the Particular Person or Thing, spoken of.—The Reader is here desired to take notice,—that in this Note, and elsewhere, by General Ideas we mean all Ideas commonly called
End, so neither does it first begin in the present age. Now this perpetual Attendant upon all Speech proceeds, as it seems to Me, from Something immortal and undecaying within our Selves. And hence it is, that the Youth everywhere, when they have thus had a Taste of it, are overjoyed at their having thus found a Treasure of Wisdom. Transported therefore with the Delight it gives them, they apply it to every Subject of Discourse: sometimes they collect Particulars from all Quarters, and roll them into one; then they unroll called Universal; comprehending Ideas Special, as well as Those which are General, and Those also, which, not being limited to any One Species or Genus of Things, deserve to be alone filed Universal: to one or other of which Three Orders belongs every Idea in our Minds: for of Individuals we have only Images in our Imaginations.

64 This perhaps is added, to prevent any Person from surmising it to be a new Creation, or even a new Discovery of Zeno's.

65 Meaning the Mind. For Speech is, for the most part, an Exhibition, or outward Display, not of Images in the Fancy, but of Ideas in the Mind, which are Copies of Things eternal. And even these Originals of our Ideas may very properly be said to be within us; inasmuch as they are the Ideas of That great Mind, whose intimate Presence to Our Minds continues their Being; preserves to them their Principles of Sameness and Difference united; and supports their Powers of seeing Many in One, and One in Many.
them again, and part them asunder. After having, in this way, puzzled Themselves in the first place, they question and puzzle the Person next at hand, whether he be their Equal in Age, or Younger than themselves, or Older, sparing neither Father nor Mother, nor Any one else who will attend to them, scarcely other Animals, more than Man; it is certain, they would not exempt Any who speak a Foreign Language only, could they but find somewhere an Interpreter.

Protarchus.

66 See Note 62, not far from the beginning.
67 This Passage, on a slight reading of it, seems to mean nothing more than This, — to rally the Athenian Youth on That contentious Manner of discoursing, and that immoderate Love of arguing and disputing, with which the Logick of Zeno, then newly introduced into Athens, had inspired them; — a Manner and Disposition, of like Kind with those which have been often observed of Young Logicians in Modern Universities. — But on a little careful examination, the Whole Passage will be found to have, beside this jocose Raillery, a serious and philosophic Meaning. It will be found to convey these Truths, — that General Ideas are not peculiar to Persons who philosophize, nor to Nations which are civilised or enlightened; and that no less do they attend the unlettered Vulgar and the Savage: — that they neither first come into the Human Mind, when her Facultys arrive at their Maturity; nor depart, when those Facultys decay; but that, as they are essential to all Mind, (for What is Mind without Ideas?) they spring up naturally in every Mind, as soon as the Rational Soul.
Do you not see, O Socrates! how numerous we are, and that All of us are Young? and are you not afraid, that, if you rail at us, we shall All join Philebus, and attack you jointly? However, (for We apprehend your Meaning,) if you can, by any Means or Contrivance, easily rid us of these Perplexitys, which hinder the Progress of our Inquiry, and can devise some better way of managing the Argument, do You but give your Mind to the prosecution of it, and We shall do our utmost to follow and attend you. For the present Debate is of no trifling Concern, Socrates!

Soul begins to energise; at latest, a little sooner than Speech is formed and issues from the Mouth. For General Ideas may be said, in a metaphorical Sense, to be the Souls of all Human Speeches; from Them, much more than from Sensible Images, it is, that Articulate Sounds, the Subject-Matter of Speech, receive their Form or Meaning: and thro' Them it is, that the Meaning passes from One Mind into Another.—A Hint also is given, in a Part of the Passage now before us, that Novices in Philosophy are apt to imagine Some Brute Animals not totally void of General Ideas. —The Satyric Humour which appears in this Passage, and the grave Meaning, couched under that Appearance, were, we find from what Protarchus says next, Both of them discerned by the young Gentlemen of the Lyceum, Auditors of the Conversation.

Socrates.
Socrates.

Indeed it is not, Children! as Philebus called you. No better Way then is there, nor can there be, than That, which I am always a great Lover of ⁵⁹; but often before now, it has flipt away from my Sight, and has left me, as it were, in a Desert, at a Lofs whither to turn me.

Protarchus.

Let us but know, What Way you mean.

⁶³ In the Greek,—μνημα,—perhaps alluding to a Device, sometimes used by the best Tragic Poets of Greece. For, when their Ingenuity was at a Lofs, how to diëntangle the Perplexitys of their Plot or Fable, by any ordinary and Human Means, they introduced the Person of some Deity, appearing in the Scene ἐκ μνημαῖς, (that is, by some such Piece of Machinery, as hath been exhibited on our modern Stage in many of our Pantomimes;) either to unfold those Intricacies of the Drama, occasioned by the Misapprehensions and Errors of the principal Persons therein,—or to bring about a Catastrophe, not to be accomplished without some Divine Interposition,—or to pacify and silence all Partys, by announcing the Will of Heaven. — In this Theatrical Sense the Word μνημα is used by Plato in his Cratylius, pag: 425. But our chief Reason for thinking, that he meant an Allusion to it in the place now before us, is This,—that he is here actually preparing to introduce True Divinity, as the only Means of clearing away the present Difficultys about the Monads.

⁶⁹ The Way, which the Philosopher means, is the ascending to the Principles of All things.
Socrates.

To point out the Way, is not very difficult; but to travel in it, is the most difficult of all things. For all such human Inventions, as depend on Art, are, in this Way, discovered and laid open. Consider then the Way, which I am speaking of.

Protarchus.

Do but tell it us then.

Socrates.

A Gift of the Gods to Human Kind, (as appears plain to Me,) it was of old brought from Heaven, by some Prometheus, along with a Fire the most luminous.

For the only Way of explaining any Works of Art fully and clearly, is to shew the Principles of their Construction. And the only right Way of teaching any Art, is to begin from the Principles on which the Art is founded.

These re-iterated Delays in Socrates are evidently intended to augment the Curiosity of his Audience, and to heighten their Expectations of something very important.

What is said, in Plato’s Timeus, pag: 47, of Philosophy in general, that ’twas a Present from the Gods to Human Kind, seems to be here said particularly of that Basis of Philosophy, the Doctrine of the Principles of the Universe, which are the same with those of Mind.

The fabled Prometheus is said to have brought down fire from Heaven, to animate the Man, whom he had made of Mud or Clay;
minous. From the Men of ancient Times, Men, better than We are, and dwelling nigher to the Gods,

Clay; that is the Human Body, composed (as Clay and Mud are) from the Elements of Earth and Water.—Concerning the allegorical Prometheus, see the next Note.

We presume, that the Luminous Fire, here spoken of, means the Fire truly Ætherial, the immediate Seat of Mind; — That Fire, which is termed by the Stoicks νεφές, Intelleclive; and by Heraclitus, Ἐαμ, Divine, ἑρεῦς, the Vehicle of Wisdom, and ἄλων, pregnant with the ἄλων, the essential Forms (or Ideas) of all things. —In the Passage now before us, it is evidently implied, that the original, principal, and proper Place of this Luminous Fire is Heaven, or the Upper Sky;—an Opinion, which has in all ages every where prevailed. For All men, Barbarians as well as Grecians, says Aristotle, in his Treatise de Cælo, L. i, C. 3, τὸν ἀμφύτατο τῷ θεῷ τῶν αἰεοθεισι, assign the biggest Place [in the Universe] to That which is Divine.——Agreeable to this universally received Opinion, concerning Heaven, is an Account of the allegorical Person of Prometheus, given us by Cornutus, the Stoic Philosopher, in his Treatise de Naturâ Deorum, C. 18, apud Opuscula Mythologica, pag: 179; and by Julian, the Platonizing Emperor, in the Sixth of his Orations, where he explains the present Passage of Plato. For according to Their Interpretation of this Fable, Prometheus is an Allegorical Person, representing That divine παραστάξεα, or παροικα, which forms and orders the lower Parts of the Universe, the mutable and mortal; continually creating the various Forms of Bodies; and dispensing to the Bodies, newly created, Life, Soul, and Mind, in different Portions, suited to the Capacity of each Form. The more ancient
Theologers, however, the Orphic, seem not to have made any Distinction between ἅς, or μήτη, and πρόσωπα, or προφυλάκα. And we must confess that these different Names are very properly given to One and the Same Supreme Being; but they are proper in different respects. When he is considered abstractedly from Outward Nature, and as conversant only with Things Eternal, (the sole Objects of pure Mind,) πρόσωπα Providence, or προφυλάκα Forthought, is not to be attributed to Him; because as no Eternal Things are past, so none of them are yet to come; and in pure Mind there is neither a before nor an after, but all Ideas are αὐτά ναί ὑπόσχοντα, together always present. On the other hand, when he is considered as the Creator of Temporary Things, His Being is prior to Their Existence; His Ideas, considered as the Originals and Models of Their Forms, are before the Copies; and his Creative Mind is, with respect to these his Creatures, Fore- Thought, Providence, Contrivance, and Design.—Now this Divine Prometheus, being the Soul of the Universe, and inspiring into [lower] Nature, says Julian, προσώπα ἐνυμήμων a Spirit full of Warmth, or warm Life, imparts to Animals, Vegetables, and Fossils, so much of Soul, or of meer Life, as their several Frames are fitted to receive. But since, in lower Nature, only the organisation of the Human Frame admits of Mind, only to Human Beings is Mind communicated, in a Particle of that Aetherial Substance, which, according to Plato and Aristotle, is the first and finest, the only pure and simple, Body, or Corporeal Form: and is therefore the fittest of all Bodys to be the immediate Vehicle or Seat of Mind; filling those boundless Tracts of Aether, which, if the old Egyptian or Eastern Doctrine be true, are peopled with Immortal Beings, whose Bodys consist of that Aetherial Substance, and whose Minds approach nearest to the Supreme.
Gods 75, this Tradition of it hath descended to Us, — that those Beings, said to be for ever 76, derive their Essence

75 We apprehend, that, by these Better Men, these ancient Inhabitants of the mountainous Parts of the Earth, (many of which rise above the Clouds,) our Author here means the same Persons, of whom he writes in the Beginning of his Third Book of Laws, — Those, who escaped the last General Deluge, which had laid all the low Lands under Water, and had drowned all their Inhabitants. For those few Survivors were, as Plato with great probability there supposes, Such as led the Pastoral Life on the highest Downs, and with the natural Produce of their own Flocks fed andcloathed their own Familys; — “People, says He, of more Simplicity and Candour, more Sobriety and Manliness, and more Universal Justice, than the present Race of Men.” — Such People were likely to preserve, and to deliver down to their posterity those accounts of Beings, either Divine, or at least superior to Human, which the Philosophy of Ages, prior to the Deluge, had discovered and taught the World. — But who else may possibly here be meant, see in the latter Part of Note 78.

76 By these Immortal Beings, may be meant either those invisible Ætherial Beings, mentioned in Note 74, or else those visible Celestial Bodys, (as they are commonly called,) the Sun, together with the Planets, primary and secondary, and also the Fixt Stars; all of which in Greece at that time, and indeed all along from the time of Orpheus, were vulgarly deemed to have, Each of them, a distinct Intelligence or Mind. Whichever of these Two is Plato’s Meaning in this Sentence, it may well seem strange, that he should derive the Nature of the Monads or Ideas,
Effence from One and Many; and therefore have, in Themfelves, Bound and Infinity, connatural to them:
of which he is now discoursing, (Beings not intelligent, but intelligible,) from the fame Principles, from which the ancient Tradition, here perhaps referred to, derived the Nature of those intelligent Beings immortal and undecaying.—But we shall ceafe to wonder at this, if we consider, that an exact Analogy muft always subsift between all intelligent Beings, (of whatever Order,) and their Ideas. The fame degree of Purity or Perfection, which they have, Themfelves, the fame will be in their Ideas: for in proportion to the Grofsnefs or Finenefs of the Bodys, with which they are invested, will their Ideas be more or less accompanied or mixed with corporeal Images, and consequently will be more or less imperfect; because Matter, one of the Principles of Body, admits not of perfecft Form; and because no Particular Minds, (Minds, inclefled with Bodys,) can have any Knowledge of any Thing out of Themfelves, but thro corporeal Images. To this argument it may be added, that Being Intelligent and Being Intelligible are not only Correlatives, but are fo in their very Effences; Neither of them can be at all, without the Being of the Other.

That all particular Minds, even those of the Higheft Order, derive the Nature of their Beings from One and Many, is moft certain. For whatever Particulars fland together in the fame Rank of Being, they partake of One and the Same Universal; and all Universality fuppofes Unity, or Oneness, as a Principle of Things. On the other hand, if Multitude were not originally in Nature, as another Principle of Things, there could be no Particulars of any Universal; because every Particularity infers an indefinite and a poiffible infinite, Multitude of the Kind.—This Argumentation
them 78:—that, being in the midst of Things so constituted as they are, we ought to suppose and to search for some One Idea in every Thing around us; for that, since it is there, we shall on searching be sure to find it:

Argumentation not only relates to those Æthereal Beings before mentioned, (Such, as are termed by Proclus ρωσι τῶν ἑπειδῆς Deities,) and to Such also, as are their Objects, (those eternal and divine Ideas, termed by the same Proclus ρωσι τῶν ἑπειδῆς Divinities,)—but 'tis applicable no less to the Heavenly Bodys, visible to the Eye of Sense, — to all Such of them, at least, as seem to be of the same Nature, — the Sun and the Fixt Stars. For These have, according to the Orphic and Pythagorean Doctrine, as it is reported by Lamblicbus de Vita Pythag: C. 28, Ν. 151, τὰ παντὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν μορφὴν ὄμιλον, a Nature and a Shape, like to That of the Universe; that is, they are Ætherial in their Essence or Nature, and Round in their external Form or Shape; as the same Doctrine supposed the Universe to be, which may therefore be considered as That Universal One, of which They are the Particular Many.

78 This, as well as the preceding Part of the Description, here given us, of certain Beings, said to continue for ever, equally agrees to the nature of those intelligent Beings Ætherial, above mentioned, and to the nature of the Celestial Orbs. For all Individual Beings are Corporeal; and Corporeal Beings, be their Bodys ever so fine, consist of Matter and of Form. Now Matter, considered (καὶ τὴν λόγον) by its Self, is infinite; tho 'tis every where bounded, because it is every where formed: for the Form of every Portion of Matter is its Bound.—By the Form of it we mean, not the

Figure,
Figure, but the effential Nature, That Genus and Species, of which it is an Individual.—For neither doth the Nature of any Corporeal Being, nor do any of its Essential Qualities, arise from the Figure, Position, or Scituation of its Parts, as the ancient Atomists strangely imagined; but, on the contrary, from the Nature, the Essentiel Form, of every such Being, ariseth the Figure, which is proper to that Essentiel Form.—To this Interpretation of the Passage now before us, which attributes Bound and Infinity, Both of them, to Such Beings only as endure for ever, it may reasonably be objected—that Infinity and Bound are, Both of them together, essentiel to the Nature of all Body or formed Matter, and connatural therefore to every Corporeal Form. But to this Objection it may be anwered, — that Form is no where stable, and consequently that Bound is no where fixt, in any Corporeal Beings, Other than in Such as are permanent and endure for ever; and None can be Such, excepting these Two Kinds; — One of which is the purely Äthereal:—for Beings of This Kind, being uncompounded and uniform, have within them no Principle of Dissolution; (especially if their Parts, all of which are Similar and homogeneous, are held together by an unifying Principle within Themselves, a Particular Mind, or Intelligence of their own;) nor from without can there come to them Any Substance, finer than their own, (for None can be finer than the purely Äthereal,) so as to penetrate, divide, and separate their Parts:—The other Kind of Corporeal Beings, permanent thro all ages, comprehends all Such as are indeed, like temporary Beings, composed of Parts dissimilar and heterogeneous; and in the Frame of whose Bodys, just as in the Frame of Theirs, different Elements are mixed together, and are continually changing, Each into Other;—yet, because they are Spherical in their Figure, and are pressid every where from without by the Circumambience of an equal and unvarying Äther,—and because all their Parts gravitate within to
One Central Point,—and also, because they are incessantly in rapid Motion, turning, Each of them, around its own Axis, and wheeling their Course, in unresisting Aether, All of them, around one Common Center,—all these Causes operate together, so as to prevent their Frame from ever falling to Pieces.—Of this latter Kind is our own Terraqueous Globe, with its surrounding Atmosphere; and, reasoning from Analogy, we may, with great probability, refer to the same Kind all the celestial Planetary Bodys, whether of primary or of secondary Order; as appears from the most ingenious Theory of Huygens in his Cosmocoros.—Of the former Kind is generally deemed the Sun, That common Center, to the Earth and to all the visible Planets, of their circularly progressive Motion. To the same Kind are referable, according to the most probable and received Opinion, those Celestial Bodys, called the Fixt Stars: and the Quality of being Fixt is attributed to them, because, tho it be reasonable to conclude from Analogy, that they move around their several Axes, yet they still maintain the same Places in the Heavens; that is, the same Situation, Each of them, relatively to all the Others. To this Ætherereal Kind of corporeal Forms belong also whatever Intelligent Beings there may be throughout infinite Æther, invisible to Us on Earth, on account of the Finenes of and Minutenenes of their Spheres, or the Immensity of their Distance.—But, as to these Diviner Beings, last mentioned, tho Plato himself, during his Abode in Egypt might have been well informed of the Eastern Notions concerning them, yet, since it appears, that Socrates never intermeddled in such Speculations, we deem our Author too strict an Observer of Propriety, to give the least Hint of them, as coming from the Mouth of his great Master. It seems more probable therefore, that the Beings, spoken of in the Passage now before us, are Those, usually styled by Astronomers the Celestial Bodys. And what encreases the Probability of it, is

Q This,
This, — that, according to the Orphic Doctrine, these Celestial Bodys are infinite in Number; — that Some of them are fixed im movably, Each in the Center of some Planetary System; — and that the Motions of such Others, as move around them, are confined within Bounds impassable. Now we cannot suppose, that Socrates, so well acquainted as he was with all the Mathematical and Philosophical Learning of Greece, could have been a Stranger to the Beginning of it all, the Philosophy of Orpheus. For the Orphic Doctrine, descending from the Mountains of Thrace, where the Music of it had softened in some measure the savage Manners of the Thracians, soon spread itself over all Greece, by means of the First Followers of it, Musaeus, Linus, Thamyris, Eumolpus, and many Others; carrying with it, not only a Social Spirit and the Rudiments of Legislation, but also a Knowledge in the Nature of the Universe, veiled under the Rites of Religious Mysteries: and These, so long as they remained uncorrupted, were found to be the firmest Support to Legal and Just Government, and the strongest Barrier against the lawless and boundless Spirit of Injustice. — But now, after all the Pains we have taken to interpret this whole Passage in Plato, as if it respected Individual Beings, Such of them as endure for ever,—yet, if we may suppose, that either the Philosophy of Orpheus, or the Traditional Doctrine of the more ancient Mountaineers, reached so far in the Knowledge of Universal Nature, as to see, that all the Kinds and Species of Being are comprehended in Being its Self, — in One eternal and universal Mind, — in One inward or intelligible World, — in like manner, as the Individuals of all those Kinds and Species are comprehended in One sensible and outward World,—on such a Supposition, we should be apt to think, that Plato, in speaking of Beings, said to endure for ever, meant those very Kinds and Species of Being. For 'tis evident, that in this Part of the Dialogue, he hath These principally in his View; and that the Mention
it"—that, after we have found it, we are next, in this One to look for Two, if Two only are next; otherwise

of any Individual or Particular Beings, which endure for ever, could be introduced for no other Purpose, than to illustrate, in the way of Analogy, the permanent Nature of those Kinds and Species.—In this case, however, they are not to be considered as pure Ideas, or as having their eternal Essences only in the Mind of Nature: for Infinity enters not into the Composition of Any thing there, where the Bounds of All things are invariably fixt, and where the Nature of every One [that is, of every Monad] is always the Same: but to the Beings, here spoken of, Plato says that Infinity is connatural.—If then, by these Beings, we are to understand the Kinds and Species of Things to be meant, they are here to be looked on in no other Light, than as having an everlasting Existence in Outward Nature, thro an ever-lasting Succession of Individuals and Particulars, their Copies or Pictures, the Ground of which is the Infinity of Matter. See Note 164, in which is confirmed this Interpretation of the Passage now before us.

79 "All Nature (fays Plato in his Epinomis, near the End) beareth the Stamp of Genus and Species."—Every Form in Outward Nature is an Individual of some One Species, amongst Many; to which Many, One Kind of Being is common.—Nor is This true only of the Essential Form of every thing, from which Form the Thing receives its Denomination; no less true it is of every accidental and variable Quality, Condition, or Circumstance, which the Form admits within its Self; or which may invest, or encompass, or attend, or any way affect its Being. See Notes 26 and 28 to the Meno.
In the two First Editions of Plato, Aldus's and Waldor's, we here read μεταλαβωμεν, a Word, which the Sense of this Passage absolutely condemns. We therefore hope, that future Editors of Plato will here follow Stephens’s Edition, where we read καταλαβωμεν.

That is,—if the Highest Genus (or most General Nature) of the Subject of our Inquiry be, in its First Division, divisible only into Two Kinds, immediately subordinate to That Highest. — We shall exemplify the Division of Things, recommended to us here by Plato, in the following Table: it is adapted to Each of those Three Meanings, in which that ancient Tradition, concerning Immortal Beings, may be understood; as appears in Note 77 and the Two which follow it. — The Division of Animals, Vegetables, and Fossils, into their several Kinds,—and the Division of Each of these Kinds into the Species, peculiar to it,—are the entertaining Studys of the curious Naturalist, or minute Observer of the lower Works of Nature. — But, in this Table, we are far from pretending or desiring to make a just or complete Division of Being: we mean nothing more, than to give an Example, or Specimen, of the Method of dividing λόγω, or logically, Things (with regard to their Essences) into their several Kinds and Species,—a Method, which is perhaps the only Way of proving any such Subject to have been justly analysed.—For when we are analysing any individual Complex-Form of Nature,—that is, when we are investigating its Principles,—(from which Principles only we can discover, What it is, or in What the Essence of it consists,) we tread unsurely in every Step we take; because we tread all along in the Way of Induction from similar Forms; until we arrive at our End, the Principles we are in search of.—But when we are once arrived at this End, we are able with Certainty and Ease to return, thro every Step of the Road,—that is, thro every Degree in the Derivation (or Process in the Composition)
REAL.

Transient, or Mutable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower Elements</th>
<th>Bodys Mixt of the Four Lower Elements</th>
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<tr>
<td>Water, Earth</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senseless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vegetables. Fossils.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Mixed with the Four lower Elements; The Planets.

Primary; Secondary; Earth, &c. The Moon, &c.
BEING.

INCORPOREAL:
Eternal Ideas in the Divine Mind.

CORPOREAL.

PERMANENT.

Elementary Light, or Ether.

Ætherial Beings Individual.

The Four Lower Elementary Bodies, Fire, Air, Water, Earth.

TRANSIENT, or Mutable.

Body Mixt of the Four Lower Elements.

Unintelligent;
The Celestial Body.

Sentient;
Animals.

Simply Ætherial, or composed of Æther chiefly;
The Sun and the First Stars.

Mixed with the Four Lower Elements;
The Plants.

Senile.

Vegetables. Fossil.

Intelligent;
Of whose Specific Division we are quite ignorant; but among those of Lower Order, we may venture to place the Rational Soul of Man, the immediate Seat of That, which participates of what is Incorporeal and Eternal.

Primary;
The Earth, &c.

Secondary;
The Moon, &c.

[To be placed facing page 124.]
otherwise Three, or some other Number: again, that Every One of this Number we are to examine in like manner: until at length a man not only perceives, that the One, with which he began, is One and Many and Infinite, but discovers also how many it contains: — for, that a Man never should proceed to the Idea of Infinite, and apply it immediately to any Number, of that particular Complex-Form, whose Essence we desire to know; — in descending from Principles to Kinds, from Kinds the least General to Sorts or Species, and among These to that very Specific Form, which had before been the Subject of our Analysis. — Accordingly Plato, in his Dialogues, employs Analysis and Induction for the inquiring after and the discovering of any Truth,— Synthesis and Division, for the proving and the teaching of it.

In the above drawn Table it appears, that Being its Self is One, comprehending immediately the most General Kinds of Being; and thro' These, the least General and subordinate, in their several Gradations; — and more remotely, the numerous Species of all the least General Kinds: it appears at the same time, that Each of these Kinds and Species is also One, comprehending Many.

That is, — the Highest Genus of the Subject, which he is examining.

The Many, comprehended in every lowest Species of Being, are Beings Individual and Corporeal: and These are infinite in Number; because Matter is One of the Principles of their Existence; and Matter is infinite, in Extension, Divisibility, and Duration thro' all Ages of Time.

The Kinds and Species of Things must be of a definite and certain Number: for otherwise there would be no Science of them.
before he has fully discovered all the definite Number, which lyes between the Infinite and the One: but that, having compleated this Discovery, we should then finish our Search; and dismissing into Infinity Every One of all those Numbers, we should bid Farewell to them. The Gods, as I before said, have given us to consider Things in this way, and in this way to learn them, and teach them one to another.

But

36 That is,—that, after some General Subject of our Speculation has been considered by us, and divided into its several Kinds, we should not descend to the consideration of the Particulars or Individuals of those Kinds, untill we have considered, and are able to enumerate, all the subordinate Kinds, Species, or Sorts, intermediate;—if we would attain to true Science, or to full and perfect Knowledge, in the Subject.

37 Individual Beings are the Objects only of the Outward Senses, or of the Imagination: but where Sense or Imagination begins, there Science ends. Sense reaches to Individuals, the Multitude of which is infinite, and the Diversity unbounded: for Sense is in its Self infinite; and in Animals, or Sensible Beings, is bounded only by Defects in the Organs of their Sensation: but Science descends no lower than to Species.

38 For this mythological Tradition, see Note 72. But in its Mystic or Philosophic Meaning, it imports,—that every Particular Mind, having a Faculty of perceiving Every one of her Ideas, (every Kind and every Species of Things) to be both One and Many, derives that Faculty from the same Fountain, from which she derives her Being,—namely, from The Mind Universal and Divine.
But the Wise Men of these days take any Monad whatever, and divide it into Many with more Conciseness

For Unity and [definite] Multitude are the very Principles of all Mind.—Of Mind, considered as the Seat of Intelligibles, or as the Subject of Intelligence, Unity is the Principle; and of Mind, considered as the Object of its own Intelligence, [definite] Multitude is the Principle.—On Unity and Multitude, joined together, depend all Order and Proportion, all Harmony and Beauty. Without Number presupposed, there could be no Place for Agreement, no Place for Measure: neither would it be possible without Number, for any Truth, or any Good to have a Being. — But these two Principles, Unity and Multitude, or One and Many, may be considered, \( \lambda \omega \gamma \varphi \), not only as they are together in Mind and in every Idea, but as Principles distinguished from each other: and thus considered, they are severally the First or most General Objects of the Two higher Facultys of the Mind, Intellect and Reason. By her Reason, the Mind comprehends Many, and defines them, all and every of them; which Every of those Many, by her highest Faculty, That of Intellect, she sees to be One,—and All of them together, to be united, and to be One, in her Self.—And as One and Many are together the Principles of every Mind, so Same and Different are together the Principles of all the Mind's Intelligence and Knowledge; and may, in like manner, be considered \( \lambda \omega \gamma \varphi \) as Two distinguished Principles, and severally the Objects of those Two distinguished Facultys, Intellect and Reason. By her Reason, the Mind compares one Idea with another, and discerns the Difference between them; —a Difference, which by her Intellect she annuls,—that is, sees an Agreement between different Species in the Sameness of their Kind, and between different Kinds in some higher Sameness.
than they ought, and with more Prolixity too, since they never come to an End: for immediately after the Monad, they introduce Infinity, overlooking all the intermediate Numbers; the express Mention of which, or the Omission of them, distinguishes such dialectical and fair Debates, as Ours, from such as are contentious and sophistical.

Protarchus.

Part of what you say, Socrates, I seem to apprehend tolerably well: but the Meaning of Some Things, which you have now said, I should be glad to hear you express in plainer Terms.

Socrates.

The Whole of what I have said, Protarchus, is evident in Letters. In These therefore, which have

39 For instance, let the General Idea of Science be the Monad proposed; and let the Nature of this Monad be made the Subject of Inquiry; as it is in Plato's Theaetetus: if a Man, presuming that he knew its Nature, should begin to give an account of it, (as Theaetetus does in pag: 146, Edit: Steph:) by enumerating several Objects of Knowledge, the account never would be finished; because particular Objects of Knowledge are infinite. — In like manner, if the Nature of Pleasure in general be inquired into, as it is in the present Dialogue, it would be endless to enumerate the various Things, in particular, from the application of which to some Part or other of us we feel Pleasure.
PHILEBUS

been taught you from your Childhood, you may easily apprehend my Meaning.

PROTARCHUS.

How in Letters?

SOCRATES.

Voice, that issues out of the Human Mouth, may be considered as One General Thing, admitting of an infinite Number of Articulations, not only in all Men taken together, but also in every Individual Man.

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

Now we are not made knowing in Speech, or Sound Articulate, thro the Knowledge either of the Infinity or of the Oneness of its nature: but to know how Many, and What, are the Parts, into which it is naturally divided, This it is, which makes any of us a Grammarian, or skilled in Grammar.

PROTARCHUS.

Most certainly.

SOCRATES.

And farther, That by which a Man comes to be skilled in Musick, is This very Thing.

R

PROTARCHUS.
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

How so?

Socrates.

Musical Sound, which is the Subject-Matter of this Art, may be considered in its Self as One general Thing.

Protarchus.

99 In the Greek, the Term, used here, as well as just before, (where this Translation hath the word, Voice,) is φωνή. It there signified Articulated Vocal Sound, or Speech: — It here signifies Musical Sound of the Voice, or Vocal Musick.—We see then, that φωνή Human Voice is by Plato supposed to be a Common Genus, divisible into those Two Sorts or Species. It is expressly so laid down by Nicomachus, (Harmonic: Enchirid: pag: 3. Edit: Amst.) in these words; — Τῆς ανθρωπίνης φωνῆς οἱ ἄντω τῇ Πυθαγόρει ἔνσα-καλείσθαν πρὸς ἐφασκον, ὡς ἵναι γένες, εἰδὴ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ το μὲν συνεκτε-ιδίως ὄνομαζον τὸ δὲ διατηρατικὸν. Such [Writers concerning Musick,] as came out of the Pythagorean School, say, that of Human Voice [in general], as of One Genus, there are Two Species. One of these Two they properly named Continuous; the Other, Discrete. — These two Technical Terms he afterward explains, by showing us, that the Continuous is That Voice, which we utter in Discouraging and in Reading; (and therefore by Arisflaxenus and by Euclid termed φωνὴ λογικῆ) and that the Discrete is the Voice, issued out of our Mouths in Singing; (and thence termed φωνὴ μελωτικῆ) for, in this latter case, every single Sound is distinguished by a certain or measured Tone of the Voice. The same Division of φωνή is laid down, and a similar Account of it is given, by Arisflaxenus, in Harmonic: Element: pag: 8 & 9., Edit: Amst.
Without dispute.

**Socrates.**

And let us suppose Two Kinds of it, the Grave and the Acute, and a Third Kind between those Two, the Homotonous, or how otherwise?

**Protarchus.**

Musical Sound in general is so to be distinguished.

**Socrates.**

_Ansi:—_ The Doctrine, implied in the Passage now before us, will assist in the explaining of a Difficulty in the latter Part of this Dialogue.

91 **Homotony of Sound** is made, when a _String_ of some stringed Instrument of Musick, having the same degree of _Tension_ with a similar _String_ of some Other, yields, in conjunction with it, the same _Musical Tone_;—or when Two different _Voices_ utter, at the same time, Musical Sounds, Neither of which is more _Acute_, or more _Grave_, than the Other.—In Both cases, the Sameness of the Sound is also termed _homogonia_: for _same_ Voice is (metaphorically) attributed to all _Musical Instruments_; (see Nicomachus, pag: 5 and 6.) as on the other hand, _Tone_ is (by an easy Metaphor) attributed to the _Human Voice_, modulated by the Will in the _Trachea_, or _Aspera Arteria_; for this natural _Wind-Instrument_, in English aptly named the _Wind-Pipe_, while it transmits the Air breathed out from the Lungs, receives any degree of _Tension_ it is capable of, at the pleasure of the Mind.—In like manner,
manner, a Repetition of the same Tone from a single Human Voice, as well as from a single Monochord, is termed a Monotony. —In the Passage of Plato, now before us, we may observe farther,—that, tho Musical Sounds Homohonous, considered by themselves, may be either of an Acute Tone, or of a Grave, indifferently; in like manner as Persons, who read or speak in a Monotony, (where the same Tenor is continued in the Organs of the Voice,) may, in Expiration, draw their Breath either from low down, or from higher up; (indeed all Musical Sounds must be either Acute or Grave on every Scale of Music;) yet we here find Homonous Sounds separated from both the Acute and the Grave, and supposed to form a Third distinct Kind. —To set them thus apart by Themselves, is agreeable to that Account of Grave and of Acute Sounds, in Composition, which is given us by the old Greek Writers on Music. For, according to Them, every Musical Sound, called either Acute or Grave, is so called relatively,—either respecting the Sound which immediately precedes it, if issued from the same Voice or Instrument, —or respecting a Sound, issued at the same time from another Voice or Instrument. —And this perhaps may be one Reason among others, why Grave and Acute Sounds, in Music, are by those Writers said to differ katâ topov with regard to Place. From a Grave Sound to an Acute, and from an Acute Sound to a Grave, a Step or a Transition is made; (a Step to either of the nearest Musical Sounds, a Transition to any one that is remote:) ὁδὲ, says Nicomachus, pag: 8, ἀπὸ βαρύτητος καὶ ὑψητάτα, ὅ ἀνάπαλυ. But Homonous Sounds, even tho successive, remain (as it were) All in one and the same Place, to the Hearing of the Ear; as the successive Waters of a running Stream do, in their Appearance to the Eye.—'Tis from that Neutrality or Indifference of Musical Sounds Homonous, with respect to both the Grave and the Acute, and not from their partaking of Both These, that Bacchins and Aristides
Aristides Quintil. say, they are μέσοι Middle Sounds, between Both the Others. See the former, in his Introduce: Music: pag: 11; the latter, in his elegant Treatise τερί μεσικα concerning Music, pag: 23; of the Amsterdam Edition, Both.—Very different from these Homotinous Sounds are Others, to which is given the same Epithet of μέσοι—the φωνή, or Vocal Sound, in Cathedral Chaunting; — That of the ancient Rhapsodists in reciting Poems; — and the Recitativo in modern Operas; — a φωνή, Each of them, between the Continuous and the Discrete, (that is,) between Reading (or Speaking) and Singing,—a Composition or Mixture of them Both, and thence denominated μέσοι. See Aristides, pag: 7, and Martianus Capella, Lib: 9. To speak or to read in some such manner, Nicomachus, pag: 4, terms μελετάσεω.—No less different from the Homotinous is That φθόγγος, or Musical Sound, which, lying in the Mid-Way between the υπατί and the νῦτι, the Two Extremes on the most ancient and simple Scale, is accordingly there marked as the μέσοι, or Middle. See Nicomachus, pag: 9. — There is a Passage in Theon’s Mathematica, (pag: 76, Edit. Parisis) where μέσοι φθόγγοι Middle Sounds are to be understood in a Sense, similar to That last-mentioned. It begins thus, — τῶν φθόγγων οἱ μὲν οἰκεῖοι, οἱ δὲ βασικεῖοι, οἱ δὲ μέσοι Of Musical Sounds, some are Acute, some are Grave, and others are Middle:—Now this Division, being in almost the same Terms with Plato’s Division now before us, may easily be supposed to have the same Meaning; especially since this Work of Theon’s is professedly a Comment on the Mathematical Passages in Plato, But, as Theon proceeds to explain his own Meaning, in these words, — οἰκείοι μὲν οἱ τῶν υπατίων, βασικεῖοι δὲ οἱ τῶν νῦτων, μέσοι δὲ οἱ μεταξύ—he is so far, we find, from meaning, by his Middle Sounds, Sounds Homotinous, (the Epithet given by Plato to His Third Kind of Sounds,) that he must be understood to mean different Musical Sounds from the same Voice or Instrument,—all those, which, on the most enlarged Scale of Music,
Socrates.

But with the knowledge of this distinction only, you would not yet be skilled in Musick; tho' without knowing it, you would be, as to Musick, quite worthless.

Protarchus.

Undoubtedly.

Socrates.

But, my Friend, when you have learnt the intervals between all Musical Sounds, from the more Acute to Musick, ly, between the several ὑπάται and ὑπάται, in those several Systems, the Conjoined, the Disjoined, and the Excessive;—for which, see the Diagrams, drawn by Meibomius, in his Edition of Alypius. In a Sense, somewhat of kin to this of Theon's, a Tenor-toned Voice or stringed Instrument is sometimes called μέσον, as being the Mean, or Middle, between a Treble and a Bass, when all the Three are joined in Concert. Were the word Homotonous capable of such a Sense, we should not scruple to assign this Sense to it in the Passage of Plato now before us.

An Interval is the Distance [or Difference παρά τόπον with regard to Place, mentioned in Note 91,] between any Two Musical Sounds, (between That which is Acute relatively to the Other, and That Other which is relatively a Grave,) however near together they may be, or however remote from each other, on any Scale of Musick. In proportion to the Nearness or Remoteness of these Two Sounds, the Interval between them is, in Mathematical Language, said to be small or great; that is, it is short or long. So that different Musical Intervals, like all other different
to the more Grave, how Many they are in Number 93, and into What Sorts they are distinguished 94; when you have
different Distances from Place to Place, essentially differ, one from another, in Magnitude or Length. And on this essential Difference are founded all the other Diversities of the Intervals; as will be seen in Note 94.

93 The Number of Intervals, between such Sounds as are definite and certain, must depend on the Number of those Sounds; in like manner as the Number of Distances between Citys, or other certain Places in any Country, depends on the Number of those Places. No other Things, than such as are definite and certain, is it possible to number: and no Sounds are Such, except the Musical.—For Sound in general, considered, not as a Sensation, but as a Thing External, is nothing else than a Percussion of the Air; and Air, being an Elementary Body, is indefinite in Extent, and infinitely divisible. Sound in general therefore must have the like Nature, and admits of no Limit, none to its Extensiveness, Depth, or Greatness, none to its Subtlety, ShriUiness, or Minuteness. — But the Organs of the Human Voice are limited in their Power of striking the Air; so as that they cannot produce Sounds, either above or below a certain Pitch.—Limited also are the Organs of the Human Ear, in their Power of transmitting Sounds to the Seat of Sensation. But Nature has given to these Auditory Organs a Power more extensive than she has given to the Vocal; because, tho the Equality of their Extent would be sufficient for mutual Converse, and for the other Ends of Social Life, yet 'tis necessary for Man, who is, by means of his Body, connected with all lower Nature, to hear many Sounds, very different from the Voices of his own Species.—The Companions however, of the Voice in uttering Articulate Sounds, or Speaking,
tho' it be narrower than That of the Ear in Hearing, yet can never be ascertained: the extreme Boundaries of it, Either way, in Height or in Depth, cannot be settled; neither can it be divided into any fixed or measurable Parts. The Voice of Grown Persons is stronger, and consequently of larger Extent, than That of Children. It is deeper in the Male Sex, than in the Female: in the Female, on the other hand, it rises higher, than in the Male. In warm Climates, the Organs of Speech are capable of greater degrees of Tension, nor less of Relaxation, than they are in colder Climates, where they are, like the Air, rigid as well as contracted.—But, in Singing, the Human Voice hath no such Latitude.—For Musical Sounds, uttered by Persons of either Sex, at any Time of Life, and in any Climate, have the same Effect on a Musical Ear, — on that inward Ear, which perceives Harmony; — uttered by Voices the most different, they hold the same Proportion, each of them to the rest; and in uttering them, all Voices have the same Degree of Tension, relative to the Powers of their respective Organs.—The Cause of all these Sameness lies in the Nature of Things, — in That Part of Nature, which immediately corresponds with Mind Eternal and ever the Same.—To this Part of Nature belong all Particular Minds, all Beings intelligent and rational. With the Nature of all such Beings the Nature of Harmony is congenial. For Harmony and Mind are con-natural: whatever Beings therefore partake of Either, partake, at the same time, of Both.—Hence it is, that Musical Sounds, uttered by Human Voices, or issued from any Musical Instrument of Man's Contrivance, proceed from what is of Divine Origin within him; and the Force of them is felt only by what is of the same Origin in Others, namely, Harmony and Mind. — Sound is nothing more than the $\lambda$, or Subject-Matter of Musick, in the partial and modern Meaning of the word Musick: it is Harmony, which gives Form to this Matter, and makes
makes Sounds to be Musical. — Now it is the Nature of Form in general, to set certain Limits to every Portion of Matter, which it invests. The Compass or Extent therefore of Musical Sound in general must of necessity be limited; and every Musical Sound within that Compass must be fixed to a certain Point. If their Extent be limited, there must be then a Highest and a Lowest, their extreme Boundaries: and if every one of them be fixed, the several Distances, or Intervals, between Each and every Other, must be limited also, and certain. Of these Intervals, there must also then be a Greatest and a Least. The Greatest or Longest Interval, between any Two of these Sounds, is evidently That between the Highest and the Lowest: and 'tis agreed on by all the Ancient Writers on this Subject, that the Least or Shortest Interval is the \( \sigma \nu \varepsilon \iota \zeta \zeta \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \varepsilon \zeta \) or \( \chi \iota \iota \zeta \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \) in the Enharmonic Melody. Now the Knowledge of a Quarter-Tone, or of any larger Part of a Tone, implies the Knowledge of a Whole Tone; and the Knowledge of This infers a Knowledge of all the Other Intervals, in respect of their Magnitude or Length; for they are all measured by Tones, or definite Parts of Tones: tho' some indeed fail of so exact a Measure, some Space remaining over, which is called a \( \epsilon \iota \eta \mu \mu \alpha \). If then all the Intervals of Musical Sounds are knowable, no less knowable is the Number of them: For Things of any Kind, when they are all known, are easy to be numbered. None indeed, but Such as are definite, fixed, and certain, are ever to be known; and Such only are Those, which (to use our Author's own expression) lye between the Infinite and the One. In the present Subject, Musical Sound in general is That One; and Those Infinite are the Musical Sounds from innumerable Voices and Instruments of Musick.

\[94\] The ancient Writers on this Subject enumerate Five Sorts of Diversities, in which the Intervals differ, Some of them from Others. The First Sort has been mentioned in the preceding Note,
Note,—namely, That, relative to their Magnitude.—This primary Difference between them is (as it were) the natural Ground, out of which, when it was cultivated by the close Attention of Good Ears, Another Sort of Difference was perceived arising between the Intervals;—a Difference, from which anciently were framed Three different γένα τῶν μέλωνias Kinds of Melody, (as they are called by Aristides, pag. 19,) the Diatonic, the Chromatic, and the Enharmonic.—The smallest Interval in the Diatonic Melody was a Half-Tone: the Enharmonic descended to a Quarter-Tone: the Two smallest in the Chromatic were between the Half-Tone and the Quarter-Tone;—namely, a Third Part of a Tone, in one Species of the Chromatic; in another Species of it, a Quarter and Half-Quarter Tone, as One simple Interval. —Those Three Kinds of Melody had also Seven Other simple Intervals, severally peculiar to each Kind. The Diatonic had an Interval of a Whole Tone; another Interval of a Three-Quarter Tone; another, of a Tone and a Quarter: in the Enharmonic, there was an Interval of Two Tones: and in the Chromatic, was an Interval of a Tone and Half-Tone and the Third of a Tone; another, of a Tone and Three Quarters; another, of a Tone and Half a Tone. These Eleven peculiar Intervals, the Four smaller and the Seven greater, were called by the Names of those Three different Kinds of Melody, to which they respectively belonged,—the Diatonic Intervals, the Chromatic, and the Enharmonic;—and thus arose a Distinction of the Intervals κατὰ γένες, in respect of Kind. —The Speculation of these Two Sorts of Difference between the Intervals,—their Difference in Magnitude, and their Difference in Kind,—easily produced a Third Sort; according to which, they were distinguished by the opposite Attributes, Compounded and Uncompounded.—The uncompounded Intervals are those, which are not divisible by any intervening ψυχικος, or Musical Sound, on the same Scale, or in the same Kind of Melody: the compounded are Such, as over-leap some intermediate.
mediate Musical Sound or Sounds, by which they may be divided, and into which, as into their Elements, they are resolvable. Thus we find, this Third Sort of Difference between the Intervals to be grounded in the First Sort,—That, which regards their several Magnitudes,—but not discernible, until the Ear had nicely distinguished all the peculiar Intervals in the Three Kinds of Melody. —Farther; when the Ground had received an additional Cultivation from Mathematical Science, — when the Greater Intervals in each Kind of Melody came to be measured,—a Fourth Sort of Difference was discerned between them: for Some were found to be completely measured by some Smaller Interval in the same Kind of Melody: Others were found to exceed, or to fall short of, any such certain Measure multiplied; Those were distinguished by the Epithet ἄλογα; while These were called ἀλογα;—Mathematical Terms, both of them;—the former was applied to those Quantities, which had a certain Name, because they were divisible into Parts of known Proportion; the latter Term was applied to Quantities, the Parts of which were not in any certain Proportion to each other, and were therefore, as well as the Wholes which they composed, undefinable and nameless: the Epithet, now given to Quantities of this latter Sort, is the Term Surd. — Of the Four Sorts of Difference between the Intervals, hitherto mentioned, the First Sort we called metaphorically the Ground of the other Three; and These, the Products of that Ground, arising from learned and heedfull Culture. — The Fifth Sort of Difference is That, by which the σύμφωνα Consonant Intervals differ from συμφωνα the Dissonant. Now this last Distinction (to continue the Metaphor) springs up spontaneously from the same Ground; having been sown therein by Universal Mind, the Cause of Harmony: the Discrimination or Sense of this Distinction needs only the Warmth of Genius, to raise it higher and higher towards Perfection. For a Particular Mind, or Genius, disposed to Harmony and Musick, is
have also learnt the Bounds of these Intervals, and how many Systems of Sounds are composed out of them.

is (as it were) the Air within, warmed by the Rays of the Intellectual Sun;—Rays, which refine the Mental Facultys; quicken the Discernment of Sameness and Difference in all Things; sharpen the Sense of Order, Harmony, and Proportion, in the Works of Nature; and form a fine as well as a just Taste of whatever, in the Works or Operations of Art, is agreeable to those Outward Copies of the Mind of Nature. — Thro this innate Sense of Harmony, liveliest in the finest Genius, it was discovered, that the smallest Interval of Consonance was the Diatessaron; for that every Interval, smaller than This, was dissonant. Thro the same Sense, a farther Discovery was also made, of Seven more Intervals of Consonance, Each greater than the preceding, when placed in the Order now to be exhibited;—the Diapente; the Diapason; the Diatessaron added to Diapason, as One Interval; the Diapente added to Diapason, in like manner; the Disdiapason; the Diatessaron added to Disdiapason, as One Interval; and the Diapente added to Disdiapason, in like manner: Every Interval between any Two of these Eight was perceived to be an Interval of Dissonance.

The Bounds of each Interval are those Two Musical Sounds, from Either of which there is made an immediate Step or Transition to the Other. Of all Musical Sounds the Three principal were ὑπάρχον the most Grave, ἀρχη the most Acute, and μέσον the Middle between those other Two, on the most ancient Scale of Musick; which consisted of only Seven Sounds, produced by striking on the same number of Strings, all of different Lengths. We account those Three, just now mentioned, the principal, because the first and easiest Division of any Quantity.
city, whether it be continuous or discrete, is into two equal Parts, or Halves; the most distinguishable Points or Bounds of it therefore, however it be afterwards subdivided, are the two Extremes and the Middle. Accordingly Plato, in his 4th Book de Republica,Edit: Cantab: pag: 314, speaking of the veatn, the vpatn, and the meon, the Highest, the Lowest, and the Middle Sound in Music, calls them είγος τρισ ἄγορίς, the Three Bounds of Harmony; and likens to them the three most evidently distinguishable Parts of the Soul,—the Rational Part, the Highest,—the Conceivable, the Lowest,—and the Irascible, between them both.

96 A System is a Composition of three or more Musical Sounds; or (what amounts to the same thing) it is an Extent, comprehending two or more Intervals.—Of these Systems the general Diversities are laid down by Arifides, pag: 15, & seq. But in His Definition of a System, (as it is printed,) an important Error deserves Notice. For we there read — πλεον τα δυo, — more than Two:—instead of which, we ought to read  δυο τα πλεον, Two or more; or else — πλεον τα επ' εις, more than One: which last are the very words, used by Arifloxenus, Euclid, and Gaudentius, in Their Definitions of a System. The Error probably arose from some Manuscript Copy of Arifides, happening to be not easily legible in this place. The Transcript of it therefore, we suppose, consulted Baccheius; who in His Definition of a System, useth the words — πλεον τα δυο — these words are right indeed in Baccheius, because they are by Him applied to φαντασμών Musical Sounds, agreeably to Our First Definition; but they would be wrong in Arifides, where he is speaking, not of φαντασμών, but of διάσταινων the Intervals of those Sounds, agreeably to our Second Definition.—On the many Diversities and Variations, to be made in so large a Field of Systems, are founded those many different Forms, Figures, or Modes of Harmony, or Sorts of Tunes, (the Greek
them; (which our Predecessors having discovered, delivered down to Us, who come after them, by the name of Harmonys; and having discovered other such

Greek Writers call them ἀσία, μόσφαξ, γυματα, τρόποι, and τόνω ἐχονικά) the general Kinds of which, according to Aristides, pag: 25, are These — the Dorick, the Phrygian, and the Lydian: if this be true, all the other Modes are to be considered as subordinate to these Three; and indeed they seem, Some of them, to be Intensions, Others to be Remissions, and Others to be Mixtures, of Those the more moderate and simple.

97 The word ἐχονικά, Harmony, was used in different Senses by the old Grecian Writers. We learn from Nicomachus, that the most ancient Writers on Music gave the name of Harmony to that most perfect Concinnity, the Diapason. — Aristoxenus and Euclid mean, by the Term Harmony, That Kind of Melody, which is called Enharmonic. — Plato and Aristotle, when they speak of Harmony in the singular number, without the addition of an Epithet, denoting the Sort, mean, by that Term, the Idea, which is commonly nowadays expressed by the Term Music; — probably, because it was the First discovered of those Sciences, as well as the First invented of those Arts, which were anciently comprehended together in One general Idea, expressed in One Word, and termed Music. What Sciences and Arts were included in the Meaning of that general Term, it will be more opportune to specify in the next Note. — But when the same great Philosophers speak of Harmonys in the plural number, they mean those different Forms or Modes of Harmony, whose Specific Differences depend on the different Systems, or on the different Order of those Systems, of which they are severally composed. — To the Term Harmony
such Affections in the Motions of the Body, and in Words, measuring these by Numbers, they have taught

Harmony in this latter Sense only, (as it signifies a Mode of Harmony,) agrees the following Definition of it, given us by Theo, and, long after him, by Psellus; — Ἀμονία ἐτὶ συντμάτων σύνταξις. A Harmony (not, Harmony in general) is a Composition (or an Ordering together) of Systems. — On this Definition Bouillaud in his Notes to Theo, pag. 250, judiciously thus observes, — Vacat hic Harmoniam, quos alii appellant τρίτος σεν τόις. — On this Subject we shall only observe farther, that the Synthesis of Harmony, presented to us by Plato in the whole Passage now before us, beginning from simple φωναῖα or Musical Sounds, (which are the Elements or primary constituent Parts of Harmony,) is exactly the same, and proceeds in the same Order, with That Synthesis, which is taught by all the ancient Greek Writers on Music: One Proof among Many, This, of Plato’s Knowledge in the Theory of Music. Agreeably to which observation, Plutarch, in his Treatise τῷ μουσικῷ, informs us, that Plato applied his Mind closely to the Science of Music; having attended the Lectures of Draco the Athenian, and those of Metellus of Agrigentum. Or if we suppose, that Plato, in this Part of the present Dialogue, did no more than faithfully record the Doctrine of Socrates, our supposition is very justifiable: for Socrates, in his Old Age, studied Music under Connus.

That is, — such Relations and Proportions, (or to make use of Musical Terms) such Steps and Transitions, Intervals and Bounds, Systems and Compositions, in the Motions of the Body, and in Words, as are analogous to the Affections of Musical Sounds, called by those very Names. — The Greek word, which we have rendered.
ordered into English by the word Affections, in the Passage of Plato now before us, is πάθος, and translated literally, signifies Passions. For, whatever Situation, Condition, or Circumstance, any Being or Thing is placed in by some Other,—or by its Relation to some Other,—in whatever way it is acted on, or affected by that Other,—such Situation, &c, of the Being or Thing so placed, so acted on, or so affected, was by the Greek Philosophers termed a πάθος, a Passion of such Being; because, in that respect, the Being is passive.

In the printed Greek of this Passage we read only, —

ἔντε τὰς κωνιόςιαν αὐτὸ τῆς σώματος — immediately after which, —

ἔντε βίομασιν, — ought to follow, but is omitted. This will be rendered probable, at the least, by the two next Notes; to which we shall here prefix the following Observations.—The ancient Grecians, in their Idea of Mufick, comprehended the Sciences of Harmony, Rhythm, and Metre; — that is, — a perfect Theory of Sounds, Musical and Harmonic,—of Motions of the Body, regular and well-proportioned, — and of Words, the Meaning of which (and perhaps the Sound also, when those Words are properly pronounced,) agrees with those Musical Sounds, and those Rythmic Motions; all Three joining to produce One great Effect on the Souls of the Hearers and Spectators.—On the Principles of those three Branches of Musical Science were of old founded the Arts of Vocal and Instrumental Harmony, Dancing, and Poetry; — Arts, which advanced nearer and nearer to Perfection, as the Minds of Men became more and more refined and polished, thro' the Study of Mufick. — We are furnished indeed by Nature with sufficient Powers to produce the several Materials for those Arts, or their Subject-Matter; namely,—inarticulate Sounds,—voluntary Motions of our Bodys, or of its Limbs,—and Speech in general, or Voice articulated.—Nature has also taught us to express, by those several Signs, the Passions, Affections, and Sentiments of
our Souls. But she has left to Us the harmonizing of those Sounds, the regulating of those Motions, and the modulating of our Speech,—not only, so as to attract and charm the attention of Those who see and hear us,—but farther, so as to raise in them such Sentiments, Passions, and Affections, as we feel, or feign to feel, our Selves, and think it good to impart to Others. To accomplish this End, were the Musical Arts invented; and Rules, and Systems of Rules, were composed and framed, for the teaching and learning of these Arts. But the Sciences, on whose Principles these Arts are founded, have their foundation, Themselves, in universal Nature,—in That Part of it, which is everlastingly the Same,—in the Harmony and Symmetry of Things, which are the outward Expressions of Those harmonious and justly-measured Forms, the Ideas of Universal Mind; whose all-comprehensive Intelligence, or Wisdom, is Measure its Self,—The Measure of All things.—For these Ideas are the Originals of that Symmetry and that Harmony, which appear exemplified in the Forms of Outward Nature; and These their Exemplifications, the copied Forms, imperfect as they are, serve Us for the Foundations of our Science; which Science, in all its Compartments, we begin to build, as soon as our Minds are excited by those external Forms, so as to look within Themselves, and to contemplate there the more exact, tho faint, Copy of the same divine Originals.—Now the Internal Forms of Symmetry and Harmony, (obscured by those Corporeal Images which excite them, yet still bright, in proportion to the Brightness of the Mind where they arise to View,) are, as we conceive, meant by the Muses, those superior Beings in the old Mythology, from whom the whole Science and Art of Musick took its Name. For they were supposed to inspire Men, Such as they favoured, with a just Sense or Taste of Harmony, Rhythm, and Metre; and with a Genius for those Arts, which
taught us to call them Rythms and Metres; bidding us to infer from hence, that Every One-and-Many ought to be searched into and examined in the same way;)

which are founded on that natural Sense, improved by Science.

—The same allegorical Persons, the Muse, are also fabled to be the Daughters of Memoria Memory, begotten by Jupiter. And, if the Platonic Philosophy be true, our conception of What were meant by those Muse, rightly explains the Allegorical Fable of their Parentage. For, if all Particular Minds are derived from Universal Mind, the Mind of Nature, then must Their Ideas be derived from the Divine Ideas, as having been implanted or sown in them by their proper and true Sire; and when these Embryon-Ideas are born, or spring up in any Particular Mind, they are so natural to her, that she is apt to take them for her own Productions, her own long-lost and long-unthought-of Offspring; and to recognize them for Such, as if thro her own actual Reminisence.

Rhythm, in general, is an Order of homogeneous Motions, measured by Time. Motions homogeneous we call all such Motions, as are made in the same way and manner; whether they are made by one and the same Thing, as for instance, by the Foot or Hand in beating Time to a Tune; or whether by different Things, as for instance, by all the Four Feet of a Horse, one after another, in walking or in galloping. — Now all Order infers Distinction, — a Distinction of the Parts of some Whole. And where the Whole consists in Motion, as doth a Dance for instance, all the Parts of it are so many distinct Motions, and all these Motions are homogeneous. Every distinct Motion hath its Bounds, — a Beginning and an Ending; — Bounds, which are separated by Intervals of both Space.
Space and Time. For some Part of Space must be between the Place from which the Thing in motion began to move, and the Place to which it moves, and where That Motion of it ends: some Portion of Time also must elapse during such Motion, if no Motion can be quite instantaneous, or without a Lapse of Time. Two distinct Motions of one and the same Thing, as of the Human Body for instance, require, at the least, a Point of Time, for an Interval between them. Three or more such Motions, having Intervals of Time both within and between them,—Intervals unequal, but well-proportioned,—make a System or Composition of Motions,—an Integral Part of some Dance: and Many of these Systems (Each of them being, in the Times of its Intervals taken together, equal to every one of the rest,) compose a whole Dance; all the Parts of which συνταξιωταί are ordered together, and are proportioned, Each to Other and to the Whole.

101 In the Greek, — μέτρα. — The term μέτρον, in common acceptation, signifies Measure in general. But the manner, in which that word is introduced by Plato in the Sentence now before us, shows, that 'tis here used in That peculiar Sense, given it by the ancient Greek Grammarians, in teaching the Art of Verfification. Accordingly, the Romans, who derived all their Skill in that Art from the Grecians, retained the word μέτρον, in Latin Characters metrum, as a Technical Term, appropriated to Poetical Measure solely, the Measure of Syllables in a Verse. — Our old English Poets indeed sometimes, by the word Measure, mean a Dance; (probably because our British Ancestors used to dance to the Verses of their Bards;) but we venture to assert, that the old Grecians, by the word μέτρα Measures, never meant Measures in the Motions of the Body; for Such they express only by the term μέτροι Rythms. This Consideration first led us to suspect the present Passage to be, in some Part or other of it, wrong printed: and the Translations of
of it, made by Ficinus, Grynaeus, and Serranus, confirmed us in this Suspicion. For they translate, as if in the MSS, made use of by Them, next to the words — ἐν τε ταῖς κινήσεωι αἴτῳ τῷ σώματι,—they found written,—ἐν τε χιμάσωι—tho indeed erroneously so written, instead of—ἐν τε ρθυσιων,—as in this English Translation we have not scrupled to take for granted. The Mistake is only of the Letter ρ, to which the erroneous Character has a very near resemblance: it was committed the more easily, because χιμάσωι, in Plato's own Writings, frequently signifies any Figures, described by the Motions of the Body in Dancing. So in Aristotle's Poetics, Cap. i, χιματικῇ μεθέναι Ὑμηρεῖ signify the measured Motions of Dancers, imitating, by the various Figures which they describe, the various Manners, Affections, and Actions of Human Kind. But Plato, in the present Passage, is speaking of the Subject-Matter of Rythms or Measures in Dancing,—namely, Motions of the Body,—and not of Figures, which are described by those Motions, and constitute the Structure of the Dance; —in like manner, as he had just before spoken of the Subject-Matter of Harmonys,—namely, Musical Sounds, from which those Harmonys were composed, or constituted: and in the same scientific way, 'tis highly probable, that he should speak of the Subject-Matter of Metres,—namely, Words, —before he mentioned Metres themselves, which are framed by a fit Choice and Composition of those Words.—To this presumptive Argument for inserting—ἐν τε ρθυσιων,—we shall add an Observation, of weight with all learned Criticks: One of whose Rules, in judging of the Correctness of dubious Passages in any ancient Author, is to compare them with his Style and Language in other Passages on the same Subject: our Observation is This, — that where Plato is speaking of the Subject-Matter of the Poetic Art, tho sometimes he calls it λόγος Speech, and sometimes λέξις Diction, yet in other places,
places, particularly in his Writings de Logibus, pag: 660, 800, and 812, Edit: Stepb: he expresses the same Thing by the Term ὅματα Words: and these Three Terms are used with equal Propriety; for all Speech and Diction consist in Words. — Perhaps the old Greek Grammarians use a stricter Accuracy, when they say, that Syllables are the Subject-Matter of Metres, or of the Feet which compose them: see the Scholia to Hepheiston, pag: 76, Edit: Pau: and again, pag: 79, lin: ult: for it is certain, that a good Verse depends on the just and precise Measure of each Syllable in every Word of it. But an Account, so minute, as This the last mentioned, would have been, not only futile in Plato, but quite foreign to his more important Ends in treating of this Subject. Not the Structure of Verses, but the Sentiments, conveyed by the Words which they consist of, had He under his consideration, whenever he wrote concerning Poets or Poetry, except in the Passage now before us. For he has here in View, as we imagine, a still more important End, to be discovered in the latter Part of the Dialogue: and if in This we imagine rightly, an Exactness too minute would have less become him here, than anywhere else.—Since, however, the apparent and professed Subject of the present Passage is Musick, — and since the Musick of every Verse depends on the Quantity of the Syllables which compose the Words of it, measured by Time,— we are here to understand, by the term Words, their component Syllables. — Viewing the Passage in this Light, we may soon perceive, that Words are attended by Affections similar to Those, which attend Musick of every Verse, which enters into the composition of a Word, is composed of Letters, the Elements of all Speech, it must have Two Bounds,—namely, the First Letter of it, and the Last: 'Tis easy to apprehend, that
that an Interval,—not an Interval of Place, (Such as there is in Musical Notes, marked on a Diagram; or Such, as in Musical Sounds, issuing from the Organs of the Voice;)—not an Interval of Space, (as there is between the Beginning and the Ending of every distinct Motion of the Body;) but an Interval of Time only, between the pronunciation of the First Letter and the pronunciation of the Last, must intervene. 'Tis easy to discern, that an Interval of Time also, in speaking, must divide every Two Syllables of a Word, as well as every Two Words, if pronounced distinctly, let the latter of them ever so rapidly follow the former.—Nor is it difficult to conceive, that those other Affections of Musical Sounds, mentioned in Note 98, may be attributed to Words or Syllables, with no less Propriety, than to Motions of the Body. From What Principles, in What gradual Formation, the ancient Writers have actually attributed such Affections to the Syllables of Words in Metre, we shall now endeavour to delineate.—The Masters of Metrical Science, measuring Syllables by certain or definite Quantities of Time, admit of only Two such Quantities in Metre, One short, the Other long; the latter of which is twice the length of the former. A long Syllable therefore is analogous to a Whole Tone in the Scale of Music; as a short Syllable is to a Semitone. The Interval of Time, between the pronunciation of the First Letter of a Syllable, and the pronunciation of the Last Letter, ascertain s the Quantity of that Syllable. From one Syllable to another Syllable, a Motion must of necessity be made: and the quickest Motion is made from a short Syllable to another such; the slowest, from a long Syllable to such another. Two or more Syllables, set together as One certain Measure, whether the Syllables be short or long, are called a Foot. Every Foot is One progressive Step; and consists of Two Parts,—an áèrs and a ŋèm, an elevation and a depression of the Voice in pronunciation.
nunciation. Now these Two Parts have an evident Analogy to the Two Sounds in a Musical Interval, the relatively \textit{Acute} and the relatively \textit{Grave}; they are also exactly similar to the \textit{Lifting up} and the \textit{Setting down} of the Foot, (in the proper sene of the word) necessary to every \textit{Step}, in all \textit{progressive Motions} of the Body. From these very \textit{Motions} indeed are the terms,—\textit{Arsis}, \textit{Thesis}, and \textit{Foot},—taken, and metaphorically used, in speaking of \textit{Metres} in Poetry. Hence also a Verse, when the \textit{Feet} or \textit{Steps} of it are either \textit{even} or \textit{regularly uneven}, is said to \textit{run well}; when they are uneven without any Rule or Law of Metre, the Verse is called \textit{lame}, and is said to \textit{stumble}.—In some Sorts of Verse, Two Feet, coupled together, and thence called a \textit{στιγμή}, form the \textit{Metre}, or Measure of the Verse. A certain Number of \textit{Metres}, whether they be \textit{single Feet}, or \textit{στιγματικά Pairs of Feet}, being collected and composed together, constitute either a \textit{τρίος a Verse}, or a \textit{larger System} of Metres,—an \textit{Integral Part} of a \textit{Poem}: for a Poem is a \textit{Composition} of many such Verses, or of many such larger Systems. Where the \textit{single Feet} are regularly uneven, or where the \textit{Combination of Feet} (which is also called the \textit{Figure}) varies in a \textit{Verse}, or in some larger \textit{System} of Metres, there is evidently a \textit{Transition from one Kind of Metre to another}; and the Metres are then said to be \textit{πολυστιγματικά} variously figured. See Hephe- 

tion's \textit{Enchiridion}, especially in pag: 63, 65, and 59, together with the Greek \textit{Scholia} thereon.—Our Aim, in giving this summary account of \textit{Verfification}, is to show,—not only, that the \textit{same Affections} are incident to \textit{Musical Sounds}, to \textit{Motions of the Body}, and to \textit{Words spoken};—but also, that in all the Three Musical Arts, whose respective \textit{Subjects} are these Three several \textit{Sets of Materials}, those Affections are expressed by the \textit{same Terms}: And if we have not. missed our. Aim, the \textit{Meaning}, which we have attributed to the word \textit{μέτρα}, at the end of the present.
present Passage in this Dialogue, seems to be sufficiently confirmed. — Now if, on good grounds, we have supposed the Greek of this whole Passage to be, in some Part of it or other, faulty or imperfect, — if we have rightly conjectured, Where the Fault or Imperfection lay, — and if we have not ill succeeded in our Endeavours to correct and perfect it, — then have we before us three distinct Instances of One and Many, in the Three Musical Sciences, those of Harmony, Rythm, and Metre; — Sciences, which are by Plato in many other places, and by Aristotle in his Poetics, spoken of together, because Musical Science, in the general, naturally spreads or divides itself into these Three Branches. But that Each of them alone, is a distinct, proper, and compleat Instance of One and Many, will appear by considering Each in That respect only. — For Musical Sounds, the Subject-Matter of Harmony, being also the Elements from which every Form of Harmony is derived, by Mixture of their different Intervals in different Proportions, they are to be considered as One comprehensive Genus, divisible into Many Kinds and Species of Harmony.—In like manner, those Motions of the Body, which are the Subject-Matter of Rythm, being also the Elements of Rythm, they virtually comprehend the several Forms and Figures of Rythmic Motion; for These all arise from those Motions and their different Transitions, measured by proportioned Parts of Time. Hence are they, as it were, some extensive Monad, comprehending every Kind and Species of Dance.—Nor otherwise, the Syllables of Words, being not only the Subject-Matter of Metre, but the Elements also, from whose different Compositions result the various Forms of it, may justly be considered as a most ample Monad, pregnant with all the Kinds and Species of Metre.—Thus we find, that Each of the Musical Sciences, taken by its Self, is One and Many.—Now it appears from the whole Tenour of the Argumentation
mentation of this Part of the Dialogue, that Plato, in bringing so many Instances of One and Many, meant to illustrate the following Doctrines: — that, when the Subject of Dispute, or of rational Conversation, is some General Idea, containing a definite Many, (that is, a certain number of Kinds or of Species,) it cannot be known clearly and thorowly, without a Knowledge of All those Many, which it contains: — that no One of those Many can be known fundamentally, (or, as derived from its Principles,) without a Knowledge of that First One, which heads All the Many, and from which they are, All of them, derived: — and that those Many must be accurately distinguished from each other, and their Specific Differences precisely marked, by all Persons in discoursing together, if they would avoid the Error, which Protarchus had fallen into, in his account of Pleasure, That of confounding One Kind or Species with Another quite different from it; an Error, owing to This Supposition, — that Two Things, which bear the same General Name, as having the same General Nature, must therefore be, in their whole Essences, the Same.—To illustrate these Doctrines, Harmony, Rythm, and Metre, seem to be the fittest Instances of One and Many, among all that could be chosen at the Time of this Dialogue. For a compleat and full Discovery of the whole Science of Musick was made but a short time before: the Professors, in Each of the Three large Branches of it, were then, but not till then, thorow Masters of what they respectively professed: it was now studied by All of the Athenian Youth who had a Liberal Education; Many of whom were Auditors of the Conversation here related. Whenever Instances are to be brought, for the Proof or the Illustration of any Doctrine, delivered from the Mouth of Socrates, Plato is always accurately careful to choose Such, as are the moft adapted to the Understanding, Taste, and Characters, of his Audience. But in his Choice of the
way); when you have learnt all those things, and comprehend them in this ample manner, with all their several Diversitys and Distinctions, then are you become Skilled in Musick. And by considering in the same way the Nature of any other Kind of Being, when you thus fully comprehend it, you are become, in that respect, intelligent and wise. But the infinite Multitude of Individuals, their infinite Variety, and the infinite Changes, incident to Each, keep you infinitely far off from Intelligence and Wisdom:

Instances, now before us, we imagine that he had a more important End, than meerly the Observance of such a Propriety. We imagine, that in This he intended to give his Readers (of That Age, at least,) a Hint of what is to come in the latter Part of the Dialogue; where, in establishing the Order of Things good, he sets in so high a Rank all Those, the Principle of which is Measure. We imagine, that to prepare them for this Doctrine it is, that he raises up in their Minds afresh the well-known Ideas of Harmony, Symmetry, Rythm, Numbers and Proportion; and thus, obscurely at a distance, anticipates the Decision of the present Controversy concerning the Chief Good, by reminding them of Things better and more valuable than either Pleasure or Knowledge.

102 This long Parenthesis renders the Sentence, in which it is inserted, somewhat obscure and difficult. 'Twould have been easy for us to avoid the Parenthesis altogether, by breaking the Sentence, and out of One making Many. But we have chosen.
PHILEBUS.

P H I L E B U S. 155

dom: and as they make you to be behind other Men in every path of Knowledge, they make you chosen to follow the Steps of our Author all along, as closely as we are able. For we aim at presenting him to our Fellow-Countrymen, as he is; only clothing him in English Garments; but in his Make, his Gait, his Air and Aspect, throughout unchanged, with all his Blemishes, no less faithfully, than with all his Beautys. Successful should we think ourselves in this our Aim, could we exhibit his Beautys, as fairly and as fully as we can his Blemishes. And long Parentheses are, without doubt, great Blemishes in deliberate and cool Writings. But, as in Conversation they are customary, and in the warmth of Oral Argumentation are scarcely to be avoided, perhaps our Author purposely introduced such a one here, to give his Dialogue more the Air of a real Conversation. Perhaps also, by inclosing two of the Three Musical Sciences in this Parenthesis, wherein the natural Connection and the Similarity of all Three are shown, he would have us take them, all the Three, for One single Instance of One and Many: intimating to us, in this way, that All things, the Excellence and very Essence of which depend on Measure, naturally are allied together, as being congenial; just as afterwards he shows, how nearly related and how connatural they are, All of them, to Mind.

103 In the Greek,—ἀετερον τα φερεται.—Mons. Grou (to whom the French Nation are greatly obliged for their having the Philebus and other of the finest Dialogues of Plato in their own Language,) rightly observes, that in this Passage there is a Playing with Words. We are not surprized, however, to find no jeux des mots in his French Translation of it. This Sort
inconsiderable, and of no account, not to be numbered amongst the Knowing in any Subject; because you never consider any thing thorowly, and are unable

-Sort of Wit is indeed impossible to be preferred in a Metaphrase, or strict Version from One Language into another, if the two Languages greatly differ in the Words by which they express the same Things. The Utmost that can be done, in such a case, is to imitate the original Puns, by making new ones, as like to them as possible. But 'tis very difficult to make such Puns in either French or Latin. Is it not therefore a little uncandid in the French Translator, to accuse the Latin ones of not understanding the Puns in this Passage? and is it not more probable, that they All equally found the Puns too difficult for Them to imitate, as well as impossible to translate verbally? But to imitate those Puns in English, we find a matter of no difficulty at all: the reason of which is, we presume, This—that the English Language approaches nearer to the Greek, in Copiousness of Words, and Variety of Meanings, than doth the Latin, or any of its Descendants now living.—Some of our Readers, after all, may perhaps condemn us, for attempting to imitate a mere Sporting with Words: or, if they admit the Plea, put in by us very lately on Another occasion, to be extendible to This, and acquit us as being only Copiers, they may perhaps condemn our Author; deeming so ludicrous a Sentence, especially at the Conclusion of this Speech of Socrates, to be beneath the Dignity of a Dialogue so deeply philosophical as The Philebus. But besides what we have to say in general on this Subject in a Note soon to follow, we imagine, that the great Philosopher plays upon words with a particular
unable to give a true Account of it, never looking at the definite Number which it contains 107.

Protarchus.

Excellently well, O Philebus! as it appears to Me, has Socrates spoken in what he has now said.

Philebus.

It appears so too to Me my Self. But how does all this Speech of his concern our Controversy? What was the Design or Drift of it?

particular view in this place,—to keep Philebus in Good Humour: for, by assuming a jocose Air, he softens the Severity of the Censure, which, tho in appearance pointed at Protarchus, he here throws obliquely on the conceited Sophist.

104 In the Greek,—έκάτον.

105 Οὔς ἐλλάγμος, in the Greek.

106 Οὔτε ἐναγίδμος. Alluding to this Verse of Homer, in Iliad. L. 2. ver. 202. Οὔτε ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναγίδμος, ἐτ' ἐνὶ βιλῃ.

107 Protarchus is to be here considered as the Representative of every Man, who has not arranged and classed the Subject-Matters of his Speculation, or the Beings with which he has to do, their diverse Propertys and Accidental Affections, under distinct Heads juftly, by referring them to their several Kinds and Species according to Nature; for These are Things invariable, and among the Objects therefore of Knowledge. See Note 26 to the Meno.

Socrates.
Socrates.
A very pertinent Question, O Protarchus! This, proposed to us by Philebus.

Protarchus.
Indeed it is: and by all means, give it an Answer.

Socrates.
That will I do, as soon as I have gone thro' the Little yet remaining of the Subject, on which I have been speaking. For, as the Man, who applies himself to the consideration of any Kind of Things whatever, ought not, as I have said, to throw his Eye at once upon the Infinite, but upon some definite Number in the first place; so on the other hand, when a Man is obliged to set out from the Infinite, he ought not to

158 The Division of any Being, or Attribute of Being, into its Kinds and Species, descending from the most General gradually to the most Special, is (as we have seen) the Method, recommended by Socrates, for teaching and for learning any Science, heretofore discovered. See page 126 of this Dialogue.—The great Master of Dialectic proceeds to show the Method, by which every Science was discovered first; and to recommend the same Method, for advancing the Discovery of any Science, and for rectifying such Errors in the teaching and learning of it, as must have arisen from a Division originally wrong or incomplete.
incompleat. — Now this latter Method is directly contrary to that Other, which, beginning from One, descends to Many by Division and Subdivisions: for This begins from the Infinity of Particulars, collecting them into Many distinct Species; goes on, to comprise Many several Species in a few distinct Genera or Kinds; and thus gradually ascends to fewer still, and more General; till they are, all of them, discovered to have One common Nature, in which they, all of them, agree. — An Example of this ascending Method is here given us, in the Invention of Letters, those Elements of all Language. In this Example the Ascent is shorter, than perhaps in any other, possible to be given. For it consists of only Three Steps; wonderful of Contrivance in the Master-Builder; but when built, very easy of Ascent; so well have they been smoothed by good Workmen in this Elementary Part of Grammar. For this very reason, indeed, among others, we presume it was, that Socrates chose it for his Instance of the congregating and uniting Method, in the attainment of Science: as he before chose it for his First Instance of One and Many, because it was the most easy to be apprehended by his Audience; — a reason, which he Himself gave them, when first he mentioned Sounds Articulate. — His Second Instance of One and Many, That in Musick, would certainly have been alone sufficient; because all his Audience were versed in Musick, no less than they were in Grammar: but he began with the mention of Sounds Articulate, for the sake of introducing, regularly and scientifically, the mention of Harmony. For the First Division of Vocal Sound, in general, (as we observed in Note 90,) being into Articulate and Musical, (Articulate Sound, the Subject-Matter of Language, — Musical Sound, the Subject-Matter of Harmony,) — Articulate Sound ought to stand First in Order; because, the Musical Sound, with respect to Universal Nature, must be acknowledged prior to Articulate.
to mount up immediately to the One; but to some certain Number, in Each of whose Ones a certain Multitude is contained; and thus gradually rising from a greater to a less Number, to end in One. As an Instance of what I have now said, let us resume the consideration of Letters.

Protarchus.

In what way?

Socrates.

Whoever it was, whether some God, or some Divine Man, (the Egyptian Reports say, that his name was Theuth,) who first contemplated the Infinite nature of the Human Voice, He observed, that, amongst the Infinity of the Sounds it uttered, the Vowel Sounds

Articulate in Dignity; yet 'tis equally certain, that, with respect to Man, Sounds Articulate are not only prior in Time to Sounds Musical, (on every Scale of Musick,) but in Value also are pre-eminent: because Language is necessary to Man's Social Life, and perhaps even to his continuance in Being; whereas Musick is useful only to the Purposes of Civil Life, and contributive only to Man's Well-Being.

That is,—Sounds purely Vocal; whence the Letters, by which they are distinguished, are called Vowels; in the utterance of which Sounds, the Voice solely is employed, whilst the other Organs of Speech remain inactive.
were more than One, they were Many. Again, Other Utterances he observed, which were not indeed Vowels, but partook, however, of some Kind of Vocal Sound; and that of these also there was a certain Number. A Third Sort of Letters, also he set apart, Those, which are now called Mutes.

In the Greek of this Passaige, as it is printed by Aldus and by Stephens, we here read—φωνῆς μὲν ὑ, φώνησκε ἵπτεχοντα τύπος—a Reading which may be tolerably well supported by what soon follows. But the Margin of the First Basil Edition of Plato has suggested to us a Reading, in which appears a Distinction more obvious and plain, than there is between φωνή and φώνησκα, Voice, and Sound of the Voice. For, in that Margin, we are directed to read the word ὑπτα (sound perhaps in some Manuscript Copy of Plato) immediately after the word φωνῆς, and before the words μὲν ὑ, in this Sentence. Now these Two words, φωνῆς ὑπτα, put together, very little differ from φωνῆντα, a word, which gives to this Part of the Sentence a Meaning quite agreeable to the Tenor of the Whole of it, and to the Language of all Grammarians.

These were by the old Grammarians called μείπωνa Semi-Vowels; because, in their very formation by the Organs of Speech, they are, of necessity, so far accompanied by the Voice, as to give a Half-Vocal Sound, without the open Aid of any Vowel.

The Greek Grammarians enumerate Eight of these Semi-Vowels.
by Us. After this, he distinguished every one of these letters, which are without any vocal sound, whether perfect or imperfect: the vowels also, and those

Socrates, by expressing himself in this manner, concerning the general name of this third sort of letters, as if it were then newly given them at Athens, seems to disapprove it. Perhaps the ancient term, ὑπερωνα Consonants,—a term, applied by the new grammarians to the ἵμφωνα Semi-Vowels, as well as to the ἀφωνα Mutes,—was, in his judgment, properly applicable to those letters only, which yield, of themselves, no sound at all. For Mutes, as they are called, cannot be pronounced, even imperfectly and obscurely, as Semi-Vowels can, without the concurrence of some vowel, some sound perfectly vocal.

In the Greek,—ἀφωνα καὶ ἁφωνα,—evidently meaning such, as are neither vowels nor Semi-Vowels. It should seem therefore, that by φωνή Plato meant a perfect and clear vocal sound, such, as we utter in pronouncing a vowel singly; and that by φονής he meant that imperfect and obscure sound of the voice, made in the forming and pronouncing of a Semi-Vowel, unaided by a vowel. Now if this be true, then may the printed reading of that passage, to which belongs Note 110, be justified. Aristotle, however, who treats of this subject in his Poetics, Cap. 20, recognizes not any such distinction between φωνή and φονής; for he attributes φωνή ἀξωθήν, a vocal sound, such as may be heard, to the Semi-Vowels, no less than to the Vowels; and states the difference between these two sorts of letters thus,—the voice, in uttering the Vowels, proceeds ἀρευ προσβολής, that is, it makes no Allusion against any parts
those of Middle Sort, every One of them, he distinguished in the same manner: and when he had discovered how many Letters there were of Each Sort, to every One, and to All of them together, he gave the Name of Element. But perceiving, that None of us could understand any One of them, by its Self

Parts of the Mouth, those upper Organs of Speech, so as to be impeded in its free and full Exit: but the expressing of the Semi-Vowels is μετα προσβελτίς, the Voice, in uttering them, makes such Allision, and meets with some degree of Resistance: by the Allision it is indeed articulated; but by the Resistance, the Passages thro' the Mouth being straitened, it becomes weaker, and is diminished; — except it be in some Syllable; for here a Vowel will never fail to assist in the Delivery, by giving the Voice a free Passage into the Air. — Now Aristotle is indisputably right, in attributing to a Semi-Vowel, by its Self, φωνή Vocem, a Vocal Sound: but his learned Commentator, Victorinus, is equally right, in giving to this Vocal Sound the Epithets obscura, tenuis, & exilis; since it is but Half of the full and whole Vowel-Sound: and Plato may fairly be allowed to distinguish the Half-Sound by a particular Name, and to call it φωνήφωνις. But we know not how to agree with him, if he says that a Semi-Vowel does not partake of the Vowel Sound; because the Half of any Thing whatever seems to partake, to be a Part, or to have a Share of its Whole. For this reason it is, that we incline to That Emendation of the printed Greek Text, proposed in Note 110.
PHILEBUS.

alone, without learning them All \(^{115}\), he considered, that this Connection, or common Bond \(^{116}\) between them, was One; and that all these Letters made in a manner but One Thing \(^{117}\): and as he thus in One Idea-

\(^{115}\) No Man can know, What Share any Letter of a known Word has in the pronouncing of that Word,—nor how much any of the Three Sorts of Letters are able to contribute towards the forming of a new Word, — unless he knows, What Letters may be founded or pronounced, Each of them, singly and alone,— What Letters, joined together, have One Simple Sound Articulate,— What Letters easily slide into each other, and coalesce together in One Complex Sound Articulate,— and What Letters refuse all combination immediate, and require the intervention of some Third Letter, (a Letter of a certain Sort,) for a common Link between them, to produce any Sound at all. See Plato's Dialogue, named Sophiska, pag: 253, Edit: Steph.

\(^{116}\) The Passage, referred to in the preceding Note, attributes the Virtue of this common Link to the Vowels \(\deltaιαφορ\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\nu\rho\alpha\varepsilon\nu\), chiefly or eminently,—and not solely; because the Semi-Vowels are not quite destitute of this connecting Virtue; a Semi-Vowel may be interposed between a Mute Consonant and a Vowel, or between a Vowel and a Mute Consonant, to connect them Both, in the same Syllable.

\(^{117}\) This Passage may be illustrated by considering any One of the Elements of outward Nature. Every Portion, every Part and Particle of such Element, whatever be its Size, whether large or small, is not only One, distinguishable, by its Local Situation, from all other congenial Parts, Particles and Portions of: the
Idea contemplated them All, he perceived the Science of them All to be but One Science; and naming it from its Subject-Matter, he called it the Science of Letters.

PHILEBUS.

This, which Socrates now says, O Protarchus! I understand still more plainly, than what he said just before;

the same Element,—but also, when it enters into any Compound-Body, it becomes One of the Elements of That particular Body: and yet all the Portions, Parts, and Particles of this Element which is diffused throughout the Universe, distinguishable as they are from each other locally, and separated as they are by entering into different Compound-Body, are still but One Element, One of the Elements of all Corporeal Nature. What farther Meaning, enigmatical and profound, we apprehend to be conveyed in this whole Sentence, may be seen near the conclusion of the next Note.

In the Greek—γραμματικὴ τεχνή, that is, (translated into English literally,) the Grammatical Art. As to the latter of these words, Art, we are to observe, that Plato here, and frequently elsewhere, useth the term Art instead of Science, in speaking of Sciences, which begin not with First Principles, the Principles of All Things; and no Science except That of Mind, rightly called by Aristotle ἐ πρώτη φιλοσοφία the First Philosophy, begins with laying down These for its own Principles: the Maxims and Axioms of every inferior Science take these Principles for granted; and such a Science sets out on a supposition of their being known to All men. One of these inferior
rior Sciences, depending on the Science of Mind, is That of Grammar; — a Science, which, ever since it was fully discovered, and especially now, when it has been lately illustrated from the Light of true Philosophy by our English Hermes, appears to extend itself to all the Words of every Language, possible to be devised.—The other of the two words, the term Grammatical, is here used by Plato in its original Meaning. For the first Openings of this Science were confined to the Knowledge of Letters,—to the knowing how to spell Words, that is, how to resolve them into their Elementary Parts, Letters; These being the Elements of all Syllables; and Syllables being either the constituent Parts of Words, or whole Words, themselves.—But the singular Propriety of mentioning the Invention (or Discovery) of Letters, as an Inflation of ascending from Infinite to One, cannot be apprehended perfectly, without making use of that Kind of Analysis, by which the Wisest of the ancient Sages investigated the First Principles of All things;—That general and concise Analysis, which resolves every Individual Being or Thing, whether natural or artificial, into the Matter of it and the Form.—'Tis probable, that this Analysis began in the Minds of thoughtful Men from their observing, how the Works of Art were composed and framed. They had seen the Materials of these Works, totally void of the Forms, which afterwards they saw created by the Workmanship of Man. They knew, that those Materials had once been Parts of some of Nature's Living Forms, out of which all Life, whether Animal, Vegetable, or Plastic, was departed. Furnished with this previous Knowledge by Observation, when they came to philosophize, — that is, to inquire into the Principles and Causes of Natural Things,—reasoning in the way of Analogy, they inferred, that these Subjects of their Inquiry, Things Natural, were the Works of Nature, Creatures of her forming,
from Materials which every where lay before her. They were confirmed in the Truth of this Inference, by observing, that these Natural Beings either grew, or gradually were augmented, from very small Beginnings to a much larger Size; and from the mere Rudiments of some Form, attained nearer and nearer to the Perfection of it; by means of frequent Supplies of fit Matter from without, partly Solid and partly Liquid: whence it appeared, that this extraneous Matter furnished, at least, the greater and the bulky Part of those Materials, from which the Buildings of Nature were raised up and enlarged to their due Size.—It was argued also, that, whatever Life these Materials had once possessed, whether a Life of their own, or whether only as they had been connected with Other Substances, pervaded by a Life Common to them all, as Members of some Great Body,—if it was a Life of their own, it must have departed out of them,—or, if it was some General Life only, the Connection between them and their Fellow-Members must have been broken off, and the Life, Common to them all, must have passed by them,—before any fresh Life could enter, so as to form them anew; or before they could again partake of any General Life, by new Vital Connections with foreign Substances.—It was observed farther, that to all such Beings as possessed a Life of their own, (whether a Life of mere Vegetation, or of Sensation superadded,) besides a constant Supply of solid and of liquid Food, for Aliment to their Frames, Warmth also and Coolness from without were necessary, to support the Life and Strength within them:—and that, as to those Productions of Nature, which seemed to have no particular and private Life,—those various Substances, which are discovered in the Bowels of the Earth, or, on being ejected from beneath, are seen upon its Surface,—they were found by experience to be porous throughout, and permeable by Fire and by Air; and that:
that Fire and Air did actually penetrate and pervade all the Earth, was evident, from the Heat and Cold felt low down within the Earth,—from the hot Steams and cold Vapours arising out of the Earth,—and from the visible Eruptions of Subterraneous Fire, and the alarming Sound of Subterraneous Thunder.—From all these Observations and Reasonings, considered together, Philosophers soon came to these Conclusions,—that Earth and Water, Air and Fire, were the component Elements of all visible and known Corporeal Beings, and the Materials of all the Works of operative and plastic Nature:—that to these Corporeal Beings additional Substance came from the Elements of Earth and Water; (perhaps, from Earth only, if Water served but as the Vehicle of Earthy Matter to every Part of every such Being;) but that Life was conveyed to them thro the Elements of Air and Fire: (if Fire was not rather the sole Vehicle of Life; and if Air served but to fan the Fire, and to push forward the groffer Fluid Matter:)—that Life, being thus conveyed to every Part of every Compound-Being, was continually operating, to apply and adjoin thereto the newly arrived Matter; converting this Matter into a Substance of the same Form, or Nature, with That of the Part to which it was applied; and thus fitting it for the Growth or Increase, as well as Aliment, of the Part:—that Life had these Powers, the Power of transforming all Terrestrial Substances, together with the Powers of conjoining the Separate, and uniting the Distant, because it was full of Mind: for it evidently appeared, that Mind was the Cause of Form to all things formed by Man, and the Cause of Union or Conjuction to all things united or conjoined by Art: and from no less Evidence, That of Experience, it appeared, that Mind could form New Fabricks from the Materials of Such as were demolished; could even change the Nature of some of these Materials, and give them other Con- nections and other Unions than Such as they had before. — But
But farther; the Contemplators of the Nature of Things, in continuing to make Observations and Inquirys, found, that the Elements of Air and Fire, in their vigorous and rapid Motion, were incessantly busied in abrading from all Compound-Bodys many Particles of their solid and earthy Substance; in extrarring also from the same Bodys, and in sucking up from all Bodys of Water, many aqueous or humid Particles; and in freeing, and carrying away with them, many of the Aerial, and many of the Igneous, from all Bodys wherein Air and Fire were confined; for Any Particles of These Elements were ready to join with them, as being congenial to Themselfes: — that, on the other hand, the same Active Elements did continually, in their Passage along and through all Compound-Bodys, deposit, and leave behind them, many of those Earthy Particles of various Natures, and many of those Aqueous, which they had compelled into their Marching Company; and that, wherever they met with Bodys, wherein Air and Fire were found to circulate, Some of their own Race stopped there, and for a while took up their Abode within those animated Bodys. For it appeared, that Life was imparted to every Compound-Body, so framed as that Air and Fire could remain therein and circulate; and that 'twas this very Life, (imparted by, or from, a Life more general and extensive,) which enabled any Portion of Fire and Air actually so to remain and circulate.—Farther, it appeared from the Evidence of the Senses, that the Earthy Particles of various Kinds, so abraded, so carried off, and afterwards so deposited, as before mentioned, did, by this Change of their Places and immediate Connections, suffer a Change also of their Forms; but that, notwithstanding these continual Changes and Variations, absolute as well as relative, in all Corporeal Beings, yet the Bulk of them All, taken together, continued always the Same. — These Appearances brought on, of necessity in reasoning Minds, This natural Conclusion,—that One and the Same Substance,
Substance, namely, the Element of Earth, was the Subject-Matter of all this Variety, and underwent all this Transformation. — Wider Observations, and deeper Researches into the Secrets of Nature, led those sagacious Inquirers to deem it probable, that Earth, That Element evidently so variable, and those other Three Elements seemingly invariable, Water, Air, and Fire,— however they might essentially differ, all the Four, Each of them from the Others,—yet exchanged their whole essential Forms or Natures, One with Another, thro' a reciprocal Exchange of their Situations and Connections:—and that a frequent Intercourse, and mutual Commerce actually passed between Earth and Water, between Water and Air, and between Air and Fire, was visible to the Eyes of All men. Now if This was rightly judged,—"that all those Four Elements were subject to a Total Transformation, by an Interchange of their Forms,'—the following Consequences of this Position are rational and just: — In the first place, that those Four Elements, the Ingredients of all Compound-Bodys, (from the variously-proportioned Quantities of which Ingredients all the Variety of those Bodys probably arises,) have, all of them, One and the Same Substance,—a Substance, capable of receiving Form;—its Self, considered abstractedly from any Form, (and some Form or other Every Portion of it must always wear,) being only the Subject-Matter of all Forms,—of all such Forms as, together with That Substance, (formless, immeasurable, and boundless in its Self,) constitute all Bodys, whether Elementary or Compound:—Secondly, that all the various Forms, received by this Substance, the Subject of them, are introduced into it by One and the Same Life, — a Life, pervading, animating, and moving it throughout: — and. Thirdly, that this One and the Same Life of that Substance is the Efficient of all those Forms therein, by its being the Energy of One and the Same Mind: for
for Mind, being seatèd every where within That Substance, and ever contemplating within Himself those eternal Forms, his own Ideas, or, in other words, energizing within Himself, (for actual Contemplation is the Energy of Mind,) must be, by the necessity of his own Nature, the ever-rising Fountain of Forms to a Substance capable of receiving them, but incapable of retaining them; and the first Spring of Motion to those Forms which for ever must be in Motion, for ever changing the Places of their Abode, because of the Poverty and Imbecillity of the Matter which receives them. — Thus much, for the present, concerning the Elements of Outward Nature; and concerning Matter and Form, their constituent Principles, ever united; as also concerning their Efficient Cause, the Energy of Mind within the Matter; and their Formal Cause, or Exemplar, the Ideas within the Mind. — What is soon to follow in this Dialogue, will give us Occasion to resume these Subjects: we have handled them, as yet, no farther than seemed necessary, for investigating the Grounds and Principles of the Invention (or Discovery) of Letters, and for showing, with what Propriety our Author has chosen This Instance, to illustrate the Analytical Method of ascending from Infinite to One. — For if the Subject-Matter of all Outward Nature be infinite, in Extent as well as in Divisibility, — and if no Portion of this infinite Matter can subsist, or be, without some Form, (united with which it is called Body, or Corporeal Form,) — it follows, that Those Bodys, or Corporeal Forms, of which all other Bodys are composed, are infinite in like manner, that is, infinitely divisible, and infinitely extended. Air is One of these Elementary Bodys, and therefore must be infinite.—Now Air is the Subject-Matter of Sound; if Sound be considered, not as a certain Sensation in Sentient Beings, but as something External, the Cause of that Sensation. Sound in general, so considered, is Air, put into
into preternatural or unusual Motion, by the Impulse of greater Bodies, whether Elementary or Compounded; which Bodies are, themselves, impelled against it. Bodys, differing in Degree of Force, give it different Degrees of Impulse. Some of these Air-impelling Bodys are the Lungs of such Animals as breathe. For to the Air, which they breathe out to mix with Common Air, an Impulse is given by their Lungs; and the Lungs are impowered to impell the Air, which is in their Air-Vessels, by the Life which is in their Blood-Vessels; it being necessary that the heated Air within should be breathed out, and that Common Air from without should be drawn in, to refresh the Life, to cool the Blood, and to invigorate the Arterys. The Impulse is so small in ordinary Expiration, that, if the Passages for the Air be quite unobstructed, little or no Sound can be heard. The Impulse is increased by whatever increaseth the Force and Velocity of the Blood; and the Expiration is then very audible. The Souls of Brute Animals, strongly moved by their Appetites and Passions, give a proportionate degree of Vehemence to that Impulse; and are instructed by Nature to express those different Emotions by different Sounds, which are formed by widening or straitening, more or less, the Air-Passages in Expiration. It appears from this account, that every meer Animal-Sound consists of Matter and of Form; the Matter of it is Air; and the Form of it is the Kind of Sound, that is, the Quality and the Quantity of it,—a Form, which it receives (as to its Quantity) from the Lungs, and (as to its Quality) from the Contraction or Dilatation of the Larynx. —But these Parts of the Body, in forming those Sounds, are meer Organs or Instruments, employed by the Soul.—The Soul of the Animal hath this forming Power from the Soul of Nature; and this Universal Soul has it from being full of Mind, the Fountain of all Form and of all Efficient Power.—But the Soul:
Soul of Man partakes of the Mind of Nature, as well as of her Soul. And from this Universal Mind it is, that a natural Sense and Love of Harmony is in the Soul of Man. To gratify a Sense, greatly superior to Those Senses, the Objects of which are Corporeal, (and Such is simple Sound, the Object of the external Sense of Hearing,) and to favour a Love, greatly superior to Those Loves, the Object of which is Sensual Pleasure, — a Love, leading to the Enjoyment of Things Divine, — Nature has endued Man with a Power of modulating his Voice, and of giving to his own Breath, (which he can impel with more or less Force at his own pleasure,) the Form of Harmony. This Power she has given him, by having framed his Respiratory Organs, (especially the Glottis, or Mouth of the Larynx,) of a Substance much more yielding, contractile and dilatable, than That, which she has employed in framing the like Organs of any other Animals, equal in Size to Man. In all Animals then, (Man included,) the Soul is the immediate and spontaneous Former of those indefinite Sounds, unmodulated and inarticulate, which may properly be said to issue from the Voice of Nature animated and sentient: in Man alone, his Mind is the immediate and voluntary Former of those Musical Sounds; in which he may figuratively be said to imitate the Voice of Nature universally operative and forming. For Nature's Self (as it were) sings continually whilst she operates; putting Rythm into her Motions, Measure into her Materials, and Harmony into all her Forms; tempering the lulling Smoothness of Conords with the rousing Roughness of well-timed Discords; framing many Systems, correspondent to each other; and composing all of them together in One stupendous Whole παναγομόνον, comprehensive of all Harmonic Numbers. — But farther; the Human Nature, by partaking of Mind, partakes of Truth, as well as of Harmony. For indeed Both are connatural to all Mind, and congenial to each.
each other; as they will be found to be from the latter Part of this Dialogue. But, natural as Truth and Harmony are to Man, he partakes of them in no other Way from Nature, than as he partakes of General Ideas; and That is by the Power, which he naturally has, of perceiving them when offered to his Mind. For in the Human Mind, only the Principles of Mind, properly speaking, are innate. By the Principles of Mind we mean the Transcendental and truly Universal Ideas of Unity and Multitude, Identity and Diversity: These are the native Light of the Mind,—That Light, by the Medium of which she sees whatever she attains at any time to see, of Species or of Genus, of Sameness amongst the Different, or of Unity amidst the Many. Without these Principles, inherent in all Mind essentially, Man would be incapable of acquiring any the least Part of any Science; because he could never have any General Ideas; and without General Ideas, he could never attain to view any Truth whatever. For a Truth of the most simple Kind is only the mutual Relation of Two General Ideas; and a Truth of the most complex Kind is nothing more than the Agreement, the System and Harmony, of Many of them. — Any Two General Ideas, which are in Harmony together without the Medium of a Third, are, to a Mind, in which her native Light shines unobscured and clear, what Two Musical Sounds in Consonance are to a Musical Ear; if they offer themselves Both at the same time, such a Mind is, of herself, sensible of their Harmony, or Agreement; and understands the Relationship between them, without being taught, What particular Truth is the result. But a Man can receive no Instruction, nor can his Mind be informed with any Truth, new to her, if the Terms, in which that Truth is delivered, apply not to certain Ideas in his Mind. Previous Ideas are necessary therefore to the Perception of the plainest Truth. — Now 'tis certain, that no man,
man, from his own acquaintance with the Objects of Sense, can have his Mind **stored** with the **Ideas of All Things**. For, in that case, a Man must have had all those Ideas, at different times, _actually present_ to his Mind. But, should the possibility of that case be admitted, the whole Time of Man's Life would not suffice for the longest Liver to _compare_ Each of those Ideas distinctly with _every Other_; and yet This is the only Way, in which all Truths can ever be discovered. A Discovery therefore, so ample and compleat, is impossible to be made by any One Man. In fact, One Man alone can advance but a very little way towards it. And yet every Man, who is, what Nature made him, speculative and free, has, when his Bodily Wants are all of them supplied, such an insatiable Desire of **Knowledge**, and such a strong Tendency of Will towards **Truth**, as that, after he has attained ever so much, still they urge him on to the Pursuit of more. To indulge a Desire so rational, and to gratify a Love so godlike, with as much Enjoyment, as the Human Mind can bear, and to as great an Extent as her Powers can reach, the providential **Mind of Nature** has contrived the Means, how Each Man's small Stock of Knowledge and Truth, of his own acquiring, may be **communicated** to Others, without Loss to Himself; and farther, how it may be placed in a **Common Treasury**, which should be _exhausted_, for every Man to draw from thence whatever his Occasions or Inclinations may require. These Ends are known to be accomplished, — the first of them, by **Speech,** — the latter, by **Writing** and publishing what is written. — For all the **Words**, significant of **Things** or of the **Attributes** of Things, in every Language **spoken** by Men, are the Representatives of **Ideas**; and all **Letters written**, or Characters, are the Representatives of **Words spoken**. — Now, with regard to **Speech**, it is admitted, that every **particular** Language, spoken by Some Men
Men and not by Others, was invented by the First Speakers of it: for they must have been unanimous, and by Signs tacitly have agreed, that certain arbitrary Sounds Articulate, (that is, Words,) uttered from their Mouths, should represent or signify the Species of those Objects, to which they pointed. But, notwithstanding this, it must, on the other hand, be granted, that Language in general, or Speech, was derived from Nature; as Nature is employed by the Giver of all Good in the distribution of his Corporeal Gifts. From Nature it is, that Man hath this Faculty of Speech, this Power of articulating his Voice, and of giving it an infinite Variety of distinct Sounds, at his own Will and Choice. For Nature has provided him with the Instruments, by which he so articulates. It is She, who has formed the Human Mouth and Tongue, to be much more pliant, moveable, and flexil, than the same Parts in other Animals. She it is, who has furnished those immediate Organs of Speech, in Man, with peculiar Muscles; by which he can give to his Mouth any Degree of Aperture and Curvature; and to his Tongue, any Kind of Flexure that he pleases, with an Application of this agile Member to any Part within its Sphere of Motion. — With regard to Letters, considered as Characters or Marks, representing Words spoken, they are well known to be of Invention merely Human; as being arbitrary, without any natural relation either to Words or to Things, and significant only by Common Agreement. — Again; if Letters are considered as the Elements of all Language, and the indivisible Parts of all Words, (in which Sense they are considered here by Plato,) 'tis but fair to acknowledge them to have been discovered, or found out, by Man. Plato indeed seems to make it a Question, whether the Discovery was not rather owing to some Being superior to Man. What the Philosopher means in raising this Doubt will presently be shown. But, to whatever Being
Being we are obliged for the Discovery, we have great Reason to
rejoice in its being made; This being of all Discoverys, by far the
most important. — For, in the first place, if a Discovery had not
been made, that the articulated Sounds of the Voice (or Words)
were almost all of them complex, and divisible into such as are simple,
— that is, into such as are formed, Each of them, by a single
Motion of only One Organ of Speech, accompanying the Voice;
—and that the simple Articulations, into which the infinite Num-er of Sounds Articulate (or Words) may be divided, were,
All of them together, but a Few in Number; — we say, if
these Elementary Articulations had not been found out, every
different Word must have had a distinct Mark or Character, ap-
propriated to it, in Writing or Engraving; for no Reader, not
even the most sagacious, could have been always certain, What
particular Word was meant to be represented by a Mark or
Character, signifying more Words than one. But a Multiplicity
of Characters, equal in Number to the Words, would have
rendered the learning to read a Language the Work almost of
the Life of any Man who spake it.—In the next place, with-
out this Discovery of Letters, all Language would have been
very defective; it would have consisted only of Substantives and
Attributives, Such as are the Symbols of corporeal and visible
Substances, and of their sensible Qualitys, Actions, and Affections:
for to these things only could the Inventors and First Speakers
of Words have pointed, so as to be certain, that they meant
the same Things by the same Words. Instead of Definitions and
those Connectives usually termed Prepositions, they must have used
the natural Expedient of Manual Signs and Gestures: but, for
those Connective Words, usually termed Conjunctions, so necessary
in all rational Conversation, they must have been wholly at a
lost. Labouring under this Poverty of Expression, they could
have spoken only in very short and unconnected Sentences;
not with any Series of Argumentation, nor with any Thread of Discourse; endeavouring to supply their want of Words by various Motions of their Eyes, Arms, Hands, and Fingers, and by many Gesticulations and Postures, properly now called antick, because in antique days Some of the Kind were practised perhaps in every Country, during the Infancy of its Language.—But what, most of all, renders the Discovery of Letters, those Elements of Speech, valuable to Man as a rational Being, is This,—that, without it, Language would have had no Words for any other Objects than those of Sense; none, for those of Mind or Intellect, considered abstractedly from Sense. Now it is true indeed, that Men, before they had Words for these intelligible Things, might have communicated, or made known, one to another, what they had observed separately, concerning the different Natures, Propertys, and Uses of the different Species of Things they saw: but they could not have communicated, or imparted, one to another, any General Ideas, which might have arisen in their private Minds; they could not have conversed together on any Subject beyond the reach of their outward Senses: and we presume, that a Man even of the quickest and most penetrating Genius would make as small a Progress in the Abstract Sciences, as he would in the Knowledge of Outward Nature, without being aided and supported by the Conversation of other Men, or without being (as it were) lifted up and carried on by their Writings. We presume, that, if Socrates himself had not studiously perused the Writings of many Philosophers before him, he would not have excelled them all in the Knowledge of Things the most important to be known, namely,—What, in the Order of Causes, ought properly to be deemed the First Cause of All things,—What, in the Order of Goods, is absolutely the Best,—and What is the Chief Good, relatively to Man. We presume also, that, if Plato had not studiously
studioufly attended to the Conversations and Discourses of Socrates on these Subjects, he could not have written this divine Dialogue, the Philebus; to which, all subsequent Philosophers, who have thought rightly of these Points, seem to Us to be indebted for such their right Opinions.—Indeed, to this Discovery, which appears so trivial, if taken by its Self, This of Letters, the mere Elements of Speech, considered as the primary Means of Knowledge, we may ascribe justlywhatever of Philosophy, Science, or Art, is, or ever was, amongst Men. For when Letters were universally once known, and pronounced distinctly, nothing was more easy than to invent Characters or Marks betokening them; nor was it less easy to learn or to remember those Characters, when they were seen to be so few. The Letters being also distinguished into Three Sorts, into Vowels, Consonants, and Semi-Vowels, as soon as it became commonly known, What Share each of those Sorts contributed to the pronunciation of Words, it was the easy Province of Any Man to combine Letters into Syllables, and to join Syllables together in framing longer Words; for it seems probable, that the First Set of Words, expressive only of Sensible Objects, were all of them Monosyllables. — It was always the Inclination of Every Man to express the Ideas of his own Mind, and to learn those of Other Men. So that when, by their acquaintance with Letters, all Men were enabled to frame Words expressive of their General Ideas, the Objects of their Minds, it is probable, that the Second Set of Words expressed those Ideas, which naturally rise in all Minds, and are common to All men. But while Men were thus opening their own Minds, One to Another, they enlarged at the same time, Each of them the Other's Mind; and Ideas, latent before, were stricken out between them, as it were, by Collision. To express these Ideas, new to them, it was expedient, in some Cases, to assign Figurative Meanings to
to many Words, which until then signified certain Objects of Outward Sense: it was sufficient in some other Cases, to compound Words, which had before signified Ideas common to all men: on many Occasions it became necessary to frame Words entirely new: and in this way the Improvements of Language kept even pace with the Advancements made in Knowledge. Every Invention of a new Art, every new Discovery in Science, introduced a new Set of Terms and Phrases, Technical or Scientific. And when, at length, the Sciences of Mind, of Morals, and of Politicks, (the Knowledge of the Divine Nature, and the Knowledge of the Human,) were carried as far as Human Abilities could reach,—it well deserves Notice, that, nearly about the same Time, the Knowledge of Speech, in all its Powers, and with regard to all its Uses,—Declarative, Didactic, Demonstrative, Entertaining, and Persuasive,—attained the Summit of its Perfection.—But the remarkable Coincidence of these two great Events will appear, not casual, but quite natural, if we consider the Nature and Origin of Human Reason and of Human Speech, as they are mutually related. — The Correspondence of their Natures will appear by considering, that, on the one hand, all Words, (except such as represent Particular Persons and Particular Places,) are Exhibitions of General Ideas; and that many of these Ideas lie as it were dormant in our Minds, till, being thus exhibited to us from without, by Words either heard or read, they are awaken'd and roused within us for the first time:—that, on the other hand, those Ideas, which are thus excited in us by Words either spoken or written, have so much the appearance of being the mere Offspring of those Words which excite them, that some Persons have imagined all General Ideas to derive from Names and Words all the Being which they have; as if Sounds and Characters could generate or create Ideas in the Mind, instead of being themselves created by
by some Mind or other, to facilitate the intercourse of Ideas between Man and Man. The Grecians therefore, who were sensible of this natural and near Relationship between Reason and Speech, gave the same Name, that of ἀγών, to them Both. For the Word ἀγών is taken in different Senses, severally to be determined by the difference of the Subject-Matters spoken of: sometimes it signifies the Sentence of the Mind, pronouncing within her Self her Judgment (or Opinion) concerning the Agreement or Disagreement of any Two (or more) of her Ideas, on viewing them together: on other occasions, it means the like Sentence of some Particular Mind, pronounced in Words outwardly; which indeed seems to be the proper and Primary Sense of the Word ἀγών; the Other being metaphorical, and therefore Secondary. The same Word is used by Some of the Pythagorean and Platonic Philosophers, in a Third Sense more figurative still, to signify That essential Form, which is Common to all the Individuals of any One Species; such Form being (as it were) the outspoken Sentence of the Sovereign Creative Mind, determining or defining the Nature of those Individuals, and pronouncing it to be Such as he wills. Again, since every Specific Form in outward Nature is copied from some Idea within the Divine Mind, the Seat of all Original Ideas, on this account the Word ἀγών, when the Epithet ἀνεός divine is annexed to it, is by those Philosophers used, in a Fourth Sense, to signify That very Divine Mind, considered as viewing all those his Ideas, with the true Relations of Each to Every Other, and therefore pronouncing justly within Himself, concerning their Samenesses and their Differences. So that ἀγών, to begin with the last and most sublime Sense of the Word, and thence to go backward to the first and lowest, signifies—Divine Reason,—the Expression of Divine Reason by the Forms of Nature, — Human Reason,—and the Expression of Human Reason, by Human Speech,
or *Words spoken.*—Thus are these Four Things \( \alpha \xi \chi \nu \) just Proportionals: for *Words spoken* have the same relation to Human Reason, as the Forms of Nature have to Divine Reason; they are express Image, or outward Representations of Things invisible. And the Proportion holds good \( \epsilon \pi \lambda \lambda \pi \alpha \zeta \) alternately: for Human Speech hath the same relation to That Divine Speech, Outward Nature, as Human Reason has to Divine Reason; it is only so far right and true, as it agrees with That, from which it is derived, and to which indeed its immediate Birth is owing.—

With regard to Speech,—it has been before shown in this Note, that Speech is derived to Man from Nature. Now whatever is spoken, concerning General Things, in agreement with the genuine Appearances of Nature, must be true; because all such Appearances are Transcripts of the Divine Ideas and of their mutual Relations, which are eternal Truths; tho the Transcripts, it must be confessed, fall far short of the Perfection of their Archetypes: but those Ideas, when they arise in the Mind of Man, being obscured by Images of Corporeal Things, and being afterwards blended with false Fancies, the Offspring of those Images, Man is apt to mistake the real Nature of Things, to have his Mind filled with false Opinions, and consequently, in speaking his Mind, to say what is not true.—With regard to Reason,—it will presently be seen, proved by Plato, that Reason in the Human Mind is immediately derived from Reason in the Divine Mind: and this Original Reason is the only just Standard of Rectitude and Truth; whether we consider Reason as an Object of Mind, or as the Power of viewing such Object. Considered as the Object, Reason is the relation of some One Idea to some Other;—and accordingly, on the Subject of Quantity, such a relation is by the Greek Mathematicians termed \( \lambda \zeta \rho \), and by the Latins Ratio. Now in pure Mind Universal such Reason or relation is an Eternal Truth. On the other hand, if we consider

Reason
Reafon as a comprehensive Power, by which the Mind views Two or more Ideas at once, compares them together, and discerns how far they agree, and in what respects they differ, this Discernment is clear and unerring in That Mind alone, all whose Ideas are pure and perfect,—whose Power is constant Energy,—and whose Eye is Intellectual Light its Self, unobstructed, unbroken, and unclouded by any of its Objects, being present to them all without the intervention of any Medium. But the Eye of Man's Reafon, how short-sighted and how weak it is,—tho what a Medium of false Colourings, and with what interrupted Glances, it discerns the few Objects to which it is directed,—and how frequently therefore and how greatly Man's Judgment errs,—is well known to every fair Mind, who has had Experience of her particular and private Self, and has conversed with Universal Mind, with Truth and Right Reafon, intimately as with Friends, yet modestly as a Disciple with his Teachers, and simply as a Child with his Natural Parents, to whom he owes his Being and his Nurture.—Hitherto we have considered Human Speech, as very distantly related to the Truth of Things and to Right Reafon; thro the defective Medium of Corporeal Nature, from which the Faculty of Speech is derived; and thro the unsettled Medium of Man's Private Reafon, with which every Sentence spoken by Man is coloured. In Either of these Views, Human Speech appears infinite; so various are Men's several Minds and Meanings; and as to Words, or Sounds Articulate, they are known to be without Number. — We shall now consider Speech, as an Object of higher Dignity,—as immediately related to the Divine Mind, the Author of all Corporeal Nature, and the Father of all rational and intellectual Light.—For Letters are analogous to the Elements of Body. As all Corporeal Forms are composed from these Elements by Plastic Nature, thro various Mixtures and Unions of the minute Particles of
of Each, Each being infinitely divisible; — so in every Language all the Words are by Man, their immediate Maker, composed from Letters, in like manner, thro various Combinations. — Again; as Plastic Nature is but an Instrumental Agent in making her Compositions; and as She can make no new Elements of Body, nor any way change the Essential Forms, or Qualities, of the Few she has to work on; for they are delivered into her hands, ready made by the great Creative Mind; who, in making them, designed all those Forms, made out of them by Plastic Nature; and in pursuance of that Design, impresses on her continually his own Ideas for the Exemplar-Patterns of her Forms: whence it is, that the Kinds and Species of the innumerable, the infinitely varying Individuals, are all numbered, ascertained, and fixed, according to the Divine Ideas: — just so is it with the Words of Man's making, the Elements of them are Few; and no Man, thro the Power of his Will, is able to increase the Number of these Elements, by making any new simple Articulations. The Animal Soul has here no forming Power; no Passions or Affections of this Soul vary the Motions of the articulating Organs: and tho these Organs are corporeal, and therefore come within the Province of Plastic Nature to frame them; — and tho her Power, in framing the Organs of the Voice, (or of the Sound issuing from the Mouth of any Animal whatever,) is bounded only by the Essential Form (or Specific Nature,) of each Animal, and has a Latitude, which is perhaps infinite, in varying the Voices, or Animal Sounds, of Individuals; — yet has she no more Power over the Organs of Articulation, than she has over the Elements of all Compound-Body's. Whether the Voice be strong or weak, rough or smooth, deep or shrill, the Articulation of it, made by Every one of the Human Species in the pronouncing of any Letter, is the same, and performed by the same Motions of the Mouth and Tongue. — Considering then,
then, that neither the *Rational* nor the *Animal* Part of Man's 
*Soul* can vary the simple *Articulations* of his Voice, — that *Na-
ture*, in framing the Organs by which they are performed, 
has not her usual Scope and sportive Licence granted her,—
and that nothing is here left to Chance,—we cannot but con-
clude as follows; — that those *Organs*, by which every *single* 
*Letter* is pronounced *distinctly*, are as much the Work of the 
*Supremum Intelligent Creator*, as Letters engraved are the Work 
of the Engraver: — that *Nature*, considered as acting without 
Intelligence and Design, has in this case, as well as in that 
of the Elementary Bodys, no other Office than that of a *mere* 
*Instrument*, or Tool, in the directing hands of *Mind* and *Wis-
dom*:-that these *Elements of Speech* were given originally to 
Man, ready made, as *Materials* for Him to work up into *Words*; 
so that with regard to *Letters*, the *Elements of Speech*, Man 
has no other Office, than to *discover* this admirable Work of 
profound Design in the *Great Creator*; to *distinguish* it from his 
own Work, the Formation of *Syllables* and *Words*; to *find out* 
the *Power* of each of these *Letters*, so as to perform That 
Work of his own the better; and to *pronounce* every Letter 
carefully and plainly, so as to be understood with ease. ——

Considering farther, that from *Letters* arose *Words*, expressive of 
Men's *Ideas*, and that from *Words* of various Sorts arose *La-
guage*; — that *Language* and Men's *Ideas* improved gradually to-
gether; — that from both these *Improvements* arose, in time, 
the Inventions of every *Art*, the Discoveries in every *Science*, 
and lastly, the *First Philosophy*, or the *Knowledge* (as far perhaps 
as attainable by Man) of the *Causes* and *Principles* of Things; 
—and that all these noble Edifices are constructed from those 
Primary Materials, the *Elements of Speech*, and are the natural 
Consequences of Man's having the *Facultys of Speech* and *Reason*, 
which are inseparable Companions; — we cannot but conclude
farther, that Man was designed for Sciences and Arts;—in the first place, for those of Speaking and Reasoning, the Foundations of all the rest;—and lastly, for those, the First in Value, and the Crown of them all, the Science of Good its Self, and the Art, thereon founded, of leading a happy Life. For, in pursuance of these Designs, the gracious Designer, being present within every Particular Mind, undraws the Curtain of Sense from before the Mental Eyes of all the real and disinterested Lovers of Science, and exhibits to them the pure Ideal Objects of their Love. Thus, for instance, we may find, near the End of this divine Dialogue, that he revealed to Socrates, (who, being perfectly free from every lower Attachment, was a thoroughly sincere Lover of pure Truth,) the very and true Essence of the Beautiful and the Good.—It should seem, that Orpheus, and those allegorical Poets and mystic Theologers, who followed his Doctrine, reasoned after some such manner, and concluded the Origin of Letters to be Divine, when they taught, that Hermes was the Son of Jupiter, and was appointed by his Father to the Office of conveying his Mind to favoured Mortals, so far as it concerned them. For by this Fable, we presume, they meant to inculcate,—that the Divine Ideas, and those Relations between them, Eternal Truths, are conveyed from the Mind Universal and Divine, to such Men as will receive and honour them, by the means of Human Reason and Human Speech. For Both these Facultys, being naturally connected, were personified together, under the Name of Hermes, by the Grecians; and by the Egyptians, under the Name of Theuth. But the People last mentioned, thro extreme Veneration for their ancient Princes, Legislators, and national Benefactors, gave them severally the same Names, which they had before given to their Gods, the personified Parts and Powers of Nature; attributing to them severally the same Divine Excellencys, according to the Virtues for which
PHILEBUS

which they were renowned. Thus to One of their remote Ancestors, renowned for Arts, and especially for Eloquence, they ascribed the Invention of Letters, and gave him the Name of Theuth. From this Part of the Egyptian Archeology, the Athenian Philosopher, who was well acquainted with it, took occasion to propose his pretended Doubt concerning the Origin of Letters, whether it was Divine, or whether it was Human.

And now in full Light may appear the singular Propriety of this Instance, the Discovery of Letters, for the Purpose of showing the Progress of the Mind from Infinite to One.—For if we resolve Speech, or Sound Articulate, into the Matter of it, and the Form, we find Human Voice to be the Matter, and the Articulation of that Voice to be the Form. If we begin our Progress from farther back, we find Human Voice its Self, infinite as it is, resolvable into Matter and Form; the Matter of it being Air, issuing from the Lungs, and formed, or modified, by the Larynx. If we advance forward, we find, that Speech, the Compound of Voice and Articulation, is infinite in its Self; but, that Words set Bounds and give Forms to it, different in different Countries, and among different People. If we proceed farther still, and resolve Words (which, like the Individual Beings of Nature, cannot be numbered,) into their Matter and their Form, we find the Elementary Parts of Speech to be the Matter, from which Every Word is composed, and the Meaning of Each particular Word to be the Form of that Word,—a Form, however, which is not settled and permanent, till it be looked on as the Representative of some Idea which is common to all Minds. — Thus we find, that, in searching after the nature of Speech and Language, we go on, just as we do in our Inquirys into any Part of Outward Nature;—we travel all the Way thro Infinitude, till we arrive at those Borders of the Land of Science, where we have a Prospect, on the one hand, of the component
before

; and am at no Loss to apprehend, What relation Each of the Subjects, about which he has spoken, has to the Other. But as to that Article,

component Elements of Things, — on the other hand, of their Species and Genera; — a Prospect, terminating in that Highest Genus, Universal Mind,—the sole Cause of the Common Bond or Connection between All things,—or, to speak metaphorically, (and perhaps it is impossible to speak otherwise of Things Divine,) the Ubiquitay Center, in which the several Virtues and Powers of Nature meet; as from thence continually they issue forth, extending around thro All things, uniting All, and making them to be in a manner One only Thing. But these great Truths we shall see represented by Metaphors the most adequate perhaps and juft, in the latter Part of the present Dialogue. —Our Readers, we presume, will now think it high Time to put an End to this Note; for the exorbitant Length of which we have no better Appology to make, than by assuring them, that 'twill lessen the Number of Notes to follow, and serve to explain, as well as we are able, many subsequent Passages in this Dialogue: to This Note therefore, when we come to those Passages, 'twill be sufficient to refer.

119 Philebus, it seems, did not comprehend, how Musical Sound was One and Many, so clearly, as he understood, how Speech was One, tho Words were Infinite.—The illiberal and ungentle Manners of the Sophists, in Plato's Dialogues, show them not to have had the most liberal Education: and perhaps the intention of this Passage is to confirm that Fact.

120 The Connexion between the Science of Musick, and the Science of Grammar, may be seen in Note 90. The Meaning
ticle, in which his Argument on the First of those Subjects appeared to Me to be defective, I am at a Loss still.

SOCRATES.

To know, What those Instances are to the Purpose; is not This your Meaning?

PHILEBUS.

Just so. This very Thing it is, that Protarchus and my Self are all this While in search of.

SOCRATES.

In search still, do you say, when you are just now arrived at it?

ing of this Passage may include also the relation, which the Words of an Ode, or Poem sung, have to the Musick; that is, to the Harmony and the Measure: for all Ears, tolerably good, are sensible that the Musick and the Diction ought to be adapted to each other.

121 For Socrates had not shown, What relation Either of those Subjects, Musick and Grammar, has to the Point in controversy. See before, in Page 157.

122 In the Greek,—τι προς ἵππος παύετ' ἵπτι; What is all This to the Verse?—a Saying, which seems to have grown into a Proverb, from its being frequently repeated by some of the People, on finding the Harangues of the Rhapsodists, in their Interpretations of the Verses of Homer, so frequently quite foreign to the Poet's Meaning.

PHILEBUS.
Philebus.

How so?

Socrates.

Was not the Point, originally in Dispute between us, This,—whether Wisdom or Pleasure was the more eligible?

Philebus.

Certainly it was.

Socrates.

And do we not admit, That Each of them is One Thing?

Philebus.

Without doubt.

Socrates.

Now then must come this Question, arising naturally from what was said, a little before the mention of Musick and Grammar \(^{123}\);—In what way, (or by what division,) are Wisdom and Pleasure, each of them, One and Many? or how is it, that Neither of them breaks into infinite multitude directly; but that Each contains some certain Number, before it passes into Infinity?

\(^{123}\) See before, in Pages 82, and 83.

Protarchus.
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Upon no trivial Question, O Philebus! on a sudden has Socrates, after having led us a large round-about way, I know not how, thrown us. And now consider, Which of Us Two shall answer to the Question he has proposed. 'Twould be ridiculous in Me, who have undertaken the support of your Argument, to make an absolute Revolt, on account of my Disability in regard to the present Question; and so to remit over again to You the Task of giving an Answer to it: but I think, 'twould be much more ridiculous, for Both of us to fail. Consider then, what we shall do in this case, where Socrates seems to interrogate us concerning the Species of Pleasure; — whether it is divisible into different Species, or not; and, if it be, what is the Number of these Species; and how they differ in their Nature: and the like Questions he seems to put to us, concerning Knowledge and Intelligence.

SOCRATES.

Your Conjecture is perfectly right, O Son of Callias! And, if we are not able to answer to these Questions upon every Monad \(^{124}\), as to its Likeness \(^{125}\),

\(^{124}\) Meaning every Subordinate Genus, and every Species, in any Subject, taken in hand to manage, or to speak on.

\(^{125}\) Sameness.
Sameness 126, and Contrariety 127,—unless, I say, we can do this,—the Instances, just now produced, have shown, that None of us, in any Matter we had to handle, would ever be of any Worth at all 128.

Protarchus.

The Case, 'O Socrates! seems indeed to be not very different from Your Representation of it. —— Well, 'tis certainly a Fine Thing to know 'All things, for a Wise and Prudent Person 129: but, I think, the Best Thing, next to That, is for a Man

125 The Likeness of One Monad to Another regards their Common Genus; for thro' this it is, that They are alike.

126 The Sameness of any Monad regards the Species of it; for 'tis in Every one of These, that the Genus is the Same. To see Likeness in all the Species of any Genus, and a Sameness running thro' them all, shows a Knowledge of that Genus, which in common they partake of.

127 The Contrariety of any Monad to Some Other regards only One certain Species under the same Genus;—a Species, from which it differs more, than it differs from Any Other of the same Genus. To see therefore such a Contrariety between any Two Species, implys a Knowledge of All the Species co-ordinate.

128 See before in Page 156.

129 That the word Every, in what Socrates said last, concerning the necessity of thorough Knowledge, regards all the Subjects of
Man not to be ignorant of Himself. With what Design I have now said This, I shall proceed to tell you. This Conversation, O Socrates! you have granted of Knowledge, taken distinctly,—that is, any One particular Subject whatever,—is evident from the very strong Expression, with which he concludes that Sentence. And the immediate Assent to it, given by Protarchus, shows that he understood it rightly. But presently after, ludicrously affecting to misapprehend it, he supposes, that the word Every, in that Sentence, was meant to include all the Genera and Species of All things. In confirming, therefore, the supposed Judgment of Socrates, and extolling Universal and perfect Knowledge, he subjoins very justly the Restriction, which occasions the present Note; because Knowledge, if not accompanied with Moral Wisdom and true Prudence, is often hurtful. (See the Second Alcibiades, page 82.) The Restriction also, in this place, serves Two particular Purposes; it prepares us for the being told of Something more valuable to Man than Knowledge; and it connects what Socrates had been saying, on That Subject, with what is next to follow.

The Excellence, spoken of by Protarchus in this Sentence, as the highest, is either the incommunicable Property of the Supreme Mind; or, if it be imparted to any Particular Minds, it can only be to Such, as are greatly superior to the Human. Whether it be indeed the highest Excellence (or Best Thing) absolutely, or whether it be inferior to some Other, is offered to our consideration afterward: but, since the professed Subject of this Dialogue extends no farther, than to inquire What is Best relatively to Man, Plato slides again into his Subject by this easy and gentle Way: at the same time it gives him an opportunity
granted to us all, and have given your self up to us, for the Purpose of investigating What is the Best of Human Goods. For when Philebus had said, that it consisted in Pleasure, and Delight, and Joy, and all things of the like nature, You opposed him on this Point, and said, it consisted not in These things, but in Those, which we often repeat the Mention of; and we are right in so doing, that the Opinions on each side, being always fresh in our Memorys, may the more fairly be examined. You then,

of insinuating This Truth,—that the Knowlege of our Selves, and the Knowlege of our Chief Good, are inseparable. See Note 208 to the First Alcibiades.

Protarchus says This, because he is sensible, that his high Commendation of Self-Knowlege might seem to be introduced improperly, and without a fit occasion: In these Days it may seem so still, notwithstanding the Account he gives of his Design in it. For the Relation, which it has to the Subject of this Dialogue, can be discovered by Those only, to whom the great Truth, mentioned at the end of the preceding Note, readily occurs. But in that philosophic Age and Country, the Connexion was perhaps easily seen: Socrates, to whom Protarchus addressed his Speech, must have understood the allusion therein to a principal Doctrine of his own: and 'tis probable, that all the younger Part of the Company had before heard Socrates discoursing on that very Subject.

It was necessary, that Plato, in this Dialogue, should, for the sake of his Readers, state the Points in controversy between Socrates
then, it seems, say, what I shall be right in again repeating, that Mind, Science, Understanding, Art, and whatever is allied to them, are better Things than Pleasure with Her Allys; and therefore, that the Possession, not of These, but of those Greater

Socrates and Philebus. And yet, on the other hand, the doing of this necessary Thing, must seem, at best, superfluous and idle, to Those who consider this Dialogue as the Author of it would chuse to have it considered, as the Transcript of a real Conversation, For it commences immediately after a long Dispute between those very fame Persons, Socrates and Philebus, on the very Points, here litigated. To this Reason, for leaving out a Recital of those Points, it may be added, that the Dispute had been carried on hitherto, in a dogmatical way, by proofless and bare Asserions, and that in These the Sentiments of each Party must often have been repeated; so that, to propose the Question over again, at full length, in this argumentative Part of the Conversation, must be troublesome and tiresome to the supposed Audience of the former Part, the assertive. Plato therefore, to give the necessary Information to his Readers, without violating the Decorum of the Dialogue, has contrived to make a Repetition of the Sentiments of Socrates and Philebus appear not unnecessary, by introducing a new Antagonist to Socrates, and thus beginning the Dispute de novo. Not content with This, he has found means, in the Passiâgé now before us, to state the Question once more, for the sake of renewing it in his Reader's Mind, after a long seeming Digression, and at the same time to make a sufficient Apology for it to the supposed Auditors of the whole Conversation.
Goods ought to the Object of our Aim. Now these Positions being laid down severally on each side, as Subject-Matters of our Debate, We in a jocose way threatened, that we would not suffer you to go home quietly, before it was brought to a fair Determination. You complied, and promised us to contribute all you could towards the accomplishment of that End. We insist therefore, that, as Children say, you must not take away again what is fairly given. But in the present Inquiry forbear proceeding in your usual way.

Plato, in this Passage, which has a Retrospect to the supposed prior and unwritten Part of the Conversation, imitates the Conduct of Dramatick Poets in their Tragedys. For, a well-formed Tragedy being the mimetic Representation of some single important Action, if this Action was connected with any antecedent Circumstances of Things or Persons, it was necessary, that the Poet should give a Narration of these Circumstances, in the πρώτος or First Part of his Drama, to make the Whole of it easily intelligible. And the most artful Way of doing this, — a Way, taken by every good Dramatic Poet, — is to put that Narration into the Mouth of some Person of his Drama; by making an Occasion for him to recount what he had done, and to repeat what he had said, previous to the Opening of the Scene then present. Plato has taken the same Way, and with so much Art, as to make this Recital of the Engagement, entered into by Socrates, to appear quite natural. And the Recital is necessary, because That Engagement is laid down as the Foundation, or Occasion, of this Dramatic Dialogue.
Socrates.
What way do you mean?

Protarchus.
Bringing us into Straits and Embarrassments ¹³⁴; —
propounding Questions, to which we should not be able, on the sudden, to give a proper Answer. For we are not to imagine, that our present Inquiry is brought to a Conclusion, meerly because All of Us are at a Loss what to answer. If therefore We are unable to extricate our Selves from these Difficultys ¹³⁵; You must help us out; for so you promised. Consider then what to do on this occasion; whether to distinguish Pleasure and Knowledge, each of them, into their proper Species; or whether to pass it by, if you choose to take a different Way, and can find some other Means of deciding the Matter, now controverted between us.

Socrates.
No Harm then need I be afraid of, any longer, to my Self, since you have said This ¹³⁶. For your

¹³⁴ See the Meno, page 98.
¹³⁵ Those concerning the Species of Pleasure and of Knowledge.
¹³⁶ Alluding to those jocular Threats, employed by the young Gentlemen, then in the Lyceum, and gathered around Socrates, to engage him in this Dialectic Inquiry. See page 112.
leaving to my own Choice, what Ways and Means to make use of, frees me from all Apprehensions on my own private account. But, to make it still easier to me, some God 137, I think, has brought Things to my remembrance.

Protarchus.

How do you mean? What Things?

Socrates.

Having formerly heard, either in a Dream, or broad awake 138, certain Sayings, I have them now again present to my Mind;—Sayings concerning Pleasure and Knowledge, that Neither of them is, of its Self, Good, but some Third Thing, different from Both of those, and better than Either. Now if This should discover itself to us clearly, Pleasure is then to be dismissed from any Pretensions to the Victory. For we should then no longer expect to find, that

137 See the Greater Hippias, Note 70. and the First Alcibiades, Notes 268 and 269.

138 That is,—whether he had only had a visionary Notion, or fanciful Conceit, of what was the Chief Good of Man,—or whether, freed from Sense and Imagination, (by which the Judgment is fettered, no less than the Outward Senses are by Sleep,) his Mind was then thoroughly awakened to the Consciousness of her real Self, and of her true Nature, when the Idea of True Good first arose within him.

Pleasure
Pleasure and Good are the Same Thing: or how say You?

Protarchus.

Just so.

Socrates.

We shall have no Occasion then, in My opinion, for distinguishing the several Species of Pleasure. And in the Progress of our Inquiry 'twill appear more evidently still, that I am in the right.

Protarchus.

Having begun so happily, proceed and finish with the same Success.

Socrates.

Let us, first, agree upon a few little Points beside.

Protarchus.

What are Those?

Socrates.

In what Condition or State of Being is the Sovereign Good 39? Must it of necessity be perfect 40? or may it want Perfection?

39 In the Greek, — ταγαγην. — concerning which Word, see Note 35, toward the End.—Three Characteristics of the Sovereign Good, whatever it be, are ascertained in what now follows.
Of all things, O Socrates! it is the most perfect.

Socrates.

In the Greek, the word is here used in a peculiar and philosophical sense, to be explained only from the ancient Division of Good Things into Two Kinds, into Such, as are good on their own account, or eligible for their own sakes; of which Kind is Health of Body; and Others, which are good only as they conduce to the attainment of those Goods of the First Kind; of this Latter Kind are Medicines for the sake of Health. A Third Kind of good Things, (namely, Such as are desirable on their own account as Ends, and at the same time are desirable as Means to attain farther Good,) seems to have been added by Some of the Pythagoreans: but this Addition was not received by Plato, nor by Arisotle. And indeed these middle Goods (for so they may be called, as they partake of the nature of Ends and the nature also of Means,) make not a distinct Kind, but are comprehended in the First Kind; as will appear from considering the Answer of Protarchus to the Question, here put to him by Socrates.

In the Greek, To this Sovereign Good alone the Stoicks allowed the Attribute of telos, a word, which Cicero very justly interprets by the Latin word absolutum; accordingly, to this Sovereign Good alone they gave the Name of telos End, as being the only End of Man kata phain according to his nature: and to be thoroughly consistent with themselves, and to avoid all partial Objections to their Doctrine, all Objections, which attacked not the whole System of it at once,
once—they denied even the Attribute of good to all things commonly called good, if inferior to this Good Supreme; at the same time, however, allowing them the Preference to things contrary, and admitting them to be eligible of themselves; as Health, Peace, Liberty, personal and civil: to these Things, which are commonly considered as compleat Ends absolutely desirable, the Stoicks, who were of all Philosophers perhaps the most consistent in their Tenets, and the most accurate in their Terms, gave the Name of ὑποτέλεσις, that is, Subordinate Ends, or rather, Objects of Pursuit in subordination to the End. 'Tis easy to perceive, that the disagreement in this case, between Plato and the Stoicks, is merely verbal; as it is indeed in most other Points wherein they seem to differ: at the same time 'twill be admitted, that, if the Stoicks use expressions, philosophically more accurate than Plato, this Philosopher speaks more intelligibly to common Apprehensions. Arisotle herein follows his Master's manner of expressing himself: for, on this very Subject of things good, he speaks of Ends ὑποτέλεσις, imperfect; he speaks of Ends, pursuable for their own sakes, as being τέλειότερα more perfect, than the pursuable for the sake of something else; and he speaks of That End, which is τέλειότερον the most perfect of all. By Andronicus, the Paraphrafs of his Nicomachean Ethicks, This is called τὸ ἔξοτον τέλος the Ultimate End; by Eutbhatus, the Greek Commentator on that Treatise, it is called παντέλεσις all-perfect; and by Cicero it is called finis bonorum, — honorum ultimum, — extremum, — summum. — To this all-perfect End, the Sovereign Good, the Pythagoreans and Arisotle gave the Name of εὐδαιμονία Happiness: for, that the Ancients understood This to be the Meaning of that Term, appears from this Passage of Stobæus, in Eclog. Ethic. Cap. 3. Τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν συνομονεῖν τῷ τέλει λέγεσιν [sc. οἱ ἄρχαίοι]. εὐδαιμονία δ' ἐγί τὸ ἀριστον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ὑ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὑ τὸ κράτιστον. They
Socrates.

Well; and is it also sufficient 142?

Protarchus.

Without doubt: and in this respect it excels all other Things.

Socrates.

But farther; This also, I presume, is of all things the most necessary to say of it, that Every Being, to

[the Ancients] say, that Happiness and the [ultimate] End are synonymous Terms. Now Happiness is the Best Thing in [human] Life, or the Greatest or most Excellent of Good Things. — And concerning this First Characteristic of the Sovereign Good, Aristotle himself, in Ethic: Nicom: L. 10, C. 6, thus writes,

—ἀπαντα, οὐ εἰσεῦ, ἑτέρα γὰρ αἰσθήσεα, πλὴν τῆς εὐθαμονίας τέλος γὰρ αὐτ. Every thing, as I may say, except Happiness, we choose for the sake of something else: for [of all our Aims] Happiness is the End.

142 That is, sufficient to make those Beings happy, who partake of it.—This Attribute of the Sovereign Good, this Second Characteristic of it, is recognised as such by Aristotle in these words, — τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταχὲς ἐναι δεξίον. The perfect [or final] Good is, we think, self-sufficient. Ethic: Nicom: L: 1, C. 7; and The self-sufficient is presently afterwards defined to be, — ἃ, μακερετήν, ἀρχὴν καὶ αἴρετον ποιεῖν βίον, καὶ μνήμης ἠρέτην. that which, unaccompanied and left alone, suffices to make Life eligible and in want of nothing: — a Definition exactly agreeable to the Sense, in which Plato here uses the word ἱερὸν, as will presently be seen.

whom
whom it is known 143, seeks it intently; as choosing the possession of it above All things; and indeed caring

143 The Third and last Characteristic of Good, here mentioned, — namely, that 'tis the chief Object of Desire, — is to be understood in a Sense different from what is meant in the ancient Definition of Good, — that 'tis That, which All things [all Beings, in all their Actions and Operations] aim at. — For in this Definition, Good is to be taken in a general and indefinite Sense; the aiming at it is attributed to All Beings, whatever be their Nature; and the Good, which they severally aim at, is of different Kinds, respectively suited to their several Natures. But in the Passage of Plato, now before us, the aiming at Good is attributed to such Beings only, as have the Knowledge of it; and the Good, professedly here meant, is the Chief Good of One only Kind of Being, namely, the Rational. — Aristotle, in like manner, attributes the capacity of being happy to no Beings but such as are endued with Rational Souls. For Happiness, in His Judgment, is seated only in Souls, energizing [that is, moving within themselves, and operating without] conformably to That Virtue which is the most excellent in Human Life; — namely, the Virtue of Man, as he is a rational and social Being. — Thus we may observe,—that, in giving us the Three Characteristics of Good, here noted, Plato and Aristotle are agreed. We make this Observation, to pave the Way for more such in some of the subsequent Notes, serving to prove how well these great Masters in the Science of Good agree in all their Notions concerning it, however they may differ in their Expressions. For those three Characteristics of the Sovereign Good are not the only peculiar Properties of it; several others have been justly enumerated by Mr.
caring for no Other Things,—except Such as are con-
stantly attended with the Enjoyment of that Supream
Good 14+.

Mr. Harris, in his fine Dialogue concerning Happinefs; and some
others, differing in Terms at leaft, will be noted by Plato
himself in the latter Part of this Philebus. But the Three, juft
now pointed out, are decisive enough to show, that neither
Knowledge nor Pleasure can be the Sovereign Good of Man, be-
cause they are Both wanting in every one of thofe characteriftick
Marks; and to prove This, is all which is aimed at in this
Part of the Dialogue.

14+ Plato’s own Words are these,—πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελεμένων ἀμα
ἀγαθῶν [sc: ἀποτελεμένων].—The ἀποτέλεσμα τῶν ἀγαθῶν Con-
fummation of all Good, meant in the Laft Words of this Paffage;
is the Sovereign Good or Happinefs of Man: and if this So-
vereign Good, according to Plato, conifton in Virtue, it follows,
that thofe ἀποτελεμένων, which are meant in the First Words of
this Paffage, muft be virtuous (honest and good) Actions per-
formed, and virtuous Designs accomplished. For, juft fo, Thofe
who place their End, the Conflation of all Good, in Plea-
sure, have no Concern or Care for any Thing beside; — ex-
cepting thofe Things, or thofe Designs, the pofterfing or the
accomplifhing of which is accompanied with the Attainment
of This their End. —— Aristotelé, in Ethic: Nicom: L. 1, C. 8,
writing on this very Subject, giveth the fame Meaning to the
word ἀποτελεῖν, which is here given it by Plato.—If then we
have interpreted the present Paffage rightly, — and if only
Virtue can justify her Claim to thofe Characters of the Sovereign
Good, which are before noted as Marks to afcertain it,—twill
be
he found, that _Plato_ placeth a Man's _Possession_ of this Good in his being _possessed of Virtue_,—in having his Mind furnished with _Virtuous Habits_, naturally productive of _Virtuous Actions_,—_Actions_, growing up, and _attaining their full Perfection_, ἀποτελάμενα, _together with those Habits_.—We take this occasion to observe, that _Aristotle_, when he placeth the _Essence_ of all and every Virtue in _Habits_ of the Soul, (that is, in the Soul's firm and sure holding or _possessing_ of Virtue,) exactly agrees with _Plato_: for, according to _Aristotle_, virtuous _Habits_, acquired, as they are, only by virtuous _Energies_ and _Actions_, become, after they are acquired, _Causes_, in their turn, of all the virtuous _Energies_ and _Actions_, performed _in future_, and then, but not till then, performed _with perfect Ease_. See _Ethic: Nicom._ and the excellent _Greek Paraphrase_ thereon, in L. 2, C. 2.—On this occasion also we may observe, that _Aristotle's Definition of Happiness_ supposes Virtue to be the Sovereign Good of Man. For on this _Supposition_ depends the Validity of his Reasoning, to prove that _Human Happiness_ consists in _energising agreeably to_ [the Rules of] _Virtue_: because no other Thing than the _actual Enjoyment_ of Man's Sovereign Good, whatever it be, can constitute a Man's _Happiness_. If then _Man's Sovereign Good_ be _Virtue_,—if Virtue be always _operative_,—and if she always operates, under the direction of Moral _Wisdom_, to the conscientious and affectionate Discharge of all Moral Dutys, unimpeded by Pain or Pleasure,—it follows, that the free _Energy_ of Man's _Rational Soul_, whilst he is _actually employed_ in _discharging_ those Dutys, is the _actual Enjoyment_ of his Sovereign Good, gives him _pure Pleasure_, unmixed with Pain, and _alone_ makes his _Happiness_.—For, to add one _observation_ more, on this sole account it is, that _Aristotle_ deems a _moderate Share_ in the _Goods of Fortune_ necessary to the _perfection_ of human _Happiness_—'tis, that they furnish Good Men with
Protarchus.

There is no possibility of contradicting this.

Socrates.

Now then, let us consider and judge of the Life of Pleasure, and the Life of Knowledge: and to do this the better, let us view them, Each apart from the Other.

Protarchus.

How do you mean?

Socrates.

Thus; let us suppose a Life of Pleasure, unaccompanied by Knowledge; and, on the other hand, a Life of Knowledge, unaccompanied by Pleasure. For, if Either of them be the Sovereign Good, it must be compleat and sufficient, in want of no Aid from any other Quarter. But, if Either of them should appear to be Indigent of aught, or Insufficient, we are no longer to imagine This to be that Real and True Good we are in search of.

Protarchus.

In such a case, how could we?

with the Means of discharging every Duty, and of practising every Virtue: as may be seen in Ethic: Nicom: L. 10, C. 8.

Socrates.
Socrates.

Shall we then examine their Pretensions thus separately, making your own Mind the Judge?

Protarchus.

With all my heart.

Socrates.

Answer then to My Questions.

Protarchus.

Propose them.

Socrates.

Would You, Protarchus, accept the Offer, were it made you, to live all your Life with a Sense and Feeling of Pleasures the most exquisite?

Protarchus.

Undoubtedly. Why not?

Socrates.

Suppose you were in full possession of this Good, would you not think, that Something beside was still wanting to you?

Protarchus.

I certainly should not.

Socrates.
Socrates.

Consider now, whether you would not want to have a just Discernment of Things in which you are interested, and to have true Notions, and to reason on them rightly, and to exercise other Powers of the Mind, near of Kin to those; at least, whether you would not want to see something.

Protarchus.

Why should I? when I had, in a manner, All things, in having continual Joy?

Socrates.

Living thus then continually all your Life, would the most exquisite Pleasures give you any Joy?

Protarchus.

Why not?

Socrates.

Having neither Mind, nor Memory, nor Knowledge, nor true Opinion,—in the first place, of this very thing, your having of Joy, you must of necessity be ignorant.

145 Memory, and right Opinions, or just Thoughts of Things, are particularly meant in this place; as will appear from what immediately follows; and also by comparing this Passage with the professed Hypothesis of Socrates, as stated by himself in the Beginning of this Dialogue. See Pages 36 and 38.
ignorant, and unable to say whether you then had any Joy, or not, being void of all just Discernment or Knowledge of things present.

Protarchus.

I must.

Socrates.

Being also void of Memory, 'twould be impossible for you to remember, that you ever had any Joy; or to preserve even the least Memorial of a Joy then present: wanting also right Opinion, you could not so much as think you had any Joy, tho' in the midst of it: unable also to reason or draw consequences, you could not possibly conclude, that ever you should have any Joy to come. Thus you would live the Life, not of a Man, but of a Sea-Sponge, or of an Oyster. Are these things so? or ought we to think Otherwise concerning them?

146 We have followed Ficinus and Grynaeus in attributing this Speech entirely to Socrates. With this agrees the First Basel Edition of the Original. Aldus, however, and Stephens break the Sentence just in this place, and put the word οὐκ οὖν true in the mouth of Protarchus. Who are in the right, appears from the necessity of adding to the word ἰδείη either the Epithet αἵρεσις, as in the next Sentence of Socrates, or the Epithet ἔποιημα, as in the Beginning of the Dialogue: for no man ever supposed it a Good Thing to have any sort of Opinions, or any other than such as are right and true.
Protarchus.

A Life of mere Pleasure must be such, as You have described it.

Socrates.

Do we think then, that such a Life is eligible?

Protarchus.

The Description of it, O Socrates! has silenced me entirely for the present.

Socrates.

Nay; let us not shrink so soon from pursuing our Inquiries; but proceed to the consideration of that other Life, the Life of Mind.

Protarchus.

What Kind of Life is That?

Socrates.

Let us consider, whether Any of us would choose to live with a just Discernment, and a right Understanding of things, and with Science, and a perfect Memory of all things; but without partaking of Pleasure, whether great or small; and on the other hand, without partaking of Pain; wholly exempt from all Feelings of either Kind.

Protar-
Protarchus.

To Me, O Socrates! Neither of these Lives appears eligible; and I think never would appear so to any other man.

Socrates.

What think you of a Middle Life, where Both of them are mixed together—a Life, composed of the other Two?

Protarchus.

Composed of Pleasure do you mean, on the one hand, of a right Understanding also and a just Dís-cernment, on the other hand?

Socrates.

Just so: such a Life do I mean.

Protarchus.

Every man would certainly prefer Such a Kind of Life to Either of the other Two.

Socrates.

This Sentence, in the Greek, is followed by these words,—καὶ πρὸς τὸῦτο, ἐνχ' ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' ἦν. "and beside this, 'tis not that One man would (prefer it), and Another not." — But these words neither illustrate nor strengthen those which precede, nor convey any additional Meaning: we have therefore taken the liberty of omitting them, as erroneous and corrupt. Where the
Perceive we now, what the Result is of our discoursing thus far on the Subject now before us?

Protarchus.

Perfectly well; 'tis This; that Three Lives have been proposed for our consideration, and that Neither of the Two first-mentioned appears sufficient, or eligible, for Any one, whether of Human Kind, or of a Kind superior to the Human 148.

Socrates.

the Error lies, and how it may be rectified, is in the next Note conjectured. — Ficinus and Serranus deem it an imperfect Sentence; but the words, added by Them, to make it perfect, by no means amend the Fault here censured, making this latter Sentiment a mere Repetition of the former in other Words.

148 In the Greek, — ἄρτε ἄνθρωπον ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐνοικεῖν. "nor to any other Animal whatever." — But This could not be written with a view to Brute Animals; because Brutes are not only incapable of partaking of any Good, beside the Pleasures of Sense, or what is referable to those Pleasures, but are also incapable of knowing, What Good belongs to Mind, — inasmuch as they are unable ever to conceive, that there is any such Being as Mind any where in Nature.—Now the having of those Capacities, or latent Powers, and the having of that Knowledge, (or rather, those Pre-conceptions, the Principles of that Knowledge,) are expressly said by Socrates to be requisite to the Choice and Pursuit, as well as to the Enjoyment, of Mental Good. — See Notes 9, 10, and
Is it not evident then, with regard to the Point in controversy, that Neither of those Two Lives can give the Possession of the Sovereign Good? for Whichever of them had such a Power, That Life would be sufficient, perfect, and eligible also to all those and 143, to this Dialogue, and the Passages, to which those Notes belong.——These considerations have induced us to think, that, in the Passage now before us, we should either read \( \tau \varepsilon \delta \nu \) instead of \( \zeta \varepsilon \delta \nu \), or, at least, should understand the word \( \zeta \varepsilon \delta \nu \) to have respect to other Rational Beings in other Parts of the Universe. For all These are expressly called \( \zeta \varepsilon \delta \nu \), Animals, by Plato in his Timæus. And this Thought suggested the following Alteration of the Passage, which in Note 147 we have supposed to be erroneous and corrupt;——καὶ τεὸς τῶν, ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῳ μὲν, \( \tau \varepsilon \delta \nu \) ὅ ὢ, that is, "Nay, and further, not only Men, but the Gods also." This Reading gives great Propriety to the words τεὸς τῶν, κ. τ. λ. For these Additional words considerably add to the Force of this Passage; as they express, much more fully, than the words preceding them, the strong Sense, which Protarchus had, of the Insufficiency of a Life, either merely pleasurable, or purely mental, for the Happiness of any Being, in whose Body dwells a Rational Soul.—It may well be, that the Passage was at first wilfully corrupted, from a suspicion of Impiety in the Sentiment therein expressed. But the Weakness of such a Suspicion will presently appear from what follows in the Dialogue.

Animals,
Animals 149, who are capable of living in the continual enjoyment of the Good all their Lives. And whoever of Us should give any Other Life the preference to That, would make his Election contrary to the nature of the truly Eligible, tho not-willingly, because thro Ignorance, or some unhappy Necessity 150.

Protarchus.

What you say, is highly probable indeed.

149 In the Greek,—πάσιν φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις, to all Plants and Animals.—But are Plants capable of living a Life of Senfual Pleasure? or Brute Animals, a Life of Science and Understanding?—We are therefore inclined to think, that Plato’s own Words were πάσιν τοῖς ζώοις; for immediately he subjoins an Explanation of his Meaning, and limits the word πάσι, all, to Such only, as are endued with Reason; (see Note 148;)—and that the word φυτός was written in the Margin of some Manuscript, opposite to the words πάσιν τοῖς, by a Reader, astonithed at the Boldness of the Expression, πάσιν τοῖς ζώοις, and not sufficiently attentive to the qualifying words subjoined.

150 What this unhappy Necessity is, see in Argument to the Lesser Hippias, page 7. — The happy Necessity is That, which obliges every Mind, freed from the Power of the unhappy Necessity, and enlightened by Divine Reason, to assent to whatever That Reason shows her to be true, and to will whatever the same Reason shows her to be good.
PHILEBUS.

That we ought not then to think That Goddess of Philebus 151 to be the same thing with the Sovereign Good, has been shewn, I think, sufficiently.

PHILEBUS.

Neither is that Mind of Yours, O Socrates! 152! the Sovereign Good; for 'twill be found deficient in the same respects 153.

Socrates.

Mine perhaps, O Philebus! may; but not That Mind which is Divine and True 154; for 'tis otherwise,

151 Socrates here alludes to that pompous Invocation of ἀφοριστὴν τάσιμον, or Venus Volupia, made by Philebus in page 51.

152 Philebus here evidently means,—Mind, so much extolled by Socrates, who had placed the Sovereign Good in Mind and Mental Energys.—This Retort is very fair; for the Argument, brought by Socrates to confute the Position of Philebus, is equally conclusive against the Hypothesis, opposed to it by Socrates.

153 The next Editor of Plato, we hope, will be more careful than the former, all of whom have in this place printed ταυτα instead of ταυτα.

154 Socrates here willingly joins his Adversary in rejecting the Hypothesis, hitherto espoused by him,—That, which affirms Mind, or Intelligence, to be the Chief Good of all Beings, who are
are endued with Mind or Reason,—with an exception of One only Being, the Divine Mind; if He can properly be called an Exception to that Doctrine, He, who doth not partake of Mind, but is, Himself, Mind Universal.—For, as the Position of Philebus cannot be true, in as much as Man partakes of Mind,—so neither can the Hypothesis, opposed to it by Socrates, be true, inasmuch as the Rational Soul of Man, and every other Particular Mind, is invested with a Body; because the Good of every Being must be of such a Kind, as entirely agrees to the whole Nature of that Being whose Good it is. Socrates therefore, by intimating his Hypothesis to be still true of the Divine Mind, intimates at the same time, that the Divine Being alone is, in his whole Essence, True Mind,—that is, perfect and pure Mind, exempt from Body. For, as all Corporeal Forms are not only fleeting, but imperfect also, untruly representing those Originals, of which they are but transient Copies,—so all Particular Minds, being invested with Bodys, are too intimately conversant with those Corporeal Forms, and too closely connected with the Outward Sensés, to have any of their own Ideas, or Mental Forms, perfect, and pure from Images of Things Sensible. But Pure Mind is ἐπάνω τῆς φύσεως, transcendent [all Corporeal] Nature, and consequently is free from all those Feelings and Sentiments, those Passions and Affections, to which embodied Minds are liable, on account of the Bodys to which they are united.—We have here only to remark farther, that Socrates, in this modest Reply of his to the tart but just Observation of Philebus, affects to understand the word Fours in a Sense, widely different from the evident Meaning of that Sophist, on purpose to introduce, as it were by the Bye, the Mention of this Transcendant Being, Pure Mind;—and that we imagine this Mention to be here introduced by Plato, with a view to excite the Curiosity of his Readers,—
wife, I presume, with This. However, I do not contend for the Chief Prize of Victory, in behalf of the Life of Mind, against the Middle or Mixed Life. But what to do with the Second Prize, and which Life to bestow it on, is next to be considered. For the Cause of that Happinefs, which the Mixed Life affords, One of us perhaps may ascribe to Mind, the Other of us to Pleasure. And thus, Neither of these Two, would be Man's Sovereign Good, and yet One or Other of them may perhaps be supposed the Cause of it. Now on this Point, I would still to prepare them for seeing this Divine Subject more opened in what is soon to follow,—and perhaps also to give them the first Openings of an Insight into the Ultimate Design of the whole Dialogue; for it ends with showing us, that Mind, considered not as Intelligent, but as Intelligible Being, the Object of Intelligence, is \( \tau \alpha \gamma \alpha \tau \rho \nu \) The Sovereign Good absolutely, originally, and supereminently;—absolutely, or independently, as having all Good within Himself;—originally, as being the sole Principle or Fountain of Good throughout Nature;—and supereminently, as being the sole Cause of Good to all Beings who partake of Mind,—producing Good to them even from the Corporeal Part of their Frame, and from all Outward Things within the Sphere of their Enjoyment. See Note 35, near the Conclusion of it.

\[155\] In Stephens's fine Edition of Plato, by a strange Error of the Press, \( τ \omega \ \mu \nu \ \alpha \gamma \alpha \sigma \omicron \nu \) is here printed, instead of \( τ \omega \ \mu \nu \ \alpha \gamma \alpha \sigma \omicron \nu \).
more earnestly contend against Philebus,—that not Plea-
sure, but Mind, is the nearest allied, and the most similar
to That, whatever it be \(^{156}\), by the Possession of which,
the Mixed Life becomes eligible and good. And if
this Account be true, Pleasure can never be said to
have any just Pretensions either to the First or to the
Second Prize of Excellence. Still farther is she from
coming in for the Third Prize \(^{157}\), if any Credit may
be given for the present to that Mind of Mine.

**Protarchus.**

\(^{156}\) Those of our Readers, to whom the present Dialogue is
entirely new, are to be informed, that Moral Virtue is here
meant; This being the most nearly of all things allied to Mind.
For it is the Offspring of imparted Wisdom; and Wisdom its
Self is That Mind, which alone is Divine and True, considered
as contemplating and energising on his own Ideas, and their
mutual Relations. — Again; Moral Virtue is of all things the
most similar to Mind. For the very Essence of it consists in
Measure; and the Principle of all Measure is Mind; the pure
and perfect Ideas of the Divine Mind being the Measures of all
the Forms of Outward Nature, and the Standards of their Truth,
Rectitude, and Goodness.

\(^{157}\) Before this Dialogue is ended, 'twill appear, that in the
Order of such Things, as are good and valuable to Man for
their own Sakes, and not as Means only to some farther End,
the Third Rank is assigned by Socrates to Mind; (so far as the
Term Mind signifies a Perception, Intelligence, and Discernment of
Things abstractedly considered;) that is, to mere Theory unap-
plied
PHILEBUS. 219

Protarchus.

Indeed, O Socrates! it seems to me, that Pleasure is now fallen: Your Reasons 158 have been like so many Blows given her; under the Force of which, fighting for the Master-Prize, she lieth vanquished.— But I think however, that we must say, 'twas prudent in Mind not to contend for that Prize; for She would otherwise have met with the same Fate. Now if Pleasure should also lose the Prize of Second Value, as already she has lost the Highest, she must entirely fall into Disgrace with her own Lovers:

plied to Practice and the Conduct of a Man's own Life. — Now Contemplations and Speculations, terminating in the Mind, and not referred to any Enjoyment or Use of things external and corporeal, are of all things the most remote from Bodily Pleasure; they are indeed opposite to it, inasmuch as abstracted Mind is opposed to Body: whereas Moral Virtue, and the Principle of it, (Both of which, in the Order of Human Goods, we shall find placed by Socrates in higher Rank than abstracted Mind,) have no Existence but in the Union of Mind with Body, and in the Relation which the Mind bears to all external things by means of that Union.

158 The Plural Number is here used, because Pleasure being proved deficient in all the Three Characteristics of Man's Sovereign Good, Each of those Three Defects may be understood to furnish a distinct Reason, or Argument, against Her Claim to that Character.
for even to Them she would no longer appear to merit such Honour, as they had paid to her before 159.

Socrates.

Well then; is it not the better way, to dismiss her now directly 160; and not give her Pain, by inspecting into her too nicely, and discovering all her Imperfections?

Protarchus.

What you now say, goes for nothing, Socrates!

Socrates.

Do you mean, because I supposed an impossible thing, when I supposed, that Pain might be given to Pleasure?

159 Protarchus seems, in This, to hint at the Honours given to Venus,—that is, in plain words, the Encomiums made on Sensual Pleasure,—by Minnemus, and other ancient Greek Poets, the Writers of ἐρωτικαὶ or Love-Poems.

160 The Reader will observe the Argument to be here interrupted by a little of the Socratic Humour, a seeming to decline the continuation of the Debate. The Reason of this, and such other short Interruptions, in the most argumentative Parts of Plato's Dialogues, is given in Note 151 to the Banquet: and the Reason there assigned, is no where exemplified better, than it is here. For Plato is now preparing to conduct his Readers up to the Heights of real Philosophy, to the Principles of the Universe, and to the Cause of Outward Nature.
Protarchus.

Not on that account only, but because you are sensible, that None of Us will give you a Discharge, before you have brought these Arguments to a Conclusion.

Socrates.

Ah! the copious Matter of Argument, O Protarchus, still behind! and scarcely is any Part of it

161 In the Greek we here read — ἀνάγκαι. — But before that word, we presume, the Negative ἀκ ought to be inserted; because Socrates could not be ignorant of what Protarchus here tells him. For he had not only at first engaged himself, by a voluntary Promise, to discourse on this Subject in his usual Dialectic Way, till the Controversy was decided, — but he had also very lately been reminded of that Engagement by Protarchus. — See the Passage, to which belongs Note 133. — Protarchus therefore, apprehending, that Socrates either modestly or jocosely endeavoured to evade the prosecution of the Subject, here charges him with a Conscientiousness of his Promise; and tells him, that, on that very account, his Evasion will not pass or be accepted.

162 If the future Editors of Plato will compare the present Passage, with That to which the preceding Note refers them, probably they will agree, that we ought to read — τῶν τῶν λόγων—here as well as there.
very manageable on the present occasion. For whoever stands forth, as the Champion of Mind, to win the Second Prize for Her, must, as it appears to Me, take another way of combating, and has need of other Weapons, different from those Reasons I before made use of: Some, however, of the Same may perhaps be of use again. Must we then proceed in that Manner?

Protarchus.

By all means.

Socrates.

But let us begin cautiously, and endeavour to lay down right Principles.

Protarchus.

What Principles do you mean?

163 Aldus’s Edition of Plato, by omitting the word αἰτή in this Sentence, gives a quite contrary Turn to it. Stephens, in His Edition, has inserted the αἰτή: and this Reading we have preferred to the former; because it makes much better Sense, and is agreeable also to Ficinus’s Translation from the Medicean Manuscript. ’Tis strange, that Grynaeus, who undertook to revise that Translation, should depart from it here, where it is evidently right, to follow the erroneous Reading in the Aldine Edition. Cornarius, Serranus, Bembo, and Grou, were not so mis-led.

Socrates.
Socrates.

All Things, which are now in the Universe, let us divide into Two Sorts, or rather, if you please, into Three.

Protarchus.

You should tell us, What Difference between Things it is, with respect to which you make that Division.

Among the Things, now in the Universe, Plato means not here to include those Originals of Things, those Ideas, which are in the Divine Mind now and for ever, having there an Eternal Being: for these Ideas neither mix with Matter, neither is Infinity a Principle of their Essence. Soon after this, however, these real left of all Beings will fall under our consideration. — From Plato's Meaning in this place are also to be excluded all the Doings and Effects of Chance; and all such Operations and Works of Man, as are void of Rule and of Design; — the mis-shapen Rudiments also of Nature's intended Forms; and the crude Essays of Art in its Infancy or Novitiate; — the Carcasses also and the Ruins, the Pieces and the Fragments, of regular Forms, once existing, whether Natural or Artificial:— for None of These can properly be called Forms, or Figures, or indeed Things of any Kind now in Being: if they are at all to be considered, as having any Concern in the Passage now before us, it can only be, as they are several Portions of the πέωτις ὕλη That infinite Substance, which furnishes Materials for all the Works both of Nature and of Man.

Socrates.
Some Things, which have been already mentioned, let us re-assume.

What Things?

The Gods, we said, have shown us, the Infinite of Things, and also their Bound.

Very true.

Let us take These for Two of the Sorts of Things; and for a Third Sort let us take That, which is composed of those Two mixed together. But I

See the Passage, to which belongs Note 78, and the Explanation of it in the latter Part of that Note.

Plato himself will soon explain, what he means by Each of these Three Sorts of Things. It will then appear, that his Third Sort comprehends all the Forms of Nature, together with all the Works and Performances of Art;—and that his First and Second Sorts are the Two immediate Principles of those Forms, and of those Works and Performances. At present, we shall only premise the following Observation, as preliminary to the next Note;—viz. that the First of these their immediate Principles is the necessary Consequent of Matter;—and that the Other is the natural Effect of Mind.

deserve,
deferve, methinks, to be laughed at for pretending thus to distinguish Things, and to enumerate their several Sorts.

Protarchus.

Why so, my good Friend?

Socrates.

A Fourth Sort appears to have been omitted by me.

Protarchus.

Say, What.

Socrates.

Of that Commixture, the Combination of the former Two, consider the Cause: and beside those Three Sorts of Being, let me down this 167 Cause for a Fourth.

Protarchus.

167 Socrates, when he just before divided All Things, now in the Universe, into Three Sorts, had respect only to Things external. But there is another beside These, a different Sort of Things, which also now are. For besides a Flowing Now, called the Time present, in which exist the present Individuals of every Genus and Species, (present, with regard to their Predecessors in Time past, and their Successors in Time to come,) there is also a Stable Now, which has no relation to Time, or to any Beings existing successively, or in Time, whether past, present, or to come. This Stable Now is Eternity; the Image of which,
which, Plato says, is Time. And very justly may Time be said to be the Image of Eternity; because the Beings, which exist in Time, are but Images, or Pictures, of those original and real Beings, the Ideas of the Divine Mind, which have no relation to Time, their Essence being stable and eternal. For as much therefore as these are, in the Dignity of their Being, so much above those temporary and transient things, their Images or painted Copies, they are by Socrates set apart by Themselves, as not to be ranked or numbered amongst those Others. 'Tis on this account perhaps, that here he feigns to have forgotten them at first, and now at length to recollect them.—We may suppose also, that Socrates intended, by these means, to represent the manner, in which a man arrives, if ever, at some faint View or imperfect Knowledge of these Ideas, namely, by Recollection as it were; which he elsewhere terms ἀναμνήσεως Reminiscence;—and to signify farther, how late this Knowledge is acquired by those Few of us, who do in time attain to it. If this last Supposal of ours be not improbable, it presents us with a fair Opportunity of offering our Conjectures, concerning this Fourth Sort of Being, here spoken of, Cause in general,—and concerning the Steps, by which Socrates attained to as much Knowledge of it, as perhaps is attainable by Man. —— With regard to Cause in general;—as every Cause is relative to its own Effect, the Divisions of Cause in general ought to correspond with the Divisions of that whole Third Sort of Being,—That, which is effected or produced. If That therefore was rightly divided into the Forms of Nature and the Forms of Art, Cause in general ought to be divided into Two Kinds, respectively corresponding with the Two Kinds of Production or Effect: and thus all Cause is referable either to Nature or to Art. — Now 'tis evident, that Art acts with Contrivance and with Design; and that These are feated in
in the Mind of the Artist. Evident therefore is the close Alliance between Mind, and That Kind of Cause which is termed Art. If Contrivance and Design appear also in the Forms of Nature, it follows by Analogy, that Nature, considered as an Agent, or Efficient Cause, acts agreeably to certain Rules or Laws, given her by some Intelligence or Mind, the Designer and Contriver of all those Forms which she produces;—a Mind, as much superior to the Human, as the Productions or Works of Nature are superior to those of Art, in the Wisdom of their Contrivance, and the Goodness of their Design. Here also by Analogy we may conclude an intimate Connection between this most excellent Mind and that Kind of Cause which is termed Nature.—Farther; whatever is effected or done by Art, is framed, according to certain Ideas in the Mind of the Artist; and whatever is effected or produced by Nature, we must by Analogy conclude, that 'tis formed according to certain Ideas in the Mind of Nature. In both Cases then, Ideas are the Rules of the Operation, the Models of the Work, and the Causes of its having Such a Form as it has; that is, in other words, they are the leading or directing, the Archetypal and Formal, Causes, of it.—Farther still, in Nature's Productions, the Divine Mind, and in the Productions of Art the Human Mind, always intends some End; and this intended End always is some Good: the attainment then of this Good is the Final Cause of the Production.—Thus we find, that every Effect or Production, whether of Art or of Nature, acknowledge Three Causes, properly so called, — the Efficient, the Formal, and the Final. — Of these Causes the First in Dignity is the Final, if Good be of all things the most valuable: in the Inventions of Art, the End, as it is in the Mind originally, is First also in point of Time: for the Good, sought by the Invention, must first be in Contemplation, before the Mind sets about the Con-
trivance.—Second in Dignity is the Formal Cause, if Contrivance, Design, or Art, which form the original Idea of the future Work, be more honorable than the mere Copies of that Idea, the Works of the Efficient Cause. For, altho this Third Cause be That, which executes the Design, and accomplishes the End, yet the Workman is praised only for his Art, and the Work is valued only for its End. Suppose a Deed, ever so beneficial to us, done by some other Person: if no Good was intended for us by the Doer, we feel no Sense of Gratitude toward him for his Deed. And suppose an Action or Performance ever so admirable: if Art or Skill had no Share in it, we yield our Admiration, not to the Performer, but to Chance or some other foreign Cause.—The Distinction between these Three Causes, the Final, the Formal, and the Efficient, is so real, that, in the Works or Productions of Man, the Three may severally belong to Three different Persons. For One Person may conceive and propose some End; Another Person may contrive the Means; and a Third Person may use or employ those Means. But 'tis otherwise with the Operations and Productions of Nature: sufficient for these is One and the Same Cause; in which, however, all the Three Causes concur;—and That is Universal Mind.—This will appear, if we consider this Great Mind, in the first place, as it is the Formal Cause of all Corporeal Things. And we may consider it in this way.—Essential to all Mind is Intelligence or Thinking; and accordingly intelligent or thinking Being is not a very imperfect Definition of Mind. In thinking, every Mind must have an Object; the Mind must think of Something: and the only Objects of Mind not immersed in Body, but pure and alone, are pure Ideas,—Forms unmixed with Matter, and unattended by Sensible Images;—pure Truths also, the Relations between those pure Ideas. Mind is, as we apprehend, a Perception and a Comprehension of Ideas and of Truths:
Truths: and the Mind Universal and Divine is the Comprehension of all pure Ideas and of all pure Truths in One,—in the Unity of his own eternal Essence. Now, if these pure Ideas are the Originals and Archetypes of all the Forms which are mixed with Matter, they are the Formal Causes of all Corporeal Beings: and the Union of all those Ideas,—the Divine Mind,—is thus the Formal Cause of the whole Corporeal World, which is therefore One, and in which all Corporeal Beings are united.—

In the next place, Universal Mind is to be considered as the Efficient Cause of all external Things in the following way. — All Thinking, all Comparing of Ideas, and all Reasoning,—the inferring of some General Truth from many Particulars, — the deducing of One Truth from Another, — and the resolving of any Compound Truth into its Principles, — every one of these things is an Energy of the Mind: and every determinate Thought, every Judgment or Sentence of the Mind, every settled Inference, Conclusion, or Result, is an Act of the Mind, energising within, or acting on, her Self. It is acknowledged, that the Mind, in perceiving any Truth or any Idea, seems, and is indeed in some respect, passive; as she cannot help perceiving what she does perceive: but the directing of her Eye to That Truth or to That Idea in particular, and the keeping of her Eye open, to continue in the actual Perception of it, may be justly styled Energies, or inward Actions, of the Mind. We here speak of Particular Minds, such as the Human. For the Eye of the Divine Mind is always open, and is always viewing in Himself all Ideas at once, without comparing, compounding, or dividing them,—all Truths at once, without inferring, or deducing, Some from Others,—and the Principles of All things, without Analytical Investigation.—Thus the Divine Mind is always in Energy, and therefore always in Motion,—such Motion, as belongs to Mind; for without
without Motion, of one Kind or other, there can be no Energy, neither of Soul, nor yet of Mind. — Now, the Energy of Universal Mind, being within and throughout the Infinity of Matter, (call it, if you please, Extension, or Place, or the Receptacle of Forms; see Aristot.: Phys. L. 4, C. 4,) and this being external to Mind, the Energy becomes Outward Action; and Mind, energizing only on Mental Forms, impresseth them on Matter, Mind's ubiquitous Throne: thus are produced Forms without, the Expressions of those Forms within. In like manner, Mental Thought, or Energy, being Mental Motion, is, we presume, the Spring of Motion, or the First Mover, to the whole Corporeal Universe, — to Matter invested everywhere with Form. And the Motion of this Great Body is perpetual, because the moving Mind is eternal: just as the Kinds and Species of all Corporeal Things are continued invariably the same in all successive Individuals, because their Archetypes are invariable and the same for ever. Thus Universal Mind is found to be the Efficient as well as the Formal Cause of All Corporeal Things thro infinite Ages. — It remains to be considered, in what respect Universal Mind is the Final Cause of All things. — Invariable are the Objects of the Divine Mind; so are those Objects of the Human Mind, the Kinds and Species of Things in Nature, — yet the Individuals of each Species and of each Kind are never in a settled State, but are continually varying in their Appearances, and either increasing or lessening in their Powers. Hence arises a real Distinction between Being invariable and Being variable. Mind is invariable, and Body is variable: but Being is common to them both; for both of them are. In this View it should seem, that Being is more comprehensive and more universal than Mind. But when we reflect, that these variable Individuals derive from Mind, not only their Particular Forms, and consequently their being what they are, but
but also their having *any* Form or Being at all, it should
seem, that in Mind there is Something *Superior* even to those
invariable Beings, those eternal Forms, the Mental. — Again;
if we consider the Good enjoyed by *All* Animals, in general,
and the Good, enjoyed by *Rational* Animals only; that they are
Goods of quite different *Kinds*; the former being the Good
of Sense, the latter, That of *Mind*; (for we can judge of the
Enjoyments of both Mind and Sense, as of Both we are Par-
takers;) from this consideration it may seem, that the nature
of Good is more *ample* and *extensive*, than the nature of Mind.
But if we consider, on the other hand, that all Animals
receive the Good, which the Mind of Nature intends for them,
partly by means of their own Organs of Sensation, and partly
by means of Things abroad, the Structure of whose Frame is
correspondent to the Structure of those Animal-Organs;—and
that these joint *Means* of Animal-Good are provided by one:
and the same forming *Mind of Nature*, who constructs all Cor-
poreal Things together, *adapted to each other*, according to the
*mutilal Relations* and *Harmony* of his own Ideas; — and if we
consider also, that 'tis only by partaking of Mind, that *Rational*
*Animals* are capable of enjoying the proper Good of *Mind*; and
that *Mind* alone beflows on them this Good, in presenting
them with *Truth*;—when all This is considered, 'twill appear,
that Whatever is Good to *all* Animals enters together with *Form*,
(proceeding, Both of them, from *Mind,*) into *Outward Nature*;
and that *Truth* enters together with *Mind*, (and Both of them
in the same Proportion and Degree,) into the *Rational Soul* of
*Man*. — It should seem then, that the *Idea of Good* is That
Universal Idea, which the Divine Mind, in energizing, always
holds; and in beholding which, he enjoys *Supream Happiness*;—that, as *Mind* is the first *Spring of Motion* to *Body*, so the
*Idea of Good* is the first *Spring* of the *Mind's own internal*
*Motions*. 
Motions, or Energys;—and that, in acting outwardly, that is, in producing Outward Forms, Universal Mind has no other End in View, than Universal Good.—In this way we conceive, that Universal Mind may rightly be considered as the Final Cause of All things, the Idea of Good being no where but in Mind; and hence it is, that every Particular Mind partakes of That Idea, is moved by it in all her Energys, and prompted by it in all those Actions of the Soul, which She directs. — To these considerations if we add the following;—that not only every Thing which hath its Being in the World of Mind, and every Thing which proceeds from Reason,—but every Thing also which hath its Being in the World of Nature, and every Thing which of necessity follows from Nature, is good; — that the Connection between Being and Good is so inseparable, that whatever is Good to any Particular Being, tends to the Preservation of that Being; and that whatever is Evil to it, tends to its Destruction;—that as soon as the inherent Good of any Natural Being wholly forsakes it, and fresh Recruits of con-natural Good cease to flow into it from Outward Nature, the Dissolution or End of That Being immediately ensues; but that so long as the Being retains any of its native Good, with Strength sufficient to receive a fresh Influx, Nature will, to prolong the Being, heal the Evil incidental to that Being, and even convert it into Good; — that, in the Rational Soul of Man, Divine Reason hath the like Influence, the like healing Virtue, and the like converting Power; which, if the Soul be willing, He exerts for the preservation of a Being, whose Continuance depends on its retaining a Love of its own proper Good, and a Will to enjoy it;—from hence it must appear, that every Thing, so far as it partakes of Being, partakes of Good,—a Good, belonging to its Being, and without which Good it can no longer be what it is. — To venture a Step farther in our inquiry into the nature of the Cause of All things: it appears
no less absurd than impious to suppose, that Evil has any Place in the Divine Mind. For the Idea of Being, or That of Good, is the sole Object of the Mind Universal: and this Idea comprehends every Kind of Being, and the Good belonging to each Kind; but excludes whatever is totally void of Being, and of Good. And since no Mind has any Idea, which is not derived from the Mind Universal, it follows, that of Evil there is no General Idea; — that Evil has no positive Essence; and that like meer Matter, it admits of no other Definition, than Such as is entirely Negative. As meer Matter then is only a Negation, a total Defect, of Being,—in like manner, absolute Evil is nothing more than a Negation, a total Defect, of Good. If this Reasoning be right, Evil is either the same thing with Matter, or 'tis at least the most extensive of those Infinites, which are said, in Note 166, to be the necessary Consequences of Matter: but, mixing with all Individual Beings, it is bounded in every One of them by Form, and controlled in every One of them by Good. Now, it is from necessity, that Evil mixes with them all: for no Individual of any Species, no Particular of any Universal, can be perfectly good in its Kind. — No one of them can possess all the Good belonging to its Essence, or Ideal Form, because of the Mixture of this Form with Matter: and This Mixture is necessary to constitute the Existence of every Particular Being: it is necessary for producing Divinity out of Sameness, and Multitude out of Monad; for without Matter, All would be One and the Same solitary Being, —happy perhaps in Himself, (if Want of Nothing be, as Some have said, sufficient to make Happiness,)—and absolutely perhaps good, but the Caufe of no Good at all. It seems reasonable therefore to conclude, that, however absurd it is to suppose Matter to be, properly speaking, a Caufe of Being, or Evil to be a Caufe of Good,—yet, as without Matter there would be only
One Being,—so, without Evil no Good would be possessed or enjoyed, but by That One. — Upon the whole, it appears, that Evil is as necessary to the universal Diffusion, and the endless Communication of Good, as Matter is to the Evolution of Universal Form, and to the endless Communication of Being. It appears also at the same time, that Good bears the same relation to Being as Evil bears to Matter; and that, as Evil either is the same Thing with Matter, (the same Nothing rather, if Matter be a total Defect of Being, as Evil is a total Defect of Good,) or of necessity attends on Matter in every Mixture of Form with it,—so, Good either is the same Thing with Being, or constantly attends on Being, and follows the Divisions of it into Variable and Invariable,—Temporary and Eternal.—Thus much concerning Cause in general, (the Fourth Sort of Being, spoken of in the present Passage of this Dialogue,) and the different Meanings of the word Cause; as it is properly used to signify, not only the Efficient, by which, or by whom,—but the Pattern also, according to which,—and the End, for the sake of which any Thing is made or done. — We have endeavoured to show, that these Three Meanings are together applicable to the One Cause of All Things, The Divine Being, and to Him alone. In philosophical Language, however, the word Cause is sometimes applied to Matter, as a Cause in which All things are made,—or out of which they were at first made,—or without which they could not be made.—Now That, without which a Thing cannot be made, is either a concurring Cause, or an Instrument necessary to be used in the making, or some Means necessary to be employed by the Maker, and different from Himself. But Matter and Mind are not concurring Causes; nor is Matter an Instrumental Cause; neither is it a Mediate Cause: for Universal Mind is all-sufficient, and has no need of either Co-adjutors or Instruments, or Means.—— Farther;
Farther;—That, out of which a Thing is made, must be Something antecedently existing; it must have some Form and some Figure: and indeed the Materials of every Human Work have some Form and Figure of their own, before they become the Subjects of the future Work. But the Common Matter of all corporeal, external, and particular Things is without either Form or Figure; it has indeed no real Being at all. And This is That, in which the Divine Mind energizes, and energizing operates, and operating produces all the Forms of Nature, All things to which belong both Form and Matter. As therefore these variable and temporary Beings, with respect to their Forms, derive their Origin from Being invariable and eternal,—so, with respect to the Subject-Matter of their Forms, they may be said to have their Origin in That which in reality is Nothing, —not so much as the Image or Shadow of any real Thing. —We apprehend, that, on this head, we speak the Sense of the Pythagoreans, the Platonicks, and the Peripateticks, Some of them at least; for 'tis highly probable, that These are the Ancients, meant by Porphyry, in his 'Aρομολογία, pag: 226, Edit: Cantab: where he says, that the Properties of Matter, according to the Ancients, are these; —It is incorporeal; for it is different from Bodys: it is lifeless; for it is neither Mind, nor Soul; nor a Living Thing is it, of its Self: it is formless, subject to Diversity, infinite, powerless: wherefore it is not Being, but Non-Being; not such Non-Being as Motion, (for Motion is Motion of Something;) but truly and really (ἀσύνημερον) Non-Being (μηδὲν ὑπερ') that is,—Nothing. —If then the above-given Account be true, we find the Origin of Things to be, on the one hand, the Plenitude of Universal Being, the Cause of Good to all,—on the other hand, a total Vacuity of Being, Infinite Matter, the Cause of all Evil. —The Readers of Plato will readily excuse the Length of this Account, when they are informed, that the
Design of it, partly, is to illustrate Two Passages in Plato;—One in his Timeus, vol. 3, pag: 52, Edit: Steph: concerning the First Matter;—the Other in his Phædo, pag: 260, &c, Edit: Oxon: concerning Final Causes;— but chiefly, to free from all obscurity Two other Passages;— One, in his Republick, vol: 2, pag: 70, Edit: Cantab: concerning the Idea of Good;—the Other, ἐν τίς τῷ πρώτῳ φύσεως concerning the nature of the First, (or The Supream,) in the Second of his Epistles, pag: 312, Edit: Steph: where he professt to conceal his Meaning purposely, in this Enigmatical Sentence;— ἐν τῶν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστι, καὶ ἐκάνε τέκνα πάντα, καὶ ἐκένος αἴτιον ἀπάντων τῶν καλῶν δεύτερον δὲ περὶ, τὰ δεύτερα καὶ πρίτων περὶ, τὰ τρίτα. All Beings are attendant on the King of All; for His sake are All things; and of all Beautiful Things He is the Cause: on the Second attend Things of the Second Order: and on the Third attend Things Third in Order. — This last Enigmatical Passage is to be explained from what was said concerning the Three Causes of All things. For the First, (or Supream in Dignity,) the King of all Beings, (the Law to All,) is τ'αγαθόν, Essential Good, the Final Cause of All things, and the Fountain of those fairest of things, Measure and Moderation, Unity and Harmony, Justice and Goodness, Symmetry and Beauty, the Perfection of each Kind, and the Standard of whatever in its Kind is excellent:— the Second (in Dignity) is Universal Mind, the Formal Cause of All things, and the Fountain of all Ideas and all Truths, Intelligence and Knowledge, Sciences and Arts, and Right Opinions:—and the Third (in Dignity) is Universal Soul, the Efficient Cause of All things, and the Fountain of all Sense and Life, Love and Affection, Sympathy and Attraction. — So that all Beings whatever depend on the Supreme for their very Being, since without partaking of Good they could not be:— in
like manner, all Intelligent Beings depend on the Second for their Intelligence: and all Sentient and all Vital Beings are, for their Senses and their Lives, dependant on the Third. — We have only to add This farther; — that, immediately after the Passage above cited, the Mysteriousness of which is fairly apologised for by Plato himself, he speaks of the Human Soul, and of her natural Desire to be made acquainted with those Things, (meaning the fair Streams, that flow from those Three Fountains,) because she is of Kin to them, and has them but imperfectly and defectively in her Self. Then follows the Mention of that important Problem, — "What is the Cause of all Evils?"—which Point, he says, whoever cannot clear up to his own satisfaction, will never attain to a real Knowledge of the Truth. And as This is the last of the Philosophical Points, stated in that Epistle; and as it compleats the Subject of those Inquiries, made by Dionysius, concerning the Causes of Things; we shall here finish this short Essay on the same Subject; (too short for a detached Dissertation; tho too long, considered as Part only of a Note;) and proceed to investigate the Steps, by which Socrates attained to his great Knowledge in it. This Investigation also will be long; but we hope, that 'twill not be tedious to the Admirers of Socratic Wisdom; as it leads to the Doctrine, taught first by Socrates, — the Doctrine of those Universals, which are the Principles of Moral and Political Science, and are, Themselves, immediately derived from the First Cause of All things. With this Hope, and this desirable End in View, we thus begin our Investigation. — — That a Man's First Step to any Kind of Knowledge is by means of his Sensations, was never, we believe, questioned by any Person, who considered, with a sober and unprejudiced Mind, the nature of Human Knowledge.—As soon as Infants are separated from the Womb, and are become entirely distinct Beings,
Beings, surrounded immediately with the external Air, they appear to be sensible of their own extrem Weakness and Indigence: and as soon as they find their Weakness helped, and their Indigence relieved, by Something, which is not within Themselves, nor is in their own Power to procure, (and which, by a natural Instinct, they generally solicit to obtain by Crying,) they seem thereupon to have an obscure Sense of Something external, in respect of their own Beings,—Something, which is no Part of Themselves.—It appears also, that they have, at the same time, Sensations of those Primary Qualities of external things, Moisture and Dryness, Cold and Heat, so far as they feel themselves, on the one hand, hurt or incommoded by the Excess of any one of these Qualities, and on the other hand, benefited or eas’d by a Quality which is contrary. These are called the Primary Qualities of Body, because These, and none Other, belong to those Primary Bodys, the Four Elements of all Bodys which are Mixt, or composed of different Ingredients: and ’tis worthy of Remark, that these primary Qualities are the First, by which new-born Infants appear to be affected; excepting perhaps a Glimmering of Light: concerning which we shall have occasion to say more in a subsequent Note. To proceed at present with an account of the progress of our Sensations: for only by means of These have we any apprehension of Outward Things, or of their Sensible Qualities:——Next after those First Sensations, produced in us by an application of the Primary Qualities of Body to our Organs of Touch, we soon feel various other Sensations, from those various Qualities of Body which are called Secondary, because they are found, not in the Primary or Elementary Bodys, but in Mixt or Compound-Bodys only;—Some, which affect the Touch, as Hardness and Softness, Roughness and Smoothness; — Others, which affect the Taste, as Sweetness, Sourness,
Sourness, Bitterness, &c.; together with Odours, which affect the Smell; Sounds also, which strike the Ear; and Colours, falling on the Eye. The Sensations of these, and of such other Qualities of things external, as affect any of our outward Senses, are all of them, either pleasurable or painful, more or less: and the Pleasures and Pains, which attend them, are purely Corporeal; as being produced by Bodys, or Particles of Body, when these meet with Bodys animated by Sentient Souls. Now the Pleasures and the Pains of this Kind are first felt, whilst the Rational Soul lies entirely dormant, and even before any Facultys of the Animal Soul, except That of Sense, are strong enough to exert themselves. All this while, tho the Infant-Sensations grow more and more lively, as the Organs of Sense strengthen, yet None of the Objects of Sense appear distinctly; or the Mind, newly pent up in Body, and clogged with Matter, is yet too weak to take Cognizance of any of them in the Sensörium: even there, None of them make any durable Impression; All vanish, with the Sensation which they produce; and in their present appearances, All of them belong to that First Class of Things, by Socrates termed the Infinite. Not long afterwards, however, the Mind begins to expand herself; and Children then begin to distinguish outward Things, one from another; to distinguish also the Parts of a Corporeal Figure, one from another, and from the Whole. And as soon as Imagination and Memory, those Facultys of the Animal-Soul, are able to receive and to retain the Images of Corporeal Forms, the Mental Powers are excited, by which the Mind views them together and compares them; sees Similarity and Dissimilarity amongst them; congregates the Similar, and segregates the Dissimilar; and in the Similar, be they ever so Many, sees a certain Sameness, which intitles them to be called by one and the same Name, as having, All of them, one and the same Nature.
— It seems, that, next after This, the Mind discerns some accidental Qualities, Conditions, and Circumstances,—such as Colour, Size, Motion or Rest, Action or Inaction,—wherein the most similar Beings or Substances differ, one from another; and that, discerning This, she separates those differing Qualities, &c. from That Nature, which is the Same in them All: for, notwithstanding her discernment of those Accidental Differences, she continues to give to All of them the Same Name. — Soon after this, the Mind seems to perceive farther, that Qualities, &c. of the Same Sort, are the Attributes of many Substances or Beings different in their Names and Natures; and hence she readily assigns to Each of those Attributes one and the same Name, as denoting one and the same Thing, common to many Beings of different Natures. — Thus far even Children, when they can speak, or understand what is spoken, concerning Objects with which they are conversant, are carried by Common Sense, aided by the Principles of Reason, in perceiving the Sameness and Differences of Things. And the Multitude, or Bulk of Mankind, being wholly employed in providing for their comfortable subsistence, seldom go any farther.—Now, to perceive Sameness and Difference together, in Objects of Sense, whether these Objects are Substantial Beings, or Attributes of such Beings, is to have Ideas of the Species of Things, and of their Specific Differences. To have such Ideas, in every One of which, many Particulars are universalized, (many Objects of Sense being, by the Mind’s Eye, viewed in One Special Idea,) is natural to the Human Mind, when her dormant Powers are first awakened: it is the First Stage on the Road to Science, (properly so called,) the Knowledge of things stable; and the same for ever:—and it is so necessary to the Formation, Knowledge, and Use of Language, that the Words, which seem to have been the first invented in every Language, if it be original or underived
underived, are the Symbols (or Representatives) of those Special Ideas. Indeed the Things, which Men had always the most immediate Occasion to speak of, One to Another, were Sensible Objects in their Species, not This or That Individual or Particular; as appears from the Pronoun-Words, probably the next invented, to serve instead of dumb Directions by the Eye or Finger, pointing to some Individual Being or Particular Thing, either remote or near. For this reason we presume it is, that Nature has not given the Organs of Speech to Brute Animals, not even to those of the liveliest Sense and the most generous Spirit; 'tis because they could be of no Use to an Animal, the highest Faculty of whose Soul was a Memory of particular Objects of Sense, without universalising any of them, or conceiving an Idea of any Species: for without such Ideas at least, there can be neither Speech, nor Understanding of what is spoken.—But to proceed with our present Subject, the natural Progress of Human Knowledge, until it arrives at the Cause of All things. — When the Invention and the Improvement of useful Arts had more and more abridged the Labours of Human Life, and had procured with facility the means of comfortable Living, the Lovers of Knowledge had then Leisure to search deeper into the Nature of Things. In this Search they soon came to separate the Properties, severally essential to each Species, from those accidental Circumstances, which diversify the Individuals, and serve to distinguish them, One from Another. In the next place they found, that some of those essential Properties were common to many Beings of different Species: and hence they acquired a Knowledge of the Genera, or Kinds, as well as of the Species of Things. In the same manner they went on, generalising more and more, as they found more and more Kinds of Being to agree in some of their essential Properties; — until at length they
they attained to see, that *Being its Self*, accompanied with the Property essential to all Being, was *Common to them all*, and absolutely *Universal*; inasmuch as it comprehended all the *Kinds* and *Species* of Being, together with the *Property essential*, and the *Circumstances incidental*, severally to Each.—In the mean time, for the sake of communicating this gradually increasing Knowledge, it was necessary, all along, to invent new Terms for all newly-discovered Things. And thus the Language of that People, amongst whom these Discoveries were made with the most Accuracy, became at length richer than any other Language, not only in *Substantive* Words, but in *Attributes* also; to express, not only all the different *Kinds* of Things, but also their different *Properties* and *Powers*, *Energies* and *Actions*, with the *Effects* of their last on other Things, and the *Relations* of One *Being*, or *Attribute* of Being, to Another. —But the *Knowledge of Nature* was far from being as yet completed. Nothing can be known perfectly well, without the Knowledge of its *Causes*. It remained therefore, to search out the *Cause* of those *Samenesses* and *Differences*, which appear together, in all the *Kinds* and *Species* of Being;—in the different *Species* of each Kind, the *Cause* of *Sameness*, as to their Kind; —and in each *Kind*, the *Cause* of *Difference* between its *Species*; —how *Being* comes to be divided into certain *Kinds* and *Species*; and how these *Kinds* and *Species* come to be continued the *Same* for ever, amidst the unceasing Change and Variation of all things throughout Nature.—The Speculators of Outward Nature seemed to think, that they gave a sufficient account of these *Phænomena*, in saying,—that the *Multitude* of Individual Beings, in every Age, were produced from *different Seeds*,—*generically* different, Some of these *Seeds*,—Others *specifically*,—and Others with a *Difference* merely *numerical*;—*Seeds*, which conveyed to every successive Generation the *Specific Forms*
Forms and the Generic Powers of those Beings from whom they sprang. And if these Naturalists were asked, from what Cause came any Difference at all, other than numerical, between the productive Beings, or between the Seeds which they severally produced; — and from what Cause had those Seeds the Power of continuing on, from Generation to Generation, the same Differences, both Generic and Specific, without Addition, Diminution, or Alteration; — Some had no better Answer to make than This; — "Things had always gone on after this manner; Hens produced Eggs; from Eggs came forth Chicken; Chicken grew up to be Hens, and produced other such Eggs as those from which they came." — But "Which were First, Birds or Eggs? for it does not appear, that an Egg could ever have existed without a Bird previous to it; nor that a Bird could, without a previous Egg." — To this Question it was thus answered; — "In Nature there was no First, no Beginning of Things: Time is infinite, the past as well as the future; and the successive Generations of all the Beings of Nature roll, along with Time, beginningless and endless". — But "you thus present to our Imaginations a Chain without a First Link,—an orderly March without a Leader,—an infinite Succession of Beings, Every one of which is an Effect of some prior Being, as well as it is a Cause of some posterior. Must there not have been, before Nature, some Cause of it? or at least in Nature must there not have been always Something, which is a Cause, without being also an Effect?" — These Questions drew from those ancient Physiologers the following Account of the Universe. They admitted, "'twas necessary that Something should have existed always, from infinite Time past, to be the Cause of that infinite Series of Generations, — some Being, which involved in its Self its own Cause, and existed by the necessity of its own Nature?" — "but this necessary self-
existent Being, they said, was Nature her Self; the Nature of the Universe, which continued the Same for ever:” they farther said, that “to this Nature belonged incessant and everlasting Motion, by the same necessity,—a Motion of the whole Universe, and a Motion of every Part and Particle of it:”—that “whatever Change happens in any Part of the Universe, it is occasioned only by a Removal of Particles from one Place to another:”—that “Particles of a similar Sort often meet together, and afterwards separate again:”—and that “what we call Generation, is only a Meeting together of these Particles; and what we call Death, or Corruption, is only a Parting of them asunder, followed by a Dissolution of that Being which they had compos’d.” —— Other Physiologers gave a quite contrary Account of the Cause of Nature. For they said, that “Nature was not eternal, but began in Time:”—that “the Beginning of it was from Seeds, but not from any such Seeds, as by natural necessity produce Beings of any certain Kinds; the Seeds of All things being an infinite Number of minute Bodys; Some indeed more minute than others, but All of them indivisible, and All of them eternally in Motion by a Necessity of their own, antecedent to That of Nature; for Nature as yet was not:”—that “the Figures of these minute Bodys were infinitely various; and their Motions in no determinate Direction:” that “by this vague Motion, like that of Motes in a Sun-Beam, their relative Situation was continually changing; and by striking against each other, their Posture continually varied:” that “the irregular Curvatures in the Figures of Some, like Hooks, happening to take Hold of those of Others, thenceforward they wandered on together; and in their way, gathering up more by the same means, they sometimes inclosed, amongst them, Bodys the most minute and subtile, of a Spherical Figure, and moving with the greatest Celerity,—the Seeds of Life and Sense and Understanding:”—that “hence they grew together into
into the various Beings of Nature, endued with Life in various Degrees, proportioned to the Number and the Fineness of the inclosed Vital Particles:”—that "a Being, thus framed, must have endured as long as any Vital Atoms remained within it; and some or other of These always remained, as long as the Lifeless Atoms had a Strength of Coherence, sufficient to retain them:”—for that "as the irregular component Particles of every Being were eternally in Motion, they must, sooner or later, have quitted their Hold of each other; and the Being, which they had composed, must have then come to Dissolution; the Vital Particles within, which had vitally connected them, being then let loose, must have taken Wing, and fled away:”—that "as soon afterward, as these Seeds of Life, these Vital Particles, All or Any of them, met with some Vital Being, Animal or Vegetable, newly compacted, or, at least, open enough to receive and strong enough to retain them, they entered; and were followed from time to time by More such, until the Being was satured with Life:”—that, "from That time, all superfluous Vital Particles, which had entered, found their way out, together with Fragments and Shreds from every Part or Member of the full-grown Being; and, together with them, became the Seeds of a new Being, Such a one, as That from which they either sprang forth spontaneously, or were emitted by the Desire, Will, or Consent of the Parent-Being:”—for that "Some of the original or First Beings happened to be so finely composed, that the Vital Atoms could run thro every Part of their subtile Frame; and in these Beings the Abundance of Life produced Sense,—a Sensation of Pain from Superfluities, as well as from Emptiness,—and a Sensation of Pleasure in the unburthening themselves of Superfluities, as well as in the filling of any Part empty, or not sufficiently full;—such Sensations produced Desire; Desire formed
formed Connexions and mutual Relations between similar Beings, for the sake of yielding mutual Relief, or of supplying mutual Wants:"—that "from these Causes, every where acting, at length, out of That boundless Ocean, the Infinity of Space, wherein the Seeds of all Being had swam to and fro from all Eternity, arose Venus, That Order and Course of Nature, which in every Age produceth Beings similar to Those of the Age preceding:"—and that "in fine this constant Continuance of the same Similaritys and Dissimilaritys, which appeared between the various Original Beings,—those First Assemblages of such Atoms as could hold together for a Time,—giveth us the Notion of Kinds and Species in Natural Beings."—It appears then, that, according to Both the Accounts, given by these ancient Physiologers, the Cause of this Commixture of the Infinite with Bound, (so called in the Passage now before us,) or in other words, the Cause of Bounds set to infinite Matter, is unintelligent and blind Necessity; whether it be eternal, or whether it arose in Time from the casual Concourse of eternal Atoms. From the latter of these Two Accounts, the Hypotheses of other ancient Physiologers, mentioned in Note 93 to the Greater Hippias, and in Note 83 to the Banquet, did not differ fundamentally. For All of These supposed infinite Matter, eternally in Motion, to be the sole Principle of All things; and this Motion, whether it was determined by coeval Necessity, or whether it was formerly vague and fortuitous, to have been originally their sole Cause.—But Thinking Persons, who indulged their Imagination less, and exercised their Reason more, than those Mechanical Naturalists, gave a more rational Account of the Cause of all Natural Things. These sober Thinkers, in their Speculations of Nature, observed every where the evident Marks of Design; — in the various Inanimate Beings, (Each having all its Parts similar,) they observed the Regularity
larity and Beauty of their several Forms,—in all Living Beings, (consisting of Parts dissimilar,) they perceived a Beauty, peculiar to each Kind, yet diversified in each of the Species of that Kind; they observed the Proportion, Harmony, and Correspondence of their Parts; and the Fitness of these Parts for the preserving of the whole Being, and for the generating of its Like. From such Observations, they reasoned easily to the consideration of some designing Minds invisible, the Causes of all those visible Forms. — Then widening their View, to behold the beauteous Spectacle of all Nature, they compared these Forms together; and finding, how exactly the Living Individuals of the same Species were fitted, Each to Other; every Species also, and every Kind of Being, fitted to other Species and Kinds; and the Elements of Nature, fitted to them All; so as to connect all the Parts of this visible World together, forming One great Whole; and so as to preserve this Whole for ever, found and intact, in undecaying Vigour and in youthful Beauty; they discovered Unity of Design in the Frame, and Uniformity of Conduct in the Administration of Nature; and hence concluded, that either One Intelligent Being was the sole Designer and perpetual Director of all Nature’s Motions, or, if Many such Beings were the Designers and the prime Movers, (which was more easy, tho’ less philosophical, to conceive,) yet such a Harmony and Union was between them, that One Mind must be in them all. — Now when these better Physiologists drew from their Discoveries this rational Conclusion,—that One Mind was the Cause of all Nature’s Forms, — they could not but discern at the same time, that, for this Cause to act, ’twas necessary to suppose some Subject for it to act in or upon,—some Matter for it to form,—some Principle of Things without a Will of its own, but meerly passive, and passively obedient to the Will of active Mind. For they considered, that if Mind energised
energised within its Self only, and had no other Subject, upon or within which, it might act, — the Activity of Mind could produce no External Form; nothing but Mind could have any Being at all; but All would be Mind; — Conclusions, contrary to Sense as well as to Reason, but easily admitted by those few Persons, who deny the existence of an External World.— This Reasoning gave rise to the Notion of Two Principles of Things, — a Notion, greatly corrupted in After-Ages by attributing to Each of those Principles a Will of its own,— to the One a benign Will, preservative of Health and Soundness in every Part of the Universe; and restorative, whenever any Part of it was disordered by the Other Principle: for to this Other was attributed a malignant Will, mischievous and destructive to Nature, and to all her fair Forms. But what the ancient Doctrine was concerning this Other Principle, and how it came to be corrupted, will fall under consideration properly in the Note next after This. Our Business, at present, is to proceed in considering Mind, as the Cause of the External World; in which, Bounds are set to Infinity; or, as Plato speaks in the Passage now before us, the Infinite and Bound are everywhere mixed together. — — Already it has been shown, in the Dissertation on the Doctrine of Heraclitus, page 29 & seq: what crude Notions of Mind were conceived and brought forth in the earlier Ages of Philosophy. These Crudities, in travelling abroad, engendered many a false and impious Con- ceit of the Divine Nature, in the Brains of Enthusiastic Poets, in those also of the Superstitious Vulgar, and in those of Priests interested to encourage both Enthusiasm and Superstition. Little or no Ground was gained in the Knowledge of this Divine Cause of all things, Mind, until the time of Socrates, except by the Pythagoreans, and a Colony, which came out of Their Schools, the Eleatics. — The former, in their Doctrine of the

Principles
Principles of Natural Things, taught,—that Matter, considered by
its Self, was totally void of Form, and therefore indefinable; but
that of every Form it was susceptible;—and that the ἄρχαι, the Forms
or Essences, by which the several Sorts of Things are defined, con-
sidered by Themselves, as separate from Matter, were eternal
and immutable. — They saw, that those Forms, the Place of
which was Matter, stay but for a time, and pass away; and
that, during their Residence, wherever they reside, they never
cease changing or varying. Eternity therefore, and Inmutability,
not being found any where in Corporeal Nature, those Philo-
sophers concluded, that the Forms, to which those Attributes belong, were only to be found in Mind. From the
Truth of This Conclusion, thus established, the fame just
Reasoners argued to this Other, — that those immutable
and eternal Forms, the Mental, were παρὰ ὅψιματα Exemplars-
Patterns of the temporary and changeable Forms, the Corporeal.
Accordingly, they called these Corporeal Forms ὅμισοματα and
ἐικόνες, Similitudes, Images, or Copies of those Originals. And
since it was necessary, for the denoting of newly-discovered
Things, that either new Names should be ascribed, or that old
Words should be used in a new Sense, they appropriated to
every one of those ἄρχαι ὅψιματα Corporeal Forms, those Ar-
chetypes of the Corporeal ἐς ἐν, the Term, Idea. That Such
were the Reasonings, Sentiments, and Expressions of the Py-
thagoreans, we refer for Proof to all the extant Remains of
their Physiological Treatises; in particular, see Ocellus Lucanus,
in Gale's Opuscula Mytholog: pag: 519, Edit: Amst: Timeæus Locrus,
in the fame Collection, pag: 544: and Archytas, in Stobæus's
Eclogæ, pag: 92, Edit: Ant: These Ideas then being disco-
vered to have their Seat, or Place, no where but in the Great
Mind of the Universe; and being found also to be the Originals
of all Nature's Forms; it was justly concluded that Matter,
the Subject of all Formation, was formed, (or, as we commonly speak, the World was created,) according to these eternal Ideas, or Exemplar-Forms; and that Mind was ἀίδων ἀναφωτής, the forming Form of All things.—In prosecuting the Study of Principles and Causes, the Eleatics conceived, that all these Ideas, or Intelligible Forms, are united in One most general Idea, Mind:—that this Mind is eternally united with Matter; and in consequence of this Union, continually imprints on Matter all such Forms as are comprehended in its Self:—that these imprinted Forms are the Objects of Sense; as those, the archetypal, are the Objects of Mind:—that the Objects of Sense are variable; those of Mind, invariable:—that Sense and Mind, with their respective Objects, the variable and the invariable, are connected together throughout the Universe, both in the One and in the Many:—that, tho in reality the Universe is but One, Ἑν ὈΝ, Mind in Matter, immovable and immutable; and tho all the Kinds and Species of Things are as fleable as their Ideas, and appear so to the Eye of Mind; yet to the Eye of Sense, since all Things are continually varying their Appearances, all Things seem to be in continual Motion, and to change Places, each with other; whereas they are only fitting Shadows; or a succession of Images, beheld in a transient Glass.—Thus arose the Distinction between κόσμος ἄνωτος, the Ideal or Intelligible World, and κόσμος ἀναφωτής, the Sensible World; (for which see Note 94 to the Banquet;)—a Distinction, meerly logical, and without any other Difference, than Such as there is between a real Man, and the Likeness of that Man, painted or printed upon a changeable-coloured Silk. And hence may easily be reconciled the seeming Contrariety of Doctrine between Xenophanes and Parmenides, respecting the Infinity of the Universe;—That also between Parmenides and his Disciple Zeno, respecting its Mobility;—and That between Melissus and Himself,
Himself, respecting the Infiability and Destrucibility of all things. — The two former Contrarietys are well known to the Learned; and for the latter, see Dr. Davis, in his Notes on Cicero’s Academicks, pag. 218. — Before we proceed farther in this brief account of the Progress, anciently made, in the First or Chief Philosophy, the Knowledge of the Principles and Causes of all Natural Things, we shall presume on the Reader’s Indulgence for a few Words, in defence of the ancient Doctrine, concerning those eternal and Mental Forms, termed by the Pythagoreans, who first reasoned up to them, Monads and Ideas: tho' we should not have imagined a Defence of that Doctrine necessary for Any Persons, who acknowledge immutable and eternal Mind to be the Cause of Outward Nature, were it not, that Many in modern Ages seem to think such an Acknowledgement very compatible with a Supposition, that the World was created by the all-wise Author of it on a Plan not eternal, but contrived and executed in Time, for some unknown Purposes, ex mero arbitrio; — a Plan therefore, changeable at pleasure, and in Time perhaps to be quite abolished. — But we desire Those, who entertain Opinions, so inconsistent with their professed Belief concerning Mind, to consider, that the Being of Mind infers the Being of Ideas, and that the Being of a Mind eternal and immutable infers the Being of eternal and immutable Ideas; — that on Ideas of the Mind every Plan or Design is built; — and that Such as are the Ideas, Such will always be the Plan. — — The Nature also of eternal Ideas, considered as the Foundation of the Plan of Outward Nature, may be argued from the Analogy, which they bear to Human Inventions. — They are Mental Forms alike; and they are alike capable, Each single Form of either Sort, of being multiplied, or becoming Many, in the external Copies of it: but in This respect they differ, in that eternal Ideas, being original Con-

ceptions
ceptions of an all-perfect Mind, are, All of them, brought into Outward Light continually, thro the continual Operations of Nature; whilst Human Inventions, being conceived in the imperf ect Minds of Men, Many of them perish in their Embryo-State. Since, however, Such of them, as come to Light, and for a Time remain, are the Originals of all the Works of Art, we perceive This Analogy between Divine Ideas and Human Inventions,—that the former are to the Works of Nature, what the latter are to the Works of Art,—namely, Formal Causes, Exemplar-Forms, and Archetypes. — Now, we are well aware, that Those Persons, who have been used to consider every Species, or Specific Form, as an AbstraÆ, made by the Human Mind, from a Collection of similar Images in the Imagination, may object to this Analogy, that the very Foundation of it fails: for, tho it were granted, that some Sort of Similitude subsisted between the Divine Mind and the Human, or between the Ideas of the One and the Ideas of the Other; yet, that the Works of Art are made from Images modelled in Men's Imagination, and thence generally copied first, and drawn on Paper; and that these Images are composed from Parts of many other Images, those of Sensible Objects, whether Natural or Artificial, treasured up in the Memory; but that the Works of Nature, planned by the Divine Mind, are not made after any previous Models or Images of them; for that pure Mind excludes Imagination, and is prior to all Sensible or Outward Objects. — To these Objectors we believe it sufficient to answer, that they are mistaken in That Part of their Objection, on which depends the validity of the Whole: for in the Works of Art, tho their immediate Model, or Exemplar to be followed, be delineated perhaps on Paper, perhaps only rough-drawn in the Imagination of the Workman, yet the Design originates in Mind; the designing Mind of some Artist forms the
the Image in his own Imagination first, and transfuses it thence into That of the Workman, (if a different Person,) by such Words or Draughts, as explain it to his Understanding. — Thus much for the present, concerning the Divine Ideas, comprehended, all of them, in One, — in the Divine Mind, considered as Intelligible, or the Object of his own Intelligence, and as the Archetype or Formal Cause of the Sensible World, and of all the Forms of Outward Nature. — And thus much indeed is at present necessary; because on the Reality of those Ideas will depend the Truth of what we have to say farther, in the prosecution of our Subject. — If then the ancient Doctrine, concerning the Cause of all Natural Things, be admitted to be true, so far as we have already proceeded in the History of that Doctrine, it appears, that, before the Time of Socrates, Mind and Matter were discovered to be the Two Principles of all external Things; and that Mind alone was discovered to be their Formal Cause, as well as their Efficient. — In this State stood Human Knowledge, with respect to the present Subject, the Cause of this Outward World, at the time when Socrates the Athenian made his Appearance in it, — a Man, whose Wisdom and Virtue were the greatest Honour to his Country, and the Manner of whose Death therefore was an indelible Reproach to it. — Thus we preface the following Summary of the Moral Doctrine of Socrates; because the well-tried Integrity of his whole Life seems to have been founded on the Wisdom, which to this Day shines in his Doctrine of the Supreme Mind, as the Fountain of Wisdom and true Virtue. — Of Socrates then it is thus said by Aristotle, (who never was suspected of Partiality in favour of any prior Philosophers,) — διό εἰσίν, αἱ τις ἀν ἀποδῶν Σωκράτηι δικαίως, τῶν ἐπακτικῶν λόγως, καὶ τὸ ὄφισθαι καθόλου ταύτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀμφοτὲρ ἄρχων ἐπιτηκνίς. — Ἄρχων ἐπιτηκνίς λέγω νῦν. "There are Two.
Two Things, (meaning either Two Discoveries in the Science of Mind, or Two Improvements in the Manner of teaching that Science,) which may justly be attributed to Socrates, viz. Reasoning by Induction, and to define things from Universals: (that is, in giving a Definition of any thing, to ascend to That Universal, which the Thing to be defined partakes of:) now Both of these (Discoveries, or Improvements,) regard the Principle of Science.—By the Principle of Science, I mean Mind.—

Analytic: L. i. C. 33. — What immediate reference Both of those Discoveries or Improvements, made by Socrates, have to Mind or Intellect, may be thus shewn.—As to the First; to reason by Induction, is to conclude the Being or Truth of some Universal, some comprehensive One, from all its Particulars which are Many: such Reasoning therefore brings us directly up to Mind, by whose Eye alone can be seen One in Many, And as to the Other; Every right Definition, in ascending to That which is more General than the Thing defined, brings us One Step nearer to the Highest Genus of Things, the most Universal, the most comprehensive One, that is, Universal Mind. Such Definition also sets together a Sameness and a Difference,—the Sameness of some Genus in all its Species, or Kinds subordinate,—and the Difference of the Thing defined from all collateral Kinds or Species: — the Sameness and the Difference are thus exhibited together to the Mind or Intellect, which alone can behold them Both in One View. — In this manner, and by these few and easy Steps, did Socrates lead his Followers to those Prime Ideas of Mind, reaching to all things,—and comprehending all things,—One in Many, and Sameness amid Difference: —from whence it was obvious to draw these Conclusions, that Unity and Number, Sameness and Difference, were the First Universals, were of the Essence of Mind, and, (as it were) Mental Principles;
Principles; and that, in viewing these, the Mind views herself. See Note 82 to the Meno. In this way of thinking, Socrates perhaps was helped and forwarded by the Conversation, which in his early Youth he had with Parmenides and Zeno. But of himself he seems to have applied these Principles to other Things the most Universal, τὰ καθόλω μάλιστα, (next after the Principles themselves;) being Universal,—not as every Genus is, with regard only to its own Species, nor as every Species is, with regard only to its own Individuals,—but absolutely, and without any restriction, Universal. —The most obvious and striking of these is Beauty: and this he saw was spread over the Face of all things, (beheld in One View,) the whole Countenance of Nature; he saw it investing every Kind and Species of Things, (taken singly,) the several Features of that lovely Face; he saw it accompanying Form in all its Journeys from one Portion of Matter to another, and attendant on all its Changes and Variety of Appearances: and he considered, that Similarity in Forms is Uniformity; that Difference in Forms is Variety; and that Uniformity amidst bounded Variety is the Essence of Beauty.—Not less universal than Beauty, appeared to Him the Constituents of it, —Harmony, or the mutual Fitness and Correspondence of Parts in any Whole,—Symmetry, or the Measurability of those Parts by one common Measure,—and Mediocrity, or a just Temperament in any Mixture of different Ingredients. For in the Frame of every distinct Being in Nature, as well as in the complex System of the Universe, he found Harmony and Symmetry combining all the Solid Parts, and Mediocrity running thro all the Fluids. And having learnt the Science of Geometry from Theodorus, he knew, that Harmony, Symmetry, and Mediocrity, are all measured by Proportion; —that Proportion is either between Things the same in Kind, but different in Magnitude or in Multitude, or else between
tween many Parts of one Whole; — that all Proportions are measured by Numbers; — and that every Number consists of many Units conjoined, or rather united. — The penetrating Genius of Socrates seems also to have discovered, that those Universals, Harmony, Symmetry, and Mediocrity, are the immediate Efficientsof Good, no less than they are of Beauty; seeing that Inanimate Beings owe to Them the Coherence of their Parts, and the Soundness and Permanency of their several Frames; — that Vegetables maintain their flourishing Estate, and the Duration of their Forms, only so long as those Causes of Union continue with them; — that all the Pleasures of Sense, which Sensitive Beings feel from external Things, (such as are adapted to their Senses, and commensurate with their Organs of Sensation,) they are indebted for to those Principles in Nature, which connect them with external Things; — that Beings, who partake of Mind, derive the serene Pleasures, enjoyed in contemplating the Truths of any Science, from the natural Correspondence and Harmony between the Mind and Truth; — that those Sciences only, which the Capacity of a Man's Understanding is adequate to, and as it were commensurate with, are to Him delightful in learning and acquiring, or in recollecting and reviewing the Theorems which they contain; — and that in exercising his rational Facultys, whether on the Subjects of Science or on those of Art, however natural and agreeable to all Mind such Exercise may be, yet for Human Minds no more Exercise than what is moderate, and sufficient to maintain their Strength, is beneficial; and that all, beyond the just Measure, is pernicious, is a weakening and a wearing of them out. — In contemplating Mind, the Seat of Science, Socrates discovered another Universal, — a Universal, of all the most Divine; — he discovered the Being of Truth. He perceived, that all the mutual Relations between the Ideas of Mind partake of this Universal
Universal Being; these Relations being indeed no other Things than Particular Truths, the Truths of each respective Science. He perceived that Each Idea in the Mind, taken by its Self, lyes single and apart from all the rest;—that the most obvious and simple Truths are the Relations of these single Ideas, one to another;—that Truths more remote, more general and comprehensive, are more extended Relations between those Ideas;—and that, as all Ideas are comprehended in that most general one, Universal Mind; (of whose eternal Being Each of them partakes;) so, all the Relations between them, that is, all Truths, are comprehended in Universal Truth; which imparts its own stable Eternity to every Particular Truth. He perceived, that not only by their own Nature they are linked together, (Each of them drawn on by some Other, and drawing after it many More,) but farther, that in Truth its Self they are, all of them, united.—Thus the philosophic Genius of Socrates conducted his Speculations and his Reasonings to that sublime Place within the Soul, which Plato terms νοημα, intelligible, as being the Place of pure Ideas;—a Place, enlightened by the Principles of Science, One and Many, Same and Different;—Principles, which throw Light on all the Objects of Mind, to make them visible to the Mind’s Eye, and at the same time, pour Light into that Eye, to see those Objects.—In this Place, and by this Light, Socrates discovered, that those Universals, Good, Truth, and Beauty, were essential, all of them, to Mind; or rather, that Each of them was the Energy of Mind, and therefore the Same Thing with Mind, whose very Essence is Energy;—that the Difference between these Energys lay merely in the Difference between the ends or Subjects of the Mind’s Energy;—that Truth was the Energy of Mind, considered abstractedly from Matter, and energising on its own Ideas within its Self; and that Beauty and Good were the Energys of Mind within Matter,
Matter,—Beauty, pouring its Self over and throughout the Forms, which the Mind, as their Efficient Cause, creates,—and Good, pouring its self into and throughout those Forms, as the Cause, or End, for which they were created.—He perceived accordingly, that the Principles of Mind, which are One and Many, Same and Different, were the Principles of those Universals, Harmony, Symmetry, and Mediocrity, those Conituents of Truth, of Beauty, and of Good. For he perceived, that Every Kind of Harmony was like That Kind of it, the Subject of which is Sound,—a Kind, called Symphony,—produced, as Nicomachus says in his Enchirid: Harmonic: pag: 25, when Sounds of different Magnitudes, or Tones, are so mingled together, as to generate a Sound ἑος ἐν ἑος, uniform, χαὶ χαὶ μιας, and as it were One. (See a Passage of the same Tenour, in Gaudentius, pag: 110.) He perceived, that Symmetry was produced, when many Things, of the same Kind, but specifically different, are measured by one common Measure. And he also perceived, that Mediocrity, in any Attribute of any Substantial Being, is a definite and certain (always one and the same) Degree of such Attribute, in the midst of many Degrees of it, infinitely various and uncertain; and that on these Excesses and Defects the very Being of Mediocrity depends. In this divinely intelligent Part of the Soul he then discerned, that Mind, in governing Matter, was Mediocrity, or Measure, the Cause of Good; and that Matter, escaped for a while from the Government of Mind, was the Cause of infinite Evil.—But the same Godlike Genius, which had thus raised Socrates to a View of Things Universal and Divine, conducted him down again to Human Subjects. His Mental Eye being then filled with Light, from that original Light, the Principles of Reason and of Science, he applied these Principles to the Sciences of Morals and Politics; or rather, by establishing Moral and Political Truths on
on their only firm Basis, the Being and Nature of the Human Mind, he united, and formed into Sciences, what before lay single and scattered, being but Right Opinions.—He perceived, that the Constituents of Private Moral Virtue are these which follow; — in the Mind, (the governing Part of the Soul by nature,) Prudence, founded on Wisdom, the Knowlege of Moral Right and Wrong; — in the Affections of the Soul, Symmetry; the Human Nature, considered as Social, in the various Relations of Human Life, being the true Measure of them all; — in the Passions of the Soul, (such as are implanted in every Animal, for the avoiding or the opposing of whatever is noxious to it, and such also as impel it to the Pursuit of what is any way needful or beneficial to it,) Mediscrity, or a juft Degree of each Passion, proportioned to the others; the proper Office of Each being assigned, and the due Bounds of Each being fixed, by the Ends of Nature, the Preservation and the Well-being of the Individual, and the Continuation of the Species; — in the whole Soul, Harmony; whilst all the Parts of it, Rational and Irrational, rightly discharge their proper Functions, striking upon the Nerves, and uttering the Voice, in Confonance and Symphony, one Part of the Soul with another.—Homogeneous and corresponding with this Personal or Private Virtue, which is the Excellence of every Human Being, appeared the Virtue of a Kingdom or Common Wealth. For he perceived This also to consist of Wisdom in the Law, which is the Mind as it were of the whole Body of the People; and Prudence, joined with Vigour, in the Execution of that Law; — in every Member of the Community, an Attachment to that Law which is Common to them all, and to that Constitution by which they are all united; — in the People, a Reverence for the Administrators of Justice according to the Law; and a Respect, full of Gratitude, to the faithful Guardians of the Constitu-

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tion; — in the Deliberative Part of the State, Courage, mixed with Caution, to guard against Evil; and in the Military Part, Valour to encounter Danger, and Magnanimity to endure Toils: — in Every one of the People, an assiduous application of his Facultys, Mental and Corporeal, to some particular Employ, conducive to the Well-being of All; and a just attention to the Gain, arising from that Employ, to Himself in the first place, for his own and his Family's Maintenance and Profit, but ultimately redounding to the Support of the Government, the Magistracy, the Military, and whatever Orders of Men beside are deemed necessary to support the whole Fabrick of the State. — With this Public Virtue, Socrates perceived the Virtue of a private Family to be essentially the Same. For he considered a single Family, with a Father and Mother at the Head of it, as a petty Kingdom; and a Civil State, as a more extensive and widely spread Family. The Virtue of Each of them was, he saw, constructed on the same Principles with the Virtue of the Other: and the several Parts and Members of the one, with the distinct Offices of each of those Parts, were, he saw, analogous to the Parts, and their Offices, in the other. — He understood Political Union to be as natural to Human Kind as the Conjugal: for he perceived, that, however sufficient the Parental Tye might be, to relieve their earliest Wants; and the Conjugal Tye, those of their riper Years; — Tyes, created by Natural Affection, and by the Natural Passion between the Two Sexes; — yet the Continuance of these Tyes, or, at least, of their natural Effects, is secure only in Civil Society; and that only there is to be found a Supply of those numerous Wants, arising afterwards from an Increase of Family; and only there to be met with is a Gratification of other Social Affections, and of other Selfish Desires, not less natural than the former, tho less violent by nature,—those which arise when the Rational Faculty
is grown more mature, and the Understanding becomes enlarged. — He considered, that, as the Domestic State and the Political are alike founded on Human Indigence, — on the Insufficiency of the several Members of Either, separately and singly to supply their own Wants, — so are they alike also formed by Compact, either expressed, or tacitly implied, —— a Compact, which creates an Obligation, inforcing on them the Calls of Nature, and the Counsels of Reason, to continue in a State of Union, thro Harmony and Concord. — He considered, that, in the Marriage-Contract, either the Conditions of it are expressed formally in Words before Witnesses; or the Defect of such Form is supplied by mutual Confidence according to the Law of Nature; or some other Form is authorised by the Law of Custom, which adapts the Law of Nature to the peculiar Circumstances of each Country: — that, in a Compact between the Master of a Family and his Domesticks, the Conditions of it are wont to be made in express Terms, where the Domesticks serve for Hire, — but are implied in the Nature and Reason of Oeconomical Relation, (the End of which is the Good of all the Partys,) where the Domesticks are born in Servitude: — that the Terms of Agreement between many Heads of Families, to unite together in Civil Society, and to be subject to One Person or to More amongst them, are expressed in the Laws, made by Themselves, for the Maintenance of their Union: — that the Conditions also of Civil Government and Submission are usually expressed in Elective Kingdoms, and wherever the People chuse their own Magistrates; and that the same Conditions are tacitly understood, from the Nature and Reason of Civil Government, in Kingdoms and Ariftocracyys Hereditary. — He saw, that in all these Cases, the common Weal, or Good of the whole State, whether Civil or Domestic, is the End intended; and that a faithful Discharge of their proper
per Dutys, by all the Members of either State, the several Partys to the Contraæt, is the only Way leading to that End. — Thus it appeared to Socrates, that all Combinations in the Moral World, as well as in the Natural, were maintained only by Union, or by Agreement, — by the Union of many Parts in some Whole, or by the Agreement of Things, the single Powers of which were different: — he was sensible, that such Union or Agreement, between any rational and social Beings, could be maintained only by Universal Justice, that is, by thorough Honesty and Goodness; — and as he knew, that every Thing is supported only by the continuing Efficacy of the same Causes which produced it, he conceived, that the Great Mind of Nature, being full of Truth, Equity and Goodness, was the Fountain of every such Union or Agreement, — the combining and uniting Cause, — without the continual Influence of which, no rational or moral Society can subsist. — And it seems, that in this way, he discovered Universal Justice to be the Law of all rational and social Beings; by faithful Obedience to which Law, they continue to be what they are, that is, Rational and Social; and by Rebellion against which Law, they forfeit That their Essential Form or Nature. He discovered, that every Being, which partakes of Mind, and consequently is Rational, is at the same time Social: — that whatever Soul loseth her Sociability, at the same time loseth her Rationality, or Capacity of Reason, her Mental Principles, or, as our great Poet very platonically expresseth it,

The Divine Property of her First Being:

— and that every Act of Injustice, and even every Neglect of any Social Duty, is a Step toward that total Los. — He concluded therefore rightly, that every Being, which partakes of Mind, is, thro such Participation, subject by its nature to that Law of Universal Justice, for the same reason, that a Child is by nature
nature subject to the Will of an Affectionate Parent, namely, for its own Good: for he apprehended That Law to be the Will of the great Parental Mind, or, to speak more accurately, to be That very Mind, considered as governing the Moral World, and imparting to all those Beings, whom he forms for Rational Society, (by enduing them with Reason and a Social Disposition,) the Principles of Moral ReAlitude, Equity, and Goodness: for these Principles are indeed none other, than the Principles of Mind and Reason, applied to all the several Relations in Social Life.— When Socrates had arrived at a full Discovery of this Cause of Good to all Beings, who are at the same time Rational and Social,— this Beauty of the Moral World,— this Fountain of all Moral Virtue and Excellence,— (and to Socrates justly, as it seems, may be attributed so full a Discovery, thro his Knowledge of the Principles of Mind,) from that time to the End of his Life, he made it his sole Business to discourse concerning Morals and Politicks, fundamentally and universally; reasoning to the Principles of those Sciences by Dialectic Questions and Inquiries: for this was the Method which he took, in teaching them to his Disciples: in this way he produced, out of Men’s own Mouths, their natural Notions, and the First Principles, common to them All, on these Subjects: and in this way he convinced of Error many Persons, who had been seduced by Sophistry to depart from the Principles of Reason and Nature. The Philebus of Plato, now before us, exhibits to our View Socrates conversing with some of these Persons; rescuing them from the Errors into which they had been drawn, concerning the Chief Good of Man; and, from their natural Pre-conceptions, reasoning them into the Truth on this Subject. Not till toward the Conclusion of the Dialogue, ought therefore the Reader to expect a Proof of what, to gratify his Curiosity, we have in this Note antici-
264  PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Will you not want a Fifth Sort too, for a Cause of Disunion and Separation?

SOCRATES.

uated, — namely, the Discovery, made by Socrates, that the same Divine Being, who is the Cause of Outward Nature, that is, of the Commixture of Form and Matter in the Corporeal World,—He, who is at once the Designer, the Forming Form, and the Beginning, or Active Principle,—is also the End, or Final Cause of all things; his Meaning, or Design, being Universal Good: — that consequently his Mind, that is, He Himself, is Goodness its Self;—That, by which he is eternally happy within Himself; and That, by which He is the Sovereign Good of all Such Beings, as, having a rational and social Nature given them, are capable of participating in that Supreme Felicity.

165 'Twas observed in Note 167, that prior to Socrates, other Philosophers had established the Doctrine of Two Principles of all things, Mind and Matter. Protarchus, in his present Question, evidently alludes to the latter of these Two, in a genteel and facetious way, between Jest and Earnest; doubting perhaps, whether this Principle ought to be numbered amongst the different ἐν τῶν ἄνων Sorts of Things or Beings, as One of them; or whether, by its Self, it had no true or real Essence at all; for since it was defined by Negative Words, such as ἀνελθαται without Form, ἀμορφος shapeless, ἀφωσιομέλος void of Figure, &c. it seemed to imply a Negation of every Kind and Species of Being. 'Tis evident, we say, that Matter is here meant: for Protarchus speaks of a Contrary to the Fourth Sort of Being, a Contrary to Mind, which is the Active Principle in the
PHILEBUS. 265

the Universe, the Plenitude of Mental Forms, the Creator of all Forms Corporeal, and the Cause of Good to All things. — Now the direct Contrary to Active is Passive; and meerly Such is Matter, as it possesses no Quality whatever, except that of being Passive, in receiving any Sort of Form. — Again; the direct Contrary to Plenitude of Forms is thorow Indigence of all Form; and in this Condition nothing is beside meer Matter. Farther; the direct Contrary to the Creator of all Corporeal Forms is the Destroyer of them all; and This only Matter is, thro its utter Impotence, and Inability to retain any Form impressed on it: for, tho it be the Seat of All external Forms by turns, 'tis a Seat for ever sinking under every One of them. — Again; the direct Contrary to the Cause of Good is the Cause of Evil; and this can be none other than Matter: for in the Intelligible or Mental World, — the World of pure Forms, unmixed with Matter, and exempt from Body, — all the Forms, and all the Connections or Relations between them, are eternally true, good and perfect; and no Form, partaking of these Attributes, can ever be the Cause of Evil: — on the other hand, in the Sensible or Corporeal World, every Individual Thing consists of some Particular Form, and of some Portion of Matter: and every One of these Particular Forms partakes of Good only: for it is an Image, however imperfect, of some eternally true Form, in which there is no Evil nor Imperfection; and it is produced by Nature, whose Mind is Goodness its Self; in as much as the Whole of this World of Outward Forms is the Image of that all-perfect Mind; and every Production of Outward Nature, an Effect of the Energy and Operation of that all-perfect Goodness. — — Seeing then, that no Forms, nor any Combination of Forms, whether they be original or copied, can cause Evil, we must conclude, that the sole Cause of Evil is either Matter, in its Self void of Form; or, at least, some Portion of this formless Matter. — But Matter is not divided into
into Parts or Portions, until it be formed.—It remains therefore past a Doubt, that Infinite Matter is to be considered, as the sole Cause of Evil to all Corporeal Beings.—Accordingly, it brings Death to all Such as are Vital, thro its Contrariety to all Life, and to all Form. For, by breaking the Continuity of those Parts of every Vital Being, thro which the Life circulates, it stops that Circulation, by which the Life is carried throughout the Frame; and, by breaking the Connections between all the Parts of that Frame, it brings the Form, the Being itself, to Dissolution.—To all such Corporeal Beings, as are Sentient as well as Vital, it brings Pain, thro preternatural Diflemions, Stri6ures, Wounds, and other Evils, incident to the Corporeal Organs of Sensation, and caused by extraneous Bodys, whose outward Invasion or inward Intrusion is unfriendly and noxious. But, if any Corporeal Form were perfect, and could, as long as it lasted, be kept intire and found, it would feel no Pain from the Stroke or Pressure of any other Bodys, beyond the instant Time of such Stroke or Pressure. And Bodys can suffer no Pain except from Body, and only by means of the Material Principle, which is common to all Bodys whatever.—Nor is Matter less mischievous to Reason and Intelligence, in all those Corporeal Beings, to whose Vital and Sentient Form, or Essence, Mind is superadded. For by the Predominance of the Material Principle in their Bodys, their Rational Facultys are weakened, or their Use of them is impeded; 'tis That, which throws a Cloud over their Understandings, and obstructs the Light of Divine Reason within them; and hence the Passions, having their Origin from the Body, and their Seat in the Irrational Part of the Soul, gain the Ascendant over the Rational Part, suppress the connatural Principles of true Virtue, (the same with the Principles of Minds,) and lead the Will blindfold into all Moral Evil. — Such and so great being the Mischiefs, occasioned by the Mixture of Matter in all Corporeal
Corporeal Forms, even in Those to whom Mind is imparted, we cannot wonder, if the Ignorant, who are always prone to Superstitious Fears, when they heard, that all these Evils were by the Wife and Learned ascribed to Matter, imagined a malevolent Mind within it, powerful to hurt and to destroy; in opposition to the benevolent Mind of the Author of all Good, whose Power was always exerted either to bless or to save. When they heard it also said, that Matter was without Form or Beauty, they supposed it to be a monstrous Being, deformed and ugly. Indulging their Fancy farther, they imagined a Multitude of Particular Beings, mis-shapen Portions of Matter; inspired, all of them, with Malice by that Evil Spirit, which reigned in formless Matter; and actively contending against a Multitude of beautiful and good Beings, Some of whom they supposed to be the invisible Protectors of whole Nations,—Others, of inferior Sort, the Patrons of private Families,—and Those of the lowest Order, the Guardians of Individual Persons.—These Opinions were favoured by crafty Men, of whose Authority and Dominion it was the Interest, to cultivate Superstition, and to draw the Minds of the People away from the Religion of Reason—the rational and sentimental Worship of One Supreme Mind, who is the sole Giver of all good Things,—to the Worship of Many fancied Deities; whose respective Priests alone were supposed to know, What Kind of Worship was the most pleasing to Those, in whose Temples they severally served. —Agreeable to this Account of the Origin of Daemon-Worship from Philosophical Truths mis-understood, and perhaps purposely mis-represented, are the Records of ancient History: for we learn from These, that a Belief of Good and Evil Daemons, interfering in Human Affairs, prevailed most in Countries, anciently the most celebrated for Knowledge philosophical and political; but in which Countries One Set of Men,
PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

Perhaps I may; but not, I believe, at present. However, should there be occasion for it, you will pardon me, if I go in pursuit of some Fifth Sort of Being 169.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

Men, from Generation to Generation, confined all That Knowledge to Themselves and their own Familys; being, by Hereditary Succession, and a peculiar Education which was denied to all Others, their only Priests, Statesmen, and Philosophers. Thus, in all probability, did the ancient Doctrine concerning the Two Principles of All things,—One the Cause of all Good,—the Other, of all Evil,—degenerate into Daemonism, mixed, in some Countries, with Polytheism, in others, with Theism itself: and thus did even the purest, simplest, and easiest Religion, by Nature dictated to all Rational Beings, become corrupted, bedaubed, and loaded, with numberless and gross Superstitions.

169 Altho the main Subject of Inquiry, in the Philebus, we acknowledge to be This,—What Kind of Life is the happiest for Man,—yet we must observe, that the Subject immediately before us, in this Part of the Dialogue, regards not the Kinds of Human Life, but the Kinds of Being in the Universe. It is surprising, therefore, that, in all the Editions of the Greek Original, we here read πέμπτης σέω, a Fifth Life; and that None of the Translators of it into other Languages appear to have suspected of Falsity a Reading, so foreign to the Purpose,
Purpose, and so absurd. What makes it the more absurd, is, that only Three Kinds of Life are taken notice of anywhere in the Dialogue,—namely, a Life of Pleasure, a Life of Speculation, (the Object of which is the Knowledge of Truth,) and a Life of Practical Virtue. Indeed only these Three Things, Pleasure, Knowledge, and Virtue, are loved and pursued by any Man, purely for their own sakes, as Ends, or ultimate Objects of his Desire. For all other Things, which many Men seem to be wholly intent on the attainment of, they consider but as Ways and Means to something else, which they cannot otherwise obtain. Now this Dialogue hath for its Subject, not the Means of being Happy, but the End, Happiness its Self; and the Object, which it hath in view, is to shew, that this End can never be obtained, either in a Life of Speculation, or in a Life of Pleasure; and only in a Life of Virtue. For this reason Plato, in his Philebus, takes no notice of Two other General Kinds of Life, totally different from any of the Three, scrutinized in this Dialogue; notwithstanding that they engross the whole Attention, Time, and Cares, of far greater Numbers of Men, than doth the Pleasurablc Life, the Speculative, or the Virtuous: on which account, they are by Aristotle of old, and in our own days by Mr. Harris, very properly ranked amongst those different Great Roads of Life, along one or other of which all Men travel:—by these Two Other Lives, we mean the Lucrative and the Political.—As to Men, who lead a Lucrative Life, that is, the Bulk of Mankind, they are generally bred to it by their Parents, or their particular Guardians, or by that General Guardian of all the People, the Government in each Civil State: and they are so bred, for the Purpose of procuring them a comfortable Subsistence, either by means of their Manual or Bodily Labour, or by their exercising of Arts beneficial to the Publick: Those also of riper Years, who commence
commence in any of the Lucrative Ways of Life, are led to it generally by the same Motive. When Any of these Persons, whose ordinary Views are confined to an acquiring of the Necessaries and Conveniencys of Life, think of enjoying Happiness, (and such a Thought must sometimes occur to the Mind of every Thinking Being,) they commonly extend their Views and Hopes beyond this Earth and the present Life, to an Hereafter in some better Place. The Utmost, which they usually hope for here, is Rest from Labour and from Cares in their Old Age. We except, however, a Few Persons, who, after they have acquired a competent Provision for the Remainder of their Lives, continue their Labour, (if it be not toilsome,) from Habit, or from not knowing how to employ their Time otherwise; but neither Habit nor Ignorance is a Rational Motive: and Some, who continue in the same Way of Life, thro Avarice; but this Motive is irrational: Some also, because they suppose it conducive to their Health, as a proper and accustomed Exercise of the Body; but no Man proposes such Exercise, or even Health, as his ultimate End: and Some, we doubt not but there are, who proceed in a Lucrative Way of Life, to acquire the Means of benefiting Others; but this End belongs only to the Good Man, and to the Life of Virtue. Besides these, we except a Few Persons more, who continue in the Practice of Arts, which they are Masters of, meerly from their Love of those Arts, and the Delight they feel in the Practice; — if indeed such Persons, having no Lucre in their View, can be deemed Exceptions, and are not rather to be ranked between the Lovers of Speculation, and the Lovers of those Pleasures, which Plato in the last Part of this Dialogue denominates pure Pleasures, unmixed with Pain; and which, he says in his Gorgias and Greater Hippias, are innocent, and good, and attendant on a Sense of Harmony and Beauty. Of these Persons
Persons it may be farther observed, that, as the natural Dispositions of their Souls are generally found to be the very same, which Plato in the Sixth Book of his Republick deems requisite to the Study of Philosophy, namely, the decile and the retentive, the magnanimous and the generous, and above all other things loving Truth, the Parent, and nearest of Kin to Harmony, Symmetry, and Beauty,—so they generally lead a Life, the nearest to the truly philosophical, or compleatly Wise and Virtuous Life,—a Life of Honesty and Goodness.—Neither is the Political Life chosen for its own sake, more than is the Lucrative. For most of the Persons, whom we see in the lower and middle Stations of it, have undertaken the Offices, belonging to those Stations, meerly with a View to Gain. These are therefore to be numbered amongst Such, as live a Lucrative Life. And Those who occupy, or who aim at occupying, the higher Posts and Offices of State, generally have in View, as their immediate End, Honour, that is, the Reputation of Wisdom and Virtue. This Reputation they take Delight in, because, as Aristotle observes with his usual Acuteness, it persuades them, that 'tis their Due, and that they really possess the Wisdom and the Virtue ascribed to them;—a Delight, which, as the same great Genius finely remarks, argues an inward Sense and Acknowledgement, that Wisdom and Virtue are the Best Things; and that a Life, according to them, is the Best Life.—Befide the Motives of Profit and of Honour, by the one or the other of which Those who live a Political Life are usually actuated, a Few we believe there are, who engage in it purely from Motives of Virtue;—with a View to bless or to benefit the Publick;—to rescue the State from bad Management;—to free their Country from domestic Tyrants;—or to save it from foreign Foes:—but such Undertakings and Employments are so far from constituting a Kind of Life different from That which is Virtuous, that they are the noblest Efforts and
PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

Of these Four Sorts then, in the first place, dividing "the former Three", and perceiving, that

and Exercises of a truly Heroic Virtue.—Seeing then, that no Man chooses either of these Two Kinds of Life, the Lucrative or the Political, for its own sake, or without some farther End in View;—seeing, that the other Three Kinds of Life, the Pleasurable, the Speculative, and the Virtuous, are Those only, which are embraced by any Man, with Expectations of finding his Happiness therein; and are Those only, which the present Dialogue treats of, or so much as mentions;—seeing also, that every Life, led by Man, is included in one or other of these Five Kinds; we presume, that, notwithstanding they happen to be just Five in Number, every Intelligent and Learned Reader will agree with Us, to reject the Reading of περιφλων βοη in the Greek of this Passage; and instead of it, to read περιφλον τι ευ conformable to which, we have made our Translation.

179 In the Greek, — διπλοντος. But Ficinus here translates, as if in the Manuscript, from which he made his Translation, he read εξελοντος. that is, taking out, or selecting: Mons'. Grou has given the same Sense to it, in his French Translation. The Sentence is indeed thus made easier and plainer, at first View. But we have thought it best to adhere to the Reading, printed in all the Editions of Plato; because it gives a Sense, more agreeable to what follows, than the other Reading does; and much more agreeable to the Design of this Passage; which leads to show, What Things they are, which are capable of a Division; and This, chiefly with a View to the infinite Diversities
PHILEBUS. 273

Two of these, when Both are divided, and their Divisions separated, are, Each of them, Many;—then, gathering together the Many of Each, and uniting them again, let us endeavour to understand, in what manner Each of them is, at the same time, One and Many.

PROTARCHUS.

Would you but express your Meaning more plainly, I might perhaps apprehend it.

Diversity of Pleasure, as to their Kinds, as well as to their Degrees, — in opposition to That, which is simply One, and indivisible.

171 We acknowledge to have no authority from the Greek, where we read only τα τρεῖα, the Three, for inserting between them, the word former: but 'tis added, to lessen the Obscurity of this Passage, at the first Entrance. — The Three Sorts of Being, mentioned together before the Fourth, (which was then pretended to have been forgotten,) are here again spoken of together: because Each of those Three is divisible into Many; and what is to follow, relates only to Things which are thus divisible: the Fourth therefore, which is Mind, the Cause of All things, is here omitted; because Mind its Self, in the Simplicity and Sameness of its own eternal Essence, considered apart from Matter, is One only, and not divisible into Many.

172 The insertion of the word es before πάλαι, proposed by Stephens, seems not so necessary as the learned Printer thought it.

M m Socrates.
PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

I mean then, by the Two, which I propoſe to be now considered, the Same which I mentioned at the first,—One of them, the Infinite,—and the Other, the Finite.—That the Infinite is, in some manner, Many, I will attempt to show: and let the Finite wait a while.

PROTARCHUS.

It shall.

SOCRATES.

Give me now your attention. It is, I confess, a difficult and doubtful Thing, That, which I would have you to consider. Consider it, however. First, with regard to Hotter and Colder, in things, fee if

The Instances, here brought, the Hotter and the Colder, sufficiently distinguish the Infinite, now spoken of, from that infinite and formless Matter, by Protarchus called a Fifth Sort of Being. For to this latter belong no Qualities whatever, no Powers; and only a bare Capacity of receiving Figure and Form, with their attendant Qualities and Powers: whereas the present Instances are taken from the Primary Qualities of Body, that is of Matter which hath received Form.—The Primary Qualities of Body, which are Heat and Cold, Dryness and Moisture, belong severally to the Four Elements of all Corporeal Nature. The former Two Qualities are Contrary to each other; as also are the Two latter.—The Pythagoreans, fol-

6
lowed by Plato in his *Timaeus*, hold, that the Four Elements differ only in Shape or Figure: the Particles of Elementary Earth being, as they suppose, Cubical; those of Elementary Fire, Pyramidal; those of Elementary Air having Eight equal Sides; and those of Elementary Water, Twenty. And if, as it is presumed, these Elementary Bodys are endowed with no other Qualities, than the Four Primary; — in other words, if their Forms or Essences differ, one from another, in Figure only, and in no other respect; — it follows, that their Figures make their Essential Forms, — that is, make them to be such Beings as they are, and to have such Qualities and Powers as they have.

—Now, as some Particles of all the Four Elements enter into the composition of every Compound-Body, those Compound-Bodys, which have more of Fire in them than Other Bodys of the like Kind, Magnitude, and Density, are, in themselves, hotter than these Others; they communicate more Heat to all Bodys adjacent, by transmitting some of their igneous Particles; and, if the adjacent Bodys happen to be Sentient, they cause in them, by the same Means, a greater Sensation of Heat. — Just so, a greater Quantity of any other Element in Some Compound-Body, than is found in Other Bodys similar to it in Kind, and equal to it in Magnitude and Density, gives it a greater Degree of the Quality, belonging to that Element. — And in every Compound-Body, the Degrees of That elementary Quality, which happens to prevail over its Contrary, are infinite; because Matter is infinite in Extent, and is every where formed. For hence it follows, in the first place, that the Primary Bodys, the Elements of all Others, are infinite also: it follows next, that, notwithstanding the fixed Number of the Kinds and Sorts of Things in Nature, (fixed in the Mind of Nature, tho perhaps not knowable by Man,) yet the Individuals of each Kind and Sort are innumerable and infinite: and since
Individuals of the same Kind and Sort infinitely differ in Magnitude; and Such of them, as happen to agree in This respect, still differ infinitely in respect of their Density and Weight; (Differences, caused by a less or greater Quantity of the Two heavier Elements, in proportion to That of the Two lighter, in their Frames;) and since the Frame of each Individual admits of infinite Changes; it also follows from these infinite Differences between one Body and another, and in the same Body at different times, that the Primary Qualities of Compound-Bodys infinitely differ in Degree.—In this Class of Infinites, produced by the Infinity of Matter,—in this first Sort of Things, so placed by Socrates, because (tho of the Four Sorts of Things, into which he divides all Being, these Infinites are indeed the Last and of lowest Dignity in Nature, yet) to Man they are the First, the first in point of Time, to his Feelings and Apprehension,—among these Infinites—are to be ranked all the Secondary Qualities of Compound-Bodys, as well as the Primary. For no less infinite is the Difference of Every one of Them, in different Bodys, with respect to its Degrees: and this infinite Difference of theirs arises out of That fundamental Infinite, which is One of the Principles of all Outward Nature. This appears from considering, that, beside That infinite Difference of Compound-Bodys, already mentioned,—That between the comparative Quantities of each Element in their Frames,—the minutest and invisible Compound-Parts of these Bodys have different Figures, according to their different Texture, the different Positions of the Elementary Particles in each of these minuter Parts, and the different Places therein, occupied by those different Particles, with respect to each other.—The Configurations also of these minute Parts, whose Figures singly are invisible,—Configurations, made, when they are assembled together, and combine to make Parts of the whole Frame,
Frame, large enough to be visible, — are infinitely different in different Bodys, and in the dissimilar Parts of one and the same Organic Body, because of the infinite Difference of their Con-
texture. And if all the Secondary Qualities of Bodys, and all their Active and Passive Powers, arise, as it is probable they do, from the Configurations of their Parts, the infinite Diversity of these Configurations must produce infinite Diversity in the Degrees of those Qualities and Powers.—To this Class of Inf-
nites, the Offspring of infinite Matter, referable also are all the Kinds, Courses, and Degrees, of Motion. For Motion belongs
only to Bodys; that is, to Portions and Particles of Matter bounded by some Figure: and Motion, of some Kind or other, belongs to all Bodys,—not, by reason of the Figures which bound the Matter of those Bodys,—but by reason of the Matter which is bounded by those Figures. For Matter, being the prime, the original and perpetual, Infinite, cannot be confined within fixed
Bounds: no Portion of it can retain any particular Form; and of Inanimate Bodys the only Forms seem to be their Figures, togeth-
er with the Qualities and Powers thence arising. Motion there-
fore, which is essential to Body, or Matter formed, is no less
infinite than Matter. The Degrees of its Celerity are as infinite as Time: the Kinds of it, among which are the tremulous, the
wavy, and the spasmotic, are as infinite as the Figures of mixt Elementary Particles in Compound-Bodys: and the Courses of Bodys, in motion, are as infinitely various, as the Deviations from a Right Line, or from a Circular.—Lastly, 'tis evident from what has been already said in this Note, that to the
Class of Infinites, spoken of by Plato in the Passage now be-
fore us, we are to refer all the various Sensations, which we feel; whether those Sensations are caused by Bodys extraneous, operating on the Bodys which are Ours, according to the Fi-
gures, Qualities, Powers, and Motions of the extraneous Bodys,
if you can think of any Bound. Or would not the More and the Less, residing in the Kinds themselves of Things, hinder, so long as they reside there, an End from being fixed to them? For, if

and the Passive Qualities of our own; — or whether they are caused by Either of the Two Active Elements, operating upon or within the Fibrous Part of our Frame; — or by all the Elements, variously mixed, and variously flowing in our Blood and Humours. — Now all our Sensations are either pleasurable or painful, more or less — in Degrees, proportioned to the Force of the Causes which produce them, and to the Sensibility of our Organs of Sense. And for as much as these Organs of ours, as well as the efficient Causes of the Pleasure or Pain we receive by Their Means, are, all of them, Corporal, and admit therefore of infinite Diversity, it follows, that the Degrees of Pleasure and of Pain, the Effects of those Causes operating by those Means, are no less infinite. — Thus we find, that Pleasure belongs to That Sort of Being, which is infinite, and which derives the Infinity of its Nature from the Infinity of Matter; — a Conclusion, which Plato intended should be drawn from This Part of the Dialogue; as may appear from the Argument of it, in Page 23.

The More and the Less of any Sensible Quality, in different Compound-Bodys, relate to a Comparison, made between those Bodys, in respect of That Quality, which they Both partake of, in different Degrees. — In the Greek of this Sentence, we ought to read ἐκινεῖται, the Dual Number, instead of ἐκινεῖ, the Singular. The Verbs, being in the Dual Number, put This out of all Doubt.
ever they receive an End, to an End also are then come their very Beings.

Protarchus.

Most certainly true.

Socrates.

And in speaking of either the Colder or the Hotter of any Two Things, we constantly attribute to them the More and the Less.

Protarchus.

We do.

Socrates.

Reason then constantly suggests to us, that the Colder and the Hotter have no End: and being thus without any End, they are altogether Boundless 175.

Protarchus.

175 End is sometimes used as a word of less extensive Signification, than the word Bound. Ἐνάγμα καὶ ἀέρι καὶ τέλος πέρας καλάτα. Inamblicibus in Nicom: pag. 11. Of every thing the Beginning, as well as the End, is called its Bound. But in the present Passage of Plato, the word End seems to be used in the larger Sense; as when we say, in speaking of Things which are motionless, and have a bounded Length, — "Every thing has Two Ends;" — and the word Bound is to be taken in a more confined Sense; as when, speaking of Things in Motion,
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

I am strongly inclined to agree with You, Socrates! in this Point.

Socrates.

Well have you answered, my Friend Protarchus! and well have you reminded me, that the Strongly, which you mentioned, and the Faintly, have the same Power as the More and the Lefs. For, wherever they reside, they suffer not any thing to be just So Much; but infusing either the more Intense, or the more Remiss, into every Action, they always produce in it either the More or the Lefs; while the just So Much flies away and vanishes from before them. For, as it was just now observed, were they not to drive away the just So Much, or did they permit This, and the Moderate, to enter into the Regions of the More and the Lefs, or of the Intense and the Remiss, these very Beings must quit their own Places: because, if they admitted the just

Motion, and of setting Bounds to them, we mean the putting a Stop to their Motion. For those Things only, which are always in Change and Motion, are here spoken of.

175 Intenseness and Remission relate to the More and the Lefs of any Sensible Quality, in one and the same Compound-Body, at different Times.

So
So Much, the Hotter and the Colder would be gone. For the Hotter, and in like manner, the Colder, is always advancing forward, and never abides in the same Spot: but the just So Much stops, and stays, having finished its Progress. Now according to this Reasoning, the Hotter must be boundless; and so must also be the Colder.

Protarchus.

So it appears indeed, Socrates! But, as you rightly said, 'tis not easy to apprehend these Things. Questions, however, relating to them, again and again repeated, might perhaps show, that the Questioner and the Respondent were tolerably well agreed in their Minds concerning them.

Socrates.

You say well: and we should try so to do. But at present, to avoid lengthening out this Argument by enumerating Every Infinite, consider, whether we may take This for the characteristic Mark of the Nature of all Infinites.

Protarchus.

What Mark do you mean?

N n Socrates.
Socrates.

Whatever Things appear to Us to be increasing or diminishing, or to admit of Intenseness and Remission, or the Too Much, and all other such Attributes, we ought to refer all These to that Sort of Being which is Infinite; collecting as it were All of them in One; agreeably to what was before said,—that whatever Things were divided and separated, we ought to assemble together and combine, as well as we are able, affixing to All of them the Mark of some One Nature;—if you remember.

Protarchus.

I remember it well.

Socrates.

Every Thing then 177, which rejects all such Attributes, and admits only such as are quite the Contrary,

177 It was observed, in Notes 166 and 173, that the First Sort of Beings, the Infinite, is the Progeny of Matter, which, in its Self, is without Bound or Measure. This, the Second Sort of Being, Bound, is the Progeny of Mind. For pure Mind, being Measure its Self, and Bound its Self, contains within its Self virtually all the Measures, which set Bounds to all the Portions.
Portions of infinite Matter; Bounds, which constitute their Essential Forms; inasmuch as they invest them with those Figures and Shapes, that give birth to their different Qualities and Powers, and dispose them for different Kinds of Motion.

— The Principles of all Measuring, and of all just Bound, are Numbers: on the Proportions of Numbers, in Things continuous, such as have Shape, or Figure, depends Symmetry; on the Proportions of Numbers in Things separate, as Sounds and Motions are, depend Harmony and Rhythm: on the Proportions also of Numbers in any One compounded Thing, in whose Composition are mixed Many Things possessed of contrary Qualities and Powers, depends Mediocrity, in which those Contrarys, infinite in themselves, are equally and justly bounded.—Thus have we, in doing our Best to illustrate the present Passage of Plato, found ourselves obliged to anticipate a little of what is to follow; and to speak of Things belonging to the Third Sort of Being, in which all the Infinites are bounded; the better to explain what is here meant by the Second Sort of Being,—Bound. For it is neither obvious to see of one's Self, nor easy to assent to Another telling us, that Numbers and Measures, with their several Relations and Proportions, are real Beings, independent of Things numbered or measured.—The Multitude, or Major Part of Mankind, are conversant with no other Objects than those of Sense, and are apt therefore to consider those of Mind, or Intellec, as imaginary and unreal, whenever they hear them mentioned. Accordingly, ideal and imaginary are, with Them, attributive Terms equivalent. On the other hand, they look on the First Sort of Things, the Infinites, as real Beings,—so real, that, when they hear Philosophers speak of the Sensible Qualities of Bodys, as not being really in those Bodys, and only Sensations in our Senses, with no little difficulty it is, that they are persuaded to believe them.

N 2
Contrary,—in the first place, the Equal and Equality \(^1\)\(^2\), and, after the Equal, the Double \(^1\)\(^3\), and every

\(^1\)\(^2\) The Ratio of Equality, or the Relation between Equal Numbers, — as \(3 + 2 = 5\), \(5 - 2 = 3\), and \(2 + 3 = 1 + 4\), — is here mentioned in the first place, because, in the words of Theon, Cap. 51, pag: 168, 'Ο τῆς ἴσοτητος λόγος, ἀσχημὸς καὶ πρώτος ἐστι καὶ περίχαρις πάντων τῶν ἐπεμένων λόγων, καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν ἀναλογῶν. The Ratio of Equality is the Prime Leader, and the Element of all the other Relations [between Numbers], and of all the Proportions which depend on those Relations. The same Doctrine is taught by Jamblichus, in Nicomachum, pag: 61, in these words,—'Αρετὴς λόγον ἔχει ἡ ἴσοτης πρὸς τὴν αἰσθήσεα. Equality, with respect to Inequality, hath the nature of a Principle. We presume, that Jamblichus means a Principle in the same manner, as a Unit is the Principle of Number. For he had observed just before, that the Relation of Equality is as it were a Sameness and a Onefulness. 'Η τῆς ἴσοτητος ρήσις, ὡσαυτὶ ταὐτότης ἐστι καὶ ἴσης. And the Cause of this we may learn from the same Treatise of that Philosopher, pag: 110, where he says,—'Αρετὴ γὰρ τῶν ἴσων τὸ ἐν καὶ ἡ μόνης, ἐγεῖ τὸ ἴσον ἐν πρὸς ἐν ἴσῃ, καὶ τὰ ἴσα καὶ ἴση λόγον ἐγεῖ ἴσα. One and Monad [that is, One in Things numbered, and Unite in abstract Numbers] is the Principle of Equals; in as much as the Relation of One to One is that of Equality, and Equals have One and the same Relation [to each other]. It is otherwise with Unequals: for Two to Four hath the Relation of a Half; Four to Two, the Relation of Double.

\(^1\)\(^3\) After the Equal, next in order comes the Double. For, since the Number, to which some Other Number bears the
every other Relation, which one Number bears to another, and one Measure to another,—all These Things, I say, in summing up, and referring them to that Other Sort of Being, Bound, think you not that we should do right? or how say you?

Protarchus.

Perfectly right, O Socrates!

Socrates.

Well; but the Third Sort of Being, made up and consisting of the other Two, what Characteristic shall we assign to This?

Protarchus.

You, as I presume, will show it to me.

Socrates.

Some God may; if any of the Gods will hearken to My Prayers.  

Protarchus.

Relation of Double, bears to this Other the Relation of Half; it is Equal to the remaining Part [the other Half] of this larger Number; which is thus divided into Equals, that is, into Two Equal Parts.

To every Reader, who is a tolerable Judge of Style, the Whole of this Passage must have an appearance of the False Sublime, at the first time of his reading this Dialogue. He will
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Make your Prayers then, and look within your Self for an answer to them

SOCRATES.

I am doing so: and some God, O Protarchus! is now, methinks, become favourable to us.

PROTARCHUS.

will think, that the introducing of Gods and Prayers here, with so much Pomp, is far above the Dignity of the present Subject, the Third Sort of Being. For This will seem to him to be nothing more than Corporal Being, or the External World, where Infinite Matter is bounded every where by Form. But 'twill partly appear soon, and more evidently before the Dialogue concludes, that whatever is most lovely and most desirable in Human Life,—in particular, the Sovereign Good of Man,—his Virtue,— the right Use and the true Enjoyment of all External Goods,—is to be found only in this Third Sort of Being.

In the Greek,—σκόπειν. — The words of the translation, which are printed in Italic Characters, are added, by way of illustration. For, if we understand this Passage rightly, it alludes to the ancient way of Divination by σκόπειν, called by the Latins Augury. A Diviner in this way, after offering Sacrifice (which implied a Mental Prayer) to the Gods, went to the σκόπεια, or σκόπελος, a Seat on the Summit of some high Mountain; from whence he had an open View of the Hemisphere above. There he stood, looking out to all Quarters of it,
How do you mean? and what Sign do you know it by? 182

I will tell you in plain Words: but let your Mind follow them closely.

it, in expectation of some Sign, or Token, of the Divine Will in Answer to his Prayer. For a Sign from Heaven it was believed to be, whatever Appearance in the Air, or the Æther, first presented itself; — such as a Brightness more than usual, Flashes of Lightning, Clouds rising or gathering together, and the Flights of certain Kinds of Birds in any particular Quarter of the Sky; — from which last Sight, as being the most ordinary, this whole Art of Augury was called Ξώνοσυναντικαί.

182 In the Greek, — τίν τευτυρίον χεῖ; — This Question abundantly confirms our Opinion, that Protarchus, in what he said just before, alluded to Divination by Augury. For to know how to interpret these Signs from Heaven, is thus expressed by Xenophon, in his Cyropæid: Σεβείς απελθω ξέναις,—and in his Memorub: μανιήν ξέναις.—The same Kind of Divination seems to have been alluded to frequently by Socrates, in saying, that the Daemon within him was wont συμανιω to give him Signs. And we suspect, that Plato, in the present Passage, had respect to that known Saying of Socrates; meaning hereby to intimate to us, that, if Socrates attained to a Knowledge of the Sovereign Good, 'twas by consulting the Divine Genius within him,—that is, by Self-Intuition, and by his frequent Converse with Ideal Excellence and Perfection.
Protarchus.

Do you but speak them.

Socrates.

We mentioned just now the Hotter and the Colder; did we not?

Protarchus.

We did.

Socrates.

To these then add the Dryer and the Moister; the more Numerous and the Fewer; the Swifter and the Slower; the Larger and the Smaller; and whatever Things beside, in our late account of them, we ranked under one Head,—That Part of Nature, which admits of the More and the Less.

Protarchus.

You mean the Infinite.

Socrates.

I do: and mingle, together with this, that which we spake of next afterward,—the Race of Bound.

Protarchus.

What Race do you mean?

Socrates.
PHILEBUS

SOCRATES.

Those things, which we did not (as we ought to have done) assemble together under One Head, in the same manner, as we assembled together the Race of the Infinite. But you will now perhaps do what was then omitted. And when Both the Sorts are assembled, and viewed together, the Race of Bound \( ^{183} \) will then become manifest.

PROTARCHUS.

What things do you speak of? and how are they to be assembled?

\( ^{183} \) The Rules and Measures, bounding those Infinites which are mentioned in Note 173, are perhaps impossible to be discovered by the Facultys of the Human Mind, wholly abstracted from the Outward Senses. The Numbers, for instance, by which are constituted Harmony in Sounds, and Rythm in Motions, cannot perhaps be ascertain'd, (whatever Some of the Pythagoreans imagin'd) by the Abstract Science of Musick,—that is, without the assistance of the Ear and Eye, among whose Objects are those Sounds and Motions. But the Numbers, in Sounds harmonious, and in Motions rythmical, are by the Mind, thro the Ear and Eye, naturally and therefore easily perceived. Accordingly Plato, sensible of This, proceeds to mention some of the fine Effects of Bound set to those Infinites before mentioned, in the Human Body and in Outward Nature,—hinting also at Others in the Soul,—without the farther consideration (for the present) of Bound or Measure, as a Principle in the Inward Nature of Things,—the Principle of all Good to all things,—Good its Self:

O o

SOCRATES.
I speak of That Nature, in which are comprised the Equal and the Double; and whatever else puts an end to Contest between contrary Things; and introducing Number, maketh them to be commensurate one with another, and to harmonise together.

I apprehend your Meaning to be, that, from the Commixture of those Two Sorts of Being, a certain Progeny will arise between them in Every one of their Tribes.

You apprehend me rightly.

Relate then the Progeny of these Commixtures.

In Diseases, doth not the right Commixture of those Two Sorts of Being produce the Recovery of Health? 

That is,—Numbers definite and certain.

All internal Diseases of the Body, (when they are not caused by the admission of Things foreign, and noxious to it, even
even in their smallest Quantities,) have their Foundations, according to Hippocrates and Plato, in the improper and ill-proportioned Quantities of the Four Elements of Nature, mixed together in the Human Body; or from (what is the same Thing, but more obvious to Sense,) a Disproportion therein of the Primary Qualities of all Body, — Heat and Cold, Dryness and Moisture. — For the Four Elementary Humours of the Human Body, — Red Blood, Phlegm, and the Two Biles, the Yellow and the Black, — are feverally produced by the Mixture of One of the Four Primary Qualities with Another, not being its Contrary, — namely, by Heat or Cold, mixed with either Dryness or Moisture. — Now the Predominance of any One of those Four Elementary Humours, — a Predominance, caused by the Excess of any One of the Primary Qualities, either in the Whole or in any Part of the Human Body, — destroys that just Equilibrium between their different Powers, on which depends the Regularity of the several Secretions and Excretions, necessary to preserve the Health and Soundness of the Frame. — Farther; as the Secondary Qualities of all Compound-Bodies are produced, in various Degrees, by the various Combinations of the Four Elements of Nature, — so, from the various Mixture of the Four Elementary Humours in different Parts of the Human Body, is produced a variety of Secondary Qualities in the mixt Humours, — Fluidity, Glutinosity, Sweetness, Bitterness, and many Others, — any One of which, in any immoderate Degree, introduces Disorder, immediately into that Part of the Human Body where it hath its Seat, and thence into the Whole. — Now, since the Immoderate, whether it be Too Much or Too Little, knows no Bound, the Degrees, as well as the Kinds and Species, of Diseases must of course be infinite. In every Disease therefore of the Body, to restore Mediocritie in all the Humours, by taking off the Excess and supplying the Deficiency of the Secondary Qualities,
Protarchus.

Intirely so.

Socrates.

And in the Acute and the Grave, in the Swift also and the Slow, which are, all of them, infinite, doth not the Other Sort, received among them, and begetting Bounds, constitute the Perfection of all the Muses' Art 186?

Protarchus.

Certainly so.

Socrates.

And in Weather excessively either Cold or Hot, doth not the Entrance of that Other Sort of Being take off the Excess, the Vehement, and the Infinite, — generating, in their stead, not only the Moderate and the Measured, but Symmetry also and Correspondence between their Measures 187?

Qualities,—to regulate the Secretions and the Excretions according to the Nature of a Sound and Healthy Body,—and to recover the Equilibrium between the Four Elementary Humours, — is to recover the Body from Disease, and to restore to it Health and Soundness. See Plato's Timaeus, pag: 82, &c, Edit: Steph: and the Banquet, page 77 of the English Translation. See also Galen peri τῶν Ἰπποκράτεσ καὶ Πλάτωνος δεμάτων, L. 8. Idem peri τοῦχεων, L. 2. and peri φυσικῶν δυνάμεων, L. 2.

186 See the Banquet, page 79.

187 See Banquet, page 81.
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

Without Dispute.

Socrates.

And do not propitious Seasons, and all their fair Productions, arise to us from hence, from the Mixture of Things which are infinite, with Things which have a Bound?

Protarchus.

Past all Doubt.

Socrates.

A thousand other things I forbear the speaking of; as, for instance, Strength and Beauty, the Attendants upon Health of Body; and in the Soul other Excellencys, very many and very noble. For Venus her Self, O good Philebus! observing lawless Lust and all manner of Vice every where reigning, the Love of Pleasure being in all Men boundless, and their Desires of it infatiable, She, her Self, established a Law and an Order, setting Bounds to Pleasure and Desire. This, you said, was to lessen and to impair Pleasure; but I maintain, that, on the contrary, it preserved Pleasure from Decay. And You, Protarchus! what think you of it?

Protarchus.

For My part I am intirely of your Mind, Socrates.
I have shown you then those Three Sorts of Being;—if you apprehend my Meaning.

Partly, I suppose, I do. By One of those Three, I suppose, you mean the Infinite: by Another, the Second Sort, you mean That which in All Beings is the Bound: but What you mean by the Third Sort, I have no strong Apprehension of.

Because the Race of that Third Sort, my Friend! has amazed you with its Multitude. And yet, the Infinite

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In this Third Sort of Being are comprehended not only all the Works of Art, but all those Beings also, which are the Productions of Nature; when, having arrived at their Maturity, found and intire, they have arrived at the utmost Bounds of their several Beings, and have attained to the Perfection of their several Forms, as nearly as the Subiect-Matter of their Forms allows them to proceed to. For the Nature, in producing and raising them to a mature State, always aims at absolute Perfection, (intending to make every One of her Works a perfect Copy of some Form Archetypal,) her good Intention is every where unavoidably obstructed, and her right Aim, in some measure, frustrated. Beside the Incapacity of Matter in general to receive perfect Form, or fixed Bounds, by reason of its own thorough
Infinite also appeared to contain many Tribes: but as they were, All of them, stamped with the Character of More and Less, they were seen clearly to be One.

Protarchus.

True.

Socrates.

Then, as to Bound; That neither contained Many, nor found we any difficulty in admitting the Nature of it to be One.

Protarchus.

throw Weakness and absolute Infinity; — and beside the particular Pravity of such a Portion of Matter, as ordinarily occurs to or lies before Nature, to be formed anew; (for these Portions usually consist not of simple Elementary Particles, but of mixed and mis-shapen Fragments, and the Relicks of prior Beings, not yet resolved into their pure Elements;) — beside this Viciousness of the First Materials, to be used by Nature; which are like bad Bricks, often necessary, for want of better, to be used by the Brick-layer, in building of a House; — we say, beside these primary Obstacles to the Designs of Nature, when she is laying the Foundation of some new Form, — continual Accessions of new Matter no better than the First, to be employed by her in raising up the Building, are farther Obstacles to the compleat Execution of her Designs. A superabundant Quantity of any One of the component Elements, or the Failure of a Quantity sufficient, — nay, even a very small Excess or Defect of any Quality essential to the Form, will in some degree marr the Beauty of that Form, and injure the Delicacy or the Strength of it, while growing; more of Either will prevent the Growth of it; and very Much of Either will immaturely destroy the Being. The Virtues also and Powers of every
every Being of Nature depend on Mediocrity: for they arise from a certain Quantity of Each of the Elementary Ingredients in its Frame, from the due Mixture also of these Ingredients, and a proper Degree or Measure of the Qualities belonging to that Mixture. See Note 173. — The Point indeed, exactly in the Middle between Excess and Defect, cannot be known by Man, in any other Things than Such as he can number, weigh, or measure; but a Middle Point there is, the Point of Perfection, in every Thing which is compounded, whether by Art or Nature; tho' such a Point is known only by That Mind, who is the Efficient Cause of the Composition; or by That Mind who was the Designer of it, and must therefore have viewed it beforehand in its Elements; — unless there be any Other Minds, which are connected with Senses able to penetrate into the Invisible of Things, and which therefore can, by means of those Senses, number all the Elementary component Particles. — But not only the Powers and Excellencies of the Human Body, and those of its several Members and Internal Parts, depend on Mediocrity; no less depend on it the Powers and Excellencies of Man's Irrational Soul: for This also is Corporeal, as well as the Souls of all other Animals: it is also, like Theirs, suitable to the Frame of that grosser Body, which it pervades: having its natural Appetites, Passions, and blind Affections, Such, and in such a Degree, as the Frame of That requires. As therefore the best State of the Body consists in a just Temperament of the Four Elementary Humours, mixt together; — and as This depends on the Mediocrity of Each, and its well-numbered Proportion to the Others; — so the best State of the Animal-Soul consists in the right Temper of it; and This depends on having the Passions, Appetites, and blind Affections of it, bounded, moderate, and well-balanced; and these Qualities they, all of them, possess, when the Strength and Weight of Each
is suitable to the Importance of its Object, with respect to
the Nature and End of the Being, therewith induced.—Now, if
the Animal-Soul of Man be, as we have presumed it to be,
Corporeal, it seems necessary to suppose a Fifth Corpuscular Ele-
ment, finer than the finest of the Four, which compose all
Vegetable and Fossil Substances: None of These being, like
Animals, capable of Self-Motion, or Motion from an Impulse
merely within them. And if this supposition of ours be true,
'tis possible, that the Soul of every Animal may be a Portion
of that Fifth Element: the Particles of which, like those of the
other Four, being infinite in Number, the Motions of the Irra-
tional Soul of Man, as well as the Motions of other Animal-
Souls, are, with respect to their Liveliness, (which is attended
usually by a Quickness and Strength of Sensation) in a Degree
proportioned to the Number of those enlivening Particles. All
other Differences between Soul and Soul, in Animals of the
same Species, seem to depend on the different Temperament
of their Bodies; that is, on the different Proportions of their Ele-
mentary Humours: and the greater Differences between the Souls
of such Animals as differ in their Kinds or Species, seem to
depend on the different Frame and Organisation of their Bodies.—
These Things, however, must be looked on as Subject-Matters
of Hypotheses, founded on Opinion or meer Conjecture; and they
are treated as Such by Plato on all occasions. But That Me-
diocrity, (or Medium between Excesses and Defects,) in which the
Excellencies or Virtues of Man's Rational Soul, or Mind, con-
sist, — and the Proportions, Measures, and Numbers, on which
those Excellencies depend, — are Matters of Science, Things as
certain as the Subjects of Arithmetick, Geometry, and Musick.—
For, to begin with the consideration of pure Mind, and abstract
Science: — it appears, from what has been already shown,
that every Idea is a Monad, or One Mental Being, ; — that every

General
General Idea, the Idea of a Kind, is a large and comprehensive Monad, divisible into a certain Number of smaller Monads; — and that every Idea, properly called Special, the Idea of a Species, indivisible (or at least hitherto undivided) into any smaller Monads, virtually comprehends an indefinite Number of Beings, outwardly existing in any given Time, and a Multitude, absolutely infinite, of such Beings, along infinite successive Ages; — unless the Species should happen to fail in Outward Nature; for, in that case, the Idea of it would be, and remain, solely, in her own Eternal Mind.—Seeing then, that all the Larger Monads, the most General Ideas, contain, Each of them, a definite or certain Number of smaller Monads; Every One of which contains a certain Number of Monads still smaller; (in like manner, as the Prime Divisions of Mathematical Numbers are to be sub-divided;) we must conclude, that in Ideas are to be found all the Relations, and all the Proportions, between definite Numbers, united or conjoined with Being. And since eternal Truths are the Relations between different Ideas, it is natural to conclude, that the Connections, which are between all eternal Truths, consist in Proportions, — that is, in similar Relations.—

— With regard therefore to Mental Beings, we see the Truth of that celebrated Saying of Pythagoras, — ἀριθμός πάντων ἐπίσκεψις, — that is, as Some understand it, “All things are to be likened to Numbers;” or, as it is interpreted by Others, “All things are suitable to Numbers.” The Saying, in Either Sense of it, is true. Accordingly, the Being Universal and Divine was by Pythagoras symbolically termed Ὄν, One; — Μένας, Monad, καὶ ἕξας ἔκας, in the most eminent Sense; — and ἀριθμὸς ἀριθμόων, the Number of Numbers,—with the same Meaning, as he was by Other Philosophers defined to be ἔσχες ἔσχων, the Form of Forms; that is, Form Universal,—the Great One, who comprehends within Himself All the Monads or Ideas, All the definite Numbers.—But let it be observed concerning these Ideas, Each of which is One certain
certain Number,—a Definite Many,—that they admit of no Excess or Defect in any degree; and that consequently Their Perfection is not a Perfection of Mediocrity; (for This Sort of Perfection, being only relative to Excess and Defect, belongs only to the Infinites or Innumerable, when they receive Bounds or certain Numbers:) absolutely perfect are the Monads; for These are the archetypal and eternal Numbers, imperfect Images of which are all the Mediocritys,—the transient Excellencies of tranitory Beings.—One of these Monads is the Human Species in its perfect Idea: included therefore in This are all the Excellencies, to which a Man, a Being composed of Body, Soul, and Mind, is capable of attaining. By Soul, we here mean Soul Irrational; for Such is every Soul, in which Mind and Reason dwell not: and of all Earthly Beings, to Man alone are the Principles of Mind imparted. By partaking of these Principles it is, that he hath the Faculty of Reason, and a Capacity of Reasoning. For by Reason, we mean the Perception of Mental Objects, or the Intelligence of Ideas,—of Kinds and Species, and of every Universal, properly so called: and by Reasoning we mean a perceiving of the Connections between different Ideas, the remote as well as the near; a perceiving, in What Relations they stand, Each to Other;—and a perceiving, that Some of these Ideas are included within Others; and these larger Ideas also within Others till more comprehensive.——In searching therefore into the Nature of any Thing within one of the smaller Inclosures, —to look whether it be contained also in the larger, and next outer Inclosure, is to reason rightly; and the Mind's comprehensive View, in seeing the Subject of its Search contained within Both those Inclosures, the inner and the outer, is very properly termed a Conclusion.—Now, as soon as the Principles of Mind, like Seeds, begin to open,—and when the Faculty of Reason, which before lay, like an Embryo, dormant in the Mind, comes to be awakened
awakened by the surrounding Objects of Sense,—the Mind has an actual Perception of those Ideas, which immediately, and the first, arise from the universal Principles of Mind.—As the Human Mind gradually dilates, and is enlarged, as it were, for the reception of more and more Ideas, the Faculty of Reason is exerted more and more; so that Ideas less and less General are excited in the Mind, by her being conversant, thro the Senses, with many Objects of the same Kinds and Species;—excited, in proportion as she yields her attention to those Objects, and at every Turn introverts and looks within her Self.—But the Capacity or latent Power of Reasoning cannot begin to energise, till the Mind is sufficiently enlarged, so as to comprehend a Genus and its Species at the same time; that is, to perceive, not only Many Ideas, but Many comprised in One. The Capacity of Reasoning, thus grown up to be a Power, is improved and strengthened by Exercise; especially, in learning the Sciences,—first, the Mathematical, and then Dialectick, and the Science of Mind.—Now, if Reason, or the Perception of Ideas,—Science, or the Knowledge of eternal Truths,—and Nos or Mind, considered as Intelligent of its Self, and of its own Principles,—if these Things are acknowledged to be the most excellent of All, which any Particular Mind is capable of attaining to,—(and we presume, that no Rational Being, except a Philo- bus, a Lover of Sensual Pleasure above all other Things, would ever deny or even doubt their Superiority,)—it may seem strange and inconsistent, that Mediocrity, in those very Things of acknowledged Excellence, should meet with Praise; or that Moderation in the Pursuit, and Temperance in the Enjoyment of them, should be deemed Virtues.—And indeed, were Man a Being designed by nature for Knowledge and Contemplation only, the more assiduous any Man was in the Pursuit of Knowledge, the greater Praise he would deserve; the more Knowledge he
he attained to, the nearer would he be to the Perfection of his Nature; and the more he enjoyed the Objects of his Knowledge, in a constant Contemplation of them, the more would he fulfill the Ends of his Being, by enjoying the Happiness for which he was designed. But from every Part of Human Nature 'tis reasonable to infer, that the wise and good Mind of All Nature had quite other Ends in the Formation of Man.—

The Human Body is evidently framed for Motion and for Action, — so compleatly framed for these Purposes of Wisdom, as to be a justly fit Instrument of the actuating and moving Soul within, in all her Operations.—This Soul, which by Nature is united with and pervades that Body, is by Nature also prompt to Appetites and Passions; and These impell her to give various Motions to the Body and all its Members, and by these means, to perform by turns all the various Animal-Actions. — The Connections, which every Man has from Nature, with other Individuals of his own Species, infuse into him Natural Affections; and These also incite his Soul to Action, as feelingly and as forcibly, as do those Appetites and Passions which arise in her from the Wants and Sufferings of the Body. — And the Civil and Social Connections, which are formed by Man, of his own free Will, tho by Nature led, and by the Feeling of his own Indigence urged to form them, These also engage him in Affairs peculiar to Man, and properly therefore styled Human; putting his Soul into Action, more or less, as Action is more or less necessary for maintaining those voluntary and yet necessary Connections. — It seems evident therefore, from the Active Life, which the Frame of Man's Nature obliges him to live, that he was designed for a Life of Action; and not to be employed in the Pursuit of Speculative Knowledge, or in the Enjoyment of Contemplation.——But an obvious Objection to This will naturally here offer itself; and the following Questions may
may reasonably be proposed;—" Why has Nature infused into Man a strong Propensity to search into the Causes of all Natural Things? Why has she inspired him with a Love of Speculative Truth? and Why has she given him a Sentiment of Satisfaction and Delight in the Perception of pure Ideas and their mutual Relations? In a word, to what Purpose is Mind superadded to his Soul?—To these Questions the right Answers will not only show, what Bounds we ought to set to our Pursuits of Knowledge,—what Parts of Knowledge are the most valuable to Man,—and how far he may laudably indulge his Mind in the Delights of Contemplation;—but also they will at the same time point out, What are those Excellencies or Virtues of the Human Soul, principally meant by Socrates, where he commends so highly the Mediocritys, which arise from a just Commixture of Infinity and Bound.—We have only to premise this fair Postulatum,—" Whatever Part of Nature is obscure to us, or not readily understood by us, cannot be explained or made clear, but from what we know of other Parts, thro' Sense, Observation, and Experience."—Now we know, thro' These, that the Appetites and Passions of all Animals, except Man, are confined by nature within those narrow Limits that circumscribe their several Ways of Life; namely, their natural and few Bodily Wants, and their accidental and short Bodily Sufferings. We find, that their Appetites are raised only by the Feeling of their present Wants, and are quite satisfied with the Supply of those Wants; and that the Passions of their Souls are roused only by the Feeling of their present Sufferings, and subside as soon as those Sufferings are ended. But the Appetites and Passions of Man's Soul are infinite by nature: the Cause of which we find, from Experience of our Selves, and from the Observations made on other Animals, to be This,—that, tho' the Human Organs of Sensation are, every One of them,
in Quickness and in Strength, inferior to those of some other Animals, yet the inner Facultys of Man's Soul, his Imagination, his Memory, and his Forethought, are greatly superior to the Facultys of the same Kind which are in Brutes.—The Imagination of Man is, of its Self, boundless in extending, enlarging, varying, and compounding the minute Images, impressed on it by those External Things, which have occurred to his Sight, or have been perceived by him: his Memory of Things past hath a Reach backward to the remotest, both in Time and Place: and his Forethought reaches forward, along the Infinity of Time, to future Things contingent, and even to the barely possible. Now, amongst the Multitude of External Things, which every day strike the several Organs of our Senses, from Some we feel Pleasure and Delight, Pain or Offence from Others; and to all the rest our Souls are quite indifferent. These therefore of the latter Sort very slightly affect us, and are soon forgotten. Those of the other Sorts make lasting Impressions on the Imagination, proportionable to the Pain or Pleasure felt. The Painful give to the Soul those Emotions which are properly called Passions. The Pleasurable excite in the Soul Desires of enjoying Pleasures of the same Kind again;—Desires, in their beginning, weak or strong, in proportion to the Depth of those Impressions. But afterwards, when exaggerating Reports of greater Pleasures of the same Kind, enjoyed by Others, reach our Ears, (and whether the Reports be true or false, it matters not, if they are credited,) Imagination always aiding and improving those Reports, the Impressions deepen; and the Desires, which they had raised, strengthen. In the same Case are all the other Natural Desires,—Those for instance, of Property and Possessions,—of Praise and Honour,—of Freedom from Submission to the Will of Others,—and of Power to induce Their Wills to agree with Ours:—the Desires increase by being.
being gratified; and what we see, or hear, or fancy, of greater
Heights of such Gratifications, attained to by Others, and
imagined to be within our own Reach, swell the Desires be-
yond all Measure.—Nor is it otherwise with the Passions of
Grief, Resentment, Hate, and Fear,—Passions, naturally raised in
us by the Loss of some Good,—by Injuries received,—by Objects
painful and present, or mischievous and to come; — whether the
Loss, Injury, or Mischief be real or imaginary, whether the
Pain be great or little, whether the Fear be well or ill-founded,
Human Imagination, if free Scope be given it, magnifies the Evil,
and heightens the Passion; and the Passion, in its turn, gives, if
it be indulged, Strength and Lastingness to the Fancy. As soon,
therefore, as Report has filled a Man’s Imagination with Images
of Things, which he never saw;—or History, with Representa-
tions of Facts, which happened Ages since;—or Poetic Fiction,
with Fancies of Things, which neither have, nor ever had, any
Existence; — Images, as well-framed, as if the Substances
Themselves were before his Eyes; — Representations, no less
clear to him, than if Himself had been Eye-Witness of the
the Facts;—Fancies, no less lively, than if they had been drawn
from Realitys, or answered to Things true in Nature;—these
Objects of the Man’s Imagination, these Representatives of the
Persons and Things he reads or hears spoken of, (the unknown to Him, or uncertain, or meerly fabulous,) immediately beget Love or Aversion in his Soul, according as they are agreeable or disagreeable to his Nature, or to his present Temper.
To these Persons and Things, afterward, he likens Such as he Himself has seen, or knows actually to exist. And tho the
Resemblance be generally partial, or imperfect, and often only fancied, he transfers his Love and his Aversion, from the
different, the long past or deceased Objects of them, to the Objects
which at present are in Being. Of These, Such as appear to
him
him disagreeable, and to which he now contracts an Aversion, of necessity he shuns and endeavours to avoid: but such as are agreeable to his Fancy, and which he now conceives a Love of, he cannot but desire and pursue. In this latter case, Love, and the Desire of imagined Good, urge him to the Pursuit; and the hopeful Pursuit increaseth his Desire: in the other case, Aversion, and the Fear of imagined Evil, make him careful to avoid it; and thro' this troublesome Care, his Aversion rises to Hatred, and his Fear rises to a Dread. — By these and other the like Means it is, that, in Man's Imagination, numberless false Fancys spring up continually; and that, since it is unbounded, there is still Room for more. On these Fancys the Desires and Passions feed, and grow to an enormous Size; by these they are inflamed, and frequently break forth in all Kinds of soul Mischief, — especially to the Persons themselves, who are tortured with those Feverish Distemperers of the Soul; and often, by Contagion, they spread the Calamity thro' whole Familys, Tribes, and Nations. — To prevent these Mischiefs and cure these Diseases, to cool the Passions and moderate the Desires, to banish the exorbitant or over-abounding Fancys, and to restrain the Wildness of Imagination, — we may reasonably presume to be the chief Ends, (at least, the more immediate Ends,) for which the Principles of Mind and Reason are imparted to the Human Soul. For 'tis only thro' Mind and Reason, that these Ends, at present the most desirable to Man, are possible to be accomplished. And we presume, that no Doubt will be made of This, on considering what we have now to offer: — If it be true, that Ideas, unmixed with Images of any Sensible Things,—and eternal Truths, the Relations between those pure Ideas,—are the only proper Objects of Intellect and Reason; — if they are also connatural to all Mind, and are therefore by all Mind naturally beloved the
most of all things;—it follows, that pure Science, the Knowledge of those Ideas and of their mutual Relations, must be of all things the most delightful to a Soul wherein Mind is sown, as soon as she is conversant and becomes acquainted with them. So that if the Human Soul were not, first, intimate with Objects of the Outward Senses, and delighted with the Pleasures which they yield,—if the Remembrance of these Pleasures did not continue to attract her,—if the Wants of her Body did not compel her to attend to them,—and if her Natural Affections did not forcibly draw her to a Regard for the Objects of such Affections, — her whole Attention would be engaged by Those her new Mental Acquaintance; (possibly indeed ancient, but long lost to her, and forgotten;) and she would then live—not a Human Life, a Life of Action,—but a Life, peculiar to Beings more purely Intellectual and Rational than Man, the higher Life of Contemplation.—On the other hand, many Objects of Sense are so engaging, Many are so enchanting, and their Charms are so heightened by Imagination,—the Witchcraft of Sensual Pleasure is so powerful,—and the higher Facultys of the Soul are held, as it were, in Chains, so strongly by those Magicians, the Fancies, Appetites, and Passions,—whilst the lower Facultys drudge, like Bond-Slaves, in the Service of these their Despotic Lords,—that only the superior Charms of Science, the more potent Spells of true Philosphy, and That all-mighty Magick of Truth, which, in respect of Outward Nature, may not improperly be termed Supernatural, have Power to free the Mind from the Force of those ordinary, corporeal, and natural Enchantments. — Thus it is, that the Irrational Part of the Human Soul, and the Rational, according to the Idea of Man in the designing Mind of Nature, counter-balance Each the Other. The Weight of the Irrational lies in Mechanical, Corporeal, and Natural Necessity; thro which, all Bodys, whether Inanimate
Inanimate or Animated, are passively, unresistingly, and blindly moved, attracted, or impelled: the Weight of the Rational Part depends on Rational and Moral Necessity; thro which, all intelligent Beings freely, willingly, and gladly, embrace known Truth, and adhere to known Good. The former Necessity weighs alone, and without a Counter-poise in the Soul, during the Infancy of Reason.—To supply this Want of an Inward Principle in Children, powerful enough to save them from the many Evils, into which they would be driven by their Fancies, Appetites and Passions, Nature has placed them under the Care and Management of their Parents; in Defect of their own Reason, giving them the Reason of Others for their Teacher and Governor. To secure this Government from being abused, to the Detriment of Those who are born in Subjection to it, Nature has implanted in the Souls of Parents a σπερματική, or Love to their Offspring, stronger than any other Love, in all Souls governed by their Natural Affections. And to make this Subjection easy to the Children, Nature has made them dependant on their Parents for all the Good which they receive; enduing them with a Sense of their own thorough Weakness, and with a simple and intire Confidence in their Parent's Care. —The Excellencies therefore of a Child's Soul are — Appetites, mild and governable,—Passions, gentle and submissive to Restraint,—Affections, proportioned to the relative Nature of their Objects, — a Quickness of Apprehension, sufficient to receive Instructions, suited to the First Openings of the Mind,—counter-balanced by a Strength of Memory, sufficient to retain them. — Thus we find that the Moderate, the just Degree, and the Sufficient, are the Basis and the Essence of all which is amiable or admirable in the Souls of Children.—When the State of Childhood is past; when the Body has attained a sufficient degree of Strength, to discharge many of the active Offices and Employments
ments of Human Life; and when the Mind is enlarged enough to collect Ideas from all the Sensible Objects with which she is conversant, and strong enough to reason concerning their various Powers and Uses; from Effects arguing backward to Causes, and from Causes arguing forward to Effects; we see, that the Bulk of Mankind still, and for ever throughout Life, continue in a State of Infancy, with respect to the Objects of Intellect; employing their whole Time and Care, their Faculty of perceiving, and their Power of reasoning, as well as their Memory and Imagination, solely in the Service of their Bodies: so that all their Views terminate in the secure Possession of Things convenient to the Body; all their Ideas of Good are invested with Images of These Things; and These Things are the only Subjects, on which they delight to think, to reason by Themselves, or discourse with Others. It appears then, that the far greater Number of Human Beings, for want of Weight in the rational Part of their Souls, sufficient to counterbalance That of the irrational Part, live, all their Lives, under the absolute Dominion of Corporeal Necessity, obedient to the Impulse of their Animal-Appetites, Passions, and blind Affections; and that, as These are of the same Kind in All Men, differing only in Degree, All Men would, thro the necessary Operation of these Causes, if not counteracted by Causes contrary, be for ever at Variance, and for ever in a State of War, until the whole Human Species were destroyed. Now, as such a Destruction would be against the plain Intention of Nature, whose Providential Care is directed to the Continuance of every Species in the Outward World, we must conclude, that the Majority of Mankind were intended to live in Subjection to Government; not in a Slavish Subjection to the arbitrary Government of Men, who are, Themselves, governed by their own boundless Appetites and Passions; their own par-
tial and extravagant Affections; not in a forced or an ignorant Obedience to the Mandates or Decrees, issued by such Men; nor yet in perpetual Bondage to any Customs, Institutions, or Ordinances, proved to be pernicious;—but in a voluntary and free Submission to Laws, made, solely for their Good, by Men wiser and better than Themselves;—Laws, found from Experience to be the best Maintainers of Civil Society, Public Concord, and Domestic Union; to be also the best Guardians of every Man's Person, and the best Protectors of his Property; — Laws, harmonizing with the Laws of all Nature, with Those by which the Rational World, as well as the Corporeal, inwardly is governed, —the Corporeal World, thro the natural Connexions between all Outward Things,—the Rational, thro natural Conscience, the secret Connection of every Mind with eternal Truth, which is the Fountain of Universal Justice. — From this Account 'tis easy to perceive, that the Excellencies of Soul, in the major Part. of Mankind, — in Those who are not qualified to be their own Masters,—are Such as follow,—viz. to have such a Degree of Strength in the lower Facultys of their Souls, as gives them a Capacity of acquiring That Kind of Knowledge, which is necessary to their acting well the Parts in Social and Civil Life, allotted to them by Providential Fate;—to have such a Measure of Attention in their Minds, as suffices them for the actual Attainment of that Knowledge; — to have Industry, sufficient to practice what they have learnt, for the benefit of Themselves and of Those who need the assistance of their Art, Skill, or Labour; — to have a Temper, mild enough to suffer their Appetites and Passions to be restrained by wise and good Laws; yielding enough to submit their Wills to be directed by Men knowing in those Laws; and compliant enough to follow, in their Fancies and Ways of living, such Public Customs and Manners as are not mischievous or inconvenient to Themselves;
—at the same time, to have a Spirit, stout enough to rise up against Oppression; brave enough to resist all Attempts to enslave them; valorous enough to defend, not only Each his own, but also each other's Person, Liberty, and Property, against Foreign Enemies and Home-Invaders; and magnanimous enough to maintain those Liberties of their Country, and those Laws, which secure to them every Blessing they enjoy.—Here also we find, that the Moderate and the Measured, the due Degree and the just Enough, constitute those Excellencies in the Souls of Some of the Populace in every Country, by which they become Worthy Men and Worthy Members of the Commonwealth.—We are lastly to consider of those highest Excellencies, to which the Soul of Man, in her present State, is capable of attaining, and to which the Souls of Some Persons actually attain. For to the End, that such good and truly Legal Governments may be established among Men, as are necessary to their living a rational, social, and happy Life,—such Governments, as are intended for them by Nature, (who always intends what is relatively the Best for every Species of her Creatures,) — a Few Men there are in every Age, and in every civilized Nation, born with Intellectual Facultys superior to those of the Multitude, — exempted also, by the good Fortune of their Progenitors, from the necessity of toiling for the Body, — and favoured, by their own still Better Fortune, with That which is termed by Plato ἔκα κρατέα, the having had their Minds, in early Life, cultivated by true Science, and timely initiated in the Studies of Universal Nature and of the Human. These Men, thus descended, thus born, and thus prepared by a proper Education, are, we say, designed, and as it were marked out, by the Providential and Creative Mind of Nature, to govern Those, who are unable to govern Themselves so as to be happy. The Excellencies of Soul therefore,
in this higher Order of Men, are those Endowments, which
fit them for answering this End of their Being;—in particu-
lar; so much Knowledge of the Great Designer, as will serve to
acquaint them with the Wisdom and Goodness of his Design;— a
Knowledge, to be acquired only thro' the Study of his Works;
so much Knowledge of the Laws, by which the Rational or
Moral World is governed, as, in the first place, will show
them, how they must govern Themselves if they would be
happy, and in the next place will furnish them with a Pattern
to copy after in their Government of Others;— and so much
Knowledge of Human Nature, of the several Appetites and Paf-
fions in All Men, and of the Difference of Temper and Degree
of Understanding in Different Men, as to know, that Some
must be driven to the Right Conduct of their Lives by Fear;
and that Others are to be drawn or led on by Hope; that
Some ought to be depressed, or kept down; Others, to be
raised up, or supported; that, in managing or treating with
the more intelligent and better Sort of the People, 'tis the
better Way to address Arguments to their natural Reason and
Conscience; but that above all things it is Best, (the Best for
all Sorts of People,) to instill gradually and gently, thro' Civil
and Religious Institutions, (and more especially the Laws of
Education,) the Principles of Right Reason, of Honesty and of
Goodness, into the Minds of all Such as can imbibe them.—
We have here attributed the noblest Excellencies of Man's Soul
to Such a Knowledge of Universal Nature and of the Human,
as of necessity infers a Conduct and Behaviour, on all Occasions,
agreeable to that Knowledge. For no Man can have the Know-
ledge of what is Best for him to do, actually and habitually
present to his Mind, without seizing every Opportunity and
embracing every Occasion of doing it. More Knowledge than
This, on those Subjects, supposing it to be acquirable or Man,
(a Supposition, the Truth of which may well be doubted of,) would be useless to those Persons, of whom we are now speaking, in the Parts of Human Life, allotted for Them to act in; besides that the Endeavour to acquire more Knowledge would be an Impediment to their well-performing of those Parts. — Here then we again meet with the just so Much, — no more than is useful to Man,—as the proper Boundary of that Kind of Knowledge, which (however admirable in its Self,) yet, if extended farther, belongs not to Man; tho it may perhaps be the Chief Excellence of some Superior Beings. — It cannot be denied, that Infirmitys from Old Age or other Natural Causes, and Disableys from various Accidents to which Human Life is subject, oblige Both Orders of Men, the Higher as well as the Lower, to abstain or to retire from all Public Offices and Active Employments. Such Persons, without doubt, may allowably and commendably employ as much Time as they please, in the pure Contemplation of Nature and her Divine Cause; — in the Speculation of Human Affairs, without taking any Share of the Business or of the Management; — in abstracted Sciences, without applying them to the Arts founded thereon; — in Arts, whether Liberal or Mechanical, without professing the Practice of them; — or in searching into the Properties of Natural Things, and their immediate Causes, without a reference to their own private Emolument. — But What we are to think of this Contemplative Wisdom, this Speculative Knowledge, these Rational Amusements, these Searches and Disquisitions, so delightful to the Mind,— and in What Degree of Esteem we are to hold them, according to Plato's Doctrine,—will appear, from the Rank which he assigns to Each of those Intellectual Goods, near the End of the present Dialogue; where All Things, which are Good on their own Account, are placed in such an Order as they merit, from their relative Value to Man, con-

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PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

How could we?

Socrates.

'Twas not at all possible indeed. Of those Two Sorts then all the Progeny,—all the Things produced into Being thro' those Measures, which are effected in the Immoderate, when Bounds are set to the Infi-

sidered in the whole Nature of his Being. — Thus much, in the mean time, falls in our way at present to observe, that, if the highest Excellency of Man be Wisdom to govern Himself, and Those who are under his Care, according to Right Reason, Universal Justice and Goodness, the Law of the whole Rational and Moral World,—and if this Law be Measure its Self, intelligent of its Self, and of all those Things, of which it is the Measure,—and distributing equally to All of them their several Dues according to their Natures,—to each Being, That Share of Good, to which it hath a Right, conferred on it by Nature,—it follows from thence, that a Man's Knowledge of the Bounds and Measures, proper to be set to all things under his Guidance and Direction,—a Knowledge of the Moderate, the Sufficient, and the Equitable, in the Conduit of his Life, with regard to himself and to Others,—is Man's Wisdom;—and that a Conduct, agreeable to such a Knowledge, is Man's true Virtue, and Man's Highest Good. — In the Greek of the Sentence now before us, the word φας is evidently erroneous. Stephens conjectures, that ἐος is the Right Reading. Cornarius would have us read ζω: and his Opinion is authorized by Ficinus's Translation. But the Emendation, proposed by M. Grou, which is φας, varies least from the printed Text.
in summing up all these Things together, and comprehending them in One, understand me to mean, by the Third Sort of Being, This One.

**Protarchus.**

I understand you.

**Socrates.**

Now, besides these Three, we are farther to consider, what Sort of Being That is, which we said was the Fourth. And as we are to consider it jointly, see whether you think it necessary, that all Things, which are produced into Being, should have some Cause of their Production.

**Protarchus.**

I think it is: for, without a Cause, how should they be produced?

**Socrates.**

The Nature then of the Efficient differs from the Cause in nothing but in Name: so that the Efficient and the Cause may be rightly deemed One.

**Protarchus.**

Rightly.

**Socrates.**

So likewise, the Thing effected, and the Thing produced into Being, we shall find to differ in the same manner, in nothing but in Name, or how?

**Protarchus.**
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Protarchus.

Just so.

Socrates.

In the Nature of things, does not the Efficient lead the way? and does not the Effect follow after it into Being?

Protarchus.

Certainly.

Socrates.

Cause therefore is not the Same Thing with That which is Subservient to Cause in the producing of its Effect, but a Thing different.

Protarchus.

Without doubt.

Socrates.

Did not the Things which are produced into Being, and the Things out of which they are all of them produced, exhibit to us the Three Sorts of Being 169?

Protarchus.

Clearly.

Socrates.

That then, which is the Artificer of all these, the Cause of them, let us set down for a Fourth Sort of

169 That is,—all the Productions of Nature and of Art, and their Two immediate Principles. See Note 166.
of Being; as it is fully shown to be different from those other Three.

Protarchus.

Be it so.

Socrates.

But the Four Sorts having been now described, every One of them distinctly, we should do well, for memory's sake, to enumerate them in Order.

Protarchus.

No Doubt of it.

19 On this Passage, which concludes a Summary Account of the whole Universe, we have only to offer the following short but important Observation;—Socrates here plainly distinguishes the Mind of the Universe, or Internal Nature, the Cause of All things, [in every proper Sense of the word Cause,]—from the Corporeal Universe, or External Nature, the Effect or Production of that Great Cause,—of that Universal Mind, who, by constantly energizing within every Particle of Matter, and thus continually forming and re-forming it, produces and reproduces every Natural Body. — The great Athenian Philosopher does not confound the Corporeal and Sensible World together with the Mental and Intellectual Cause of it; as Some Philosophers have very injudiciously, or very inaccurately, done in their Expressions, speaking of them as One and the Same Substance or Being: nor does he, on the opposite hand, separate them, like some Others; so as to make a Third Substance or Essence, distinct from Either of Those, — a Soul of the World, or other subordinate Divine Being,—necessary, by way of a connecting Medium between them.

Socrates.
PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

The First then I call Infinite; the Second, Bound; the Third, That which is generated or produced into Being from the Mixture of those Two: and in saying 191, that the Cause of this Mixture and this Production is the Fourth, should I say aught amiss?

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

Well now; What is next? How proceeds our Argument? and with What Design came we along this Way? Was it not This? We were inquiring, Who had a Right to the Second Prize of Victory; whether Pleasure had, or Wisdom: was it not so?

PROTARCHUS.

It was.

SOCRATES.

Now then, since we have laid down those Distinctions between the several Sorts of Being, may we not haply form a more finished Judgment, concerning both the Very Best, and the Second-Best of those

191 The Edition of Plato by Aldus, and That by Stephens, in this place erroneously give us to read $\lambda\epsilon\gammaω$, instead of the evidently Right Reading, which is $\lambda\epsilon\gamma\omega$, exhibited in the Basil Editions.
Things, which originally were the Subjects of Dispute between us?

Protarchus.

Perhaps we may.

Socrates.

We made no difficulty, I think, of setting down for Conqueror, the Mixt Life, the Life of Pleasure and Wisdom together. Was it not so?

Protarchus.

It was.

Socrates.

We perceive then, of what Sort the Mixt Life is, and to which Sort of Being 'tis to be referred.

Protarchus.

Evidently.

Socrates.

And I think we shall agree, that 'tis Part of the Third Sort. For the Mixt Life is not to be referred solely to any One of the Infinites, mixed with some One only of the Bounds: it is a Life of All such Things together, as are Infinite in their own nature, but are under the Restraint of Bound \[192\]. So that the

\[192\] We cannot explain the Meaning of this whole Sentence in a better Way, than by giving a few Instances to prove the Truth
Truth of it.—Cold has been mentioned before, as One of the Infinites: a certain Degree of Heat, mixed with it, is a Bound set to it: this Infinite and this Bound, together, produce Coolness: now the agreeable Sensation of Coolness, felt by any Sentient Being throughout Life, cannot be the Mixt Life, here meant; because Mind, or Wisdom, has no Share in it.—In like manner, Speech, as we have also seen before, is One of the Infinites: a certain Form is given to it, as a Bound set to it, by Mind and Reason: this Infinite and this Bound, together, produce Language, or Speech Intelligible; the Intelligence of which, in daily Conversation throughout Life, be it ever so agreeable to the Mind, cannot be the Life, where Pleasure and Wisdom are blended and unite together; because Body, the Outward Senses, and the Animal-Soul, have no Share in the Enjoyment. —Neither is such a Life to be found in any One Other of the Infinites, tho mixed with its proper Bound; not even where the Animal-Soul and the Rational have, Each of them, a Share in the Enjoyment of that Particular Mixture. Thus, for instance, Pleasure thro the Sense of Taste is One of the Infinites, in which the Animal-Soul alone has a Concern: Measures are prescribed, or Bounds set, to her Enjoyment of this Pleasure by Mind and Prudence: and hence ariseth the Virtue of Temperance in Eating: but as this Particular Virtue is composed of One only of the Infinites, and of One only of the Bounds, it is but a small Part of that happiest of Human Lives, where Pleasure and Prudence meet, and go on together,—That Life, which according to Socrates, in the Sentence, to which we have made this Note, embraces ἐκμακάρια ἄσεσθαι All the Infinites, (All, which offer themselves,) confined within the Bounds of Moral Wisdom, and the Measures of Universal Justice.
the Mixt Life, this Winner of the Prize, may be rightly said to be a Part of the Third Sort of Being.

Protarchus.

Most rightly.

Socrates.

’Tis well. But that Life of yours, O Philebus! a Life of Pleasure simple and unmixed, to Which of the Three Sorts may we rightly say that it belongs? But before you pronounce, answer me, first, to this Question.

Philebus.

The Idea of the Mixt Life, so highly extolled here by Socrates, is included in the Idea of Man: and Man is one of Nature’s Forms, — a Part of That Nature, the Third Sort of Being, in which all the Infinites are bounded. — For, in the Ideal or Perfect Man, the Acquisition and the Possession of all those Things, which may be of any Use to him, are bounded by Honesty and Goodness; the Use and the Enjoyment of them are bounded by Prudence; and the Appetites and Passions of his Soul are bounded by the Particular Virtues: the Nature of Things he makes the Measure of his Fancies and Opinions: and the Measure of his Ideas, eternal Truth. — And we beg Leave to observe by the Bye, that Aristotle hath this very same Meaning in his Nicomachean Ethicks, where he says, in his concise way of expressing himself, — μὲν τῶν ἰ ὑ βετή καὶ ὁ ἐνθαδειώ, — Virtue and the truly good Man are the Measures of every Man’s Moral Conduct. — At the end of the Sentence now before us, in the Greek, we suspect, that λέγετ' αὖ should be read, instead of γέγεντ' αὖ.
PHILEBUS.

Propose it then 194.

Socrates.

Concerning Pleasure and Pain; have they in their own nature any Bounds? or are they 195 among Those things which admit the More and the Less?

PHILEBUS.

Pleasure, O Socrates! to be sure, admits the More. For it would not comprehend every Good in it, if it were not by nature Infinite, with respect to the Multitude which it contains, and the Increase which it is capable of.

The words of Socrates in his next Question justify our Suspicion: on which account we recommend it to the consideration of future Editors.

194 Aldus, in his Edition of Plato, gave these words to Protarchus; though nothing is more plain, than that Plato meant them for Philebus. The Basil Editors restored them to the right Owner: and 'tis strange, that Stephens either knew it not, or did not acknowledge it.

195 In all Editions of the Greek, we here read ἡ, instead of ἡ. We are ignorant of any authority for using so strange an Enallage; and therefore we suppose it an erroneous Reading.

Socrates.
Nor can Pain be imagined, O Philebus! to comprehend every Evil. So that we must consider of some Other Thing, different from the nature of the Infinite, for the imparting of any Good to Pleasures. — It is admitted, that your Life of Pleasure is the Issue of Things unbounded, and belongs therefore to That Sort of Being. But to Which of the Sorts before mentioned, O Protarchus and Philebus! may we refer Wisdom, and Science, and Mind, without being guilty of Impiety? For I imagine that we incur no trifling Danger, in answering the present Question, whatever be our Answer, whether right or wrong.

196 This Sentence in the Greek seems to be somewhat imperfect. For we apprehend the Reasoning in it to be This: —Philebus had acknowledged, that Pleasure (meaning the Pleasure of Sense) had no Bounds in its own Nature; and had made That very Infinity an Argument, to prove every Good to be included in it. This Argument is confuted by Socrates, in remarking, that, by the same way of reasoning, it might be argued, that Pain (the Pain of Sense) included every Evil; Pain, as well as Pleasure, being infinite: But all men acknowledge other Evils, beside the Evil of Pain: It was therefore a probable Conclusion, that other Things were good, beside Pleasure. The Infinity of One particular Species, which is subordinate to some Genus, (as Pleasure, for instance, is only One Species of Good,) does not prove That particular Species to include all the co-ordinate Species, or to be as comprehensive and universal as their Common Genus.
PHILEBUS.

You magnify that God of yours, O Socrates! very highly, methinks.

SOCRATES.

So do You, my Friend! That Goddes of Yours. The Question, however, ought to be answered by us.

PROTARCHUS.

Socrates says what is right, O Philebus! and we must do as he says we ought.

PHILEBUS.

Have not You, Protarchus! taken upon your self My Part in the Debate?

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis true, that I have. But in the present case I find myself much at a Loss, how to answer. I must therefore request, O Socrates! that You, your Self, will take the Office of Prophet 197 to us; left by some Mistake,

197 All Readers of this Sentence must be surprized at the Paradoxical Conclusion of it, till they have read a little farther on; where Socrates fairly confesses, that he mixed a little of his jocose Humour with the Solemnity of the Sentiment, here expressed. See Note 26.

198 The Poet in the Temple at Delphi, whose Business it was to deliver in Verse the Oracular Responses to Those who consulted
fulted the Oracle, was supposed to be inspired by Apollo, and had the Title of Prophet given to him. (See Note 44 to the lo.) Protarchus here alludes to that Office of the Delphic Poet, when he desires Socrates to undertake the like Office of Prophet, by delivering the Diê̂stes of Divine Wisdom to the Company assembled there to hear him. This is Plato's usual Manner:—before he enters on any Subject of Importance more than ordinary, he founds some solemn Note

Of Preparation,—to engage his Readers to a more than ordinary Degree of Attention. In the present Passage, he uses great Propriety in his way of giving them this Notice. For it precedes a Doctrine, to be delivered at large soon afterwards,—a Doctrine, truly Oracular, derived immediately from the Fountain of Wisdom into the Minds of Such as Socrates,

And Tirefias, and Phineus, Prophets old;

if these Prophets were Such as they are described by ancient Poets. For of Phineus they tell us, that He, (like Socrates,)

Fearless and firm, had Boldness to reveal,
Oracularly, Jove's own hidden Mind
To Mortals.

—οὐς τοσούτω ὑπέρτησε, καὶ Διὸς αὐτῆ
Χρῆν ἄτρεχεσσ σ’ ἔρδον τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Apollonius Rhod: L. 2. v. 181.

As to Tirefias; on What account we have here likened Him to Socrates, will easily be discovered by a judicious Reader, on perusing Note 242 to the Meno.

Mistake,
Mistake, I should offend the Combatant whom You favour, and by singing out of Tune, should spoil the Harmony.

Socrates.

You must be obeyed, Protarchus! Indeed there is nothing difficult in your Injunctions. But, in asking you, to What Sort of Being Mind and Science were to be referred,—when I was magnifying, as Philoebus says, the Subject of my Question,—the Joke, which I intended to soften the Solemnity of it, confused your Thoughts, I find, in good Earnest.

This evidently is a Metaphor, taken from the Contentions, usual at that time, between Dramatic Poets, during the Feasts of Bacchus, for the Fame of Superiority in their Art. For the Grecians of those days had an Emulation to excel in the Musical Entertainments of the Mind, as well as in the Gymnic Exercisés of the Body. To inspire them with that Emulation, Combats in Poetry and Musick, as well as in Gymnastic, were instituted by their Legislators: and the Contenders in either Kind were alike termed διόμενοι, Combatants. — The Metaphorical Combatants, meant by Protarchus, are Mind and Pleasure.

In continuing the Metaphor, taken from Theatrical Contests, Protarchus likens Himself to One of the Chorus in a Tragedy or Comedy, and Socrates to the Κορυφαίος or Χορηγὸς, the Chief or Leader of the whole Band. For in the Chorus-Songs, it was the Office of the Chief or President, to lead the Vocal Musick, keeping it in Time and Tune with the Instrumental: and in the Dialogue-Scenes, wherever the Chorus bore a Part, their President spake alone, for them all.
326 PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Very thorowly so, I confess, O Socrates!

SOCRATES.

And yet 'twas an easy Question. For on this Point, there is a Consent and Harmony among all the Sages, dignifying thus themselves, — that Mind is King of Heaven and Earth 201. And This, which they say, is perhaps well said 202. But let us, if You are willing, consider the Nature of this Universal Being more amply, and not in so concise a manner.

PROTARCHUS.

Consider it in what manner you think best, without regarding the Length of the Inquiry: for the Length will not be disagreeable to Us.

201 The unanimous Agreement of all the ancient Philosophers in this Dogma, — that Mind governs throughout the Universe, — seems to be introduced, as a Presumptive Argument in its favour; to procure a serious attention to the Inductive Reasoning, which is soon to follow, as a Rational Proof of it.

202 The word perhaps is here used by Socrates, not because he was, Himself, doubtful in this case, but because the Opinion, or Dogma, of an Universal Mind, tho authorised and patronised by Persons the most respectable, is still but an Opinion, till it is shown to correspond with all the Phenomena of the Universe; (see Note 204,) and till it is proved, moreover, to be founded on the Principles of Science and of sound Reasoning.
Socrates.

Fairly spoken. Let us begin then, by proposing this Question.

Protarchus.

What?

Socrates.

Whether shall we say, that the Power of the Irrational Principle governs all things in the whole Universe, fortuitously and at random 203? or shall we, on the contrary, agree with our Ancestors and Predecessors, in affirming, that some Mind and Wisdom,

203 The Atheistic Hypothesis, here spoken of, was broached at Athens by Critias, one of the Thirty Oligarchic Tyrants. Indeed we cannot find it to have made its appearance in Public any where, till a short time before. For it must be distinguished from the Hypothesis of those ancient Physiologers, who supposed,—that All things originally were in Disorder; and that Mind, thro the Infinity of Time past, was either involved in Chaos among the rest of Things, or else lay dormant, or inactive, somewhere above, or some how apart from, that wild Abyss,—The Womb of Nature;—but that, when at length Mind was extricated out of Chaos, by a casual Co-incident of Things similar to each other, and a casual Separation of dissimilar Things,—or when Mind awoke, or began to energise,—immediately an Infant-World of Beauty burst forth from the Womb; Order every where took place of Disorder; and the Government of Mind, throughout the Universe, superseded the Anarchy of Chaos. wonderfully
wonderfully Great, orders All things together, and governs throughout the Whole?

Protarchus.

Alike in nothing, O Socrates! are these Two Tenets. That, which you mentioned just now, is, in My opinion, impious. But, to hold, that Mind disposes All Things in a beautiful Order, is agreeable to That View which we have of the World, of the Celestial Bodys, and of the whole Circumvolution of the Heavens. For my own part, I should never speak nor think any otherwise on this Subject.

Socrates.

"That Mind presides over and governs the Universe," is the natural Conclusion, drawn by Common Reason, from the Evidence of Common Sense. For Who, that sees This universal Frame, thus wondrous fair,

but must infer the Cause of it to be full of wondrous Beauty? Who, that observes ever so slightly That Constancy, which is in the Motions of the Planets, and in the Risings and Settings of the Fixt Stars, can possibly imagine the Inconstancy of Chance to be the Mover? What Man, not disordered in his own Mind, can suppose any Other thing than Mind to be the Cause of that everlastting Order, which appears in the regular Interchanges of the Elements, and the circling Returns of the Successive Seasons?—This short and obvious Reasoning seems alone to have satisfied
PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

Is it then your Pleasure, that we add Our Voices to those of the Ancients, and openly avow that Tenet to be Ours; — not contenting our selves with a bare repetition of the Sayings of Others, in hopes of escaping Danger to our Selves; but resolved to run all Riffque together, and to share in undergoing the Censures of some Great and Formidable Man, when He afferts, that in the Whole of Things there is no Order 205?

PROTARCHUS.

How can I do otherwise, than join with you in This?

satisfied all the old Physiologers and earliest Philosophers: here therefore it is very properly put into the Mouth of Protarchus, whose Education, we may presume, made him acquainted with this their chief Doctrine. The more diffuse and copious Proof of it by Induction is, with equal propriety, reserved for Socrates. For this great Master of Dialecick, we are told by Aristotle, was the First who made use of the Inductional Method of Reasoning in his Philosophical Conversations.

205 That the Person here alluded to, is Critias, cannot be doubted of by Those who are acquainted with his Character, and the injurious Treatment he gave to Socrates.— A considerable Fragment of his Atheistick Poetry is extant in Sextus Empiricus, pag: 562.

Socrates.
PHILEBUS

SOCRATES.

Attend now to the Argument, which comes on next to be considered.

PROTARCHUS.

Propose it then.

SOCRATES.

In the Body of all Animals somehow we discover, that Fire, Water, and Air, must be in their Composition by nature; and Earth, which gives Support to the other Ingredients in their Frame, we see plainly: as Mariners say, when they are tossed about in a Thunder-Storm at Sea, and descry Land 266.

PROTARCHUS.

266 This Simile presents to our Imagination a Scene, in which the Four Elements are by Sailors seen distinctly at the same time; — the Watery Ocean, upon which they sail,—the Expanse of Air, over their Heads, — The Fire of Lightning, flashing around them, and Land, at a Distance within their Sight.—In Animal-Body, we have only the Earthy Part of their Frame before our Eyes: the Fire, the Air, and the Water, which are within them, we discover by some other ways. That they have Fire in them when alive, we perceive, by feeling their Warmth in handling them: when we hear their Voices, we know, that Air issues out of them, and must therefore have been within them: and when we feed on them dead, we find, that Moisture is in them, by our Taste; for This Sense is not affected.
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

True: and tossed about indeed are We too in these Discourses; but for a Port, to anchor in, we are entirely at a Loats.

affected by any Thing, which is totally deprived of its native Liquid.—However; we do not imagine the Simile to be here introduced, for the purpose of showing, that we have Ocular Demonstration of the Existence of the Four Elements: but the Exhibition of those separate and larger Parts of Each of them, presented to us in the Simile, is perhaps intended to prepare us for that vast View, which, immediately after This, opens itself on our Minds, in considering Each of those Elements as Universal, or rather Infinite.

Protarchus, by using the Plural Number, means Himsel and his Young Companions.——The fresh Subject, just now started, This of the four Elements of Outward Nature, occasions him to renew his former Complaint, mixed with Pleasantry, in the name of all the Younger Part of the Assembly. We have here a remarkable Instance of our Author’s fine Judgment in the composition of his Dialogues. For, being aware, that Some of his Readers are probably dissatisfied with this seeming Digression from the Subject, proposed to be considered,—viz. “to Which Sort of Being Mind belonged,” —he has contrived to intimate to them, in this Socratic way of Humour, that he is pushing forward, however he may appear to deviate; and that he offers to them this seemingly new Matter, only as a Vehicle to convey them the sooner to their Journey’s End. We conceive this to be his Purpose, from the first words of Socrates in Reply.
Let us proceed then:—Concerning Each of those Elementary Ingredients in our Frame, understand This.

What?

That, which there is in Us, of each Element, is small and inconsiderable; no where in any Part of our Frame have it we at all unmixed and pure; neither has it in Us a Power, worthy of its nature. Take One of them for a Sample, by which you may estimate all the rest. Fire in some manner there is in Us: Fire there is also in the Universe, throughout.

Most certainly.

Now the Fire, which is in Our composition, is weak and inconsiderable: but That, which is in the Whole of Things, is admirable for the vast Quantity

For, in the Bodys of all Animals, the Four Elements are so intimately mixed together, and (as it were) united, that the natural Quality of Each Element is restrained, and the inherent Force of it is cramped, by the other Three.
of it,—for the Beauty which it exhibits 209,—and for every Power and Virtue which belongs to Fire 210.

Protarchus.
Perfectly true.

Socrates.
Well then; is the Universal Fire generated, fed, and ruled by the Fire which we have in Us? or, on the contrary, does My Fire, and Yours, and That of every other Living Thing, receive its Being, Support, and Laws, from the Fire Universal?

Protarchus.
This Question of yours does not deserve an Answer.

Socrates.
Rightly said. And you would answer in the same manner, I suppose, if your Opinion was asked con-

209 For Fire is not only luminous, its Self, and therefore agreeable and pleasing to the Sight, — but also enlightens all Outward Forms, and renders their Beauty visible to Sense.

210 The Power, for instance, of pervading all Bodys, whether Elementary or Mixt, with the most rapid Motion; — the Power of rarefying all Fluids and expanding all Solids; — the Power of fusing Metals and other Fossils; — the Power of producing or increasing Vegetation; — and the Power of causing a Sensation of Heat or Warmth in all Sentient Beings.
cerning the Earthy Part of every Animal here, compared with the Earthy Substance Universal: and just so, concerning the other Elementary Parts of Animal-Bodys, mentioned before.

Protarchus.

What Man, who made a different Answer, would ever appear to be of Sound Mind?

Socrates.

Scarcely would Any man. But attend to what follows next. Wherever we find these Four Elements mixed together and united, do we not give to this Composition the name of Body?

Protarchus.

We do.

Socrates.

Apprehend the Same Thing then, with regard to This, which we call the World. This should be considered as a Body in the same manner, being composed of the same Elements.

Protarchus.

You are perfectly in the Right.

Socrates.
Socrates.

To the Whole of this Great Body then does the Whole of that Little Body of Ours owe its Nourishment, and whatever it has received, and whatever it possessés? or is the Body of the Universe indebted to Ours for all which it is, and has?

Protarchus.

There is no reason, O Socrates! for making a Question of This Point neither.

Socrates.

Well; What will you say to This Point then?

Protarchus.

What Point?

Socrates.

Must we not affirm these Bodys of ours to be animated with Souls 211?

211 All which Socrates, in his present Argument, has said concerning Body, regards the Bodys of all Animals in general, and not the Human Body in particular; agreeably to his own words, when he entered on this Subject: see in Page 330. The Souls therefore of all Animals in general are meant in the Sentence now before us, and not Souls Rational or peculiarly Human: the Rational Soul, or Mind, is not brought into consideration by Socrates, until after his next Sentence.

Protarchus.
Tis evident, that we must.

But from whence, O my Friend Protarchus! should Our Bodys derive those Souls of theirs, if that Great Body of the Universe, which has all the same Elements with Our Bodys, but in much greater Purity and Perfection, was not, as well as Ours, animated with a Soul? [212]

Unless Soul was infused throughout the Body of the World, every Member of this Great Body, every Part and Particle of the Corporeal Universe, could not be, as it is, in perpetual Motion. For the immediate Cause of all Corporeal Motion is either out of, or within, the Body moved. Causes, which are out of, or exterior to, the Body moved, are other Bodys, acting on it by Impulse, Attraction, Repulsion, &c. Causes within are either Mechanical or Vital. The Mechanical are, when the First Spring of Motion, tho' it be within the Body moved, is, its Self, Corporeal; and tho' it be a Part of the Machine, must have been wrought separately, and inserted afterwards. The Vital are when the First Spring of Motion is Incorporeal; when 'tis not only within but throughout the Body which it moves; when 'tis thorowly united with it, holding all the Parts of it together, and making it to be One Being, without consideration had of any End for which it may have been designed. — Where the Cause of Motion is External, there, on the removal of the Cause, or on its ceasing to act, the Motion,
PHILEBUS. 337

PROTARCHUS.

'Tis evident, O Socrates! that from no other Origin could they derive them.

SOCRATES.

Since therefore, O Protarchus! we acknowledge these Four Sorts of Being,—Bound,—Infinite,—the Com-

which it gave, gradually lessens, and at length entirely stops. Where the Cause of Motion is Mechanical, there the Spring of it has ever and anon need to be wound up, and will in time be quite worn out; when the Motion must of course cease for ever. But where the Cause is Vital,—where Soul is united with Body,—Life ceases not within that Body, till the Body is worn out, or destroyed; or till the principal Parts of it are so injured, as to be incapable of being held together by One Life, or of preserving their Union with the Soul. This Principle of their Life then departs; and either passes immediately into the Seeds of some other Body, or is resolved into That Great Soul, which animates the Universe. For it is absurd to suppose, that a Vital Principle, the very Essence of which is Life, giving Life to all Bodies where it enters and abides, can ever dye; no less absurd, than to suppose it possible for any Being whatever to be annihilated, or to become a Non-Being.—Now in the Corporeal Universe all Bodies are included: there is no exterior Body to act on it, in any one of those ways, in which Body acts on Body. Neither can the Motion of this Great Body be mechanical; for it needs no Renovation or Repair from any Foreign Hand, but is equal and everlasting. The Motion therefore must be vital: and on this account the Best of the ancient Philosophers held, that the World was Over a Living Thing.
pound of Both Those,— and Cause,— to be in all Bodys; and since we find, that in this Part of the Universe, to which We belong, there are Beings of that Fourth Sort,—Causes, which produce Souls, build up Bodys for those Souls to dwell in \(^{213}\), and heal those Bodys when diseased \(^{214}\); Causes also, which create and frame other Compositions, and amend

\(^{213}\) In the Greek of this Passage we read,—\(ψυχη \text{ τε παρέχων καὶ σώμα σωκάν ἐμποών.}\) — Ficinus translates the two last words of it thus,—"dum imprimit umbram." But This being obscure, an Error in the Greek Manuscripts was justly suspected by the subsequent Translators, Cornarius and Serranus; the former of whom proposes, instead of \(σωκάν\), to read \(ψυκή\); and the latter imagines, that we should read \(σωμασκιάρ\), as One Word. Gryneus and Bembo never attempt an Emendation of the printed Greek, even where it is most apparently erroneous. And Mons' Grou has taken the easy way of not translating the two last words. But all the Difficulty vanishes, if, instead of \(σωκάν\), we read \(σωκός\), a Tabernacle, or Tent, — a word, metaphorically used by the Pythagoreans, to signify the Human Body, as being but a slight temporary Dwelling for the Soul. See Timæus the Locrian, in several Passages; and a Fragment of Ocellus the Lucanian, de Lege, in Stobæus's Eclogæ Phyæ: cap: 16: See also Æschines the Socratic, pag: 128, Edit: Horrei; the Greek Index to which will furnish the learned Reader with Examples of the same Metaphor, used by several Greek Writers in the succeeding Ages.

\(^{214}\) The Causes here meant, we denominate Natural; and their Effects we call Works or Operations of Nature.
them when impaired —Causes these, to Every one of which we gave a particular Name, betokening a particular Kind of Wisdom or Skill; —since, I say, we are persuaded of these things, surely we can by no means think, that the whole Heaven, in the larger Parts of which are the same Four Sorts of Being,—and These, undepraved and pure,—can have any other Cause, than a Being, who is full of Contrivance and Design, and in whose Nature the most beautiful and noble Things all unite.

**Protarchus.**

It would not be at all reasonable to think it can.

**Socrates.**

If this then be absurd, we may the better assert, as a Consequence of our Reasoning, that in the Universe there are, what we have several times repeated, *Infinite* in great quantity, and *Bound* sufficient; and

215 These Forms, Structures, and Compositions, we denominate *Artificial*: for *Human Arts* of various Kinds are known to be their *Causes*.

216 That is, the *Heavenly Bodys*. In the same manner *Theophrastus* speaks,—*δόλω ψευδώ, καὶ ἐκατὰ τῶν μεγῶν*. and *Plotinus,* —*δόλω ψευδώ, καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶ τα ἀέρα*. Pag: 99.

217 In the *Greek*, —*τῶν τῶν καλλίτων καὶ τιμιώτατων φύσιν*,—The Things here meant are *Truth* and *Good, Mind* and *Wisdom*; to which in many other Passages of *Plato* those Attributes are given.

_U u 2_ besides
besides these, a Cause, not inconsiderable or mean \( ^{218} \), which, by mixing them properly together, marshalls and regulates the Years, the Seasons, and the Months, —a Cause \( ^{219} \), which with the greatest Justice we may term Wisdom and Mind \( ^{220} \).

Protarchus.

\( ^{218} \) That is,—a Cause the most excellent; according to a Figure of Speech, by the Masters of Rhetorick termed \( \alpha \iota \omicron \tau \iota \omicron \varsigma \), Extenuation; — a Figure, which is sometimes used, as it is here, to amplify the Sense, by conveying a Supposition, that Language affords no positive Epithet, of Force sufficient to express the Greatnes of our Meaning. — This Figure is so employed by Homer, in his Iliad, Lib: 15, v. 11; where Ajax, the strongest of all the Grecians, is spoken of only as not the weakest, \( \varepsilon \alpha \rho \alpha \upsilon \gamma \sigma \tau \alpha \tau \alpha \tau \alpha \tau \alpha \). And just so, to signify the Height of the Indignation, Grief, and Reluctance, felt by Achilles, when Agamemnon sent his Heralds to demand Briseis, the Poet says only,—\( \alpha \delta ' \alpha \zeta \tau \omega \gamma \iota \omega \nu \gamma \nu \theta \sigma \nu \omega \nu \alpha \chi \iota \lambda \lambda \iota \lambda \iota \iota \iota \iota \).

These, when Achilles saw, no Joy he felt.

See Hermogenes \( \pi \xi \iota \mu \varepsilon \delta \alpha \omega \), Cap: ult:

\( ^{219} \) That this Cause, to the Speculation of which we are at length conducted, is Cause Universal, — \( \tau \alpha \rho \alpha \varsigma \omega \nu \), Good its Self, the First Spring of all Motion, — will evidently appear, if we look back on the Process of Reasoning, along which we have travelled.—In the first place, the Element of Fire was offered to our View, and perceived to be Universal. Then, by an easy and plain Analogy, proceeding to the other Three Elements of all Mixt Bodys, we perceived Them to be, in like manner, Universal. The next Step in our Progress opened to us a View of.
of all visible Corpuscular Nature, in which all the Four Elements are combined together; the Infinity of Each being everywhere bounded, and the Vehemence or Mightiness of Each, everywhere restrained and tempered, by mixing with its Contrary. In proceeding farther, we found it a short Step from the Universality of Body to the Universal Life, the Life-giving and actuating Principle in Universal Nature. Next appeared the Universality of Mind, within the Universal Soul: it appeared from the Regularity and Order of the Motions, given by this Great Soul to every Part of its Great Body. And now, in the last place, within this Universal Mind appears the Idea of Good, as the First Cause of All things. For it appears, from the Share of Good, which every Being possesses, and which every Sentient Being enjoys, (a Good attendant on its Nature,) that universal Good was designed in the wise Order of all the Vital Mundane Motions;—in the Motions of the Celestial Bodies, in the first place;—next, in such Motions of the Elementary Bodies, as are governed or influenced by those Primary and Leading Motions;—and lastly, in those of all Mixed Bodies, Animal, Vegetable, and Fossil, whose Natural Motions depend on the Motions of the Elements;—an Order, which is therefore wise, because it is good, and produces all the Good possible to be enjoyed by Temporary Beings, in their several Kinds and Degrees of Capacity, according to the Divine all-comprising Idea.—This Fountain of Good, the Final Cause of All things, is expressly termed Wisdom and Mind in the Sentence of Socrates now before us: by which the essential and undivided Unity of the Supreme Being is plainly acknowledged. And yet, immediately after This, we find Socrates distinguishing the Cause of All things from Mind, the Exemplar of them all,—and from Soul, their Efficient,—by styling it peculiarly and eminently Cause: for the governing Mind and Soul of the Universe are spoken.
spoken of in the next Positive Sentence except one, as governing in virtue of this sole Cause of All things. But the distinction, there meant, is not real, as if it were made between Two different Beings; — 'tis meekly Logical, like That, which is made between Intelligible and Intellec,t, in the Argument of the Meno, page 9, and repeated in the Notes to other Dialogues. For this Triad of Divine Causes (concerning which, see Note 167) is One and the Same Mind Universal. 'Tis of excellent Use, however, to Us Men, to consider the Divine Mind as thus distinguishable: it furnishes our Understandings with as full and clear a Conception of the Government of the Universe, as it concerns Us to have. For with this Distinction, we contemplate the Divine Being,—first, as he possesses in Himself the ultimate End of Being, perfect Beatitude, αὐτῷ τὸ καλόν, to which no Good is wanting. We contemplate him again, as he enjoys this all-comprehensive Good by energising, that is, by an actual τῶν, View or Intellec,t, of Himself as τὰ καλά Good its Self, or Being universal and all-comprehensive. We contemplate him farther, as acting outwardly, in this View, and with this Intellec,t;—continually displaying the fair Forms comprehended in Himself; and thus creating an infinite number of Individual Beings, of all Kinds and Species, throughout the Immensity of the Universe; — diffusing through all Nature every Kind of Good, adapted to every Kind of Being; and thus providing a sufficient Relief to the natural Wants of them All; — into Multitudes of those Beings, of different Kinds and Species, inspiring Sentient Souls, a distinct Soul into each Individual, with a Power of Self-Motion; thus creating Animals, endued with a Sense of their proper Good and Evil,—Pleasure and Pain; — endued with a Sense of their own Wants, an Impulse to seek Relief, and an instinctive Direction, pointing to the Means; — endued with a strong Propensity to produce an Offspring
Offspring from ThemseIfes; with the strongeFt Affection also for that Offspring; and with as much Affection for All of their own Species, as may be necessary to the Preservation of that Species, and to the Good of other Beings interested in its Preservation. — We perceive all these Animals no less endued with a Discrimination of whatever is naturally hostile or noxious to them; and with a Forefight of their Danger at distance, for their avoiding it:—we perceive Fear implanted in the Weak, for their escaping Danger at hand by Flight; Boldness in the Strong, for their encountering and repelling it; and in All, an Apprehension of the Means, afforded them by nature for those Purposes, Swiftness for Flight, Armour for Self-Defence, and Arms for Combating: for Flight Wounds, given them by their Enemies, and for other Mischiefs incident to them from without, we discover them to have a Balm within them, a self-restoring Nature: and for the inward Maladies, to which they are liable, we discover in them an innate Physician, directing them to the proper Remedies.—In this View, we contemplate the Great Author of All, as Universal Soul, full of Goodness, and full of Wisdom, continually putting in Motion the whole Animal-World, through Appetites, Passions, and Affections; — from which are produced all Animal-Actions, and all Animal-Enjoyment.—In this manner then is the World of Animals governed by Universal Mind, the King of All. The sole End of the Government is the Good of those Beings, which are the Subjects of it; 'tis administered by the Wisdom of the Kingly Mind; the Law, or Rule of the Administration, is comprised in that Idea, with which the Kingly Mind is fraught,—the Great Idea of Universal Good; — and the Executor of this Law is the Agency of the same Mind, considered as Soul, active thro all the Sentient Part of his Universal Kingdom. — But farther; this Logical Division of Universal Mind, the One sole Cause of All things, into Three Caufes,
Causes, the Final, the Formal, and the Efficient, (as if they were Three different essential Properties, inherent in One and the Same Subject,) discovers to us the Frame and the Origin of our own Souls; and That Discovery opens to us the mysterious manner, in which the Rational and Moral World is governed by the Supreme Governor of all Beings. For by help of the Distinction above-mentioned, between the Three Causes concurring in One Universal Mind, we may perceive the Rational Soul of Man to be as it were an Impress of that Divine Triad.—In the first place; our Notions of Universality; — our Ideas, or Conceptions of all the Things we are acquainted with, (whether Substances or Attributes,) in their Genera and Species, where Many are comprized in One;—our Perception of Truths, the mutual Relations between those Ideas;—and our Powers of Reasoning from one Truth to another;—all these Forms and Energies of the Human Mind bear the Stamp of the Original Ideas, and of their Union in the Divine Mind, whose Intellect comprehends All of them together in One eternal View.—In the next place; our constant Wishes for Happiness; our unavoidable Desires of whatever we deem conducive to it;—our Attachment to Life, so long only as it promises more Good than Evil to us;—the Horror we feel at the Thought of Annihilation; as it destroys all Hopes of any future Good at all;—our Love of Reality and Truth; and the Delight we take in Order, Harmony, and Beauty, as con-natural to us, and congenial with our Being;—all these inward Motions, or Energies, are indelible Marks of our Descent from Him, the Sovereign Good, whose perfect Beatitude consists in his Idea or Intelligence of Himself, as the Fountain of those Divine Universals, just now mentioned, and the Cause of Good to All.—In the last place; the whole Business of Human Life, properly so termed, (in the account of which we are not to reckon those Hours, when our
our Thinking Part is employed alone, like Beings of higher Order, in the contemplation of Nature and of Nature's Cause,—nor that larger Portion of our Time, which, of necessity, is devoted wholly, like the Life of Brute-Animals, to the Service of the Body,) all the Actions, peculiar to Man, those of deliberate Choice, or of free Will, with every Study, and every Amusement, in which the Mind makes use of the Body, as her Instrument,—Eyes, or Ears, or loco-motive Members;—all these Employments of our Time (in some or other of which we are occupied continually, except when we descend to mere Animal-Life, or rise to the Mental and Divine,) show the reflex Activity of the Human Soul in pursuit of some Good, which is peculiarly Human. For wherever the Mind and the Body are employed, Both together, it is always from an Expectation of Something, good for the whole Man, to be found in the Employ its Self,—or to follow it, as a Consequence,—or, as an Effect, to be produced by it.—And this Expectation is raised in us by Opinion; the Foundation of which is either Experience, or natural Sagacity, or Fancy, or Faith in the Fancys and Opinions of other Men. So that, in all these cases, the Activity of a Man's Soul, (whether it be exerted in his own Body only, without any farther Operation, or whether it be exercised on external Subjects, by means of his Body,) always operates agreeably to the Thoughts or Opinions of his Mind, with a View to the Benefit of his whole Compound-Being. Hence it follows, that the Soul peculiar to Man, if this Account of it be true, is no other than the active Spirit of the Human Mind, energizing within a Human Body; in consequence of whose effective Energies, the Body, which it inhabits, is, in all those Motions which depend on a Man's Self, moved according to the Will of his own Private Mind: in like manner, as the Great Body of the Universe is actuated, and the Motion of every
every Part of it directed, by the energetic and efficacious Will of the Sovereign Mind Universal. And in like manner, as this Divine Mind, by energizing within, throughout, and upon the First Matter, is the Efficient Cause of the Outward World—of all those corporeal and natural Forms, which it consists of,—and of all the Changes and Variations of these Forms, through Motion; (with relation to which EfficAc, the great Author of them is styled the Mind of Nature, and the Soul of the World, or Mind and Soul Universal;) so the Human Mind, energizing within and throughout her own Body, comes to be the Soul of this Body of hers, so as to move and govern it as She wills; and being also, by means of this moveable Body, able to operate upon such Forms of Nature as lye within her Reach, and within her Power to move, change, and manage at her pleasure, she becomes the Efficient Cause of artificial Forms in every Art which she has learnt. — Now if Arguments from Analogy have the Weight of Proofs in any Subject at all, the many concurring Analogys, above shown, between the Soul of the Universe and the Soul of Man, are, we venture to say, abundant Proofs of the Extraction or Derivation of the latter from the former. — Against this Doctrine of the Pythagoreans, of Socrates, and of the chief Philosophers who came after him, except Epicurus, many Objections have been made: an Answer to the most formidable of them will serve to establish the Doctrine more firmly; and at the same time will instruct us in That Part of the Knowledge of Nature, which it concerns every Man to be thoroughly well versed in,—That, relating to the Divine Government of Man, with a View to his Happiness.—It has been argued by the Objectors,—that, if One only Being governs the whole World, his Government must be absolute, his Power unlimited, and his Will irresistible: and that, if the same Being, who governs the World, was the Creator of it,
and the Author of Universal Nature, it follows, that the Essential Form or Nature of every Kind of Being, and the Properties, or inherent Qualities belonging to such Form, are, to every Individual of the Kind, the Laws by which it is and must be governed,—a Declaration of the Will of the Supreme Governor.—And the Fact, they say, is indisputable throughout Inanimate Nature: for 'tis well known, that all Bodys whatever, in all their Motions, uniformly obey the General Laws, impressed on all Corporeal Being by its Creator. Nor is the Fact less evident, say they, in the Qualities of all Bodys, than it is in their Motions: the Elements of Nature, for instance, act and are acted on, according to the Active and Passive Powers, with which they are severally invested by The All-powerful: and every Mineral and every Vegetable operates according to the Virtues, with which the Essential Form or Nature of it is endued: for whatever is certain in any of the Arts, the Mechanical and the Military, in Agriculture and Navigation, or in Chemistry and Medicine, depends on the constant the unfailing Effect of those Laws, Powers, and Virtues.—And this Foundation of our Adversary’s Argument undoubtedly is true. For all Bodys, and every Particle of Body, whether Elementary or Mixt, not endued with Sense, having no Particular Souls of their own, are as it were in the Hands of their Creator, to be moved and managed immediately by Him. Their Motions therefore, and the Operations and Effects of their several Powers, must of course be as constant and as unerring as That impowering Mind who moves them, as being the Soul of the Universe, the only Soul, which those Bodys have. —— The Objectors to the ancient Doctrine concerning Human Nature proceed, and tell us, that all Beings, animated with Souls, no less uniformly obey the Laws implanted in their Nature,—the Laws of Sense,—being governed in all their Actions.
Anions by a Feeling of present, or an Apprehension of future Pain or Pleasure: for 'tis only thro these their Animal-Feelings and Apprehensions, say they, that we are able to tame many of the Wild by nature, and to make the naturally Tame subject to our Will. — This also is readily admitted. For all Souls, not endued with Reason, having no Particular Minds of their own, are guided in the Motions which they give their Bodies, by the governing Mind of the Universe: and his General Directions, in what Way they are to go, are given them thro natural Impulses or Instincts: but These being insufficient to guide them aright, in a World where all things are subject to Change and Motion, Particular Directions are superadded continually thro Sense and Memory,—Sense of the present, and Memory of the past.—Thus far then the Defenders and the Opposers of the original and native Divinity of Man's Intellectual Soul are agreed in their Notions concerning Nature, and the Government of the World. But here they divide. For the Degraders of Human Nature, proceeding on the Ground of those settled Preliminars, assert, that the Divine Government is alike over all Creatures, uniformly absolute, and despotic; and that Man acts from Necessity, as well as all other Animals, being guided by the same irresistible Law of Sense, implanted in all the Sentient Part of Nature. That Faculty in Man, which is commonly called Reason, is, according to Them, only a larger Compass of Imagination, and a Memory more amply furnished, than other Animals are possessed of. And Man enjoys these superior Advantages, say They, from his acquaintance with a greater Multitude of Sensible Objects; into which acquaintance he is brought by the greater number of his Wants. For, being left by Nature less defended, than any other Animals, from the frequent Inclemencys of the Air, and less able to resist the Attacks of an Enemy; being also subject to more internal
internal Maladies, and to more accidental Mischiefs from without; he is naturally led to seek for Protection and Defence, Relief and Remedy, from all the Bodys around him, the Inanimate, the Vegetable, and the Animal; and for these Purposes, to search out their Occult Qualitys, that is, such Property and Powers in them, as are not obvious to Sense. In the beginning of this Search, Man has no other Guides, say They, than his own Five Senses, together with the Sensible Qualitys of those Bodys. Afterward, as his Knowledge of Nature increases with his Searches and his Experiments, his Memory, say They, assists him with Similitudes and Analogys; and These supply his Imagination, (which his Wants keep in continual Exercise,) with copious Matter for the Invention of Arts. Those Arts, say They, which are the most boasted of, as Proofs of Human Wisdom, and of a Divine Principle in Man, derived from the Legislator and Governor of the Universe,—the Arts of Government and Legislation,—prove, that Man is no more a Rational Animal, than such as he is pleased to term Brutes. For the necessity of making Penal Laws, and of governing by Compulsion, shows, say They, that Men are not to be restrained from following their Inclinations, Appetites, and Passions, otherwise than by Fear of suffering what is painful, or of losing what is pleasant to the Senses. And they pretend, that all instituted Religions are built on that very Ground: for that the Sanctions of their Prohibitions and Injunctions suppose Men to be governable only thro' the same Principles,—Fear of Sensible Pain, and Hope of Sensible Pleasure, in some Future State of Being. Now, say They, if the Principles of Reason, of Justice, and Goodness, were essential to the Soul of Man, (as they would be, if the Essence of it was Divine, or of Divine Original,)—if Man could naturally discern between just and Unjust,—and if his Nature led him to adhere to the former, and to shun the latter,—Human Laws,
Laws, and Human Governments, would be then unnecessary for the direction of Man's Moral Conduct: Universal Justice would be his Natural Law; to which he would be subject, as irresistibly, as all other Beings are to the Laws of Their respective Natures.—But since the Case is quite otherwise, being as above stated, it should seem, say They, that the Soul of Man is derived from some other Source than the Divine Mind, the Fountain of Wisdom,—namely, from Matter, the Root of Evil; —and that, like the Souls of all other Animals, it is Corporeal and Mortal: — that, as the Arts of Building were invented by Men, to shelter them from foul Weather and fierce Animals, so Religions, Governments, and Laws, were contrived and framed by Men, to protect and secure them against Those of their own Species, who excelled in Bodily Strength; as it was to be feared, that, without these Inventions, the Men of Might would seize on all the Bountys of Nature for the sole Use of Themselves and their own Families; and would rob and defpoil, injure and destroy Others at their pleasure. — To these and other such Arguments, in which the Rational and the Animal Natures are confounded together, and the Soul of Man is put on a Level (as to Kind) with the Souls of Brutes, it is answered, — that Mind, or the Faculty of perceiving Mental Objects, differs from Sense, or the Faculty of perceiving Sensible Objects, as much, as Monad differs from Multitude, or as Universal differs from Particular. — By the Mind or Rational Faculty, many Sensible Objects, of one and the same Kind, (or rather all of the Kind, how few of them soever may have fallen under the cognisance of the Sensés,) are viewed together as One, by an instantaneous All (as it were a Glance) of the Mind; in which she seems to throw her Eye over the whole Sensible Universe; and immediately to sort out, collect together and unite, All the Individuals of some One Kind,—not only All, then
existing, but all Those also which are past, and all Those which are to come;—as if all Places, and all Ages were at once present to her View. So full and complete a Transcript of some Part of Eternal Being, is This and every other Mental Object, in every Particular Mind!—By the Sense, or Sensitive Faculty, Sensitive Objects of the same Kind are perceived separately and distinctly, Each of them apart from the rest: and tho they may be, afterwards, assembl'd together in the Memory or Imagination, yet they still continue separate, as so many distinct Ones; and still they admit more of the same Kind. For Imagination is indefinite, as well as Sense; the Objects of Each are infinite in Number; and to every Infinite in Number, enumerate as many as you will, More may be for ever added: so far doth the greatest Multitude fall short of All! and so different a Thing is Infinity from Universality! not less far do Sensitive Objects fall short of Mental; and not less different is Sense from Mind, in Comprehensiveness, as well as in Purity and Perfection. The Difference between them would easily be seen, were they not so closely connected, as they are, in Human Souls: for in These, on the one hand, Objects of Sense naturally excite Ideas; on the other hand, Images of Sensitive Objects never fail to obtrude themselves on every Idea; nor do they ever fail to narrow and abridge, as well as to vitiate and deprave, every Idea, which they mix with.—Man is an Animal, to whose Sentient Soul is super-added a Mind; or rather, perhaps, in whose Soul are implanted the Principles of Mind and Science. In Some happy Souls, these Principles take deeper Root, than they do in Others of the Kind. Some also are so fortunate, as to meet with a better Cultivation of that divine Plant, than Others. In Some Places, it is sheltered from the Storms, raised by Malice and Ignorance; it is enlivened by the opening Warmth of Liberty and Independance; and is strengthened.
strengthened by the Breath of cool Controversy and ingenuous Debate: in Other Places, it is exposed to the Tempefts of Tyranny; blasted by the biting Airs of Oppreffion, Penury, or Superflition; or 'tis dried up and withered by the Heat of religious Enthusiasm. Some Kinds of Science, especially if implanted in generous Souls, as it were in Soils ftted to receive them, shoot up quickeft, or spread wideft, in the Sun-shine of Praise and Glory: other Kinds, the most abftacted from Body, if implanted in Souls the nobleft of all, as it were in the richeft Soils of the hotteft Climates, thrive perhaps better in the Shade; tho in Souls lefs noble, the Saplings of these Kinds are apt to dye the fooneft of any, if those animating Rays from without do not reach them. To these and the like Causes are to be ascribed the different Degrees of Knowledge, Wisdom, and Virtue, and of their Contrarys also, found amongst Men.—Wisdom, Virtue, and Knowledge, are feated in the Rational Part of the Soul: their Contrarys poffefs the Irrational Part, in a Degree proportioned to the Want of those Qualities in the Rational. Nor only do Men differ greatly, One from Another, in these refpefts; but also the Same Man, at different times, as greatly differs from Himself. For sometimes we follow the Rules of Reafon, Wisdom, and Virtue: at other times we fuffer our felves, in violation of those Rules, to be led by Sense, and the Passions of the Animal-Soul: and These, tho regular and bounded in all Brute-Animals, yet in Man are lawlefs and infinite; because, Man's Imagination being unbounded, Whoever has not the Knowledge of True Good habitually preffent to his Mind, and the Attainment of it always at his Heart, is apt to employ his Memory, and his Rational Powers, in the gratification of his Desires; and a Man's Desires, limited as they are by Nature, and born of limited Sense, yet feeding on the Fancys, stretch and grow to a Size beyond all
all Bound and Measure.—Seeing then, that Man is so various and vague a Being, we cannot suppose, that he is to be governed well in any one certain way. Accordingly, in the Divine Government of the World, Good and Evil Men, the Wise and the Foolish, are led towards That, which is the End of Man, thro' different Roads; and Philosophy stands, as a Mercury, to point them out. — Now the nature of what is good is then most conspicuous, when viewed in the most perfect State of it, unmixed with Evil: and the nature of what is evil is not discerned clearly, unless it be carried to Extremity, unmixed with Good. Let us therefore, on one side, suppose a Man, intelligent and conscious of the Divine Principle within himself; and wise in knowing, from What Fountain he derives the Superior Part of his Soul: Such a Man must have his Inward Eye steadily fixed on the Princely Ideas, presiding in that Part,—namely, τὸ ἴθισων, τὸ καλόν, καὶ τὰ ἀραξόν, The Just, The Beautiful, and The Good,—Ideas, which comprehend the whole Choir of Particular Virtues, every Species of Beauty and Loveliness, and every Kind of Things conducing to real and permanent Felicity: and Such a Man cannot fail of keeping, in every Walk of Human Life, along that unbroken Line of Truth and Moral Rightitude, or Universal Justice, every Step of which is strown with Heart-felt Delights, and the End of which is the Height of Human Happiness. For a Man cannot but fix his Eye on That which he admires, if he continues within Sight of it; he cannot but admire Beauty, if he perceives it; he cannot but perceive the Beauty which he looks at, if he hath a Sense of Beauty; and if, having this Sense, or Taste, he perceives any thing beauteous, and continues to look at and admire it, he cannot help having a Love of it, proportioned to the degree of its Beauty. Farther; whatever a Man knows beneficial to him, he cannot but prefer it to every thing
thing which he knows hurtful to him, or least beneficial: if the Good, so preferred, is not in his Possession, or within his Power of possessing it, he cannot but desire and pursue, till he obtains it; and if he is already possessed of it, he cannot resist an Impulse or Desire, which he feels, to hold it fast. The Man therefore, who knows Himself, his Better Self, and his Origin,—the Man, who perceives, that Truth and Universal Justice are absolutely the fairest and the best of Things, and to Man the most beneficial,—or, in Platonic Language, that τὸ δόξαν η ἡμῖν ἡμῖν τὰ ἀριστάτα τὸν Πλατωνικὸν λόγον ἡμῖν, The Beautiful and The Good,—He can never lose Sight of them; his Heart and Mind are fixed on the Object of his Love and Desire; and as far as he has it in Possession, every Action of his, moving from that Love, strengthens the Habit, or Hold, which he has of the Object of it. Now the State of such a Man's Mind must be attended with as much Happiness, as the Human Mind is capable of enjoying. For, if the Beatitude of the Supreme Being consists in the Contemplation of Himself,—and if those Ideas, of all the most comprehensive, Beauty, Truth, and Good, are Himself,—his Mind,—the eternal Object of his Contemplation,—it follows, that, in imparting those Ideas, he imparts Himself, and his own Beatitude;—on which Participation is founded all the Happiness, enjoyed by any Particular Mind. —In the Mind of Man, indeed, even of the Wisest, these imparted and derivative Ideas must ever fall short of the Totality, Purity, and Perfection of the Divine Originals: but Man, however, has a Power of purifying his Mind more and more, and of continually advancing it nearer to Perfection, by directing his Mental Eye to that Place within the Soul, (as Plato speaks in his First Alcibiades,) where the Divine Mind is always present; where he governs with Paternal Authority, by making his Presence perceived and felt; and where he directs, infallibly
right, That Private Mind, which directs every Action of
the Man. Here then the Wife and Good Man finds at the
same time the perfect Rule, to direct his Conduct,—and the Pa-
rental Guardian of his Mind, to prevent his Miss-apprehension of that
Rule, by rectifying his Ideas depraved by Sense and Imagina-
tion. So simple, uniform and easy, is the Divine Government,
when the Subjects of it are Such happy Souls as, to use the
Words of our admirable Poet, are

———Self-knowing, and from thence
Magnanimous, to correspond with Heav'n;

Milton, Par. Lost, B. 7.

Such, as are blest also with a Conscience of that Correspondence,
and with a Certainty of having their Conduct approved by the
Author of their Being and Happiness, in their knowing it to be agreeable to his own Mind.—— We may farther imagine,
that the Condition of the Man, whom we have been supposing,
is attended with a certain Circumstance,—Such a one, as sets in
the strongest Light, every Article of the Subject immediately
before us;—Such a one, as clearly shows, first, the wide Dif-
ference between Sense and Reason, — 2dly, the Divine Origin of
the Rational Part of the Human Soul,—3dly, the peculiar Hap-
piness of a Man, the whole Conduct of whose Life is under
the Guidance of This his better Principle of Action, — and
lastly, the manner of That Government, in which the Father of
all Minds superintends, supremely blest, and lifts the nearest
to Perfection, (the nearest to Himself;) the most excellent of his
Offspring. The Circumstance, here meant, is the Enjoyment of
pure and perfect Friendship. That our Supposition of this Cir-
cumstance hath a Foundation in Nature, and is not meerly
imaginary, appears from its being the deepest Bosom-Wish of
every Soul, susceptible of so godlike an Affection, to meet

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with
with that Enjoyment. Now, if such a Wish be natural to the Best of the Human Species, the Enjoyment of it must be suitable to their Nature; and if so, it proves incontestably the Four Points, above recited: as will appear from the following summary account of the Nature and Cause of pure and perfect Friendship. — All Benevolence, Love, or Affection, from the lowest to the highest degree of it, seems to be founded on some real or supposed Similitude. — Sameness of Kind, inferring many general Similitudes, attracts Men, one to another, and associates them together. — Sameness of Country, by Birth and Education, producing a Similitude between Men in their outward Manners and Customs, conciliates a greater degree of Benevolence, than is felt by Strangers to each other. — Sameness of Institution in matters of Discipline or Teaching, as it produces a Similitude of Notions, and often of Opinions also, in the Mind, engages a degree of mutual Benevolence, greater than what arises from being born and bred in the same Country. — Farther; any Two Persons, who have a Knowledge of their Descent from one common Ancestor, conceive an Affection for each other, more or less, in proportion to the Degree of their Propinquity in Blood, from a natural presumption of some Similitude in their Tempers and Dispositions, which they suppose to be derived from the same Fountain. — A Similitude of Mind, between these or any other Two Persons, perceived by Themselves through Acquaintance with each other, draws on, by degrees, a mutual Intimacy and Familiarity, with a free Communication of their Sentiments and Thoughts on every Subject. — An Amiableness of Temper, Mind, and Moral Character, in which any Two Persons are alike, combines them in mutual Amity, Esteem, and Love. And as the Ideas, Sentiments and Manners, above mentioned, are of all things the fairest and the most amiable, so they conciliate the most entire Love and Amity between
between Persons, who have their Minds filled with those Ideas, pregnant with those Sentiments, and visible to each other in those Manners.—But nothing beside Assurance, in Each of the Persons so combined, of the Continuance of that amiable Temper, Mind, and Moral Character in the Other Party, can unite them in a perfect Friendship, as durable as their Beings. And, altho a particular Temperament of Body, in which some one Humour strongly predominates by nature, may perhaps insinuate (in some measure) a permanent Temper in the Soul; (an Assurance, rendered very fallible by the Changes, to which all Corporeal Things are liable;)—'tis certain, that the only firm Ground of Dependance on a Confiancy of Mind and a Conflancy of Manners, whether in one's Self or in any other Person, is the Science of Mind, with which That of Morals is immediately connected:—nor is it less certain, that the permanent Abode of any Science in any Human Mind, (so apt to be forgetful as the Mind of Man is,) depends on frequently recurring to the Principles of that Science. Now the Principles of all the Sciences are contained in, and flow from, the Principles of Mind: and these Universal Principles in their Purity, free from all Images of Corporeal Things, are no where to be found but in Mind Universal;—in That Divine Light which, enlightening all Particular Minds, enables them to see whatever Truth is actually by Them seen;—That pure Light, in which eternally dwell all pure Ideas; and in which (we may presume) live for ever all such Minds, as are entirely purified from Sense, and divested of every the least Relick of Sensible Things: and from these Premises it follows, that an ample Security for perfect Friendship, (the Permanence of mutual Love and Amity, founded on Moral Science,) is to be obtained by Those, and by Those only, who are under the immediate Influence and Guidance of the great Parental Mind,—the sole Bond of perfect Union between
his Offspring.—Thus have we attempted to give a Sketch of the Character and the Condition of those godlike Souls, who may properly be said, in every Sense of the Expression, to be governed by Divine Love. Whether the Character does, or ever did, or indeed can, exist on Earth, in so high a degree of Excellence as we have supposed, is not our Business now to examine: its Ideal Essence, and the possibility of its Existence, suffice to the present Argument: but the actual Existence (at least for any considerable time) of a Character, the reverse of it, appears much more doubtful.—For if, on the other side, we suppose a Man, wholly blind to the Ideas of Truth, Honesty, and Goodness,—unconscious of any Principle within him, of higher dignity than the Power of Sensation, we must suppose him under the absolute uncontrolled Dominion of the Passions, which arise from external Things magnified by Imagination;—we must suppose Conscience, or the innate Sense of just and unjust, and every Feeling also of Natural and Social Affection, quite stupefied, if not extinct, in him; for such a Sense and such a Feeling always awaken those Ideas in every Soul, where they have a Place, as it were, but lie dormant:—we must suppose him therefore to act counter to the Nature of a Rational and Social Being, by violating the Laws of just Bound and equitable Measure, whenever they oppose the boundless Demands of his immoderate Passions.——Such are the chief Outlines of a Character, too hateful to be dwelt on.——

As to the inward Condition of such a Man, if such a Man there be, 'tis evident, that he must ever be without the Complacency and Satisfaction, the Delights and Joys, which attend those Ideas and Sentiments, those Affections and Actions, belonging to the Character above delineated.—'Tis no less evident, that, being ignorant of his own true Being, and the native Independence of it on all Exterior Things, he must be, first, a Slave to his Desire
Desire of these Things, for want of knowing any better; and he will, then, easily become a Slave to Those of his own Species, who seem to have them in their Power to bestow, —especially, to some One, who assumes a Power, which of right belongs to None but the Supreme Governor of the World,—the Power of giving and taking them away as He thinks fit:—so that the wretched Mortal, we are here supposing, not only never enjoys any of the Sweets of his native Liberty, but has neither Inclination nor Relish for them, perhaps not the least Notion or Thought of them. —— It is evident farther, that, being ignorant of his Relation to the great Parental Mind, (to his natural Dependence on whom, he owes his natural Independence on all Other things) he can never feel That Freedom from all anxious Care, That Serenity and Cheerfulness of Soul, which can only be inspired by a Filial Confidence in Paternal Wisdom and Goodness, together with a Consciousness of Filial Gratitude. —— And farther still, 'tis evident, that; being ignorant also of the Brotherly Relation, which his Mind bears to the Minds of other Rational Beings, he can never enjoy the pure and sincere Delights of rational and social Conversé: nor, abstrated from Selfish Views, can he take Pleasure in the Company or Sight of Any of his Species; for, conscious of no Benevolence towards them in his own Heart, he supposes none to be in the Hearts of Others: still less is it possible, that he should ever taste of the refined Pleasures of perfect Friendship and pure Love; since he is utterly incapable of either being, or having, a true Friend. —— Thus much for the Condition of his Mind,—a Condition, which any Other, than Such a Man, would deem insupportable to a Man's Self: ——

As to his Condition, next, with regard to his Fellow-Men, in the Midst of whom he lives: to These, whatever be his Rank amongst them in Outward Life, he must be wholly insupportable,
able, if he acts according to his own Will and Pleasure. For, acting thus, if he be an Absolute Monarch, he will be soon slain by his own Soldiery: if he be a King or Supreme Magistrate, being condemned by Laws universally known, his own Subjects will become his Executioners: if he be a Private Person, a speedy End will be put to his lawless Life by the Magistracy of his Country. But if, living under a Legal Government, such a Man is restrained by the Laws from openly acting as he would, 'tis because the Passion of Fear is the predominant Passion of his Soul. For if, under this Restraint, he happens to be a Private Person, he will use Fraud instead of Violence, for the Means of accomplishing his Ends, and of escaping, at the same time, the Punishment threatened by the Laws: and if he happens to be King, he will employ all his Cunning to get rid of the Restraint, by secretly and gradually acquiring an Authority with the People, superior to That of the Laws, or a Power which may put him above their Reach.

---Tolle periculum,

Et vaga profliet frænis natura remotis.

Horat: Sat:

The Dread and Danger gone, he gives a Loose To his wild Genius; like the Mountain-Colt, Set free from Bit and Bridle, strait be bounds Exulting; spurs at Man; and high o'erleaps, Indignant, every Barrier Man can raise.

But, when this Slave to his own Passions hath usurped an absolute Dominion over the Persons and Properties of the People, and hath assumed an uncontrolled or arbitrary Sway in all their Public Affairs, if, after This, he abstains from the commission of any Piece of Injustice, to which his Passions urge him, and from which (by our Hypothesis) no inward Sense of Justice withholds
withholds him,—in such a supposed case, we may fairly con-
clude, that Fear, to which every Tyrant must be always sub-
ject, operates in his Soul more forcibly, than the rest of his
Passions, be they ever so violent. On the other hand, if ever
he performs an Action, the Motives to which, in Other Men,
would be Generosity and Goodness, or Equity and Humanity, 'tis
not uncandid to presume, that His sole Motive is to lessen
the Odium and the Danger, which he is sensible that his nu-
umerous Acts of Cruelty and Oppression must have drawn on him,
from the People whom he still dreads.—And lastly, as to his
Condition with regard to the Supreme Governor of the World:
being (by the Hypothefis) without the least Sense of true Re-
ligion, or of the really Divine Nature, his Fears will make
him prone to embrace any Superflition, which is suitable to
his own impious Fancies. For he will be apt enough to sus-
pect, that Gods there may be,—

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust;} \\
\text{Whose Attributes are Rage, Revenge, and Lust;} \\
\text{Such, as the Souls of Cowards may conceive;} \\
\text{And, form'd like Tyrants, Tyrants can believe.}
\end{align*}
\]

But now, as no erroneous Notions, no Ignorance of the Truth
of Things, can exempt any Man from being a Subject of the
Divine Government, this Government over Him is exercised
thru his Fear; by which he is made, maugre all his Malevo-
lence, sometimes to abstain from doing Injurys; and, notwith-
standing his total want of Benevolence, sometimes to do Good; for
the avoiding or softening of the Punishment which he dreads.
Such, with respect to God, to Mankind, and to Himself, is the Con-
dition of the Man whom we have supposed,—a Man, if he may be
so termed, thorowly impious, unsocial, and unjust,—incapable of

being governed, like a Rational and Social Being, thro Reason, Kindness, and Love; and incapable of the Happiness, designed for such a Being; because he is, by our Hypothesis, dead to all Sense of it. Yet this Wretch, irrecoverably lost as he is to Goodness and Honesty, is found to be, by means of his Fears, subservient, tho in a low degree, to the Ends of the Divine Providence; whose Views, in his Government of Man, are these, to oblige every Man to do Good to Others, and to restrain every Man from doing to Others any Evil, so far as such Obligation and Restraint are compatible with Choice and voluntary Action, or with Man's being what he is,—a Moral Agent. Accordingly, when this Passion of Fear ceases to be effectual for those Purposes, in governing Him who is wholly Selfish and Unsocial, the same Divine Providence removes him from amongst Men,—either thro the natural Operation of the same Passion of Fear, implanted in All men for a Guard against impending Evils,—or thro the natural Effects of their Resentment of the grossest Injustice, and heaviest Injuries,—or thro the Prudence of the Civil Magistrate, and the Wisdom of Good Laws.—If this Character, the purely Selfish, is not a mere Creature of Man's Imagination; and if the other, the purely Rational and Social, hath any Being, besides its Ideal Being in Mind, 'tis certain, however, that the Existence of Either of those Characters, on this Earth of ours, is extremely rare. The real Characters of Human Mortals are to be found between those Two Opposites; Some, wavering between; Some, inclining strongly yet variously to Both by turns; but the greatest Multitude, tending more or less, and approaching faster or slower, towards the One or the Other. 'Tis obvious to perceive, that this dubious or mixt Character must be governed, if governed well, by the mixt Motives of Love and Fear;—by Each of them, in proportion to the degree of Power and Prevalence, which either
either the Faculty of Reason, or the Faculty of Sense, obtain in the Soul of any Man: for the former of those Principles in the Human Soul is always followed by the Social Affections; and the latter, by the Selfish Passions. Accordingly, the Divine Cause of Harmony in the Moral World, as well as in the Natural, employs Both of those Means, Love and Fear, in the Government of Human Kind; — Love, for the maintenance of Cordial Agreement amongst Men,—and Fear, for the prevention of Mischiefs, so great and so extensive, as would, in time, be destructive of the Species.—Now if the Character of a Man, who is governed thro Love, be contrary to That of a Man governed thro Fear; — if the Objects of Love, which are the Beautiful and the Good, be contrary to those of Fear, which are the same with those of Hatred, the Ugly and the Evil;— if the Cause of Concord, and true Love or Friendship, between one Person and another, be That Congeniity and Similitude of Minds, That constant Agreement in their Sentiments and Ideas, the sole Fountain of which is Universal Truth, and Right Reason, in the great Parental Mind; and if the Cause of Hatred and Fear be of a quite contrary Nature, namely, the Opposition between one Man and another, on account of the Rival Appetites in Both, the Fountains of which are Sense and Imagination;—it follows, that Mind, or the Rational Part of the Soul, is so far from being the same thing with Sense, or the Sensitive Part of the Soul, as the Doctrine of Democritus affirms, that 'tis quite the Contrary. And thence it is, that Mind and Sense, taken apart, Each from the Other, produce quite contrary Effects, — contrary Dispositions, Sentiments, Actions and Habits. And thence also it is, that in the Human Soul, where they are joined together, they are often found to be Impediments to each other. We find the Energys of our Intellectual and Rational Powers interrupted and retarded, or an End put
to them for a time, by the intervention of external Objects, such as strike any of our outward Senses strongly. On the other hand, we find the Liveliness of our Sensations deadened or weakened by a concomitant Attention of the Mind to her own proper Objects.—Farther; it has been observed by Some, that Men of Athletic Strength of Body are generally weak in their Mental Facultys: and that Men of Understanding, greater than is ordinary, are wont to be more infirm or tender than ordinary, in their Bodily Frame and Constitution.—These Observations, if they are just, added to the before-cited Experience of us all, confirm the Truth of these Platonic Doctrines,—that Mind alone is the Cause of Good and Happiness to that Compound-Being, Man; and that his Body, one of the Principles of which is Matter, (the General Cause of Evil,) is, on that very account, the Cause of That Evil which is to Man peculiar.

'Tis evident, that the word Mind, in this Sentence, means the Mind Universal and Divine: the preceding word Wisdom therefore is here used in its only true and proper Sense, to signify That Wisdom, which is peculiarly essential to the Divine Mind. But as it is here distinguished from Mind nominally, we are to observe, that σοφία Wisdom has, in this place, the same Meaning with φήσις in the First Alcibiades, page 321; and signifies, as it is explained in the Note to that Passage, the Divine νοέων Intelliection;—or the Divine Mind, energising inwardly, and intelligent of Himself, as being νος ρντὸς Mind Intelligible, as well as νος νοεῖος Mind Intelligent, — and thus viewing in Himself the Originals of all things in all their Beauty, and disposed in perfect Order,—commensurate and justly congruous Each with Other, and every One of them with the Whole,—for the sufficient Good of every Part, and for compleat Good Universal, flowing from Him, as He is τἀγαθὸν Good its Self.

—Aristotle, in Ethic: Nicom: L. 6, C. 7, defines Wisdom, or σοφία, which.
which he says is ἀριστερὰς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν The most accurate of the Sciences, thus,—ἐπιστήμης ἢ νῦν τῶν τιμωτάτων The Science and Intelligence of those Things which are highest in Dignity;—meaning (as appears from his own words in Mag: Moral: L. 1, C. 35,) Things divine and eternal; the chief of which are those Ideas which are the most Universal, The just, The Beautiful, and The Good,—and those Principles of all Ideas, One and Many, Same and Different. — Plotinus, in Ennead: 1, L. 2, distinguishes Wisdom from Mind thus,—ἡ σοφία ἐν ζωικῷ ἐν νῦν ἐγένετο. Wisdom consists in the Contemplation of those Things, which Mind (or Intellect) possestes.——Iamblichus, in Vita Pythag: defines Wisdom thus,—σοφία, ἡ τῶ οὐν ἐπιστήμης τῆς, ἡ περὶ τὰ καλὰ πρῶτα, καὶ Ἕως, —ἀν μετοχῇ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀν εἶται τις καλὰ. Wisdom is in truth a certain Kind of Science; it is That (Science,) the Objects of which are those Original and Divine Beautys, by partaking of which, other things may be called beauitulous.——The Author of the Life of Pythagoras in Photius thus,—σοφία, ἐπιστήμης τῶν πρῶτων αἰτίων. Wisdom is the Knowledge of the First Causes. Pellenus, in his ἐπιστήμων, or Explication of the Six (old) Definitions of Philosophy, speaks thus concerning Wisdom,—ἐν ἐγένεσι, διηλογοῖ καὶ σοφία ἐγένεσι, δι' ἡς προορίζεται ο θεός. If there is a Providence (in the Divine Being), 'tis manifest, that Wisdom also is (in Him); for thro Wisdom it is, that God provides, (providet,) or views in Himself, before the Generation of Each temporary Being, what is good for such a Being. ——We have made these Citations from Philosophers, who lived in different Ages, and were, all of them, well versed in Plato's Writings, the more fully to confirm our Explication of Plato's Meaning in the Sentence now before us. Hence also we may perceive, on what account Wisdom is here placed before Mind: 'tis because Mind, strictly speaking, is conversant only with First Principles; or rather, those Principles Themselves constitute Mind, and,
and, taken together, are Mind, when Intellecit only is signified by that word: but to the Intellaotion of those Principles Wisdom adds the Knowledge of those Divine Universals, which, together with the Knowledge of them, are derived from those Principles; as the Parmenides will afford Occasion to show. Rightly therefore is it observed by Eustratus, in commenting on the Passage of Aristotle, above cited,—that Intellecit, taken by its self, τὸν κατὰ σοφίαν θείσαν τελεστειον falls short of the Perfection which it hath in Wisdom, where it stands at the Head of Science.—Nothing farther remains on the present Subject, unless it should be thought necessary to justify Plato, in his using the Terms φῶσις and σοφία indifferently, as if they were synonymous; tho only σοφία denotes the Whole of Wisdom, and hath for its Object all eternal Truth; whereas φῶσις signifies at the most nothing more than Moral Wisdom, is peculiar to the Human Species, and regards only what conduces to Human Good in Human Action, and therefore is properly translated into English by the word Prudence. If this Objection should occur to any Man’s Thoughts, it may be obviated, by considering, that when φῶσις is attributed to the Supreme Being, it is the same with σοφία, because God is both Truth its Self, and Good its Self: his Intelleotion of Himself, or his Intellecit in Energy, while he contemplates all Ideas, and all Truths, in the Archetype of Universal Nature, contemplates at the Same time all Good, and knows what is Best for the Great Whole and for every Part of it; and his Outward Action, for ever accompanying his Inward Energy, produceth That Best, and most conducive to the Good of all and every Being, thro all successive Ages.—The learned Porphyry appears to have had the same Notion of those Terms, σοφία and φῶσις, when applied to the Divine Cause of outward Nature. For, in his Treatise de Antro Nympharum, speaking of the Sensible World, he says,—χόσις
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

With the greatest Justice, indeed.

SOCRATES.

But farther; Wisdom and Mind could never be without Soul. But

PROTARCHUS.

ēst φρονίσεως ζεύ καὶ νοημα: (I. rentes) φύσεως ἀποτελέσμα. it is the Effect of the Divine Prudence and of Mental Nature: (meaning the Divine Ideas:) pag: 131, Edit: Rom: and a little afterward, his words are theic,— ἐν ἐξ αὐτοματισμῷ τὸ ἔλον τέτο, καὶ (f. uüë) τύχῃ ἀλόγῳ ἐγένεν γέγονεν: ἀλλὰ φύσεως νοημὰ καὶ σεφίκας ἀποτελέσμα. This Whole (or Universe) was not produced from Automatism, (or Self-Motion,) neither was it the Work of Fortune devoid of Reason; but 'tis the Effect of Intellectual Nature and of Wisdom.

This Sentence strongly militates against the Opinion of those Pseudo-Platonicus, who imagine the account, given of the Creation of the World in Plato’s Timæus, to be Plato’s own Doctrine; gravely taking in a Literal Sense what is no less Poetically there written, tho in looser Numbers, than is the Seventh Book of Milton’s Paradise Lost. — The Formation of Matter from infinite Time past,—a Creation without a Beginning,—an Effect, co-eval with its Cause,—are Things inconceivable to Vulgar Understandings. But no less inconceivable to Such are Eternity — the Being of eternal Mind, and of those pure Objects of Mind, Ideas. — The greatest Part of Mankind cannot apprehend any Mental Object to be real, unless it appears in their Imaginations, invested therein with the Image of some Object of Sense. They have therefore no conception of Eternity, but
but thro' its Image, Time; and of This, only by Portions;—no conception of Ideas, but thro' their Images in Things Sensible;—no conception of Mind its Self, devoid of Body, Bulk, and Figure.—As little can they conceive of Infinity, or of any Infinite Things, One of which is Time. — It is thro' Reason alone, to a Few Persons, who are able in some measure to remove every Sensible Image from their Contemplations, that Eternal Beings are known to be, and even to be the only Things truly knowable, or indubitably certain. And only thro' Reasoning it is, that the Series of Effects, continually produced by those eternal Beings, which are always in Force, (the Divine Mind energizing always within the Subject-Matter of Outward Forms,) is concluded never to have an End.—But of Time, considered as infinite, or of Infinity in general, there is neither an Idea, nor an Image; — no Idea of it is to be found in the nature of Mind; no Image of it is to be framed in the Human Imagination: it is but obscurely knowable to have any Sort of Being at all, thro' Conclusions, remotely thro' rationally drawn from the following Considerations: — The Causes of corporeal Things, being eternal and always the Same, must have always been followed by their Effects; and must for ever continue to be so followed:—All these Effects are produced in Outward Nature, and exist in Time:—of Such, as are temporary and transient, there must have been, and everlastingly must be, a never-failing Succession, if the Same Causes always produce the Same Effects:— and Such, as are permanent, are everlastingly in Motion, a Motion periodical:—these periodical Motions are the Measures of Time to each other, and to all Beings which are transient: — the Periods of their Motions are the larger Parts or Portions of Time; and being visible, become Objects of Imagination:—Imagination can divide these Parts ad infinitum; and borrowing from Mind whatever abstracted or pure Numbers she pleases, can add.
add one Portion of Time to another, and multiply any Portion of it, without End. — Now as Number is Infinite, the best Notion, that can be gathered, of Infinite Time, is thro its Analogy to Infinite Number. But as the Notion of Infinite Number is meerly Negative, and consists in the rejecting of every Bound that can be set to Numbers by the Mind, our best Notion of Time, considered as Infinite, is no better than our Notion of Infinite Number, that is, meerly Negative. Just such another Notion is That of the Infinite First Matter,—a Notion, framed in like manner, by rejecting every Bound that can be set to Sub stance, and every Positive Attribute, except the bare Capacity of receiving some Form or other into any imaginable Portion of it. Another such is our Notion of Infinite Space; for it is acquired by rejecting all Form and all Substance too,—Mind as well as Matter,—from our consideration of it. Hence it may be justly said of Infinite Space, and of Infinite Time also, the Same which Plato says of the First Matter, that 'tis μένων πάνω scarcely credible. Those Persons indeed, who duly consider of these Infinities, Matter, Space, and Time, are, by the sacred Laws of Reasoning, and the Necessity of admitting the truth of rational Conclusions from undeniable Premises, compelled to believe in them, meerly Notional as they are, and Objects of neither Intel lect, nor Reason, nor Sense, nor Imagination; because they are found necessary to the Existence of those Corporeal Forms, both the permanent and the transient, which are the necessary and everlasting Effects of necessary and eternal Causes. But because such Notions, founded on such Considerations, enter into the Heads of None but Speculative Persons, it was deemed proper, by the wise Legislators of antient Ages, to induce the unphilosophical Multitude to a Belief (Such, as they are capable of,) in the Divine Causes of all Things which affect their Senses, by representing those Causes,
as prior in Time to the whole Visible Universe. They assigned therefore to the endless Motion, Change, and Succession of all Bodys whatever, a certain Beginning in Time; and thus rendered the Creation of this ever-moving, ever-changing, and ever-flowing Scene of Things a conceivable Object of Religious Faith.—In the mean time, however, the philosophical Truth, on this Subject, was not withheld from Any, whose natural Genius, favoured by a Liberal Education, and by a competency of external Means, inclined them to the Study of Nature and of simple Truth, regardless of Popular Opinion. Accordingly, Men who professed a Knowledge of Nature, and of the Causes of Natural Things, were not only tolerated by all Wise States, but were even encouraged to assist Others in their prosecuting of these Studys, to fit them the better for a Share in the Government, should they ever be called to it. For a Knowledge of the Truth, undisguised by Fables, was deemed one of the necessary Qualifications of a Governor; because if he knew not the Reason and the real Foundation of Popular Opinions and Public Establishments, he could not know, which of them were proper to be supported, or improved, and which to be corrected, or quite abolished.—Hence arose the Two-fold Doctrine of Those, who were both Legislators and Philosophers, concerning this Point. An Instance of This we have in Orpheus and his Followers. For in those Fragments of the Orphic Theologers, recorded by Proclus, we read an Account of the Origin of Things, very different from that Poetical Tale, (authorised by a Tradition, probably derived from Orpheus Himself,) with which Apollonius of Rhodes feigns Orpheus to have amusèd the Argonautic Mariners. Another Instance is the seeming Difference between the Pythagoreans on this Subject. For Ocellus, in whose Country, which was Lucania, his Brothers of the Italic School had never employed their Skill in Legislation,
PHAILEBUS.

Proposition, teaches, as expressly and plainly as Aristotle Himself does, that Time and temporary Things always were; the World being co-eval with the Principles and Causes of it. On the other hand, Timaeus, a Citizen of Locris, (in which, and in many neighbouring Citys of Italy, Timaratus and other Pythagoreans had instituted Civil Laws,) seconding, in his Treatise πεδίον χωρίς κόσμων concerning the Soul of the World, the established Opinion, that the World was created in Time out of a Chaos of pre-existing Particles of Matter. Perhaps also That illustrious Pythagorean Philosopher and Didactic Poet, Empedocles, at the inconsistency of whose Writings Mr. Harris expresses a very just Surprise, may be reconciled to Himself, if we suppose, that he wrote his Poem πεδίον φύσεως concerning Nature, like Parmenides, for the Use of Philosophers only; and that, like Hesiod, he wrote another Poem, entitled, κοσμοποιία the Creation of the World, (cited by Aristotle in his Physicks, Lib: 2.) suitable to the Taste of the People, and favourable to that Article of their Faith, founded by Orpheus,—the Creation of the World out of a Chaos. For Such a Creation is by all its Advocates supposed to have been gradual, one Part of it after another. —But, whatever was the meaning of Empedocles in his Cosmopoeia, certain it is, that Plato, in his Timeus, delivers not the Sentiments of Socrates. That whole Dialogue is only a copious and elegant Commentary on the above-mentioned Treatise of Timeus the Pythagorean, who is there represented as the principal Speaker, expatiating on his own Doctrine. It is therefore not to be wondered at, that in That Dialogue the Soul of the World is said to be created; and yet that in the present Sentence of the Philebus, which afferts, that "Mind can never be without Soul," the Co-eternity of That Soul with the Divine Mind is evidently implied; for this Sentence is spoken by Socrates. He had, before, shown the Truth of it,

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by
by this Argument;—every animated Body infers an animating Soul; and every Soul, whose Actions and Operations are, all of them, directed wisely for the Good of that Body which it animates, infers a directing Mind within, intelligent of Good, and of the best Means to obtain it for That which is under its Government and Care. So that, to explain the nature of the Universe, according to the Doctrine of Socrates and Plato, we are to begin thus;—Good is in the Mind, as the motive Principle of Mind's Design;—Mind is in the Soul, as the directing Principle of the Soul's Operations;—and Soul is in the Body, as the moving Principle of all the Body's Motions.—But an attentive Reader must have observed, that Socrates divides his Argument in proof of a governing Soul of Nature, in the following remarkable manner;—First, he leads us to the contemplation of it, by considering the External World as One great Body, in which all the Elementary Parts of Nature are united; and afterwards, in the Sentence now before us, he brings back our Thoughts to it again, thro' the consideration of the wise and good Government of that World, and the necessity of supposing a Soul, for That Wisdom and That Goodness to reside in. By this way of arguing,—first, from Body, which is inferior to Soul,—and afterwards, from Mind and Wisdom, which are at the Head of all things,—it should seem, that Socrates considered the Soul of the World, as the intermediate Link, connecting the Divine Mind with Outward Nature. This Opinion was certainly entertained by Those, who, for the wise Ends above mentioned, wrote Poetical Histories of an original Creation of the World at a certain Time, but to endure for ever; and by Those likewise, who framed an Hypothesis, somewhat different, of a periodical Destruction and Renovation of All things alternately for ever. For the Philosophers,
Phereus, who favoured Either of these Systems, very consistently held, that the *Soul of the World* was a *Temporary Being, co-eval* with That *World* which it animates. The Eleaticks also, *'tis probable*, in asserting the *Unity of All things*, considered the *Soul of the World* in the same manner, as the *connecting Medium* between things *intelligible* and things *sensible*. For such seems to be the true Sense of this Verse of Parmenides, cited in Notes to the Banquet, page 114,

'Εν δὲ μέσῳ τῶν, Δαίμων, ἡ πάντα κυβερνα.

where, by using a Relative Pronoun Feminine, we presume that he means ἴ ψυχὴ τὴν ἀρχηγήν τοῦ κόσμου, *the governing Soul of the Universe.* —Agreeably to this Explication, when the same great Philosopher said, τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν ἐν τοῖς ταύτων ἐκεῖ, *that the Soul and the Mind were the Same Thing,* he meant not to confound Sense and Intelligence together, as Democritus did afterwards: he seems to have had the same Meaning with Socrates and Plato, —that *Univerfal Soul* was essentially the Same Being with *Univerfal Mind,* but that, considered with regard to the *Sensible World,* He is the *Animating Soul,* —with regard to the *Intelligible,* he is the *Intelligent Mind.* It should seem also, that Socrates, in proving the Existence of an *Univerfal Soul,* from the beneficial, *salutary,* and restorative Operations of some universal Active Cause in and throughout Nature, —after he had already proved it, in the same way of arguing by *Analogy,* which he had used in proving the Existence of the Four Elements of Nature and their Mixture in One Corporeal World, —took this *Two-fold* way of instructing his Disciples in the true Doctrine of One Divine *Soul of the Universe,* on purpose to prevent their falling into That Error concerning Souls, which perhaps was...
the principal Ground of Polytheism, — the attributing to every Element and to every Compound-Being of Nature, to every Mineral and every Vegetable Form, as well as to every Animal, a Particular Soul, a Soul of its own; intelligent to govern the Corporeal Form which it animates, and concerned for the Interests of that Form; careful to defend it against the Danger to which it is naturally exposed, and studious to heal whatever Mischief it receives from the Violence of mightier Beings. But Socrates, as we have just now seen, ascribes the wonderful Powers, with which all Natural Forms are endued for their own Preservation, to the Wisdom of One Mind, dwelling in One Soul, active thro all Outward Nature. It appears therefore, that, in the Opinion of Socrates, all such Forms of Nature, as show no Signs of their being endued with any Pre-sensation of Danger incident to them, or with any Sense of Pain from Mischiefs befallen them, having no Souls of their own, are acted on immediately by the Great Soul of the Universe; that from His conjoining and assimilating Virtue they receive sufficient Nourishment, just Growth, and the Faculty of propagating their Species; and that from the Providence of His Mind they receive a natural Defensive Armour, innate Strength to bear up against ordinary Oppressions, and Remedy within Themselves against ordinary Maladies.—From this Doctrine it is argued, in the way of Analogy, that all those Beings, which are evidently endued with Sense, but show no Signs of having Reason or any Universal Ideas, — such Beings, as derive from Nature, thro an instinctive Perception of their Make, certain προσοψιμοι, or previous Apprehensions of their native Powers, long before they are able to exert them, — inspired also by Nature with a Dread of their natural Enemies, the first time they see them, and with an Appetite for their natural Food, the
the first time it is offered to any of their Senses, — deriving their Apprehension of future Things contingent, meerly from their Memory of similar Things past, without magnifying or adding to them in their Imaginations, — that such Beings, rightly termed Brute Animals, are under the Rule and Government of the Soul of Nature, in all their Actions, as immediately and as absolutely as the Passive and the Active Elements of Body, and as all Fossil and Vegetable Forms are, in all their Motions. For this Universal Soul, from whom the Particular Souls of all Animals are derived, (and by whose Influence every Animal-Soul is supported,) being full of Providential Wisdom, directs the Energys and the Actions of each Particular Soul, by giving it con-natural Inclinatns and occasional Impulses to energize and act as it ought;—in other words, by exciting in it those Pre-Sensations and Pre-Conceptions, those Appetites, Passions, and Affections, by which alone it is impelled to Action, for the Good of the Body which it animates, and for accomplishing the Ends of Divine Goodness in the formation of that Body. — It is farther argued, from the like Analogy, that those Beings, who are rightly termed Rational Animals, to whose Souls are super-added the Principles of Mind and the Faculty of Reasoning, — altho they derive their Souls, like all other Animals, from the Great Soul Universal, — yet derive their Mental Principles and Rational Facultys immediately from the Mind of that Great Soul, Mind Universal: — that, in consequence of this High Birth of their Nobler Part, they are, by nature, free from an absolute Subjection to the Power of Corporeal Necessity; and that, for the Conduct of their Lives, they are, by nature, committed to the Guidance and Government of their own Reason, as soon as the Seeds of Universal Ideas within them are sufficiently developed, their Minds amply enough expanded, and their Powers of Reasoning matured; — that, till then, during the long
long time of their Infancy and natural Nonage, they are, by nature, and the superintendant Care of Divine Providence, intrusted to the immediate Care and Government of their Parents; and that when this Parental Care is naturally superseded, and they are delivered over to their own free Will, to choose, whether they will subject Themselves and their Actions to the Rule of the inferior Part of their Souls, and to the Dominion of blind Necessity, or whether they will submit to the Laws of their superior Part, whose Government is perfect Freedom, and whose Leading conduct* Such as follow it, (not blindly, but with their Mind's Eye open and clear to see every Step they tread,) to That End which they have in view,—Happiness. For if they make it their Choice to live under the Government of Reason, the Force of their own Reason, too weak of its Self to resist their Passions, (strengthened, as these are, by the subtle Sophistry of Imagination,) is always aided and supported effectually by That Sovereign Reason, That unconquerable Truth, ever present within every Particular Mind: with which Standard-Truth, and unerring Reason, a constant Communication, free and unobstructed, is necessary to prevent any Mind, inhabiting a Human Body, from falling into Error, and mistaking Falsity for Truth; perhaps, to prevent it from finally relinquishing its immediate Seat, the Soul: no less necessary is it, than a constant Communication with the Universal Soul is necessary to preserve any Particular Soul from sickening and drooping, and falling from its Seat, the Body. —— Now, if the above Arguments are valid, and if these Conclusions are rightly drawn, — namely, that neither Intelligence nor Sense, neither Mind nor Soul, is imparted to the simple Elements of Body, nor to Fossils, nor even to Vegetables; and that no Degree of Mind or Reason is imparted to any Animals, known by Us,—to any Compound-Beings, having Souls of their own, or a Principle
Principle of Self-Motion within Themselves,—except to Those of the Human Species;—it may reasonably be concluded farther, that no Portions of the simple Elements, no Fossil nor Vegetable Forms, are capable of receiving or retaining any Sentient Soul within them; and that the Souls of no Brute Animals are capable of receiving or retaining the Principles of Mind and Reason: for the Divine Goodness never witholds from Any of his Creatures any Good, which they are capable of.——The Cause of those Incapacities, which attend the Beings above-mentioned, seems to be the Structure of their Frames. It seems necessary to the Being of every particular Sentient Soul, that it be seated and circulate within a Body, compounded of all the Four Elements. For Fire and Air, the Active Elements, are the only fit Vehicules of the Soul, in her quick and vigorous Motions: Earth and Water, the Passive Elements, are the Receptacles of Fire and Air; none of whose Particles could be detained in any certain Place, otherwise than by Portions of Earth and Water inclosing them. Again; the moist and fluid Element is a necessary Vehicule for Air and Fire, jointly to perform their regular Circuits throughout the Body: the dry and solid Element is necessary to the composition of circulatory Tubes for the conveyance of the Fluid: the hot Element is necessary to preserve the Fluidity of Water from being destroyed by Air: and this cold Element is necessary to cement together the Particles of Earth; (by the Medium, we presume, of Watery Particles, congealed by Cold;) for intense Heat totally dissolves the strongest Cement, made by Air and Water, and destroys all Cohesion. It seems necessary too, that a Body, inhabited by a Sentient Soul, should not only be compounded of all the Four Elements, but should also be organized, for the sake of Motion, as well as of Sensation. For we presume, that Organs of Sense are necessary to Sensation; which Faculty not only would be useless, without the Power of moving towards what is felt agreeable.
able and good to the Sentient Being, but would also be inconvenient, without the Power of moving away from what is felt disagreeable and evil: and these Powers, we presume, they could not have, without having Organs of Motion. Now Fossils, which are by nature fixed within the Earth, and Vegetables, which are therein rooted, being thus denied the Power of Local Motion, have no occasion for Organs necessary to the Exertion of such a Power,—a Power, absolutely necessary to their Well-being, had they Sense. And as to the simple Elements, they are evidently moved only by the Laws of Mechanical Necessity,—Laws, implanted in all Body by the Soul of the Universe, and put in Force continually by that Great Soul Himself. — Thus it appears, that only Animals are so framed, as to be capable of Sentient Soul and Self-Motion, or of the Passions and Appetites, which arise in the Soul from her Sensations, and excite her to all her Outward Actions.—The internal and immediate Organs of Sensation, as well as of Motion, are the Nerves; which have their Origin, All of them, either in the Brain, or in that Production of the Brain, the Spinal Marrow. In these Glandular Parts is secreted from the Blood a Fluid, which is called the Nervous Fluid, because it is conveyed to the External Organs of Sensation, and to Those of Motion, thro' the Nerves; —a Fluid, probably composed of the finest and purest Lymph, and of those Portions of Air and Fire, in which the Animal-Soul immediately is seated, and which are, on that account, not improperly termed Animal-Spirits. The Nerves have their Fibres more elastic, than are the Fibres of any other Parts of the Body; and their Coats more solid, and less porous, than any other Membranes. Their Elasticity perhaps is owing to the Purity of those Particles of Air, which they convey: and their Solidity (which seems necessary to prevent a Lateral Escape of the Fire which they convey,) is perhaps owing to the strong Cement,
Cement, given to all their component Earthy Particles, by those Aerial and Lymphatic Particles together, which the more rapid Igneous leave behind them, there deposited. It seems therefore, that the Sentient Soul, tho seated universally in the Animal Spirits, and carried throughout the Body in the Nervous Fluid, yet hath her Chief Seat, and as it were the Metropolis of her Dominion, in the Head. The Iraefible Part of this Soul, τὸ ἐμοδές τῆς ἀλόγου ὄρχης, is by Timeus (whom Plato follows in his Dialogue of the same Name,) held to have its Central Seat in the Heart: the Ground of which Tenet, we presume, is This; — that to the Cavities of the Heart, as to some great Sea or Receptacle of Waters, all the small Veins, like Rivulets, which in their Progress unite and form large Rivers, are continually transmitting the whole Mass of Blood thro the great Veins; whilst the Arterys, like subterraneous Passages from the Sea, continually convey the Blood again from the Heart to the Capillary Vessels, which are as it were the Fountains of the Venous Blood: now the Motion of the Heart, and consequently of the Blood in all its Vessels, is differently affected by all the Passions of the Soul, but chiefly by those which arise in her from her Sense of present Injuries, Mischiefs, or Misfortunes, or from her Expectation of any such to come, or from her Remembrance of the past.—The Appetitive Part τὸ ἐτιζωματικὸν of the Animal-Soul hath, according to the Doctrine of the same Timeus, the Liver for its Center: — and this Doctrine is, we presume, founded on the following Discoverys in the Animal Oeconomy; — that from the Blood, which is a Mixture of various Humours, that is, of various Combinations of the Four Elements in different Proportions,—Combinations, differently figured, or endued with different Qualities, for the various Purposes of Nature in the Animal, — these Humours are, to serve those Purposes, secreted by different Glands, severally appropriated to the several Secretions:
eretions; — that One of these Glands is the Liver; which is appropriated to the Secretion of the Bile, — a Humour, containing a large Proportion of fixed Fire, combined with a gross muddy Earth; — that the Bile, after its Secretion, is the Soul's principal Instrument in her Work of digesting the Food; — and that, before its Secretion, whilst it circulates in the Blood, but more especially, when Part of what had been secreted is re-absorbed into the Blood, uncorrupted and exalted, it is the chief Stimulus, to excite all the Appetites which are natural. — Thus much seems sufficient to show, from What natural Incapacity it is, that Sentient Soul is communicable only to those Corporeal Beings, in whose compounded and organized Bodies Air and Fire continually circulate together.——What is wanting in the Composition of all known Animals, except in those of the Human Kind, to enable them to partake of Intelle& and Reason; is much more difficult to be discovered. It seems inconceivable indeed in any other way, than by recurring to the very ancient Doctrine, (espoused by Plato in his Epinomis, and by Aristotle in his Treatise de Caelo,) concerning a Fifth Element, finer than the finest of the commonly known Four, and having its proper Place in the Heavens, or Æther; above that Region of Air and Fire, the Atmosphere. But the difficulty quite vanishes, on supposition of the Truth of that Doctrine; the Ætherial Fire being thus distinguished from That Fire, which is One of the Ingredients in all natural Compound-Bodies, either fixed in them as in Fossil, or passing thro' them as in Vegetables from a warm Air, or continually circulating within them as in Animals. —For the Maintainers of this Distinction teach, that, as the Sensitive Soul has her immediate Seat in a Portion of Air and Fire, in like manner the immediate Seat of the Rational Soul of Man is a Portion of universal Æther; and that no other known Animals have, in their composition, any Particles of this
this finest of all the Elementary Bodys, unobstructed and disun-
cumbered: whether it be, because their Blood is too gross, and
the Lymph of it charged with too many Earthy Particles, not
to deprest, clog, or overwhelm a small Quantity of so delicate
a Substance; (for Human Blood is less impure than the Blood
of any Brute Animals;) or whether they want Glands in the
Brain, fine enough to secrete the Ætherial Fluid, and to free it
from the other Elements; or whether it be, that the Mem-
branes of their Vessels in the Brain, however thick they may be,
are yet too porous to prevent the Lateral Escape of it.—
Such of the ancient Philosophers, as admit not of a Fifth
Element, recognizing only Four, hold, that the Two lightest of
them, Air and Fire, are no where pure, but in the Heavens or
Æther; for that, in all the Space between the Heavens and Earth,
they are mixed with Particles of the Two heavier Elements,—
with Vapours arising from the Waters of this Terraqueous Globe,
and with Effluvia from the Earth and all Earthy Bodys.—Ac-
cording to this Account, it should seem, that the Fire of
Heraclitus, and the Stoicks, is no other Element than the Æther
of Plato and Aristotle. These Two Hypotheses are, indeed,
essentially so much alike, that 'tis doubtful, to which of them
Virgil alludes, in the Two following Passages of his Poems:
One, in the Sixth Book of his Æneid; where he imitates Plato
in espousing the Eastern Doctrine of a Purgatory, in which
Human Souls, departed from their Bodys, and not doomed to
Tartarus, are confined,—

.Donec longa dies, per se(o) temporis orbe,
Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
Ætherium sensium, atque aurai simulcisc ignem.

A Paraphrase of which Verses, by way of a Comment there-
on, we have attempted thus,—
Their periodic Time
Till Ages have compleated; and the Stains,
Sunk in the Soul, (when erst in Body plung'd,
She flounder'd in the Mire of earthly Life,)
Now purg'd away, th' ætherial Sense is left
Pure; and the Soul, in pure celestial Fire
Seated, again inhales th' untainted Air
Of Æther.——

The other Passage is in his Fourth Georgick; where, having
produced several Proofs (Signs and Inflances the Poet himself
calls them) of the wonderful Inflances of Bees, he adds,—

His Quidam signis, atque haec exempla secuti,
Effe apibus partem divinae mentis, & haussus
Ætherios dixere:——

Of this Sentence also we have attempted an Explanatory Para-
phrase, as follows,—

Hence 'tis said by Some,
That from pure Æther, Particles of Air
Ætherial, fraught with Mind, on Bees descend.
Thus, as they breathe, their little Beings inhale
Sense Intellectual, of the Mind Divine
A Portion.——

But, as we just now observed, the difference between the Doc-
trine of Plato and That of the Stoicks, concerning the finest of
all Corporeal Substances, seems to have been, like the differences
between their Moral Doctrines, meerly nominal. For the Ele-
ment, peculiarly termed Æther by Plato and Aristotle, (to dif-
tinguish it from the Element of Fire,) was by Heraclitus, (with whom
whom in his Doctrine concerning Nature the Stoic Philosophers agreed,) termed Fire and Æther indifferently; as being, with Him, words of the same Import, when applied to the First corporeal Principle of Things, or, as Aristotle more justly terms it, the First Body. Anaxagoras also is cenured by Aristotle in Meteorolog. L. 1, C. 3. & de Cælo, L. 3, C. 6. for his promiscuous use of the terms Æther and Fire, in speaking of the Heavens; whereas, in all former Ages, they had been rightly distinguished, and applied to different Parts of the Universe.—But, that all these Philosophers had the same Meaning, is put beyond a Doubt by the Doctrine of Chrysippus, a genuine Stoick, on this Point. For Chrysippus, using the word Æther, just as we use the word Sky in English, to signify all that immense Tract of Space, which is (to Us) higher than Our Atmosphere, asserted, in his Treatise concerning Providence, that τὸ καθαρὸς τὸ αἰθέριος the purest Part of Æther was the Seat of τοῦ ἄρχοντος τοῦ κόσμου That which governs in the World, meaning Mind.—The Nature of this fine Substance was generally supposed to be the same with That of Light, and void of all Sensible Qualities; (some or other of which belong to all Bodys beside, to the Elementary, as well as to the Mixt;) for Light, tho’ it gives Visiblity to the External World, its Self is invisible: and the Motion of it was generally held to be swifter than That of the rapid Lightning; for Lightning is a Collection of Fire mixed with Air, let loose from its Confinement in that Region of impure Vapours, the Atmosphere. But the purest Æther was universally deemed to be the Seat of those Beings, who in the Vulgar System of Religion were hailed Gods of the highest Order: whence the Populace readily imagined that the Bodys of these Deities were wholly Luminous; (the Soul or Mind of Each being invested with no other Body, than a Portion of Light or pure Æther;) and readily embraced the Worship of the...
the Celestial Body, as soon as it was proposed to them by those Legislators, who seemed to think, that visible Objects of Religious Worship were the properest for the People. — That the truly Divine Being himself, the Mind Universal, the Father of all those Particular Deities, hath his Capital and Chief Seat τὸν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρωτῷ ζῷαν in the highest Heaven, or purest Æther, was a Doctrine of the most remote Antiquity, and universally received; as we are assured by the ancient Writer of the Treatise περὶ θέου, who (if he was not Aristotle Himself) followed in this Point Aristotle’s Judgment. See his Treatise de Caelo, L. 1, C. 3. And we are told by Porphyry, in Vitæ Pythag: pag. 41, Edit. Kußler: that Pythagoras embraced this Doctrine of the Persian Magi, which he had learnt from them,—τῷ ζῷῳ (for the word παρα, which precedes, ought to be omitted,)—ἐσκέται τῷ μὲν σώμα φωτι, τῷ δὲ φυσικ ἀληθείᾳ —that the Supreme Being has, for his Body as it were, the Light; and for his Soul, Truth. — But farther; — the pure Æther was supposed by the Ancients not only to be the Abode of Celestial Beings, but to be also the Native Place of all Rational Souls whatever. See Note 74 to this Dialogue. Indeed on no other Foundation, than Such an Hypothesis, could have been rationally built many ancient Opinions, almost universally received, and remaining to this day; — Some, concerning the Lapse, or the Descent of Rational Souls from Heaven into Human Bodies; (to account for which Degeneracy, many Allegorical Fables, and Mystic Parables, were of old spread amongst the Eastern Nations;) — concerning the Return also of the Human Soul, after its Departure from this Earthly Body, and travelling thro divers Regions or States of Purification, to her native Country, the pure Æther; — Others, agreeable to the Doctrine of the Stoicks, as well as to That of Plato, concerning a distinct and separate Existence of the Souls of wise and good Men,
PHILEBUS.

Men, until a certain Period of Time, when they will have attained to such a degree of Wisdom and inherent Virtue, as may qualify them for being essentially and substantially united to the Universal and Divine Mind. — But Proofs of the near Neighbourhood between the Philosophers of the Porch and Those of the Academy, in their Notions of Man's Rational Soul, have their proper Place in Notes on the Phædrus and the Phædo; the Subject of Both which Dialogues is the Superior Soul of Man. Such Reafonings belong not immediately to Annotations on the Philebus; the Subject of which is much more Divine,—the Mind and Soul of the whole Universe. However, since in the First Part of this Dialogue, the Frame of Man's Nature is divided into its Two most General constituent Parts, Body and Soul, — his Body, analysed, and the Elements of it shown to be the Same with the Elements of all Corporeal Nature,—his Soul distinguished into Sensitive and Intellectual,—the former of which he has in common with Brute Animals,—the latter, His sole Prerogative, no Brute Animal being able to receive and to retain it;—since also it appears, that the Sensitive Soul is seated in Air and Fire; and the Intellectual Soul, in an Ætherial Body, a Portion of Universal Æther; — it may be pertinent in this place to observe, on the Subject of these Two Souls, (evidently found to be thus distinct,) that, tho they are united together in the upper Part of Man's Body, his Head, their common Mansion, (agreeably to the Notions and perhaps also to the Consciences of all Mankind, as well as to the Doctrine of Timæus,) yet, at the Dissolution of this Compound-Body, when all the Elementary Parts of it return to their several universal Elements, 'tis highly probable, that the Rational Soul and the Sensitive Soul separate again; unless a Man's Reason and Intelle&ita;lt;e; were, before that time, quite absorbed in Sensé; and the Rational Soul sunk and

C c c lost
386 PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

By no means.

SOCRATES.

You will affirm then, that in the nature of Jupiter there is a Kingly Soul and a Kingly Mind, throu

lost in the meer Animal; for that, otherwise, Each Soul would be carried by Nature to her Native Place.

That is,—in the internal nature of the Universe. — In the Orphic Verses, the name of Jupiter is sometimes given to the Whole Universe,—including both Worlds, τὸν ῥωτὸν καὶ τὸν αἰώνιον the Intelligible and the Sensible;—including all Causes and all Effects;—including the First Principles of Things, Mind and Matter, αἰτικῶν υὸν καὶ μορφῶν the (actually) Indivisible Essence and the (actually) Divisible;—and including the immediate Principles, Bound and Infinite, together with τὸ Κύριον the Mixture of them Both.—But generally in those Verses, the Term Jupiter is restrained to signify the Mind, Soul, and Life of the Universe; or, in other words, the Forming Form Universal, acting with Intelligence. And accordingly, the Corporeal World is there styled Ζωῆς σῶμα the Body of Jupiter, and Ἰδων βασιλείαν the Kingly Body. ——The Verses, termed Orphic, — as containing the Traditional Doctrine of Orpheus, and as being accommodated to those Religious Mysteries, of which He was the Founder, — obtained so great an Authority throughout Greece, that the Name of Jupiter was received and used in the same Meaning, which it bore in those Verses, by all the philosophical and learned Poets of that Country. Even when they personify the Supream Being, and represent him as some Particular Deity, by placing his Throne in Heaven, —
tho the Power of Cause; and that to the other Gods belong other Excellencys, whatever they are,

where he over-looks, inspects into, and governs All things,—they draw this representation from the Analogy between the Divine Mind and the Human. For the Mind, or Rational Soul, of Man, is universally deemed to be seated in the Head; where it takes cognizance of all things within reach of the Senses; and from whence it directs and rules the Motions of every Member of the Body.—Nor did only the philosophic Poets give the name of Jupiter (not, like the Vulgar, to an imaginary Being, whom they supposed to be thundering in his Wrath, when they heard Thunder in the Air, but) to the true God,—the Creator and Governor of All things, — the Fountain of all Intelligence, Sense, and Life:—even the best Philosophers sometimes gave him the same poetical and popular Name. Of This we have an Instance, now before us, in Socrates, recorded here by Plato: and the Authority of Seneca we deem sufficient to vouch for all the rest. For of all these Seneca thus writes, in Natural: Quæst: Lib: 2, C. 45.—Sapientissimi viri — eundem, quem nos, Jovem intelligunt; custodem rectoremque Universi, animum ac spiritum; mundani hujus operis dominum & artificem; cui nomen omne convenit. Vis illum Fatum vocare? non errabis: Hic est, ex quo suspenfa sunt omnia; caufa caufarum. Vis illum Providentiam dicere? recte dices: Est enim, cujus consilio huic mundo providetur; ut inconfusus eat, & actus suos explicet. Vis illum Naturam vocare? non peccabis: Est enim, ex quo nata sunt omnia; cujus spiritu vivimus. Vis illum vocare Mundum? non falleris: Ipse enim est totum quod vides; totus suis partibus inditus, & se sustinens vi suâ. —— Compare this Passage with another of the same Writer, in his Treatise de Beneficiis. L. 4, C. 7.

C c c 2
by which their Deitys love to be distinguished, and from which they delight in taking their respective Denominations.

Protarchus.

Certainly I shall.

Socrates.

The Discourse, we have now had together on this Subject, O Protarchus! think it not idle, and to no Purpose. For it supports That Doctrine of our Ancestors, that the Universe is for ever governed by Mind.

Protarchus.

Indeed it does.

Socrates.

And besides, it has furnished us with an Answer to My Question,—to What Sort of Being Mind is to be referred; in making it appear, that Mind is allied to That, which we said was the Cause of All things, One of our Four Sorts of Being. For now at length you plainly have our Answer.

Protarchus.

I have; and a very full and sufficient Answer it is: but I was not aware, What you were about.
Socrates.

A Man’s attention to serious Studys, O Protarchus! is sometimes, you know, relaxed by Amusements "233.

Protarchus.

Politely said.

"233 In the Greek, — ὢ παίζει, Play or Sport. — For Socrates, with his accustomed Irony, shunning the invidious Character of a great Philosopher, is pleased to term his Disquisition concerning the Divine Nature: and thus he makes, at the same time, a polite Apology for Protarchus, to prevent the young Gentleman from being ashamed of his not discovering the Design of Socrates in that Disquisition. — Compare also what Socrates says in the Middle of the Page, immediately preceding This, with what he said before in Page 325. — And perhaps this present Turn in the Discourse of Socrates, from the Serious and the Grave, at once to the Easy, the Familiar and Jocose, is designed by him to recreate the Minds of Protarchus and his other Auditors, by giving them an occasion to unbend a little the Strictness of their Attention: — for, as Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, observes, ἄνατανε ἐν τούτῳ ὃ παίζει, Play serves as an Interval of Rest (from Labour).—In fact, if this whole Dialogue be supposed entirely fictitious, the present Turn, at the same time that 'tis quite agreeable to the usual manner of Socrates in conversation with his Friends, is contrived by Plato, according to his consummate Art in this Kind of Composition, to refresh the Minds and relax the Attention of his Readers, before they enter on the Second Argumentative Part of the Dialogue: for nothing now remains of the First Part, but to sum up the Capital Doctrines of it, in a brief Recital of the Two Conclusive Propositions, therein proved.
And thus, my Friend! to Which Sort of Being Mind belongs, and What Power it is possessed of, has been now shown tolerably well for the present.

It has indeed.

And to Which Sort also belongs Pleasure, appeared before.

Very true.

Concerning these Two then, let us remember these Conclusions;—that Mind is allied to Cause; and is as it were congenial with it: — and that Pleasure is infinite in her own nature; and belongs to That Sort of Being, which, of it Self, neither has, nor ever will have in it, either a Beginning, or a Middle, or an End.

We shall not fail to remember them Both.
PHILEBUS,
A
DIALOGUE
CONCERNING
THE CHIEF GOOD OF MAN.

THE SECOND PART.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY R. HETT;
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MDCCCLXXX.
[PRICE THIRTEEN SHILLINGS.]
Socrates.

Now we ought to consider next, in Which Sort of Being, Either of those Two Things, Intelligence and Pleasure, is found to have a Seat; and in what State or Condition those Beings must be, in whom Either of them is produced, at the time of its Production. And first in the case of Pleasure: for as we inquired, to which Sort of Being She belonged, before we considered, of which Sort was Mind; so with regard to the Points also, now proposed, She is the first to be examined. But separately from the consideration of Pain, we should never be able fully to explore the nature of Pleasure.

Protarchus.

Well; if we are to proceed in this way, let us then in this way proceed.

Cornarius and Stephens, Both of them, perceived the Greek of this Sentence to be erroneous. But the Emendations, proposed by Them, appear insufficient. Ficinus's Translation from the Florentine M.S. helps to restore the right Reading thus;—

Cornarius and Stephens, Both of them, perceived the Greek of this Sentence to be erroneous. But the Emendations, proposed by Them, appear insufficient. Ficinus's Translation from the Florentine M.S. helps to restore the right Reading thus;—

In the Edition of Plato by Aldus, and in That also by Stephens, this Sentence, by a strange Mistake, is printed as if it were spoken by Socrates.
Socrates.

Are You of the same Opinion with Me, concerning their Rise and Production?

Protarchus.

What Opinion is That?

Socrates.

Pain and Pleasure appear to Me, Both of them, to arise, according to nature, in the Middle Sort of Being.

Protarchus.

In the Greek,—κοινός, Common. But this attributive Term, in English, is never applied to any Thing, considered as between Two other Things, and partaking of them Both; which is the case of that Sort of Beings, meant in the present Passage. In a Passage before, where the same Word κοινός occurred in the same Sense it has in This, it was rendered into English by the Term, Compound; and in a Passage prior to That, the Term, Commixture, was chosen to represent κοινωνία in the Greek: in all the other Passages on this Subject, Plato useth the Terms μικτόν or μειρυκένον, and μίξις.—Now it is easy enough to perceive, that Bounds, set to Things which are infinite of themselves, are together with (or as it were mixed with) those Infinites. But the Terms, κοινός, and κοινωνία, Common, and Communication or Communion, when applied to these Mixt Beings, seem to require some explanation. — By those Terms then it is here signified, as we apprehend, that all such
such Beings, all Natural and Artificial Things, partake of Form, and partake also of Matter:—that, on the one hand, Form is derived to them from Mind;—superficial Form, derived to the Works and Performances of Art, from the Minds of Human Artists;—internal and essential Form, derived to the Works and Operations of Nature, from the Divine Mind, for ever forming or reforming Nature's Materials, the Substance of all Natural Beings:—and that, on the other hand, the Substance of all External Beings whatever, the Substratum of their Forms, the Subject-Matter of Formation both to Nature and to Art, is derived from the First Infinite, the common Matter of them all.—It seems also to be implied in those Terms, χωρίς and καταπλάσια, that the Elements (or Elementary Forms) of Nature have for their immediate Subject this First or fundamental Matter, and communicate with it continually: as it is certain, that they do; for they would not else be transmutable directly into each other:—that Such of the Works of Nature, as are compounded of the Four Lower Elements, receive from these Elements the first Seeds of their Being; and that Particles of their Substance are continually departing from them into these Elements; from whence they receive a continual accession of fresh Particles in their turn; thus keeping up a constant mutual Communication:—that, of these Compound-Beings, Such, as have Sentient Souls, render them up, at their Death, to the great Soul Universal, from whom they at first received them;—and that, from the time of their Birth to the time of their Death, nothing, but His continued Communication with them, by means of the Active Elements, enables them to retain those Souls of theirs, or to live.—On this Point, we farther thus argue from Analogy; that, of these Sentient Beings, Such as have Mind and Reason superadded to their Souls, by the Divine Mind immediately, preserve That their Rational Part, only by maintain-
ing its **Union** and **Communion** with its immediate Sire, — who Himself is **Right Reason** and **Truth**, The supremely **Fair** and the
sovereignly **Good**, — so as to receive from him his continual
Influence and Aid: for that 'tis impossible for the Mind of
Man, or Human Reason, otherwise to be preserved in a sound
State: wanting its sole Support, of necessity it must become
contracted, vitiated and corrupted, a Slave to the Passions
of its Partner; until finally, having lost all its govern-
ing, comprehending, and uniting Power, the **Unity** of its
own Being be destroyed, and for ever lost in **Multitude**. ——But
beside this **Vital Intercourse** and **Communication** between all the
Compound-**Beings** of Nature, on one side, — and those **Elements**,
from which they derive their component Parts, on the other side; — and besides the **Continuity**, throughout the Universe, of
the **First Matter**, the **Substratum** of all external Forms, thro
which **Continuity** the **Vital Intercourse** between them is main-
tained; — there is also an **Occasional Correspondence**, either casual
or voluntary, carried on, thro the **Continuity** of the **Elements**,
between the **Senses** of all **Sensitive** Beings, on one side, — and
the **Qualities** or **Powers** of the **Elements**, simple or combined, on
the other side; — from which arise actual **Sensations**, either plea-
surable or painful, in those Sensitive Beings. —— This **Corre-
spondence** is divided into **Five Branches**, according to the num-
ber of the outward **Senses**, and the number of the **Elements** of
outward Nature. — The **Sense of Seeing**, by the means of **Light
within the Eye**, which is the **Organ** of that **Sense**, corresponds
with the **Light without**; thro the **Continuity** of which Lucid
Element, reaching to the inmost Membrane of the Eye, the
Soul can take cognizance of Compound-**Bodys** at distance from
her own, as to their **Colour**, **Figure**, and **Magnitude**. —— The **Sense
of Hearing**, by means of **Air within the Ear**, which is the
Organ of that **Sense**, corresponds with the **Air without**, the
only
only Vehicle of Voice and of all other Sounds; thro the Continuity of which Elementary Air, reaching to the Membranes of the Ear, the Soul receives Notice of Vocal and other Sonorous Beings, afar off as well as near. — The Sense of Smell, by means of the Igneous or Æthereal Fluid, contained in the Nervous Membranes of the Nose, which is the Organ of that Sense, corresponds with the same Fluid without: for this Element flows in a continual Stream from Bodys which emit many Particles of it, combined with Particles of the other Elements, (Effluvia from the same Bodys,) and reaches home to that Organ of the Smell. — The Sense of Taste, by means of the Moiſture, supplied plentifully from the Blood to the Organs of Taste within the Mouth, corresponds with the Humid Element in Exterior Things, whenever any of these Things are applied immediately to those Organs. For Particles of all the Lower Elements being intimately combined together in every Compound-Body, the Soul, by means of the Humid Element, is sensible of the Hot or the Cold, if either of these Elements hath the ascendance over its Contrary in the Composition. By the Degree of Moiſture therein, the Soul perceives, how much it partakes of the Dry Element. And, by the means also of the Moiſture, she perceives Such of those Qualities of the Elements combined, called Secondary Qualities, as affect the Sense of Taste. — The Sense of Feeling, by means of the Solid or Earthy Part of our Frame, corresponds with the Dry Element of Earth in all exterior Solid Bodys, whenever any of these are applied immediately to any Membranous Part of our own Body, whether an inward Part, as the Coats of the Stomach, or outward, as the Skin. For only by the Degree of Drynesſ or Solidity, felt by the Soul in those Mixt Bodys, which are in Contact with her own, is the sensible, in what Degree they partake of the Moiſt Element: only by the Contraction or Dilatation of some Membranous Part of her
own Body, is the Soul sensible of either Cold or Heat, whether in Things outwardly or inwardly applied to it, or in the Atmosphere immediately surrounding it: and only by the different Effects, wrought in some Membrane, by the Appulse or Application of different Exterior Bodys, is the Soul sensible of their Roughness, or Hardness, or any other of their Secondary Qualitys, which affect the Sense of Feeling.——This whole Correspondence between the Five Elements, simple or combined, and our Five Animal-Senses, by means of the Membranous Organs of these Senses, is as it were a Commerce with foreign Countrys, from whence the Commoditys of these Countries are conveyed to our own Ports. For, as all the Membranes of the Body are more or less replete with Nerves, the Sentient Soul, whose immediate Seat is the Æthereal Fluid in the Nerves, feels and perceives, thro these Nervous Membranes, What exterior Things are benign and friendly to her Body, and What are mischievous and hostile.——A more intimate and immediate Correspondence, without the intervention of Exterior Bodys, like a Home-Trade without newly-arrived Imports from abroad, is carried on between Soul and Soul in our own Species. The Passions and Affections of the Soul are communicated from one Person to another, thro inarticulate Sounds, and thro the visible Impressions, unavoidably and naturally made by those Passions and Affections, on the Countenance, Gestures, and Behaviour, of the Party first impassioned or affected. Sentiments, Notions, and Opinions, are communicated from one Person to another, thro the winged Conveyance by Words, understood in the same Sense by the Speaker and the Hearer. Every Art also, and every Particular Science, may be and often is communicated from one Mind to another, the same way; and from the Writer also to the Reader.——Now in all this interior Commerce, excepting That of the Sciences, it may be observed, that the Articles of it, as they are derived from Things the Nature of which is infinite, are Themselves also infinite;
infinite; and that Bounds are set to them only by Mind,—the Mind of the Communicator, the Mind of the Participant, or the Minds of Both, according to the degree of their Knowledge, their Wisdom, and their Virtue.—So that thro' Sympathy, mutual Affection, and the Intercourse of social Conversation, or by the Medium of Writings, That Mixture of the Infinite with Bound, which is in Each particular Soul and Mind, becomes common to Two or to Many: and thus a Community of Souls and Minds, a perfect Pythagorean Friendship, may be formed, and extended to as many Persons, as have All of them equally, a Social Sense of Things, and a Delight in communicating;—All of them, Sentiments agreeable to Human Nature, the Nature, common to all Men;—and Notions agreeable to that Divine Reason, of which all Men naturally partake.— For it is the natural Perfection of all Particular Minds, to hold a Communion, the most intimate and the most immediate, with the Sovereign Mind, the Parent of their Beings; who, as he is Truth its Self, is the out-radiating Centre of Union to all Minds: as he is also Good its Self, amply sufficient for all Beings, in Him the Desires of all Such, as know what is True Good, meet, concetere, and unite: and as he is the Universal Soul, the combining Principle to all the Beings of Nature, he inspires the Spirit of Communion, Concord, and Amity, into the Souls of all Rational Beings, who are not fully pre-posessed with the Contrary Spirit, That of Selfishness, of Discord and Enmity, but are open to receive That which is Divine or Godlike.—Thus it appears, that Man, who is of all Compound-Beings the most compounded, and to whom Socrates, in speaking of this Third Sort of Being, principally had a View, has Communication, remote or near, mediate or immediate, with all external and internal Nature. His Body, being compounded of the Elements of Outward Nature, communicates with the Infinity of those Elements,—with the Infinity of the Qualities and Powers.
Powers of all the Mixt Bodys and Compositions which surround him,—and with the Infinity of the Common Matter of them all. His Mind, if he studys to improve this nobler Part of his Being, by pure Science, abstracting his Ideas from the Images of things Sensible,—or, in other words, removing these Images from his Ideas,—converses with those Eternal Monads, those Original Numbers and Proportions, which set Bounds to all the Infinites in the Compound-Beings of Nature. And his whole Soul, being partly Sensitive and partly Rational, holds as it were a Converse, and feels as it were a Sympathy, with all Things, in which, (as in her Self,) the Infinites receive Bound and Form, Number and Measure. She delights to dwell with Symmetry in Buildings, Rythm in Motions, and Harmony in Sounds: and thro intimate and long Converse with These, she acquires the Art of giving to the like Infinites the like beautiful, graceful, and captivating Forms. If, after a thorow acquaintance with her own Body, she chooses to make This the Subject of her Art, she co-operates with the Great Soul of Nature, in regulating and harmonising the discordant Humours of that Body; the Irregularities of which Humours, in Kind as well as in Degree, are infinite. And if, after a thorow acquaintance with her own Nature, she makes her Self the Subject of her Art, she co-operates with the Supream all-harmonising Mind, the great Physician of Souls, in effecting Harmony between all her Parts, and in procuring Health and Soundness to her whole Frame.—Thus have we endeavoured to explain the Attributive Term xωρ, Common, as here applied to all Beings sensible of Pain and Pleasure; but particularly applicable to Man; and, as we presume, meant by Socrates to be so applied: for only Man has Communion with All things, whether Sensible or Intelligible; and only in the best and most perfect State of Man's Being, all the Infinites, as well those in his Soul, as those in his Body, meet with their proper and just Bounds.
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Remind us, Friend Socrates! which of the Sorts of Being, mentioned before, is meant by the term Middle 227.

Socrates.

What you desire, young Gentleman! shall be done, —as far as My Power reaches 228.

PROTARCHUS.

227 Socrates had before explained, what he meant by the Term, Mixt, when applied to his Third Sort of Being; and Protarchus was quite satisfied with that explanation. It seems therefore, that nothing but the Term, κωντων, could puzzle him, or make him at a Loss for the Meaning of Socrates, at this time. See from Page 54 to Page 60 inclusive.

228 'Tis observable, that Socrates, in this Reply, seems uncertain, whether he was able, or not, to explain to Protarchus the nature of this Third Sort of Being; and yet, that he had, just before, without any hesitation, difficulty, or ill success, undertaken the Office of Expounder on this Subject. The Thing, to be explained, is the very Same: the only Difference lies in the changing of the Term, Mixt, for the Term, κωντων, Common. We are therefore to suppose, that Socrates deemed Protarchus incapable of apprehending the Philosophic Sense of the Word, κωντων. Indeed, as this Young Gentleman had not been initiated in the Doctrine, by which alone That Sense of the Word could be explained, to Him it was not in the Philosopher's Power to explain it. None but his own Disciples, who were his constant Auditors, were able fully and clearly to apprehend his Meaning in this Expression: the rest of his present Audience, how-
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

Fairly said.

Socrates.

By the Middle Sort of Being then, we are to understand That, which, in recounting the Four Sorts, we reckoned as Third.

Protarchus.

That, which you mentioned next after Both the Infinite and Bound:—That in which you ranked Health, and also, as I think, Harmony 229.

Socrates.

ever, and among them Protarchus, might be set on thinking, afterwards when alone, What he could mean by the Term, οὐσία, on this occasion.

229 Man, and his Chief Good, Moral Virtue, are not only the Subjects of this whole Dialogue, (as in the Argument is endeavoured to be shewn,)—but they are also, (amongst the Multitude of Things, in which Infinity and Bound are mixed together,) the ultimate Objects of our Author's View, in delineating his Third Sort of Being. It is indeed only with a View to Man, to Human Virtue, and to Human Good, that he makes a Division of Being into Kinds or Sorts. And it seems, that Health and Harmony are here chosen for Instances of the Nature of this Third Sort of Being, because Health and Harmony in the whole Human Soul are the first, the internal and immediate, Effects of Moral Virtue. See also the latter Part of Note 226. ——

Aldus and Stephens, in their Editions of our Author, and Bembo
Socrates.

Perfectly right. Now give me all possible Attention.

Protarchus.

Only speak.

Socrates.

I say then, that whenever the Harmony in the Frame of any Animal is broken, a Breach is then made in its Constitution, and at the same time Rise is given to Pains.

Protarchus.

You say what is highly probable.

Socrates.

But when the Harmony is restored, and the Breach is healed, we should say, that then Pleasure is produced: if Points of so great Importance may be dispatched at once in so few Words.

Protarchus.

In my Opinion, O Socrates! you say what is very true: but let us try, if we can shew these Truths in a Light still clearer.

In his Translation, ascribe the Speech, now before us, to Socrates: but the Basil Editions agree with Ficinus and Cornarius, in restoring it to Protarchus, the right Owner; as they likewise do, in transferring the two next words,—"Perfectly "right,"—from Protarchus to Socrates, in whose Mouth alone those words are, in this place, proper.

Socrates.
Socrates.

Are not such Things, as ordinarily happen, and are manifest to us All, the most easy to be understood?

Protarchus.

What Things do you mean?

Socrates.

Want of Food makes a Breach in the Animal-System; and at the same time gives the Pain of Hunger.

Protarchus.

True.

Socrates.

And Food, in filling up the Breach again, gives a Pleasure.

Protarchus.

Right.

Socrates.

Want of Drink also, interrupting the Circulation of the Blood and Humours, brings on us Corruption, together with the Pain of Thirst: but the Virtue of a Liquid, in moistening and replenishing the Parts dried up, yields a Pleasure. In like manner, preternatural suffocating Heat, in dissolving the Texture of the Parts, gives a Painful Sensation: but a Cooling again, a Refreshment agreeable to Nature, affects us with a Sense of Pleasure.

Protarchus.
Protarchus.

Most certainly.

Socrates.

And the Concretion of the Animal-Humours thro Cold, contrary to their Nature, occasions Pain: but a Return to their pristine state of Fluidity, and a Restoring of the natural Circulation, produce Pleasure. See then, whether you think this general Account of the matter not amiss, concerning That Sort of Being which I said was composed of Infinite and Bound,—that, when by nature any Beings of that Sort become animated with Soul, their Passage into Corruption, or a total Dissolution, is accompanied with Pain; and their Entrance into Existence, the Assembling of all those Particles which compose the nature of such a Being, is attended with a Sense of Pleasure.

Protarchus.

I admit your Account of this whole matter; for as it appears to Me, it bears on it the Stamp of Truth 230.

Socrates.

These Sensations then, which affect the Soul by means only of the Body, let us consider as One Species of Pain and Pleasure.

230 As it corresponds with Nature and Experience.
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.
Be it so.

Socrates.
Consider now the Feelings of the Soul her Self, in the Expectation of such a Pain or of such a Pleasure,—antecedent to the Pleasure expected, an agreeable Feeling of Hope and Alacrity,—antecedent to the Pain expected, the Uneasiness of Fear.

Protarchus.
This is indeed a different Species of Pleasure and Pain, independant of the Body, and produced in the Soul her Self thro Expectation.

Socrates.
You apprehend the matter rightly. Now the consideration of these Feelings of Pain and Pleasure, which immediately affect the Soul her Self, (and seem to be produced in her, Each of them, unmixed and genuine 231,) will, as I imagine, clear up that Doubt concerning Pleasure,—whether the whole Kind be eligible,—or whether a particular Species of it be the proper Object of our Choice 232.—And in the latter case, Pleasure and Pain, (in general,) like Heat and Cold,

231 That is,—Pleasure without Pain, and Pain without Pleasure.
232 Meaning That Pleasure which is pure and unmixed with Pain.
and all other things of this Sort \(^{333}\), will deserve sometimes to be embraced, and at other times to be rejected; as not being good in themselves, but admitting the nature of Good \(^{334}\) to be super-added to them only at some times \(^{335}\), and Some of them only \(^{336}\).

**Protarchus.**

You are perfectly in the right. It must be in some such way as This, that we ought to investigate the Things we are in pursuit of \(^{337}\).

**Socrates.**

If then what we agreed in be true,—that Animal-Bodys feel Pain, when any thing befalls them tend-

\(^{333}\) That is,—such **Qualitys** and **Powers** of things corporeal, as, when these things are applied to Sensitive Beings, raise in them Sensations, different and even contrary in Kind.

\(^{334}\) In What the nature of Good consists, and What are its proper and constant **Attributes**, we learn from the latter Part of this Dialogue.

\(^{335}\) That is,—on certain occasions, when they tend to the production, preservation, or recovery of Life, Health, or Strength.

\(^{336}\) What Sorts and Degrees of Pleasure, strictly and properly so called, are at all times **incompatible** with the Enjoyment of true Good, 'tis the chief Object of this Second Part of the Dialogue, to show.

\(^{337}\) See before, in Page 391.
ing to their Destruction, — Pleasure, when they are using the means of their Preservation, — let us now consider, what State or Condition every Animal is in, when it is neither suffering aught that tends to its Destruction, nor is engaged in any action, or in the midst of any circumstances, tending to its Preservation. Give your earnest attention to this Point; and say, whether it is entirely necessary, or not, that every Animal at that time should feel neither Pain nor Pleasure, in any degree, great or small.

Protarchus.

It is quite necessary.

Socrates.

Besides the Condition then of an Animal delighted, — and besides the opposite Condition of it under Uneasiness, — is not this a different, a Third, State or Condition of an Animal?

Protarchus.

Without dispute.

Socrates.

Be careful then to remember this Judgment of ours. For, on the remembering of it, or not, greatly will depend our Judgment, concerning the nature of Pleasure.
Pleasure. But, to go through with this Point, let us, if you please, add a short Sentence more.

Protarchus.

Say What.

Socrates.

You know, nothing hinders a Man, who prefers the Life of Wisdom, from living all his Life in that State.

Protarchus.

In the State, do you mean of neither Pleasure nor Uneasiness?

Socrates.

I do: for, when we compared together the different Lives, it was supposed, that whoever should choose the Life of Mind and Wisdom, was not to have Pleasure either in a great or in a small degree.

238 Stephens, in the Marginal Notes to his fine Edition, too rashly rejects the Preposition περὶ in this Sentence; not considering that it governs the Participles διαφασμεών and ἀρασομεὼν, tho it be placed after them: it should therefore be accented thus,—περὶ,—as it is in the Aldine and Basil Editions: a Comma should also be subjoined to it, in the Pointing.

239 See again the Passage, referred to in Note 237.

240 For he is free from the Sensations both of Pain and Pleasure; Either of which, during the continuance of it, is a Hindrance to the Energys of the Mind, the Mind's only Enjoyments.

Protarchus.
PROTARCHUS.

That was the Supposition.

SOCRATES.

He must live therefore such a Life. And perhaps it is by no means absurd, to deem That Life to be of all Lives the most Godlike.

PROTARCHUS.

It is not indeed probable, that the Gods feel either the pleasurable Sensation, or its Opposite.

SOCRATES.

Highly indeed is it improbable. For neither of them is consistent with the Divine Nature. But we shall consider farther of this Point afterwards, if it should appear to be of any service to Our Argu-

See before, in Page 210. In the Greek, the first Words of this Sentence of Socrates, and the first Word also of the next Sentence, spoken by Protarchus, ought for the future to be printed thus, — Ὁξῆν. — and not Ὁξῆν. — The wrong Accentuation of these Passages, in all the Editions, seems owing to the error of Ficinus, who mistook Both the Sentences for Interrogations: and the Mistakes are continued by Gryneus. Serranus’s Translation is guilty of the same Mistakes: but in those of Cornarius, Bembo, and Grou, they are corrected.
ment; and shall apply it to the Purpose of winning the Second Prize for Mind, though we should not be able to make use of it so as to win for her the First. ²⁴².

Protarchus.

Very justly said.

Socrates.

Now That Species of Pleasure, which we said is proper to the Soul her Self, is all produced in her by means of Memory.

Protarchus.

How so?

Socrates.

But, before we consider of this Point, I think we should premise some account of Memory, What it is: and still prior to an account of Memory, some mention too, methinks, ought to be made of Sense; if we are to have this Subject appear tolerably plain to us ²⁴³.

Protarchus.

Explain your Meaning.

²⁴² In the estimating of Human Goods.

²⁴³ The Greek of this Passage, it is presumed, ought to be read thus,—επεξ μέλλειν ταύτα ἥμισυ ν.τ.λ.
Socrates.

Of those things, which are incident to our Body in every Part, coming from all Quarters around us, and affecting us in various ways,—Some spend all their Force upon the Body, without penetrating to the Soul, leaving This entirely untouched and free;—Others extend their Power thro' the Soul, as well as thro' the Body; and Some of this latter Sort excite a vehement Agitation in them Both, jointly and severally. Do you admit This?

Protarchus.

Be it admitted.

Socrates.

If we should say of those Things, the Power of which is confined to the Body, and reaches not the

Such as, for instance, a Temperate Air immediately surrounding us, inhaled in every Breath, and entering at every Pore, without our feeling it,—if our Bodys happen to be in the same Temperament, that is, in a Medium between Hot and Cold.—Such also is the Nutrimental Part of our Food, when, after it has been converted into Chyle, and mixed with the Blood, it is actually employed in nourishing every Part of our Bodys, in augmenting and strengthening the Young, in maintaining the Bulk and Vigour of the Mature, and in rendering the Decays of old Age slow and imperceptible.

Soul,
Soul, that the Soul is deprived of knowing them; but of other things which befall us, and have a Power to pervade both the Body and the Soul, that of These the Soul hath the Knowledge; should we not thus say what is most true?

Protarchus.

Without dispute.

Socrates.

But when I say, that the Soul is deprived of knowing the former Sort, do not suppose my Meaning to...

245 In the Greek—τὸν ἅμα τὴν ἀναξάτων—that the Soul hath not the Knowledge (or Perception) of them.—In what follows, the Noun ὁμηρ. Oblivion is supposed to have been derived from ἀληθεία, the Preterit Tense of the Verb ἀναξάτων, (or rather of the obsolete Verb ἀναξωτεύονται).—To preserve the Allusion, taken from this supposed Etymology, we have been obliged to vary a little from the simple and just Translation above given.—But we can imagine no reason, why Socrates here makes such an Allusion, (since it is of no service to his present Argumentation,) unless he meant by it to remind his Disciples, who were a Part of his Audience at this time, of the Doctrine which he had taught them,—"that all our true and certain Knowledge, That which enters not into the Soul thro the outward Senses, but is purely Mental and Ideal, is Reminiscence, a Recovery of some Knowledge, which the Mind lost in Oblivion, when she became Particular, by her being united to a Human Body."
be, that Oblivion happens to her in this case. For Oblivion is the Departure of Memory. But of the Accidents, now spoken of, the Soul never had a Memory. And of That, which neither is, nor ever was, it is absurd to say, that any Loss can happen to us. Is it not?

Protarchus.
Undoubtedly.

Socrates.
Only then alter the Terms.

Protarchus.
In what manner?

Socrates.
Instead of saying, that the Soul is deprived of knowing what the Body suffers, when she is not affected by any Motions produced in the Body, by those ordinary Occurrences,—what we termed a Privation of Knowledge, let us now term Insensibility.

Protarchus.
I apprehend your Meaning.

Socrates.
But when the Soul and the Body are affected, Both of them in common, by any of those Occurrences, and in
in common also are moved or agitated \textsuperscript{246}, — in giving to this Motion the name of Sensation, you would not speak improperly.

	extbf{Protarchus.}

Very true.

	extbf{Socrates.}

Now then do we not apprehend, What it is, which is commonly called Sense or Sensation?

	extbf{Protarchus.}

What should hinder us?

	extbf{Socrates.}

And of Memory, if one should say, that 'twas the Retaining of Sensations, it would not be ill defined, in my opinion.

	extbf{Protarchus.}

I think so too.

\textsuperscript{246} In the Greek of this Passage, instead of \textit{γραφώμενον}, the Participle Singular, agreeing with \textit{σώμα}, we ought to read \textit{γραφώμενα}, the Plural, agreeing with the Two preceding Substantives, \textit{φυσιν} and \textit{σώμα}, coupled together; according to a Rule, the same in the Grammars of the Greek and Latin Languages. For the Words of this Sentence, placed in the Order of their Grammatical Construction, are these,—

\textit{Τῷ κοινῷ καὶ δια σον ἡ ἀκοή καὶ τῷ σώματι, καὶ ἡ γραφώμενα ἐν ἐν τῷ πάθεν,—ταύτην τῇ κατοικῶν, κ. τ. λ.}—If Stephens had perceived This, he would not have adopted Cornarius's Alteration of the Text.
Socrates.
Do we not hold, that Memory differs from Remembrance?

Protarchus.
Perhaps it does.

Socrates.
Do they not differ in this respect?

Protarchus.
In what respect?

Socrates.
When the Soul alone, unaided by the Body, recovers and resumes within her Self, as much as possible, the State which heretofore she was in, when she was affected jointly with the Body, we say, that the Soul then remembers. Do we not?

Protarchus.

247 That is,—by the Corporeal Organs of Sensation.

248 That is,—when, by means of those Corporeal Organs of Sensation, she actually felt and perceived any external Objects at the time of their being presented to her.

249 Mr. Locke justly says of Remembrance, that 'tis a Secondary Perception. For the Notice which the Soul takes, and the clear Discrimination which she has, of any Sensible Object, when the Image of it first enters the Sensorium Commune, (the Common Seat of all the Senses,) may very properly be styled, as it
Certainly we do.

So we do also, when the Soul, after having loft the Memory of something which she had sensibly perceived, or of something which she had learnt, recalls it is by Mr. Locke, a Perception—to distinguish it from those mere Sensations, which indeed sensibly act on or affect the Corporeal Organs, but which the Soul is inattentive to, and takes little Notice of;—or which are confused or indistinct, when caused by Objects too remote, or when the Medium or Passage is obstructed or obscured.—The Images of those Sensible Objects, which the Soul has once perceived clearly, are retained within her by a certain Power, termed the Memory.—Now of these Images, Such, as the Soul frequently reviews, she hath the Power of calling into her Presence, as often as she pleases; and Such, as have lain by, within her, for a long time neglected and forgotten, she hath the Power of recalling to her Remembrance: and this latter Power she exercises, when of her Self she searches after and traces them out, thro Images familiar to her, and connected with those she seeks;—or when she is reminded of them by other Persons in Conversation, or by new Sensible Objects, such as resemble the forgotten Images, or such as, being directly opposite to them, remind her of them, as Contrasts.

256 We may observe, that Objects of Science, as well as Objects of Sensë, are included in this Sentence; as they are by Aristotle.
Aristotle also, in the First Chapter of his Treatise on this very Subject. An Account of Memory, thus comprehensive, is agreeable to the usual way of speaking: for both those Sorts of Things, the Intelligible and the Sensible are, alike, commonly spoken of, as Objects of the Memory. It seems, however, on the one hand, very different from the Account of Memory, given in the preceding Note; and on the other hand, to contradict the Account of it, given by the Pythagoreans, as cited in Note 5;—unless we have two different sorts of Memory in our Souls,—one of them, a Repository for the Images of Things Sensible,—the other, for Intelligible Truths, conceived by the Human Mind, in learning any Science.—For neither Ideas, nor consequently Intelligible Truths, are Images of any Sensible or Corporeal Things: on the contrary, all Corporeal and external Things, whether Natural or Artificial, Themselves and their Qualities, Powers and Relations, are Images of Ideas;—Natural Things being Images of Ideas in the Divine Mind; Artificial Things, Images of Ideas in the Minds of Men.—But we are to consider, that all Ideas in every Human Mind are clothed with Images of external and Sensible Things; and that all the Relations between those Ideas, all the Truths, which we either conceive of our Selves or learn from Others, arise in our Minds either clothed with Words heard or written, (that is, with Sounds Articulate, or with Letters and Syllables,) or, if the Truths are Mathematical, they arise clothed with Mathematical Figures or Symbols of such Figures, or with the Symbols of Numbers: now all these things,—Images and Figures, Sounds of any Kind whatever, Letters, Syllables and Words, with all other Symbols, are Things external, and Objects of outward Sense.—As often therefore as we recollect Truths of any Kind, heretofore conceived or taught us, they return to our Minds,
Minds, clothed with the Relicks of those Vesture, in which they first appeared to us. Nay farther; it seems, as if 'twere only by these decayed Vesture, that we are able to lay hold of those Truths again, or to recognize them as Some of our old Acquaintance. Indeed, when they are thus recognised, every Mind, well informed, can distinguish between her old Friends and their Apparel: for their Apparel she overlooks; tho it was the Medium, thro which she recovered her Knowledge of them. Their flimsy Drefs they keep, however, always on them; nor ever appear they to any Human Mind, unattired and naked. It concerns us therefore much, if we set a just Value on simple Truth, not to confound these Mental Objects, which are eternally the Same, tho clad in a variety of Corporeal Vesture, with those Images of Sensible Objects, which have nothing intelligible, nothing invariable, within them: (all their Substance being mere Matter:) least we should fancy, (as Some fanciful Philosophers have heretofore, and Some again in modern times,) that the IntellecTive and Rational Powers of the Soul, are not to be distinguished from the Sensitive and Imaginative; — that the Understanding is but a finer Sense, and a more enlarged Imagination;—that Science is nothing more than the Result of Sense; and that Mind arose always out of Body.

Now if, on the contrary, Mind and Body are Beings essentially distinct; — if Intellect and Reason are different from Sense and Imagination; — if the only Objects of Intellect and Reason are those Intelligible Beings, Ideal Forms and the Truths of Mind and Science; and if the only Objects of Sense and Imagination are those Sensible Forms, Corporeal Substances, together with their Attributes, the Sensible Qualities of Body;—it seems to follow, that the Memory of Mental or Intelligible Objects hath the same relation to those Objects, as hath the Memory of Corporeal or Sensible Objects to These the Objects of it. And if this Analogy be just, it certainly follows, by the Rules of Alternate

\[ G \ g \ g \ 2 \]
and of inverse relations, that the memory of sensible objects hath the same relation to the memory of intelligible objects, as the objects themselves of the former sort have to the objects of the latter sort. But the analogy is not exactly just; for the relations (the terms of it) are not in all respects analogous. — The memory indeed of sensible objects is a retaining of their images, or other impressions made by them, in the soul: and that which is called memory of intelligible objects is a retaining of these also in the soul. But the places in the soul, where these very different sorts of objects are separately retained, very widely differ, — as widely as their respective objects. — The places or receptacles of those images, and of all other impressions made in the soul by her sensation of external things, are the common sensory and the passive imagination; of which places the latter is also made their store-room by the memory. Now memory and passive imagination are temporary and transient powers of the soul, granted to many brute animals, as well as to man; and consequently they are powers, with which mere body is capable of being endued; (if the souls of brute animals are merely corporeal;) no less than it is capable of receiving the power of gravitation, common to all bodys, or any other passive powers, internal and invisible, given to bodys of peculiar kinds. — But the proper place of intelligible objects is pure mind, their native seat, of the same nature with themselves, incorporeal and eternal. Into this high and holy place no images can enter; nor even ideas, unless they are divested of all remains of images, with which human ideas are wont to be apparelled. — Yet, as the soul of man partakes of mind, his soul hath also a place within her, a certain ground, (as the principles of science may be fitly called,) the natural soil, for ideas and the truths of science to arise in. Here accordingly they do in fact arise and spring up; but impure, disguised,
guised, and covered over with *Images* from the neighbouring Soil of *Imagination*, which is over-run with these flowering and light-flying Weeds. Every Soul, however, whose Disposition is truly philosophic, is studious to *purify* her Ideas, by stripping them of all *Images*; as she longs to behold the naked *Truth* and *Reality* of Things; of which she has, by her Origin, a native *pre-conception*, almost as strong, as if she had them actually in *View* or in *Remembrance*.—From this cause probably it is, that a *learning* of the *Axioms* and *simplest Theorems* of any Science, seems like a *recollecting* of them; and that all our *Progress in Science* is by Plato (metaphorically perhaps,) termed *Reminiscence*.—But, whatever be the Cause of that *Facility, Complacency,* and *Delight*, with which a truly philosophic Genius acquires Science;—and whether We have rightly conjectured the Whole of Plato's Meaning in his *Doctrine of the Soul's Reminiscence*; — or whether he meant to intimate farther, that every *Human Mind* had, before its descent into a Human Body, an *Ideal Essence* in the *Divine Mind*,—as an *Intelligible Idea*, with respect to Him who contains all Ideas within him,—but at the same time, in its Self, a pure *Intelligence*, an Idea intelligent, more general than any general Ideas which are unintelligent and only intelligible; comprehensive therefore of These, tho' in a manner infinitely short of the Divine All-Intelligence;—or whether Plato thought fit to favour the Notion of the *pre-existence* of every Human Soul in some *other Body*, either celestial and *etherial*, or pneumatic and *aerial*; — without entering into an examination of these Doctrines, probably fabulous and allegorical, as being of Eastern Extraction,—This we may be certain of from Reason,—"that to *Mind universal and eternal*, all Things in their Essences are always *really present*;” and therefore we must conclude, that neither *Memory* nor *Reminiscence* can be attributed to the *Divine Being*;
Being: for Memory is only of things past, things absent in reality, and present only by their Representatives, their Images; and Reminiscence is only of things, the Memory of which the Mind had lost, and hath again recovered. — As to Memory, the Souls of many Brute Animals have, as we before observed, this Power of retaining in their Imagination, the Images and Impressions of Things External. And we find from experience, that they often retain them for a longer Time, and with less Impair, than ordinarily doth the Soul of Man. — But as to Reminiscence, or Re-collection, no Irrational Soul hath this Power: it can belong, as Aristotle has justly observed of it, to no Animal we are acquainted with, except Man; if it be, what the same great Philosopher says, συλλογικός τις, a Sort of Syllogizing. — And indeed 'tis a Collecting of Some things from Other things, thro an accidental Connection between them — a Connection, which arises either from the Same of the Times when, or of the Places where, they made their first Impressions on the Soul, — or from other Proximities or Agreements meerly external, and still subsisting between them, tho latent, in the Memory; — just as Syllogistical Reasoning is a Collecting of Some Truths from Other Truths, thro the necessary Connection between them, as being, all of them, Parts of Truth Universal, the Intelligible World. — We re-collect, re-call, or raise up again to our Remembrance, Sensible things past, by investigating them thro the Remains of their connected Images, — or by following, in a Series of Steps, the Tracks of their Impressions: — and in the same manner, Intelligible things, (seemingly) forgotten, we recollect — not, thro that natural Connection between all Truths, by which we first acquired the Knowledge of them, (for This would be like a learning of them anew,) — but thro the artificial Combination of Words, (Articulate Sounds,) formerly heard, or of Characters, (the silent
silent Symbols of those Sounds,) formerly seen; (especially if the Combination be Metrical;) where One Word remembered draws after it Another, meerly by the Concatenation of those Sensible Impressions, which the Memory retains in the Imagination. — Here however, an intelligent Mind, being within every Human Soul, perceives and takes notice of them; and, by the Medium of those remaining Sensible Images or Impressions, regains that Knowlege, which she had formerly acquired by the Medium of Sounds or Characters, the Objects of Hearing or of Sight. — Aristotle accordingly, in his short Treatise concerning Memory and Reminiscence, having first said of Memory, that 'tis φαντάσματος, ὃς ἑκόνος ἐσφαντασμα, εἶναι, the possessing (or retaining) of some Phantasm, as an Image of that Thing, of which it is the Phantasm, — afterwards says of Reminiscence, that 'tis κατατικεῖν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι, a Searching for what we have lost the Memory of, thro' (or by means of) such a Phantasm. — Having also observ'd, ὅτι τοῖν πέτ ἐτέρων ἔτερον φαντασμάτων, that we cannot perceive or apprehend any thing in our Minds, (not any Intelligible Truth, nor any Idea,) without a Phantasm, (that is, unless it be clothed with the Image or Impression of some Sensible Object,) — farther on he says, that the Memory of Intelligible Things is not without a Phantasm (or Image).— Η μνήμη ἡ τῶν ρωτῶν ἐκ ἔτερον φαντασμάτων ἐτέρων. —— Now, if the Common Sensory, and the Passive Imagination, are the Places of all those Phantasms, internal Images and Impressions, which are true, (that is, which are true Representatives of external Things affecting our Senses,) as well as they are the Places of a much greater Multitude which are false, (that is, which represent external and sensible Things untruly,) whether the Phantasms of Either Sort are fresh arrived, or whether they have resided there a long time, and are either ready at hand, or
hidden in some deep Hole or remote Corner,—if also Intelligent Mind, or the Intellectual Power of the Soul, is the only Place of Intelligible Forms. — a Doctrine, in which Aristotle and Plato both agree, (as appears in Aristotle's Treatise on the Soul), L. 3, C. 5, together with the Commentary of Philoponus thereon,) we say, if the Powers or Facultys of the Human Soul, regarding her different Objects, are rightly thus distinguished, the following Consequences also are rightly drawn; — viz. that the immediate Objects of all Memory, and of all Reminiscence, whether it be That of Things Sensible, or That of Things Intelligible, are only Images or Phantasms, the true as well as the false: — that what we call a Memory of Ideas, or of the Truths of Science, is the Mind's continuing in possession of them all along, from the time when they first arose in her, excited (as it were) by the Images of things Sensible: — and that what is termed a Reminiscence, a Remembrance, or Recollection of them, is in truth a re-furrecion or Re-refuscitation of them in the Mind, by (or thro) the same Images, again making their appearance in the Imagination, and again there beheld by the Mind's intellectual and comprehensive Eye. — From these Conclusions it appears, that the Terms Memory and Remembrance,—Terms, which are used, not only in speaking of external and sensible things, as the Objects of those Facultys of our Souls, but also in speaking of things mental and only intelligible,—on these Subjects, essentially so different, are used homonymously; — with strict propriety, in speaking of the former Sort of Things; but figuratively, in speaking of the latter. — For we find, on the one hand, that Memory, or Mindfulness of External Objects, is the holding fast of their volatile Images in the Imagination; and that a Remembrance, or Reminiscence of the same Objects, is a Recovery or Re-inflating of their Images in the same.
fame Place, from whence they had disappeared, and were
supposed to have flipt away: since it is known from experi-
ence, that the Imagination, a Power of the mere Animal-Soul,
gradually decays, and loses by little and little its retentive
Strength; and that, even while it remains in full Force, it
confines None of the Images, arrived there thro the Senses,
nor any Others, created by the Active Imagination of Man
out of those prior Images, except Such as have made a deep
Impression there, and Such also as the Percipient Power of
the Soul frequently revisits.—On the other hand we find, that
the Objects of Intellect, and Those of Reason, being seated, all
of them, within the Mind,—a Seat, for ever permanent and un-
decaying, — (to which nothing ever comes from without, —
from which nothing ever departs, to return again, — and no-
thing is for ever loft,) abide there eternally: tho Human
Minds are not able actually to behold more than One of them
at a time; and tho the Minds of None but Men of Science
look at all at Any of them ever in their Lives.—Thus it
appears, that neither Memory nor Remembrance, to speak pro-
perly and strictly, belongs to the Rational Soul, or to any of
her Powers or Facultys. So that, when the Term Memory is
applied to the Mind's reviewing of Intelligible Objects, it should
be considered as a Metaphor, taken from that Power of the
Animal-Soul, which retains the Images of Sensible Objects in the
Imagination. In like manner, when the Terms Remembrance
and Reminiscence are applied to the like Intellectual or Rational
Review, they are to be considered as Metaphors, taken from
that Active Power, which is only in the Soul of Man — That
of regaining Images lost, by tracing them out thro their Con-
nections. —— But the great difference between Mind and Me-
memory, or between understanding, (which is always of Things
present to the Mind,) — and the imagining of Things past, (tho

H h h

formerly
formerly present to the outward Senses,) will best appear from the very different Nature and Origin of their respective Objects. — Images and Phantasms are referable only to Things external: and to These do they so much owe their Origin, as that without them they never could have had any Being at all.— But farther; the Things, from which all Images and Phantasms within us take their Rise, must not only be external; they must also be corporeal. For with respect to our Selves, the Minds of Others are external: and of Minds there are no Images, nor Phantasms: the sole foundation of These is Body: and of all Body the sole Substratum, or Substance, is the Common Matter. — Nor less necessary to the production of Images and Phantasms in our Souls are the Organs of Sensation, which are in our own Bodies. For only thro these Organs are the Images of external Things transmitted to their proper Place within us.— And farther; when our Imagination is furnished with a multitude of Images, so transmitted; if afterwards we meet with Relations of foreign Countries, or with Records and Memorials of past Ages, they pour into that vast Receptacle of Images a much greater Multitude, — Images of Things existing in those Countries, or of Things formerly in Being, but now extinct; — such Things being always represented, as similar or analogous to some prior Images, with which our Imagination is pre-possessed. — To these Things, all of which are Objects of the Outward Senses, and thence come to be Objects of Imagination, of Memory and Remembrance; — the Subjects also of all Description, whether in Painting or in Sculpture, in History or in Poetry; — to these Things quite contrary, in their Nature, are the Objects of Mind or Intelléction, the Subjects of Science and sound Philosophy. — This will appear highly probable, if we consider, that all Human Beings from their Birth, for a long time after, converse wholly with external
external and Sensible Objects, and the Offspring of these, their Images and Phantasms:—that the Few Persons, who attempt afterwards to travel in the only Road to real Science, That along General Ideas, are obliged to set out from Things particular and sensible:—that presently they perceive all such Ideas enveloped with the Images of those sensible Things, from which they had departed:—that if the Traveller’s Genius be phiſophic, he will find these Images to retard his Progress; like violent Winds full against him, as if they strove to blow him back again to the Objects he left behind:—that, on the other hand, if his Disposition be unfavourable to the Journey undertaken, his Genius will prove like a reflive Horse, or like a Jade mindful only of her accustomed Manger, refisting his continuance in the road onward, and pulling backward to the Stable and the Straw.—Besides these Remoras and Impediments, which a Man brings along with him, or carries about him, in travelling toward Truth and real Science, he is encountered ever and anon by new Sensible Objects unthought of; and These, if they do not altogether block up his way, never fail of interrupting his Progress for a while.—Seeing then, that all this Opposition to the Science of Mind, and of Things intelligible, comes from Body, from Things corporeal, and their Images,—we infer a natural Opposition between Body and Mind,—a natural Repugnance of the Animal-Soul to the Rational,—a natural Inconsistency of all vehement Sensation, and of all strong Phantasy, with any present Intellification, or any Exercise of the Reasoning Faculty,—and a natural Contrariety between the Objects of Sense and the Objects of Reason and Intelleſt.—These widest of all possible Diverſities, between Things of different Kinds, are owing to the very different Origin of the Human Mind from That of the Human Body, and That of the Animal-Soul. — The passive and maternal Parent of all Body is meer Matter: and Bodies, or

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Things corporeal, (Portions of Matter formed,) and the Images of these Things, are not only the Objects, but also the immediate Agent-Causes, of all Sensation, of all Imagination, and and of all Memory: and the organical Parts of organised Bodys, endowed with Animal-Souls, are the instrumental Means, by which those Causes act. — On the other hand, every Particular Mind; or Rational Soul, is derived,—not from Sensation, Imagination, or Memory, — but immediately from the Great universal Mind alone, its sole Parent: being by Him infused into a Body capable of being governed by it. Into Such a Body, animated by Such a Soul, are infused, together with Mind, the Principles of Science; the same being the Principles of Mind, and to all Mind essential: and these Principles are the native Light, by which every Mind is enabled to perceive One and Many at the same time (Sameness and Difference together) in All things. — Thus are these Principles the Seeds of Science; opening by degrees into all Ideas, General and Special, as widely as a Mind, pent up in a gross and perishable Body, can shoot forth and extend itself. For in the Principles of Mind latent, or virtually included, are all such Ideas; like Buds and Flowers within the Seed of some Plant.—Now, as every Particular Mind is an Offspring, and as it were an Image in Miniature, (how imperfect a one soever it happens to be,) of the Divine Mind,—in like manner, those Ideas, the Objects of a Particular Mind, are Descendants, and as it were Copies or Transcripts (how diminutive and faint soever they may prove) of the Divine Ideas: from These are They derived: to These only are They to be referred: and only in and thro These have They an eternal Being; immortaliing the Soul in which they dwell; when all the fading Images of temporary Things, all Memory and Remembrance of Sensible Objects in the lower World of Sense, are vanished away.
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recalls and recollects the Memory of it again, her Self within her Self: and all This we term Remembrance, and a Recovery of things flipt out of our Memory 235.

PROTARCHUS.

Very true.

SOCRATES.

Now the End, for the fake of which we have been considering these Facultys of the Soul, is This.

235 In the printed Greek we here read,—ἀνάμνησις καὶ μνήμα. —So that Memory and Remembrance are now confounded together; and the difference, but just before made between them, is annulled. — It is therefore apprehended, that we ought to read—ἀναμνήσθης καὶ μνήμω ανακτήσωσ.—Probably the Transcriber of some ancient Manuscript omitted the last word, if read to him by another Person, (as usual,) on account of the similitude of its Sound with That of the word ἀναμνήσες; — or on account of the similitude between the Letters of those two words, if he read with his own Eyes;—or because he suppos'd it to be a corrupt Reading, instead of ἀνάμνησις, and to have been inserted, into the Manuscript which he was copying, from the Margin of some M.S, still more ancient.—In Varinus, —ἀνάμνησις is defined to be—μνήμως, ἐπιστόλω γενομένη, ἀνάκτησις, the regaining of a departed Memory (that is, of a Notion or a Phantasm, departed out of the Memory).—Cicero translates αἰώνιοι into Latin by the word Reminiscencia. But to the English word Reminiscence we have preferred the word Remembrance, (a word, more in Common Ufe,) after the example of Mr. Locke, by whom it is rightly used, to express a Revival of (what He calls) an Idea in the Memory.

PROTARCHUS,
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

For the sake of What?

Socrates.

That we may apprehend 252, as well and as clearly as we are able, What is Pleasure of the Soul abstracted from the Body 253, and at the same time, may apprehend also, What is Desire. For the nature of Both these things seems to be discovered in some measure, by showing the nature of Memory and of Remembrance.

Protarchus.

Let us, then, O Socrates! now explain, how such a Discovery follows from perceiving the nature of these Faculty of ours.

Socrates.

In treating of the Rise of Pleasure, and of the various Forms which she assumes, it will be necessary for

252 All the Editions of Plato give us here to read,— "Τα μυη γα σοιοι και τη λα. From this Sentence, thus absurdly printed, Cornarius, in his marginal Lemmas, extracted the following curious Precept,—" Voluptas & cupiditas animæ, abique corpore, vitanda." Pleasure and Desire in the Soul her Self, abstracted from the Body, are Both to be avoided.—The French Translator has judiciously rejected the Negative Particle in this Sentence.

253 That is,—Pleasure, in which the Body has no Share.
us, I believe, to consider a great variety of things. But before we enter on so copious a Subject, we should now, I think, in the first place, consider the nature and origin of Desire.

**Protarchus.**

Let us then: for we must not lose Any thing.

**Socrates.**

Nay, Protarchus! we shall lose One thing, when we shall have found the Objects of our Inquiry; we shall lose our Uncertainty about them. 254.

**Protarchus.**

254 This jocose Turn, which is entirely agreeable to the usual Facetiousness and ἐπιγραφεῖς of Socrates, (on whose Mind the graveſt Subjects of Discourse are easy, because familiar to it,) is here thrown in by Plato very opportunely, just at the time of starting fresh Matter. For we imagine it a Contra
vance of his, purposely to prevent the Patience of his Reader from being tired out by a longer Delay of the principal Pursuit. Such a Purpose is answered by an Intimation here given, that Protarchus was right in supposing this seemingly new Subject to make a Part of the proposed Inquiry, or essentially to belong to it; and that Socrates would put an End to all Doubts, concerning the Pleasures of the Animal-Soul, by showing to what Cause the Motions or Affections of this Soul were to be referred, and to what End they tended. —Some Hope also is perhaps here meant to be given us, that the
PHILEBUS

PROTARCHUS.

You are right in your Repartee. Proceed we then to what is next.

SOCRATES.

Was it not just now said, that Hunger, and Thirst, and many other things of like Kind, were certain Desires

255

PROTARCHUS.

the Philosopher will, in the Sequel make the greater Goods of Mind, of Wisdom and of Science, to appear manifest, by showing, in like manner, the more internal Motions and Affections of a Rational Soul, the Tendency of these Motions, and the Objects of these Affections.

255 This is evidently implied, tho not expressed, in what Socrates had said before concerning Animals,—that "Want of Food, to fill up a Vacuity or Breach, made in the Bodily Frame, by the passing away of many solid Particles of it, is always attended with the Pain of Hunger." — See page 402. For, as all Sentient Beings, whenever aught is wanting to the Soundness of their Frame, are made sensible of it, by feeling some Pain or Uneasiness,—and as Nature has given them an Aversion to Pain,—and all Aversion is of necessity attended by a Desire of having the Object of it removed away,—the Pain of Hunger must infer a Desire of being freed from it by Food; an instinctive Appetite to which, on that occasion, is given to every Animal by Nature. — But beside the Pains of Hunger and Thirst, Socrates had spoken of the Uneasinesses, arising in the Body from excessive Heat and Cold; as Influences of the general Position, he was then establishing,—This, "that all things,
PROTARCHUS.

Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.

What is it then, which is the Same in all these things,—That, with respect to which we give to All of them, notwithstanding the great difference between them, One and the Same Appellation 256?

PROTARCHUS.

By Jove, Socrates! it is perhaps not easy to say: it ought, however, to be declared.

SOCRATES.

Let us resume the mention of That, with which we began the consideration of this Subject 237.

PROTARCHUS.

Of What in particular?

things, which have a Tendency to destroy the Animal-Oeconomy, or dissolve the Corporeal Harmony, produce Pain: and such things are here meant by the many other things of like Kind. For every Pain or Uneasiness, in the same manner as Hunger and Thirst, infers a Desire of having it removed.

256 That of Desire.


SOCRATES.
Socrates.
Do we not often speak of being thirsty?

Protarchus.
We do.

Socrates.
And do we not mean by it some Kind of Emptiness?

Protarchus.
Certainly.

Socrates.
Is not Thirst a Desire?

Protarchus.
It is.

Socrates.
A Desire of Drink is it?

Protarchus.
Of Drink.

Socrates.
Of being replenished by Drink: is it not?

Protarchus.
I suppose it is.

258 A future Editor of Plato may consider, in the Greek of this Sentence, whether οὖ should not be inserted before the word πῦματος.

Socrates.
Socrates.

Whoever of us then is emptied, desires, it seems, a Condition the Reverse of what has befallen him. For whereas he is emptied, he longs to be filled again.

Protarchus.

Most evidently so.

Socrates.

Well now; is it possible, that a Man, who at the first empty is empty, should apprehend, either by Sense or by Memory, what it is to be full,—a Condition, in which he neither is, at the time, nor ever was, here-tofore?

Protarchus.

How can he?

Socrates.

We are agreed, that the Man, who desires, has a Desire of Something.

Protarchus.

Without Dispute.

Socrates.

Now it is not the Condition in which he is, that he desires. For he suffers Thirst, that is, an Emptiness: but he desires to be full.

*59 That is, at the Beginning of his Sensitive Life.

Protarchus.
Protarchus.

True.

Socrates.

Something therefore, belonging to the Man who is thirsty, must apprehend in some manner What it is to be full.

Protarchus.

It must, of necessity.

Socrates.

But 'tis impossible, that This should be his Body for his Body is supposed to suffer Emptiness.

Protarchus.

Right.

Socrates.

It remains therefore, that his Soul apprehends What it is to be full, by means of her Memory.

Protarchus.

Plainly so.

Socrates.

For indeed by what other Means could his Soul have such an Apprehension?

Protarchus.

Hardly by any other.
PHILEBUS. 435

Socrates.
Perceive we now, what Consequence follows from this Reasoning of ours?

Protarchus.
What Consequence?

Socrates.
It proves, that Desire doth not arise in the Body.

Protarchus.
How so?

Socrates.
Because it shows, that the Aim and Endeavour of every Animal, is to be in a Condition opposite to the Feelings, with which the Body is at that time affected.

Protarchus.
It certainly shows This.

Socrates.
And the Inclination, by which it moves toward this opposite Condition, shows the remembrance of a Condition opposite to those present Feelings and Affections.

Protarchus.
Clearly.

3. Socrates:
Our Reasoning then, in proving that Memory leads us toward the Objects of our Desire, shows at the same time, What is the general Inclination and Desire of the Soul; and What is the Moving Principle in every Animal.

Protarchus.

Perfectly right.

Socrates.

Our Conclusion therefore will by no means admit of an Opinion, that the Body suffers Hunger, or Thirst, or is affected with any other such Desire.

Protarchus.

Most true.

Socrates.

Let us observe This also farther, regarding these very Subjects now under consideration. Our Reasoning seems to Me, as if it meant to exhibit, in those very Things, a certain Kind of Life.

Protarchus.

260 Namely,—to have the Wants of her Body relieved, and her own Being perfected. For the moving Principle in every Animal is a Desire of that Good, which is agreable to its Nature.

261 That is,—Socrates, in explaining the Nature and the Cause of those Desires, incident to the Souls of Sentient Beings, meant it as introductory to a View of That Life, in which there is a Mixture of Pain and Pleasure.—In the Greek of this
PHILEBVS.  437

PROTARCHUS.

What Things do you mean? and what Kind of Life do you speak of?

SOCRATES.

I mean the being filled and the being emptied, and all other Things tending either to the Preservation of Animal Life, or to the Destruction of it; and whatever Things ordinarily give Pain, — yet, coming in a Change from things Contrary, are sometimes grateful 268.

PROTARCHUS.

True.

SOCRATES.

But what, when a Man is in the Midst of these Contrary Conditions, and is partaking of them Both?

PROTARCHUS.

How do you mean in the Midst?

this Sentence we here read βεθεδαι. But 'tis presumed, that we ought to read βεθεδαι—a Reading, which is confirmed by the Medicean and the Heffenstein Manuscripts; as appears in that. Ficinus and Cornarius render it into Latin by the word velle.

268 Such, for instance, as a cold or a hot Air; Both of which are very disagreeable to many Persons; but they are quite otherwise, when Either of them succeeds to Air of a contrary Quality in a high Degree. — In the Greek of this Sentence, τοτε δε (and not τοτε δε) χαιει, is perhaps the right Reading. We may, however, read τοτε δε χαιει, if we are permitted to change the word ἲμων, just before, into ὅτε μεν.

Socrates.
PHILEBUS.

Socrates.

When he is afflicted with an anxious Sense of his present bad Condition, but at the same time has a Remembrance of past Delights; he may enjoy an Intermission of his Pain, without having as yet the Cause of it removed 263; now do we affirm, or do we deny, that he is at that time in the Midst of Two contrary Conditions?

Protarchus.

It must be affirmed.

Socrates.

Is he afflicted or delighted wholly?

Protarchus.

By Jove, he is in a manner afflicted doubly; in his Body, from his present Condition; in his Soul, from a tedious Expectation, longing for Relief.

263 Thus have we rendered into English the Greek of this Sentence, as it is printed. But we are much inclined to adopt the Emendation, καὶ παῦσαι μὲν, proposed by Stephens in the Margin of his Edition: only changing 2 into %. If our learned Readers are of the same Opinion; and think with Us, that Two different Cases are here stated by Socrates; in Both of which there is a Mixture of Anxiety and Delight, but not a Mixture of the same Kind; then, instead of—he may enjoy,—the Translation should be—or when he enjoys, &c.

Socrates.
Socrates.

How is it, O Protarchus! that you suppose his Affliction to be doubled? Is not a Man, whose Stomach is empty, sometimes in a State of Hopefulness, with Assurance of having it filled? and on the contrary, is he not, at other times, in a Condition quite hopeless?

Protarchus.

Certainly.

Socrates.

Do you not think, that, when he is in Hopes of being filled, he is delighted with the remembrance of Fulness? and yet, that, being empty at the same time, he is in Pain?

Protarchus.

He must be so.

Socrates.

In such a State therefore, Man and other Animals are at the same time afflicted and delighted.

Protarchus.

It seems so to be.

Socrates.

But What think you, when a Man is empty, and hopeless of obtaining Fulness? must he not, in such a Con-
a Condition, suffer Double Pain? with a view to which particular Condition it was, that just now you supposed the Memory of past Delight, in All Cases, to double the present Pain.

Protarchus.

Most true, Socrates!

Socrates.

Now of this Inquiry into these Feelings of ours we shall make This Use.

Protarchus.

What Use?

Socrates.

Shall we say, that all these Pains and Pleasures are True? or that they are all False? or that Some of them are True, and Others False?

Protarchus.

How should Pleasures or Pains, O Socrates! be False?

Socrates.

How is it then, O Protarchus! that Fears may be either True or False? that Expectations may be True, or not? Or of Opinions, how is it, that Some are True, and Others False?

Protarchus.

Opinions, I admit, may be of Either Kind: but I cannot grant you This of those Other Feelings.

Socrates.
PHILEBUS. 441

Socrates.

How say you? We are in danger of starting a Disquisition of no small Importance.

Protarchus.

That is True.

Socrates.

But whether it has any relation to the Subjects which have preceded, This, O Son of an illustrious Father 264! ought to be considered.

Protarchus.

264 We cannot conceive, to what Purpose this Compliment to Protarchus is here introduced, unless it be by way of a Simile; to represent the Dignity and Excellence of the Matters before discussed; and, by reminding Protarchus of his illustrious Birth, to signify to him,—that, as He ought not to degenerate from his Ancestors, so neither ought any New Matters to be brought upon the Carpet, if, in their Weight and Value, they fall short of Those which have preceded. — Perhaps also an Intimation is thus given by Plato to his Readers, that one of the Subjects of Inquiry just now mentioned by Socrates,—That concerning Opinions,—immediately related to that Other concerning Pleasures, as to their Truth or Falsity. — In the Greek of this Passage, it is probable, that the printed Reading καλαὶ τὰ ἀδὲξίας is erroneous; and that Plato wrote καλὲτὰ ἀδὲξίας; — but that, in after ages, a Reader of some Manuscript Copy of this Dialogue, where, instead of καλὲτὰ, was written καλεῖν, (and Hesychius interprets καλεῖν by the more usual Terms ἐξοικεῖος, ἐπιρχαῖος;) on collating it
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

Perhaps indeed it ought.

Socrates.

Tell me then: for, as to myself, I am continually in a state of Wonderment about these very Difficultys, now proposed.

Protarchus.

What Difficultys do you mean?

Socrates.

False Pleasures are not True; nor True Pleasures False 265.

Protarchus.

it with another M.S. Copy, where he found ξλοιηδες written, wrote το in the Margin of the former Copy, opposite to the Syllable το with which perhaps a new Line began; that afterwards a Transcriber of this Copy received το into the Text of his own Transcript, just before ρης, supposing it to be a word casually omitted in the former Copy; — and that, last of all, when χλευη το δης was discovered to be a Solecism in the Greek Syntax, χλευη, a word very uncommon, was easily changed into καρσ, and the Construction was thus purified.

265 In the Greek we read only,—ἀευσθες, αι δ' αλκεσθεις εις εις γεωραι.—All the Translators of Plato into other Languages justly suppose this Sentence to be imperfect in the Beginning of it; but in Their way of supplying the Words omitted,
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

How is it possible, they should?

SOCRATES.

Neither in a Dream then, nor Awake, is it possible, as You hold, not even if a Man is out of his Senses thro' Madness, or has lost the Soundness of his Judgment any other way, is it possible for him ever to imagine that he feels Delight, when he is by no means sensibly delighted; or to imagine that he feels Pain, when actually the Man feels none.  

omitted, 'tis nothing more than a Repetition of the Question proposed before, without any new additional Matter. (See in Page 440.) — Socrates in fact is now entering on a Proof of the Distinction between the True Pleasures and the False: and we presume, that he here builds his Proof on That prime Axiom, on which is founded all Demonstration, — viz. "Things cannot be what they are, and yet different from what they are, at the same time. — In the Passage therefore, now before us, it seems probable, that the Sentence, to be made agreeable to the Sense of it, is to be compleated thus, — ἐὰν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἐν εἶναι ἐστὶν, ὥς ἐν εἴναν ἐστὶν. — The Error of omitting the first Words is easy to be accounted for.

266 Those Persons, who are evidently in a State of Infinity of Mind, imagine many Things which have no Existence, and entertain a firm Belief of their Reality. Some of these unreal Fancies, meerly the Objects of Imagination, affect such Persons with
Protarchus.

All of us, O Socrates! constantly suppose these Facts to be, as You have now stated them.

Socrates.

But is it a right Supposition? or should we examine, whether it is right or not?

Protarchus.

We ought to examine it, I must own.

Socrates.

Let us then explain a little more clearly what was just now said concerning Pleasure and Opinion. Do we not hold the Reality of our Having an Opinion?

Certainly.

with Joy or Grief, as strongly, as if they were Objects of the Senses, and did really produce in them pleasurable or painful Sensations. — That this is often the Case of Dreams in Sleep, every one of us hath ample Experience. — And Philosophers say, that Such, as are under the Power of Passion, and consequently under That of boundless Imagination, — nay, that All Persons who think not justly, (that is, not agreeably to Nature and to Right Reason,) — dream soaking; and are affected with Joys and Griefs, which have no better a Foundation, than have the Fancy of Madmen, or the Dreams of Men asleep.

Socrates.
PHILEBUS 445

SOCRATES.

And the Reality of our having Pleasure?

PROTARCHUS.

To be sure.

SOCRATES.

Farther; it is Something, That which is the Object of our Opinion.

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt.

SOCRATES.

And Something also That is, with which Whatever feels a Pleasure is delighted.

PROTARCHUS.

Most certainly.

SOCRATES.

In the Having then of an Opinion, whether we are right or wrong in entertaining that Opinion, the Reality of our having it abides still.

PROTARCHUS.

How can a Man lose an Opinion whilst he has it?

SOCRATES.
SOCRATES.

In the enjoying also of any Pleasure, whether we do right or wrong to enjoy it, 'tis certain, that the Reality of the Enjoyment still remains.

PROTARCHUS.

To be sure, these things are so.

SOCRATES.

On what account is it then, that we are used to call Some Opinions True, and Others False; yet to Pleasures only we allow the Attribute of True; notwithstanding that Pleasure and Opinion, Both of them, equally admit Reality in the Having of them?

PROTARCHUS.

This ought to be considered.

SOCRATES.

Is it that Falshood and Truth are incident to Opinion? so that, by the supervening of one or other of these, Opinion becomes Something beside what in its Self it is; and every Opinion is thus made to have the Quality of being either False or True. Do you say, that This ought to be considered?

PROTARCHUS.

I do.

SOCRATES.

And beside This; supposing, that Opinions universally do admit of Attributes and Qualities; whether
ther only Pleasure and Pain are what they are in Themselves simply, and never admit any Quality to arise in them; ought we not to settle this Point also by agreement between us?

**Protarchus.**

'Tis evident, that we ought.

**Socrates.**

But 'tis easy enough to perceive, that These also admit the accession of Some Qualitys. For of Pleasures and Pains we agreed a while since, that Some are Great, Others Little; and that Each Sort admits of Vehemence and of Intension 267.

**Protarchus.**

Very true.

**Socrates.**

And if either to any Pleasure, or to any Opinion, there be added the Quality of Evil, shall we not affirm the Opinion thus to become Evil, and the Pleasure Evil in the same manner?

**Protarchus.**

Without doubt, O Socrates!

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267 See before in Pages 280, and 321.
Socrates.

And What, if Rectitude, or the Opposite to Rectitude \(^{268}\), accede to any of them, shall we not say, that the Opinion is Right, if Rectitude be in it? and shall we not ascribe the same Quality to Pleasure, on the same supposition?

Protarchus.

Of necessity we must.

Socrates.

And if the Object of our Opinion be mistaken by us, must we not in such a case acknowledge, that our Opinion is erroneous, and not right; and that We are not right, our selves, in entertaining such an Opinion \(^{269}\)?

Protarchus.

Certainly we must.

Socrates.

But What, if we discover our selves to be mistaken in the Object of our Grief or of our Pleasure \(^{270}\), shall

\(^{268}\) That is, Pravity.

\(^{269}\) For instance, if we mistake a Friend for an Enemy, or an Enemy for a Friend.

\(^{270}\) As for instance, if, mistaking our Enemys for Friends to us, we rejoice at their prosperous Success, or grieve at their Disappointments.
we give to this Grief, or to this Pleasure, the epithet of right, or good, or any other which is fair and honourable?

Protarchus.

We certainly cannot, where a Mistake is in the Pleasure.

Socrates.

And surely Pleasure is apt to arise in us oftentimes, accompanied, not with a right Opinion, but with an Opinion which is false.

Protarchus.

Indisputably so. And the Opinion, O Socrates! then and in that case, we should say was a false Opinion. But to the Pleasure its self no Man would ever give the appellation of false.

Socrates.

You are very ready, O Protarchus! at supporting the Plea made use of by Pleasure on this occasion.

Protarchus.

Not at all so. I only repeat what I have heard.
Socrates.

Do we make no difference, my Friend! between Such a Pleasure as comes accompanied with Right Opinion or with Science, and That Kind of Pleasure which often arises in every one of us at the same time with false Opinion or Ignorance 271?

Protarchus.

It is probable, I own, that no little difference is between them.

Socrates.

Let us now come to the consideration of What the Difference is.

Protarchus.

Proceed in whatever way you think proper.

Socrates.

I shall take This way then.

271 Stephens's Edition of Plato agrees with all the prior Editions, in giving us to read ἄρειας in this place: but that learned Printer, in his latter Annotations, pag: 75, justly observes, that instead of ἄρειας we ought to read ἄρειας. That Emendation was made, before Stephens, by Cornarius in his Echlogae, pag: 333. Ignorance is here opposed to Knowledge; as False Opinion is opposed to True. — The Medicean Manuscript exhibits the right Reading; as appears from the Latin of Ficinus.

Protarchus.
PHILEBUS

Protarchus.

What way?

Socrates.

Some of our Opinions are false, and others of them are true: This is agreed.

Protarchus.

It is.

Socrates.

Pleasure and Pain, as it was just now said 272, sometimes attend on Either of them indifferently; on Opinions, I mean, either true or false 273.

Protarchus.

Certainly so.

Socrates.

Is it not from Memory and from Sense 274, that Opinion is produced in us, and that room is given for a Diversity of Opinions on every Subject 275?

Protarchus.

272 See Note 266.

273 They attend on false Opinion, in that instance which is mentioned in Note 270:—they attend on true Opinion, when we have just reason to grieve or to rejoice.

274 That is,—from a Memory or Remembrance of Things heretofore seen, or heard of; and from a Sense or a Perception of Things present.

275 For the Diversity between Things present is infinite; as is the Diversity of Places where the Things are: and the Diversity
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Most undoubtedly.

Socrates.

I ask you then, whether or no, as to these Things, we deem ourselves to be of necessity affected thus?

Protarchus.

How?

Socrates.

Oftentimes, when a Man looks at Something, which he discovers at a great distance, but does not discern very clearly, will you admit, that he may have an inclination to judge of what he sees?

Diversity between many past Things, seen or heard of by different Persons now in Being, is indefinite; as is the Number of those Persons. Beside all this Diversity of Things, both present and past, different Persons are affected differently (at the least in different Degrees) by the Same Things. What an infinite Diversity of Opinions must all these Diversities occasion, or rather, of necessity, produce!—The word ἁπάξ λεγόμενον, in the Greek of this Passage, being perhaps a ἁπάξ λεγόμενον, seems not to have been understood by any of the Translators, except Ficinus. It is plainly analogous to the words, ὑπάρχειν, ὑπάρχειν, ὑπολείπεσθαι, ὑπόλοιπον ὑπολείπεσθαι.

276 Meaning—our Opinions; together with those Sentiments of Grief and Joy, or those Fancys (or fancied Feelings) of Pain and Pleasure, which attend on our Opinions.
Protarchus.

I do admit the Case.

Socrates.

Upon this, would not the Man question himself in this manner?

Protarchus.

In What manner?

Socrates.

What is That, which appears as if it was standing under some Tree by the Cliff there? Do you not suppose, that he would speak those words to himself, looking at some such Appearances before him, as I have mentioned?

Protarchus.

No Doubt of it.

Socrates.

Hereupon, might not this Man then, making a Conjecture, say to himself, by way of Answer,—It is a Man?

Protarchus.

Certainly.

Socrates.

But walking on, perhaps he might discern it to be but the Work of some Shepherds, and would say again to himself,—It is only a Statue.

Protarchus.
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

Most certainly he would.

Socrates.

And if he had any Companion with him, he would speak out aloud what he had first spoken within himself, and repeat the very same words to his Companion: so that, what we lately termed an Opinion, would thus become a Speech.

Protarchus.

Very true.

Socrates.

But if he were alone, this very Thing would be a Thought still within him; and he might walk on, keeping the same Thought in his Mind, a considerable Way.

Protarchus.

Undoubtedly.

Socrates.

Well now; does this Matter appear to You in the same Light as it does to Me?

Protarchus.

How is That?

Socrates.

The Soul in that Case seems to Me to resemble some Book.

Protarchus.
PHILEBUS.  455

Protarchus.

How so?

Socrates.

The Memory \(^{277}\), co-inciding with the Senses \(^{278}\), together with those Passions of the Soul which attend this Memory and the present Sensation \(^{279}\), seem to Me as if they concurred in writing Sentences at that

\(^{277}\) That is,—a Memory or Remembrance of other such Statues, formerly seen by him, — the Effigies of Men, wrought by Carpenters and Masons.

\(^{278}\) For his Senses exhibit to him an External Object, co-inciding with Those in his Memory, which he remembers to have been the Works of Human Artists.

\(^{279}\) As long as the Object appeared to be a real and living Man, the Appearance must have been attended with Pleasure in the Soul of the Spectator, if a Person of a benevolent and social Disposition; for such Persons are pleased with seeing the Fellows of their Kind: but quite contrary Sentiments would have arisen in his Soul, were he a Misanthrope, or afflicted with a Redundancy of Black Bile; for to such unhappy Persons the Sight of a Human Being gives a Pain. Again; as soon as the Object is discovered to be, what really it is, the wooden Effigy of a Man, carved by some Shepherd, a good-natured Spectator of it would be pleased with the Shepherd’s Ingenuity and Industry: but if the Beholder happens to be a Churl, or an Admirer of nothing but what procures Money, he will reflect on the Shepherd as an idle Fellow or unprofitably employed, and will feel the Pain of his own ill-natured and illiberal Reflection.

M m m time
time within our Souls. And when the Scribe writes what is True, true Opinions and true Sentences are by Him produced within us: but when our Scribe writes what is False, then what we think, and what we say to our Selves, is contrary to the Truth.

PROTARCHUS.

I heartily agree to Your Account of this Matter, and acknowledge those joint Scribes within the Soul.

SOCRATES.

Acknowlege also another Workman within us, operating at that time.

PROTARCHUS.

What is He?

SOCRATES.

An Engraver, who follows after the Scribe; engraving within the Soul Images of those Thoughts, Sentences, and Sayings.

PROTARCHUS.

How and when is This done?

SOCRATES.

It is, when That which a Man thinks and says to Himself, concerning the Object of his Sight, or of any
any other Outward Sense, he separates from the Sensation which he has of it; and views somehow within Himself the Image of that Thought, and of that Saying. Or is there no such Thing as This ever produced within us?

Protarchus.

In this Disjunctive Particle of the Sentence, the Sense of Hearing is chiefly meant. For what we hear from Others often makes an Impression in the Imagination as strong as what we see with our own Eyes; nay sometimes a stronger: for in some cases, the Imagination of the Speaker, in reporting, is apt to magnify what he has seen; and the Imagination of the Hearer to magnify what he hears reported.

The Images of external and sensible Things are undoubtedly fixed for a time, and as it were engraved in the Imagination, by that Faculty or Power of the Soul, termed the Memory. But it must sound strange to a modern Ear, and perhaps it may be deemed a Solecism, to say,—the Image of an Opinion,—or, the Image of a Sentence. Yet, on due consideration, it will be evidently perceived, that an Opinion, Judgment, or Sentence of the Mind, concerning any particular Thing, Person, or Action, is a Combination of Images in the Imagination;—the Image of That Particular, which is the Subject of our Opinion, combined with some prior Image within us,—with such an Image, as habitually invests or accompanies that Idea, which our Imagination now connects with her present Subject, and attributes to it, or, in Scholastic Language, predicates of or concerning it;—whether the Idea, thus attributed, be any Quality, Condition, or Circumstance, which the Subject may be supposed capable of, or liable to,—or whether it be any Species.

M m m 2
or *Genus,* to which the Subject may possibly belong:—as in the Instance, just before brought by Plato; where the walking Speculator combines the internal Image of that Object of his Sight, which is the Subject of his Thought or Opinion, with his own pre-conceived Notion or Idea of a Man in general; and no Ideas ever present themselves to a Human Mind naked, or stript of all Imagery.—Agen; if the Subject of our Opinion or Thought, and what we deem or think relative to that Subject, be, Each of them, a General Idea, their concomitant Images will be combined in the Imagination, and a Complex Image will thence arise. —As, for Instance, if we think concerning Man, that he is naturally mild and gentle, as being a rational and a social Animal, endowed with a natural Sense of Equity and Justice, and in Matters of Indifference, easily submitting the natural Freedom of his Actions to Laws and Government for the Common Good,—or if, on the contrary, we think him to be an Animal naturally fierce and cunning, selfish and lawless, and governable only by Force or Fear;—the Subject of Either of these Thoughts is *Human Kind,* or the General Idea of Man; and this Idea we connect in our Mind either with the General Idea of Rational Sociability, or with That of Brutish Ferocity mixed with Cunning: (for we attribute one or other of these Qualities to that Being who is the Subject of our Thought:) now in these cases, some of the external and visible Signs of the Quality so attributed will be imagined, and as it were painted within our Soul, in combination with an obscurely or imperfectly imaged Person of a Man; and probably, particular Persons, mild or fierce, Friends or Enemys, (that is, the internal Images of them,) will then occur to our Remembrance.—These Cases will also serve as Instances to shew, that Pain and Pleasure of the Soul attend our Thoughts and Opinions on Some Subjects which are General. For the Opinion unfavourable to

Human

4
Nothing is more certain.

Socrates.

The Images of true Thoughts and true Sentences, are They not true? and the Images of those which are false, are they not Themselves also false?

Protarchus.

Human Kind, fills the Heart with Jealousy and Distrust, Misanthropy and Malevolence, Sentiments and Passions painful, we presume, to all of Nature's Children. On the other hand, the contrary Opinion, the benign, while it cultivates in the Heart universal Benevolence and Philanthropy, sown there by Nature, yields at the same time a calm Pleasure con-natural to the Soul, conduces to Ease and Tranquillity of Mind and to Health of Body, inspires a Cheerfulness of Temper, and leads to the livelier Pleasures of Civil Life and Social Converse, and the delightful Dearnesses of disinterested Friendship and perfect Love.

It must be acknowleged by all thinking Persons, that the Philosopher was right, in distinguishing between That Power in the Soul, by which she receives sensible Impressions from external things,—and another Power of hers, by which she retains Such of those Impressions as she attends to:—for different Names are given to these different Powers: the First is termed Sense; the latter, Memory.—But we suspect, that many of our Readers will think him wrong, in distinguishing so greatly between the Impression which is received, and the Impression which is retained, as to call this latter the Image of the.
the former. For it is well known, that in Vision, (or the Act of seeing,) the Impression, made on the Retina of the Eye, by the Rays which are extended to it from the Object, and viewed there by the Sensitive Soul, is the Image of that Object: and it may reasonably be asked, — "Whence is it, that the Object, which is long since (perhaps) out of Sight, is often remembered as if present to the View, unless it be thro' the impress Image of it, still remaining?"—To this we answer, that the Presence of any Object of the Sight always accompanies the Impression which it makes; and that the Image, impress'd by it on the Retina, remains there no longer, than while the Object is within Sight and actually beheld: but that the Soul, if, in viewing the Object by means of its concomitant Image, she bestows on it any degree of her Attention, withdraws this Image into her Imagination, and there reviews it abstracted from its Archetype, the external Object, when this Object is vanished from her Sight.—The Image therefore in that inner Membrane of the Eye, called the Retina, is like the Image in a Mirror; it departs, on the departure of the Object which created it. — But the Image within the Soul her self, being derived from that Image which she beheld in the Retina, is nothing more than a Copy of it, the Image of an Image. Yet this Copy, imperfect as it is, and less like to the Original, being by the Memory as it were engraven, remains after the disappearing of the First Image: and abides in the Imagination for a short or a longer time in proportion to the Depth of the Engraving; and This is usually proportioned to the Strength of the Affection or Passion, raised in the Soul by that transient Image. — The Case is the same with regard to Thoughts or internal Sentences, and to their attendant Pains or Pleasures of the Soul. For the Cognisance, which the Soul takes, of any Sensible Object, thro' its Image in the Retina, is immediately followed
followed by a Thought, of What Kind or Nature the Object may be: the Thought or internal Sentence on this occasion, whatever it be, is a Combination of Images; as we observed in the preceding Note: and the Mind's Assent to the Thought makes it an Opinion.—Now this Thought, or this Opinion, may be as transient as the Object of it, and vanish together with it. But if, after the Object is away, the Soul dwells on that Combination of Images, (or rather that Complex Image,) the Thought or Opinion, she views it now in no other manner, than as it is engraven in her Imagination, together with the Pain or Pleasure, which she there feels attending it. In that Seat the Opinion and the Feeling will remain, (if the Memory and the Affection or Passion are strong enough to retain them,) how false forever the Foundation of them may be,—until from an improved Understanding and a Mind enlightened, a truer Opinion, and a juster Sense of Things come and drive them out. And farther; should the Opinion, first engraven, be entirely true,—and the Pain or Pleasure which attends it, entirely just,—(that is, should they be quite agreeable to the Nature of Things,) yet should the Mind, or Rational Soul, who entertains that true Opinion, and feels that just Sentiment, arrive afterwards at Science,—the Science, to which belong those General Ideas contained in the Opinion,—she instantly removes the Opinion out of the Imagination, which is the only Seat of all Opinions, into her own Territorys, where all true Opinions become Parts of Knowledge.—What pleasing Sentiments, abstracted from all Sensation by means of Body, attend the Rational Soul into her own proper and retired Place of Abode, are briefly mentioned in Note 3.—But whether the First Opinion be true, or false,—and whether the Beginning of it, the Thought, originally sprang from a Man's own Imagination, or was suggested to him first by some other Person, it makes no difference in the Depth.
Undoubtedly.

Now if we have pronounced thus far rightly, let us proceed to the consideration of one Point farther.

What is That?

Whether all the Operations of this Kind, such as are naturally performed within our Souls, regard only Things present and Things past, but not Things to come; or whether any of them have a Reference to these also.

Difference of Time makes no difference in these Matters.

Did we not say before, that Pleasures and Pains of the Soul, by her Self, arise in us prior to those Pleasures and Pains which affect the Body? so as that we feel antecedent Joy and Grief in the Prospect of things to come hereafter.

Depth or Durableness of the Engraving.—What the difference is between true and false Opinions, or Thoughts, see in Page 421.

See Page 404.
Very true.

Socrates.

Those Writings then, and those Engravings, which, as we held just now, are performed within us, do they respect the Past and the Present Time only? and have they no concernment with the Future?

Protarchus.

About the Future very much are they concerned, and chiefly.

Socrates.

In saying This, do you mean, that all these Things are Expectations of the Future; and that we are, All of us, throughout Life, full of Expectations?

Protarchus.

By these Things are to be understood our Thoughts and Opinions concerning what we have no Knowledge of. For of sensible things, present to our Senses, we have an actual Perception,—such a Sort of Knowledge, as Sense furnishes:—of sensible things, past or absent, we have only a Remembrance:—of intelligible things, when present to our Minds, we have a Certainty, the Certainty of Science or perfect Knowledge.—None of these Things then are Subjects of Opinion.—Our Thoughts or Opinions, therefore, as they relate to Things, of which we have neither a Sense nor a perfect Knowledge, are either of Things not yet existing, but to come;—or of Things, which never did nor ever will exist, the mere Creatures of Imagination:—or if
The very Thing I mean.

Now then, since we are thus far agreed, answer to this farther Question.

What is it?

A Man who is just and pious and intirely good, is he not beloved by the Divine Being?

Undoubtedly.

And What of the unjust and intirely bad man? is not the Reverse of it true of Him?

the Subjects of our Opinions are Things in nature now existing,—or Things which have an eternal Being in the Divine Mind;—our Perception of Those is still to come,—and the Knowledge of Those we are not, as yet, arrived at: so that the Subjects of mere Opinion are, to the Mind which entertains any Opinion, all of them future: of such a Future, the Thought or Opinion begets an Expectation; and every Expectation is attended either with Hope or with Fear, proportioned to the Pleasure or the Displeasure, which it gives to the Imagination.

Protarchus.
PHILEBUS. 465

PROTARCHUS.
How can it be otherwise?

SOCRATES.
Now every Man, as we said just now, is full of a multitude of Expectations.

PROTARCHUS.
True.

SOCRATES.
Sayings there are, written within every one of us, to which we give the name of Expectations.

PROTARCHUS.
There are.

SOCRATES.
And Phantasys also, engraven in us. Thus, for instance, a Man often sees in Imagination plenty of Money flowing in to him, and by that means many Pleasures surrounding him; and views Himself, engraven within Himself, as highly delighted.

PROTARCHUS.
That often is the case.

SOCRATES.
Of these Engravings, shall we say, that Good Men, because of the Divine Favour, have generally

those
those which are True; and Bad Men, generally those of the Contrary Sort? or shall we deny it?

Protarchus.

It cannot be denied.

285 The present Reasoning depends on these Principles: viz. that the Divine Being is Universal Truth, Truth itself; that from Him are derived to Man not only General Truths, those of Mind and Science, but the Truths of Sense also; for these consist in the constant Harmony of all Nature, and in That Agreement between the Sensæ and their Objectæ, of which He is the sole Cause:—that from a clear Perception, or a true Sense of Sensible Objectæ, joined to such a Knowledge of Intelligible Objectæ, or General Truths, as a found Mind and an upright Heart never fail of producing, arise all true Opinions, and whatever in Man's Imagination, whether pleasurable or painful, accords with Reality and the Truth of Things:—that the Standard of this Reality and Truth is the Book of Nature, open to every Man, and by the Author of it Himself explained to every Man, who with a Mind unprejudiced will attend to the Divine Interpreter within him:—and that all false Sentiments, Thoughts, and Opinions, all imaginary Pleasures and Pains, all groundless Hopes and Fears, spring from those unbounded Appetites and Passions, and those extravagant Affections, which are apt to fill a human Soul undisciplined, whose Mind is mis-informed, or its Attention drawn away from its only faithful and unerring Governor and Preceptor, the Fountain of all Truth.—From these Principles, the Positions here laid down by Socrates, in his usual way of querying, are clearly deducible, and need not any farther Proof or Illustration.

4 Socrates.
Socrates.

Bad Men then have Pleasures engraven within them also; but these are of the False Sort.

Protarchus.

No Doubt of it.

Socrates.

Wicked Men therefore delight mostly in False Pleasures; the Good, in Pleasures which are True.

Protarchus.

It must of necessity be so.

Socrates.

According to this account, there are, in the Souls of Men, such Pleasures as are False; tho' in a most ridiculous manner they imitate, and would fain pass for, True Pleasures: Pains also there are, with the like Qualities.

Protarchus.

Such Pleasures and such Pains there are.

Socrates.

May not a Man, who indulges Fancy at random, and embraces Opinions of any Kind whatever, always really
really "think and believe some Things to be, which neither are, nor ever were, and sometimes such as never will be?

Protarchus.

Certainly.

Socrates.

And they are the False Semblances and Seemings of these unreal Things, which produce in him those False Opinions, and occasion him to think thus falsely. Are they not?

Protarchus.

They are.

Socrates.

Well then; should we not say of the Pains and Pleasures, felt by those Bad Men, that their condition corresponds with the case of False Opinions?

Protarchus.

How do you mean?

In the Greek of this Sentence, before the word δει, we ought to read ωτος instead of ωτος. This appears from a Sentence soon after, concerning a Man really delighted with the Thoughts of things unreal. Both the Sentences refer to what was said in Page 444. where the same Word is used in the same Sense as it is here.
Socrates.

May not a Man, who courts and embraces Pleasure at random, Pleasure in general, of any Kind whatever, may not such a Man always really feel Delight from things which are not, and sometimes from things which never were, often too and perhaps the most frequently, from things which will never be?

Protarchus.

This must of necessity be granted.

Socrates.

Should not the same be said of Fears and Desires, and all things of the like Sort, that These also are sometimes False?

Protarchus.

Certainly.

Socrates.

Well now; can we say of Opinions, that they are Bad, or that they are Good, any otherwise than as they prove to be False, or prove to be True?

Protarchus.

287 Meaning—every such Passion of the Soul, as hath, for the Object of it, the appearance of Good or the appearance of Evil, either present or to come; from the Falsehood or the Truth of which Appearance, the Passion its self is denominated either False or True.

288 It is observed by Cornarius, that after the word ἱστῶσις in the Greek of this Sentence, all the printed Editions omit the
Protarchus.

No otherwise.

Socrates.

And I should think, that Pleasures too we apprehend not to be Bad on any other account, than as they are False.

Protarchus.

Quite the contrary, O Socrates! For hardly would any Man put to the Account of Fallhood any of the Evils brought on by Pain and Pleasure; since many and great Evils accede to them from other Quarters.

Socrates.

Pleasures, which are Evil, thro the Evil they occasion, we shall speak of by and by, if we shall continue to think it requisite: but we are now to speak of a multitude of Pleasures, felt by us, and frequently arising in us,—Pleasures which are false in yet another way 389. And this other way of considering Pleasure

the words ἔαὶ ἐλεύθερος; the Sense evidently demands them; and they are not wanting in the Medicean M. S. as appears from Ficinus's Latin Translation. See also Stephens's Annotations, page 75.

389 That is,—in a way different from That, mentioned before, in which the Pleasurabale Object was unreal and imaginary; and on that account, the Pleasure, felt from it, was considered as a False Pleasure.
we shall have occasion perhaps to make use of, in forming a right Judgment of the several Sorts of it.

**Protarchus.**

By all means let us speak of these, if any such Pleasures there are.

**Socrates.**

And there are such, O Protarchus! in My opinion. But as long as this Opinion lyes by us unexamined, 'tis impossible for it to become certain or incontestable.

**Protarchus.**

Fairly said.

**Socrates.**

Now therefore, let us advance to this other argument, like Champions to the Combat.

**Protarchus.**

Come we on then.

**Socrates.**

We said, if we remember, a little while since "9, that as long as the Wants of the Body, which are called Desires in us, remain unsatisfied, the Body all that time will be affected distinctly, and in a different manner, from the Soul.

99 See from Page 435 to Page 440.
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

We remember, that 'twas so held.

SOCRATES.

In such a Cafe, That within us, which desired 291, would be the Soul, desiring to have her Body in a State contrary to its present Condition; and That, which felt Uneasiness or Pain from the Condition it was in, would be the Body 292.

PROTARCHUS.

Things would be thus with us.

SOCRATES.

Now compute these things together, and consider the Amount.

291 We are to understand the Desire, in this Cafe, to be accompanied with Hope; agreeably to the Cafe, stated in Page 439. For the Soul is here supposed to feel Pleasure; and the Body, at the same time, to feel Pain: but a Desire hopeless would add Pain of the Soul to that of the Body.

292 The Sensitive Part of the Soul is joined so immediately to (or united with) the Body, that to all Human as well as other Sentient Beings the Body seems to be the Seat and the Subject of all Sensual Pain and Pleasure. But Desire is universally acknowledged to belong to the Soul only, as distinct from the Body. And by the word Soul, in the present Passage, only the Appetitive Part of the Soul is meant.

Protarchus.
Protarchus.

Say, What.

Socrates.

In such a case, it comes out, that Pains and Pleasures are placed together, each by the other’s side; and that together, each by the other’s side, arise in us a Feeling of Emptiness, and a Desire of its contrary, Fullness: for so it has just now appeared.

Protarchus.

’Tis indeed apparent.

Socrates.

Has not This also been said? and does it not remain with us a Point, settled between us by agreement?

Protarchus.

What?

Socrates.

That Pain and Pleasure, Both of them, admit of the More and of the Less; and that they Both are of the Infinites.

Protarchus.

It was so said and agreed.

Socrates.

293 See Note 291.

294 In the Greek,—ἐγκαινία,—to which are added these two short words,—τι ποιεῖ,—without dispute;—an expression, frequently
474 PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

Is there not then some Way, in which we may judge of Pain and Pleasure rightly?

PROTARCHUS.

sequently occurring in all such Dialogues of Plato as are of the Inquisitive or Inquiring Kind, particularly in This; and very proper in the Mouth of the Party questioned, where the Subject of the Question asked is an Opinion universally received. But where the Subject of the Question is a Matter of Fact well known, or a Thing said but just before, and agreed in by Both the Parties, (as in the present case,) the expression is unusual, and if not quite improper, is at least superfluous. Here therefore we suspect an Error in the Text; and shall endeavour to account for and rectify it in the next Note.

\[295\] In the Greek,—Τις ἐν μνήμην ἡ ἰ. τ. λ. What Way then can be contrived, &c.—Cornarius and Grou, in translating the Question, here put by Socrates, adhere to this Reading of it. But, if This were right, then the next words of Protarchus, instead of being an Answer to the Question, would amount to nothing more than a retorting of the same Question back again to Socrates.—Ficinus and Serranus, together with Grynaeus and Bembo, make this Sentence, not Interrogative, but Positive, thus,—

"There is then some Way, &c."—But the Greek Words admit not this Interpretation; for the Indefinite τις (Some) never, we believe, begins a Sentence.—Yet as the Passage stands at present, it seems, that every Interpreter must of necessity adopt either the one or the other of these wrong Interpretations. But Both of them may be avoided by a very slight alteration of the Greek Text; that is, by taking from Protarchus the words τι μνη, and transferring them to Socrates,
Protarchus.

What Way, and how do you mean?

Socrates.

In judging of them, are we not wont, in every case, readily to try them by these marks,—Which of them is the Greater, and Which is the Less,—Which of them hath the Nature of its Kind the most,—and Which is more Intense than the other,—in comparing either a Pain with a Pleasure, or one Pain with another Pain, or one Pleasure with another Pleasure 296?

Protarchus.

Such Comparisons are often made; and from these Comparisons we are wont to form our Judgment and our Choice.

with the omission only of the last Letter in μίν. The Sentence will then stand thus;—"Τι μίτις ἐν μεγαλῇ Χ. Τ. Λ. Well, is there not then some Way, &c."

296 This Sentence may be either taken as Interrogative, according to all the Translations of it into Latin, French, and Italian;—or it may be taken as Conditional: in the latter case, at the beginning of it, a few words, connecting it with what precedes, are to be understood; as thus;—("The Way appears plain,) if, in judging of them, we are wont, in every case, readily to try them, &c."—And indeed thus the Sentence more easily is seen to be what it really is, — an Answer to the Question of Protarchus,—than it would be, were it a new Interrogatory.

Socrates.
Socrates.

Well now; in the case of Magnitudes, does not the Distance of visible Objects, Some of which are seen remote and Others near, render their real Magnitudes uncertain, obscuring the Truth of things, and producing false Opinions? and does not the same thing hold true with regard to Pains and Pleasures? is not the same Effect produced by the same Means in this case also?

Protarchus.

Much more feelingly, O Socrates!

Socrates.

But in this case, it happens contrary to what was in the case, mentioned a little before 297.

Protarchus.

What happens, say you?

Socrates.

In that case, the true and the false Opinions, entertained by us, impart to the Pains and Pleasures,

297 See in Page 451. — Stephens's Edition follows That of Aldus, in attributing this Sentence to Protarchus; an Error, the more inexcusable, in that the Two Basil Editions, Both of them prior to That of Stephens, agree with Ficinus in ascribing it to Socrates, to whom it undoubtedly belongs.
which attend them, their own Qualities of Truth and Falshood.

Protarchus.

Very right.

Socrates.

But in the case, which I am now speaking of, the Pains and Pleasures, being viewed afar off and near, continually changing [their Aspects with their Distances], and being set in comparison together, [it happens, that] the Pleasures [at hand], compared with the [remote] Pains, appear greater and more intense [than they really are], and [that] the Pains, compared with the Pleasures, [have an appearance] quite the contrary 298.

Protarchus.

298 The Pains and Pleasures, meant in the former case, arise in us from certain Notions or Opinions: that is, certain Notions or Opinions there are, which give us Uneasiness, Grief and Sadness; and from certain other we receive Comfort, Joy, and Delight. If therefore the Opinion, on which entirely depend any Pains or Pleasures of the Soul, be false, those Pains or Pleasures must be false themselves, as being merely imaginary. But in the case now put by Socrates, the Pains and Pleasures are supposed to be real in a certain degree, and from a natural necessity must be felt in a short or a longer time to come. These Pains however and these Pleasures, being by the Imagination exaggerated beyond their real Magnitude, or diminished to a Size below it, are so far false, as they either exceed, or fall short of, the reality of the Feeling, when it comes to be present.
sent. So that the Pains and the Pleasures, here spoken of, are false, as well as those in the former case; but their Falsity is of a different Nature, and proceeds from a different Cause.—Those are false entirely and essentially: These are only false in their apparent Magnitude. — The Cause of that total Falsity in the former is an Error of our own Judgement concerning the Subjects of our Opinion: the partial Falsity of the latter is owing to the nearness or remoteness of that Distance from our Selves, at which we view the Pleasure and the Pain, Each of them severally, in our Imagination, whenever we chuse to set them in comparison together: for they are there placed at different Distances, not by Foresight and Prudence, but by Desire and Fear, according to the present Predominance of either of their Passions. And as the Strength or Weakness of the Passion creates the imaginary Distance of its Object, so the nearness or remoteness of this Distance creates the imaginary Quantum of the Object; and the seeming Magnitude of This is still more increased, or its seeming Minuteness is still more diminished, by the comparison, made with its Antagonist. — The Instance of this, here brought by Plato, is when Pleasure appears to be at hand, and Pain to be remote, rather than in the contrary appearances of Both, for this reason, — because the Falsity of some Kinds of Pleasure is the immediate Subject of this Part of the Dialogue. The Conclusion, however, drawn from hence, in the next Sentence of Socrates, includes an imaginary and false Magnitude of both Pain and Pleasure.—The learned Reader, if he compares the Sentence, now before him, with the Greek, will observe it to be somewhat enlarged in the English. The additional Words, inclosed within Hooks, were left by Plato to be supplied by his Reader's own Understanding. But, as our modern Style of Composition admits not of such Ellipses, the Words, omitted in the Greek, are inserted
Protarchus.

Such appearances must of necessity arise by these means.

Socrates.

As far therefore as the Pains and Pleasures appear less or greater than they really are, if from the Reality you separate this Appearance of what Neither of them is, and take it by its Self thus separated, you will not say that 'tis a Right Appearance; nor will you venture to assert, that this Additional Part of Pain and Pleasure is right and true.

Protarchus.

By no means.

Socrates.

After these discoveries, let us look, if we can meet with Pleasures and Pains, still saller, and more remote from truth, than those already mentioned, which are not only in Appearance what they are called, but are felt also by the Soul 299.

FERRED IN THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION FOR THE SAKE OF PERSPICUITY. For, that these Words, or others of like Import, are to be understood as if they were expressed in this Sentence, may appear from the present explanatory Note.

299 Felt in the Imagination, or Imaginative Part of the Soul. — See Page 469.
Protarchus.

What Pleasures and Pains do you speak of?

Socrates.

We have more than once said, that when the Frame of any Animal is on its way to Dissolution, thro' Mixtures and Separations, Repletions and Evacuations, the Increase of some and the Diminution of other Parts of it, that in such a Condition of its Body, Pains, Achs, and Oppressions, with many other uneasy Feelings to which are given various Names, are wont to arise in us 300.

Protarchus.

True; this Observation has been again and again repeated.

Socrates.

And that, when all things in our Bodily Frame return to their natural and sound State, together with this Recovery, we receive some Pleasure from within our Selves.

Protarchus.

Right.

Socrates.

But how is it, when none of these Changes are operating in our Bodys?

300 See Pages 401, and 431, &c.
PHILEBUS. 481

PROTARCHUS.
At what times, O Socrates! may This be?

SOCRATES.
The Question, O Protarchus! which you have now put to me, is nothing to the Purpose.

PROTARCHUS.
Why not?

SOCRATES.
Because it will not hinder me from putting again My Question to You.

PROTARCHUS.
Repeat it then.

SOCRATES.
I shall put it thus: If at any time, none of those things were passing within us, What condition should we of necessity be in, as to Pleasure and Pain, at such a time?

PROTARCHUS.
When no Motion was in the Body Either way, do you mean?

301 In the Greek, to read μαλῶσαῖ seems preferable to the printed Reading, which is μαλῶσει.

302 That is,—when the Body is neither in such a condition as tends to its Dissolution,—nor, on the other hand, in such a condition as tends to the recovery of its Health and Soundness, after they have been injured.

Socrates.
Exactly so.

Protarchus.

It is plain, O Socrates! that we should feel neither any Pleasure, nor any Pain, at such a time.

Socrates.

Perfectly well answered. But now in Your Question I suppose You meant This,—that some or other of those things were of necessity passing within us, continually at all times; agreeably to this Saying of the Wise,—"that all things are in perpetual Flow, going upward and downward." 303

Protarchus.

So they tell us: and this Saying of theirs is, methinks, worthy of Regard.

Socrates.

Undoubtedly it is: for 'tis said by Men, who are worthy, Themselves, to be regarded 304. But this

303 See the Dissertation concerning the Doctrine of Heraclitus, Page 17.

304 It is affirmed by Socrates, in Plato's Thaetetus, page 152, Edit: Steph: that the Wise Men, (that is, the Philosophers,) in a continued Succession, All except Parmenides, (who stands for the whole Eleatic Sect, of which He was the Founder,) agree in asserting the Inflability of all things; that is, of all things in the Corporeal World, or Outward Nature.
Subject, which we have thus lighted on, I would willingly decline. Now I have it in my thoughts to avoid it This way; but You must accompany me.

Protarchus.

What way?

Socrates.

Be it so then, let us say to these Wise Men: but You, Protarchus! answer me to This Question: Do Animals feel all the Alterations which they continually undergo? or whilst we are growing, or suffering in any Part of our Bodys any other Change, are we sensible of these internal Motions? Is not quite the contrary true? for almost every thing of this Kind, passing within us, passes without our Knowledge.

Protarchus.

Certainly so.

Socrates.

It was therefore not right in us to say; as we did just now, that all the Alterations which happen to our Bodys, and all the Motions within them, produce either Pains or Pleasures.

Protarchus.

Certainly not right.

Socrates.
And it would be better, and less liable to Censure, to lay down this Position.

Protarchus.

What Position?

Socrates.

That Great Changes within give us Pains and Pleasures; but that such as are Inconsiderable, or only Moderate, produce neither Pleasures nor Pains.

Protarchus.

This is more justly said, than the other Sentence, indeed, Socrates!

Socrates.

If then these things are so, we meet with the Life, mentioned before, recurring to us here again.

Protarchus.

What Life?

Socrates.

That which is exempt from all Sensations both of Pain and Pleasure 395.

Protarchus.

Very true.

395 See Page 408.
Socrates.

Hence we find, there are three Kinds of Life proposed to our consideration; One of them, full of Pleasure; Another, full of Pain; the Third, Neutral, and free from Both. Or how otherwise would You determine upon these Points?

Protarchus.

No otherwise I for My part: for Three different Kinds of Life appear to Me in what has been said.

Socrates.

To have no Pain therefore cannot be the same thing as to have Pleasure.

Protarchus.

Certainly it cannot.

Socrates.

But whenever you hear a man say, that 'tis the most pleasurable of all things, to live all one's Life free from Pain, What do you take to be His Thought and Meaning?

Protarchus.

He means and thinks, as I take it, that 'tis a Pleasure not to have any Pain.
Socrates.

Well now; let there be any Three Things whatever; to instance in Things of honourable name, let us suppose One of them to be Gold, Another to be Silver, and the Third to be neither Gold nor Silver.

Protarchus.

We shall suppose so.

Socrates.

That which is Neither, is it possible for it any way to become either Gold or Silver?

Protarchus.

By no means.

Socrates.

The Middle Life therefore, if 'twere said to be pleasurable, or if 'twere said to be painful, would not be spoken of, in either way, rightly and agreeably to the true Nature of Things; nor would any Person, who entertains Either of those Opinions concerning it, think rightly.

Protarchus.

Certainly not.

Socrates.
PHILEBUS.  487

SOCRATES.

And yet, my Friend! we find that there are Persons, who actually speak and think thus amiss 306.

PROTARCHUS.

306 Hence it appears, that in the time of Socrates, when Men of Leisure began to be much addicted to Philosophical Studies and Discourses, in many Grecian Countries, and particularly at Athens, the chief Seat of all Philosophy for several Ages, from that time, Persons there were, who, like Epicurus, tho long before him, held, that between Pleasure and Pain there is no Medium; for that to be free from Pain, is not only a Pleasure, but the very Height and Consummation of Pleasure: as may be seen from the Reasoning of Torquatus an Epicurean, in Cicero de Finibus Bon: & Mal: L. i, §. 11. — But Who were the Persons, alluded to here by Socrates, and What Sect of Philosophers in His time held so paradoxical a Tenet, or rather, used the Term Pleasure in so new and strange a Sense, we are at a loss to conjecture,—unless they were Some of the Cyrenaicks. — And yet we learn from Cicero in his Treatise above cited, from Laertius also in L. 2, §. 89, and from Sextus Empiricus, pag: 411, that the Cyrenaicks thought like Socrates on this Subject; and spake of it in Terms, such as those which had been used by Him. — Sextus delivereth their Sentiments in these words,—πάντων τῶν ὑπότων, τὰ πάντα κριτήρια εἶναι τῆς τῶν πάθων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡσύχα, τὰ δὲ, ἀληθεῖα, τὰ δὲ, μεταξὺ. Τὰ μὲν ἀληθεῖα, κακὰ φασὶν ἔ παι τὰ δὲ ἡσύχα, ἀγαθὰ: τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ, ὑπὲρ ἀγαθᾶ, ὑπὲρ κακᾶ. And again;—ὑπὲρ ἀγαθῶν, ὑπὲρ κακῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐστὶ μεταξὺ ἡσύχας καὶ ἀγαθῶν. The Passions of Man (or the Feelings of his Soul) are (to Him,) the Criteria and Boundaries of the Good and Evil of all things. Of
the Passions (or Feelings of the Soul) Some are pleasurable; Some, painful; Others, between Both. The painful, say They, are evil; the pleasurable, good; those between Both are neither good nor evil. And the Condition of a Man between Both, in which he feels neither Pleasure nor Pain, is neither good nor evil.—

Laertius, speaking of their Opinions, says,— ἵ τῶς ἀληθῶς ὑπεξαίρεσις δεότι αὐτῶς μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον, ὧς ἡ ἀνθοχία ἀληθῶς ἐν πλήσει γὰρ εἶναι ἀμφότερον μὴ ἐστι τὰς ἀποικίας ἡ τὰς ἀνθοχίας κυμάσως ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀνθοχία ἀιονεὶ καθεύδουσι ἵππα κατάτασις.—μέσα τε κατάτασες ὅνομαξον ἀνθοχία ταῖς ἀποικίαις. The Removal of That, which gives Pain, they deem not to be Pleasure; nor the Privation of Pleasure deem they to be Pain: for that Pleasure and Pain Both, say they, consist in Motion: but the Absence of either Pain or Pleasure is not any Kind of Motion. The Absence of them Both is like the State of a Man soundly asleep. This therefore they termed a Middle or Indifferent State of Being.—Now concerning this Middle or Neutral State of the Soul.—a State of pure Tranquillity, and perfectly serene,— That State, which according to Socrates in this Dialogue, page 408, is the most Divine,— That, in which Hieronymus the Rhodian placed the Sovereign Good, and which Epicurus deemed to be the Higheft of all Pleasures,—we are told in general by Cicero and by Sextus, as we have just now acknowledged, that the Reality of this State is held by the Cyrenaicks: but 'tis observable, that by Laertius it is recorded among the Tenets of Those only of the Cyrenaicks, who continued in the Institutes of Arifippus, ἐπι τῇς ἀγωγὴς τῇς Ἀρείπτων μαίνατες, and were alone peculiarly and properly termed Cyrenaicks. For, though the Disciples of this celebrated Cyrenecan persifted, all of them alike, in his Capital Doctrine,— that "Pleasure is the sole Good and End of Human Life,"—yet, as they differed, one from another, about some of the Means fit for the procuring of this End, (One Party, for instance, admitting the Study of Logick and Physicks, Others rejecting them;) and One Party recommending.
recommending *Friendship* and *Patriotism*, Others renouncing them; so 'tis probable, that the different Partys, into which they were divided, used the Term *Pleasure* in different Senses; and that, while it was confined by Some to signify *Sensual Pleasure* only, which is common to all *Animals*, Others enlarged its Meaning, so as to comprehend all those *Enjoyments*, which are peculiar to the *Soul of Man*, and are mentioned in Note 3.—Certain it is, that in the Life-time of *Plato*, the *Cyrenaicks* were divided into Four Partys, severally named from their immediate Heads or Leaders,—the Theodorians, from Theodore,—the Hegesians, from Hegesias,—the Annicerians, from Anniccris,—and the genuine *Cyrenaicks*, who were strict followers of Arisippus, the Founder and prime Leader of all the Four. —This their partial *Disagreement* gave occasion, perhaps, to the Charge, brought against them by Some Persons, as we are informed by *Sextus*, pag. 372, — the Charge of *Inconstancy* or *Inconstance*. For the different Partys retaining, but for a short time only, the particular Names by which they were distinguished, soon became, All of them, included in their general and original Name, *Cyrenaicks*. In all likelyhood, they either laid aside or lost those Names of Distinction, by uniting in the Defence of that Doctrine, common to them all, — the supreme *Happiness* of enjoying *Pleasure*,—against those formidable Enemys of theirs, the *Stoicks*, whose Sect arose soon after the death of *Plato*. But however This may have been, 'tis certain that, in a short course of time, all the *Cyrenaicks* were easily absorbed in the wide-spreading Sect, founded by *Epicurus*. For the Principles of his Doctrine, in *Ethicks*, agreed entirely well with Theirs: and his amiable Manners attracted to him all the Grecian Youth, whose Genius led them to *Philosophy*; but whose *Love of Ease* deterred them from undergoing the *rigid Discipline* of severer *Moralists*; or
It is very evident.

Do these Persons really feel Pleasure, whenever they are free from Pain?

whose humbler Thoughts, confined to Body and the Corporeal World, aspired not to contemplate the nature of Mind and Science, or to investigate the Principles of all Kinds of Reasoning. — The Epicureans also were not less unsettled in their Notions of Pleasure, than the Cyrenaicks had been; as we observed in page 34 of the present Dialogue. But this Inconstancy never broke the Harmony of the Epicurean Sect; the reasons of which probably were these; — that from the time of its Beginning, it always had to combat with the Stoicks; — and that All, who adhered to it, were Worshippers of the same Deity,—the multiform Deity of Pleasure,—as the sole Cause (the Efficient, Formal, and Final Cause) of all Good to Man. Accordingly, all the Epicureans, without Distinction, are by Ammonius and Simplicius, in their Comments on the Categories, styled 

\[\varepsilon\omega\delta\iota \iota, \text{Voluptuaries (in Theory)}\] — an Appellation, very properly given long before by Cebes, in his Picture of Human Life, to all the Cyrenaicks, tho at that time they were divided into Partys.

307 We have ventured to suppose an Error in the Greek of this Passage; and that we ought to read \[\chi\iota\iota\iota\nu \vartheta\iota\iota\iota\], instead of the printed words, — \[\chi\iota\iota\iota\nu \iota\iota\iota\iota\iota\]. For without such an alteration, Socrates, in his next Sentence, (where these very words — \[\chi\iota\iota\iota\nu \iota\iota\iota\iota\iota\] — appear again, and where they are very proper,)
Protarchus.
So they say.

Socrates.
They must imagine then, that they are pleased; for otherwise they would not say so.

Protarchus.
They do, it seems, imagine it.

Socrates.
They have a wrong Opinion then of Pleasure; if it be true, that Pleasure, and Freedom from Pain, have Each a distinct Nature, different from that of the Other.

Protarchus.
Different indeed we have concluded them to be.

Socrates.
And are we willing to abide by our late Conclusion, that the Subjects, still under examination, are Three distinct Things? or do we choose to say, that they are only Two? do we now say, that Pain is Man's Evil, and that Deliverance from Pain is Man's Good, and is That to which is given the appellation of Pleasure?

proper,) is guilty of mere Tautology; and his argumentation proceeds not the least Step, but halts during that whole Sentence.

protarchus.
How come we, O Socrates! to propose this Point to be reconsidered by us now? for I do not apprehend your Drift.

In fact, O Protarchus! you do not apprehend, Who are the direct Enemys to Philebus.

Whom do you give that Character to?

Persons, who are said to have a profound Knowlege of Nature: and these Persons say, that Pleasures have no reality at all.

Meaning absolute, and positive Pleasures, independant of Pains.—We have no doubt, but that the Persons, here meant, were Antisthenes and some of his Disciples. To this Opinion we have been led by the following considerations.—In the first place, the Persons, spoken of, are characterised by their aversion to Pleasures; that is, to Those Pleasures, which are preceded naturally by Pains; for only Such answer to the Description here given. And indeed the Pleasures of this Sort, whether those of the Body and Soul jointly, or those of the Soul alone, are always great, in proportion to the greatness of the Pains preceding them. As therefore vehement Pains are felt by the Soul, when her Body suffers in a high degree any such
such Alterations, as are mentioned before in page 401, &c.;— proportionably vehement are the Pleasures, which attend the Deliverance from those Pains, thro contrary Alterations in the Body. — And as the Soul is also tormented by her own imaginary Wants and immoderate Desires, — the Removal of that Torment, by a Supply of those Wants, or a Gratification of those Desires, is apt to affect her with so tumultuous a Joy, as sometimes to overwhelm her Reason.—In the former case, those extravagant Pleasures of Sense, which succeed to Sensible Pains, tend to relax the Nerves, and to weaken the Vigour of the Body. — And in the latter case, extravagant Joys, succeeding to high Passions of the contrary Kind, have a tendency to weaken the Understanding, and to loosen (as it were) the Joints of the whole Soul.—When both these cases concur, as they sometimes do, all Strength of the Mind is wont to be dissolved, the Power of Judgment totally to fail, and every Faculty of the Soul to become engaged in the Pursuit of the like Pleasure and the like Joy for ever after. — Such Pleasures and Such Joys as These, we presume that Antisthenes had a view to, in this celebrated Saying of His,—ματέείν μαλλον ὑπεδέειν, I had rather have my Soul seized with Madness, than possessed by Pleasure. The Severity of the Sentiment, and the Harshness of the Expression, are quite agreeable to the rigorous Discipline, the rugged Manners, and the rough Language of the Cynic Sect, founded by Antisthenes: nor less exactly do they correspond with what Socrates says, presently after, of the Persons whom he is here speaking of.—The great Respect which he soon professes for them, and the high Character which he is about to give them, in likening them to Men inspired by the God of Wisdom, are farther Reasons for our Supposition. For between Socrates and Antisthenes subsisted the truest Friendship, That which is built on the Similarity of Two Minds, wholly devoted,
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

What do they mean?

SOCRATES.

They say, that all those things, which Philebus and his Party call Pleasures, are but Deliverances from Pain.

devoted, Each of them, to the Search of Truth, the Study of Wisdom, and the Practice of every Virtue necessary to the Happiness of Private Life, and to the very Being of Civil Society. Hence it was, that Antisthenes recommended to his own Disciples, to become Followers and Hearers of Socrates; ingenuously professing himself to have been advanced in Wisdom by His Converse. — Our last Argument to prove, that Socrates meant, by the Adversaries of Pleasure, his great Friend, and the peculiar Disciples of this Friend, is the Description which he gives of them, in the Sentence now before us,—that they are Persons, δευτεραμονη τα πεποιημεν, said to be profound in the Knowledge of Nature. For, that Antisthenes answered to this Description, better than any other Athenian contemporary with Socrates, or than any Foreigner who in that age philosophised at Athens, must be acknowledg'd by all true Theists, if they are versed in the History of Philosophy; and if also they have read the only remaining Fragment of the Treatise of Antisthenes, πεποιημεν, as it is translated by Cicero in his First Book de Naturâ Deorum, §. 13,—“populares Deos esse multos, naturalem esse unum,” — that the Gods of the People are many, the God of Nature is only One.

PROTARCHUS.
Protarchus.

Is it Your Advice then, O Socrates! that we should hearken to these Persons? or how otherwise?

Socrates.

Not so; but to consider them as a Kind of Diviners, who divine not according to any Rules of Art; but from the Austerity of a certain Genius in

399 The various Modes of Divination, practised anciently in Greece, are rightly comprehended, all of them, in Two Kinds, the Artificial and the Enthusiastic. Of the First Kind, were the Inspectors of the Entrails of Beasts sacrificed, the Observers of the Flight of certain Birds, the Interpreters of Dreams, and many other Sorts of Artificial Diviners; All of whom prognosticatet future Events, from the Rules of their several Arts, taught them by Human Masters. The Diviners of the Second Kind, the Enthusiastic, are distinguished into Two Sorts;—into Those, who delivered the Oracles of the Gods, given in their Temples,—and Those, who were inspired by some God within Themselves. Mention is made of Both these Sorts in the Apology of Socrates, where they are called, the former Sort χρησμοφόροι, the latter θεοματεῖς. Socrates there likens to them the Poets; for that These compose their Poems ὑπὸ σοφίας, not from any Wisdom, or Skill in the Subjects on which they write, ἀλλὰ φύσει τιν καὶ ἐνθυθαλκάστης, but from a Kind of Natural Genius, aided by Enthusiasm. And he here likens to those Enthusiastic Diviners, especially to Those of the latter Sort, Antisthenes and his Disciples, for much the same reason; These not
not having learnt their Doctrine from any Human Master of Science. For, if they had, they would have been taught to make a more Sciential and accurate Distinction between Pain and Pleasure: they would have known them Both to be equally Sensations, (if in the Body,) or Sentiments, (if in the Soul only,) but of two contrary Kinds: they would not have confounded the Feeling of Pleasure with the Deliverance from (a mere Absence of) the contrary Feeling, that of Pain: they would have placed, between Pain and Pleasure, as Socrates had done, an Insensibility to Either: They would also, like Socrates, have assigned the Causes of those contrary Feelings; and have described the Alterations made in the Body at the time of Each, and the Tendency of those Alterations.——Now, to confirm the Judgment of Socrates concerning the Cynicks, — that they philosophised ἵνα τέκνα, not from Art, or any Human Teaching,—we are informed, in the Emperor Julian's Sixth Oration, that the Cynicks disowned Antisthenes, Diogenes, and every other Man, as the ἀρχής First Leader of their Sect, or Founder of their Discipline; acknowledging no Teacher, beside the God of Wisdom; and affirming, that He it was, who prescribed the Way of Life peculiar to them, in this Symbolical Precept, εἰς τὸ νόμισμα, "Efface the current Coin:" — by which it was signified, that Whoever would attain to Wisdom, must not conform his Notions to Popular Opinions, nor the Conduct of his Life to Public Manners, or the Fashionable way of Living; but should erase out of his Mind all Impressions, made by any Teaching, except the Teaching of That Oracle within Himself, which is Divine. They owned therefore the Divinity of the Delphic Sentence,—γνώθι σεαυτόν, "Know thy Self," — only because God, they said, dictated to Them the fame Precept.——But besides their own disclaiming of all Human Instruction, the learned Emperor, (to whom we are indebted
in them not ignoble 319, have conceived an Aversion to the Power of Pleasure; and deem Nothing in her
delected for this Piece of Information concerning their above-mentioned peculiar Maxim,) taking upon himself the Office of Advocate for them, cites, in Their Behalf, the well-known Saying of Heraclitus,—πολυμαζεθε νησεν ε δισεφε, “Much Learning doth not teach good Sense.”——What Socrates meant farther, in flying them Prophets or Diviners, may appear, from considering the consequences of what he said before in this Dialogue,—viz. “that a Life of Insensibility to Pain and Pleasure is of all Lives the most Godlike: — for thence it follows, that such a Life is the Portion of those Beings, whose Nature is nearest to That of The Supream; and that 'twill also be hereafter the Portion of all Those, who may perhaps, in time, arrive at a State so exalted. —The Cynic Philosophers aimed at such a State of Life here on Earth. And indeed, could a Man live well and happily, independant on Domestic and Civil Society,—did not his natural Inclinats and Affections strongly incline him, and his natural Wants forcibly impell him, to a Conjugal, Social, and Civil Life,—were he not a Political as well as a Rational Animal,— and were the Cynical Life a Life designed by Nature for any Human Being,—we should make no Scruple of pronouncing it the happiest of all Human Lives. — For a well-drawn Sketch of it, we refer the learned Reader to Maximus the Tyrian his thirty-sixth Dissertation, as numbered by Dr. Davis.

319 Meaning—a Genius the most noble.—Concerning this Figure of Speech, see Note 218. — It is remarkable, that Julian useth the same Figure, in writing on the same Subject. For
to be Solid; but all her attractive Charms to be mere Illusions, and not [true] Pleasure. It is thus that we should regard these Persons, especially if we consider their other harsh Maxims. You shall in the next place hear, What Pleasures seem to Me to be True Pleasures: so that, from Both the Accounts, compared together, we may find out the nature of Pleasure, and form our Judgment of her comparative Value.

Protarchus.

Rightly said.

Socrates.

Let us then follow after them, as our Allies, wherever their Austerity shall lead us. For I suppose, they would begin their Argument with some General Principle, and propound to us some such Question as

his account of the Cynic Philosophy, in his Sixth Oration, is ushered in by this general Character of it,—ἀδικοὶ ψιλοσοφίας ἐτι φαντάτωρ, ἀδίκημοτατος, ἀλλὰ τοῖς κρατίσεις εἰόμισθον,—that 'tis none of the meanest or most ignoble Species (or Sects) of Philosophy, but comparable to (or a Match for) the most excellent.—In which Sentence, the beautiful Contrast between the Two Parts of it is very suitable to the florid Style of a Declamatory Dissertation; as all the λόγοι of Julian are; (Compositions very fashionable in those days;) but like other Gorgiasms, it would much enervate the proper Style of Dialogues, such as Plato's; the Energy of which consists in Metaphors, and other Strong Figures of Speech, laconically expressed, and unexplained by the Writer.

This;
This;—Whether, if we had a mind "to know the Nature of any particular Quality of things, for instance, the nature of the Hard, whether or no we should not comprehend it better, by examining the hardest things, than we should by scrutinising a various multitude of the less hard. Now, Protarchus! you must make an Answer to these austerer Persons, as if you were making it to Me.

Protarchus.

By all means: and I make this Answer to them,—that to examine such Bodys, as exceed all others in Hardness, is the better way.

Socrates.

In like manner then, if we had a mind to know the nature of Pleasure in general, we are not to con-

311 In all the Editions of the Greek, we here read—βολαρ, σειμεν,—but the Sense of this Passage will direct us to read—βωλυσείμεν (one word):—and it appears to have been so understood by Ficinus, Grynaeus, and Serranus, as well as lately by M. Grou; tho otherwise by Cornarius and Bembo.——This Observation, with many Others of like Kind in the Course of our Notes to Plato, we offer to all Readers of the Greek Original; but more especially to Thofe, who may oblige some future age with a more accurate Edition of it, than has yet been given.
sider the multitude of little or mean Pleasures, but those only which are called extream and exquisite.

Protarchus.

Every man would grant you the truth of this your present Argument.

Socrates.

The Pleasures which are always within our Reach, those which we often call the greatest, do they not belong to the Body?

Protarchus.

There is no doubt of it.

Socrates.

Are the [Bodily] Pleasures, which are produced in those Persons who labour under Diseases, greater than the Pleasures [of the same Kind] felt by Those who are in Health? Now let us take Care not to err, by making too precipitate an Answer.

Protarchus.

What danger is there of erring?

312 In the Greek of this Sentence, all the Translators, except Serranus, seem to agree with Us, in reading ταῦτα, and not (as printed in all the Editions of Plato,) ταὐτη.
SOCRATES.

Perhaps we might pronounce in favour of those who are in Health.

PROTARCHUS.

Probably we should.

SOCRATES.

But what? are not those Pleasures the most excessive, which are preceded by the strongest Desires?

PROTARCHUS.

This cannot be denied.

SOCRATES.

The Afflicted with Fevers, or with Diseases of kin to Fevers 313, are they not more thirsty than other Persons? do they not more shake with Cold? and suffer they not, in a greater degree, other Evils 314 which the Body is subject to? do they not feel their Wants more pressing? and feel they not greater Pleasures,

313 Meaning, as we presume, Such as are attended usually with a Kind of Fever,—as Gouts and Rheumatism, Putrid Maladies, and Obstructions of the Viscera.

314 Viz. Inappetency, Indigestion, Costiveness, &c.
when they have those Wants supplied? Or shall we deny all this to be True?

Protarchus.

Your representation of those cases clearly is right.

Socrates.

Well then; should we not be clearly right in saying, that Whoever would know What Pleasures are the greatest, must not go to the Healthy, but to the Sick, to look for them? Be careful now, not to imagine the Meaning of my Question to be this,—whether the Sick enjoy Pleasures more, in Number, than the Healthy: but consider me as inquiring into high Degrees of Pleasure; and by what Means, and in what Subjects, the Vehemence or Extreme of it always is produced. For we are to find out, we say, What the Nature is of Pleasure, and What those Persons mean by Pleasure, who pretend that no such thing as Pleasure has any Being at all.

Protarchus.

Tolerably well do I apprehend your Argument.

In all the Editions of the Greek, we here read ἀπό-πληρωμένων but certainly we ought to read ἀπόπληρωμένων.

We are to observe, that the Philosopher is here speaking only of Pleasures belonging to the Body: Pleasures of the Soul he will examine afterwards.
Socrates.

And possibly, O Protarchus! you will equally well show the Truth of it. For tell me; in a Life of boundless Luxury see you not greater Pleasures, (I do not mean more in Number, but more intense and vehement,) than those in the Life of Temperance? Give your Mind to the Question first, and then answer.

Protarchus.

I apprehend what you say: and the great superiority of the Pleasures, enjoyed in a Luxurious Life, I easily discern. For Sober and Temperate Persons are on all occasions under the Restraint of That Maxim, now become a Proverb, which advises them to avoid the Too Much of Any thing; to which Advice they are

317 In the Greek—Μετ' ἡμῶν ἄφαρτον. This most excellent Saying, which recommends Moderation, or due Measure, to be observed in all things, is numbered among the Grecian Proverbs by Erasmus and by Schottus. The Author of it, according to some ancient Writers, was Solon; Others attribute the Origin of it to Thales; and Aristotle is generally understood to have ascribed it to Chilo: but perhaps Aristotle, by calling it Χιλιάδες, as he does in his Art of Rhetorick, Lib: 2, only meant, that 'twas a Saying frequently in the mouth of Chilo. Indeed 'tis probable, that only on the like account the Honour of it was given to Any of the old Grecian Sages in

S s s

par-
are obedient. But an Excess of Pleasure, even to
Madness, poffeffing the Souls of the Unwise and In-
temperate, as it makes them frantic, it makes them
conspicuous, and famed for being Men of Pleasure.

Socrates.

Well faid. If this then be the cafe, 'tis evident,
that the greateft Pleasures, as well as the greateft
particular. For the Antiquity of it seems to have been much
earlier than the Age of the celebrated Seven. See Erasimus's
learned Explication of the ancient Adages. And 'tis reasonable
to fuppofe, that the firft Speeches of Philosophy, in her Infant-
State, were short and fententious, comprehending, in a very
few energetic Words, very deep or sublime or extensive Mean-
ings. Now 'tis certain, that no Sentence can be fhorter, than
the Sentence now before us: for it confifts only of Two Words.
And no Sentiment can be more comprehensive, more profound,
or more sublime, than the Sentiment conveyed in those Two
Words: for it not only extends its regulating Influence to all
Human Energys and Actions, — as it fets the proper Bounds to
them, refcpecting the End and Defign of Each,—but alsο it is
the Law, obferved by Nature in the forming of all her Works:
it hath its Foundation therefore deep in the Nature of Things:
and it lifts up our Thoughts on high to Nature's Caufe, — to
the great Legiflator of the Universe: — all which Excellencys it
will be found to have, when we fhall be led to the confideration of it again, in the latter Part of this moral and di-
vine Dialogue.
Pains, are produced in a morbid and vitious Disposition of the Soul or of the Body; and not, when they are in their sound and right State.

**Protarchus.**

Certainly so.

**Socrates.**

Ought we not then to instance in some of these Pleasures, and to consider What Circumstances attend them, on account of which it is, that they are styled the Greatest?

**Protarchus.**

That must be done.

**Socrates.**

Consider now What Circumstance attends the Pleasures, which are produced in certain Maladys.

**Protarchus.**

In what Maladys?

**Socrates.**

In those of the base or indecent Kind; — Pleasures, to which the Persons, whom we termed Austere, have an utter Aversion.
What Pleasures do you mean?

Socrates.

Those which are felt in curing the Itch, for instance, by Friction; and in other Maladies of like Kind, such as need no other Medicine.

Now the Sensation, thence arising in us, in the name of the Gods What shall we say of it? Pleasure is it? or shall we term it Pain?

Hippocrates, in his Treatise περὶ παθῶν, accounts this Disorder among those, which are αἰχμα μᾶλλον ἡ ναισώματα. And Ptojius, in his Note on that Passage, cites the following Sentence from Avicenna:—"Istae cutis affectiones, cum morbi non sint, sed cutis sœditates potius & opprobria, morbis tamen annumerantur."

This is to be understood of Cases, in which these Disorders are meerly superficial, and affect not any Parts of the Body deeper than the Skin. Such Cases frequently happened, in the fine Climate of Greece, to Bodies not perfectly free from ill Humours, at the Spring-time of the Year. For then the Humours, which had been condensed and driven to the Interior Parts by the Cold of Winter, are attenuated and rarefied, and tend toward the Surface. See Galen in Hippocrates Aphorismos, §. 3. Aph: 20.
PHILEBUS. 507

Protarchus.

A mixt Sort of Sensation, O Socrates! seems to arise from this Malady, partaking of both Pain and Pleasure.

Socrates.

It was not, however, for the sake of Philebus 320, that I brought this last Subject into our Discourse: 'twas because we should never be able to determine the Point now before us 321, unless we had taken a view of these mixt Pleasures, and of Others also which depend on these. Let us proceed therefore to consider Such as have an Affinity with them 322.

320 Meaning,—it was not for the sake of confuting those Cynicks, the Enemies of Pleasure and of her Advocate, Philebus,—Those, who held Sensual Pleasure to be nothing more than a Deliverance from Pain,—that he produced this Instance of a Malady, in which there is found a Mixture of Pain and Pleasure. See Page 494.

321 The Point of Inquiry is this,—whether all and Every Sort of Pleasure is desirable for its own sake; or whether One Sort only;—viz. the pure, and unmixed with Pain. See Page 404.

322 We have followed Ficinus and Grynaeus in ascribing this last Sentence,—“Let us proceed &c”,—to Socrates: the next Interrogative Sentence,—“Such do you mean, &c”,—to Protarchus: and the short Answer, following it, to Socrates: though contrary to all the Editions of the Greek; in which, as well as in the rest of the Translations, the Persons of Socrates and Protarchus are interchanged.

Protarchus.
Protarchus.

Such do you mean, as partake of Pleasure and Pain by means of their Commixture?

Socrates.

That is my very Meaning. Of these mixt Feelings then, Some belong to the Body; and in the Body are these generated. Others are of the Soul; and these have in the Soul their Residence. We shall find also PLEASURES mingled with PAINS, where the Soul and the Body have, each of them, a Share. Now these Mixtures [tho composed of Contrarys,] are, in some cases, termed only PLEASURES; in other cases, only PAINS.

Protarchus.

Express yourself more fully.

Socrates.

When a Man, whether in a sound or in a decaying State of his Body, feels Two contrary Sensations at the same time; as when, chilled with Cold, he is warming himself; or sometimes, when over-heated, he is cooling himself; with a view, I suppose, to his enjoying One of those Sensations, and to his deliverance from the Other: in such cases, what is called
called the Bitter-Sweet\textsuperscript{333}, thro the difficulty met
with in driving away the Bitter Part, causeth a
Struggle within, and a fierce Meeting together of
opposite Qualities and Sensations.

\textbf{Protarchus.}

It is perfectly true, what you have now said.

\textbf{Socrates.}

Are not Some of these Mixt Sensations composed
of Pain and Pleasure in equal Proportion? and in
Others is not one of them predominant?

\textsuperscript{333} In the Greek,—τὸ λεγόμενον πικρῷ γλυκῷ μεμιγμένον.—But,
if we are right in our Conjecture, the three latter words τ. γ. μ.
originally were a Marginal Glofs, meant only to explain the term
γλυκύπικρον, found in the first and unadulterated Copies of the Dia-
logue. For this single word—γλυκύπικρον—was τὸ λεγόμενον, the
common Saying, to express Pleasure and Pain mixed together, but
most commonly was applied to the Passion of Love.—A Passage in
Plutarch, Sympotic: L. 5, C. 7, at the same time that it proves
this Use of the Word, explains it exactly in the same manner as
it is explained by our supposed Glossographer; and may serve
therefore to support our conjectural Reading of the Sentence
in Plato now before us.—In that Passage of Plutarch, Lovers,
when they look at the Objects of their Passion, are said to
λαμβάνειν μετ’ ἡδονῆς ἀληθῶς μεμιγμένης, ὅπερ αὐτοὶ Ἑλληνικῶν
ἐσχήσαν, with a Pleasure mingled with Pain, and termed by them-
selves a Bitter-Sweet.

\textbf{Protarchus.}
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Without doubt.

Socrates.

Among those then, in which there is an overplus of pain, I reckon that of the malady termed the itch, and all other pruriencys and itchings, when nothing more than a slight friction or motion is applied to them, such as only dissipates what humours are at the surface, but reaches not the fermentation and turgescence of those humours which lye deep within. In this condition, the diseased often apply heat to the parts which pain them, and then the opposite extremity, through impatience, and uncertainty which way to take. Thus they excite inexpressible pleasures first, and then the contrary, in the interior parts, compared with the pains felt in the exterior, which yet are mixed with pleasures, according as the humours are driven outwardly or inwardly. For by violently dispersing the

324 In the Greek,—φερωτες ὡς πος αὐτὰ. By which probably are meant warm fomentations by the fire-side.

325 Meaning probably the ἔρχεται, or immersions in the coldest waters. — Concerning the cold embrocations, and cooling unguents, used in such cases afterwards by Themison and the Methodists, see Cælius Aurelian. de Morbis Chron. L. 4, C. 1.

Morbific
Morbific Matter where it is collected, and by compelling it together from Places where it lies dispersed, Pleasures and Pains are at once excited, and arise by each other’s Side \[326\].

**Protarchus.**

Most true.

**Socrates.**

Now wherever, in any case of this Kind, a greater quantity of Pleasure is mingled, the smaller quantity of Pain creates but a slight Uneasiness, no more than what serves to tickle: whilst, on the other hand \[327\], the great Excess of Pleasure, spread throughout, convulsesthe whole Frame, and sometimes causeth involuntary Motions; operating also every Change of Colour in the Countenance, every Variety of Posture in the Limbs, and every different degree of Respiration; — and within the Soul it energiseth in Transports, uttered madly in Exclamations.

**Protarchus.**

Entirely so.

\[326\] External **Warmth** relaxes, attracts, rarefies, and disperses: external **Cold**, on the contrary, constringes, repells to the interior Parts, gathers together, and condenses.

\[327\] In the **Greek**, as it is printed, we read, — \(\tau\' \delta'\alpha'\nu't\nu's\) \(\nu'\delta'\nu'\tau'\nu's\). — but we should choose to read, — \(\tau\' \delta' \alpha'\nu'\tau'\nu's\) \(\nu'\delta'\nu'\tau'\nu's\).
Farther; a Man in such a Condition, O my Friend! is apt to say of himself, and Others are apt to say of him, that he is dying, as it were, thro Excess of Pleasure. From this time for ever after, he is wholly intent on pursuing the like Pleasures; and the more so, the more he happens to be intemperate, and less under the government of Prudence. Thus he calls these Pleasures the greatest, and accounts Him the happiest of Men, who spends his whole time, as far as possible, in the enjoyment of them.

Protarchus.

You have described all This, O Socrates! just as it happens to the Bulk of Mankind, according to their own Sense and Opinion.

Socrates.

But all This, O Protarchus! relates only to Such Pleasures mixed with Pains, as arise solely in the Body, in its Superficial parts and Interior parts alternately. And as to those Feelings of the Soul 328, which meet with a contrary Condition of the Body,

328 In the Greek of this Passage, immediately after the word. ἐμένη, we presume, that the word ὅταν, or ὅσ was dropt by some ancient Transcriber.
when Pleasure in the One is mixed with Pain in
the Other, so as that Both are Ingredients in One
Composition, we spake of Those before 399; such as
a Desire of Fulness, under a Sense of Emptiness in
the Body; when Hope administers Delight, while
the Emptiness gives a Pain. We did not indeed con-
sider them at that time, as Evidences of the present
Point; but we now say, that in all those Cases,
(and the number of them is infinite,) where the
Condition of the Soul is different from That of the
Body, a Mixture of Pain and Pleasure happens to
be produced.

Protarchus.

You are, I believe, perfectly in the right.

Socrates.

Among the Mixtures of Pain and Pleasure, there
is a Third Kind remaining, yet unmentioned.

Protarchus.

What Kind is That?

Socrates.

That, where such Pleasures and Pains as we said
arise frequently in the Soul herself by her Self 339,
are mixed together.

399 See before, in Page 439, and again in Pages 471 and 3.

Protarchus.
Protarchus.

In what Cases, say we, are These Mixtures found?

Socrates.

Anger, Fear, and Desire, and Lamentation, Love, Emulation, and Envy, and all other such Passions of the Soul her self, do you not suppose them to give Pain and Uneasiness to the Soul?

Protarchus.

I do.

Socrates.

And shall we not find these very Passions fraught with wondrous Pleasures? In the Passions of Resentment and Anger, do we need to be reminded of what the Poet says 331, — that

tho Resentment raise

Choler, like Smoke, in even the prudent Breast;
The luscious Honey from its waxen Seat
Distills not half such Sweetness.

And do we not remember in Lamentations and De-

330 That is, without the concurrence of any Sensation, pleasurable or painful, by means of the Body. — See before in Pages 409 and 428.

331 Homer, in the Eighteenth Book of his Iliad, 108, &c.
fires, the Pleasures we have felt, mingled with the Pains which those Passions produce?

**Protarchus.**

'Tis true; our Passions do affect us in the manner You have mentioned, and no otherwise.

**Socrates.**

And have you not observed, at Tragic Spectacles presented on the Stage, with how much Pleasure the Spectators shed Tears?

**Protarchus.**

I certainly have.

**Socrates.**

But have you attended to the Disposition of your Soul at the acting of a Comedy? Do you know, that there also we feel Pain mixed with Pleasure?

**Protarchus.**

I do not perfectly well comprehend That.

**Socrates.**

It is not perfectly easy, O Protarchus! at such a Time, to comprehend what mixt Passions possesse the Soul in every Case of that Kind.

**Protarchus**
Protarchus.
Not at all easy, I believe.

Socrates.
However, let us consider what our feelings are at that time; and the more attentively, on account of their obscurity; that we may be able to discover with the greater ease, what mixture there is of pain and pleasure in other cases.

Protarchus.
Say on then.

Socrates.
The passion, known by the name of envy, will you set it down for a sort of pain in the soul, or how?

Protarchus.
Even so.

Socrates.
And yet the man, who envys another, will plainly appear to be delighted with the evils which befall him.

Protarchus.
Clearly so.

Socrates.
PHILEBUSA
Socrates.
Now, Ignorance \textsuperscript{332} is an Evil; and so is what we term Want of Sense.

Protarchus.
Undoubtedly.

Socrates.
From these Premises you may perceive, what is the nature of Ridicule and the Ridiculous.

Protarchus.
You must tell me, What it is.

Socrates.
Every particular Vice takes its Name from some particular Bad Habit in the Soul. But total Viciousness, the Habit of Wickedness in all respects, is the direct Contrary of That Habit, which the Delphic Inscription adviseth us to acquire.

Protarchus.
That of knowing one's Self do you mean, O Socrates!

\textsuperscript{332} Among the various Readings of the Greek Word in this place,—viz. \textit{d\;\nu\;\i\;\z}, \textit{\d\;\nu\;\i\;\z}a, and \textit{\d\;\nu\;\i\;\z}ax— we have made no doubt of giving the Preference to the latter, from the authority of Ficinus's Translation; which is followed, herein, by all the subsequent Translators, except Serranus, who preferred \textit{\d\;\nu\;\i\;\z}a.

Socrates.
Socrates.

I do. And the Contrary to this Advice of the Oracle would be, — Not to know one’s Self in any respect at all.

Protarchus.

Certainly it would.

Socrates.

Try now to divide this Ignorance of our Selves into Three Kinds.

Protarchus.

How, say you, should this be done? for I am not able to do it.

Socrates.

Do you say, that I should make this division, in Your Stead?

Protarchus.

I not only say it, but desire you so to do.

Socrates.

Well then; Whoever is ignorant of Himself, must he not be thus ignorant, in one or other of these Three Respects?

Protarchus.

What Three?

Socrates.
Socrates.

First; with respect to External Possessions, in imagining himself wealthier than he really is.

Protarchus.

Many Persons there are, who labour under this Sort of Ignorance.

Socrates.

Yet more numerous are They, in the next place, who imagine themselves handsomer in their Persons, nobler in their Air, or graced with some other Corporal Advantage in a higher Degree, than actually they are.

Protarchus.

Very true.

Socrates.

But the Number is by far the greatest, I presume, of Such as are mistaken in themselves, with respect to the Third Kind of Excellence, That which belongs to the Soul, by fancying themselves possessed of more Virtue than in truth they have.

Protarchus.

Nothing is more certain.

U u u  Socrates
Socrates.

Among the Virtues and Excellencies of the Soul, is not Wisdom That, to which the Generality of Mankind lay Claim with the greatest Earnestness, and in regard to which they are full of Contention, Opinionativeness, and false Notions?

Protarchus.

Evidently so.

Socrates.

Now the Man, who should say that Ignorance and Error, in any of these respects, were Evils, would say what is true.

Protarchus.

Very right.

Socrates.

But we are to make still another Division of this Ignorance of a Man's Self, O Protarchus! if we would discover the odd Mixture of Pain and Pleasure in that mirthful Envy, which is excited by Comedy, — a Division into Two Sorts.

Protarchus.

Into what Two Sorts do you mean?

Socrates.
PHILEBUS. 521

SOCRATES.

To those Persons, who foolishly entertain any such false Opinion of themselves, it necessarily happens, as it does to all Men in general, that Strength and Power attend on Some; while the Fate of Others is quite the contrary.

PROTARCHUS.

It must be so.

SOCRATES.

According to this Difference then between them, distinguish those ignorant Persons into Two Sorts. And all Those, whose Self-Ignorance is attended with Weakness, and with a Want of Power to be revenged on Such as laugh at them, you may justly say, that they are open to Ridicule, and may call their Characters properly Ridiculous. But as to the Others, who have Power to take their Revenge, if you should say, that These are to be dreaded, as being powerful and hostile, you would give a very right account of them. For such Ignorance, armed with Power, is powerful to do Mischief; and not only its Self is hostile and hurtful to all Persons within its Reach; but so likewise are all its Images 333 and

Critias, in particular, is perhaps here alluded to. See Notes 203 and 205.

U u u 2
Representatives. But Self-Ignorance, without Strength and Power, is to be ranked among the Things which are Ridiculous, and is a proper object of Ridicule.

Protagoras.
There is much of Truth in what you say. But I do not as yet perceive clearly, what Mixture there is of Pain and Pleasure in our Feelings on such occasions.

Socrates.
You are in the first place to apprehend the Force of Envy in these cases.

Protagoras.
Show it me then.

Socrates.
Is not Sorrow, on some Occasions, felt unjustly? and is it not the same case with Joy and Pleasure?

Protagoras.
No doubt can be made of it.

Socrates.
There is neither Injustice, nor Envy, in rejoicing at the Evils which befall our Enemys.
Socrates.

Certainly there is not.

But if at any time, when we see an Evil happening to our Friends, we feel no Sorrow, — if on the contrary we rejoice at it, — are we not guilty of Injustice?

Protarchus.

Without Dispute.

Socrates.

Did we not say, that 'twas an Evil to any Person, to be ignorant of Himself?

Protarchus.

We did, and justly too.

Socrates.

If there be in any of our Friends a false Conceit of their own Wisdom, or of their own Beauty, or of whatever else we mentioned, when we divided Ignorance of one's Self into Three Kinds, is not this Conceit an Object of Ridicule, where 'tis attended with Impotence and Weakness; but an Object.
ject of Hatred, if Power and Strength are joined with it? or do we deny, what I just now said, that the having of such a false Opinion, if it be not hurtful to Others, is an Object of Ridicule?

Protarchus.
You said what is entirely true.

Socrates.
And do we not acknowledge this false Conceit to be an Evil, as being built on Ignorance?

Protarchus.
Most heartily.

Socrates.
Whether do we feel Delight, or Sorrow, when we laugh at it?

Protarchus.
'Tis plain, that we feel Delight.

Socrates.
Did we not say, that whenever we feel Delight from the Evils which happen to our Friends, it is Envy which operates in us that unjust Delight?

It is hoped, that no future Editor of Plato will be either so absurd, or so careless, as to follow all the former Editors, in printing μὴ (instead of ἐν) ἐφισπασμένα, in the Greek of this Passage.

Protarchus.
Protarchus.

It must be Envy.

Socrates.

Our Reasoning then shows, that, when we laugh at what is Ridiculous in a Friend, mixing thus Delight with Envy, we mix together Pleasure and Pain. For we acknowledged long ago, that Envy gives Uneasiness and Pain to the Soul; and we have admitted, that Laughing yields Delight. Now in these Cases they arise, Both of them, at the same Time.

Protarchus.

True.

Socrates.

We see then from the Conclusion of our Argument, that in mournful Spectacles, and no less in Comedys\textsuperscript{335}, — not only as they are acted on the Stage, but

\textsuperscript{335} Every philosophic Admirer of the Comedys, of old written by Terence and Plautus, or of Some in modern days, written by Poets of our own or of the French Nation, — if he happens to read this Dialogue, and is unacquainted with the History of the Athenian Theatre,—must be surprized at the Severity of the Censure, passed on Comedy in this Part of the Dialogue; where the Pleasure, felt by the Spectators and Readers of a Comedy, is attributed to Envy; and represented as a malicious Joy, at seeing the ridiculous Faults of our Neighbours, Fellow-Citizens, and Countrymen, exposed to Public View. But the
P H I L E B U S.

Conduct and Manners of the Comic Muse at Athens, in the time of Socrates, are a full justification of his Censure. For the time was not long before his Death, when a Law was made in that City, that the Actors of a Comedy should personate none of the Citizens by name. And such a Law was necessary, because the Comic Poets were used to gratify such of the People, as were envious and malicious, by presenting to Ridicule, on the Public Stage, living Characters by their names, and even some of the greatest Worth; as Socrates, for instance, was personated by name in the Clouds, a Comedy of Aristophanes, to please Anytus and the rest of the Cabal, formed for the destruction of that most excellent Man. —About the same time, on the same account, was suppressed, in all the Athenian Comedies, the Chorus; many of whose Speeches were abusive, either on particular Persons, or on whole Orders of Men, Parts of the Commonwealth; and whose Language was often very scurrilous: for this Chorus commonly represented the Athenian Populace; and it was indeed a just Representative or Image of the Sentiments and Style of that lowest Order of the People in every Free State. To this Rabble of a Chorus succeeded the Comic παράβασις: in which the Poet himself in Person (or his Representative, the Spokesman or Foreman of the old Comic Chorus,) παράβασις, quitting his place at the Back-Part of the Stage, came forward to the Front; and after addressing the Audience, and courting their Favour to him as Author of the Drama, indulged their Love of Contumely, by vilifying Foreign Nations, or by carping at the Best Poets of former Ages. And to show farther, in how small a degree the Licentiousness of the Athenian Comedy was restrained by the Law abovementioned, against personating on the Stage any Citizen by name, we are told by several ancient Writers, that successful Attempts frequently were made to elude that Law; sometimes,
sometimes, by the Actor's wearing a Mask, resembling the Face of the Citizen who was meant to be exposed and vilified; sometimes, by pointed Allusions to certain Accidents of his Life, or Particulars in his Character, well known to the whole City; and sometimes by a small Alteration of his Name,—as, by calling him Ἀμύνας, referring to the Face of the Citizen who was meant to be exposed and vilified;—In this State remained the Comic Muse at Athens, until Menander rose, who taught her to philosophize: for he taught her to paint, in Moral Poetry, the General Characters, by which All of the Human Race are to be distinguished internally, or according to their Souls and Minds, Some from Others.—He had learnt Moral Philosophy, himself, under an excellent Master, Theophrastus: he had learnt from His Lectures the several Passions of the Human Soul; the Predominance of any One of which over the rest, in the Whole of a Man's Life, is the plainest of those Marks which characterize the Man. Of these General Differences he had learnt from Him the ordinary Causes;—a difference of Natural Temper in the Soul, arising probably from a different Mixture of the fundamental Humours in the Body;—a different Education; or a difference of Notions early imbibed, and of Habits early contracted;—a different Way of Life; a difference of the Objects, engaging a Man's serious Study, or continually presented to his View;—a difference of Conversation, of Examples casually met with, or of Advice from Persons whose Judgment we esteem.—He must have learnt farther, (for Theophrastus, who taught him, had farther learnt from Aristotle,) how to distinguish different Nations; not, by those Marks, so obvious to every Eye and Ear, and so easily counterfeited,—their Attire and Language,—but by the difference of their National Manners, owing to the differences of Climate and Soil, of Government and Laws, and of Public Customs, whether Civil or Religious.—Menander, being thus provided
vided with a large Stock of Moral and Political Knowledge, adapted his Comedys,—not to the bad Passions of some Athenian Citizens,—but to the common Sense of all Mankind:—secretly appealing, for the Truth of his Characters, to every Man's Experience of Human Nature in Himself and Others,—to every Man's Feeling of such Sentiments, as are common to Persons of his own Rank and Nation, his own Age, Temper, Way of Life, &c.—and to every Man's Knowledge of the Sentiments of such Persons, as differ from him in any of those Circumstances which are common to Many.—So that the Persons of the Drama, in Comedy, were no longer, what they had formerly been, Caricature-Portraits of the Manners of particular real Persons; but they were, like the Characters in an Epic Poem, Pictures of the Poet's own General Ideas: for they represented, according to the Best of the Author's Knowledge and Fancy joined together, whatever appeared to Him most striking in the Moral Characters and Behaviour of the several Kinds and Sorts of Persons in the various Stations, Conditions, and Accidents, of Human Life.—Such, as we have here delineated, was the New Comedy, introduced by Menander, and followed by all the Greek Comic Poets, his Contemporaries and his Successors. The licentious and abusive Kind of Comedy, in Vogue until the making of the Law above-mentioned, was then, and for ever after, styled the Old Comedy: and that Kind, which succeeded to the Old, and obtained universally, till Menander had reformed the Comic Muse, took the denomination of the Middle Comedy.—But so powerful is the Force of Truth and Nature, and so amiable are Decency and Good Manners, (especially when Envy and Malice lurk not under that fair Covering,) that, in all Countries, to which the Greek Language extended, the New Comedy met with a much more general Approbation than Either of its Predecessors: and perhaps it contributed, more than any other.
other thing, (except That Part of Philosophy, from which it sprang,) to refine the Public Taste, and to civilize the Public Manners, wherever Grecian Literature was held by the Publick high in their Estimation.—From the same Causes it was, that a few Ages after,—when the Romans, having brought all Greece under their Dominion, received from their Grecian Captives the Philosophy and the Poetry, together with the particular Sciences, and the rest of the fine Arts, of that most ingenious and polished Nation,—the Roman Poets presently applied themselves to imitate, or translate into their own Language, the New Comedy of the Grecians. Thus Menander and Apollodorus were translated, or closely at least imitated, by Terence; Diphilus and Philémon, (Two other Greek Writers of the New Comedy,) by Plautus; tho it must be confessed, that Plautus for some time chose to tread in the Steps of Epicharmus, who wrote Greek Comedys before the Reformation of the Comic Stage. Nor was it long, before this Reformed or New Kind of Comedy grew to be the favourite Entertainment of the Patricians and the Equites or Cavaliers, (that is, of the Roman Nobility and Gentry,) and of other dignified Citizens: and the Satyr of the more ancient Romans, with the Ribaldry of the Pæcennine and Atellane Verfes, (which, in Personul Abusiveness, resembled the Old Comedy of the Grecians,) by degrees became antiquated, and utterly diffused. Some time after this, the Whole Body of ancient Grecian and Graeco-Roman Literature fickened and languished, and lay as it were dead for many Ages: the greatest Part of it, 'tis to be feared, has irrecoverably perished: a considerable Part, however, at length revived, and rose up into Light again. Among those long-lost Writings, which had been happily preserved and were recovered, there appeared some Comedys of Aristophanes, of Terence, and of Plautus. And here we find a fresh Influence of the truth of
but as they are presented to us also in the Tragedy and the Comedy of real Life, and in a thousand

our observation, concerning the Preference, given by all civilized Nations to the New or latest Kind of Grecian Comedy: for the Causes of that Preference have, ever since the Revival of ancient Literature and Politeness, operated again with their former Force: and, notwithstanding the infinite Wit of Aristophanes, notwithstanding the Musical excellence of his Verses, and notwithstanding the licentious Disposition of the lower Orders of the People, and the Delight they take in seeing their Superiours defamed or ridiculed,—yet we find, that Terence, and so much of Plautus as exhibits General Characters, those especially of Persons in the middle Stations of human Life, have ever since been the Models of Comic Poetry, and Patterns to all successful Writers of Comedy. And hence it is, that the most admired of our modern Comedys, however faulty in other respects, yield no Food for that Envy and Malice, so justly, and yet so gently, satirized in this Part of the Philebus. The Comic Muse now performs her proper Office; which is, to exhibit to all People, of whatever Country, who are between the Great and the mere Rabble in Civil Society, those habitual Faults, which are common to Many Persons of nearly equal Condition, in their Behaviour, Commerce and Conversation with each other, on the ordinary Occurrences of Private or Domestic Life;—showing every such Person to Himself, as in a clear Mirrour placed in the strongest Light;—painting in the liveliest Colours whatever is ridiculously wrong in his Character and Conduct;—and holding close to his Eyes as it were a Magnifying Glass, the more easily to perceive his Faults, instead of the Microscope, thro' which he had been used to view them.
sand intermediate Occurrences, Pains and Pleasures blended together.

Protarchus.

'Twould be impossible, O Socrates! for a Man not to acknowledge This, were he ever so zealous an Advocate for the opposite Side.

Socrates.

When we entered on the present Subject, we proposed to consider Anger, Desire and Grief, Fear and Love, Jealousy and Envy, and such other Passions

That is,—not any Such Feelings either of Pain or of Pleasure, as belong to the Sensitive Part of the Soul,—or to that meerly Passive Power in the Soul, by which she feels whatever immediately affects her Body in any important degree,—but such Agitations and Emotions, as are peculiar to the Imaginative Part of the Soul,—or to that Power, (Passive likewise,) by which the Soul imagines that she feels present Good or Evil, or remembers the Good or Evil, felt by her in time past, or pre-conceives some Good or Evil, to be felt by her in time to come.—For imagined Good or Evil (Good or Evil in Opinion) is the Object of all those Passions of the Soul, which are here meant:—and the Ground of them all is that general Love or Desire of Good, essential to the Soul of Man.—For Love infers the Hate of whatever is repugnant or opposite to the Object of that Love; in like manner, as the Inclination of a byass'd Bowl to one Side of the Green, in Bowling, infers a Declination from the Side opposite. And out of these Two con-natural Dispositions of the Soul, Love and Hate, arise all.
all such of her Passions, as are abstracted from any Bodily Feelings;—such as joy, when the loved Object is attained;—Grief, when it is lost; and Hope, when it is expected; Aversion, where the Object of Hate is present; Fear, when the Approach of it is apprehended; and Anger at the supposed intentional Causes of its Presence or Approach.——Now these and all other such Passions of the Soul, —that is, all such as have either Good or Evil for their Object,—are governed by Imagination and a false Opinion of Good and Evil. For since the Knowledge of True Good, and of its Contrary, is seated in the Intellectual Part of the Soul, the Mind, where no Passion finds an entrance, it can neither be accompanied nor followed by any Passion, Emotion, or Agitation whatever: the only Attendants on it are a simple Pursuing of the known Good, and a simple Avoiding of the known Evil.——Farther; the actual Knowledge of true Good, as far as the human Soul is capable of a Knowledge so divine, infers an actual Possession of it, proportioned to the degree of that Knowledge; so that no room is left for Grief: —the Expectation of attaining more of this Good, by continuing the Pursuit of it, is never liable to Disappointment; and this precludes all Fear:—a constant Possession of the present, and a continual Attainment of more and more by easy degrees, admit of no Emotions of joy: —and the impossibility of suffering real Evil from any Person, without the Soul's own Consent, cuts off all occasion of Anger.—The Knowledge therefore of true Good is accompanied with no other Sentiments or Feelings than those of Pleasure; (if the Term, Pleasure, may befit the most internal, intellectual, and godlike Satisfaction;) in None of them is any Mixture of Pain ever to be found.——But with the Passions of the Animal-Part of the Soul it is quite otherwise. For if we consider the nature of each Passion severally, after having divided them All into Two Kinds, the Pleasurable
of the Soul; promising ourselves to find in Them those Mixt Feelings, which again and again we had been speaking of: Did we not?

Protarchus.

We did.

Socrates.

Do we perceive, that we have dispatched already all which relates to Grief, and Envy, and Anger?

Protarchus.

Pleasurable and their Contrarys, the Painful, (according to those Instances in each Kind, brought by the Poet,

Love, Hope, and Joy, fair Pleasure's smiling Train;
Hate, Fear, and Grief, the Family of Pain;

Pope's Essay on Man, Ep. 2d.) we shall perceive, that every Passion, of Either Kind, has, for an inseparable Companion, some one of the Contrary Kind. Thus Anger and Refentment, no pleasing inward Agitations, are always coupled with an Exultation, or self-applauding Elation of the Imaginative Soul:—the Pain of Grief, at the Loss of an imagined Good, is always joined with a pleasing Remembrance of the past Enjoyment:—the pleasurable Hope of obtaining is always combined with a painful Fear of Disappointment; and Desire is pleasurable in proportion to such a Hope, and at the same time painful in proportion to such a Fear.—Sympathy, or Pain felt at the seeing or hearing of Another's Woe, is mixed with the pleasurable Exercise and Feeling of Social Affection:—and in the Instance, produced just now by Socrates, the Delight, felt by the
We perceive it clearly.

But there is much yet remaining.

Very true.

For What reason, principally, do you suppose it was, that I explained to you the mixt Feeling, which a Comedy occasions in us? Do you not conceive, that 'twas to shew my self able to explain to you, with much more ease, the like Mixture of Pain and Pleasure the Spectators of the old wittily abusive Comedy, was mixed with the Pain either of Indignation, or of Pity, or with the greater Pain of Envy.

That any Pain is felt in the Soul, amidst the Merriment which a laughable Comedy excites,—a Pain, occasioned by the very Subject of that Merriment,—must have seemed to Protarchus paradoxical, and difficult to be conceived, before Socrates had unravelled the difficulty, and explained the Paradox.—It is probable, that the greater Part of that multitude of Spectators, present at one of the Old Comedys, were unconscious of any Envy, lurking within them at the time. The Wit, with which many of those Comedys abounded, might easily hinder Any man who was in a Humour only to indulge Mirth, from a Reflection, that
Pleasure in Fear, in Love, and in the other Passions? and that after you had seen the truth of it in One Instance, you might discharge me from the necessity of proceeding to the rest, or of lengthening out the Argument any farther; but might receive it for a Truth, without limitation or exception, that the Body without the Soul, and the Soul without the Body, and Both together likewise, are, in many things, which

that he was laughing at the Representative of some particular Person, to whom he had not the least Envy or Ill-Will, but on the contrary perhaps was a Well-wisher and a Friend.——As to such Bad Men, as knowingly and wilfully indulge Envy or Malice in their Souls, They are so entirely occupied with the Pleasure, which they receive from gratifying those Selfish Passions, as to be wholly inattentive to the painful Wounds, given to the Social Part of their nature by that gratification.——For Envy is produced from an Opinion, that the Good, supposed to be enjoyed by the Persons envied, whatever it be, Power, Wealth, Pleasure, Fame, or Honour, is incompatible with the Envier's own Good of the same Kind.——Hatred and Malice spring from an Opinion of Evil, expected to be done to a Man's Self by Others who are the Objects of those Passions, unless they are rendered incapable of doing such Evil, by some Evil befallen Themselves.——The Social Affections, on the other hand, instinctively and spontaneously prompt us to rejoice at the Good, and to be sorry for the Evils, which happen to Any of our Kind, especially to Such as are connected with us, either by Consanguinity, or by Domestic, Civil, or Federal Tyes, or by the more indissoluble Bands of true Friendship;——and to be thus

Y y y

affected
which affected them severally or jointly, full of a Sense of Pleasures mingled with Pains. Say then, whether you will dismiss me, or make it Midnight before we finish. But I imagine, that, after I shall have added a few things more, I shall obtain from you my dismission: for I shall be ready to give you an account of all these things at large to morrow; but at present am desirous of proceeding to what remains on this Subject; that we may come to a Decision of the Point in Controversy, as Philebus hath enjoined us.

Protarchus.

affected with Joy or Grief, abstracted from the consideration of any Good or Evil, which haply may result to our Particular Selves from what has befallen those Others.—Hence it is, that, where the Selfish Passions predominate in the Soul, thro the Weakness of the Social Affections, there Envy and Malice usually are found, either professed or latent:—that, where the Social Affections are felt strongly, tho the Soul should happen not to have the Knowledge of True Good, there the Selfish Passions, the Seeds of Envy and of Malice, are easily kept under, and yield to the Dictates of the Social Affections, even to Those of a Kind naturally cooler and weaker than the rest,—Common Humanity, and a general Benevolence, implanted in the Human Nature:—but that the Grounds of Malice and of Envy are quite destroyed in such happy Souls only, as have attained in some degree to know, and in some measure to enjoy, Good compleat, sufficient for Happines, stable and permanent: for only Those know, that None can deprive them of any Substantial Good: their
PHILEBUS. 537

PROTARCHUS.

You have well spoken, O Socrates! and as to what remains, go thro with it in whatever way is agreeable to your Self.

Socrates.

Well then; after the Mixt Pleasures, we are to proceed, by a Kind of natural necessity, to the several Pleasures which are unmixt and pure.

PROTARCHUS.

their Social Affections therefore have free Scope, and large Room to operate; and their natural Inclination to Private Good interferes not with the Good of any other Person.

338 To translate literally, we should here use these Two Expressions,—According to Nature, and by some Kind of Necessity,—For in the Greek they are divided and displaced.—But we presume, that, in uniting them, we have not deviated from our Author’s Meaning; which, as we apprehend, is This;—that, for the Mixt Pleasures to precede, and for the Pure Pleasures to come after them, is agreeable to the Order, established by Nature, on the Basis of Corporeal Necessity.—For the Pleasures, which are mixed with Pains, are those of the Taste and of the Touch. Now these, according to Nature, are preceded by such Bodily Wants, as create an Appetite for the Enjoyment of them: and after the Enjoyment is past, they are apt to leave a Sting behind them, in Souls not otherwise employed, creating a new imaginary Appetite,—a Desire of enjoying the like again, without waiting for the Calls of Nature.—Appetites and Desires, while

Y y y 2 they
Perfectly well said.

The nature of These I shall endeavour to explain to you, by converting to my own Use, with a little Alteration, what is said of them by Others. For I do not entirely give Credit to those Persons who tell us, that All Pleasure consists in a Cessation from Uneasiness and Pain. But, as I said before, I make Use of these Persons as Witnesses, in confirmation of This truth,—that some things there are, which seem to be Pleasures, but by no means are so in reality; and of This also,—that some other Pleasures they remain unsatisfied, raise such Passions and Commotions in the Soul, as either blunt her Relish for the Pure Pleasures, or at least disturb her whilst she is enjoying them.

According to Their Doctrine, all Pleasures would be equally pure, and unmixed with Pain, contrary to the Doctrine of Socrates.

Our Translation of this Passage supposes, that the word μάρτυς, in the Greek, is no erroneous Reading. It must however be acknowledged, that μάρτυς is the word, used before, in the Sentence to which Socrates here refers, and where, in translating it, we have used the word Diviners.

For Pleasure is not Indolence, Rest, or Ease; but a real and actual Feeling,—the Reverse of Pain.—Those meerly seeming Pleasures
Pleasures there are, many and great in Imagination, accompanied with Pains, but, at the same time, with Relief 342 from Greater Pains, amid the Distresses 343 of the Body and of the Soul.

Protarchus.

But What Pleasures are those, O Socrates! which a Man would deem rightly of, in supposing them to be True?

Socrates.

The Pleasures, which are produced in us from seeing beauteous Colours and beauteous Figures; many Pleasures also of the Smell, and many Others arising in us from the hearing of Sounds; in a word, whatever Pleasures we feel from perceiving the Presence of any thing, whose Absence we are insensible of, or at least occasions no Pain in us, all These are unmixt and pure.

Pleasures are therefore, in Page 479, called false Pleasures, and the most remote from truth or reality.

342 In which Relief consisted the Pleasure its Self, according to those Cynicks.

343 In the Greek, ἀπόγιας. See before in Page 510.
How do you explain this general account, O Socrates!

Socrates.

The Meaning of it indeed is not directly obvious: but we must endeavour to make it evident. I mean then, by beauteous Figures, not, as most men would suppose I meant, the Beauty of living Forms, or their Statues; but the Strait and the Round, whether in Surfaces $^{344}$, or in Solids $^{345}$; according to which are fashioned the Turner's Works, and those of the Carpenter by means of his Rules and Angles. For the Figures which I mean, if You apprehend me, have no Relative Beauty, like those other beauteous Forms $^{346}$; but in their own nature, separately considered, are always absolutely Beautiful;

$^{344}$ That is, — Rectilinear Plane Figures, — such as Triangles, Rectangles, and Circles.

$^{345}$ Such as Pyramids and Cubes, Spheres, Cylinders and Cones.

$^{346}$ The Parts of every Mathematical Simple Figure, whether it be right-lined or circular, are, all of them, similar and commensurable. — The Beauty of Figure, in all Animals, on the contrary, arises from the Proportions of dissimilar Parts, measured, not by any Common Measure, but by the respective Ends and Uses, for which they were severally designed by Nature.
and the beholding of them gives us certain peculiar Pleasures, not at all similar to the Pleasures excited in us by any Kind of Motion. And as to Colours, I mean Such as bear the like Stamp of Absolute Beauty \(^{347}\), and yield also Pleasures of a peculiar nature. But do we apprehend these things? or What say we to them?

**Protarchus.**

I endeavour, O Socrates! to comprehend your full Meaning: but endeavour You, your Self, to explain thorowly the whole of it.

**Socrates.**

As to Sounds, I mean Such as are smooth, clear and canorous, conveying some pure and simple Melody \(^{348}\), without relation to any other Sounds \(^{349}\), but singly

\(^{347}\) Such as the beautiful Colours of many Flowers; or as those of a clear Morning or Evening-Sky: not such as the Colour of a Complexion,—the Tinèture of a Skin,— in the Human Species,—a Colour belonging only to that Species, and relatively agreeable, as it indicates Health of Body, and a Purity of the Blood and Humours.

\(^{348}\) Such is That of many Species of Birds, whose Whistling is all Monotonous. Such also is That of the Æolian Harp, on which the Vibrations are made solely by the Air in Motion.

\(^{349}\) Exclusive therefore of all Harmonizing Sounds.—For the Essence of even the simplest Harmony consists in an Interval of.
PHILEBUS.

of Consonance between Two Musical Sounds;—that is, in the Musical Relation between the Two;—whether One of them be subsequent immediately to the Other; or Both be produced together from different Parts of one and the same Stringed Instrument; or Both issue at once from different Voices or Instruments, as in a Concert.—The single Musical Sounds, here spoken of by Socrates, are merely Objects of the Outward Sense of Hearing: but the Harmony of Musical Sounds, harmonising together, is an Object only of the Mind; and gives Delight only to that Superior Part of the Human Soul. As much therefore as Mind is more excellent than Outward Sense, in the same degree are Mental and Rational Delights more excellent in themselves, and more valuable to all Intelligent and Rational (tho Sentient) Beings, than any Pleasurable Sensations.—Indeed, the difference is so great between those Delights and these Sensations, that, tho in some Modern Writings we read of Intellectual and of Moral Pleasures,—of the Pleasures of the Understanding, the Pleasures of Reason, and the Pleasures of Virtue,—and tho Aristippus introduced the like Phrases into the conversation of those Young Gentlemen, who philosophised at Athens in the time of Socrates,—yet Socrates Himself, and all the other Ancient Philosophers, to the best of our Knowledge, except the Cyrenaicks and the Epicureans, usually meant, by the term Pleasure, Pleasure of Sense, or Pleasure of Imagination; and the Vulgar, we believe, in all Ages, signify by it always one or other of these Two Meanings.—To this General Observation we are to add, with regard to the particular Passage now before us, that the difference between Harmony and the sweetest Single Sounds will, from the Conclusive Part of this Dialogue, appear to be so great, that, in the Order of Goods, there establishe, the Enjoyment of any Kind of Harmony is placed as near to the Highest or Chief Good,
fingly of Themselves Musical: of Such I speak, and of the con-natural Pleasures which attend them.

PROTARCHUS.

That Such Pleasures also there are, I readily acknowlege.

SOCRATES.

The Pleasures, felt by us from certain Odours 359, as the Pleasure, received from any Single Sounds, appproaches to the Goods of Lowest Rank.

359 Not any Odours, the Pleasure of which hath respect only to the Causes they proceed from, the Odour-emitting Bodys, and consists wholly in the prospect of enjoying Sensual Pleasure of a groffer Kind; — such are those Odours, by which every Animal discerns its natural and proper Food; — such also are those, which are connected by a Man's Imagination with Pleasure of the Palate, which awaken a dormant Appetite, tempt a luxurious one, or create a preternatural one: — for Odours of the former sort, to give Pleasure, must be preceded by a proportionate Pain of Hunger; and those of the latter Sorts are followed either by the Pain of unsatisfied Desire, or lead to the many Pains which attend Luxury and Indigestion. — The only Odours, meant in this Passage, are such as we receive from the Fragrancy of many Flowers, Herbs, and Shrubs: for the Pleasure, given us by These, is confined to the Sense of Smelling; and, if the Nerves, the Organs of all Sensation, are in a sound State, the Pleasure is attended with no Pain or Mischief.

Z z z
are indeed of a Kind less divine than the Pleasures just now mentioned; but in respect of their being

351 Pure Pleasures of the Smell are here said to be less divine, than Pleasures of the Sight, or those of the Hearing: and the Truth of this Sentence may be evinced from Two Arguments:—One of Them is This; that the Organ of the Sense of Smelling presents us with nothing better than Pleasurable Sensations; while the Organs of the Sight and Hearing not only present the Sensitive Soul with simple Figures, Colours, and Sounds; but thro these Organs are perceived also such complex Figures, such conjunctions or juxta-positions of different Colours, and such combinations or sequences of different Sounds, as excite in the Rational Soul, or Mind, her first imperfect Ideas of things so divine, as Symmetry, Order and Proportion, Harmony and Beauty,

—Our other Argument for the so much higher Character, here given to the Senses of Sight and Hearing, is derived from the following ancient Doctrines in Natural Philosophy:—that the Subject-Matter of Colour, which is the general Object of the Sense of Seeing, (for the Figures of all Bodys are exhibited by Colour,) is (according to the hypothesis of a Fifth Elementary or Simple Body) Light in Energy; whether it be reflected from diversely opaque Bodys, or diversely refracted in passing thro different transparent Bodys, or whether it be diversely coloured by Effluvia from Bodys, where the Four Elements are diversely mixed, and where the Quantities of those Elements are in different Proportions:—that the Subject-Matter of Sound, which is the general Object of the Sense of Hearing, is Air in Motion:—that the Subject-Matters of all Odour, which is the general Object of the Sense of Smelling, are subtle Effluvia, (termed by the Chymists volatile Oyls or Sulphurs,) from those Bodys, in whose composition
composition Fire is the Principal Ingredient, but is mixed with the finest Particles of a Moistened Earth: that the Subject-Matters of all Flavour, which is the general Object of the Sense of Taste, are those groser Juices, (termed by the Chymists fixed Oyls or Sulphurs,) in which the Aqueous Particles predominate over the Igneous and the Earthy:—and that the Subject-Matters of all Solidity, which is the general Object of the Feeling or Sense of Touch, are only the Earthy Parts of Compound-Bodys; for that none Other resist the Touch:—that, in this way and manner, the Five outward Senses of the Soul correspond with the Five Elements of outward Nature:—that accordingly, in the First place, (to begin with the grossest of those Senses, and the lowest of those Elements,) when the Earthy Part of the Body communicates with the Element of Earth abroad, either by Contact, or by a large Admittance within of Earthy Particles from without, the Soul perceives the communication by her Sense of Touch externally, or of internal Feeling; the nervous Organs of this Sense being distended thro every Membranous Part of the Body, as well as throughout the Skin, that Covering of the Whole:—Secondly; when the Juices, or Humid Parts, of any Extraneous Bodys, received into the Mouth, mix with the Saliva, which is engendered in the Blood, and thence by the Salival Glands continually flows into the Mouth, the Soul perceives those foreign Juices by means of the Organs of Taste, the Gustatory Nerves, there seated:—Thirdly; when the Igneous Particles, which are secreted from the Blood, by the Glandular Vessels of the Brain, and thence rapidly fly thro the Nerves, meet with any invisible Igneous Effluvia from Extraneous Bodys, striking the Membranes of the Nose, where the Olfactory Nerves, the Organs of the Smell, are seated, the Soul perceiveth those foreign Effluvia by means of these Organs:—Fourthly; when the External Air in Motion, (Such a Motion as produces Sound,)}
being equally pure, and not, of necessity, mixed with Pains, I rank them all under the same head.

Striking against the Auditory Nerves of the Ear, communicates with the Aerial Part of the Nervous Fluid, the Soul perceives the communication of the Sound, by means of those Organs of the Hearing:—and Lastly; when Light from without, falling on the Eye, that tender Organ of the Sense of Seeing, communicates with Particles of the same Element residing, the Sentient Soul actually then feels the existence of that finest of all Bodys, Light; and perceives whatever Colour the Light, so communicated, is tinged with, and whatever Figure it exhibits. — To these Doctrines we are to add, that Light alone anciently was deemed to be the immediate Seat of every Particular Mind; — Fire and Air, to be the only immediate Seats of Soul — and thus Earth and Water, to be farther removed from Life and Sense, and farther still from what is incorporeal, eternal and divine. — Now, the Elementary Fire be finer than the Element of Air, and more nearly allied to Light, (as appears not only from the greater Velocity of its Motion, but also from its being luminous, till it be overpowered and suppressed by Air,)—and tho it be the principal Ingredient in all odoriferous Effluvia, — yet, since in these it is mixed and clogged with Aqueous and Earthy Particles, it becomes less fine than Elementary Air, the pure Vehicle of Sound, not deadened by Particles of the groffer Elements. — From these Two Arguments, taken together, we may conclude justly, that the Objects of the Sight and Hearing, and these Senses also themselves, have a much nearer Affinity to Mind, than any other Outward Sense or the Object of it; and therefore that the Pleasures of those finest Senses, are the nearest, of any Sensible Pleasures, to the godlike Enjoyments and Delights of Mind.

For
For in whatever Pleasures there happens to be found this Quality of intire Freedom from Pain, all these I oppose to those other Pleasures, with which Pain is complicated. Now, if you observe, we have already spoken of Two different Kinds of Pleasure.

Protarchus.

I do observe it.

Socrates.

To these let us now add the Pleasures, taken in the Mathematical Sciences; unless we are of Opinion,

Both these Kinds of Pleasure are Sensual; that is, they are Pleasures either of Sensation immediately present, or of Imagination and Memory derived from Sensations past. For Sensible Objects are the only Sources of the Pleasures of Either Kind, the Mixed with Pain, and the Unmixed, hitherto spoken of; the Organs of the Five outward Senses of the Soul are the only Conveyances of Any of those Pleasures; (no Faculty of the Mind ever being employed in that Office;) and only the mere Animal-Part of the Soul, (That which is Sensitive and Imaginative) ever enjoys any of them.

From the Pleasures of Sense our Philosopher proceeds to speak of the Pleasure, which the Rational Part of the Soul takes in Science;—a Pleasure which, tho' it be of a higher Kind than the Pleasures of the Sight and Hearing, he here considers only as it is, like Those, pure and unmixed with Pain. Thus he ascends gradually from the lowest Rank in the Order of Goods.
Opinion, that such Pleasures are of necessity preceded by a Thirst of learning them; and that, when tasted and enjoyed, they raise a Thirst of more and more; so that, from our beginning to learn them, they are all along attended with Uneasiness.

Protarchus.

I think, that such Uneasiness is not at all necessary.

Socrates.

Well; but suppose, that, having attained to full Possession of them, we happen afterwards to lose some Part thro Forgetfulness, do you see no Uneasiness arising hence?

Protarchus.

Goods, the Pleasures of Taste and Touch, to the Goods of highest Rank, and to the Head and Leader of them all: and from These he afterward descends, in the same gradation inverted, down again to the lowest.—But concerning the Goods superiour to those of Science, we shall not anticipate, needlessly, what is to come in the remainder of this Dialogue: and shall only observe, at present, that Socrates, in the Sentence now before us, allows the name of Pleasures to the Delights of Science; unwilling perhaps to engage in a Dispute with the Disciples of Aristippus, about the Propriety of a Name, when they agreed in meaning the same Thing. 'Tis for the like reason, as we presume, that in the Republick, L. 9. pag: 255, Edit: Cantab: speaking of the Delights, which the superiour Part of the Soul takes.
None at all from the nature of the Thing itself: but when the Knowledge is wanted to be applied to some Use in human Life; then a Man is uneasy at having lost it, on account of its Usefulness.

And we are at present, my Friend! actually concerned about those Feelings only, which arise in us from the nature of the Knowledge itself, without any regard to the Usefulness of it in computing or measuring.

You are right then in saying, that, in Mathematical Knowledge, a Forgetfulness frequently befalls us, without giving us any Uneasiness.

taxes in Philosophy, he gives them the appellation of Pleasures: it is because he is there speaking before a mixt Company, consisting of three Sons of Cephalus, two elder Brothers of Plato, besides other Athenians, and two foreigners then at Athens. All of them used to the Language of the Multitude, and probably some of them at least tinged with the Doctrine of Arisippus. —Perhaps the like Apology may be justly made for those improper Phrases, frequently met with in some Modern Writers of great Merit, which are mentioned in Note 349. They wrote to the prevailing Epicurean Taste of their times; and therefore used the fashionable Epicurean way of expressing their Ideas.

Socrates.
Socrates.

These Pleasures therefore, the Pleasures of Science, we must acknowledge to be unmixed with Pains. But these Pleasures belong not to the vulgar Multitude, being enjoyed only by a very Few.

Protarchus.

All This must certainly be acknowledged.

Socrates.

Now then, that we have tolerably well distinguished between the Pure Pleasures, and Those which are rightly called Impure, let us farther add These Distinctions between them,—that the Vehement Pleasures know not Moderation nor Measure; while Those of the Gentler Kind admit of Measure and are moderate:—and that Greatness and Intenseness, and the contrary Qualities, the Frequency also and the Rarest of Repetition, are Attributes of Such Pleasures only, as belong to the Boundless Kind of Being,—to That which is perpetually varying in its Quantities and Motions thro the Body and thro the Soul 354,—while the Pleasures, to which the like Variations never happen, belong to the contrary Kind of

354 See pages 321, and 410.
of Being and are allyed to all things wherein Symmetry is found.

Protarchus.
Perfectly right, O Socrates!

Socrates.
The Pleasures, beside these Assortments of them, are to be farther distinguished thus.

Protarchus.

How?

Socrates.
We should consider, whether the Purity and the Simplicity of Pleasures serve to discover what True Pleasure is: or whether the Truth of Pleasures may best

355 That is, — Bound and Measure.

356 In the printed Greek we here read ἐμέτρων, Things in Measure.—Now if this Reading were right, our Author would have been guilty of an evident Tautology. For the ἐμέτρησις of the Gentler Pleasures had been already mentioned in the First Part of this Sentence, where it is opposed to the αὐτρήσις of the Vehement Pleasures. But 'tis highly probable, that the word συμμέτρων is the right Reading: this probable Conjecture is confirmed by the Medicean M. S. as appears from the faithful Version of Ficinus; who renders it into Latin by the words—
best be known from their Intenseness, their Multitude, their Greatness, and their Abundance 357.

Protarchus.

What is your View, Socrates! in proposing This to be considered?

Socrates.

To omit nothing, by which the Nature of Pleasure, and That of Knowledge, may be set in the clearest Light; and not to leave it undiscovered, whether or no Some Kinds of Each of them are pure, while Other Kinds are impure 358: that thus, what words — commensurati genus. — And according to this Reading, the whole Sentence will be found agreeable to what we read before in Page 292; where ἐμετήρα the Measurable, and συμμετέρα the Commensurate, are expressly distinguished from each other. See also Page 290.

357 In the Greek, this last word is ἰκανόν, — a word, which, every where else in this Dialogue, means Sufficient: but it cannot have that Meaning here, where it is attributed to Pleasures of the Infinite Kind. For as Sufficiency implys Bound and Measure, it belongs only to That Kind of things, which is contrary to the Infinite. We suspect therefore the Greek Text in this place to be corrupted and erroneous.

358 It has been already seen, that Purity, when 'tis attributed to Pleasure of some certain Kind, means, that Pleasure of such a Kind
what is pure and simple in Each being brought before us to be judged of, You and I and all this Company may the more easily form a right Judgment.

Protarchus.

Very rightly said.

Socrates.

Well then; all those Kinds of things, which we commonly say are pure, let us consider of, in the following way; but first let us choose out some One among them for an Instance to consider of.

a Kind is free from any Mixture with what is contrary to the general nature of Pleasure, that is, Pain. In like manner, when Purity is attributed to some certain Kind of Knowledge, it means, that the Knowledge, whereto such an Attribute belongs, is not mixed with any thing, the nature of which is contrary to the nature of Knowledge;—not with things uncertain, the Objects only of Imagination or Opinion;—not with things subject to Change or Motion, the Objects only of outward Sense.

The Epithet "pure" is given to many things;—to Virgin-Earth or Mould;—to all Metals, separated from their Dross; and to the richer Metals, separated from their Allays;—to Fountain-Water and Rain-Water;—to the pure Virgin-Snow, says our Poet Thomson;—to Air upon the Tops of high Mountains;—to a cloudless and clear Æther;—to uncompounded or simple Colours; and to unmixed or simple Flavours.

Protarchus
Protarchus.
Which would you have us choose?

Socrates.
Among the principal of those Kinds, let us, if you please, consider the White Kind of things.

Protarchus.
By all means.

Socrates.
In What way then might we have any thing, which is called White, with the most perfect and pure Whiteness? whether by having the greatest Number of things which are White, and the largest of the Kind in Size, or by having what is White in the highest Degree, and not tinged with the least Degree of any other Colour?

Protarchus.
Evidently, by having what is of the most simple and unmixed Whiteness.

Socrates.
Rightly said. Shall we not then determine, that this Pure White is the Truest, and at the same time the most Beautiful of all Whites; and not That which
which is of the largest Size and whose Number is the greatest?

**Protarchus.**

Most certainly we shall.

**Socrates.**

In pronouncing then, that a Little of Purely White is Whiter, and of a more Beautiful and True Whiteness, than a great Quantity of the Mixt White, we shall say what is entirely right.

**Protarchus.**

Without the least Doubt.

**Socrates.**

Well then; I suppose, we shall have no occasion to produce many such Instances, to prove the truth of our conclusion concerning Pleasure: the Instance, already brought, seems sufficient for us, to perceive at once, that a Little of Pleasure, pure, and free from Pain, is more pleasant, more true, and perfect, as well as more comely, than Pleasure where Pain is mingled, be there ever so much of it, or be it ever so vast and vehement.

**Protarchus.**
By all means: the Instance, you gave in Whiteness, is an argument from Analogy, sufficient for the Proof of it.

But What think you now of This? Have we not heard it said concerning Pleasure, that 'tis a Thing always in generation, always produced anew, and having no Stability of Being, cannot properly be said to Be at all? For some ingenious Persons there are, who endeavour to show us, that such is the nature of Pleasure; and we are much obliged to them for this their account of it.

Why so?

I shall recount to you the Whole of their Reasoning on this Point, my Friend Protarchus! by putting a few Questions to you.

In the Greek,—κομβοκαταφυτη, neat and trim, that is, in their Reasonings and Discourses;—subtle Arguers, or fine Logicians;—a Character, which distinguished the School of Zeno the Eleatick.—It will presently be seen, that the Persons, here spoken of, philosophied on the Principles of the Eleatic Sect, and probably were Some of the same Zeno's Athenian Disciples. See Note 34.
PHILEBUS. 557

PROTARCHUS.
Do so; and begin your Questions.

SOCRATES.
Are there not in Nature Two very different Kinds of Things; This, in its Self alone compleat; That, desirous always of the Other 361?

PROTARCHUS.
How do you mean? and what Things do you speak of?

SOCRATES.
One of Them is by nature always of high Dignity and Value; the Other, falling far short of it, and always indigent 362.

361 The First of these Kinds is Form; the Other is Matter. —By Things of the First Kind, we are to understand, — not these Sensible Forms, which every where invest Matter, and are for ever changing and passing away,—but those Intelligible and Ideal Forms, which are the Originals of the Other. — Again; by Things of this other Kind, are meant the Parts of Matter, considered — not abstractedly, or as negatively opposed to all Form,—but as it were soliciting the Embrace of every Ideal Form which presents itself, and vainly as it were endeavouring to retain the Image of every such Form, as it passeth thro' them.

362 See Note 123 to the Banquet.
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Express your self a little more clearly.

SOCRATES.

Have we not seen Some of the Fair Sex, who excelled in Beauty and in Virtue? and have we not seen their Lovers and Admirers?

PROTARCHUS.

Often.

SOCRATES.

Analogous then to these Two different sorts of Persons, see if you cannot discover Two different Kinds of Things, to One or Other of which different Kinds belongs Every Thing, commonly said to have a Being: The Third be to the Saviour 363.

PROTARCHUS.

363 This whole Sentence, in all the Editions of the Greek, is thus printed,—Τέτων πολλων ευσκόμα δυνα τοι, δυ άλλα γρηγέρ, κατά πάντα δόσα λέγομεν ενα το τῆτων ἔτερον.—A Sentence, quite unintelligible to us!—Monf. Grou very justly apprehends some Error in the Text. We presume, that this sensible and elegant Translator never saw the Emendation, proposed by Cornarius; for that, otherwise, he would have embraced it, and have made His Version, as We have Ours, agreeable to that Emendation: which is no more than a Change of the last word—ἔτερον—into σωτήρι.—The Sentence, thus amended, concludes with this Proverbial Saying,—The Third
Speak your Meaning, O Socrates! in plainer Terms.

Protarchus.

to the Saviour. — It was a Form of words, anciently used at the Feast of every Victor in the Olympic Games, when he made an accustomed Libation, out of the Third Cup or Glass, Διὸ σωτήριος, to Jupiter in his Character of Saviour in all Difficultys and Dangers. — A Speech, so well known to all the Grecians, easily pass’d into a Proverb: and it is alluded to, as Such, by Plato in his Charmides, pag. 167; in his Republick, pag. 533; and in his Seventh Epistle, pag. 334. In the Republick, he applys it to the Best and Happi’s of Human Lives; when Two inferiour Ways of Life had been already mentioned. — In the Charmides, he applys it to a Third and more profound Inquiry into the Meaning of that Delphic Sentence, "Know thy Self;" after it had been Twice considered superficially.—In the 7th Epistle, he applys it to the making of a Third Attempt; after Two had been made by him without Success. — And in the Sentence now before us, he applys it to this Third Explanation of his Meaning, in hopes of its being found fully sufficient; the Two former having been intended only as introductory to This. — But in all these applications of the Proverb, 'tis to be observed, that the several Cases, to which it is applyed, are of the most important and interesting Kind, — Cases, in which it was proper to implore the Divine Assistance.—For the Subject of that Case, in the Republick, is the Happiness of those Persons, who posses true Virtue, or Universal Justice. The Subject of that Case, in the Charmides, is the nature of true Prudence, or Man's highest Wisdom. The Aim of Plato, in that Part of his Seventh Epistle, is to convince the Chief Men among the Siciliens, that 'tis Best for every
PHILEBUS.

Socrates.

I mean nothing, O Protarchus! but what is very simple and easy to be seen. But our present Argument is pleased to sport itself. However, it means no more than this;—that there is a Kind of Things, which are always for the sake of some Other; and there is also a Kind of Things, for whose sake always is produced whatever hath any Final Cause of its Production.

Protarchus.

City and Community, not to be subject to the Will of Men, but to the Laws only; and that all Violation of the Laws is equally pernicious to the Governors and the Governed. And, the Design of this present Part of the Philebus, is to open the Way to a discovery of the nature of Mind, by unfolding the nature of the Universe, and distinguishing this outward, mutable, and transient World, in which alone arises Sensual Pleasure,—from That World, which is intelligible, immutable and eternal, where all Wisdom, Law, Virtue and Happiness, are seated; and from which they are derived, tho' in Streams polluted as they run, into and through this Other.

364 Meaning,—in the Simile, taken from that Courtship which is paid to the Fair by their Humble Lovers.—The Speech of Socrates, in the Banquet, abounds with Metaphors, taken from the same Subject.

365 All the Works of Man are for the sake of Man, who is their Efficient Cause: the Good of Man therefore is their Final Cause, or End.—Those Works of Nature, which are inferior
Protarchus.
I find it difficult to understand your Meaning, after your many Explanations of it.

Socrates.
Perhaps, Young Man! 'twill be understood better, as we proceed in the Reasoning on this Subject.

Protarchus.
I make no doubt of it.

Socrates.
Let us now make another Division of Things into Two different Kinds.

Protarchus.
What Kinds are They?

in Dignity to other of her Works, are for the sake of Some of those which are nobler: the Good of These therefore is the End, or Final Cause, of the less noble. The noblest of all her Works are for the sake of That Higheft Good, which only They are able to partake of: this Higheft Good therefore is the Final Cause of their Being, and their End. And the whole Outward Universe, the World of Nature, is for the sake of Universal Good: Universal Good therefore is the End, or Final Cause, of the whole Creation.

Socrates.
The Generation of all things is One Kind of Things; and the Being of all is a different Kind.\[566\]

Protarchus.

\[566\] We are now brought to those Doctrines of the Ekatic Philosophers, on which the Whole of the present Reasoning is founded: as in consequence of Their Tenets it will appear; that Pleasure has no permanent or stable Being, and belongs only to the unsteady and vague Appearance of Things always in Flow;—an Appearance, which is but for the instant Now, and glides away from the Beholder, like a Shadow.—For the Ekatic Philosophers supposed One only Principle of the Universe,—Mind,—One and the Same for ever.—But they did not suppose this sole Principle to be Such, as an Arithmetical One, or as the abstract Idea of Unity: Neither did they suppose it to be Such a One, as empty Space, or as formless Matter; nor to be like absolute Darkness, or like total Ignorance: for the continual Sameness, or simple Oneness of all These, is nothing Positive, nothing more than a Vacancy or Want of Form and Being; an Absence of Light, or of Intelligence; a Negation of the Means or of the Power of distinguishing one thing from another.—On the contrary, they held this Principle, Mind, to be Form and Being Universal, comprehending and uniting all true Beings, all Forms eternally the Same, all pure Ideas; intelligent of all, thro Self-Consciousness; contemplative of all, thro Self-Contemplation, and viewing them all by his own Light, the Light of Intelligence, the Principles themselves of Mind, Identity and Diversity. — For, as every General Idea is \(\xi\varepsilon\ \xi\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma\) One and Many, they held, that Universal Mind, comprehensive of all General Ideas, is \(\xi\varepsilon\ \xi\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma\) One and All things,—the whole
I admit your difference between Being and Generation.

Socrates:

whole Ideal or Intelligible World,—the True All.—They held, that this Great One-All is determined, fixed, and immutable: for, that every Change infers a Diversity, without a Sameness, in That which is subject to the Change; and it infers a Multitude of the Principles of that Change, or Two at least, without a Union between them: but This, they presumed, could not be the Cape of Mind; because, as in every General Idea, so in Mind, the Head of them all, Sameness abides throughout Diversity, and Multitude is surrounded, embraced, and bound together by Unity. To the Essential nature of Mind they deemed it owing, that every Idea therein is exempt from all Change, and liable to no Generation or Corruption, no Addition or Diminution.—It should seem therefore, that Matter, (which, according to Plato and Aristotle, is another necessary Principle of Things,) was considered by the Eleatic Philosophers, either as Empty Space, the ἄμαξ, the Inane of Democritus and Epicurus, or as Something very different from real Being, and as much a Non-Entity, as that imaginary Vacuum.—Accordingly they held, that all Change of Forms was only in Appearance; that only the Semblances of Form suffered Corruption; and that Generation was but the Arising of new fallacious Semblances to the ἀκούσαν ὀμοία, the inconsiderate Eye of Sense, followed by ἐξαρτών Ἰός, αῖς ἐν ἐν πτερίδω αλυσίδα, the uncertain Judgment of Human Opinions:—that yet, as much a Non-Entity as Matter is, it is This only, in which those Semblances of Form arise, and out of which they are continually produced; infinite Matter being as it were their Matrix, or native Bed, all-capacious, and common to them all.—
PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

You are perfectly in the Right. Now, Whether of these Two is for the sake of the Other? Shall we say, that Generation is for the sake of Being? or shall we say, that Being is for the sake of Generation.

PROTARCHUS.

all.—The Eleatics therefore, conceiving Matter to be thus entirely passive, and Mind to be the only active and generative Power in the Universe, deemed Matter unworthy to be styled a Principle of Things; and deigned this Title,—a Title of so high and universal Import,—to Mind alone. On the same account, those Philosophers denied the Appellation of Beings to Sensible Forms, the imperfect and short-lived Products (or rather, Mischariages) of Matter, their ineffectually nursing-Mother: looking on them as only the Shadows of Substantial Forms. Accordingly, they held Mind to be the only Place of Forms, and Matter to be the Place but of their Shadows: agreeably also to this Tenet, and in pursuance of the fame Metaphor, they held this Shadowy Place itself, this unreal and merely nominal One, to be but the indefinite and indeterminable Shadow of Universal Form, the real and essential One.—From these Considerations, they taught, that this Outward World, the World of Sense, is mutable, infinite, uncertain, and untrue; continually new-created, as it were, in continual new Generations; and tho ever aiming at Being, unable to attain to it: for that Being and Generation are so entirely distinct, and incompatible, that of Things in Being there can be no Generation, nor can Things continually in Generation ever have what can properly be called a Being.—See page 250 of this Dialogue.

PROTARCHUS.
Protarchus.

Whether or no That, which is termed Being, is what it is, for the sake of Generation, is this your present Question?

Socrates.

Apparently it is.

Protarchus.

In the name of the Gods, how can you ask so strange a Question?

Socrates.

My Meaning in That Question, O Protarchus! is of such a Kind as this Other; — whether you would choose to say that Ship-building is for the sake of Shipping, rather than you would say, that Shipping is for the sake of Ship-building: and all other Things of like Kind, O Protarchus! I include in the Question which I ask you.

Protarchus.

Protarchus seems, in this, rightly to apprehend, that Socrates means Form by the term Being.

That is, — whether all Structures, and all other Forms, intended to be made, are intended for the sake of the Construction or Formation, — the mere Operation of constructing or forming them; — or whether this Operation is not rather for the sake of the intended Form.
But for what reason, O Socrates! do you not give an Answer to it, your Self?

I have no reason to refuse that Office; do You but go along with me in my Answer.

Certainly I shall.

I say then, that for the sake of Generation, it is true, that Medicines are composed; the Instrumental Parts, prepared by Nature, and all the Materials of it, provided: but that every Act of Generation is for the sake of some Being; Generation in every Species, for the sake of some Being belonging to that Species; and universally, all Generation, for the sake of Universal Being.

Socrates here again is pleased to temper the Gravity of his Reasoning, and the Dignity of his Subject, with that urbane Facetiousness, usual to him, and very becoming him, in the Mixt Company of those polite Athenian Youths, who frequented the Lyceum.

It is here intimated, that the Design or End of that Generation or Production of all natural Things, which is con-
Protarchus.

Most evidently so.

Socrates.

If Pleasure then be of such a nature, as to be generated always anew, must not the generating of it be always for the sake only of some Being?

Protarchus.

Without doubt.

Socrates.

Now That, for the sake of which is always generated whatever is generated for some End, must continued on for ever, is to communicate Form and Being, as far as possible, to innumerable Individuals of every Kind and Species, throughout the Universe, in everlasting succession. Now this End is impossible to be accomplished, without the Dissolution of all these Individuals, successively, for the sake of continual new Generations; as every Generation is for the sake of Being. —Thus it is, that, Generation keeping even Pace with Dissolution, the Universe is always full: —the external World, is no less full of formed Matter, than Matter is full of Mind, or than Mind is full of those eternal Forms, or true Beings, wrapt up in One Universal Being, for whose fake all created Things are generated and dissolved.

371 The Greek word, τὸ γεγομένον, here signifys whatever is produced, formed or created, whether it be by Nature, or by Human Art.

C c c c
be in the Rank of things which are Good \(^{372}\) : and That, which is generated for the sake of any Other thing, must of necessity, my Friend! be placed in a different Rank of Things.

**Protarchus.**

Certainly it must.

**Socrates.**

Shall we not be right then, in placing Pleasure in a Rank of Things different from That of Good \(^{373}\);—if it be true, that Pleasure has no stable Being, but is always generated anew?

**Protarchus.**

\(^{372}\) Hence it should seem, that those philosophical Persons, whose Reasoning on the present Subject is here delivered to us by Socrates, denied the Attribute of Good to all Instrumental and all other Means of Good; deeming it to belong only to Final Causes or Ends, and to Beings who possess and enjoy those Ends.

\(^{373}\) It is plain, that the Persons, here spoken of, by the term Pleasure meant Pleasure of the Outward Sensés only. The same Term is used in the same Meaning by Socrates, in the Conclusive Part of this Dialogue, where he speaks only his own Sentiments. He agrees also with those Persons, in attributing the Quality of Good to no other things than such as are pursuible for their own sakes: (see the Argument of this Dialogue, page 11.) but he differs from the same Persons in this Point, that he there places the Pleasures of Sensé in the order of things Good; assigning, however, the last and lowest Place to those

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Sensual
Perfectly right.

Socrates.

Sensual Pleasures, which are of the greater Kinds and are mixed with Pain; and a Place next above the lowest, to Such as are more refined and pure.—Now perhaps Both these Partys, Socrates, and the Persons whom he speaks of, may well be justified in their opposite Expressions on this Point; as they meant Two Things very different from each other, but very conformable together. — Socrates, in the present Dialogue, professedly treats of Human Good solely. Now if Man be considered as a Sensitive Animal, Pleasure is The Good of Man: and if Man be considered in the Whole of his nature, in all the Parts of it taken together, Pleasure is still a Good to Him; — it is One of the Goods, altho the meanest, which he enjoys. —— On the other hand, the Studys of the Eleatic Philosophers (and Such we imagine to be the Persons, here spoken of,) were confined to the uppermost Regions of Philosophy: they spent their time, partly, in contemplating the Nature of the Universe, and the Causes of All things; and partly, in searching out the Principles of Mind and Science, and in building on those Principles the Art of Reasoning, commonly called Logick. Whenever they condescended to cast an Eye on the Sensible World, they looked on it, like the Pythagoreans from whom they sprang, no otherwise than as having a reference to the Intelligible World, true Being, of which it is an outward Representation or Picture: and consequently, they must have considered all Pleasure of the Senses, only as one of the Means, intended by the Providential Mind and Wisdom of Nature, to freshen the fading Colours of this Picture, or to lay Such as are similar to Those which are faded.
Socrates.

Therefore, as I said in beginning this Argumentation, we are much obliged to the Persons who have given us this account of Pleasure, that the Essence of it consists in being always generated anew, but that never has it any Kind of Being. For 'tis plain, that these Persons would laugh at a Man, who asserted, that Pleasure and Good were the same Thing.

Protarchus.

Certainly they would.

Socrates.

And these very Persons would certainly laugh at those Men, wherever they met with them, who place their Chief Good and End in Generation.

Protarchus.

How, and what Sort of Men do you mean?

faded quite away. — To Man therefore the Pleasures of Sense may be in the Rank of Ends; altho in Nature they have only the Rank of Means.

374 See Page 556, and Page 498.

Socrates.
Socrates.

Such, as in freeing themselves from Hunger, or Thirst, or any of the Uneasinesses from which they are freed by Generation, are so highly delighted with the action of removing those Uneasinesses, as to declare, they would not choose to live, without suffering Thirst and Hunger, nor without feeling all those other Sensations, which may be said to follow from such Kinds of Uneasiness.

Protarchus.

Such indeed there are, who seem to be of that Opinion.

Socrates very justly here distinguishes between those Philosophers in His time, such as Ariisippus on the one hand,—who held that Pleasure was Good, and that Good was Pleasure; for that Pleasure and Good were the same thing;—and those unphilosophical Voluptuaries in every age, on the other hand,—who, because they have but little Taste for any other Good than Sensual Pleasure, and consequently have but little Enjoyment of any other, imagine, that either Sensual Pleasure in general, or some one Species of it, is the Higheft human Bliss. —Socrates therefore, in speaking of these Two different Sorts of Persons, speaks of each Sort distinctly,—of this common Sort, in the present Sentence,—of the philosophical Sort, in the Sentence preceding.
PHILEBUS.

Socrates.

Would not all of us say, that Corruption was the Contrary of Generation?

Protarchus.

It is impossible to think otherwise.

Socrates.

Whoever then makes such a Life his Choice, must choose both Corruption and Generation, rather than that Third Kind of Life, in which he might live with the clearest Discernment of what is Right and Good, but without the Feeling of either Pain or Pleasure.

Protarchus.

Much Absurdity, as it seems, O Socrates! is to be admitted by the Man, who holds that Human Good consists wholly in Pleasure.

For it is with the Human Body, as it is with all other Natural and Corporeal things; not only every Part is continually in Motion and Mutation, but also every Condition of it is followed by its contrary Condition; and every the slowest Motion, or most minute Change, in each Part, is a Step toward that contrary Condition. Thus there is a continual Vicissitude of Repletion and Inanition, Augmentation and Diminution, Growth and Decay, Corruption and Generation.

See Pages 210 and 485.

Socrates.
PHILEBUS

SOCRATES.

Much indeed. For let us argue farther thus.

PROTARCHUS.

How?

SOCRATES.

Since no Good nor Beauty is in Bodys, nor in any other things, beside the Soul; is it not absurd to imagine, that in the Soul Pleasure should be the only Good; and that neither Fortitude, nor Temperance, nor Understanding, nor any of the other valuable Attainments of the Soul, should be numbered among the Good things, which the Soul enjoys? Farther too; is it not highly irrational to suppose, that a Man, afflicted with Pain, without feeling any Pleasure, should be obliged to say, that Evil only and no Good was with him, at the time, when he was in Pain, tho' he were the Best of All men? And is it not equally absurd, on the other hand, to suppose, that a Man in the Midst of Pleasures must be, during that time, in the midst of Good; and that the more Pleasure he feels, the

378 For only the Soul is capable of enjoying any Good, or of perceiving any Beauty: and Good is nothing, unless it be enjoyed; nor Beauty, unless it be perceived: just as Pleasure is nothing, if not felt; Harmony, nothing, if not heard.

more
more Good he is filled with, and is so much the Better Man?

Protarchus.

All these suppositions, O Socrates! are Absurdities in the highest degree possible.

Socrates.

'Tis well. But now, let us not employ our selves wholly in searching into the nature of Pleasure; as if we industriously declined the examination of Mind and Science: but in These also if there be any thing putrid or unsound, let us have the Courage to cut it all off, and throw it aside; till, coming to a Discovery of what is entirely pure and sound therein, the Discovery may be of use to us, in comparing the truest Parts of Mind and Science with the truest Parts of Pleasure, and in forming our Judgment concerning the Superiority of Either from that Comparison.

Protarchus.

Rightly said.

The truest Parts of Mind are, where Ideas are unmixt with Images: the truest Parts of Science are, where the Objects of Science are unmixt with Objects of Sense: and the truest Parts of Pleasure are, where the Pleasure is pure, and unmixt with Pain.

Socrates.
PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

Do we not hold, that Mathematical Science is partly employed in the service of the Mechanic Arts, and partly in the liberal Education and Discipline of Youth? or how think we on this Subject?

PROTARCHUS.

Exactly fo.

SOCRATES.

Now, as to the Manual Arts, let us consider in the first place, whether Some of these depend not on Science, more than Others; and whether we ought not to look on those of the former Sort as the more pure, and on these Others as the more impure.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly we ought.

SOCRATES.

And in Each of these we should distinguish, and separate the Leading Arts, from the Arts which are led and governed by them.

In the Greek of this Passage, it is presumed, that we ought to read χειροτεχνίας, and not, as it is printed, χειροτεχνικής,—and also to read ἕτι, instead of ἕν.

D d d d PROTARCUS.
PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

What Arts do you call the Leading Arts? and Why do you give that Epithet to them?

SOCRATES.

I mean thus: from all the Arts were a man to separate, and lay aside, those of Numbering, of Measuring, and of Weighing, what remained in every One of them, would become comparatively mean and contemptible 381.

PROTARCHUS.

Contemptible indeed.

SOCRATES.

For room would be then left only for Conjecture, and for Exercise of the Senses, by Experience and habitual Practice; and we should then make use of no other Facultys, beside those of Guessing and Aiming well, (to which indeed the Multitude

381 Prais-es, still higher than This, are, in Plato's Epinomis, pag: 977, ascribed to the Knowlege of Numbers. But indeed a Science more divine, than Mathematical Arithmetick, seems to be there meant:—namely, the Knowlege of those Numbers, (so termed by the Pythagoreans, and by Plato termed Ideas,) which are the true Measures of All things.
PHILEBUS.

give the name of Arts,) increasing the Strength of those Facultys by dint of Assiduity and Labour.

Protarchus.

All, which you have now said, must of necessity be true.

Socrates.

The Truth of it is evident in all Musical Performances throughout. For in the first place, Harmony is produced, and one Sound is adapted to another, not by Measuring, but by that Aiming well, which arises from constant Exercise. It is evident too in Musical Performances on all Wind-Instruments: for in these the Breath, by being well aimed, as it is blown along, searches and attains the Measure of every Chord beaten. So that Musick has in it Much of the Uncertain, and but a Little of the Fixt and Firm.

382 It seems doubtful, whether we ought not, in the Greek of this Passage, to read ψεφομέν, instead of ψεφομένας. In this Doubt, we have endeavoured to adapt our Translation to Either of those Readings: and shall only observe, that, if the printed Reading, by which that doubtful word is made to agree with παρεχ, be right, it carries with it a probability, that the Flute was used by the Ancients to accompany the Lyre; as the Human Voice, in modern days, often accompanies the Harpsichord.

Protarchus.
Protarchus.

Very true.

Socrates.

And we shall find the Case to be the same in the Arts of Medicine and Agriculture, in the Art of Navigation also, and the Military Art.

Protarchus.

Most clearly so.

Socrates.

But in the Art of Building we shall find, as I presume, many Measures made use of, and many Instruments employed; by which it is made to surpass in Accuracy many things which are called Sciences.

Protarchus.

How so?

Socrates.

It is so in Ship-building, and House-building, and in many other Works of Carpentry. For in these, I think, the Art useth the Strait-Rule and the Square, the Turning-Lathe and the Compasses, the Plummet and the Marking-Line.

Protarchus.
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

You are entirely right, O Socrates! it is so as you say.

Socrates.

The Arts therefore, as they are called, let us now distinguish into Two Sorts; — Those, which Musick is at the Head of, as they are less accurate than some Others, — and these Others, which partake of Accuracy the most, at the Head of which is Architecture.

Protarchus.

This Distinction is allowed of.

Socrates.

And let us set down those Arts for the most accurate, which we lately said were the Prime or Leading Arts.

Protarchus.

You mean, if I mistake not, Arithmetick, and those other Arts which you mentioned together with it but just now \(^{383}\).

\(^{383}\) Namely,—Mensuration and Staticks.

Socrates.
Socrates.

The very fame. But, O Protarchus! must we not say, that Each of these Arts is Twofold? or how otherwise?

Protarchus.

What Arts do you speak of?

Socrates.

Arithmetick in the first place. Must we not say of This, that the Arithmetick of the Multitude is of One Sort, and that the Arithmetick of Those who apply themselves to Philosophy \(^{384}\) is of Another Sort?

Protarchus.

What is the Difference, by which the One may be distinguished from the Other?

Socrates.

The Difference between them, O Protarchus! is far from being inconsiderable. For the Multitude, in numbering, number by Unequal Ones, put together; as Two Armys of unequal Force; Two Oxen of unequal Size; Two things, the smallest of

\(^{384}\) Meaning the Students in Mathematicks. For the Study of the Mathematical Sciences was deemed by Plato the best Introduction to the Knowledge of Intelligible Things.

All,—
PHILEBUS.

All,—or Two, the greatest,—being compared with Others of the Same Kind. But the Students in Philosophy would not understand what a Man meant, who, in numbering, made any Difference between Some and Other of the Ones, which composed the Number 385.

PROTARCHUS.

You are perfectly right, in saying, that no inconsiderable Difference lyes in the Different Manner of studying and using Numbers; so as to make it probable, that Two different Sorts there are of Arithmetick.

SOCRATES.

Well; and What of Calculation 386 in Trade, and of Mensuration in Building? does the latter of these Arts

385 See Plato de Republicâ, L. 7. pag. 112, Edit. Cantab:

386 The Art of calculating, computing, and accounting, (λογιστικὴ in Greek) is here mentioned as an Art different from Arithmetick; tho by many Greek Writers, and by Plato himself elsewhere, no Distinction is made between them.——To know, in what respects they differ, and whence it is that the Difference is often overlooked, may be of use for the right understanding of the Science of Mind. For in this Highest Part of Philosophy, the Terms anciently made use of, were borrowed from the Mathematical Sciences: the reason of which was This,—that the pure Objects of these Sciences are, in some degree, abstracted.
Arts not differ from Mathematical Geometry? nor the other, from Calculations made by the Students in pure Mathematicks. Shall we say, that they are, Each absraèted from Body;—being absraèted from Matter, and from all the Sensible Qualities of Body, except Figure;—and are therefore allied, more nearly than Corporeal Objects are, to Objects purely Intelligible.—Now Mathematical Arithmetick, in the strict Meaning of that Word, is the Art of Numbering,—that is, of adding Units to Units, so as to compose or augment some certain Number,—and also of substracting Units or small Numbers from greater, so as to de-compose or lessen the greater Numbers:—for as to the Rules, which direct how to multiply and divide Numbers, they depend immediately and entirely on the Rules for adding and substracting; and on these Four Rules depend all other Operations in Practical Arithmetick.—The Primary Subjects therefore of this Art of Numbering, are Units,—such Ones as are all of them equal,—as Socrates just before observed;—and the Secondary Subjects of it are Numbers, composed from those Ones, and considered meerly with respect to That their Frame or Composition, without regarding any of their Properties, or any of their mutual Relations.—But as Geometry, in the larger signification of the word, is the Science of Measures, on which Science is founded the Art of Mensuration,) and includes Stereometry, or the Art of measuring Solids; altho, in a more confined sense, Geometry signifies only the Art of measuring Surfaces, and is then distinguished from Stereometry;—in like manner, Mathematical Arithmetick, in the larger sense of the word, is the Science of Numbers, and of all their Properties, Powers, and Relations: thus it includes Logièick, or
Each of them, but One Art? or shall we set down Each of them for Two?

Protarchus.

the Knowledge of Accounts; the Subject of which Knowledge (according to the definition of it in Plato's Charmides, pag: 166,) is That Property of Numbers, by which they are, all of them, divided into Two Sorts, Even and Odd; and thro' the Knowledge of which Subject, the nature of Both those Sorts is known, whether considered, each in its Self, or as they stand related to each other. So that the Primary Subjects of Logistic are—not Units,—but Numbers, composed of Units; and the Secondary Subjects of it are the Equalities and Inequalities of different Numbers, compared together,—and in Unequals, the precise Quantity, by which the One exceeds the Other. For the Object and End of this Art is, in all Calculations, Computations, and Accounts, to judge rightly of Equals and Unequals,—and between Unequals, to ascertain the Quantum of the Difference.

387 The Logistic, used in Merchant's Accounts, hath the same Analogy to Mathematical Logistic, as the Arithmetick, used in Buying and Selling, has to the Arithmetick of Mathematicians. For it is only the Mathematical Science or Art, applied to things Sensible and Corporeal. As Arithmetick teaches to reckon up the Number of any such Subject-Matters of Exchange, in Trade and Traffick,—so the Accountant's Art teaches to ascertain their Comparative Value, when the Absolute Value of Each Article is first settled, and when afterward they are all compared together. — Accordingly, in Plato's Politicus, pag: 259, the Office, assigned to Logistic, is—τα γνώσεις κρίνω, to judge of things known,—that is, to judge of their respective Values, and to pronounce what the Difference is between them. And occasion
PHILEBUS

PROTARCHUS.

For my part, I should give my opinion, agreeably to your division of Arithmetick; and should say, that each of these arts also was twofold.

Socrates.

occasion is hence taken, presently after in that dialogue, to apply the name of this art, λογική, in a figurative sense, to the science of magistrates, kings, commanders of armies, and politicians. — in Plato's Republick, L. 7. pag. 525, it is again so applied: but the figurative application of that term λογική is there carried still higher; it is there applied to the science of mind,—a science, peculiar to the true philosopher. for the γνώσις to him, the proper objects of his science, are, according to Socrates, truth and being;—in which are included all ideas less general than mind or being its self, and all truths subordinate to truth its self. — now every single idea is perceived and known by the first of all the mind's energies, commonly termed by logicians simple apprehension. and all positive truths,—the relations between ideas,—are perceived and known by that energy of the mind, which the logicians rightly term judgment; because the perceiving of any of these relations implies not only a knowledge of the ideas so related, and a discernment of some difference between them, but also a right judgment of what the difference is. this right judgment therefore of the mind concerning mental things, perfectly thus known, agrees to the above-mentioned definition of logick in Plato's Politicus: and according to this definition, the name of logick is applicable to the mind's perception of truth, in the same figurative sense, as the name of arithmetick is given, in the epinomis, to the mind's perception of her first objects, the most simple of pure ideas. — now.
You would give a right Opinion. But with what Design I brought these Distinctions on the Carpet, do You conceive?

Now to distinguish between Arithmetick, (in the strict sense of that word,) the Art of Numbering,—and Logistik, the Art of Accounting,—and again, to comprise them both in one,—namely, in the Science of Numbers, (Arithmetick, in its larger sense,)—may help us to discern the Logical Distinction between 

Mind and 

λογιασία Reason,—and to perceive, at the same time, how they are actually inseparable, and are both comprehended in the larger meaning of the word Mind.——For this term Mind, in its stricter sense, denotes the Intellect,—That Power in the Soul, by which all our Ideas, but especially the Principles of Knowledge, are perceived, Each separately and singly.—The term 

νός is so used by Aristotle, in his Posterior Analyticks, L. I. C. 33. where he says,—νός ἡ ἀριθμητική ἡ ἐπιστήμη, by Mind I mean the Principle of Science:—and again, in his Nicomachean Ethics, L. 6. C. 6. he says,—νός ἡ ἠμα τῶν ἀριθμων, that Principles are Objects of the Mind.—By Epicurus also the term νός is used, to signify the Perception of Simple Ideas, in that Verse of his, which is cited in Note 228 to the Banquet, page 240: for the Platonists agree in opinion, that the Outward Senses are meant, in that Verse by ἑκάστα other things. See Maximus Tyrius, in Dissertation, 1, or 17, § 10, and the Authors cited by Heinsius and Davis in their Notes thereon.—But the term Mind, in its larger meaning, includes Reason; whether Reason be considered as the Relation between Ideas, or the Power of perceiving that Relation: (see before in pages 182, 3.) and in
PHILEBUSB.

Protarchus.

Perhaps I do. But I could wish, that You your Self would declare, What was your Design.

Socrates.

this sense is the term ῥῦς used by Aristotle in his Treatise de Anima, L. 3, C. 5. λέγω ῥῦς, says he, ὡς ἰδιονοηται καὶ ὑπολογίζειν ἄ νοόν. By Mind I mean That (Power) by which the Soul thinks and conjectures. — Now One single Idea is not the Object of a Thought, nor of a Conjecture: Two Ideas (at the least) are necessary in the forming of it. For a Thought and a Speech are the same thing; (says Plato in his Sophistia, pag: 263.) except that the former is ἄνευ φωνῆς without Voice, being only in the Mind; (see pages 453, 4. of the present Dialogue;) and a Speech is a combination of (at least) Two Terms, signifying Two Ideas.——These Samenesses and Differences,—on the one hand, between Arithmetick and Logistik,—on the other hand, between Mind and Reason,—as slightly as we have now touched on them, must appear to be so greatly alike, that the Analogy between the former Two, and the latter Two, are easily discovered. — The Analogy between λόγος, Reason, and λογιστηκόν, the Knowledge of Accounts, is so obvious, that the Rational Part of the Soul is termed by Plutarch in his Symposium, L. 3, C. 8. τοῦ λογιστηκον, the Accounting Part: and in our own Language, the showing of a rational Connection between the Moral Actions of any Person,—or a probable Concatenation of Historical Facts, —the assigning also of a reason for any One moral Action, or historical Fact,—is often expressed by this Phrase, "the giving of an Account."—The other Analogy, That between the Science of Mind and the Science of Numbers, is so just and exact, that the Pythagoreans, who were great Masters in Both those Sciences, considering
These Distinctions seem to Me to have shown to us, that in Science there is That very Circum-
stance

considering Ideas as so many single Ones, termed them χώνες:—again, considering Each of them as One Many, or Many contained in One, they gave them the name of Numbers: and This indeed they seem to have had in their consideration, when they taught, that the Soul of Man was composed of Numbers: for such was their general or summary Doctrine concerning the Soul. But, (to step out of our way for the space of a few Lines, on this curious and interesting Point,) when they taught in particular, that the Soul of Man was Harmonically constituted, or composed of Numbers in Harmonic Proportion, they meant to ininfuate (as far as We apprehend) a very high Doctrine, founded on the deepest Researches into the nature of the Univerfe,—This,—that the several Parts or Powers, both the Active and the Passive, of the Human Soul, with all their Effects and Consequences in Human Life, ought to be, and according to nature were, like the Energys, Operations and Productions, of the great mundane Soul, all harmonising together;—viz. in general, the Intellectual and the Sensitive, the Rational and the Imaginative, the Affectionate and the Passionate, the Appetitive and the Averfative, the Nutritive and the Generative.

—From the Digreflion of these few Lines, we return to the Subject of our present Note; and shall finish it in Lines not many more, but of much more comprehensive Import. For if we inquire into the Foundation of those Resemblances and of those
instance attending it, which we had before discovered to be in Pleasure; the One thus answering to the Other. For, having found, that some Sort of Pleasure was purer than some Other Sort, we were inquiring, whether the same Difference was to be found with regard to Science; and whether One Sort of This also was purer than some Other.

those Analogys above-mentioned, we shall discover it to ly in the First Principles of all Form and Being;—in those Principles of Mind its Self, as well as of Outward Nature, — One and Many, Same and Different:—these being also the Principles of Numbers;—the Principles of their several Ratios, or of the Ratio of Each Number to every Other;—and the Principles of every Proportion, how variously soever the Terms of it change their Places.—For Things which have nothing in Common, no Sameness between them, have no Relation to each other: and Sameness of Ratios, or Relations, is the very Essence of all Proportion. On the other hand, to every Ratio, or Relation, Difference is necessary; to the Ratio of perfect Equality, Difference numerical: for every Relation is between Two things, at the fewest: and equal Ratio's, Two at the fewest, constitute Proportion.—Again; One, and More than One, are essentially necessary to every One Number; and every One large Number, containing many less, contains many Ratios and many Proportions: every Ratio is One Ideal Thing; but Two Ideal Things are necessary to compose it: and every Proportion is but One Thing in Idea; yet Three Things, or Numbers, are the fewest Materials, to which that Ideal Form is or can be given.

Protarchus.
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

'Tis very manifest, that your Distinctions between the several Arts were introduced for this very Purpose.

Socrates.

Well then; have we not discovered, in what has been said, that Some Arts are clearer than Others, having more Light within them; and that Others are more involved in Obscurity and Darkness?

Protarchus.

Evidently so.

Socrates.

And has not the course of our Argument led us to take notice of some Art, bearing the same Name with some Other Art; and first, to suppose them Both to be, as they are commonly imagined, but One Art; then, to consider them as Two different Arts; to examine Each, with regard to its Clearness and Purity; and to inquire, which of the Two has in it the most Accuracy, whether That which is cultivated by Students in Philosophy, or That which is exercised by the Multitude?

Protarchus.

Our Argument seems to bring on this Inquiry.

Socrates.
And what Answer, O Protarchus! should we make to such a Question?

Protarchus.

O Socrates! we are now advanced so far, as to discover an amazingly wide Difference between the Parts of our Knowledge in point of Clearness.

Socrates.

It will therefore be the easier for us, to answer to that Question.

Protarchus.

Without doubt. And let us affirm, that those Leading Arts greatly excell the Others with regard to Clearness; and that Such of those brighter Arts themselves, as are studied by real Students in Philosophy, display, in Measures and in Numbers, their vast superiority to all other Arts, with regard to Accuracy and Truth 388.

Socrates.

388 This whole Sentence, beginning with the words “And let us affirm,” is, in Stephens’s Edition, very improperly given to Socrates, and consequently the Sentence following, with equal impropriety to Protarchus. The Basil Editions are Both right; the Aldine not clear.
Socrates.

Granting these things to be what You say they are, let us, on the Credit of what you have said, boldly answer to those Persons, who are so formidable in argumentation, thus.

Protarchus was not sensible, that he had said any thing, beside what resulted plainly from the Reasoning of Socrates just before. He knew not, that, in the last words of his Answer, he had gone a Step farther, than he was authorised by That Reasoning. And because this Step exceeded the Bounds of Truth, in praise of Arithmetick and Geometry, for this reason it is, that Socrates here does not confirm the Answer, made to his Question by Protarchus, but proceeds to examine it.—In so easy and natural a way, is the brightest, the purest, and the highest Science,—That of Mind,—coming on to be introduced. Indeed, without some such contrivance, the Mention of that Science would have seemed abrupt: and yet, to treat of it, so far at least, as to delineate the nature of it, is no less essentially necessary to the Subject of this Dialogue, than to mention it, next after Geometry and Arithmetick, is necessary to the Order, observed in this Second Part of the Dialogue, regarding the Conclusion. For, having been conducted, thro a View of the greater Pleasures of Sense, to the View of Such as are finer and pure from Pain; from These we proceeded to speculate the Arts and Mathematical Sciences: from Arts and those lower Sciences, we now rise to the consideration of Mind, as it is intelligent, the Intelligence of First Principles, and the Science of Universals.

Protarchus.
Protarchus.

How?

Socrates.

That there are Two Sorts of Arithmetick; and that, dependant on these, there is a long Train of Arts, Each of them, in like manner, Twofold under One Denomination.

Protarchus.

Let us give to the Persons, whom you call formidable, That very Answer, O Socrates! with a confidence of its being right.

Socrates.

Do we then affirm, that in these Sciences there is an Accuracy, the highest of all.

Protarchus.

Certainly.

Socrates.

But the Power of Dialectick, O Protarchus! if we gave to any other Science the Preference above Her, would deny that Superiority.

Protarchus.
PHILEBUS. 593

Protarchus.

What Power is it, to which we are to give that name?

Socrates.

Plainly That Power, O Protarchus! by which the Mind perceives all that Accuracy and Clearness, of which we have been speaking. For I am entirely of opinion, that all Persons, endued with even the smallest Portion of Understanding, must deem the Knowledge of the real Essence of Things, — the Knowledge of that Kind of Being, whose nature is invariable,—to be by far the most certain and true Knowledge. But You, Protarchus! to What Art or Science would You give the distinction of Preeminence?

Protarchus.

As to Me, O Socrates! I have often heard Gorgias maintaining in all places, that the Art of Persuasion has greatly the Advantage over all other Arts, in over-ruling all things, and making all Persons submit to it, not by Constraint, but by a voluntary Yielding; and therefore that of all Arts it is by far the most excellent. Now I should not choose to contradict or oppose either You or Him.
Socrates.

As much as to say, if I apprehend your Meaning rightly, that you cannot, for shame, desert your Colours 390.

Protarchus.

Let Your Opinion of these matters now prevail; and the Ranks of the several Arts be settled, as You would have them.

Socrates.

Am I now to blame for Your making a Mistake?

Protarchus.

What Mistake have I made?

Socrates.

The Question, my Friend Protarchus! was not, Which Art, or Which Science is superior to all the rest, with regard to Greatness, and Excellence, and Usefulness to Us; but of Which Art the Objects are the brightest, the most accurate and true, tho the Art its Self brought us little or no Gain: This it is, which is the present Subject of our In-

390 In this Metaphor it is implied, that Protarchus had been as it were inlifed under the Leading and the Discipline of Gorgias.
quity. Observe then; Gorgias will have no Quarrel with you: for you may still allow to His Art the Preference above all others, in Point of Utility and Profit to Mankind. But, as I said before concerning White, that, be there ever so little of it, so it be pure, it excels a large quantity of an impure White, with regard to the truth of Whiteness; just so is it with the Study which I have been commending; it excels all others, with regard to Truth its Self. And now that we have considered this Subject attentively, and discussed it sufficiently, laying aside all Regards to the Usefulness of the Sciences and Arts, as well as to the Reputation which they bear in the world, and thorowly sifting them to find out the Purity of Mind and Wisdom,—if there be in the Soul any Faculty of loving Truth above all things, and of doing whatever she does, for the sake of Truth,—let us consider, whether it is right to say, that we have this Faculty improved chiefly by Dialectick, or whether we must search for some other Art, fitter for that purpose, and making it more her proper Business.

Protarchus.

Well, I do consider the Point proposed; and I imagine it no easy matter to admit, that any other:

391 See in Pages 454, 5.
Science or Art seeks and embraces Truth so much as This.

Socrates.

Say you this, from having observed, that many of the Arts, even such as profess a laborious Inquiry after Truth, are in the first place conversant only with Opinions, and exercise only the Imagination; and that methodically, and according to a set of Rules, they then search into things which are the Subjects only of such Opinions? and do you know, that the Persons, who suppose themselves to be inquiring into the Nature of Things, are, all their Lives, inquisitive about nothing more than this Outward World, how it was produced, what causeth the Changes which happen therein,

392 Meaning, as we presume, Such as the Philosophers of the Ionic Sect, by Aristotle styled φυσικοὶ Naturalists. For we learn from D. Laertius, that Archelaus, a Disciple of Anaxagoras, and the last Professor and Teacher of the Doctrine of those Philosophers, did, in the time of Socrates, introduce into Athens Their Way of philosophizing; which was none other, than That, spoken of in this Passage. It seems therefore probable, that the Athenian Scholars of Archelaus are the very Persons, whose Studys are here shown to fall short of attaining to the Knowledge of Truth, or the true Nature of Things.—The same Judgment of Socrates, concerning these Ionic Physiologers, we find recorded by Xenophon, in Memorabil: L. i, C. i, § 11.
and how those Changes operate their Effects? Should we acknowledge all this so to be, or how otherwise?

Protarchus.

Just so.

Socrates.

Whoever of us then adds himself to the Study of Nature in this way, employs his time and care, not about the Things which always are in Being, but about Things which are either newly come into Being, or which are to come, or which have been already and are past.

Protarchus.

Very true.

Socrates.

What Clearness therefore, what Certainty, or exact Truth, can we expect to find in these Things, none of which had ever any Stability or Sameness in them, nor ever will have any, nor have such of them as now exist, any, even during their existance?

Protarchus.

How can it be expected?

Socrates.
Concerning Things, in which there is not the least Stability, how can we form any stable Notions?

Protarchus.
I suppose it not possible.

Socrates.
Of those Things then there is neither Intelligence, nor any Sort of Science to be acquired; at least, not such as contains the highest degree of Certainty.

Protarchus.
It is not probable, that there is.

Socrates.
We ought therefore, both you and I, to lay aside the consideration of what Gorgias or Philebus said, and to establish on a firmer Basis this Truth.

Protarchus.
What truth?

Socrates.
This;—Whatever is in us of stable, pure, and true, it has for the Objects of it—either the Beings which always are, and remain invariable, entirely pure
pure and unadulterate 393,—or [if These are beyond the reach of Our Sight] then Such as are the nearest allyed to them, and are Second in the Ranks of Being 394: for all other Things come after those First Beings,—Second, and so on in Order 395.

Protarchus.

393 Meaning the eternal and immutable Ideas of the Divine Mind. For, inasmuch as the Divine Being is the Creative Cause of all Corporeal Things, He himself (who is pure Mind) must be unmixed with any thing Corporeal: and consequently, the Ideas of his Mind, all of which are eternal and immutable, the Formal Causes of all things Corporeal, must be perfectly pure and unmixed with Images: because Images in the Soul are only in the Soul’s Imaginative Part, are only of Corporeal things, and are themselves also Corporeal.

394 These Beings of Second Rank are the Ideas of all Particular Minds; and Such are not only Ours, the Human, but all Other Minds, inferior to the Divine. For, whatever Rational Beings there may be in the infinite number of Orbs, and vast Regions of the Universe, unknown to Us,—and how greatly soever Some of those Beings may excell Man in the highest Powers of his Soul, Intellect and Reason,—yet the Mind of Every One of them must be Particular; because it is united with only a Part or Portion of formed Matter, a Body, how fine soever; to the Soul of which Body superadded is a Mind.—Now by means of this Body it is, that the Soul, which animates it, not only receives from external Things the Impressions, which are made in her Sensory, the proper Seat of all her Sensations,—but receives also the Images of those Things into Their proper
proper Seat, her *Imagination*;—by means of this *Soul* it is, —by means of those *Impressions* and those *Images* which she receives,—that the super-added *Mind* hath its *con-natural Ideas* at the first excited.——In other words; essentially *natural* it is to all particular *Minds*, to *universal life* every *Object*, presented to them by *Sens*e and *Imagination*, —to rise from every *Individual*, which by those means they take cognizance of, to the *Species*,—thence to the *Kind*, and to those higher *Universals*, of which every Individual partakes, whatever Kind and Species it belongs to.——But whilst the *Mind* is thus rising from Beings of lower Order to those of Higher, it is, all the time, so closely joined to *Sens*e and *Imagination*, that the *Images* of things Sensible, not only *reach* it thro' the *Organs* of *Sens*e, but are *retained* also in the *Memory*; and with *Memory* and *Imagination* the *Mind* is for ever conversant, even when the *Organs* of *Sens*e are obstructed totally in *Sleep*: so that *Images* are mixed with all our *Ideas*, and render them *less* pure and *clear*, *less* true and certain, than the *Divine Ideas*, their *Archetypes*.——In these *Divine Ideas*, the Seat of which is the *Divine Mind*, and only in Them, is to be found what *Socrates*, in Plato's *Phaedo*, (pag: 266, Edit: Oxon:) styles ἴ αληθεως των ὤν την the *Truth of Things*, or *True Being*. For he there tells to his *Disciples*, who were attendant on him in those last *Hours* of his *Life*, that he had formerly sought to find that *Truth* εν τοις ἴ αληθεως *in the Works of Nature*; (This was at the time, when he admired Anaxagoras, and studied the *Writings* of that great Physiologer:) but that, meeting only with *Disappointments* in this way of philosophsing, (for that neither *Outward Nature*, nor Those who wrote concerning it, showed him the *fundamental Causes* of Things, or their real *Essences*, but the *Images* of them only,) he applied himself, from that time, to the *Search of Truth* εν τοις λογοις *in Reasonings*, —in the *inward Speeches*.
Speeches of his own Mind, and in Logical or Dialectical Discourses. But he plainly enough intimates, at the same time, that, in Human Minds, the Universals, the Subjects of those Speeches and Discourses, are, like the ἐκ τῶν Works of Nature, only ἔννοεις Images or Copies of true Beings, tho μᾶλλον more nearly resembling the Originals or Realities. See Note 62 to the present Dialogue, Pages 106, 7; and Note 118, Page 181.

—Very willingly therefore, and very consistently with himself, does Socrates, in Plato's Parmenides, (pag: 22, 24, and 26, Edit: Oxon:) acknowledge, that eternal Ideas,—Forms subsisting by Themselves, αὐτῶς ἄνετα, αὐτῶς, apart from all external and sensible Things, are not, and cannot possibly be in Us;—that Beauty its Self, or Good its Self, in its own pure Essence, is not an Object of Our Knowledge;—and that an accurate Science of the Truth of Things is in God alone;—for that Science in Man reaches not to Any Thing which is Divine. —All these Inferences, drawn by Parmenides from the Doctrine of Ideas, (on which depends, according to that Great Philosopher, the Power of Dialectick,) Socrates says, are entirely agreeable to his own Mind.—Aristotle, on this Subject, seems to have been of a different Opinion. He seems either to have supposed that Our νομισμα, or Notions of the Kinds and Species of Things, were possible to be divided of all the Images of Sensible Objects; and that Our Minds were capable of becoming as pure and simple as Mind its Self;—or else to have deemed those Kinds and Species of Things as they exist in outward Nature, all the Similitudes and Distinguishes of Corporeal Forms, to be Objects of the Divine Mind as properly as of the Human. —Indeed he never departs from the Doctrine of Plato concerning the Principles of Knowledge, or concerning those Universals, the Kinds and Species of Things; rightly arguing, that, without them, no Definition could be given of any thing;—that,

G g g g a

without
PHILEBUS.

without them, there would be no Demonstrative or Syllogistic Reasoning, no General Conclusion could be drawn from any Premisses;—and that, without them, we should only have Sensations, or Perceptions of Sensible Things, but no Science.—And thus far the acute and learned Stagyrite confirms the Sentiments of his great Master. But, in many Passages of his Writings, he argues against the Being of any Universals, considered as lying separate or apart from the Forms of Nature, with which our Senses are conversant. For it is from these Individual and External Forms, that the Human Mind is by Him supposed to gather up as it were those Universals, and to collect them within her Self; by abstracting them χύμα from that ςάμ or Common Matter, with which all Form is united. On this supposition, rejected are the Forms of higher Order,—the Forms, original to those of outward Nature; — and the Great Mind Universal differs not from any Particular Mind, except by being actually, what every particular Mind by nature is only δυσμενες, or has a bare Capacity of being, viz. the place of Forms Intelligible, of abstract Forms, unmixed with Matter; —and except also, by comprising at once, in One eternal View, all the Forms of Nature: whilst every Mind Particular, even the largest and the most comprehensive, is obliged, in all her Speculations, if they are distinct and accurate, to view One Form only at a time; and in the Process of all her Reasonings, to make a transition from One Form to Another; either from one Species to another and so on, as in reasoning by Induction; or from Genus to Species, and back again to Genus, as in reasoning Syllogistically; or from Compound Forms to their Elements and Principles, in reasoning Analytically.

395 The several Perceptive Powers of the Soul have, for their respective Objects, all the several Kinds of Form or Being. The primary Forms, or those of highest Dignity, are, according to

Socrates
Protarchus.

Perfectly right.

Socrates.

The noblest therefore of the Names, given to Things of this Kind, is it not perfectly right to assign to those of this Kind, which are the noblest?

Protarchus.

Socrates and Plato, pure Ideas, the Objects of the Divine Mind, and the Subjects of Divine Wisdom.—Ideas probably, which the highest Power in Man's Soul, his Intellect, has but a bare Capacity of viewing, in their genuine Purity, or as they are in Themselves.—The Forms of second Rank, as they are rightly deemed by Socrates in the present Sentence, are Ideas in the Human Mind, of those Divine Forms original the Mental Copies, the natural and proper Objects of Man's Reason, and the Subjects of his Reasoning and of all his Science.—Third in Dignity are the vital Forms of Nature, the Objects of the Sensitive and Imaginative Powers of the Soul, and the Subjects of Opinion and Hypothesis.—Last and lowest in the Ranks of natural Being are things inanimate, the entirely passive Subjects of Human Art; Objects of Sensation and Imagination these also, but not of Opinion.

In this expression, (things of this Kind) are meant to be included all the perceptive Powers or Faculties of the Soul, as well as all the Objects of Perception, mentioned in the preceding Note. For every perceptive Power, is united with its Object, by actually perceiving it.—The Sensitive Power, thro' actual Sensation, is united with its present Object, so far as
'Tis reasonable, so to do.

Socrates.

Are not Mind and Wisdom the noblest of those Names?

that Object is sensible or an Object of Sense:—the Imaginative Power of the Soul, in imagining, is united with an Object of Imagination:—the Rational Power, in the act of reasoning, becomes One with an Object of Reason, the present Subject of its reasoning:— and the Intellectual Power, in actual Intelligence, is One with that intelligible Form, its present Object.—In reality, both Mind and Sense are formed by their Objects. Mind without intellection of any Ideas, and Sense without a sensation of any Objects of Sense, are nothing more than ὑλή the Matter of their respective Forms; like the ὑλή or common Matter of all corporeal things, considered λόγῳ as void of Form. For Mind is the Place or Residence of Ideas, and Sense is the Receptacle of Sensations; just as external Matter is the Receptacle and the Place of external Forms. — No less true is it, on the other hand, that — as there would be in Nature no external Forms, if That common Matter, which is the Subject of them all, were away, — so, none of these Forms, considered as Sensible, or as Objects of Sense, could have any Existence, if there was not, in Beings of a certain Kind, viz. in all Animals, the Power of Sensation; nor could there be in the Soul any Images or internal Representatives of external Forms, if there was not in the Soul a Power of Imagination: neither would any Intelligible Forms, any Ideas, have a Being, was there not, in the internal Nature of the Universe, the Power (in Man perhaps, and in some other Beings, at the first, a bare Capacity) of Mind or Intellect.

Protarchus.
They are.

Socrates.

Rightly then are these Names, in accurate Speech, appropriated to the Intelligence and Contemplation of Real Being 397.

Protarchus.

Certainly so.

Socrates.

And the Things, for the excellency of which I at the first contended, are the very Things, to which we give these Names.

Protarchus.

Clearly are they, O Socrates!

Socrates.

Well now; were a Man to say, that the nature of Mind and the nature of Pleasure lay severally before us, like Two different Sorts of Materials before some Workman, for Him to mix or join together, and from them, and in them, to compose his designed Work, — would he not make a fair

397 See Page 240 of this Dialogue.

Comparison,
PHILEBUS.

Comparison, suitable to the Task which our Inquiry has engaged us in? 

PROTARCHUS.

A very fair Comparison.

SOCRATES.

Should we not then, in the next place, set about mixing them together?

PROTARCHUS.

Why should we not?

SOCRATES.

Would it not be our best way, to begin this Work by recollecting and repeating those things over again? 

See Page 211, and 317; and the Argument also of this Dialogue, Page 27. — According to the Division of it, proposed in that Argument, the Third and last Part of it begins with the Sentence now before us. For the nature of Mind having been considered in the First Part, and the nature of Pleasure in the Second Part, the nature of that greater Good, which consists in the right Mixture of Mind and Pleasure, is the only remaining Subject of Inquiry.

See Note 132.

PROTARCHUS.
PHILEBUS. 607

Protarchus.

What things?

Socrates.

Those, we have often mentioned before 400. For, I think the Proverb says well,—"Again and again That which is right, by repeating it, to recall into our Minds 401."

Protarchus.

Undoubtedly.

Socrates.

400 In the Greek of this Sentence, as it is printed, there seems to be an Omission of the necessary word πολλάνιον. See Stephens's Edition of Plato, vol. 2, pag. 19, D. i. or Page 194 in this Translation.

401 The Proverb, here mentioned, is recorded by Zenobius and by Suidas thus,—Δίς καὶ τὸς τὸ καλὸν. And indeed the Whole of it seems to be contained in those few words; and the rest of the Sentence, now before us, seems added by Plato, to explain and illustrate the true Meaning of that Proverbial Saying.—Michael Apostolius, however, at first Sight may seem to report the Proverb more fully and perfectly in these words,—Δίς καὶ τῆς τὸ καλὸν: τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἐδὲ ἀπατεῖ.

Again, and yet again, whate'er is good:
But what is evil, not so much as once.

We have translated the Sentence last cited, thus into English Metre, because we apprehend it to be a Verse of some ancient Sentimental Poet, possibly Euripides, reciting the Proverb, and adding
PHILEBUS.

Socrates.

In the name of Jupiter, then come on. The whole of our Controversy began, I think, with stating the Point in question, to This Effect.

adding to it; especially if, instead of τὸ δὲ παρὰν, the right Reading be, as probably it is, τὸ δ' αἰσχρῶν. For the Sentiment, tho' very laudable, is not single enough, nor is the Sentence concise or brief enough, for a Proverb. If our Supposition be well founded,—that 'tis a Verse, containing in the First Half of it the Proverb, and in the Latter Half a Thought, how just sover, yet foreign to the Proverb,—this additional Thought so much agrees with That of Sophocles, in his Oedipus Tyrannus, ver. 1423,

'Αλλ' η γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔδω, ἀ μὴν ὤφησε, καλὸν,

Best, not to speak of what 'tis ill to aIt,

that we are apt to imagine it thence derived. However this be, the Proverb, as we have it delivered to us by those old Grammarians, first cited, and no more, is alluded to by Plato, in his Sixth Book de Legibus, pag: 754, C. 2. and again in his Gorgias, pag: 498, lin: ult: where he attributes to it the same Meaning as in the present Passage, but in other Words. Zenobius also interprets the Proverb, agreeably to Plato's Sense of it, as meaning—not to applaud the frequent Doing of good Actions,—(for the frequent Repetition of These is too evidently right, for the Praise of it to pass into a Proverb,—) but meaning to justify, or at least to apologize for, the Repetition, over and over again, of the same Words and Sentences, expressive of the same Thoughts, if those Thoughts are just and true.
Protarchus.

How?

Socrates.

Philebus affirms, that Pleasure is the right Mark, set up by Nature, for all Animals to aim at; that they all ought to pursue Pleasure; that the Good of them all is this very thing, Pleasure; and that good and pleasant, these Two Attributes, belong but to One Subject, as they Both have but One and the same Nature: on the other hand, Socrates denies This to be true; and maintains, in the first place, that as the Two Names, good and pleasant, are Two different Names, different also are the Things so denominated 402; in the next place, that the Nature of Good differs from that of Pleasure; and that Intelligence, or Mind, partakes of the Property of Good more than Pleasure does, and is allied nearer to its Nature 403. Were not some such Positions as These, O Protarchus! severally laid down by us?

Protarchus.

They were.

402 See Pages 68 and 74, and Note 35.
403 See Pages 50 and 218.
But was not this Point agreed on between us at that time, and do we not still agree in it?

What Point?

That the nature of Good its Self is more excellent than the nature of any other Thing, in this respect.

In what respect?

This,—that whatever animal Being hath the constant, intire, and full Possession of Good its Self, such a Being has no want of any thing beside, having always a most perfect and compleat Sufficiency. Is it not so?

It certainly is.

Have we not endeavoured to consider separately a Life of Pleasure and a Life of Understanding,

See Pages 200 and 202.
PHILEBUS.

Each unmixed with the Other,—a Life of Pleasure without Understanding, and in like manner, a Life of Understanding without the smallest degree of Pleasure?

PROTARCHUS.

We have.

SOCRATES.

Did Either of those Lives appear to Us, at that time \(^{405}\), to be sufficient for the Happiness of any Man?

PROTARCHUS.

How was it possible \(^{406}\)?

SOCRATES.

But if, at that time, any Mistake was committed, let it be now revised and rectified. In order to which, let us take Memory, Knowledge, Understanding, and Right Opinion, comprehending them all in One Idea, and consider whether any Man, without having something of that Kind, would accept of Pleasure were it offered to him, either in the greatest abundance, or in the most exquisite degree;

\(^{405}\) That is,—when they were severally the Subjects of our consideration.

\(^{406}\) See Pages 206 and 212.
whether indeed he would regard the having or the receiving of any thing whatever; as he would not, in that case, have a right Thought or Opinion of his having any Pleasure; neither would he know What he felt or had at present; nor would he remember, in what condition or circumstances he had been at any time before. In like manner concerning Intellecction or Understanding, consider, whether a Man would chufe to have it without a mixture of any Pleasure in the leaft, rather than to have the fame Understanding attended with Pleasures of certain Kinds; and whether a Man would prefer the having of all poSSible Pleasures, without Understanding, to the having of them accompanied with some degree of Understanding.

Protarchus.

It is imposSible, O Socrates! for a Man to make any such Choice as you have supposéd. And there is no occassion to repeat these Questions again and again.

407 See Page 209.

408 What Kinds are here meant, will soon appear.

409 This seems to refer jocosely to the Proverb, cited just before. See Note 401.
PHILEBUS. 613

SOCRATES.

Not Pleasure then, nor Understanding, either of them alone, can be the perfect and consummate Good, eligible to all men, That which We are inquiring after.

PROTARCHUS.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

Of this Good then we are to give a clear and full Description, or at least some Sketch; that we may know, where the Second Prize of Excellence, as we called it, ought to be bestowed. 410.

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly right.

SOCRATES.

Have we not then taken a Way, by which we may find out our Chief Good?

PROTARCHUS.

What Way do you mean?

SOCRATES.

As, if we were in search of any particular Man, and were already well informed of the place of his

410 See Page 217.
Abode, we should have made a great Progress toward finding the Man himself.

**Protarchus.**

Without doubt.

**Socrates.**

And our Reasoning has now declared to us clearly, what it pointed to before, that, not in the Unmixt Life, but in the Mixt, we are to seek for Happiness.

**Protarchus.**

Certainly so.

**Socrates.**

But in a proper and well-tempered Mixture, we may reasonably hope to discover what we are in search of, with more certainty, than we could by an ill-made composition.

**Protarchus.**

With much more.

**Socrates.**

Let us then set about mixing, and making the Composition, first praying to the Gods for their assistance; whether it be Bacchus or Vulcan, or some
some Other of the Gods, who presides over the Mixture of these Ingredients.

Protarchus.
Let us, by all means, do so.

Socrates.
And now as it were Two Cisterns, or Vases, are set before us; the Vase of Pleasure, as of Honey; and the Vase of Understanding, cool and sober, as of some hard and healthful Water. These then we are to mix together in the best manner we are able.

Protarchus.
With all my Heart.

Socrates.
Come then: but first say, whether, by mingling all Sorts of Pleasure with all the Kinds of Know-

411 Bacchus is here mentioned in particular, because the Greeks, in drinking, usually mixed Water with their Wine: and Vulcan in particular, because of the Mixture of different Metals by Fusion, as composing together the best Matter of many Utensils in common Life.

412 This Allegory seems to be derived, in the way of Imitation, from Homer's Allegorical Fable of the Two Chests, (in his Iliad, L. 24. v. 557.)—One, filled with things Good,—the Other, filled with Evils; —like the Allegory in Plato's Gorgias, pag: 493.—See Porphyry, in his Treatise de Antro Nymphaeorum, pag: 129.
lege and Understanding, we may best obtain our End, the having of a proper and due Mixture.

Protarchus.

Perhaps we might.

Socrates.

But 'tis dangerous to make the Experiment. And I believe, that I can point out a way to mix them with more Safety.

Protarchus.

Say, What way.

Socrates.

Concerning Pleasures, I think, we held, that Some more truly deserved that name, than Others of them; and of Arts, that Some were more accurate and exact, than Others.

Protarchus.

Undoubtedly so.

Socrates.

And that the Sciences also differed, one from another, in like manner: for that Some Kinds of Science have for their Objects only such things, as arise into Being and afterwards perish; whereas...

See Pages 479 & seq.

See Page 589.
Another Kind directs its View to things which are
neither generated nor destroyed, but always are in
Being, always have the same Properties, and preserve
always the same Relations. And this Kind of
Science, with regard to the Truth of it, we deemed
more excellent than the other Kinds. 

Protarchus.

Intirely right.

Socrates.

In the first place therefore, mixing together the
purest Parts of Pleasure and of Knowledge, when they
have been thus distinguished from the less pure, if
we view those purest Parts of Each in combination,
are they not, thus combined, sufficient to furnish
out, and present us with, an ample View of That
Life which is most desirable? or is any thing far-
ther, any Ingredient of a different Kind, wanting
to perfect the Composition?

Protarchus.

So as You propose, and only so, it seems to Me
necessary for us to do.

\[415\] See Pages 593 & seq.
PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

Let us then suppose a Man to have in his Mind the Idea of Justice its Self, so as to know What it is in its own Essence, and to be able to give an Account of it in consequence of that Knowledge. Let us also suppose him to have the like Knowledge of all other Beings 416.

PROTARCHUS.

Be such a Man supposed.

416 ὅτι ἐστίν, in the Greek of this Passage, signifies ὅτι ἔστιν. Things which really and truly are, as having some precise and definable Being, Each of them; and Such only are Those, which are stable and invariable;—Ideal Forms, unmixt with Matter;— the Subjects of pure Science; and the Objects of Understanding, of Mind and Reason, but not of Sense or Imagination. — Of these Intelligible or Mental Objects, the Highest are those Universals, which are the essential Properties of the Supreme Being; One of which, viz. Justice its Self, is brought for an Instance of Mental Knowledge, in the Passage now before us.—In the next Sentence of Socrates, an Instance of the same Kind of Knowledge is taken from the Lowest of Mental Objects, as the Subjects of the Mathematical Sciences are justly deemed by Plato: for on this account it was, that he recommended to All, who were desirous of attaining to know the true Nature of Things, to begin their Studys with those Sciences; which he considered as the first Step, in ascending to the Heights of true Philosophy,—to the Contemplation of those Things, which alone are truly universal and divine.

SOCRATES.
PHILEBUS.

Socrates.

Will this Man now be accomplished sufficiently in Knowledge, by knowing the nature of the Circle its Self, and of the Sphere its Self, whose Nature is Divine; whilst he is ignorant of That Sphere and of Those Circles, with which the Eyes of Men are conversant? Will that Knowledge of his be sufficient for his Use, in Building, and in other Arts, where Lines and Circles are to be drawn? 417?

Protarchus.

Ridiculous we should call the condition of our Minds here, O Socrates! if our Knowledge were thus confined to things Ideal and Divine.

Socrates.

How do you say? Arts, which are neither certain nor pure, using untrue Rules, and conversant

417 In the Study of pure Mathematicks, the Mind ought to abstract her Ideas, as much as possible, from all their Images or Figures, described upon any visible Subsance, such as Paper and Slate,—or in any, as in Wood or Stone. For the Subjects of Mathematical Science are—not things sensibl, or perceivable by any of the outward Senses,—but things intelligible to Mind, and definable to Reason. And the Abstraction from all Figures, even those in the Imagination, is absolutely necessary for the apprehending of any Mathematical Truths; because no other Faculty in the Human Soul, than that of Reason, is capable of seeing the Demonstration of them,
P H I L E B U S.

with untrue Circles, are we to throw such Arts into the Composition, and mix them with the other Ingredients?

Protarchus.

It is necessary for us;—if, whenever we are anywhere abroad, we are desirous of finding our way home.

Socrates.

Are we to add Music too?—an Art, which, not long since we said, is wanting in Purity, as being full of Conjecture and Imitation 418?

Protarchus.

Of necessity we must, as it appears to me, if the Life, which we are to lead, shall ever deserve to be called Life, or be at all worth the having.

Socrates.

Would you then, like a Door-keeper, when he is pushed and pressed by a Throng of People, yield to them, set the Doors wide open, and suffer all Kinds of Knowledge to rush in, the less pure mingling themselves among the perfectly pure?

Protarchus.

I see not, O Socrates! for My part, how any Man would be hurt by receiving into his Mind all

418 See Page 577.
the other Kinds of Knowledge,—if he was already in possession of the First and Highest.

Socrates.

I may safely then admit them All to come pouring in, like the Torrents of Water in that fine poetical Simile of Homer's, rushing down into a Valley from the Mountains which surround it.

Protarchus.

By all means, let them be All admitted.

Socrates.

Let us now return to the Vase of Pleasure. For when we thought of mixing Pleasure and Knowledge together, the purer Parts of Pleasure did not present themselves immediately to our Minds: but, from our affectionate regard to Knowledge, we suff-

This Sentence, which alludes to a Simile in Homer's *Iliad*, L. 4, v. 453, we have translated into English paraphrastically, for the sake of setting in a clearer light, than we could by a mere *Metaphrase*, the just application of it to the present Purpose of our Author: for, if we mistake him not, he here means to insinuate to us,—that Philosophical Knowledge descends into a Man's Mind from above, thro' his studious Observation of all the Parts of Nature which lye before him, and thro' his fair and honest Reasoning thereon.
fread all Kinds of it to crowd in, before any of the Pleasures.

**Protarchus.**

Very true.

**Socrates.**

It is now time for us to consult about the Pleasures; whether we should let them All come thronging in, or whether we should admit those of the True Sort first.

**Protarchus.**

It makes a great difference in point of Safety, to let in, the first, Such only as are True.

**Socrates.**

Let These then be admitted. But how shall we proceed? Must we not do, as we did with the several Kinds of Knowledge, admit as many Pleasures also, as are of the necessary Sort?

**Protarchus.**

Without doubt, the necessary Pleasures also, by all means.

**Socrates.**

But now, as we held it both safe and advantageous, in going thro Life, to be acquainted with every
every Art; — if we are of the same Opinion with regard to Pleasures, — if we hold it conducive to our Good, and at the same time harmless, to enjoy every Sort of Pleasure in the course of our Lives, — in this case, we are to intermix all Sorts of Pleasure with all the Kinds of Knowledge.

Protarchus.

What say we then as to this Point? and how ought we to act?

Socrates.

This Question, O Protarchus! should not be put to Us. But the Pleasures themselves, and the Other Assembly also, That of the Sciences and Arts, are to be examined, each Party concerning the other, in this manner.

Protarchus.

In What manner?

Socrates.

Friends! we shall say, [addressing our Question to the Pleasures first,] whether we ought to call you Pleasures, or whatever is your right Name, would ye choose to live in the same place with all Kinds of Knowledge and Discernment, or to live without knowing
knowing or discerning any thing whatever? To this Interrogatory, they must, as I imagine, answer thus.

Protarchus.

How?

Socrates.

That, seeing, as was said before, were Knowledge and Pleasure to be left, Each of them, alone, single, and destitue of Aid, neither of them would have any Virtue or Power at all, nor would any Advantage arise from Either,—we deem it best, that all the Kinds of Knowledge should dwell with Us, One Kind of Knowledge with Each of us, One who is suitable to the peculiar nature of its Companion, and is perfectly acquainted with Her Power and Influence.

Protarchus.

And well have ye now answered, We shall say to Them.

Socrates.

After this, we are to demand of Knowledge and Understanding, in the same manner, thus;—Have ye any occasion for Pleasures to be mixed among you?—On the other side, we may suppose Know-

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420 See Pages 611, 12.
lege and Understanding to interrogate Us; and What Sort of Pleasures, they would perhaps say, is it that ye mean?

**Protarchus.**

Probably they would.

**Socrates.**

And to this Question of theirs our Answer would be This:—Beside those True Pleasures, we should say, do ye farther want the Pleasures of the intense and exquisite Kind to dwell with you?—How is it possible, O Socrates! they would then perhaps say, that we should want These?—These, who give a thousand Hindrances to all our Proceedings; and who, by their Fury and Madness, are always creating Disturbance in the Souls where We dwell;—These, who had they been there first, would never have suffered Us to have admittance; and who intirely spoil our Children, there born, by letting Forgetfulness in upon them, for want of Care to guard the Dwelling-place. But the Other Pleasures, mentioned by you, the True and the Pure, you are to know, that They are nearly related to us, and belong to our Family: and beside These, the Pleasures who are accompanied by Health and Sobriety; Such also, as are the Followers of all Virtue,
like the Train of some Goddess, every where attending her; let All of these come and mix amongst us. But those Pleasures, who are always found in Company with Folly, and with all Kinds of Vice, it is very absurd for a Man to mingle with Mind, — if he desires to see a Mixture, as clear, untroubled, and well-tempered, as possible to be made; — and if he would from thence try to discover, what the nature is of Good, not only in Man, but also in the Universe; from which discovery some Notion is to be gained, by a Sort of Divination, of What the Idea is of Good its Self. — Shall we not say, that Mind and Science, in thus answering, have spoken prudently and consistently with \( ^{421} \) themselves, pleading in their own Cause, and at the same time in behalf of Memory and Right Opinion.

**Protarchus.**

By all means ought we.

**Socrates.**

\(^{421}\) This Sentence, in the Greek, begins thus; — \( \text{Δε' ε'ω \epsilon'μ-ϕιόνος ταύτα καὶ έξόντως έαυτόν τὸν ὑπ' φίλομεν α'ποκαθάδει—Henry Stephens imagined a gross Error in this Reading of the Passage; and he attempted a Correction of it, by transposing the \( έξόντως \) \( υπ', \) (so as to read \( υπεξόντως \) in one word,) and by rejecting entirely the two intermediate words, \( έαυτόν τὸν \). — But in this bold Alteration, the words \( τὸν ὑπ' \) will be found wanting, tho they
PHILEBUS

SOCRATES.

But in our Mixture it is necessary to add This also; for without it no One Thing could ever be.

PROTARCHUS.

What is That?

SOCRATES.

Whatever has not Truth mixed with it, in the composing of it, can never be produced into true Existence; or, could it be produced, it never can be lasting.

PROTARCHUS.

How is it possible, that it should?

y they are necessary to precede the word ἀποψαλλω in the Construction of the Sentence.—Many Years since therefore, supposing, with Stephens, the Greek Text in this Passage to be erroneous, we imagined, that it might be amended, by changing ἔχοντος ἑαυτῶν into ἔχομένως ἑαυτῷ (or ἑαυτῷ) agreeable to which we made our translation. But having, since that time, read and considered the judicious Monf. Grou’s Note to his French translation of this Passage, we see no necessity for any Alteration to be made, either in the Greek Original, or in our English translation; especially, if it be true, what is said by Constantin in his Lexicon, that ἔχοντος ὑπ’ is sometimes used for ἔχομένως.—Cornarius also, in translating ἔχοντος ἑαυτὸν into Latin thus,—pro fui dignitate,—seems to have understood those words in the same sense with Monf. Grou.

SOCRATES.
Certainly no way. Now if any thing farther be yet wanting to perfect our Composition, declare it, You and Philebus. For the Mixture, which we have now made in Speculation, appears to Me to have been as perfectly well composed, as if it were some incorporeal Order 422, meant for the good Government of an Animated Body.

Protarchus.

422 The Mixture, now made in the speculation, represents the happy State of a Man truly virtuous. Mind, in such a Man, is That incorporeal Order, That Law, which governs his whole Conduct agreeably to Truth and Rectitude: and his animated Body, (his Animal-Soul and Body, joined together,) enjoys those Pleasures, which his Nature makes him capable of, and his Fortune offers to him,—all Such Pleasures, as are admitted and authorised by Mind and Reason,—all Such, as are consistent with an Acquisition of the Sciences and Arts, and with a Retention of them in the Memory,— and are not repugnant to a Right Opinion, concerning the relative Value of every thing to Himself. —— The Greek word in this place is χόσμος, — a word, which often signifys Order, and is accordingly, in this Translation, so rendered into English; — but often also it signifys World; and this latter, this secondary and philosophical Sense of the word is, by all the other Interpreters of this Dialogue, attributed to it in the present Sentence.—Perhaps they considered Man as a Microcosm, and his Nature as partaking of the Two most general Kinds of Being in the Universe,—viz. the incorporeal, intelligible, and invariable,— and the corporeal, sensible, and variable.— Indeed, we have no Doubt
And be assured, O Socrates! that to Me it has had the same appearance.

Might we not then rightly say, that we were now arrived at the Dwelling-place of Good, and were standing in the very Entrance of his House?

I think, we might.

And now What should we deem to be the greatest Excellence in the Composition, and to be also the chief Cause, that such a Mixture must be grateful to All? For when we shall have discerned What this is, which is so grateful and so excellent, we shall then consider to which of the Two, to Plea-

Doubt of our Author's having in his Mind the last-mentioned Sense of the word χάρις, when he wrote this Sentence. We have no Doubt, but that he intended to give us a Representation of the Universe, and (at the same time) of Man, as he is by nature an Image of it in Miniature,—an animated Body, under the Government of a Mind.—This Intention will perhaps appear more plainly in the Conclusive Part of this Dialogue, to which we are now approaching.
Philebus.

Sure or to Mind, it is related the most nearly, and familiar the most intimately, in the Constitution of the Universe 423.

Protarchus.

Right: 'twill be of the greatest service to us, in determining this Point.

Socrates.

And there is indeed no difficulty in discovering the Cause, why Some Mixtures are most valuable, and Others good for nothing.

Protarchus.

Explain your Meaning.

Socrates.

No Person is ignorant of This.

Protarchus.

Of What?

423 The words of Plato are—ἐν τῷ παρῇ σωτῆριεν. Compare this Passage with a similar one in page 626, line 10. Both the Passages perhaps are to be explained by the latter Half of the Note preceding this.

Socrates.
PHILEBUS. 631

Socrates.

That in every Mixture, whatever it be, and whatever be the Quantity of it 424, if Measure pervades it not, and if thence it obtains not Symmetry and Proportion, all the Ingredients must of necessity be spoilt, besides the spoiling of the whole Composition. For in such a case, no One thing is really tempered by any Other thing; but a confused and disorderly Assemblage is made, of various Things jumbled together; which, like a Concurrence of bad Accidents in Life, is a real Misfortune to the Persons who are to use it 425.

Protarchus.

'Tis very true.

424 In all the Editions of the Greek, we here read ὀποσάν, "however it be made." But this is contradictory to the Meaning of the Sentence; for the Meaning is this,—that "every right and good Mixture must be made in one certain manner only, viz. by Measure."—We may fairly therefore presume, that Plato wrote, not ὀποσάν, but ὀποσάν, (or, by Elision, ὀποσάν) with a view to the infinite Extent of the Universe.

425 In the Greek, συμφερα,—a word, which has Two different Meanings, not to be expressed by One single word in English. A Paraphrase therefore was found necessary, for conveying (agreeably to our Author's Intention,) Both Meanings together, to the Readers of this translation.

L111  Socrates.
PHILEBUS.

Socrates.

The Power of the Chief Good then is transferred, we find, into that Province, where dwells the nature of the Beautiful. For every where, from Measure and Mediocrity, and from Symmetry and Proportion, arise Beauty and Virtue.

Protarchus.

Certainly so.

Socrates.

And we said before, that Truth also was an Ingredient in the Composition.

Protarchus.

We did.

Socrates.

If then we are not able to discover the nature of Good its Self in One single Idea,—yet, taking it in Three Ideas together, in Beauty, Symmetry, and Truth, we may conceive it as One Thing; and most justly attributing to it the Cause of whatever is graceful or agreeable in the Composition, we may most truly say, that by means of This, as being Good its Self, the Whole proves to be Such as it is, thus agreeable, and thus graceful.

Protarchus.
Protarchus.

Most truly indeed.

Socrates.

Now then, O Protarchus! any Person may be a competent Judge between Pleasure and Understanding, to decide, Whether of the Two is nearest allied to the Supream Good, and of higher Value, than the Other is, both to Men and Gods 426.

Protarchus.

What the Decision must be, is clear. However, it is the better way to go thro the Recital of it, in explicit Words.

Socrates.

Each of those Three Ideas then let us compare, severally, with Pleasure, and again with Mind. For we are to see and determine, Whether of these Two it is, that Each of those Three Ideas is most congenial to, and to give Sentence accordingly.

Protarchus.

Do you speak of Beauty, and Truth, and Mediocrity?

426 See Pages 627, 8. and Note 422.
PHILEBUS

SOCRATES.

I do. Now take in the first place, O Protarchus! Truth; and look at all the Three together, Mind, Truth, and Pleasure: and after you have considered them a sufficient time, say whether, in Your opinion, Mind, or whether Pleasure is the nearer of Kin to Truth.

PROTARCHUS.

What need is there of Time, to consider of this point? for I presume, that very great is the difference between Mind and Pleasure in this respect. Of all things in the world, Pleasure is the most addicted to Lying: and it is said 477, that in the Pleasures of Venus, which seem to be the greatest, even Perjury is pardoned by the Gods; it being supposed, that Pleasures, like Children, have not the least Understanding in them, to know what they say. But Mind is either the same thing with Truth, or

477 Plainly alluding to the Proverb,—'Αγαθίας ἔρκω ἐν ἑμποίημος;—in which words it is delivered to us by the Collectors of the ancient Greek Proverbs. But we imagine, that the Proverb, in common use, consisted of only the Two First of those Words, and that the latter Two were added by some Grammarian, to explain their Meaning. For, besides that to leave out this Explanation is more agreeable to the Spirit as well as to the Brevity of a Proverbial Saying, the word ἑμποίημος
or it is of all things, the most like to it, and the truest 428.

Socrates.

Next then consider Mediocrity in the same manner 429; and say whether you think, that Pleasure possesses more of it than Understanding, or that Understanding possesses more of it than Pleasure.

Protarchus.

This, which you have now proposed for a Subject of consideration is not less easy than the Other. For there cannot, in my opinion, be found any thing more immoderate, in its nature, than Pleasure

is not found in Plato's Symposium, (pag: 183 Edit: Steph:) where this Proverb is cited: tho' it must be confessed, that the very learned and judicious Erasimus was of opinion, that the word ἐμπόινιον is erroneously omitted in that Passage. See the Banquet, Page 66. However this may be, the Proverb seems to have been always understood in that Sense, in which it is used by Plato. And in all probability, Tibullus from hence borrowed that Sentiment in his Elegys, L. 2, El: 6, — perjurio ridet amantium Jupiter,—express after him by Ovid in the very same words.

428 See Pages 256, 7. and Symphs, Page 14.

429 Cornarius, and Stephens after him, rightly obxerve, that in the Greek of this Sentence, we ought to read ὀσαυτως, and not, as it printed, ὀς ὀτως.

and
and extravagant Joy; nor any thing which has more of Measure in it, than Mind and Science.  

Socrates.

You have well said. But proceed farther now to the Third Idea. Do you say, that Mind partakes of Beauty, more than any Species of Pleasure partakes of it? and that Mind is more excellent than

439 Every perfect Idea, every Idea in the Divine Mind Universal, is the true Measure of every Idea, synonymous with it, in all Particular Minds. Nor is it less the Measure and the archetypal Standard of Rectitude and Truth to every Copy or Image of it, impressed on any Part of Nature's Works, or imitated in the Works of Art. — Thus, for instance, perfect Rectitude in the Government of the World, the great Idea of the Divine Mind, is the Measure of all Moral and Political Rectitude in Man: thus also, the Ideal perfect Animal, of any Kind and Species whatever, is the Measure of Rectitude in the Frame and Disposition of every Individual of that Kind and Species: and thus also, the Ideal true Circle is the Measure of every circular Shape or Figure, whether natural, or artificial. — These Measures of All things the Divine Mind is full of: and whatever is immeasurable, or immense, is not an Object of any Mind whatever. — Farther; every Truth in every Science is bounded by those Ideas, the mutual Relation of which constitutes that particular Truth: and these Ideal or Sciential Truths are the Measures of Rectitude to every Position or Hypothesis, laid down by any man, and to every internal Sentence, or Opinion, of any man's Mind.

Pleasure
Pleasure in This respect? or that the Contrary is true?

Protarchus.

Did ever Any man then, O Socrates! whether awake or dreaming, see or imagine Understanding and Mind to be, in any Matter, or in any Manner, unhandsome or Unbecoming, whether in reflecting on the Past, or in perceiving the Present, or in looking forward to the Future?

Socrates.

Right.

Protarchus.

But whenever we see any Person immersed in Pleasures, in Those Pleasures too, which are of all perhaps the greatest 431;—when we behold, what a ridiculous Figure the Man makes in the very act of enjoying them, — or view what is of all Spectacles the most unseemly, the consequence of his Enjoyment, — we, our selves, are ashamed 432; and all such things, as far as possible, we conceal, veil-

431 For the Nature of every Thing is most apparent in That, which is the greatest or most excellent of the Kind.

432 Either ashamed for him, or ashamed of that Part of our Nature, by which we are subject to what appears to ourselves so unseemly.
PHILEBUS.

ing them with Night and Darkness, as not being fit Objects for the Light to look on.

SOCRATES.

Every where \(^{433}\) then, O Protarchus! you will declare, speaking, your Self, to all Persons about you, and publishing abroad by Messengers \(^{434}\), that the possession of Pleasure is neither of Supream nor

\(^{433}\) The Greek word in this place, as it is printed, is παρθ. Ficinus, by translating it "cunelis," seems to have read, in the Medicean Manuscript, παρτι, to every Person. But 'tis a matter of indifference, Which of those Readings we prefer. For in this Dialogue we are taught, that, to every Person, in whatever Region of the Earth he lives, all those Kinds of Things, which are good on their own account, and not meerly for the sake of something else, are, when compared together, more or less valuable, in That very Degree, which is assigned to Each of those Kinds in the following Sentences of Socrates.

\(^{434}\) By Messengers, we presume, that Books or Writings are here meant.—And we may well presume farther, that Socrates, in this Speech of his, seemingly directed only to Protarchus, aimed obliquely at recommending to his Disciples, then around him, the Propagation (both Oral and Scripture) of the Truths, he is about to utter,—Truths, which he deemed of the highest Importance to every Man to be presented with, and which he made the sole Business of his own Life to study and to promulgate. — If Plato was of the Audience, it seems, that he took the Hint, and wrote the Philebus.
of Secondary Worth: but that whatever is of all things the most excellent and valuable, is to be found in Measure, in the Moderate, and the Seasonable, and in all things of That Kind, whose Nature and Essence we ought to deem Eternal.

Protarchus.

This is the First of the Six Conclusions, here drawn from the Three Argumentative Parts of this Dialogue, taken together. But in the Third Part only is the Subject-Matter of the Two first Conclusions particularly treated of: the Third and Fourth Conclusions relate chiefly to the First Part, whence they are especially derived: and the Two last Conclusions arise principally from the Second Part, where the Subject of them is accurately considered. — In proof of the Conclusion now before us, see particularly Page 420. — Why it hath the place of Preeminence, and in What respect the Subject of it hath the Preference to the Subject of the Second Conclusion, will be seen in Note 438.

Monf. Grou has observed very justly, that the word εὐγνώσα, in the latter Part of this Sentence, is an Error in the Text: and instead of it, he proposes the word ἡγνώσα. Grynceus, the Corrector of Ficinus's Translation of Plato, seems, in his rendering the Greek word in this place into Latin by the words fortitudo esse, (to have obtained an allotment of,) either to have read εὐλογεῖσα in some Manuscript, or else to have thus amended the Text by a happy Conjecture of his own.

Of this Kind are the pure and perfect Ideas of the Divine Mind Universal, and Ideal Truths, the mutual Relations of those Ideas. — If there be also, beside that Great Mind, any other Minds,
PHILEBUS.

Protarchus.

Their supreme Excellence appears from what has been said and proved.

Socrates.

And that the Next in Value are Symmetry and Beauty, the Compleat and the Sufficient, and whatever else is congenial to these.

Protarchus.

Minds, or Mental Beings, in whom any of those Ideas and Ideal Truths are, and will for ever be, pure and perfect,—if any Ideas within the Divine Mind are νησαί ἁμα νυτα, intelligent as well as intelligible, (as Proclus seems to have imagined,)—These also may properly be said εἰκόνις (to have obtained for their Allotment,) an eternal Nature.—However this may be, 'tis certain, that the Divine Ideas and their mutual Relations, being eternal and immutable, are the true Measures of all Human Notions and Opinions in all ages and in all places:—it is certain, that only by the Divine Ideas are Bounds and Measures set to any of the Infinites, in the natural production or generation of Corporeal Forms, every one of which is thus limited in its Essence;—that only by the Divine Ideas, impressed on Outward Nature, is the regular Course of her Motions maintained, amidst their various accidental Changes;—that only thus is the Predominance of the lower Elements, which are often prevalent by turns, subdued and tempered in seasonable time, so as to prevent the preter-natural or untimely Dissolution of every Compound-Frame on Earth;—and that only by the Divine Ideas, imparted to the Rational Soul of Man, are his natural Appetites
Appetites and Passions moderated, and restrained from any un- 
seasonable or vehement Emotions.

The Forms and the Qualities, specified in the present Sentence, — namely, Symmetry and Beauty, the Complete and the 
Sufficient,—are, in some prior Passages of this Dialogue, spoken of together with Measure; as if they were, in all respects, equal to Measure in Dignity and Value. Indeed they have a Relation to the same Kind of Being,—to That, in which the Infinites are mixed with Bound. — In this place, however, where the Order of Things, absolutely Good, is settled with the nicest accuracy, they are distinguished from Measure. In this place, Measure, with the Attributes essential to it, and inseparably attending it, is mentioned singly and alone; because, in the natural Order of Things, it is the First and Highest of all absolute or final Goods. — For, according to such Order, Causes are prior and superior to their Effects; and Principles are higher, and of more dignity than any of their Derivatives, as having a more extensive Power. — Now, 'tis Measure which is the First Cause of every Good, enjoyed, by any Animal-Beings, whether Sentient and Rational, or meerly Sentient: — 'tis Measure also, which is the First Cause of every Good inherent in, or possessed by, any Senseless or Lifeless Beings,—a Good, to be felt, relished and enjoyed—not by Themselves,—but by Such Beings only, as are made for the Enjoyment of it. — 'Tis Measure, which is the First Principle of those Goods, celebrated in the present Sentence: for Measure is the immediate Principle of Symmetry; on Symmetry is founded all Proportion; on Proportion are
founded all Beauty in Figures, and all Harmony in Sounds: and to any Outward Form, in which are found these Excellencies, nothing is wanting to make it an Object most delightful to all Rational Animals, whose Eyes or Ears convey to them the Image of that Form: such a Form is, to Sense, compleat in all its Parts, and possesses all the Perfection, which it is capable of by nature.—Full of these Excellencies is the Frame, or outward Form, of the Universe; because the Architectonic Mind within—the Forming Form,—is Measure its Self, comprising all the Kinds of Measure: and since Measure, of some Kind or other, is the Cause of whatever Good is either enjoyed or possessed by any Kind of Being, it follows, that the Great Universal Being, in whom all those Causes of Good, those Measures of every Kind, are comprised, is the Cause of All Good,—is Good its Self.—On this account especially it is, that, in the First Conclusion from all the Reasoning of this Dialogue, Measure stands by its Self, single and alone; it is because the word Measure, in an eminent Sense, as used by Plato, signifies That Sovereign Being, who is the Sovereign Good,—That Supreme Beauty, which, in the expression of our divine Philosopher in the Banquet, is αὺτῶ καὶ αὐτῶ, μεῖτ' αὐτῶ, μόνον ἐν δεί ἂν, Alone by its Self, with its Self conversing, is eternally Sole and Single in its Essence.—But we are here to consider the Goods mentioned in this Second Conclusion, with a view particularly to Man: for the Good of Man in particular, and not the Good of the whole Universe is the proper Subject of this Dialogue.—It has appeared from the Reasoning of it, that, as Man is a Being, partly Rational, and partly Sensitive, his Happiness, or highest Good, cannot be placed either in Knowledge alone, or in Pleasure alone: Knowledge being the Good of only One Part of his Nature, the Rational; and Pleasure, the Good of the other Part only, the Sensitive: it has appeared, that
that Man's Happiness must consist in the Good of Both Parts of his Compound-Nature, taken together,—the Good of the Whole Man. And this Good is Moral Virtue.——For the Sensitive Part of every Man is an Animal-Soul, united with a Human Body: and his Rational Part is a Particular Mind. The Animal-Soul, as well as the Body, of every Man, with all those Appetites, Passions, and Affections, to which that Soul of his, thro' its union with Body, is subject, belongs to the First Kind of Being, That which is Infinite; and every Particular Mind, by its nature, belongs to the Second Kind of Being, That which Sets a Bound to every Infinite; as in the Body of this Dialogue has been shown at large: (See from Page 274 to the End of the First Part.) The Rational Part of Man, his Mind, is the proper Seat of Moral Virtue; and Moral Virtue, the peculiar Excellence of Man, belongs to the Third Kind of Being,—to That, in which all the Infinites are bounded, or mixed with Bound. (See particularly in Pages 293 and 297; and in Notes 180 and 193.) In the Man therefore, whose Mind is accomplished with Moral Virtue, all the inward Properties and Powers of his Animal-Soul, which in their own nature, and left to themselves, are immoderate and boundless,—and which, outwardly flowing, influence all his Actions,—receive Bound and Measure: and this Blessing they receive from Prudence or Moral Wisdom,—the Prime Excellence of the Human Soul,—and the Virtue of Man's Rational Part, respecting the Good of the Whole Man, as a Being composed of Body, Animal-Soul, and Mind.——The Excellencies of the Body are well known to All men; and are wont to be, by Most men, over-valued: they are these Six;——Health,—Strength,—Agility,—Fineness of the Organs of outward Sense,—well-proportioned Features of the Face,—and the Comeliness of those Parts of the Body where any of the other Excellencies
Excellencies appear visible. — Of the Four first-mentioned the Extremes are generally admired, and are often celebrated with high Encomiums. But the Masters of Medical Science know, that Excessive Health is the Forerunner of Diseafes; — that Athletic Strength is unfavourable to the Powers of the Rational Soul; — that extream Agility is injurious to the Firmness of Strength and to Robustness; — and that extream Fineness of the Organs of outward Sense borders on Delicacy, Tenderness, and Weakness,—But let us suppose These and the other Corporeal Excellencies to be possessed in such a Degree, and so well tempered together, as to be durable, and consistent with each other, and, in no respect, detrimental to the nobler Part of Man;—yet, if their Owner knows not, when, and where, and how to employ them, —the Use of them will be often turned into an Abuse; and they will then prove mischievous or dangerous to the Welfare of the whole Man. — No less necessary to their being beneficial to Man is the Measure of their Exhibition or Exertion. For, if the Exercise, given to any Members of the Body, be defective and insufficient, they will become sluggish and unapt for Motion; if it be immoderate and excessive, they will grow languid and heavy, and prematurely be worn out. — In using the Organs of our Five outward Senses, it is no less necessary to the natural Duration of their Liveliness, that we apply them always, as far as lyes in our own Choice, only to those Objects, whose Qualities and Powers are moderate. — For, to begin with the Sense of Seeing, to look at Objects too distant, or too minute, strains the Eye; and the looking only at large and near Objects, — as for instance the constant Use of Convex Glasses in reading, — incapacitates the Eye in time, for the sight of smaller: in viewing any Object whatever, too weak a Light too much dilates the Pupil of the Eye; and too strong a Light too much contracts it: Colours too faint, or too glaring, produce the like Effects.
Effects. — The Sense of Hearing, by an attention to Sounds, either dying, thro' the remote distance of their Cause, or too small, however near to their Beginning, is apt to be overstrained; and by Sounds too loud, 'tis apt to be stunned and deafened.—The Senses of Smelling and Tasting, by too frequent a use of pungent Oduors and poignant Flavours, are either deadened, or rendered too impotent to serve the Purposes, for which they were designed by Nature: on the other hand, if they are wholly confined to things of mildest Smell and Taste, they become wholly indisposed, or even utterly unable, to bear the meeting with strong Scents and high-flavoured Viands, tho' sometimes unavoidable.—It is the same with the Sense of Feeling; if habituated to no other Touch but the smooth, the soft, and the gentle, it is pained by the rough, the hard, and the violent: on the other hand, if it be conversant with only These, the violent, the hard, and rough, its Sensibility will be weakened, and finally be quite destroyed.—So that, to retain whatever Corporeal Excellencies a Man posses's, — and to preserve in their best State all those Parts of his Body, which are instrumental either to Motion or to Sensation, it is requisite for him to be moderate in the exercising and employing of those Parts, even in their natural and ordinary Functions; it is requisite also, that he should choose, for the Subjects of their Employment, Such as have Mediocrity in their Qualitys or Powers, relative to the Use of Man. — Now this moderate Exercise, (if voluntary,) and this Choice of things moderate, (if free,) are owing to the Virtue of Prudence. Those Infinites then, which immediately concern the Body, are bounded by this Virtue; and Sensual Pleasure is thus combined with Understanding and right Judgment. ——The Excellence of such a Combination will appear farther, from considering the Four natural Facultys or Powers of Man's Animal-Soul, — Instinct, Sense, Memory, and Imagination.
tion.—By these are generated Appetites and Desires, which are excited by every Appearance of any Sensible Good; whether such Good appears to Present Sense joined with Instinct, or to Imagination joined with Memory.—By the same Facultys or Powers are generated those Passions of the Soul, which are put in motion by every Appearance of Sensible Evil, whether present, past, or future.—Besides all these Inhabitants of the Soul, Others there are, who may properly be called Natives of the Soil, as they spring up and grow from innate Instinct: these are such kind Affections, as are natural peculiarly to Man; being of much larger extent, than such as are in the Souls of any Brute-Animals. Those in Us reach backward to remotest Ancestors, long since deceased; for we naturally revere their Memory, and delight to tread in their Footsteps: forward, they reach to Posterity unborn; for "nati natorum, & qui nascentur ab illis," are embraced in Imagination by Us, and have a Share in our most benevolent Wishes: sideway, they spread to all our collateral Kindred; for we consider our Selves and Them together, as derived from One common Ancestor.—But those Facultys or Powers of the Soul, and all this Progeny of theirs, the Appetites and Desires, the Passions of a contrary Sort, and the kind Affections, being, in their own nature, infinite,—as belonging to that Part of the Soul, which is corporeal, irrational, and blind,—must, to be useful and beneficial to Man, have certain Bounds and Measures affixed to them; they must also be commensurate, Each with the Others; and they must be, All of them, proportioned to their respective Ends.—Now in Man, as well as in all other Animals, Instincts, or instinctive Inclinations and Avoidances, are by Nature thus bounded; are by Nature thus in Harmony together; and are, each of them, by Nature, thus proportioned to the Degree of Man's natural Wants and Weakness. The Utility of these Pre-conceptions of Good and Evil

2
to the Animal-Nature, measured, as they are, by the natural
Necessities of the Animal, and being, as they are, in just propor-
tion to them, is always confirmed by After-Feeling and Ex-
perience.—The Senses also are, in all Animals, commensurate by
Nature with their respective Objects. The internal Images
of external Objects are, in every Animal, proportionate to its Sensa-
tion of those Objects: and the Memory of them is always pro-
portionate to the Impressions they have made on the Imagination.
—All of this Good then is the Work of Nature. And the
Appetites and Passions, raised by those External Objects, and by
their Images impressed on the Memory, may justly be deemed nat-
tural likewise: and accordingly, These also, in all Brute-Animals,
have the same Bounds, and the same Measures, with the innate
Infinities.——But in Man the Appetites and Passions are immea-
surable and boundless. For Man hath the Power of extending his
Imagination to Infinity; and the Images therein are not limited,
in their Qualities or in their Number, by the present or the
past Objects of his Senses, nor indeed by any Things anywhere
in Nature. Every Man’s Imagination hath the Power of joining
or dividing, associating or severing, the Images of those natural
and real Objects, at his own Will,—or at the Will of Those,
whose Words and Speeches have Power over Another Man’s
Imagination.—Thus are created new Fancies, innumerable, un-
limited, and endless: and thus those Desires and Aversions, Hopes
and Fears, which are apt to be raised in a Man’s Soul by every
Appearance of Good or Evil in his Imagination, are, by these
preter-natural and false Fancies, enlarged and lengthened, infi-
nitely beyond the Bounds, prescribed to them by Nature; for
whatever is beyond these Bounds, is infinite.——It is the Work
of Moral Wisdom, (in Man, termed Prudence,) to correct all
these Evils, arising from the nature of Infinity; for all the
Infinities, if left to follow their own nature, produce much Evil.
It is the Work of Prudence, in the first place, (taking then the Title of Sobriety of Mind,) not to entertain or harbour any Fancies of the false and infinite Kind, to which Nothing in Nature is correspondent; but on the contrary, to drive them away, as often as they return, by rational Studys, virtuous Employments, or innocent Amusements; giving no Credit to Notions or Opinions, suggested by our own or other Men's Imaginations, without a previous strict Inquiry, whether they agree with Experience, with the Truths of Nature, and with the Truth of Facts. And to this End, it is necessary to have our Minds stored with a competent Knowledge of Nature, with a Knowledge also of our Selves, and of other Men; having first prepared our Minds with Sobriety, and our Hearts with the Love of Truth above all things; so as to make a right Use of our Knowledge, and to reason judiciously thereon. When the extravagant Fancies and unreasonable Notions are, by these means, either banished, or so far subdued, as to be without the Power of rousing any immoderate Passion or Affection,—when Imagination is confined within the Bounds of Nature by the Laws of right Reason,—the remainder of the Work of Moral Wisdom is easy for her to execute. All irregular, immoderate, and wild Passions, and Affections, unsupported by the Fancies, are easily reduced to Rule and Measure, subjected to Reason, and become tame. The natural Appetites are then excited only by the present Wants of the Body; and only in proportion to the Sensible Evil of those Wants, and to the Sensible Good experienced in relieving them. The natural Desire (in every Man) of those External Goods, which afford a probable Security against all Bodily Wants for the future, is then moderated by considering the precarious nature of such Securitys, the Difficulty of obtaining them, and the Danger of losing Greater Goods in the Pursuit. The natural Passions, ready to be roused at the Sight
Sight of Evil present or approaching, or at the well-grounded
Apprehension of Evil to come, are then also proportioned to the
real Quantity of the Evil, and to the Value of that Good,
which a Man is deprived of by such Evil. And by the same
Virtue of Prudence governing the Fancies, are all those kind
Affections which are natural to Man, felt in a Degree propor-
tioned to the Degree of Consanguinity with the Objects of those
Affections, without Partiality or ill-grounded Prejudices, and
with no other Difference felt between them, than what the
Laws of Nature and of Reason authorise the feeling of. The
Natural Affections being thus spread, as widely as they ought,
and the Measure of Each being settled proportionately to the
Others, the Possessor of them is delighted, when he feels in
his own Heart a due Degree of Kindness toward All, in whom
he candidly and naturally supposes a Feeling of Kindness to-
ward Him in the same Degree. And this natural and candid
Supposition is another plenteous Source of Pleasure to every
Person, who, without expecting or desiring from Others any
Actions of Beneficence to Him, can feel a Pleasure in believ-
ing himself to have a Share in their benevolent Affections.——
Thus it is, that all the Facultys or Powers of a Man's Animal
Soul, with all the natural Motions and Emotions of it, are only
then beneficial to him, when they are moderate,—when they are
bounded by the Offices, severally assigned to them by Nature,—
and when they are exerted or employed, Each in proper Season,
and Each on suitable Occasions.—But 'tis not sufficient for the
perfection of the Animal Soul, that Each of those Properties of
it, taken singly, be so bounded and so measured: to perfect and
to bless that Part of the Human Nature, they must be, All
of them, commensurate and well-proportioned to Each Other.—
This will appear more fully, when we shall have considered
the Capacities, Powers, and Attainments of Man's Rational Soul:
and we are now arrived at the place, where properly they fall
under consideration.—The Creator of the Universe, in the
Distribution of his various Gifts to the various Kinds of Being,
imparts Himself and his own Happiness, in different Degrees,
to All. In imparting Mind, Understanding, and Reason, he deigns
to bestow a Share of these noblest of his Gifts on Man here
on this Earth. But as Man, during his Infancy, is utterly
incapable of enjoying, in the least, those great Endowments,
nothing more of them is given at first, than a Capacity of ar-
riving at them gradually in time. However, a Foundation for
them is laid in Man's Soul, from the beginning, by infusing
into it the Principles of Mind, the same which are the Prin-
ciples of all Reasoning and of all Knowledge,—the Ideas of One
and Many, Same and Different. For indeed 'tis only by means
of these Principles,—the Primary Ideas,—which are no less
innate than Animal-In斯坦ts,—that every Man is born with a
Capacity of Reason,—a Capacity of universalizing all the Objects
of his Senses, or of perceiving, with his Mental Eye, General
Ideas.—It is by means only of those Principles, that Man hath
a Capacity of comparing together the Ideas which he views;
and of perceiving, by that comparison, the Truths concerning
them.—Thro' the same Principles it is, that Man hath a Ca-
pacity of reasoning; or of discovering, by the Media of those
Truths which he perceives already, other Truths unperceived by
him before.—These Capacities in time grow up into Powers,
and these Powers are kept in constant Exercise, by the contin-
nual Occurring of new Sensible Objects, and the perpetual
Activity of the Mind, energizing on the Ideas excited by those
Objects. Hence it is, that more and more Ideas make their
appearance in the Mind; that more and more Truths are dis-
covered; and that more and more Knowledge is acquired. Hence
it is, that Systems of the several Sciences are framed, aug-
mented,
mented, and amplified; and hence are various Arts invented, improved, and perfected. — Such, and so great, are the Capacity, Powers, and Attainments, of the Rational Soul of Man. — But excellent as they are, yet, if they exceed the Bounds of Mediocrity, or if their Energies and inward Workings are not restrained by Moderation, they are always dangerous, and often prove fatal, to their Possessors. Any of those innate Capacity of Mind, just now mentioned, if they push unseasonably forward, either weaken the Body, or drop and perish, Themselves, before they have time to ripen. — Where they arrive at their Maturity, and actually become Powers, 'tis certain, that a Quickness of Perception, and a Readiness of Apprehension, whenever new Ideas and new Truths are offered to the Mind, are Excellencies to be admired. But if that Quickness and that Readiness be immoderate, the Perception of those Ideas will not be clear, nor will any strict Hold be taken of those Truths. — In like manner, a moderate Slowness, thro Patience, in reasoning to Generals from the Induction of Particulars, is more satisfactory to the Mind, than too precipitate a Hastie. And so much Delay, as is requisite for Reflexion, leads to Certainty and Truth, in the drawing of Syllogistical Conclusions. — To maintain the Powers of the Rational Soul in their best State, 'tis no less requisite, that Moderation be observed, in the Quantity of Exercise, given them; — that Mediocrity be attended to, in the Choice of Subjects, to which they are applied; — and that Bounds be set to the Multitude of Particulars, in whatever Kind of Subject may be chosen. — For too much Exercise fatigues and weakens the Mental Powers; and with too little they languish, and are indigested for ready Use on sudden Occasions. — If they are too conversant with Subjects insignificant and mean, they become Triflers, and unfit for handling Subjects of Importance: if, on the contrary, they reach at Subjects too mighty for
for their Management, they effect nothing, and their Strength is exhausted idly.—In too great a Number of Particulars, they are apt to be bewildered; in too small a Number, they want the enlivening Pleasure of Variety.—Man has, before him, all Nature—the whole World, with which he is surrounded,—for the Object of his View, and the Subject of his Consideration. But his Mind can by no means conceive the Mechanism of so vast and complicate a Structure. No Experiments can show him the internal Frame of any One Part. The component Elements of it escape his Sight, thro their Minuteness: And the Heavenly Bodies, be they ever so large, are too remote for his Introspection. No other Eye, than the Divine, is equal to the View: and no Mind, less than That of the Great Designer, is able to perceive, with perfect Clearness, the Uniformity of the Design, amidst the vast Variety of Parts, which are, in all outward appearance, so thoroughly dissimilar and so heterogeneous.—The World therefore, with all the Beautys of it, tho visible to us All, hath ever been the Object of Amusement to Most,—of Admiration to the Speculative Few:—the Formation also or Composition of it, and the Essence or Nature of it, are, after all our Searches, still the Subjects only of Hypothesis, Conjecture, and Opinion. —Seeing then these things to be so transcendently superior to the Utmost of Our Reach, and the Knowledge of them so impossible for the Powers of Human Reason to attain to, the Wisest Men in all ages, Socrates for instance, have always considered such Studies and Contemplations, as entirely useless to a Life properly Human; but yet of the greatest Benefit to Man; as they tend to elevate his Soul above all the Objects of Human Desires and Human Passions; and thus, in begetting Magnanimity, lay the firmest Foundation for a Happy Life, and afford the strongest Security for its Continuance until the End.—To this consideration it seems to have been
been owing, that the ancient Masters in all the Parts of Philosophy used to initiate their Disciples, early, in Cosmography,—so far, as to lift their Thoughts up to the Divine Cause of all the Beauty which they beheld, and of all the Good which they enjoyed. For at that time, the previous Studys of all the well-bred Youth, in Aritmethick, Geometry, and Musick, had brought them into an intimate acquaintance, not only with Beauty and Harmony, but with the Principles also of those delightful Forms.—The Students in Philosophy, being thus prepared and qualified to make rational Reflections, were led, in the next place, to take a Survey of those Parts of Nature, which every where exhibit ample Proofs,—Evidences to Sense and Reason in conjunction,—of the Truth of that found Theology, taught them immediately before.—Their Speculations were pointed to the Animal, the Vegetable, and the Fossil Body within the compass of their View and Examination.—But this Survey was general and too cursory to be exact. For an accurate and nice scrutinising of those inferior Parts of Nature was, in those days, deemed unworthy of a Mind truly philosophical: it was found to plunge a Man's Thoughts, and his Inquirys, into a boundless Ocean of minute Particulars; and to prevent or lessen his attention to a Subject, the most important to his Happiness.—This Subject is Himself, as he is a Man,—an Animal, partaking of the nature of Body, partaking too of the nature of Mind, and thus as it were placed in the Middle between them Both. So that the nature, peculiarly Human, is That very Subject, of Middle-Rank,—That which is neither above the Reach, nor beneath the Dignity of Human Speculations.—In considering this Subject, nothing is more obvious to perceive, than This,—that Man is of all Animals the farthest from Self-Sufficiency. Indeed, he is the only Animal, totally unable, when arrived at Maturity, to provide for itself the necessary Means of Subsistence.
ence. Much less is any One Man, alone, able to procure for himself those Conveniencies of Life, and those Delights of Sense, which the Goodness of Divine Providence seems to have designed for him. For of the Beings Inanimate, which fill the Earth, as well as cover it,—Beings, inconceivably various in their Kinds and Species, and All of them in vast Abundance,—the Greatest Part are of no other apparent Use, than to furnish out a Plenty of Materials for those Conveniencies and those Delights.—It appears then, in the first place, that the Author of all Nature has laid Men under the Necessity of associating together in Aggregate Bodys, (more or less numerous, in proportion to the Fertility of that Region of the Earth which they inhabit,) for the sake of procuring the Means of maintaining Life, thro their joint Labour and Industry; for mutual Defence also against the Attacks of wild Beasts, who, perhaps, on Their side, were created for this very End, to compel Man-kind into Assemblies and Confederacies. —Farther; as Men, by Nature, desire and seek, not merely Places of Rest and Abode, but Such as are commodious and delightful; —and as by Nature they have Ingenuity to contrive Buildings for their Habitation, Clothing for their Bodys, Utensils for the Preparation of their Food, and various other Conveniencies for living, in all respects, with Ease and Satisfaction;—as Nature has also plentifully supplied Men with Materials for all these Fabricks; —and as a great Number of Hands are requisite for the Construction of such a Variety;—(few Persons having Abilities to acquire Skill and Adroitness in more than One Kind of Art or Workmanship;)—it appears, that Men are instigated by their natural Desires, and by the Prospect all around them of attaining the Objects of those Desires, to form themselves into large Societies.—Now in every large Society of Men,—tho they have, All of them, One common Interest,—That of the whole Society,—yet, as Every Member
Member of it hath, beside That, a separate Interest of his own; — these separate Interests are apt frequently to clash. And as Passions of the same Kind are in the Souls of All men, the Passions of One man often meet and encounter with their Equals, the like Passions of Another man.—Hence appears, in the next place, the Necessity of appointing Arbiters, or Judges authorized by the Community, to decide the Controversys and Contests between Man and Man. Farther still; in every large Society of Men, Many a one there is, who aims at taking the Lead, uneleded by the rest; — Many a one, who endeavours to get more than his due Share of the Good, procured by the joint Industry of All:—Some are found, who without any honest Art or Labour, and either by Stealth, or Rapine, seize on the Possessions and Property of their neighbours:—and sometimes start up Others, who, by Fraud, or Address, or Foreign Force, aim at getting All into their Power, the Possessions, Libertys, and Lives of All. — Hence other Necessities arise; — the Necessity of constituting and establishing Civil Governments, — the Necessity of ordaining and ratifying Civil Laws, — the Necessity of creating Judicial Magistrates, to support the Constitution or established Frame of Government, by public Judgments according to the Laws ordained,—and the Necessity of creating Executive Magistrates, to protect the Common-Wealth effectually, by putting those Laws into Execution. — And, as the Necessitys, first mentioned, are indisputably natural; (for they appear evidently to flow from the nature of Man;) so we may venture to pronounce, that Civil Societys also, and the Consequences of them, just now mentioned, are no less natural and necessary; because they are the only sure Preservatives and Remedys against the Injurious, which Men are, from their nature, liable to suffer, One from Another. ————Many various Doings of Nature conspire in the accomplishment of One great

O 0 0 0

Design
Design. Accordingly, her Providential-Mind, the sole Designer, having thus pre-defined Men to a Social and Civil Life, he has so prepared and pre-disposed them for it, that they seem to enter into it, not of Necessity, but of their own free Will and Choice.—He has infused into their Souls strong Inclinations to assemble together.—He has given them to feel Delight, when they meet One with Another, tho' entire Strangers before, if no Harm be apprehended on either side to arise from the Meeting.—He has imbued them with Sympathetic Affections, from which they rejoice naturally at the Good, and grieve naturally at the Evil, befallen to any Human Being, without consideration of Advantage, or Disadvantage, to accrue from it personally to Themselves.—He has provided them with natural Inclinations to give immediate Assistance, to Such, as are accidentally in immediate Need of it.—He has endued them with natural Propensities to relieve Those whom they see, or hear of, in Distress, if they are able; or, if not, to endeavour to obtain Relief for them from Others.—He has inspired them with a Promptitude to perform the common Offices of Humanity to All; and, on any Emergency, special Acts of Kindness to Any of the Human Species, without expectation of Recompense or Requital.—And, for every such Office or Act of Kindness, done to Themselves, he has sown in their Hearts the Seeds of Gratitude.—But of all our inborn Preparations, for leading a Social and Civil Life,—That Life which is properly and peculiarly Human,—the most efficacious and the most unerring are the Ideas of Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust, Good and Evil in Moral Actions;—Ideas, which arise naturally in our Minds, as soon as we are able to apply those Arithmetical Ideas, those Properties of Numbers, Equal and Unequal, to the Intercourse between Man and Man, and to their Behaviour toward Each Other;—more clearly, however, in Such Minds,
as are able also, from their innate Principles, the Principles of all Mind,—One and Many, Same and Different,—to infer the Certainty of One Universal Law, the Same Rule of Conduct to all Rational Beings; (Reason being One and the Same in them All, how much soever they may differ in other Respects,—in other Parts and Properties of their several Compound-Forms.—From this Point of View may be seen the wondrous Beauty of Moral Virtue; by which all the Parts of a Human Soul, as they are united by Nature in One Being, so they conspire as it were together in a Moral Union, under the government of Mind and Reason, for the Good of the Whole Man.—From the same Point of View, but extending our Sight more widely around us, we may behold the Beauty, no less admirable, of a well-constituted Kingdom, or true Commonwealth; the multitude of whose constituent Parts, all of them in continual Motion, and all severally moving in lines of different direction, are so controlled by the Law,—the governing Mind, and as it were the Reason of the Whole State,—that, maugre all their continual Thwartings, frequent Jarrings, and incidental Clashings, their Political Union is preserved: Each separately contributes, and All jointly conspire, tho Moit of them un-intentionally, to promote the Well-Being of the Head, the Chief Part, and of all the Members of the Whole Community.—Now all this Beauty, both the Moral and the Political,—all this Good, both the Private and the Public,—is the Result of Symmetry, the Symmetry of various Parts commensurable, and actually measured by One common Measure, One Law, One Reason, running thro the Whole. — This Good and Beauty then, (since the Good of Sense and the Good of Mind,—Pleasure and Wisdom,—meet here together and unite,) is sufficient to satisfy all the Indigencies of Human Nature: the Happiness of Man, considered in his Private and Public Capacitys
PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

In the Third Degree of Excellence, if I divine aright, you would not greatly mistake the truth, if you were to place Mind and Understanding.\textsuperscript{439}

PROTARCHUS.

pacitys together, is here perfect: and thus in this Second Conclusion we find delineated Man's Sovereign Good. — But in this place, it becomes necessary, for the justification of the First Conclusion, to repeat what was observed in the Beginning of this Note, — viz: that Measure is the Principle and the Cause of all this Good.—For to those Personal Virtues, which consist in governing well the Appetites and Desires, Passions and Affections, of the Animal-Soul, absolutely essential are Moderation in their Use, and Seasonableness in the Time of using them: now the Principle of those Qualities, so essential to those Virtues, is no other than the Being of Measure.—Of the Virtues, which consist in regulating a Man's Conduct toward Others in the various Relations of Social and Civil Life, (all of which Virtues are comprehended in Universal Justice,) That Measure, according to which distributed are to All their just Dues, is the very Essence: and of This and of all Other Measures Measure its Self, that is, Good its Self, the Measure of All things in the Universe, is the sole Cause.

\textsuperscript{439} In some of the Notes a little preceding This, as well as in the Argument of the Dialogue, we have willingly admitted, that the Subject of it hath a respect to the Divine Nature, the Sovereign Good of the Universe; tho it hath a more immediate and professed View to the Nature and Good of Man. In the present Sentence, however, it is most evident, that
that the word *Mind* cannot be understood to mean, even remotely, the *Divine Mind*. For the Sentence, with such a Meaning, would expressly contradict the Declaration of *Socrates* himself, in Page 215, as may appear from Note 154.—Besides; the Divine Mind hath been already spoken of: This was meant in the *First Conclusion*; the word *Measure* being there used in that *supereminent transcendental Sense*, in which it signifies *Measure its Self*, *Measure universally*; for the *Divine Mind* alone is full of those *Ideas*, the most truly Universal and Divine,—The *Good*, The *Beautiful*, and The *Just*;—*Ideas* which extend, to all the Forms of *Nature*; penetrating, and wherever they penetrate, adorning, those Forms both inwardly and outwardly; assigning to Each of them its due *Measure*; affixing to the Infinites *within* them, the Elements of their Frame, *Bounds*, which they cannot pass; *moderating* the Intemperature of the Elementary Infinites *without*; and causing Nature to operate the Vicissitudes of these Elements *rationally* seasonably, and opportunely for the Good of all the Forms, which their different Mixtures compose and preserve, by being well-tempered—relatively to those different Forms.—In the Sentence therefore now before us, the word *Mind* must signify the Mind of *Man*; and indeed 'tis *Man*, whose Good is the direct and proper Subject of this Summary or Conclusive Part, as well as of the rest of the Dialogue.——Now the Human Mind reaches not ordinarily to see any Mental Objects, higher than the *Kinds* and *Species* of external Things. That every Person should perceive These, is absolutely necessary to Human Society: because Whoever was without Such *General Ideas* could not converse with any other Person; nor could the Affairs of Social Life be carried on. And such a *Degree* of natural *Understanding*, as *capacitates* a Man for the Perception of Such Ideas, is *sufficient*,—not only for the Purposes of Common Life,—but also...
for the acquisition of that Kind of Knowledge, which is termed the Knowledge of Natural History.—A greater Degree of natural Understanding is necessary for the Perception of those Ideas, which are, with more propriety than any General Kinds of things, styled Universal; — Such we mean, as are the Subjects of the Second Conclusion,—Symmetry and Beauty,—Perfection of Form, (comprehending the Perfections peculiar to Each Kind of Form,) —and Sufficiency of all things contributive to that Perfection.—Persons of this Genius, beyond what is ordinary, differ also, One from Another, in the natural Byas or Tendency of this Genius toward some Kinds of Sensible Objects, more than toward other Kinds, tho equally apt to excite in them those Universal and Divine Ideas. And to this Diversity of Genius are owing the natural Inclinations of different Persons to different Arts.—Nor is the Difference less, amongst different Persons, with regard to the Extensiveness of this finer Genius, when it is directed toward the Sciences: and Sciences are the propereft of all Subjects, for the Exercise of it; because they are farther removed from Corporeal Things, than are the Arts, and consequently approach nearer to Ideas, or Forms purely Mental.—Some Persons, who partake of this finer Genius, rest in the Mathematical Sciences, the Objects of which are indeed Symmetry and Proportion, Harmony and Beauty, but in no higher Subjects, than Numbers, Figures, and Sounds. — Other Persons, who seem to have a Genius equal to the Genius of the former, returning back again to the Corporeal World, with a View of benefiting Human Life by an Improvement of the Useful Arts, apply Mathematical Theorems to greater Bodys only, to Such as may be weighed or handled.—In some Persons, their Genius extends to those Sciences, in which the Divine Univerfals are best exemplifyed, — the Science of private Morals, and the Science of
of Government and public Laws. And in a Few, their Genius reaches to That Science, in which are contained the Principles of all the rest—Dialectick, or the Science of Mind.—Wise Men have observed, with great truth, that the intrinsic Worth of Every Man is to be estimated by the real (not the imaginary) Value of those Things which he most admires, studies, and delights in. — No less true is it of Every man’s Mind, that the Dignity of it is in proportion to the Dignity of its Objects: and that the Greatness and Extent of Every man’s Understanding are in proportion to the Greatness and Extent of the Subjects, which it comprehends.—In reasoning then from Analogy, it follows, that were it possible to separate (even καθαρώς) the Divine Mind from the Divine Ideas, as in Themselves they are, and as of that Great Mind they are the conflat Objects, it is neither absurd nor presumptuous to say, that the Divine Ideas have the Highest Place in the Divine Nature; and that the Divine Mind is, on this very account, pure and perfect, universal and eternal, because Such is the Nature of the Divine Ideas.—See Note 274 to the First Alcibiades.—But the Inseparability of Mind and Ideas seems to be peculiar to the Divine Nature. For only the Divine Mind is always in Energy, always energising on his own Ideas; or rather he is those very Ideas, on which he energises: — Himself is universal Good and Beauty, — universal Truth and Rectitude, — universal Justice and Goodness.—From these Ideas therefore the Divine Mind cannot be separated, so much as merely καθαρώς, or be considered as διστόλης. Nay perhaps these Divine Ideas are, in Themselves, but One and the Same Idea,—and only by Human Minds, (Such as partake of this Universal and Divine Idea,) are considered as Many and Different, from the Difference of its Appearances to Them, as they apply it to Different Subjects: or to the Same Subject, viewed in different lights: as the Same Thing is often both good and beautiful; the Same Action
Adion both good and just.—We dare not affirm, that Chalcidius had in view That Unity of the Divine Mind, spoken of last; but we observe, that, in his Commentary on Plato’s Timæus, pag. 431, he useth the Singular Number, in speaking of the Divine Ideas thus, — “naturam verè existentem, confiantem, eandemque semper, nimirum Ideam, qua intellecius Dei æterni est æternus.”—Possibly, this Platonic Writer meant only the Divine Ideas in the General. Be that as it may, his words are plainly expressive of an Union of the Divine Mind with its Object, whether One or Many—an Union inseparable, because eternal.—We should not have dwelt on so clear a Point, had not some Learned Men imagined, that Ideas, according to the Doctrine of Plato, are Beings, subsisting by Themselves, apart from the Divine Mind;—and that, beside the Two Causes and Principles of all things, according to the Pythagorean Doctrine, God and Necessity, or Mind and Matter,—Plato introduced a Third Principle and Cause,—Ideas, the Originals or Exemplars of all Sensible Forms.—a Principle, as distinct from God, or Mind, as from Necessity or Matter,—rightly therefore rejected by Aristotle, as unnecessary, notional, and groundless.—But D. Laertius tells us, plainly, that Plato asserted Two Principles of all things, God and Matter, δύο τῶν πάντων ἀπόφαξεν ἀρχαὶ, θεῶν καὶ ὑλῶν, and that to God he (Plato) gives the appellations of Mind and Cause, θεῶν καὶ τῶν προσαγωγέων καὶ ἀτηνών. Laertius, Lib. 3, §. 69. Edit: Amst: and afterwards in §. 76, resuming the same Subject, he says,—ἀρχαὶ εἶναι καὶ ἄτια τα λεξέντα δύο τῶν ὄντων (as M. Casaubon, like a Man versed in Manuscript Abbreviations, and the Errors thence arising, hath taught us to read this Passage,) παραδειγμά τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν ὑλῶν, that the Causes and Principles of things are the Two which have been mentioned, God the Exemplar of them, and Matter: in which Sentence, the word παραδειγμα Exemplar means Idea, as appears from §. 64, agreeably to the Pythagorean Doctrine.
Perhaps I should not.

And is not the Fourth Rank due to those things, which we assigned to the Soul herself, as her own proper

Doctrine. See before in this Dialogue, Page 249. ——

But the Human Mind, the Subject of the Sentence now before us, ought to be distinguished from her own Ideas; because she has, at first, but a bare Capacity of perceiving them; or, in other words, She is, at first, in Capacity, every Idea, which ariseth in her afterwards, — whether excited by Sensible Objects, or by learning any Art or Science, or by energizing within her Self on her Ideas already so excited. The Human Understanding is, in like manner, to be distinguished from those Subjects of any Art or Science, which are made Objects of the Human Understanding, by the receiving of such Art or Science from Human Masters, or their Writings, or from the internal and universal Teacher of all Knowledge. — Accordingly here, where only the Human Mind and the Human Understanding are meant,—and in general also, including all Degrees of Capacity, or natural Understanding, in different Human Minds,—Mind and Understanding are, as appears from the next Sentence of Socrates, (the Fourth Conclusion,) distinguished from Sciences and Arts and right Opinions; notwithstanding that neither Opinions, nor Arts, nor even Sciences, (so called by Men,) have place in any other Minds than Such as are the Human.

449 Meaning the Rational Soul or Mind of Man. — Plato, throughout the Argumentative Part of his Phædo, useth the word Soul, in speaking of Man, to signify the Mind. For the
proper Goods, Sciences, and Arts, and Right Opinions 431, a Fourth Order of Goods, following next after the first Three? ought we not here to place them,

Arguments, there made Use of, to prove the Immortality of the Soul, amount to nothing more than Proofs of the Eternity of all Mind. It may therefore reasonably be inferred, that Plato held the Soul of Man to become immortal only by partaking of Universal Mind, which is abundantly shown to be eternal.

431 Arts are here placed in a Rank inferior to that of the Human Mind, because Human Minds were the Inventors of them; and the Inventor must be allowed superior to the Invention, as being the intelligent and designing Cause of it. Indeed, ’tis Human Mind, who is the Artifl: and every Artifl-Mind is only a Human Mind, acting on Subjects of some certain Kinds, according to a set of Rules, invented by her Self or by other Human Minds. —— Even the Sciences, so far as they are known hitherto, are placed in this inferior Rank, because the Capacity of the Human Mind reaches, we presume, to much greater Heights of Science, than Man hath as yet actually ascended to. — Many Theorems in every Science remain undiscovered: many a Simple Truth, the mutual Relation of Two Ideas,—the Power (as it were) of those Two Ideas in combination,—lyes in them still latent: and many a Complex Truth, the Result of Simple Truths,—a more extensive Power (as it were) of Ideas,—lyes hidden yet deeper. But how far soever extended, the Power of Ideas may be heareafter found, by complicating and compounding Truths known before;—how great a Multitude soever may arise out of a Few, by Deductions, Inferences, and Corollrys;—every Mind is, by nature, capable of such
them, if they are more nearly related to the Chief Good \(^ {442} \) than they are to Pleasure?

**Protarchus.**

Perhaps we ought.

**Socrates.**

Then follow, Fifth in Order, the Pleasures of That Sort, which we described to be unmixed with Pain, and denominated Pure, such as Those consequent to Sensation, but belonging to the Soul her Self, when she is engaged in the Sciences \(^ {443} \).

**Protarchus.**

It may be so.

**Socrates.**

such Advancement, as to be able, in time, to follow, to apprehend, and to comprehend them all: and consequently the Human Mind is superior to the present (or any given) Stage of any Science. — In what respect, Right Opinions merit a Place in the same Rank with Sciences on some occasions, — especially at present, when they are considered as Things absolutely and always Good, relative to Man, — may be seen in the *Meno*, Pages 232, 3; and 246. — In what respect, Right Opinion is inferiour to Science, appears in the intermediate Pages of that Dialogue.

\(^ {442} \) For all the Objects of Art, or of Science, or of Right Opinion, being every One of them bounded, partake of the Chief Good,—Measure.

\(^ {443} \) In the Greek of this Sentence, the word ἐπιγέμασ ought to be either quite expunged, or changed for the word ἀδελφ, or imemmediately
So we rate.

With the Sixth Race——(says Orpheus)

Close we the finish’d Series of our Song.

Our Disquisition too seems to be now finished, and to close with passing our Sixth Sentence. After all this, nothing remains for us to do, but to affix a Head as it were to the whole Body of our Inquiry.

Immediately preceded by the Preposition πρὶν. See Page 547.

The purest Pleasures, those of Science, are certainly not Sciences, themselves.

This Verse of Orpheus we meet with again in Plutarch’s Treatise concerning the Delphic Inscription Εἰ, and in no other ancient Author, whom we are acquainted with. It is introduced by Plutarch no otherwise, than as a Part of the present Passage in Plato, which is there quoted; and not so, as to give us any light into the Poet’s own Meaning in that Verse. But if we may form a probable Conjecture from Plato’s application of it, ’twas the End of a Description of Five different Ages of the World, with regard to Men’s Manners and Ways of Life. For Men are generally supposed to have departed, more and more, from their primæval Purity, Simplicity, and Innocence; and each successive Age to have been less virtuous and honest than the preceding.—The Poet Ovid, in his *Metamorphoses*, writes of Four Ages, gradually degenerating in that manner; in the last of which *Four*, he says, the Giants made War against the Gods. The Fable was very ancient; and in Ovid’s Days, a long Time had elapsed since the supposed Age of it.—The Poet Hesiod, in his "Εγγεζευμένα Ἑμέρες*, says, that he himself lived in the Fifth Age. And ’tis highly probable, that
'Tis fit that we should.

Socrates.

Come then; the Third to the Saviour; let us commemorate Him, whose Aid brought the Argu-

that Onomacritus, an Athenian Poet, who, long after the time of Hesiod, tho long before the time of Socrates, wrote a Poem, (ascribing it to Orpheus,) intitled "Eγνα ναὶ Ἡμέρας,"—to imitate or to rival Hesiod's on the same Subject, — briefly described therein the different Manners of those Five Ages; as Hesiod had done, with regard to the first Four: but that, coming to the Sixth Age,—That, in which he Himself lived, he stopped short, like Hesiod. For the Muses, in those days, were modest; and did not, as they did afterwards, exhibit in their Songs the most offensive Objects. Two Fragments of that Poem, feigned to have been written by Orpheus, are yet remaining, given us by Tzetzes, in the Proem to his Commentary on Hesiod, pag: 4. And, in One of those Fragments, mention is made of χρόνον γενέσθαι the Golden Age, when Men employed themselves wholly in Agriculture and Planting.

445 For an account of this Proverb, the Reader is referred to Note 363.—Mind and Right Reason are here, as well as in the Passage to which That Note belongs, meant by the Saviour,—the only protecting and preserving Deity, in Cases where all other Protection, Aid, or Remedy, is insufficient. This is also the Meaning of the last Sentence of Simplicius, in his excellent Commentary on the Manual of Epicletus, where he alludes to the same Proverb.
ment to a Conclusion; calling Him to witness the Truth of it.

Protarchus.

Whom do you mean?

Socrates.

Philebus laid down this Position,—that the Good of Man was all and every Kind of Pleasure in full Abundance.

Protarchus.

By commemorating the Saviour, it seems, then, Socrates! you meant, that we should resume the original Argument of our Inquiry.

Socrates.

Well: but let us observe what followed. I, viewing with Dislike that Position just now mentioned,—the Tenet, not of Philebus only, but of Thousands beside in all ages,—on the other hand asserted, that Mind was a thing far better and more beneficial to Human Life, than Pleasure.

Protarchus.

That was Your Position.

Socrates.

But then suspecting, that many other things had Pretensions to the same Character of being the Good of
PHILEBUS

of Man, I engaged, if Something $446$ should appear Better than Both of Those, to combat for the Second Prize, in behalf of Mind, against Pleasure; that Pleasure, in her Claim to so much as This, might be defeated.

PROTARCHUS.

You did engage so to do.

SOCRATES.

Afterwards, on Trial, it was very sufficiently proved, that Neither of our Favourites answered the Character of compleat Good.

PROTARCHUS.

Perfectly true.

SOCRATES.

Mind therefore and Pleasure were, Both of them, quite dismissed from having any thing to do in the Controversy concerning Good its Self; as Each of them wanted Self-Sufficiency, and that Power which attends the Compleat and Perfect.

$446$ All the Editions of Plato give us to read $\tau\delta$ instead of $\tau\iota$ in this Sentence. Ficinus, however, translates, as if in the Medicean Manuscript he read $\tau\iota$, which undoubtedly is the true Reading; and herein he is followed by all the Translators who came after him.
670  PHILEBUS.

PROTARCHUS.

Very right.

SOCRATES.

But after we had discovered a Third Thing preferable to Either of those Two, we found the nature of Mind to approach nearer to the nature of this Conqueror, and to be much more familiar with his Form, than Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS.

We certainly did.

SOCRATES.

The Sixth § and lowest Place then, according to the Judgment now given, as the Result of

447 A very gross Error has infected all the Editions, and all the Translations of Plato, in this place. For in all the Editions we read πέμφην the Fifth, instead of ἕκτον the Sixth. Now the Fifth Rank was before assigned solely to the pure Pleasures. The Sixth and last Rank therefore remains to Pleasure, one of the Three great Subjects of this Dialogue;—to Pleasure, pretending to be the only or the chief Good of Man, and by Philebus avowed, and contended for, as Such;—Pleasure in general and undistinguised;—Pleasure at random, from whatever Quarter it comes;—in Plato's own words, vol: 2, pag: 40, Edit: Steph: παρόδων, ὑμων, καὶ εἰκή χαῖνον. — But the very next Sentence of Socrates puts it beyond all Doubt, that Pleasure of Sense,—Sensual Pleasure,—is here meant.

this
this Inquiry, belongs to the Power of Pleasure
unbounded.

PROTARCHUS.

So it appears.

SOCRATES.

But the First Place belongs to her, as 448 Bulls
would say and Horses 449, and all Beasts what-
ever of the Savage Kind: for it appears so from
the manner in which they pursue Pleasure. And
on the Credit of these Animals, just as the Judg-
ment of Diviners depends on the Flight of Birds,

448 In the Greek of this Sentence, we presume that the word
\(\beta\) ought to be changed into \(\omega\).

449 Porphyry, in his Treatise \(\pi\varepsilon\iota\ \alpha\pi\tau\nu\gamma\icosa\ \epsilon\mu\phi\phi\varsigma\mu\varsigma\), Lib: 3, §. 1.
writes thus; \(\Sigma\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\nu\ \tau\rho\us\ \tau\varsigma\ \iota\sigma\nu\ \delta\iota\alpha\mu\mu\alpha\beta\iota\tau\varepsilon\tau\tau\varsigma\ \varepsilon\iota\nu\ \tau\eta\ell\omega\). Quotem, \(\enteta\), \(\sqrt{\sigma}\varsigma\ \kappa\Phi\alpha\gamma\iota\ \tau\varepsilon\tau\varsigma\ \sigma\kappa\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\iota\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigm
Sentence is pronounced by the Multitude, that Pleasures have the greatest Power in making our Lives happy. For the Loves and Joys of Brute Animals they deem a stronger Evidence, and fitter to be credited, than the Sayings of Men, prophetically uttered in all places, thro Inspiration of the Philosophic Muse.

Protarchus.

That You have said what is most agreeable to Truth, O Socrates! we are, All of us, now agreed.

Socrates.

Now then ye will dismiss me.

Protarchus.

There is a little, O Socrates! still remaining to be considered. For you must not quit the Company, before it breaks up: and I will put you in Mind of what you have left unsaid.

THE END.
The Reader is desired to correct the following Errors; and any other, which may have escaped our Notice.

Page 53; Line 10; for Veneral, read Venereal.
Page 68, in the Notes, Line 2; for Acutenfs, read Acutenefs.
Page 257; Line 4 from the bottom; for eats, read Seats.
Page 317, End of the Note; for the Basil Editions, read the first Basil Edition.
Page 321, Note 195, for all, read most; and to the End of the Note add these words,—The 2d Basil Edition confirms our Opinion.
Page 407, Line 1, for 238, put 239. and in a few Lines after, blot out 239.—Note 238 belongs to page 406, Line 3.