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BONAPARTE

THE CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE

THE FRENCH PRESS DURING THE NAPOLEONIC ERA

THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

EUROPE IN THE EPOCH OF IMPERIALISM: 1870-1919

ITALY DURING THE MIDDLE AGES

HISTORY OF MODERN ITALY
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MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONTENTS

Introduction · page 7

Chapter I · page 13
THE YOUTH OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

Chapter II · page 35
THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, 1796–1797

Chapter III · page 58
THE CONQUEST OF EGYPT AND THE INVASION OF SYRIA, 1798–1799

Chapter IV · page 72
THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE, 1799

Chapter V · page 89
THE FIRST STEPS OF THE DICTATOR, 1799–1800

Chapter VI · page 104

Chapter VII · page 131
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW WAR WITH ENGLAND AND THE CORONATION OF NAPOLEON, 1803–1804

Chapter VIII · page 148
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE THIRD COALITION, 1805–1806
Contents

Chapter IX · page 172
THE DEFEAT OF PRUSSIA AND THE FINAL SUBJUGATION OF GERMANY, 1806–1807

Chapter X · page 204
THE REIGN OF NAPOLEON ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. FROM TILSIT TO WAGRAM, 1807–1809

Chapter XI · page 231
THE EMPEROR AND THE EMPIRE AT THE HEIGHT OF THEIR POWER, 1810–1811

Chapter XII · page 250
THE RUPTURE WITH RUSSIA, 1811–1812

Chapter XIII · page 266
THE INVASION OF RUSSIA, 1812

Chapter XIV · page 307
THE REVOLT OF VASSAL EUROPE AGAINST NAPOLEON AND THE "BATTLE OF THE NATIONS", 1813

Chapter XV · page 335
THE WAR IN FRANCE AND THE FIRST ABDICATION OF NAPOLEON, 1814

Chapter XVI · page 360
THE HUNDRED DAYS, 1815

Chapter XVII · page 397
THE ISLAND OF ST. HELENA, 1815–1821
CONTENTS

Appendix · page 406

SOME CONCLUSIONS:
POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND MILITARY

Notes · page 416

Bibliography · page 418

Index · page 423
INTRODUCTION

The man, with whose life and personality this book deals, presents one of the most extraordinary phenomena in world history. It is not surprising that he has been, still is, and will continue to be, the subject of many biographies.

As recently as 1914, a section of the militant German press sang fervent praises of Napoleon as the creator of the Continental Blockade and as the author of the idea of unifying the European continent against England; after the World War, the victorious Allies, inspired by his example, inserted the more ruthless clauses into the Versailles Treaty; and the Fascist dictatorship in Italy made the study of Napoleon's personality a compulsory course of history instruction in the schools. And before and after the World War the figure of Napoleon loomed constantly before the minds of the ruling classes, frightened by approaching revolution and yearning for the strong man and deliverer.

"The guillotine of a Robespierre is alway followed in history by the sword of a Napoleon." Such were the words which Prince Bülow, Chancellor of the German Empire, bellowed to the Social-Democrats in 1906, although they as little resembled Robespierre as William II did Napoleon Bonaparte. Following the World War and the revolt of the proletariat, these reflections and analogies were more and more often reiterated, becoming almost chronic on the lips of the representatives of the warring capitalist reaction, because of their exasperation with the weakness of democratic governments. "Do you think, Monsieur Marshal, that the recent war against Germany would have lasted a full four years and three months, if Napoleon had been our commander-in-chief?" Briand ironically demanded of Marshal Foch on May 5, 1921, at the memorial banquet commemorating the centenary of Napoleon's death. "No," Foch hastily replied. "Commander-in-Chief Napoleon would undoubtedly have broken the Germans
more quickly. But, on the other hand, he would have shown up promptly afterward to the extreme inconvenience of your Government.” Briand did not prolong the conversation.

Moreover, the world slaughter of 1914-1918 in itself enlivened interest in a man considered, by the unanimous accord of specialists, the greatest military genius in world history. The giftless French Nivelles, the German Moltke-nephews and Falkenhayns, the Russian Rennenkampfs and Yanushkeviches, the English Haigs, whose too plentiful numbers caused even such mediocre commanders as Ludendorff, Foch and Alexeyev to be regarded as gifted strategists—all these impotent leaders of armies of millions, by the mere fact of their existence, proved irrefutably that the effective forces of war and the opportunity of commanding immense armies were not in themselves sufficient to beget and give birth to a military genius, any more than whole quarries of Carrara marble were capable in themselves of generating a Phidias or a Michelangelo. After the World War this fact was accepted without contradiction. Naturally, this too, stimulated renewed interest in the few real masters of warfare—Hannibal, Caesar, Frederick II and, above all, Napoleon.

Napoleon’s ambition for fame was exceeded only by his thirst for power. To crush the enemy, to impose his will upon him, to keep him “forever” in subjection, and to direct his future history at his own discretion—that was why wars, campaigns and invasions were necessary. Fruitless, victories—victories which did not bring direct political benefits—were not important to him.

Only in romantic or idealistic conceptions of history, and especially in that species known as the “heroic school,” was there ascribed to Napoleon the rôle of “creator” of his epoch, conferring upon it its ideas as well as its significance in the development of civilisation. For us, the Napoleonic empire is the birth of the stubborn conflict of new social and economic forces, a conflict which did not begin with Napoleon or end with him, and whose basic significance consisted in the victorious assault of the middle class against the feudal and semi-feudal order in France and Europe. This struggle was complicated by the simultaneous conflict between the French and the economically more powerful English commercial and industrial groups for control of the more back-
ward countries. This, and the wars of national liberation which followed, succeeded in placing Europe on the road of "free" capitalism. It does not mean, however, that we should underestimate the gigantic personality standing in the centre of this dual conflict and imposing upon it the impress of his tragic destiny.

The grandiose Napoleonic epic has had almost as strong a hold on political philosophers and theoreticians as on historians, publicists and poets. Beginning with the Hegelians and ending with the revolutionary Marxist writers, there has been no single noticeable current of social and philosophic thought which, in one fashion or another, has not been influenced by Napoleon.
THE YOUTH OF
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

NAPOLEON's career began most inauspiciously. On August 15, 1769, Letizia Bonaparte, the 19-year-old wife of a Corsican nobleman, was strolling in a garden near her house. Suddenly she felt the pangs of approaching labour and was barely able to run as far as her sitting-room before giving birth to an infant. As no one was in attendance at the moment, the child fell from his mother's womb on to the floor. Upon hearing of the birth of a son, Carlo Bonaparte, the impoverished advocate of the tiny Corsican city of Ajaccio, decided that at the proper time the boy should have a French rather than a Corsican education. When the youth had grown up, his father succeeded in getting him an appointment in one of the French military schools, where he was to be reared by the State, for with such a large family as he already had, it was out of the question for Carlo Bonaparte to educate him at his own expense.

Corsica, which for some time had belonged to the commercial republic of Genoa, had revolted against foreign domination in 1755, under the command of a local landowner, Paoli, and had succeeded in establishing its independence. The uprising had been engineered by petty landowners, supported, on this occasion, by hunters and cattle-breeders from the hills, and the poorer classes in some of the cities—in a word, it was the revolt of a people who desired to liberate themselves from shameless exploitation by a wholly alien commercial republic and from fiscal and administrative oppression. The revolt a success, Corsica had become an independent state under the leadership of Paoli.

In 1768 the Genoese republic sold its "rights" to Corsica, non-existent in fact, to Louis XV of France, and in May of 1769, three
months before Napoleon's birth, the French troops defeated Paoli's detachments. Corsica was proclaimed a possession of France.

Thus, the years of Napoleon's childhood were passed at a time when, on the one hand, regrets were still voiced for the repeated loss of political independence, and, on the other, a section of the landholding gentry and the urban middle class were asking themselves if they should not, with a good conscience rather than from fear, become subjects of France. Napoleon's father, Carlo Bonaparte, joined the "French" party, but the tiny Napoleon thought with regret of Paoli, the defender of Corsica, and came to detest the French invaders.

Napoleon was growing up a morose and irritable child. His mother loved him, but she brought him up austerely and coldly. The family lived economically, although none of the Bonapartes actually suffered from want. Carlo, apparently, was a good man, but he was woefully weak, and Letizia soon became the real head of the family. She was a firm, stern, hard-working woman, who took upon herself the education of her children, and it was from her that Napoleon inherited his love for work and disciplined order in his affairs.

The position of this island so remote from the rest of the world, with its wild population living among the hills and forest thickets, constantly engaging in sanguinary vendettas, and assiduously concealing its stubborn hostility to the French invaders—all this was reflected in the early impressions of Napoleon.

In 1779, after repeated endeavours, Carlo Bonaparte succeeded in having his two eldest children, Joseph and Napoleon, admitted to the Nobles' College in France, and in the spring of the same year the ten-year-old Napoleon was transferred to the military school at Brienne, in northeastern France.

At Brienne, Napoleon retained his morose demeanour, standing aloof from the other boys. He was prone to irritation. He did not seek association with others, regarding them without respect, good will or sympathy. He felt confident of himself, notwithstanding his small stature and his youth. His schoolmates tried to taunt and humiliate him, by finding fault with his Corsi-
can pronunciation. However, several furiously fought brawls, all led by the little Bonaparte, convinced his comrades of the risks run in such clashes. He was an excellent student, and made fine progress in the history of Greece and Rome. He also took an exceptional interest in mathematics and geography. The instructors in this provincial military school were themselves none too well informed in the sciences they taught, and Napoleon reinforced his knowledge with supplementary reading. Even at this early age he read much and quickly, a habit he maintained in later years. He astonished and estranged his French comrades by his fierce Corsican patriotism: at this time the French were regarded by him as aliens who had invaded and conquered his native land. In these Brienne years he maintained contact with his native land solely through letters from his family: the material means of his parents were not such that they could afford the fare which might have brought him home for the holidays.

In 1784, then 15 years of age, he finished his course with distinction, and was admitted to the Paris military school, which prepared officers for the army. Here were gathered the leading teaching forces of France. It is sufficient to say that among the instructors were the famous mathematician Monge and the astronomer Laplace. Avidly, Napoleon listened to the lectures and read. There was something to learn here, and someone to impart learning. During his first year at the Paris school, he experienced a misfortune. He had entered the school in October, 1784, and in February of the following year his father, Carlo Bonaparte, died from the same disease which, years later, was to take Napoleon: cancer of the stomach. The family was left almost without means. Nothing was to be hoped for from Joseph, Napoleon’s elder brother, who was both incapable and indolent; so the 16-year-old cadet took upon himself the care of his mother, brothers and sisters. On October 30, 1785, after a year’s stay in the military school in Paris, he left it for the army with the rank of sub-lieutenant, joining a regiment stationed in the town of Valence, in the South.

The young officer led a hard life. He sent a large portion of his earnings to his mother, retaining only enough for a bare subsistence, and not allowing himself the slightest diversion. In the
same house in which he hired lodgings there was a second-hand bookshop, and Napoleon began to spend all his spare time in reading the books which the bookseller generously loaned him. He shunned society. Indeed, his appearance and his attire would have earned him only the sneers of a man of the world. He read whenever he had a moment of leisure, much more than at Brienne or in Paris, where his duties had taken up a good deal more of his time.

The books which most interested him dealt with military history, mathematics and geography. He also read narratives of travel and the works of the philosophers. It was at this time that he became acquainted with the 18th-century advocates of enlightenment—Voltaire, Rousseau, d’Alembert, Mably, Raynal. He read feverishly, marking his copybooks with notes and sketches. It is difficult to establish the precise date when he first showed distaste for the “ideologists” of liberating philosophy. In any event, the 16-year-old sub-lieutenant had not yet arrived at a point where he criticised as much as he learned. This, too, was a root quality of his mind; in those early years he approached every new book, as every new acquaintance, with an avid and impatient desire to extract as quickly as possible everything it had to give him, everything that might enrich his mind and provide him with food for thought.

He also read belles-lettres and poetry: he found diversion in *The Sorrows of Young Werther* and in several other works of Goethe; he also read Racine, Corneille, Molière and the book of verses attributed to the Scottish bard of the Middle Ages, Ossian, which had created something of a sensation at the time. (It was later discovered to be a clever literary forgery.) From these books he flung himself upon mathematical treatises and works dealing with military matters, especially artillery.

Later, the monotonous garrison life was interrupted. He made a request for a long leave, and in September, 1786, departed for Ajaccio to attend to the affairs of his family. His father had left a small estate, but his affairs were in a badly muddled state. Napoleon quickly set them straight, and, incidentally, improved the material position of his family. He managed to have his leave extended until the middle of 1788, although it does not appear
that he was compensated during this period. But the results of his work at home and on the estate covered everything.

On returning to France in June of 1788, he was immediately despatched with his regiment to the town of Auxonne. In the barracks he continued, as before, to read everything that fell into his hands, and, in particular, those fundamental works on military tactics which agitated the military specialists of the 18th century. Once, when he was confined to the guardhouse for some infraction of the rules, he quite accidentally discovered a volume of the Roman laws of Justinian, which had found its way there in some mysterious manner. He read it from cover to cover, and after a lapse of 15 years dumbfounded the famous French jurists during the drafting of the "Code of Napoleon" by quoting verbatim from the Roman digests. He had an exceptional memory.

Here, in Auxonne, he seized his pen and composed a brief treatise upon ballistics, On the Throwing of Bombs. Artillery finally became his military specialty. Among his papers of this period still extant, there are also fragments of belles-lettres and philosophic-political studies. In so far as it is possible to draw any conclusions from them, it appears that the young officer was of liberal inclination. Although he occasionally repeated Rousseau's opinions, it would be difficult to classify him as one of Rousseau's followers. During these years one particular trait attracts our attention: his complete subjugation of passions and impulses to will and reason. He never seemed to eat heartily, shunned society, had no contacts with women, indulged in no diversion, worked incessantly; and in his few moments of leisure passed his time in poring over books of every description. Had he finally reconciled himself to his lot—the lot of an impoverished provincial officer, a penniless Corsican noble, upon whom his aristocratic comrades and chief would always look down with condescension?

He had not yet succeeded in formulating a clear answer to this question and had succeeded to an even lesser degree in developing concrete plans for the future, when the French Revolution broke out.

Napoleon's countless biographers, who are inclined to endow their hero with superhuman qualities of wisdom, prophetic genius
and the inspired guidance of his star, wish to detect in the 20-year-old sub-lieutenant of the artillery of the Auxonne garrison a prescience of what the revolution, begun in 1789, would ultimately signify for him.

Actually, events took shape in a far simpler and more natural manner. Napoleon's social status was such that he could gain only from a victory of the middle class over the feudal-absolutist order. The nobles of Corsica—especially the small-landed proprietors—had never enjoyed, even in the days of Genoese rule, those privileges which the French aristocracy held as God-given rights. In any event, the small, landed provincial from the remote and, but recently subjugated, wild Italian island could not count on achieving a rapid and significant career in the French military service. If there was one idea that gratified Napoleon in his perusal of the 18th-century literature of enlightenment, it was its advocacy of equality. If there was one event in the Revolution of 1789 that captivated him, it was the Declaration of Rights. Thenceforth, only individual ability could elevate a man's social status. The sub-lieutenant of artillery needed no more than that for a beginning.

From this period there have come down to us expressions of Napoleon's opinions, from which it is evident that such events as the Revolution of 1789 are capable—if only for the moment—of kindling with something resembling revolutionary fervour even such egotistic natures as his.

Soon, however, this spark was extinguished, and practical worries seized upon him. It was essential for him to decide how he could make the Revolution best serve his ends, and where it was best to begin. To the second question there were two alternatives: in Corsica or in France.

To exaggerate the degree of his Corsican patriotism at this moment would be folly. Sub-lieutenant Bonaparte in 1789 but little resembled that militant ten-year-old wolfing who had fought so fiercely in the yard of the Brienne school because his comrades taunted his Corsican accent. He now knew what France stood for and what Corsica stood for; he knew the scale of the one and the other, and logically concluded that there could be no real comparison. However, it was also necessary for him to con-
sider that in the year 1789, particularly because of the outbreak of the Revolution, he could not hope for a position in France commensurate with the one he might, in happy circumstances, occupy in Corsica. Two and a half months after the storming of the Bastille, Napoleon managed to secure leave. He departed immediately for Corsica.

At this time Napoleon had in his possession a number of literary sketches which he had written in his leisure. One of them was a short history of Corsica. He sent the manuscript to Raynal, and was overjoyed to receive a very flattering response from the writer, who was then enjoying great popularity. The very choice of theme reveals that Napoleon was preoccupied with his native island even before he had begun to consider the possibility of engaging in political activity there.

On arriving at home, he promptly threw in his lot with Paoli, who had but recently returned from his long exile; but the old Corsican patriot treated him coldly, and it soon became apparent that their objectives were not the same. Paoli desired complete liberation from French domination; while Bonaparte, wholeheartedly in favour of the French Revolution, recognised, in the King's Court and the reactionaries, his island's only enemies.

After spending several months in Corsica, he rejoined his regiment in Valence, taking with him his younger brother Louis, in order to reduce his mother's household expenses. It now became necessary for Napoleon to support both his brother and himself on his own very slender means. Often they were forced to make dinner of a single chunk of bread. Napoleon continued to work intensively in the army service and to devour a variety of books on military history.

In September, 1791, he succeeded in having himself transferred to the army service in Corsica. Here he definitely broke with Paoli, when he learned that the latter was attempting to force a complete rupture with France. This was the last thing in the world that Napoleon wanted. In April, 1792, when a furious struggle broke out between the counter-revolutionary priesthood (which to a man supported the separatist Paoli) and the Revolutionary authorities, Napoleon went so far as to shoot into a crowd which attacked the detachment under his command. In the
end, he himself came under the suspicion of the authorities for having made an attempt to capture a fortress without direct orders. He was forced to leave for Paris to appear before the War Ministry there to answer charges in connection with his somewhat dubious behavior in Corsica. Arriving at the French capital toward the end of May, 1792, he personally witnessed the stormy revolutionary events of that summer.

We have sufficient accurate evidence to form an opinion of how the 23-year-old lieutenant regarded the two main events of the summer: the invasion of the Tuileries by the people on June 20, and the dethronement of the King on August 10. Since he was a casual observer rather than an actual participant, he gave expression to his true feelings among an intimate circle of friends. His opinions are masterpieces of clarity and unambiguity. "We'll go after this canaille," he said to Bourrienne, who stood beside him in the street watching the mob entering the Tuileries on June 20. And when Louis XVI, frightened by this menacing demonstration, came to the window, attired in a red Phrygian cape, and bowed to the crowd, Napoleon scornfully remarked: "What a poltroon! How could he have permitted this rabble to enter! If he'd only have turned the cannon on them and shot down five or six hundred, the rest would have run." (I have softened the epithet Napoleon applied to Louis XVI, because it is impossible to translate it accurately in print.)

On August 10—the day the Tuileries was stormed and Louis XVI dethroned—he was again in the street and repeated the epithet in referring to the King. As for the revolutionary mob, he spoke of it as "that most hideous rabble."

He could little have dreamed, as he stood there in the crowd and witnessed the storming of the Tuileries, that the French throne, from which Louis XVI was at that moment being driven, was being vacated for him. And the people who massed around him, fervently hailing the birth of the Republic, would have been dumfounded had they been told that this lean, young officer in the worn coat would one day crush this republic and become an autocratic emperor. Incidentally, it is interesting to observe that his instinct even then impelled Napoleon to think of grapeshot as the most practical means of suppressing a national revolt. To be
The Youth of Napoleon Bonaparte

sure, this was merely a momentary flash, for Napoleon had no desire to serve the perishing cause of the Bourbons; and now, more clearly than ever before, he saw that only through the Revolution could he hope to further his own ambitions.

Once again he returned to Corsica. This time he was definitely opposed to Paoli, who had finally decided to liberate Corsica from France by casting her lot with England. Immediately before the seizure of the island by the English, Napoleon fled, taking with him his entire family. This was in June, 1793. The Bonapartes had barely escaped, when their house was pillaged by the partisans of Paoli.

It seemed that years of poverty were in store for them. The large family was wholly destitute, and the young captain—he had but recently been promoted to that rank—had no alternative but to support his mother and seven brothers and sisters. Somehow, he managed to secure a shelter for them, first in Toulon, later in Marseilles. This appeared to be the beginning of a hard and painful existence, as month followed monotonous month in hopeless succession. Then, suddenly, the rigours of army service were interrupted in an unexpected fashion.

It came about with the outbreak of a counter-revolutionary revolt in the south of France. In 1793 the city of Toulon either exiled or executed the representatives of the revolutionary authority, at the same time invoking the assistance of the English fleet then patrolling the western Mediterranean. The Revolutionary army besieged Toulon on land. The siege proceeded languidly and without success under the direction of Carteaux. At this time the Corsican Saliceti, who had fought with Bonaparte against Paoli, was in command of the Revolutionary army engaged in stamping out the revolt of the royalists in the South. Napoleon visited his fellow countryman in his camp near Toulon and outlined to him the one possible way in which Toulon could be captured and the English fleet driven from the shores. Saliceti appointed the young captain assistant to the chief of the siege artillery.

After prolonged opposition and innumerable delays on the part of the higher authorities who had little confidence in this un-
known captain, the new commander, Dogommier, permitted him to carry his plan into execution. Placing his batteries according to his prepared plans Bonaparte opened a fearful cannonade on the city. Finally, he himself led an assault on Eguillette, a vital point commanding the heights above the sea road. Capturing Eguillette, he opened fire on the English fleet, which promptly fled. Toulon immediately capitulated to the Revolutionary troops.

So, on December 17, 1793, Napoleon gave and won his first battle. During the course of his tumultuous career, he was to engage in some 60 major and minor battles—a number incomparably larger than the combined totals of Hannibal, Caesar, Frederick the Great and Suvorov—and larger human masses were to fight in these battles than in all the wars of his predecessors. But, notwithstanding the abundance of magnificent victories with which the fame of Napoleon is associated, the Toulon triumph, for all its relatively modest scope, has always maintained a place quite apart in the Napoleonic epic. It was the first to call attention to him; indeed, it was his letter of introduction to the Paris authorities. The Committee of Public Safety warmly congratulated itself on having succeeded at last in putting an end to the Toulon traitors and in driving off the English fleet.

These events promised a speedy liquidation of the royalist counter-revolution in the South. Toulon had been considered so inaccessible a fortress that many doubted the report of its fall. It seemed inconceivable that an unknown captain named Bonaparte could have taken it. Fortunately for the victor, the camp of the besiegers contained, besides Saliceti, another person of far more influence. This was Augustin Robespierre, the younger brother of Maximilien. Having witnessed Napoleon’s capture of the city, he despatched a report to Paris describing it. There was an immediate result. By a decree of January 14, 1793, Napoleon Bonaparte was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. He was at the moment twenty-four and a half years old. The apprenticeship was over.

Napoleon’s capture of Toulon took place at a time when the Convention was completely dominated by the Montagnards, a
period when the Jacobin Club wielded tremendous influence in the
capital and in the provinces, and which witnessed the flowering
of the Revolutionary dictatorship of Robespierre, ruthlessly and
victoriously fighting against external foes and inner treachery,
against mutinies inspired by the royalists, the Girondists and the
unsworn priests.

Watching the fierce internal struggle, Napoleon saw that he
must choose between the Republic, which could give him every-
thing, and the monarchy, which would strip him of all he had
gained and, in addition, hold him accountable for his capture of
Toulon and his small brochure, "The Supper at Beauclaire," in
which he had shown that the position of the mutinous towns in the
South was hopeless.

During the spring and the beginning of the summer, the repre-
sentatives of the Convention in the South—and especially Au-
gustin Robespierre, under the direct influence of Napoleon—were
making plans for an invasion of Piedmont in northern Italy, with
the object of threatening Austria from there. But Paris was be-
coming skeptical. The Committee of Public Safety was wavering;
Carnot came out against the plan. Using his influence on Augustin
Robespierre, and reaching through him his brother Maximilien,
Napoleon had hopes of realising his dream of taking part in the
conquest of Italy. But the idea itself was alien to the present
mood of the French Government. The thought of defending
themselves from the intervention of counter-revolutionary Eu-
 rope by a direct assault, appeared arrogant to the authorities.
Then a sudden, wholly unforeseen political catastrophe changed
the entire course of the Revolution.

In order to argue in person for the Italian invasion with his
brother and the Committee of Public Safety, Augustin Robespier-
re departed for Paris. Summer came; it was essential to reach
a decision. Bonaparte was at Nice, after a trip to Genoa, where
he had accomplished a secret mission in connection with the pro-
jected Italian campaign. Then suddenly, on July 27, came the
startling and entirely unexpected news of the arrests of the Ninth
Thermidor. In Paris, at a sitting of the Convention itself, Maxi-
milien Robespierre, his brother Augustin, Saint-Just, Couthon,
and afterwards their partisans, were seized and the next day summarily executed, with the simple announcement that they were outside the law. Promptly, a series of wholesale arrests began throughout France. Anyone close, or seemingly close, to the leaders of the fallen government, was pounced upon and imprisoned. Following the execution of Augustin Robespierre, General Bonaparte came under suspicion. On August 10 two weeks after the Ninth Thermidor, he was arrested and conducted under convoy to the Fort of Antibes on the Mediterranean. After a 14-day confinement, he was released, as nothing could be found in his papers to provide cause for further investigation.

Actually, during the days of the Thermidor Terror many people only remotely associated with Robespierre and his faction perished. Napoleon had reason to consider himself fortunate in having escaped the guillotine. In any event, on leaving prison he became convinced that the times had changed and that his so-auspiciously-begun career had come to an impasse. The new Revolutionary leaders maintained an attitude of suspicion toward him. And they knew so little about him. The Toulon exploit in itself had not created a big military reputation for him. “Bonaparte? Who is this Bonaparte? Where has he served? No one seems to know.” Such was the comment of young Lieutenant Junot’s father when his son informed him that Bonaparte wanted to make him his adjutant. After the Ninth Thermidor the capture of Toulon was either forgotten or not appraised as highly as it had been immediately after its achievement.

Presently, Napoleon met with a fresh disappointment. The Committee of Public Safety unexpectedly ordered him to the Vendée to suppress a rebellion, but when he arrived in Paris he learned that he was being given command of a brigade of infantry, whereas he was an artillerist and had no desire to serve in the infantry. He engaged in a heated argument with Aubry, a member of the Committee, and sent in his resignation.

There followed another period of poverty for Napoleon. The 25-year-old general, out of commission after his quarrel with the authorities, was without means of any kind. Somehow, he survived the hard winter of 1794-1795 in Paris, and the still harder and hungrier spring. It seemed as if everyone had forgotten
him. Finally, in August, he was assigned to the Topographical Section of the Committee of Public Safety. This was a prototype of the General Staff, created by Carnot, the virtual commander-in-chief of the army. In the Topographical Section Napoleon composed the “instructions” (directions) for the Italian Army of the Republic, which was conducting operations in Piedmont. During these months he did not cease to study or to read. He visited the Botanical Gardens in Paris and the Observatory, where he listened with interest to the astronomer Lalande.

The service in which he was engaged did not bring him much income, and sometimes he would have gone dinnerless, except for the kindness of the Pernod family, which occasionally invited him to their home for meals. But never in those difficult months did he regret his resignation or dream of joining the infantry—possibly because it would have entailed his demeaning himself with humiliating petitions. And then once more he was rescued. The Republic found a use for him—against the same enemies whom he had vanquished in Toulon.

The year 1795 was one of the most critical in the history of the French Revolution. The Revolution, after deposing the absolutist-feudal order, deprived itself on the Ninth Thermidor of its sharpest weapon, the Jacobin dictatorship; and the middle class now sought new means of firmly establishing its rule. During the winter of 1794-1795 and the ensuing spring, the Thermidore Convention, reflecting in its tendencies the aspirations of the petty as well as the middle and upper bourgeoisie, steadily moved, in a political sense, from Left to Right. But toward the end of the summer of 1794, following the execution of Robespierre, the middle-class reaction was still a long way from attaining the strength and boldness which was to become so characteristic of it in the late autumn of the same year; and even in the autumn of 1794 the Right Wing of the Convention neither spoke nor acted half so arbitrarily as it did in the spring of 1795. During the terrible winter and spring of 1794-1795, exposure and famine were killing thousands of the workers and their families in the Paris suburbs. Mothers committed suicide after slaying their children. Fathers returned home after work to find their families dead of hunger and cold. But all this misery had no effect on the ruling
middle class, which had abandoned itself to a life of unrestrained debauchery and artificial gaiety. In the circles frequented by the swarms of financiers, speculators, Bourse gamblers and embezzlers who had triumphed with the downfall of Robespierre, the plight of the workers was disregarded.

As was to have been expected, the workers in the suburbs openly revolted against the Thermidor Convention. In 1795 armed demonstrations twice attacked the Convention—first on the Twelfth Germinal (April 1) and later on the First Prairial (May 25)—but both were unsuccessful. The terrible Prairial Executions which followed the forced disarming of the workers in the Saint-Antoine Quarter, ended the immediate danger threatening the Thermidorians from the workers. However, at this moment a new revolt developed, coming this time from the “old” royalist section of the bourgeoisie and the nobility. The royalists now assumed that their hour had struck, but, as events were to prove, their reckoning was an erroneous one. They apparently assumed that the defeat of the plebeian masses afforded an excellent opportunity for the triumphant entry of the pretender to the French throne—the Count of Provence, brother of the executed Louis XVI. But the ruling middle class was not to be caught napping. Even while it had been rendering the workers helpless, it had been preparing for the anticipated royalist thrust, and now was ready for its enemies. It was not that the propertied classes actually valued the republican form of government, but that they valued the benefits the Revolution had brought them. The royalists would not or could not understand the significance of the events that had transpired in the years between 1789 and 1795—that feudalism had been shattered and would never again return, that capitalism had come to stay, that the Revolution had created an impassable abyss between the old and the new eras in French history, and that any idea of restoration was alien to the majority of the urban and agrarian middle class.

In London, Coblentz, Mitau, Hamburg, Rome—indeed, in all cities overrun with influential émigrés—there was no cessation of voices demanding the ruthless punishment of all who had taken part in the Revolution. After the Prairial Revolt and the annihilation of the royalist rebels, there was unrestrained rejoicing in
the thought of the "Parisian bandits" slaying each other. The royalists were urged to take prompt advantage of the opportune moment and slay both of their arch enemies—the Thermidorians and the Montagnards. The fate of the royalist party, however, was sealed. Their absurd attempt to turn back the clock of history resulted in complete dissolution; even their most deliberated enterprises were doomed to unequivocal failure. The leaders who had crushed Robespierre and the formidable revolt of the workers—all these Talliens, Frérons, Bourdons, Boissy d'Anglas, Barrases—might quite justifiably have been accused of thievery, of animal egoism, of savage cruelty, of a capacity for almost any infamy, but they could scarcely have been called cowards. And when the precipitate royalists, with the active coöperation of William Pitt, landed an émigré detachment on the peninsula of Quiberon in Brittany, the leaders of the Thermidor Convention promptly despatched an army under General Hoche to crush them. After inflicting a stunning defeat on the landing party, Hoche ordered 750 prisoners shot, principally priests, officers and members of the aristocracy.

Nevertheless, the royalists were unable to grasp and interpret this lesson. They seemed incapable of understanding that Tallien and his friends, who had proved themselves sufficiently strong to guillotine Parisian workmen day after day throughout June, were in a better position in July to shoot down as many nobles and priests as they liked.

Even after their crushing defeat, the royalists refused to consider their cause lost. Scarcely two months passed before they renewed their attack, this time in Paris itself. Their ill-considered assault came at the end of September and during the first days of October, or by the Revolutionary Calendar during the first half of Vendémiaire, 1795.

The Convention had just finished framing the new Constitution, which provided for an executive directorate of five and a legislature consisting of two assemblies—the Council of Five Hundred and the Council of Elders. But at the very moment when the Convention was preparing to put its Constitution into operation and to dissolve, it observed a steadily growing reactionary tendency in the upper strata of the bourgeoisie. Fearing
that the royalists, acting somewhat more shrewdly and discreetly than before, might take advantage of this tendency and succeed in penetrating the proposed elective Council of Five Hundred, the directing Thermidorian group, with Barras at its head, enacted a law stipulating that two thirds of the Council of Five Hundred and two thirds of the Council of Elders be chosen from among the members of the retiring Convention.

This time, however, the royalists were not the only ones to challenge the authorities. Indeed, they took quite a secondary rôle in both the preparation and the actual execution of the new revolt. It was the new threat—the threat of the moneyed and middle bourgeoisie—that made the position of the Convention a singularly precarious one in Vendémiaire, 1795. As was to have been expected, the central sections rebelled against the decree because of its manifest purpose of consolidating the rule of the Thermidorian majority of the Convention for an indefinite period. The upper stratum of the propertied class, the so-called "rich," desired to dissociate itself completely from that portion of the Thermidor body which no longer reflected the violent swing to the Right of the more prosperous classes in the cities and in the agrarian districts. In the Parisian central sections which revolted against the Convention in October, 1795, there were, to be sure, relatively few authentic royalists who anticipated the immediate restoration of the Bourbons, but even the less precipitate could see the direction affairs were taking and jubilantly recognised the ultimate advantages to their cause. The "conservative republicans" of the Paris middle class, to whom even the Thermidor Convention appeared too revolutionary, were clearing the road for restoration. Promptly, beginning with the Seventh Vendémiaire (September 29) when the first perturbing reports came in, the Convention saw the tremendous danger which menaced it. It suddenly began to wonder on whom it might depend for support against this sudden counter-revolutionary insurrection.

Only four months had elapsed since the savage Prairial executions in the workers' quarters; obviously the Convention could not depend on active assistance from the plebeian masses. As a matter of fact, the workers of Paris regarded the committees of
The Youth of Napoleon Bonaparte

the Convention and the Convention itself as their fiercest enemies. To expect the workers to help in preserving the authority of the proposed Council of Five Hundred—representing two thirds of the present Convention—was out of the question.

There remained only the army, but even here everything was not as it should have been. It is quite true that the soldiers would have no qualms about shooting down the hated renegades and émigrés; but, in the first place, the Vendémiaire movement did not avowedly and explicitly aim at the restoration of the Bourbons. Rather, it represented the struggle against the Convention's decree violating the principle of popular sovereignty. In the second place, since the soldiers were loyal republicans, they might easily succumb to the cunning platform of the Vendémiaire revolt, in which case the Convention's position with regard to the generals would be infinitely worse. During the Prairial uprising the Thermidorian Convention had successfully called upon General Menou, now chief of the Paris garrison, to suppress the disturbances in the Saint-Antoine Quarter and to send the mutinous workers to the guillotine. Menou, his ruthless mission accomplished, had on that occasion paraded his troops in the central quarters of the city, where he received the homage of the propertied classes, who rejoiced with him in the defeat of their common enemies, the hostile non-propertied masses. These upper bourgeois, these well-dressed affluent middle-class citizens who had never hindered him, were, so to speak, flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone. It would be inconceivable for him now, in Vendémiaire, to shoot them down precisely as he had done the workers. After all, the real distinction between the Thermidor Convention and Menou lay in the fact that the general was even more reactionary than the most reactionary of the Thermidorians. It was this very reaction that the revolting central sections represented. Consequently, it would be asking the impossible to expect Menou to oppose these people when their cause and his were one and the same. Being a practical body of men, the Convention realised that little could be expected of Menou and his Paris garrison.

And now, on the night of Twelfth Vendémiaire (October 4), the leaders of the Thermidor heard the exultant cries of their
Bonaparte

enemies proclaiming that the Convention had admitted itself vanquished and had repealed the decree. There is evidence to show that Deslalos, the leader of the armed bourgeois forces of the Lepelletier central section, visited General Menou, and after a discussion got him to agree to a truce with the reactionaries. The troops were marched off to the barracks: the city was in the power of the rebels.

But the rejoicing proved premature. The Convention had decided to fight. That same night, the Thirteenth Vendémiaire, General Menou was dismissed and immediately arrested. In his place the Convention promptly appointed Barras, one of the leading participants in the Ninth Thermidor. Immediate action was imperative. The militant central sections, having learned of the dismissal and arrest of Menou, realised that the Convention had decided to fight, and began to gather in the streets adjacent to the Convention headquarters in preparation for next morning's battle. Their victory seemed certain to them and to their leader, Riche-de-Serizi, and even to many members of the Convention itself; but they counted without their host.

Barras's contemporaries considered him a collection of the basest passions and the most varied vices. He was a sybarite, an embezzler, a seeker of dissolute adventure, an unprincipled crafty opportunist, and he excelled all the rest of the Thermidori-ans in venality—and this last was no mean distinction. But a coward he certainly was not. A very shrewd and penetrating man, he clearly foresaw from the very beginning that the Vendémiaire movement would bring France closer to the restoration of the Bourbons, an eventuality which constituted a downright menace to himself. He, like other nobles who had joined in the Revolution, was well aware that he had little to expect from a triumphant nobility, which always punished with exceptional fury all those guilty of defection from their class.

Thus, there was no alternative but to give battle within several hours. However, Barras was not a military man. It was most important to appoint a general at once, and at this juncture Barras quite accidentally recalled the lean young man in the worn grey greatcoat who several times had appeared before him in the rôle
of petitioner. All Barras knew about him was that he was a retired general who, having distinguished himself before Toulon, had later suffered some unpleasantness, as a result of which he was now struggling along to eke out a bare living in Paris. Barras ordered that he be found and brought to him. Bonaparte was located and was promptly asked if he would undertake to put down the rebellion. After some reflection he agreed, stipulating a single condition: no one must meddle in his arrangements. “I’ll return the sword to its sheath only when everything’s finished,” he said. He was immediately appointed Barras’s aide. Familiarizing himself with the situation, he discovered that the rebels were singularly strong and that the Convention was indeed in great danger. But he had a well-defined plan of action, based on the ruthless utilisation of artillery. Later when everything was over he said something to his friend Junot (subsequently a marshal and Duke d’Abrantès) which showed that he attributed his triumph to the strategic incapacity of the insurgents: “If these young stalwarts only had appointed me their leader, how you would have seen the members of the Convention fly in the air!” At dawn Bonaparte stood beside the Palace of the Convention with his cannon.

The insurgents moved against the Convention and were met with the fire of Bonaparte’s artillery. Especially terrible was the slaughter on the porch of Saint-Roch Church, which sheltered the rebel reserves. The insurgents also might have acquired artillery during the night, but they missed their opportunity. They answered with rifle fire. By midday it was all over. The rebels, leaving several hundred dead and carrying away their wounded, scattered in all directions. In the evening Barras fervently thanked the young general and insisted that he be named commander of the military forces of the rear. Barras himself dropped this title as soon as the revolt had been crushed.

What impressed Barras and other active leaders of the Convention in this gloomy, sullen young man was the complete calm and the rapid decision with which he had undertaken to utilise cannon in the very heart of the city, and the ruthless precision with which he had fired them into the dense human mass. It was something that had never been done before. In this rôle Napole-
on was the direct predecessor of the Russian Tsar, Nicholas I, who was to repeat this procedure on December 14, 1825. At the time of the assault the insurgents numbered over 24,000 armed persons, while Napoleon had scarcely 6,000. His sole hope lay in the cannon, and he let them do their work. "If it comes to a battle, let it be a victory, come what may; he who thinks of anything but this single aim is lost." Napoleon always followed this rule. He did not like to waste artillery projectiles, but where they might prove of advantage he was never miserly with them. Nor was he economical in this respect on the Thirteenth Vendémiaire. After it was over the porch of Saint-Roch Church was covered with a thick bloody gruel.

The significance of the defeat of the counter-revolution aiming at restoration was tremendous. For one thing, the hopes of the royalists received a setback even more crushing than at Quiberon. Then, too, the upper strata of the city bourgeoisie became convinced that they had been premature in attempting to take over governmental authority by force of arms. They now saw that they had ignored those elements in the urban and agrarian bourgeoisie which sided with the Republic because of their fear of any rapid strengthening of reaction. Who was Riche-de-Serizi, the leader of the recent uprising? A royalist. It is obvious what attitude the peasant-proprietors would have taken. To them the restoration of the Bourbons meant a revival of the feudal régime and the deprivation of the land they had but lately purchased from the confiscated estates of the aristocratic émigrés. In the eyes of the peasantry, and in the eyes of all those opposed to the royalists, the cannon of Bonaparte had saved France from the restoration of the Bourbons. It is of but slight importance that to reach this conclusion all events were simplified in the extreme; it is essential that it was in this particular episode that the "Napoleonic legend" had its origin among the peasantry. Finally, the Thirteenth Vendémiaire once more demonstrated that the anti-restoration tendencies of the village had a potent influence on the army masses, who could be fully relied upon in any struggle involving the Bourbons.
The Youth of Napoleon Bonaparte

Such was the historical significance of the Thirteenth Vendémiaire. It was on this day that Bonaparte’s name first became known outside of those military circles where he had already earned some measure of reputation from the Toulon exploit. Henceforth, he was called “General Vendémiaire,” a sobriquet which was not discarded till the following year, when the Italian victories brought him fresh glory. He was beginning to be regarded as a man of great ability, resourcefulness, and firm resolution. Barras and the politicians who headed the Directory, which came into being in that same Vendémiaire, 1795, looked with favour on the young general. They assumed at the time that hereafter they could depend upon him whenever force was needed to crush an uprising of the people.

But Bonaparte dreamed of something more. He felt himself being drawn toward the theatre of military operations, and already hoped to gain the independent command of one of the armies of the French Republic. Director Barras’s confidence in him seemed to make these dreams not so unattainable as they had been before Vendémiaire, when as a retired 26-year-old general he had wandered about Paris, seeking a livelihood. Suddenly, in a single day, everything had changed. He had become the commander of the Paris garrison, the favourite of the mighty Barras, and a candidate for an independent post in the active army.

Soon after his elevation, the young general met the widow of the Vicomte de Beauharnais, and immediately fell in love with her. Josephine de Beauharnais, whose royalist husband died on the guillotine during the Terror, was 32 at the time. She had experienced no few romantic adventures during her life, and she nourished no particularly ardent feelings toward her new lover. On her side, material considerations weighed heavily in Bonaparte’s favour. After the Thirteenth Vendémiaire he was a coming man, and he already held an important post. But Napoleon had been seized with a sudden, enveloping passion. He begged her to marry him immediately, and she yielded to his wish. Josephine had at one time been most intimate with Barras, and this marriage opened the doors of the mightiest personages of the Republic to Napoleon.

Among the nearly 200,000 books dedicated to Napoleon and
catalogued by the famous bibliographer Kircheisen and other specialists, there is a quantity of literature defining Napoleon's attitude toward Josephine and to women in general. It proves conclusively that neither Josephine, nor his second wife Marie Louise of Austria, nor Madame de Rémuat, nor the actress Mademoiselle George, nor the Countess Walewska, nor any woman with whom he was at any time intimate, had the slightest visible influence on him. As a matter of fact, none of them sought to exert any; they were too well aware of his indomitable, despotic and suspicious nature. He could not endure the famous Madame de Staël even before she angered him by her intellectual inclination to oppose him on political grounds; he loathed her precisely for this interest in politics, which he regarded as excessive for a woman, and he loathed her no less for her pretensions to erudition and profundity. Absolute submission to his will was the indispensable quality without which women did not exist for him. In any event, his full life did not permit him time to think of emotions or to yield for long to passions.

Thus it came about that on March 11, 1796, only two days after his marriage to Josephine, he bade her farewell and departed for the Italian battle front.

In the history of Europe a new chapter had begun—a long and sanguinary chapter.
THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN
1796-1797

From the very moment that he had come into the favour of Barras and his fellow statesmen following the Vendémiaire Revolt, Bonaparte began to convince them of the necessity of conducting an offensive war against Austria and her Italian allies, as a means of forestalling the activities of the recently organized anti-French coalition of powers. As the first step he proposed the invasion of northern Italy.

Actually, the coalition was not a new one. It was the very same confederation which had been formed in 1792, and from which Prussia resigned in 1795 when she concluded the separate Peace of Basle with France. There remained in the coalition Austria, England, Russia, the Kingdom of Sardinia, the two Sicilies and the several German kingdoms, notably Württemberg, Bavaria and Baden. The Directory, as well as the European nations hostile to it, assumed that the chief theatre of war in the approaching spring and summer of 1796 would be western and southwestern Germany, through which the French would attempt to force their way into Austria’s richest possession. For this campaign, the Directory was outfitting its strongest army and its most brilliant strategists, headed by General Moreau. No means were being spared to ensure its having the best possible equipment and transports. The French Government confidently counted on its success.

Barras and his associates were not too greatly impressed with General Bonaparte’s arguments in favour of organising an army to make a thrust from southern France into northern Italy. But they realised that such a stroke might prove useful as a means of
compelling Austria to distribute her strength, thereby diverting her attention from the main German theatre of war. It was decided, finally, to set on the march the several tens of thousands of soldiers quartered in the South, as a decoy to alarm Vienna and her ally the King of Sardinia. When the question arose as to whom to appoint to this quite secondary sector of the active front, Carnot—and not Barras, as has been long maintained—chose Bonaparte. The other Directors readily assented, as none of the more important generals coveted the post. Bonaparte became Commander-in-Chief of the so-called “Italian Army” on February 23, 1796, and on March 11 he was already on his way to take charge.

A particular glamour has always enveloped this first war conducted by Napoleon, because it was in this campaign that his name was carried through Europe for the first time. “He’s striding far,” said old Suvorov after Napoleon’s first victories in Italy. “It’s about time to quiet down the fine fellow!” Suvorov was one of the first to warn Europe of this rising storm-cloud which was to wreak such terrible havoc in the years to come.

When Bonaparte reached his army and made an inspection, he must have realised at once why the more prominent generals of the French Republic had not been so eager to obtain the post. The army was in a pitiful condition, resembling a gathering of tatterdemalions more than the military host of a great nation. The debauch of embezzling and plundering of every kind that had been running riot during the final years of the Thermidor Convention and during the early days of the Directory, had reached its highest point in the first months of 1796. To begin with, the Italian Army did not fare well at the hands of Paris; but, on the other hand, the little grants Paris did make were quickly and unceremoniously disposed of by the grafters. Forty-three thousand men lived in and near Nice, existing on no one knew what, dressing no one knew how. Scarcely had Bonaparte arrived, when he learned that one of the battalions had refused to obey a command to move to another region the evening before, because none of its members had boots. The disorganisation of this army, forgotten and abandoned in its material existence, had reacted on its dis-
cipline. The soldiers themselves had no need to suspect what was going on: they witnessed it with their own eyes. And, as was to be expected, they showed their resentment by refusing to obey the orders of their officers.

Bonaparte was faced with a perplexing problem. He had to see that his soldiers were dressed and shod and disciplined while they were on the march—in the intervals between battles, in the temporary halts along the way. Under no circumstance would he postpone the campaign. And, to make matters worse, his position was complicated by friction with the commanders of the separate parts of his army—men like Augereau, Berthier, Masséna and Séruerier, who, while they would have submitted readily to an older or more experienced man, felt it humiliating to acknowledge the 27-year-old Bonaparte as their commander-in-chief. There were numerous collisions at the beginning, while the hundred- tongued rumours made the most of the slightest incidents—repeating, transforming, exaggerating, creating legendary patterns. For example, someone started the story and many repeated it that during an altercation the little Bonaparte, glancing upward at the tall Augereau, had said: "General, you are taller than I by exactly a head, but if you persist in being insolent to me, I'll promptly do away with that distinction." Actually, from the very beginning, Bonaparte gave everyone in his army to understand that he would not permit any will to oppose his, and that he would break all opposition, regardless of the offender's rank or class. "It is often necessary to shoot," he reported in passing to the Directory in Paris.

Without further ado Bonaparte began a stern struggle against thievery. This the soldiers in the ranks were prompt to notice, and it helped even more than shootings in establishing discipline. But the commander was in such a position that if he waited for equipment for his army he would have to forgo the planned campaign of 1796. He made a resolve, which he handsomely expressed to his troops in his first proclamation. There have been many disputes as to the precise date when this proclamation was put into the final form in which it has passed into history. At the present time the foremost research students of Napoleon's life
have proved beyond question of doubt that only the first phrases appeared in the original and that all the rest of the eloquence was added later. Therefore, it is possible to vouch for the basic meaning of the first phrases but not for the precise wording: "Soldiers, you are not clothed, you are hungry... I wish to lead you into the most fertile lands in the world..."

From the very start Bonaparte counted on the war itself to feed his soldiers. He held it absolutely essential to interest every soldier, personally and at first hand, in the coming invasion of Italy. He had no intention of postponing the campaign until the army was well taken care of; he wanted to demonstrate to the men that it lay within their power to take everything they needed from the enemy by force. He took the same stand with his army as had been taken by those leaders of the past—the condottieri. The cynicism was not in the unpunished acts of pillage themselves, but in the complete frankness with which Bonaparte invited his men to live off the "fertile lands" of Italy. He was always able to exercise, intensify and sustain his charm and power over the soldier's soul. The sentimental tales of his "love" for his men—whom in a burst of frankness he called "cannon fodder"—explain nothing. There was no love in him for the soldier, but there was always solicitude, as he proved again and again. Napoleon was capable of giving it precisely that nuance, which led the soldier to believe that he took a real interest in his personality. Actually, he was merely carrying out his intention of having in his hands competent material in good working condition.

At the beginning of his first campaign in April of 1796, Bonaparte impressed his army merely as a competent artillerist, who had done well some two years before at Toulon, and who had later earned the gratitude of the Convention by shooting down a mob of rioters during the Vendémiaire revolt, as a direct result of which he had been rewarded with the command of the Southern Army. That was all. The time had not yet come when his personal charm and magnetism were to give him unconditional power over his men. He had decided to appeal directly, realistically and soberly to the half-starved, half-dressed soldiers, by pointing out to them the material blessings that awaited them in Italy.
Early in April, 1796, Bonaparte moved his troops across the Alps.

The brilliant Swiss strategist and tactician, General Jomini, who served with Napoleon in Italy, remarks in his history of the Napoleonic campaign that literally from the first days of his first command Napoleon displayed the most audacious courage and the most utter contempt for personal danger. With his staff, the commander-in-chief traveled by the shorter but more precarious road—the celebrated Corniche, an Alpine ridge along the sea—despite the fact that during their passage they were almost constantly exposed to the cannon of the English cruisers lying near the shore. Here, for the first time, another Napoleonic trait was revealed. On the one hand, he never flaunted that foolhardy courage, that desperate audacity and fearlessness, which characterised his contemporaries—Marshals Lannes, Murat, Ney and General Miloradovich; he always maintained that where it was not absolutely essential the commander-in-chief of an army should not subject himself to personal danger, for the reason that his loss in itself might cause confusion, panic and defeat. But, on the other hand, he believed that if the circumstances warranted it and personal example was definitely necessary, the commander-in-chief should, without hesitation, make his appearance under the enemy’s fire.

The passage along the Corniche (April 5-9) was managed successfully. Bonaparte found himself in Italy and promptly made a decision. There were before him the active Austrian and Piedmontese troops, scattered in three sections along the roads to Piedmont and Genoa. The first battle, fought with the Austrian commander Darjanto, occurred in the centre of Montenotti. Collecting his forces in a single huge “fist,” he led astray the Austrian commander-in-chief Beaulieu—situated farther south, on the road to Genoa—and impetuously flung himself on the Austrian centre. Within several hours the defeat of the Austrians was complete. But this was only a part of the Austrian army. Giving his soldiers but a brief rest, he moved on again. The next battle, at Millesimo, took place two days after the first, and this time the Piedmontese troops suffered a crushing defeat. A mass of slain
on the field of battle, the surrender of five battalions with 13 cannon, the flight of the rest of the army—such were the day's results for the coalition. Promptly Bonaparte resumed his advance, giving the enemy no time to recover.

Military historians refer to Bonaparte's first battles—"six victories in six days"—as a single uninterrupted action. The basic principle of Napoleon's method of warfare was fully demonstrated during these days—the quick assembling of large forces into a single "fist," and the solution of one strategic problem after another, without overcomplicated manoeuvres, all designed to break up the solidarity and unity of the enemy's forces.

Yet another characteristic revealed itself—the ability to merge politics with strategy into a single inseparable whole. As he passed from victory to victory during April of 1796, Bonaparte never permitted the main objective to escape his view: that it was necessary to force Piedmont (the Kingdom of Sardinia) to make a separate peace at the earliest possible date, so that he would be in a position to face the Austrians alone. After a fresh French victory over the Piedmontese before Mondovi and the surrender of this town, the Piedmontese General Colli began negotiations for peace. On April 28 the peace with Piedmont was signed. The stipulations of the treaty were extremely severe for the defeated. King Victor Amadeus yielded to Bonaparte his two most important fortresses and a series of other points. The definitive peace with Piedmont was signed in Paris on May 15 of that same year. Piedmont agreed not to permit the passage of any troops through her entire territory except those of the French, nor henceforth to enter into alliance with other powers; she ceded to France the Principality of Nice and all of Savoy; she agreed that the frontiers between France and Piedmont were to be "rectified," to the decided advantage of the French; and finally she obligated herself to supply the French army with all necessary provisions.

Thus, the first part of the programme was accomplished. There remained the Austrians. After fresh victories, Bonaparte flung them back to the River Po, then forced them to retire from the Po to the east, and, crossing to the opposite bank, continued the pursuit. Panic seized all the Italian courts. The Duke of Parma, who had not taken up arms against the French, was one of the
first to suffer. Bonaparte refused to accept his assurances of neutrality, and inflicted on him an indemnity of 2,000,000 francs in gold and 1,700 horses. Moving on farther, he reached the little town of Lodi, where it was necessary for him to cross the River Adda. This critical point was guarded by an Austrian detachment of 10,000.

On May 10 the celebrated Battle of Lodi occurred. Here again, as during the march on the Corniche, Bonaparte found it essential to risk his life. Seeing that a terrific struggle was taking place at the bridge, he put himself at the head of a battalion of grenadiers and flung himself headlong into the rain of grapeshot directed at the French. Twenty Austrian cannon swept the bridge; but Bonaparte’s grenadiers, inspired by their commander’s daring, drove back the Austrians, who left behind them some 2,000 dead and wounded and 15 cannon. Having captured the bridge, Bonaparte followed in hot pursuit of the retreating enemy, and on May 15 entered Milan. On this occasion, he wrote to the Directory at Paris: “Lombardy now belongs to the (French) Republic.”

In June a French detachment under Murat occupied Leghorn, and another under Augereau was in possession of Bologna. By mid-June Bonaparte himself was in Modena. This much accomplished, the next objective was Tuscany—although the Duke of Tuscany had remained neutral throughout the war. This fact did not deter Bonaparte, who paid not the slightest heed to the neutrality of these Italian states. He entered the towns and villages, requisitioning whatever the army needed, often seizing miscellaneous items as well—cannon, gun-powder, rifles, and even the pictures of the old Renaissance masters. All this in addition to the direct pillaging on the part of the men in the ranks.

Bonaparte winked at these pillaging diversions of his soldiers. Matters finally reached such a point that the inhabitants were aroused to fury and mutiny. In Pavia and in Lugo there were attacks on the French troops by the local populations. At Lugo, not far from Ferrara, an enraged mob killed five French dragoons. In retribution several hundred persons were slaughtered and the town was subjected to the will and pillaging inclinations of the soldiers, who clubbed all the inhabitants suspected of having hos-
tile intentions and those who simply happened to have arms. And
who in those days was without weapons? Other places were su-
bjected to similar measures. Having sufficiently strengthened his
artillery with the cannon and munitions taken from the defeated
Austrians, as well as from neutral Italian states, Bonaparte con-
tinued his advance. He moved toward the town of Mantua, con-
sidered one of the strongest fortresses in Europe.

He had scarcely begun his siege of Mantua when he learned
that an Austrian army of 30,000 was hurrying from the Tyrol to
the assistance of the besieged city. The hostile force was under
the command of the very able and gifted General Wurmser. This
news greatly cheered the many enemies of the French invasion.
During the spring and summer of that year the Catholic clergy
and the North Italian semi-feudal nobility, who loathed the very
principles of the middle-class revolution—which the French army
had brought into Italy—were reinforced by thousands and thou-
sands of peasants and townspeople who had suffered cruelly from
the pillaging of the invaders. Piedmont, crushed and forced to
make peace, might now consider attacking Bonaparte's rear and
cutting off his communications with France.

Bonaparte assigned 16,000 men to the siege of Mantua, leav-
ing 29,000 in reserve. He was awaiting reinforcements from
France. He sent Masséna, one of his best generals, to meet
Wurmser—but Wurmser flung him back. Next he despatched
Augereau, another of his most capable aides, but Wurmser re-
pulsed him also. Bonaparte's position became desperate. It was
then that he executed the manœuvre which, in the judgment of
military experts, in itself might have earned him "immortal fame"
—the expression is Jomini's—even if he had been killed at the
very outset of his career.

Wurmser had begun to celebrate his approaching victory over
the terrible enemy. He already had entered Mantua, whose siege
he thereby raised, when suddenly he learned that Bonaparte, with
all his forces, had flung himself on another column of Austrians
who were attempting to sever the French communications with
Milan. He was further startled when he heard that the French
had engaged the Austrians in three battles—Lonato, Salo and
Brescia—and had crushed them. Wurmser immediately left
Mantua with his entire army. Breaking down the barrier placed against him by the French under the command of Valette, and winning a series of skirmishes against other French detachments, he at last met Bonaparte himself at Castiglione. Here in a brilliant manœuvre, a portion of the French troops emerged in the rear of the Austrians, and Wurmser was thoroughly beaten.

After another series of battles Wurmser, with the remnants of his shattered army, circled round the upper stream of the Adige and retired to the shelter of Mantua. Bonaparte renewed the siege. Meanwhile, a new army was quickly organised in Austria to rescue not only Mantua, which Wurmser had failed to save, but also Wurmser himself. This time Vienna sent General Alvintzy who—like Wurmser, the Archduke Karl and Melas—was one of the picked commanders of the Austrian Empire. Bonaparte went to meet Alvintzy, taking 28,500 men and leaving 8,300 for the continuance of the siege of Mantua. His few reserves were negligible; they numbered scarcely 4,000. "The general who worries overmuch about reserves before a battle is sure to be beaten," Napoleon often said—although, to be sure, he was not unappreciative of the significance of reserves. Alvintzy’s army was considerably larger. The Austrian general beat back several French detachments in a series of skirmishes. Bonaparte ordered the evacuation of Vicenza and several other points. He concentrated all his forces about him, preliminary to a decisive blow.

A stubborn and sanguinary battle began at Arcole on November 15 and ended on the evening of the 17th. Alvintzy at last collided with Bonaparte. The Austrians outnumbered the French and they fought with extraordinary courage; they were indeed the crack regiments of the Hapsburg monarchy. A particularly fierce fight was waged for the celebrated Arcole bridge. Three times the French took the bridge by storm, and three times the Austrians repulsed them with heavy losses. Precisely as he had done at the taking of the Bridge of Lodi, Bonaparte, a standard in his hands, flung himself upon the enemy at the head of his troops. Several soldiers and adjutants fell near him. The battle lasted three days, with brief intervals for rest. Alvintzy, badly defeated, was forced to retreat.
Two months later the Austrians had sufficiently recovered to attempt to gain revenge. In the two-day Battle of Rivoli, on January 14 and 15, the French put to rout the entire Austrian army, which on this occasion borrowed Napoleon's stratagem of striking in a single "fist." Saving himself and the remnants of his broken army, Alvintzy no longer dared to think of delivering Mantua or Wurmser's army sheltered within its locked gates. Two and a half weeks after the Battle of Rivoli, Mantua capitulated. Bonaparte behaved generously with the beaten Wurmser.

Following his capture of Mantua, Bonaparte moved northward, now frankly threatening the inherited Hapsburg possessions. At the beginning of the Spring of 1797 Archduke Karl was called to the Italian arena of military operations. He was defeated by Bonaparte in a series of battles and flung back to the Brenner, where he retired with heavy losses. Vienna was seized with a panic emanating from the Imperial Court itself. It became known in the Austrian capital that the crown jewels were being packed to be sent away for safe-keeping. The city was menaced by a French invasion. Hannibal at the gates! Bonaparte in the Tyrol! Tomorrow he would be in Vienna! Rumours, conversations, exclamations of terror long remained in the memory of the people of the ancient and wealthy capital of the Hapsburg monarchy. The destruction of several of the best Austrian armies, the terrible defeats of the most capable and gifted generals, the loss of all of northern Italy, the direct threat to Vienna itself—such were the final results of the campaign which had begun a year before, when Bonaparte for the first time assumed command of the French army.

After fresh defeats and the retirement of Archduke Karl's army, the Austrian court began to realise the danger of continuing the struggle. At the beginning of April, 1797, Bonaparte received official word that Emperor Francis of Austria was ready to open peace negotiations. Bonaparte, it should be remarked, had created a situation in which everything depended on his own will; he was in a position to end the war with the Austrians whenever he felt it was to his advantage to do so; so, even while he pressed hot on the heels of the retreating Archduke Karl, he notified him of his own readiness to discuss peace. There is a well-
known letter in which Bonaparte, letting down his defeated enemy gently, wrote that if he should succeed in concluding a peace, he would be prouder of that "than of the sad fame which might be attained by military successes." "Have we not slain enough people and brought enough evil to poor humanity?" he wrote Karl.

The Directory agreed to make peace, but could not come to a decision as to whom to send to the negotiations to represent the French Government. While the Directory debated in Paris, Napoleon himself concluded the Leoben truce.

But even before the Leoben negotiations Bonaparte had finished with Rome. Pope Pius VI, the irreconcilable foe of the French Revolution, regarded "General Vendémiaire"—who had been appointed commander-in-chief as a reward for his destruction of devout royalists—as a fiend, and did everything in his power to aid Austria in her difficult struggle. Bonaparte, busy on other fronts, bided his time. But when Wurmser yielded Mantua, with its garrison of 13,000 and several hundred cannon, Bonaparte, his troops now liberated from siege duty, promptly organised an expedition against the Pope.

In the very first battle the Pope's troops were badly shattered. They fled from the French with such speed that Junot, whom Bonaparte sent in pursuit, had difficulty in catching up with them; it took him two hours. When he finally drew up with them, he slaughtered many and captured the rest. After this, town after town surrendered to Bonaparte without offering resistance. He seized all the valuables he could lay his hands on—money, diamonds, paintings and precious church plate. The towns, the monasteries and the treasure chests of old churches yielded the conqueror immense booty. Panic seized upon the people of Rome; there was a general flight of the well-to-do and of the higher clericals to Naples.

Terrified, Pope Pius wrote an imploring letter to Bonaparte, which he despatched with his nephew, Cardinal Mattei, accompanied by a delegation. The Pope pleaded for peace. Bonaparte assumed a condescending attitude, making it plain to the petitioners that he would entertain nothing short of complete capitulation. On February 19, 1797, a peace with the Pope was signed at
Bonaparte

Tolentino. The Pope agreed to yield the most important and the most valuable portion of his possessions, to pay 30,000,000 francs in gold, and to surrender the finest pictures and statues in his museums. These works of art—as well as those previously seized in Milan, Bologna, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and later in Venice—were sent by Bonaparte to Paris. Thoroughly frightened, Pope Pius promptly agreed to all the conditions imposed.

Why did not Napoleon do now what he was to do several years later? Why did he not occupy Rome, arrest the Pope, and take him back to France? The explanation is logical enough. In the first place, he anticipated that his negotiations with Austria might be compromised by any harsh action which would tend to arouse the hostility of the Catholic populations of central and southern Italy, and thereby create a menace in the rear. In the second place, we know that at the time of this brilliant first Italian campaign—with its series of uninterrupted victories over the large and mighty armies of the powerful Austrian Empire—he experienced one sleepless night, the whole of which he spent in pacing up and down his tent while he wondered, for the first time, if he must always, in the future as in the past, defeat and conquer new lands for the Directory—"for these lawyers" ("pour ces avocats").

Many years were to pass and much blood was to flow before Napoleon would tell us about his lonely nocturnal reflections. But even then, in 1797, his answer to his own question was wholly in the negative. The 28-year-old conqueror of Italy already saw in Pius VI not the frightened, trembling, feeble old man with whom he might do as he pleased, but the spiritual sovereign of millions of people, even in France itself. He realised that in order to establish his own power over these millions, he must for the time being, and perhaps for some time to come, reckon with their superstitions. He literally regarded the Church as a sort of spiritual police. As such, it was a weapon which might prove useful in clubbing the great masses into line. In his opinion, the Catholic Church was particularly valuable in this respect—though, unfortunately, it had always had pretensions to political independence, due in a large measure to its harmonious organisation and to its absolute submission to the Pope.
In so far as he was concerned with the Pontificate itself, Napoleon merely felt that here was a form of purest charlatanism—historically evolved and strengthened by nearly 2,000 years' experience, and originally devised by Roman bishops who made adroit use of the propitious local and historical conditions of mediaeval life. Nevertheless, he understood that even charlatanism might possess real political power.

The time would finally come when Napoleon would treat the Pope with impatience, scorn, derision and anger; when the Pope would find himself in prison, and when Rome itself would be ruled by a general of the Hussars in the French army. But what the Emperor Napoleon was able to permit himself at a later date he was not in a position to do in 1797 when he was still General Bonaparte. Meanwhile, the Pope, submitting to the loss of his best lands, nursed his safe skin in the Vatican. Napoleon made no effort to enter Rome. Having finished his business with the Pope, he again turned his face to northern Italy to conclude the peace with Austria.

In the Leoben peace, as well as in the subsequent Peace of Campo Formio—and generally speaking in all of his diplomatic negotiations—Bonaparte followed his own independent inclinations and ideas, stipulating whatever terms he himself thought most advantageous, without bothering to consult his authorised superiors. How was this possible? Why did the Directory in Paris refrain from interfering? Here, above all, operated the ancient rule: "Conquerors are not to be judged." The other generals of the Republic—even the best of them, such as Moreau—had been soundly thrashed by the Austrians along the Rhine during the same period. Moreover, the French Army of the Rhine, although fully equipped at the beginning, had continued to demand more and more money for its sustenance. Bonaparte, on the other hand, had started out with a horde of undisciplined tramps, and had not only transformed it into a splendid and devoted army without demanding material assistance, but had actually sent Paris millions in gold coin and countless works of art, all the while conquering Italy, destroying one Austrian army after another and
forcing Austria to beg for peace. The Battle of Rivoli, the capture of Mantua and the conquest of the Papal possessions—his latest achievements—had finally made his authority absolute.

Leoben is a town in the Austrian province of Styria—within striking distance of the suburbs of Vienna. But in order finally and formally to consolidate all his Italian gains—all he had already conquered and all that he still wished to subject to his authority in the south—and withal to force the Austrians to make serious concessions on the remote West German front, where the French under their other generals had come off badly, Bonaparte realised that he would have to make some concession to Austria. He knew that although his advance guard was already in Leoben, an Austria driven to extreme measures would fiercely defend herself. Therefore, it was best to conclude a peace as speedily as possible. But where would he find the necessary compensation for Austria? There was only one answer: Venice. To be sure, the Venetian Republic had maintained a strict neutrality and had done everything within its power to avoid giving any pretext for an invasion. Bonaparte, however, never scrupled in such matters. Seizing on the first flimsy excuse, he sent a division to Venice.

Actually, Bonaparte had decided to divide Venice. The city on the lagoons was ceded to Austria, but the mainland possessions were assigned to that “Cisalpine Republic” which the conqueror had decided to create from the main mass of the Italian lands occupied by him. Of course, this new “republic” was in actuality a possession of France. There remained the petty formality of explaining to the Venetian doge and senators that their state, which had been independent from the time of its foundation in the middle of the fifth century, had ceased to exist. “I am unable to receive you. French blood is on your hands,” he wrote to the doge of Venice who implored him to relent—he had in mind an episode at Lido Beach, where someone had killed a French captain. But no pretext was actually necessary; so much was clear. Bonaparte ordered General Baraguay-d’Hilliers to occupy Venice. By June, 1797, it was accomplished. After thirteen centuries rich with events in its independent historical life, the mercantile republic abruptly ceased to exist. Napoleon notified his government, the
Directory, of his plans concerning Venice, only after he had begun to put them into effect.

Thus, Bonaparte now possessed that opulent object for trading which had been the one thing lacking for the final and advantageous peace with the Austrians. By the terms of the Treaty—or rather Truce—of Leoben, Austria agreed to yield to France the banks of the Rhine and all her Italian possessions occupied by Napoleon, receiving in return a portion of the City of Venice.

But it so happened that the conquest of Venice served Napoleon yet another and wholly unexpected service. On a May evening in 1797 Bonaparte, then in Milan, received a special relay messenger from his subordinate, General Bernadotte, in Trieste. The messenger delivered into Bonaparte’s hands a portfolio, together with a report explaining the nature of its contents. It developed that the portfolio had been taken from a certain Count d’Antraigues, a royalist and an agent of the Bourbons, who, fleeing from the French, had come to Trieste from Venice. In Trieste he fell into the hands of Bernadotte, who had already taken the city. The portfolio was found to contain some startling documents.

In order to grasp the full meaning of this unexpected find it will be necessary to give a brief summary of what at this moment was happening in Paris. . . .

Those strata of the financial, commercial and agrarian aristocracy which had instigated the Vendémiaire revolt of 1795, had by no means been shattered—nor could they have been—by Napoleon’s cannon. Only the militant element of this group, which had come out hand in hand with the active royalists, had felt the brunt of Bonaparte’s artillery. But even this faction of the middle class had not ceased to show stubborn opposition to the Directory.

When in the spring of 1796 Babeuf’s conspiracy was revealed, when the phantom of a new proletarian revolt—a new Prairial adventure—again began to perturb the propertied elements, the royalists subdued during Vendémiaire once more gathered courage and began to raise their heads. But in the spring and summer of 1797 they again erred, even as in the summer of 1795 at Qui-
beron and during Vendémiaire in Paris. Once more they failed to understand that although the masses of new landholders desired a strong police authority to defend their ownership, and that although the newly enriched middle classes were ready to accept monarchy or even a monarchistic dictatorship—Bourbon restoration was desired by only the smallest fraction of the upper bourgeoisie. All the other classes felt that the Bourbon pretender would always be a king of the nobility rather than of the bourgeoisie, and that with him would return feudalism and the émigrés, who would certainly demand that their lands be given back to them.

Nevertheless, as the royalists were the best organised of the counter-revolutionary groups and were in receipt of active assistance and funds from abroad, they once more took the guiding rôle in the new revolt against the Directory. Again the Directory’s position was an extremely precarious one. Each time the sectional elections for the Council of Five Hundred were held, the balance clearly went toward the Right—toward the counter-revolutionaries, and sometimes even quite obviously toward the royalists. Even in the Directory itself, despite the menace of the counter-revolution, all was not harmony. Barthélemy and Carnot were against decisive measures. Indeed, Barthélemy secretly sympathized with the rising counter-revolutionary movement. The remaining three Directors—Barras, Rewbell and Larévelière-Lépeaux—often conferred, but could not decide on measures to forestall the blow that was being prepared.

Barras and his colleagues, not wishing to yield their authority—and perhaps their lives—without a struggle, had resolved to fight with every weapon at their command. One of several circumstances which greatly perturbed them was the fact that General Pichegru, celebrated for his conquest of Holland in 1795, had joined the forces of the opposition. He had been chosen President of the Council of Five Hundred, the highest legislative authority in the State, and was being groomed for the military leadership in the projected attack on the republican “triumvirate”—as Barras and his two colleagues in the Directory were generally known.

Such was the state of affairs in the summer of 1797. Fighting
in Italy, Bonaparte kept in close touch with what was transpiring in Paris. He saw that the Republic was in a decidedly precarious position. While he himself had no great love for the Republic—soon, indeed, he was to throttle it—he was by no means willing to permit this operation to be carried out prematurely. Above all, he had no idea of allowing the Directory to be ousted to the advantage of someone else. During that sleepless Italian night he had decided that he would not continue to conquer for the sole benefit of “these lawyers.” Still less was he inclined to conquer for the benefit of the Bourbon pretender. He had come to the firm resolve to conquer solely for the benefit of Bonaparte. Consequently, he too was greatly perturbed when he learned that at the head of the enemies of the Republic stood one of France’s most popular generals—Pichegru. Pichegru’s name had the power in a critical moment to swing over the troops; they might conceivably follow him because they believed in the sincerity of his republicanism and might fail to understand where he led them.

Now it is possible to understand Bonaparte’s reactions when he received the thick portfolio taken from the arrested Count d’Antraigues, which contained undeniable proof of Pichegru’s treachery—of his secret negotiations with Foche-Borelle, the agent of Prince Condé. There was, however, a slight unpleasantness which somewhat delayed the despatch of these documents to Barras. It happened that in one of the papers—moreover, a paper essential in proving the charge against Pichegru—another Bourbon agent, Monheyar, had mentioned among other things that he had been in Italy and had visited Bonaparte at headquarters, where he attempted to open negotiations with him. Although Monheyar might have visited him under some pretext or other—possibly using an assumed name—Bonaparte decided that it would be safer to eliminate these lines. He, therefore, ordered that d’Antraigues be sent to him. When the royalist agent arrived he was commanded to rewrite the document, omitting the unnecessary lines. D’Antraigues, knowing that his life was forfeit if he refused, promptly acquiesced. He was later released, a sham “escape” being arranged for him while under guard. The edited version of the documents was then despatched by Bonaparte to
Bonaparte. They served to unbind the hands of the “triumvirate.” Barras and his colleagues did not immediately publish the damning papers; first they took in hand the particularly loyal divisions, then waited for General Augereau, whom Bonaparte immediately sent from Italy to aid them. Quite apart from this, Bonaparte promised them 3,000,000 francs in gold—which he had lately requisitioned in Italy—for use in strengthening their position in the impending crisis.

At three o’clock in the morning of the Eighteenth Fructidor (September 4, 1797) Barras ordered the arrest of the two reprehensible Directors: Barthélemy was seized, but Carnot managed to escape. Then began mass arrests of royalists, the purge of the Council of Five Hundred and of the Council of Elders. Many were promptly sent without trial to Guiana, most of them never to return. Newspapers suspected of royalism were forced to close. By daybreak of the Eighteenth Fructidor immense placards were to be seen everywhere—printed reproductions of the treasonable documents which Bonaparte had sent to Barras. Pichegru was arrested and sent to Guiana. This upheaval of the Eighteenth Fructidor met with no opposition of any kind. The plebeian masses hated royalism even more than did the Directory, and openly rejoiced at the blow dealt the secret supporters of the Bourbon dynasty. As for the “rich sections,” this time they did not venture out into the streets, for they well remembered the terrible lesson of Vendémiaire, which they had learned in 1795 with the assistance of Bonaparte’s artillery.

Again the Directory conquered; the Republic was saved. From his distant Italian camp, General Bonaparte fervently congratulated the Directory (which he was to destroy two years hence) for saving the Republic (which he was to destroy seven years later).

Bonaparte was gratified with the events of Eighteenth Fructidor in yet another respect. The Leoben peace, concluded with the Austrians four months before, remained only a truce. During the summer the Austrian Government suddenly began to reveal symptoms of boldness—almost to threaten—and Bonaparte had no difficulty in comprehending the reason. Austria, like the rest
of monarchistic Europe, had been following the critical events in Paris with bated breath. Italy daily anticipated the fall of the Directory and the Republic, with the consequent restoration of the Bourbons and the return of all territory conquered by the French. But the Eighteenth Fructidor, with its crushing defeat of the royalists and the public exposure of Pichegru’s treachery, put an end to all of these dreams.

Bonaparte immediately began to insist upon an early signing of the definitive peace. Finally, Austria sent the skilled diplomat Count Cobenzl to negotiate with Bonaparte. This proved a case of diamond cut diamond. During the course of the prolonged and stormy conferences, Cobenzl complained to his government that he had rarely met “such a quibbler and such a shameless human being” as General Bonaparte. Here, for the first time, Bonaparte revealed his remarkable diplomatic ability, which in the opinion of many historians of that epoch was by no means inferior to his military genius. On one occasion, however, he gave way to one of those bursts of rage, which in later years, when he became conscious of being the “master of Europe,” possessed him often. “Your empire—it is an old harlot which is used to being violated,” he shouted at Cobenzl in a frenzy. “You forget that France has conquered and that you are the vanquished. You forget that you are conducting conversations with me surrounded by my grenadiers.” He hurled to the floor a tiny table. Upon it had rested a precious porcelain coffee service, the gift of the Russian Empress Catherine to the Austrian diplomat, which Cobenzl had brought with him. The service was shattered to smithereens. “He behaved like a madman,” reported Cobenzl concerning the incident. But finally, on October 17, 1797, at the little town of Campo Formio, the peace between France and the Austrian Empire was signed.

Almost without exception all of the stipulations which Napoleon demanded were granted—whether in Italy, where he had won, or in Germany, where the Austrians were far from having been defeated by the French generals. Venice, even as Bonaparte had proposed, served as a compensation to Austria for her concessions on the Rhine.

The news of the peace was greeted in Paris with wild rejoicing.
On this occasion the plebeian masses, as well as the bourgeoisie, were greatly relieved. The name of the great military leader was on all lips. Everyone realised that the war lost by the other generals on the Rhine had been won by Bonaparte in Italy. There was no end of official and private expressions of praise of the victorious general. "O mighty spirit of freedom, thou alone could have given birth . . . to the Italian Army, given birth to Bonaparte! Happy France!" exclaimed Larevelliére-Lépeaux, one of the Directors of the Republic, in a public speech.

Meanwhile, Bonaparte was adding the finishing touches to the newly created vassal, the "Cisalpine Republic," which consisted of lands he conquered in Italy. Another portion of his conquests was joined directly to France. The third portion—Rome—remained for the time being in the hands of its former masters, but was to all intents and purposes tributary to France. Bonaparte organised the Cisalpine Republic in such a manner that, while it appeared to be governed by a conferring body of representatives from the well-to-do strata of the population, it was in reality under the absolute rule of the French forces of occupation and a commissioner appointed by Paris. Toward the traditional empty phrases about the liberation of nations and about fraternal republics, he maintained an attitude of frank contempt. Never for a moment did he believe that there were in Italy any great number of people who felt enthusiasm for that freedom about which he spoke in his proclamations to the inhabitants of the lands he had conquered.

But all of Europe heard the official version of how the people of Italy were throwing off their long-worn yoke of superstition and oppression, and of how the great masses were taking up arms to assist their French liberators. Actually, Napoleon confidentially wrote the Directory: "You imagine that liberty should inspire this flabby, superstitious, craven, shifty people to great deeds. . . . In my army there are no Italians to speak of—only 1,500 good-for-nothings, picked up in the streets, who loot and are not worth their keep. . . ." And, further, he states that only with skill and the use of "stern examples" was it possible to maintain authority in Italy. As for the Italians, they had ample opportunity to learn precisely what he meant by "stern examples." He
ordered the slaughter of the entire populations of the towns of Lugo and Binasco. In Binasco his soldiers carried out his command with such zeal that they killed nearly all of the inhabitants, including children, and afterward burned down the city. He commanded that the municipal authorities of Pavia—and of many other cities—be shot without trial, and afterward for a space of 24 hours gave up the city to his soldiers for unlimited pillage, without the slightest risk of punishment. He ordered his men to burn down all those villages where individual French soldiers had been found killed.

In all these cases Bonaparte followed a wholly systematic policy from which he was never to deviate. Never once was he harsh without purpose, but for the sake of political expediency he was ready to order ruthless mass terror, let flow rivers of blood and pile up mountains of corpses. And in such instances it always served his purpose better to over-salt rather than to be too sparing. He destroyed all traces of feudal laws in conquered Italy, and deprived the churches and monasteries of the right to exact extortions. During the year and a half he spent in Italy he succeeded in establishing a legislative programme which was intended to produce, in northern Italy, the same socio-juridical order of life at which the Revolution in France had aimed. But he well knew how, in return, he had systematically pillaged the Italian lands, leaving no visited spot untouched and sending millions in gold and countless treasures of art to the Directory in Paris. Nor had he forgotten himself in the orgy of pillage to which he subjected Italy; he returned from the campaign a rich man. He realised that no matter how cowardly he considered the Italians to be, they had no cause to love the French, whose army they had maintained all this time. Moreover, he was not blind to the fact that even their patience might come to a sudden end. This explains his habit of threatening military terror wherever he went. It was conceivably the only way he could be assured of keeping the Italians in that state of subjection which he found necessary.

He would have liked to remain a while longer in the land he had conquered, but after the Treaty of Campo Formio the Directory, in a friendly yet insistent manner, demanded that he re-
turn to Paris. As a reward for his Italian successes the Directory now appointed him commander-in-chief of the army designated to act against England. Long before this Bonaparte had sensed that the Directory had begun to fear him a little. "They are envying me, I know, even though they are burning incense under my nose—but they won't make a fool of me. They have made great haste to appoint me general of the army against England, in order to get me away from Italy, where I am more of a sovereign than a general." Thus he spoke in confidential conversations.

On December 7, 1797, he arrived in Paris, and on the 10th he was triumphantly met by the Directory in a body at the Palace of Luxembourg. A countless host of people had gathered near by; wild shouts of joy and thunderous applause hailed him when he reached the palace. Barras acclaimed him and the other members of the Directory greeted him with fervent eulogies. Talleyrand, the crafty, shrewd and corrupt Minister of Foreign Affairs—who saw ahead more clearly than the others—complimented him in honeyed words. And down in the square the huge crowd roared a deafening welcome. Yet all this was accepted by the 28-year-old general with complete outward calm—as something to be expected, as something by no means astonishing. In his soul he had never attached particular value to the raptures of great crowds. "The crowd would have run round me with equal eagerness if I were being led to the scaffold," he said in private after the ovation.

Scarcely had he reached Paris when he began to discuss with the Directory the plans for a new military campaign. In his rôle of general appointed to act against England, he had come to the conclusion that it would be possible to threaten England more successfully in Egypt than on the English Channel, where the British fleet was stronger than the French. He therefore proposed the conquest of Egypt and the creation of military outposts in the East to be used as bases for future threats to England's domination in India. "Has he lost his wits?" many people in Europe asked themselves when, in the summer of 1798, they suddenly learned of Bonaparte's new plan. But, meanwhile, it
had already been decided upon, after being discussed in the strictest secrecy by the Directory during its spring sittings.

However, that which from a distance seemed a fantastic adventure was actually an integral part of the well-defined and long-nourished aspirations not only of the post-revolutionary, but also the pre-revolutionary, commercial bourgeoisie of France. In this case, Bonaparte met with conditions which had come into being before him and independent of him, but his mind comprehended their import, his will broke down the barriers, and his colossal gifts permitted him to venture an attempt at their realisation.
From early days the merchants of Marseilles and of the entire southern portion of France had been engaging in a vast and extremely profitable trade with the Levant—with the ports of the Balkan peninsula, Syria, Egypt, the islands of the eastern Mediterranean and the Archipelago. For centuries the constant aspiration of these French traders had been the consolidation of their country's political position in these lucrative but disorganised places, where commerce had constantly to be guarded and where armed force would be of inestimable value to the merchant in protecting his interests. Toward the end of the 18th century, more and more alluring reports of the natural wealth of Syria and Egypt were brought to France. The prospect of establishing colonies and factories became an even greater temptation than heretofore.

French diplomats had always coveted these seemingly ill-guarded Levantine lands, which were considered the possessions of the Sultan at Constantinople. They looked upon Egypt, surrounded by both the Mediterranean and the Red seas, as an ideal base from which to threaten the commercial and political interests of their competitors in India and adjacent countries. In his own day the famous philosopher Leibnitz presented Louis XIV with a report counseling him to conquer Egypt and thus be in a position to ruin Holland throughout the East. Now, at the end of the 18th century, England rather than Holland constituted France's arch rival. For all these reasons the Directory by no
means regarded Bonaparte’s scheme as mad, especially after the shrewd, cautious, and sceptical Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talleyrand, resolutely supported the plan.

As early as June, 1789, when he took possession of Venice, Bonaparte had anticipated the possibility of conquering Egypt. At that time he had ordered one of his generals to take the Ionian Islands, so that they might be used later in the campaign against Egypt. Even more irrefutable evidence of his preoccupation with the idea during the first Italian wars is supplied by a letter which he wrote to Paris in August of 1797: “The time is not far distant when we will realise that in order to crush England we must take possession of Egypt.”

Throughout the long Italian campaign he continued to read as avidly and extensively as in his formative years. He sent for Volney’s book on Egypt and several other works on the same subject. That he valued his conquest of the Ionian Islands most highly is proved by a letter he wrote the Directory in which he stated that if it came to a choice he would far more readily renounce what he had gained in Italy than the Ionian Islands. And simultaneously—even before the conclusion of the Peace of Campo Formio—he counseled the seizure of the island of Malta. All these Mediterranean island bases would prove invaluable to him in his assault on Egypt.

Now, after Campo Formio, with Austria temporarily disposed of, England remained the principal enemy, and Bonaparte exerted all his influence to prevail upon the Directory to furnish him with an army and a fleet for the campaign against Egypt. The East had always lured him, and at this stage of his career his imagination was inspired more by Alexander the Great than by Caesar or Charlemagne. Subsequently, while journeying across the Egyptian deserts, he half-jestingly, half-seriously told his generals that he regretted having been born at so late a time that it was no longer possible to proclaim himself a god or a son of a god, as Alexander of Macedonia had done when he conquered Egypt. And quite earnestly he afterward claimed that Europe was too small a continent for the performance of great deeds—but the East; now, that was another matter. . . .

His subconscious desires were reflected in his political moves.
Indeed, during that sleepless night in Italy he had definitely decided to follow a path which must ultimately lead to the seizure of the supreme authority. "I am no longer able to obey," he openly announced to his staff when, while he was conducting the peace negotiations with Austria, he received irritating instructions from Paris. But it would have been premature to attempt to depose the Directory at this time (the winter and spring of 1797-1798). The fruit had not ripened. And if Bonaparte had lost something of his capacity to obey, he was still patient enough to wait for the propitious moment. For the time being the Directory had not compromised itself sufficiently, nor had he established himself sufficiently as the idol of the entire army—although even then the soldiers under his command in Italy would have obeyed him to a man. Meanwhile, how could the interval of waiting be better employed than in adding new lustre to his own reputation by conquering the land of the Pharaohs and creating a new threat to England?

Immeasurably valuable for this undertaking was the support of Talleyrand. It would be absurd to speak of Talleyrand's "convictions." Actually, he had none. He was an opportunist, pure and simple; but he saw the possibility of creating a rich, flourishing and economically useful French colony in Egypt. Indeed, Talleyrand had read a report on this theme to the Academy even before he learned of Bonaparte's project. To his desire to gain the good will of the French bourgeoisie was now added his ambition to predispose Bonaparte in his favour, for before anyone else the crafty diplomat foresaw in the young general the future master of France.

Not that it needed much persuasion to convince the Directory of the advisability of financing and equipping this distant and dangerous undertaking. In the first place, the Directory saw the economic and politico-military advantages of the proposed conquest. In the second place—and this is a reasonable speculation—the more perceiving of the Directors must have seen a distinct benefit to themselves in sending Bonaparte on so distant and so dangerous a campaign. The sudden and immense popularity of the Corsican had long perturbed them. That he was sometimes "no longer able to obey" was well known to Barras and his asso-
ciates, who had been impotent to restrain him from concluding the Peace of Campio Formio in the form he alone desired—several of his stipulations were in direct conflict with the orders of the Directory. And on December 10, 1797, during the celebration in his honour, he had not conducted himself with that humility which should have characterised a young warrior accepting the congratulations of his fatherland. Rather, he had behaved like some ancient Roman conqueror for whom a servile Senate had prepared a triumph after a successful war. He had been cool, taciturn, almost morose—accepting all his honours in a casual, unconcerned manner. In a word, he was revealing traits which stimulated the concerned onlooker to distressing reflections. Let him go to Egypt. If he returned, nothing was lost; if he failed to return— what of it? Barras and his colleagues were prepared to bear his loss without undue dismay.

*On March 5, 1798, the Directory decided to undertake the expedition, appointing Bonaparte commander-in-chief. He promptly began making intensive preparations for the campaign; there were ships to be inspected and soldiers to be chosen. Now, even more than at the outset of the Italian invasion, he revealed his capacity for organisation. Conceiving vast projects, he could at the same time attend to the smallest details without becoming entangled in them. He was never at a loss. He could simultaneously see the trees and the forest, and even each individual twig on each individual tree. He supervised the organisation of his expeditionary force both on shore and on the sea. He kept in close touch with all the vicissitudes of world politics. He remained informed of the movements of Nelson’s fleet, which at the moment was cruising near French shores and whose superior strength might overwhelm him during the passage to Egypt. All these things he succeeded in doing, while he was systematically selecting the soldiers he would take with him to Egypt. It was now that his remarkable memory proved of immeasurable value to him. He knew an immense number of soldiers—personally, as individuals. He could remember that this soldier was brave and staunch, but a drunkard; that this one was shrewd and imaginative, but tired quickly because he was ruptured and had over-
strained himself. He displayed the same patience and acumen in choosing his corporals and private soldiers as in naming his marshals. For the Egyptian campaign—for a war under a blazing sun—it was essential to select men whose fortitude and endurance were such that they would withstand the effects of the long desert marches, in scorching heat, without water or shade.

His preparations completed, Bonaparte sailed from Toulon on May 19. He took with him a fleet of some 350 large and small ships, to act as transports for his 30,000 men and artillery. His task was made all the more difficult by reason of the fact that he would have to sail almost the entire length of the Mediterranean and escape a meeting with Nelson's fleet, whose broadsides could have overwhelmed and sunk his whole armada.

All of Europe was aware that a naval expedition was being organised. England, in particular, was well informed of the preparations being made in all of the ports of southern France, of the constant arrival of troops in these ports, and of the fact that Bonaparte himself was in command of the undertaking, which was sufficient evidence of its importance. But where would the French strike? Cunningly, Bonaparte spread the rumour that he would pass through the Straits of Gibraltar, make a detour of Spain, and then swoop down upon Ireland, where he would land. The rumour reached Nelson—as Bonaparte intended it should—and deceived him. The English admiral was waiting at Gibraltar, while the French fleet left harbour and sailed eastward to Malta.

From the 16th century that island had belonged to the Order of the Knights of Malta. Bonaparte seized it and proclaimed it a French possession. After halting there for several days (June 10-19) he resumed the voyage to Egypt. A friendly wind aided him and by June 30 he touched the shore of Egypt, at the fishing village of Mallaka, near Alexandria. Here he promptly began to land his men. But at this moment he heard some disquieting news concerning Nelson's fleet and realised that his position would be precarious unless he succeeded in getting his men on dry land with all possible haste.

Forty-eight hours before his own arrival, the English fleet had touched at Alexandria and had inquired about him. Of course, no one there had been able to give Nelson any information. It
appeared that after hearing of Bonaparte's capture of Malta, Nelson, realising that he had been duped, had set full sail for Egypt to sink the French fleet while it was still at sea. But the speed with which he had reached Egypt had lost him his opportunity. His faster ships had outsailed Bonaparte's by two days, and on arriving at Alexandria he was informed that no signs of the French had been seen. Deciding that since the French had not landed at Egypt there was no alternative but that they had attacked Constantinople, he sailed for that city.

This chain of miscalculations by Nelson, pure accidents, saved the French expedition. Had he been able to intercept Bonaparte's fleet at sea, he would have made short work of it. . . .

Knowing that Nelson might return at any moment, Bonaparte speeded the landing of his troops and supplies. At two o'clock in the morning of July 2 all of his force was on dry land. Once he found himself in his own element, he feared no one. He promptly moved his army on Alexandria.

At this time Egypt was counted among the possessions of the Sultan of Turkey, but actually it was dominated and ruled by the commanders of a well-armed feudal cavalry, known as the Mamelukes. The commanders, or Bey-Mamelukes, were the owners of the best lands in Egypt, and constituted a military-feudal aristocracy. They paid tribute to the Sultan, even acknowledged his authority, but in reality were almost wholly independent of him.

The principal inhabitants were Arabs, who engaged in trade, handicrafts, caravan transport and agriculture. Below them in rank were the Copts, remnants of earlier, pre-Arab races, who barely managed to exist in the meanest imaginable conditions. They bore the name fellaheen in common with the impoverished peasants of Arab origin, and eked out their livelihood as drudges, navvies, camel drivers and wandering petty tradesmen.

Although Bonaparte had come to Egypt to seize this country which was numbered among Turkey's possessions, he attempted to give the impression that he was not at war with the Sultan. He claimed that he had come to liberate the Arabs—he made no mention of the Copts—from the oppressive authority of the
Bonaparte Bey-Mamelukes, who forced extortions from them and treated them with great severity. When he had captured Alexandria after a few hours of firing, he proclaimed himself the liberator of the population, and promptly set about establishing permanent French authority. To the people he had “liberated” he recommended full submission, threatening them with military terror if they resisted. At the same time he made it known to the Arabs that he had complete respect for the Koran and the Mohammedan faith.

After remaining several days in Alexandria, Bonaparte advanced southward into the desert. His troops suffered from a lack of water, for the people in the villages along his line of march had abandoned their homes in panic, first remembering to poison and pollute their wells. The Mamelukes slowly retreated before the French invaders, now and then harassing them in guerrilla fashion and escaping on their magnificent horses.

On July 20, in sight of the Pyramids, Bonaparte finally met the main forces of the Mamelukes. Turning to his troops before the battle, he said: “Soldiers! Forty centuries look down upon you today from the summits of these pyramids. . . .” In the fight that followed, the Mamelukes were completely routed. They abandoned a portion of their artillery—40 cannon—and fled southward, leaving several thousand of their dead on the field of battle.

Immediately after this victory, Bonaparte entered the city of Cairo, the second largest in Egypt. The bewildered inhabitants met the conqueror in frightened silence: not only had they never heard of Napoleon, but even now they were totally in ignorance of why he had come and whom he was fighting.

Cairo, richer by far than Alexandria, provided Bonaparte with a mass of provisions. Here the army rested for a short time after its excruciating desert march and the battle beside the Pyramids. Seeing that the people of Cairo were panic-stricken at the sight of the French troops, Bonaparte issued a proclamation, which he had translated into the native language, calling upon the inhabitants to be calm. But, simultaneously, he ordered the pillaging and burning of the village of Alkam, not far from Cairo, as a punitive measure because of its suspected complicity in the
slaying of several of his soldiers—and the fear of the Arabs was intensified.

Just as he had done in Italy, Bonaparte ordered mass terror wherever it might conceivably serve his purpose. Here in Egypt he issued commands to pillage, burn and kill, in order that his own troops might see how terribly he punished anyone who dared to lift a finger against a French soldier.

During the halt in Cairo, he reorganised Egyptian local government. Realising the necessity of concentrating the authority, he appointed a French officer as chief of the garrison in all of the towns he occupied. To allow for local representation, he created a council of the more prominent and responsible citizens, to act in coöperation with the chief of the garrison. These local councils came to be called "divans." He ordered that the Mohammedan faith be shown the fullest respect, and that the mosques and priests be held inviolable. In Cairo, as the central seat of the new government, he decided that in addition to the local divan there should be a large deliberating body consisting of the representatives of the provinces. Taxes and levies were to be collected at regular intervals, so that provisions would always be available for the French troops. Local officials were ordered to organise efficient police systems to protect commerce and private property, and all of the former extortions exacted by the Bey-Mamelukes were entirely abolished. The estates of the Beys, who had fled south because of their unwillingness to submit to French domination, were ordered confiscated for the benefit of the French treasury.

Here, as in Italy, Bonaparte strove to abolish feudal conditions. This was particularly convenient to the invader, as it was the Mamelukes who supported military resistance. By fighting feudalism, he was able to ingratiate himself with the Arab landowners and commercial middle class. It is significant that he did not offer to protect the fellaheen, who were exploited by the Arab bourgeoisie.

These measures strengthened Bonaparte's unconditional military dictatorship. It was centralised in his hands and secured by the middle-class order created by him. His persistent efforts to secure tolerance of the Mohammedan faith and respect for the
Bonaparte Koran immeasurably reduced the resistance of the Arabs. As a matter of fact, his stand on Mohammedanism was later used against him in 1807 by the Russian Most Holy Synod, when it claimed that he had identified himself with the forerunners of the Antichrist by his conduct during the Egyptian campaign.

Having organised a new political régime in the conquered land, Bonaparte made preparations for the continuance of the campaign. Syria was his next objective. Among his last-minute decisions was one which had a tremendous effect on the study of Egyptology. Before leaving Cairo he instructed the scholars who had accompanied him from France, to remain in Egypt and there pursue their researches. That he himself was particularly interested in this study is proved by his sympathetic treatment of these learned men during the expedition. His well-known order before the beginning of the battle with the Mamelukes—"The donkeys and scholars in the middle!"—signified his desire to shield them from harm. The somewhat unexpected juxtaposition of terms was due entirely to his habitual military laconism when issuing commands.

Even before the Syrian campaign Bonaparte had frequent occasion to learn that the Arabs were far from exultant over the "liberation from the tyranny of the Mamelukes" of which he constantly spoke in his proclamations. The French had sufficient provisions, thanks to their efficient system of requisitioning supplies and imposing taxes—although of course the local populations suffered cruelly as a result. But of actual coin, there was a relative scarcity. Consequently, Bonaparte found it imperative to employ more drastic measures to procure money.

General Kleber, whom Bonaparte had left behind in Alexandria as governor-general, arrested the immensely wealthy former sheik of that city, Sidi-Mohammed El-Koraim, on the charge of treachery against the State. Actually, there was not the least vestige of evidence against him. El-Koraim was sent under convoy to Cairo, where he was ordered to pay a fine of 300,000 gold francs in exchange for his life. But El-Koraim, to his own misfortune, was a fatalist. "If it is fated for me to die now," he said, "nothing will save me and I will have given up my piastres for no
purpose; but if it is not fated that I should die, why should I give them up?" Bonaparte, being a very practical man who needed money, ordered that his captive's head be cut off and borne through the streets of Cairo, with the inscription: "Thus will be punished all traitors and perjurers." The money hidden by the executed sheik was never found, despite the many searches made for it. The example, however, was not without result. Several wealthy Arabs yielded as much money as was demanded of them, and in the days immediately following El-Koraim's decapitation the sum of approximately 4,000,000 francs was added to the army treasury.

The masses were dealt with far more simply and with infinitely less ceremony. Toward the end of October, 1798, matters came to such a pass that there was an attempted uprising in Cairo itself. Several French soldiers were openly attacked and killed, and for three days the rebels armed themselves in several quarters of the city. To set an example and to prevent recurrences, Bonaparte ruthlessly suppressed the revolters. Quite apart from the masses of Arabs and fellaheen slain during the actual pacification, there were days when executions went on as a regular routine, from 12 to 30 people were killed each day.

The Cairo uprising was not without reverberations in the neighbouring settlements. When he learned of the first of these revolts, Bonaparte ordered his adjutant Crouazier to the spot, with the command to surround the entire tribe, kill all the men without exception, and bring the women and children to Cairo. Crouazier carried out his instructions with ruthless zeal, even burning down the evacuated village. Many of the women and children, who were driven to Cairo on foot, died along the way. Several hours after this punitive expedition, mules laden with sacks were led into Cairo's main square. When the sacks were opened, out rolled the heads of the tribesmen whom Crouazier had executed.

Meanwhile, Bonaparte had to take into account two extremely dangerous circumstances. In the first place, Nelson had completely destroyed the French fleet. A month after Bonaparte had landed in Egypt, the English admiral swooped down upon the French squadron while it was taking shelter in Aboukir Bay
and demolished it. The French Admiral Brueys perished in the battle, and Bonaparte in Egypt was completely cut off from France. In the second place, the Turkish Government had not been fooled by the Corsican’s proclamations. It no more believed that he was at peace with the Sultan, than that he had invaded Egypt merely to punish the Mamelukes for their affronts to French merchants and for their oppression of the Arabs. A Turkish army was sent to Syria.

Bonaparte advanced from Egypt into Syria to meet the Turks. The fear which his punitive measures had inspired served him to advantage now, for the local populations were afraid to attack the rear in an attempt to cut him off from his Egyptian bases.

Beginning with El Arish, city after city surrendered to the French invaders. After crossing the Isthmus of Suez, Bonaparte advanced toward Jaffa, where he met his first real opposition. The city refused to yield, and on March 4, 1799, he laid siege to it. He issued a proclamation to the people of Jaffa warning them that if the city had to be taken by assault, he would put all of its inhabitants to the sword. “No prisoners will be taken,” he threatened. Still Jaffa would not surrender. On March 6, Bonaparte ordered the assault, and the city fell into his hands. Breaking into the town, the French soldiers began a wholesale slaughter of the unfortunate population. They killed everyone they saw, and looted the houses and the shops with the full authorisation of their officers.

While this was going on, 4,000 fully armed Turkish soldiers, for the most part Albanian in origin, locked themselves in a large fortification protected on all sides. When ordered to file out and surrender, the Turks replied that they would yield only on the condition that their lives be spared; otherwise they would defend themselves to the last drop of blood. The French officers agreed to this condition, and the Turks issued from their fortification and laid down their arms. When Bonaparte heard what his officers had promised the Turkish prisoners, he became violently angry. “What am I to do with them now?” he shouted. “Where am I to get provisions to feed them?” There were no ships to transport them from Jaffa to Egypt by sea, nor could a sufficient number of troops be spared to convoy 4,000 fearless soldiers
across the Syrian and Egyptian deserts to Alexandria or Cairo. Napoleon did not come to an immediate decision in the matter.

He wavered for three days—and on the fourth gave the order that they all be executed. The 4,000 prisoners were led to the seashore. There they were shot to the last man.

This accomplished, Bonaparte resumed his advance toward the fortress of Acre. He could not afford to tarry, for the plague followed on the heels of the French army, and in Jaffa the unburied corpses of the slain population were rotting everywhere.

The two-month Siege of Acre was not attended with success. Bonaparte lacked siege artillery, and the city’s defense under the English Sir Sidney Smith and a large Turkish garrison was extremely stubborn. To make matters worse, the English were delivering provisions and weapons by sea. There was no alternative but to raise the siege, which Bonaparte did on May 20. This unsuccessful attempt to capture Acre cost the French commander 4,000 men, although there was some small consolation in the fact that the besieged lost an even larger number. Promptly, the French began their return march to Egypt.

It is worth remarking here that Bonaparte always attached a special, fatalistic significance to this failure. The fortress of Acre was the easternmost portion of the earth he was destined to reach. He had planned to remain in Egypt for a long period. He had ordered his engineers to trace the ancient attempts to cut through a Suez canal, and to draw up plans for future work on such a project. He wrote to the Sultan of Mysore, then warring against the English, and promised him assistance. He made tentative peaceful advances to the Shah of Persia. But the resistance of Acre, the impossibility of stretching his lines of communication without fresh reinforcements, and the disturbing rumours of uprisings in the Syrian villages in the rear, put an end to his dream of establishing his rule in Syria.

The return march was rendered even more difficult than the advance had been, because it was already nearing the end of May and the approach of June promised heat so intense as to be unbearable. He halted his march occasionally to deal harshly with recalcitrant populations in the mutinous Syrian villages.

During the painful return march to Egypt, the commander-in-
chief shared all the difficulties of his soldiers, allowing neither his subordinates nor himself any indulgences. The plague again played havoc with the army. The victims were left behind, but those who were wounded or ailing from causes other than the disease were taken along. Bonaparte ordered everyone to go on foot, leaving the horses and transport vehicles for those unfit to march. When, after this order was given, his chief equerry, convinced that an exception should be made in the case of the commander-in-chief, asked which horse should be reserved for him, Bonaparte flew into a rage. He struck the equerry across the face with a horse-whip, and shouted: “Everybody is to go on foot! I shall be the first to go on foot! What? You don’t know what an order is? Get out!”

For this and for similar actions the soldiers loved him, and in their old age cherished them more than all his victories. He was well aware of this and never hesitated in like instances; no one who observed him could subsequently affirm which of his actions had been impulsive and which deliberate and calculating. It is quite possible that they were a mixture of the two, as happens with great actors. And Napoleon was a past master of histrionic effects; although at the dawn of his career—in Toulon, in Italy, in Egypt—this quality manifested itself only to a few of his associates.

On June 14, 1799, Bonaparte’s army was back in Cairo. But he was not to remain long in the country he had conquered.

Scarcely had he begun to rest from the fatigue brought on by the Syrian campaign when he learned that a Turkish army had landed near Aboukir, where but a year before Nelson had destroyed the French transports. The Turkish troops had been sent to liberate Egypt from the French. Bonaparte immediately set out from Cairo with his army, going northward toward the Delta of the Nile. On June 25 he fell upon the Turks and annihilated them. Nearly all of the 15,000 soldiers of the Sultan were slain on the spot. This victory consolidated the French conquest for years to come. A small part of the Turkish army was saved on the English ships, for the sea, as formerly, belonged to the British. However, Egypt itself, more definitely than ever before, was in the hands of Bonaparte.
Egypt and Syria

Just at this moment Bonaparte's plans were completely changed by a sudden and entirely unanticipated piece of news. For many months he had been cut off from all communication with Europe, and it was only when some newspapers accidentally fell into his hands that he learned that while he was conquering Egypt, the Allies had renewed the war with France. With Napoleon out of the way for the time being, Austria, England, Russia and the Kingdom of Naples had deemed it a propitious time to strike a blow at the French. Suvorov had appeared suddenly in Italy, defeating the French and destroying the Cisalpine Republic, and was now moving toward the Alps as a preliminary to invading France. Within the French Republic itself brigandage, riots and complete confusion were disrupting the nation. The Directory, weak and distraught, was loathed by the great majority. "The wretches! Italy lost! All the fruits of victory lost!" stormed Bonaparte as he read the newspapers. "I must go!"

The resolve was promptly taken. He yielded the main command of the army to General Kleber, and ordered four ships speedily and secretly outfitted. With 500 of his most trustworthy soldiers, he set sail for France on August 23, 1799, leaving Kleber a well-equipped army, an effective administrative and tax-levying apparatus—and the mute, submissive, beggared, frightened population of a conquered country.
Napoleon sailed from Egypt with the firm and unshakable intention of deposing the Directory and taking possession of the supreme power in the State. The undertaking was a desperate one. During the 47 days of the journey to France, the English hovered near by, and a meeting seemed inevitable. According to those who observed him, Bonaparte alone, in the face of the ever-threatening catastrophe, remained calm, giving all of the necessary commands with his habitual energy. On the morning of October 8, 1799, his ships entered the bay near Cape Fréjus, on the southern coast of France.

In order to grasp what occurred during the 30 days between October 8 (when Napoleon disembarked on French soil) and November 9 (when he became master of France), it will be necessary to describe the situation in which France found herself when she learned that the conqueror of Egypt had returned.

After the Eighteenth Fructidor of 1797, it appeared that Barras and his colleagues could count upon the two factions which had supported them on that day—on the new property-owning classes, which had become rich as a result of the Revolution and which feared the return of the Bourbons, while at the same time desiring a stable police order and a strong centralised government; and on the army, which was warmly sympathetic to the peasantry and loathed the very thought of the return of the old dynasty and the feudal system.

However, in the two years which had passed between the Eighteenth Fructidor and the autumn of 1799, the Directory had completely lost the support of the masses. The commercial
middle class dreamed of a dictator who would reëstablish commerce and bring external peace and strong inner "order" to France. The petty and middle bourgeoisie—and above all the enriched peasantry, now enjoying the ownership of land—desired the same thing: any dictator who was not a Bourbon would do. The working class, after its suppression in the Prairial Revolt of 1795, no longer attempted to rise en masse, although it continued to hunger, and to suffer from unemployment and the high cost of living. It cursed the speculators and the profiteers, whose protector, according to common knowledge, was the most influential member of the Directory—Barras. The Directory demonstrated on the Eighteenth Fructidor that it could and would defend France from the Bourbons. But during the two years that followed, it just as conclusively proved that it was not in a position to create stable bourgeois order.

At this moment the Directory revealed still another weakness. The Lyons industrial workers and silk manufacturers had been enthusiastic over Bonaparte's conquest of Italy. It had opened to them a new source of the raw materials needed in the making of silk. But when, in the absence of Bonaparte, Suvorov made his appearance in Italy and dispossessed the French, their joy suddenly changed to gloom. The same spirit of disillusion seized upon the other categories of French merchants and industrial workers. In 1799 they saw their hopes for peace rudely shattered, and realised that France would find it increasingly difficult to contend with the powerful European coalition. Meanwhile, the golden millions that Bonaparte had sent from Italy to Paris in 1796 and 1797 were being dissipated—partly on war, and partly on the official speculators and mercantile contractors who robbed the treasury with the connivance of the Directory itself. Suvorov's crushing defeat of the French in Italy at the Battle of Novi, the death of the French commander-in-chief Joubert in this engagement, the defection of all of France's Italian "allies," and the threat to the French frontiers—all these factors finally alienated the bourgeoisie from the Directory.

As for the army, what was to be said? The officers and soldiers constantly conjured up memories of Bonaparte; the rank and file openly complained of the food shortage caused by the general
thievery, and protested against being sent to the slaughter to no purpose. Suddenly there came to life—as do perpetually smouldering coals under ashes—the royalist movement in the Vendée. The Chouan leaders—Georges Cadoudal, Frotté, La-rochejaquelin—again raised their voices in Brittany and Nor-mandy. In some sections the royalists had grown sufficiently audacious to shout in the streets: "Long live Suvorov! Down with the Republic!" Young men in the thousands wandered up and down the country; having rejected military service, they had been forced to abandon their native villages. Only a political upheaval would make it possible for them to return home. The already high cost of living became prohibitive as a result of the general disorganisation of industry and the ceaseless stream of requisitions on which the speculators and profiteers were growing rich. Even General Masséna's defeat of Korsakov's Russian army at Zurich in the autumn of 1799, and Suvorov's subsequent recall by Paul, helped the Directory but little and failed entirely to reëstablish its lost prestige.

The Directory's weak attempt to put an end to the ripening danger from the Right, by leaning to the Left, was without result. The petty bourgeois masses abandoned the Jacobins, who themselves could have offered but little assistance to the Directory, even if they had been so inclined. As for the workers—they remembered the Prairial Terror of 1795, the execution of Babeuf and the expulsion of the Babouvistes in 1797, and the Directory's flagrant favouritism toward the speculating middle class. They had no reason to love the Directors and less to defend them. Their slogan had become: "We want the kind of régime during which one eats."

In brief, the condition of affairs in France in the middle of 1799 can be summed up as follows: the overwhelming majority of the property-owning classes felt that the Directory was thoroughly useless and incapable, possibly even harmful; the property-less masses held the Directory responsible for the prosperity of the thieves, speculators and embezzlers, and for the everlasting hunger and oppression of the workers; the rank and file of the army considered the Directory a band of dubious personages who permitted soldiers to go without boots and bread,
and who in several months had lost all the conquests that Napoleon had won in a dozen battles. The stage was set for the advent of a dictator.

On October 13, 1799 (the Twenty-first Vendémiaire) the Directory informed the Council of Five Hundred, “with pleasure”—thus was it expressed in the report—that General Bonaparte had landed at Fréjus. A frenzied storm of applause greeted the announcement. The entire body of national representatives rose to its feet, and shouted with joy. Pandemonium broke loose. The session was cut short. Scarcely had the deputies issued into the street and spread the news, than the entire capital went mad with joy. That same evening the performances in all of the theatres were interrupted by cries of “Vive Bonaparte!” Whole audiences rose to their feet and took up the shout. Report after report reached Paris of the unheard-of welcome accorded to the general by the people of the towns through which he passed on his way to the capital. Peasants came from the villages to cheer him. One municipal deputation after another greeted him and vowed its loyalty to him. No one—least of all Napoleon—had anticipated this sudden, spontaneous manifestation. The moment the news of Bonaparte’s landing was spread in Paris, the troops of the capital’s garrison assembled in the street and paraded to the sound of music. No one has ever discovered who gave the order for this singular demonstration. Many are of the opinion that there never was any order, and that the troops had given spontaneous vent to their enthusiasm.

On October 16 (the Twenty-fourth Vendémiaire) Bonaparte arrived in Paris. The Directory’s days were numbered; it continued to exist for only three weeks after Napoleon’s arrival. But neither Barras, who was to be forced out of politics forever, nor the Directors, who were to assist Bonaparte in burying the Directorial régime, had the slightest premonition that the end was so near.

Bonaparte’s passage from Fréjus to Paris amply demonstrated that the inhabitants looked upon him as a saviour. There were triumphal meetings, fervent speeches, illuminations, manifestations, delegations. Peasants and provincials came out to cheer him. Officers and soldiers hailed him as their leader. But all these
Bonaparte's demonstrations and all these people did not in themselves assure him of immediate success. It was important to know what the capital would say. When he was in Paris four and a half years before, he had observed the Prairial uprising in the workers' quarters. He was aware of the stubborn kind of resistance the workers might offer to a candidate for the dictatorship. It remained to be seen if they had sufficiently improved their position since the Prairial Terror to give him trouble.

As soon as he reached Paris he realised that he had nothing to fear from that direction. On the one hand, the bourgeoisie was openly hostile to the Directory, while, on the other, the Paris garrison greeted him enthusiastically as their captain and cheered him for the fresh laurels he had won in Egypt. These factors encouraged Bonaparte to hasten the execution of his coup. And then, quite unexpectedly, he discovered that in the five-membered Directory there was not a single member capable of offering any resolute resistance. Gothier, Moulin and Ducos were worthless—of no account. They had been admitted into the Directory merely because they were so doltish and stupid that Barras and Sieyès could prosecute their own designs without taking them into account. They were nonentities who could be pushed aside like straw-men.

Only two Directors were worthy of consideration—Sieyès and Barras. Sieyès had caused something of a sensation at the beginning of the Revolution with his brochure defining the position of the Third Estate. He had been, and remained, the ideologist of the upper middle class. Together with this class he had reluctantly endured the petty-bourgeois Jacobin dictatorship, had hailed the dethronement of the Jacobins on the Ninth Thermidor, had applauded the Prairial Terror of 1795 and the crushing of the plebeian masses, had resisted the restoration of the Bourbons; and together with it he now sought the consolidation of that bourgeois order which the Revolution had created, regarding the Directorial régime as worthless—in spite of the fact that he was himself one of the five Directors. He looked upon Bonaparte's return with hope, but made the mistake of underestimating the general's character and ambitions. "What we need is a sword," he stated, naïvely imagining that Bonaparte would be content to
remain the sword, while he Sieyès created a new régime of his own devising.

Barras was a man of quite a different mould. For one thing, he was far shrewder than Sieyès, if only for the reason that he was not so conceited a political moralist as his fellow Director, whose egotism often took the form of actual self-admiration. Audacious, dissolute, skeptical, Barras was a thorough-going opportunist, but sufficiently a realist to offer stubborn opposition to any would-be dictator. Power was necessary to him as a means of acquiring the material benefits he so coveted. He was bold enough to risk everything on a single turn of the card, as he had done in organising the assault on Robespierre on the Ninth Thermidor and in suppressing the royalist revolts of the Thirteenth Vendémiaire, 1795, and the Eighteenth Fructidor, 1797. He had not hidden himself underground like a mouse in Robespierre's day, as Sieyès had done—the Sieyès, who in answer to the question as to how he had occupied himself during the Jacobin dictatorship, replied: "I remained alive." Barras had long since burned his bridges behind him. He was acutely aware that the royalists and Jacobins hated him, and he gave mercy neither to the one nor to the other, knowing that he could expect none from them if they should ever come into power. He was quite willing to aid Bonaparte, since unfortunately Bonaparte had managed to return from Egypt, healthy and uninjured. During the critical pre-Brumaire days, he visited Bonaparte frequently, sent him stealthy messages to encourage negotiations, and made every effort to secure for himself a position of power in the future order.

However, it did not take long for Bonaparte to decide that Barras must be discarded. Not that he lacked merits: there were not many politicians in high office who equalled him in shrewdness, in boldness, in refined skill, and in cunning. It was a pity that he would have to be shelved, but there was no other alternative—Barras had simply made himself impossible. He was not merely hated; he was loathed. His shameless thievery, his odious venality, his dishonest associations with contractors and speculators, his orgies flaunted in full view of the starving masses—all this had made his name a symbol of the putrescence, corruption and disintegration of the Directorial order.
Sieyès, on the other hand, received encouragement from Bonaparte from the very beginning. Not only had he a more savoury reputation, but, being a Director, he could in passing over to Napoleon’s side, impart to the whole affair something of a “lawful” aspect. As with Barras, Bonaparte was careful not to disillusion Sieyès too soon. He was particularly solicitous with him, for he would need him a while longer, before and after the upheaval.

During these days two men whose names were to be linked with his career, appeared before him—Talleyrand and Fouché. Bonaparte had known Talleyrand for a long time; he had known him as a thief, as a bribe-taker, as a conscienceless career-seeker, but also as a very shrewd man. That, given the opportunity, Talleyrand would not scruple to sell anyone for whom there were buyers, Bonaparte had not the least doubt; but at this moment he knew that Talleyrand would not sell him to the Directory, and that, on the contrary, he would sell the Directory to him, despite the fact that he had until very recently served it in the capacity of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Talleyrand gave his future employer many valuable hints and greatly accelerated the coming events. Bonaparte had the utmost respect for his intelligence and astuteness, and the prompt resolution with which he offered his services seemed a most propitious omen.

Fouché was no less open in offering himself. He had served the Directory as Minister of Police, and he proposed to remain in this office under Bonaparte. Napoleon was aware of the fact that Fouché possessed one undeniable merit: he would never consider betraying his new master to the Bourbons, for he had been a terror-ist in the days of the Jacobins and, consequently, Bourbon restoration would seal his own death warrant. Assured on this point, Napoleon accepted his services.

During the three and a half nerve-racking weeks preceding the governmental upheaval, Bonaparte conferred with many people, and made many observations upon them with an eye to the future. With the exception of Talleyrand, the men whom Napoleon interviewed imagined that this brilliant warrior, who at the age of 30 was recognised as the greatest military strategist of his day, was unconcerned with political and civic matters. They fondly believed that after he came into power, he would turn over to them
the management of the affairs of State. Even to the last moment they were deceived as to his real ambitions, for during these crucial days he did everything in his power to foster their illusions. There was no purpose in revealing his lion’s claw prematurely. All those who came into contact with him were struck with the simplicity, directness and spontaneity of their reception—there was a note of plainness and even limitation about it which boded well for their future careers. His conscious efforts to give this impression were wholly successful. His future bondmen regarded their master as a convenient chance instrument, and he, in turn, had no objection to their temporarily having this opinion of him. He knew that the time was passing when people might still talk to him on terms of equality, and he also knew how important it was that they should not suspect it prematurely. Yet, even now, as always, he remained the commander-in-chief, furnishing everyone with instructions for the projected undertaking. Shrewdly, he conveyed the impression to the army and to the workers that the upheaval was a revolution to the Left—a delivery of the Republic from the royalists. So successful was his disguise that even after the coup d’état, people were wont to shout: “General Bonaparte has arrived from Egypt, again to save the Republic.”

Having secured the support of the army and having calmed the workers, Bonaparte had nothing to fear from bourgeois opposition. He knew that the more powerful elements in the bourgeoisie—“the rich sections”—were suspected of royalist tendencies. He knew too, that the royalists dreamed of the overthrow of the Directory as the first step toward restoration; therefore, he did not anticipate any resistance from them, even if they should be in a position to resist. He was equally certain of the support of the middle-class, who would uphold any government—even a dictatorship—that promised to establish strong bourgeois “order.”

The coup d’état that catapulted Bonaparte into power is commonly known as the Eighteenth Brumaire (November 9, 1799). As matters stood immediately before the upheaval, Napoleon had nothing to fear from the Directory itself. Two of the Directors—Sieyès and Ducos—were in on the game. Two others—Gothier and Moulin—had been roundly duped by the sly, enterprising
Fouché. There remained only Barras, and he, flattering himself with the hope that Bonaparte would not be able to get along without him, had decided to play a waiting game. In the Council of Five Hundred and in the Council of Elders many influential deputies scented a conspiracy—some even knew of it—but the majority, without having any precise knowledge of what was going on, sympathised with the conspirators, supposing that the issue would lead only to certain personal changes.

The rôles were finally allotted on the eve of the Eighteenth Brumaire. At six the next morning Bonaparte’s house and the street in which it stood began to fill with generals and officers. Napoleon knew that he could depend upon 8,000 of the men attached to the Paris garrison. In addition, there were the 1,500 men of the special guard which protected the Directory and the two legislative houses, and there was no reason to suppose that they would raise arms in opposition to him. Nevertheless, it was highly important from the very beginning to mask the true character of the undertaking, and to avoid giving the Left section of the Council of Five Hundred the opportunity, in a critical moment, of calling upon the soldiers “to defend the Republic.” For this reason, Bonaparte so organised his thrust as to make it appear that the two legislative bodies had themselves called upon him to take over the authority. At dawn on the Eighteenth Brumaire, his trusted generals and officers gathered around him, Bonaparte declared that the day had come. Now, immediately, it was essential to strike “to save the Republic.” His aides—Murat, Leclerc, Bernadotte, Macdonald, Augereau and several others—vouched for their units. Well-formed columns of troops stood waiting in the neighbourhood. The fuse was set. . . . Meanwhile, a significant decree was being pushed through the hastily convoked Council of Elders, assembled in the Tuileries palace. . . .

Cornet, a deputy devoted to Bonaparte, had taken the floor and was at the moment haranguing the representatives about a “terrible conspiracy of the terrorists” . . . of the approaching destruction of the Republic by these birds of prey, ready to peck it to death . . . of this danger and of that danger, until he had gradually worked them into a state of fearful uncertainty. His foggy and empty-ringing phrases, defining nothing concretely, naming
no one in particular, ended in a proposal to vote an immediate decree transferring the meetings of the Council of Elders and the Council of Five Hundred from Paris to Saint-Cloud, and empowering General Bonaparte to execute the proposed act, while at the same time appointing him chief of all the armed forces in Paris and its environs. The decree was promptly passed. No one dared utter a protest.

Immediately upon its enactment, the decree was despatched to Bonaparte and his fellow conspirators.

Why was it necessary for Bonaparte to transfer the two legislative bodies to Saint-Cloud before strangling them? Principally, he had in mind the lessons learned during the revolutionary years. He felt that it would be injudicious to attempt a coup that might accidentally go astray because of interference from the masses. He recalled the amazing promptness with which they had taken up arms in defence of their representatives in the past. There rose before his mind the picture of the storming of the Bastille, when, in response to the threat that the representatives of the people would be dispersed, had come the cry: "Tell your master that we are here by the will of the people, and that we shall yield only to the force of bayonets!"—and when the master had not dared to send bayonets, the bayonets themselves had turned against the Bastille. He had memories of how the masses had snuffed out a 1,300-year-old institution, of how the Girondists had been crushed of how in Prairial of 1795 the people had carried the head of a Convention member on a pike and had exhibited it to the other members of the Convention, who gazed upon it, numbed with horror. . . . Bonaparte, aware of all this, knew that no matter how much confidence he might have in himself, it would be most hazardous to attempt to dissolve the people's legislators in the capital. Saint-Cloud, a little town whose sole structure was the suburban palace of the old French kings, was an ideal place for such a thrust, for it was sufficiently far from Paris to make it impossible for the workers to interfere. . . .

The beginning of the programme went off according to Bonaparte's prearranged plan: the fiction of legality was maintained, and, on the basis of the decree, he proclaimed to the troops that
henceforth they were under his command and must "escort" both councils to Saint-Cloud.

Then, leading his troops to the Tuileries, he surrounded it. Accompanied by several adjutants, he walked into the hall where the Council of Elders was assembled. He stammered a number of words—except when addressing his soldiers, he was never a forceful public speaker, either before or after this episode. On this occasion he was not particularly coherent, but the gist of his words was plain enough: he was ordering the council to adjourn its session and move immediately, under military convoy, to Saint-Cloud. Some of those present remembered the phrase: "We want a republic founded on freedom, on equality, on the sacred principles of popular representation. . . . And we shall have it, I swear on it." But the matter was already beyond oratorical effects; from this day on there would be no more of the parliamentary eloquence that had played so important a rôle in revolutionary France.

When he had finished his rambling address, he walked out into the street. Before him stood the advance guard of his troops. They cheered him lustily. At this moment, a quite unexpected scene transpired. A man named Botto ran up to the general and began talking to him. He had been sent by Barras, who was greatly perturbed because Bonaparte had not sent for him. On seeing Botto, Napoleon turned toward him, as though he were the representative of the Directory itself, and thundered: "What have you done with that France which I left with you in such a brilliant state? I left you peace; I find war! I left you victories; I find defeats! I left you the Italian millions; I find pillaging laws and poverty! What have you done with the hundred thousand Frenchmen whom I knew, comrades in my glory? They are dead!" Then followed a repetition of the words about his aspirations to a republic founded "on equality, morality, civic freedom and political tolerance."

The Directory—the supreme executive authority of the Republic—was liquidated without the slightest difficulty. There was not even the need for killing or arresting anyone. Sieyès and Ducos were themselves in the conspiracy; Gothier and Moulin, realising at last that everything was lost, went along with the
troops to Saint-Cloud. There remained only Barras, and to him Bonaparte despatched Talleyrand with the commission of "persuading" him to sign his resignation at once. When Barras realised that Napoleon had resolved to do without him, he promptly signed the necessary paper, at the same time announcing that he had long desired to abandon public life and retire to the quiet of his estate. Without the loss of a moment, he was escorted to his new abode, under convoy of a platoon of dragoons. So, for all time, Barras departed from the political scene; Barras who until now had successfully duped everyone, was now duped himself.

Thus the Directory was dissolved.

There now remained only the matter of liquidating the two legislative bodies.

Although the Council of Elders and the Council of Five Hundred, surrounded by Bonaparte's troops, were wholly in his hands, he hoped peacefully to persuade them to admit their own incapacity and to dissolve themselves, at the same time turning over their authority to him. This effort to achieve his designs with some pretence of legality and without the use of armed force, was entirely alien to his nature. But on this occasion he could not be absolutely certain of the unwavering loyalty of his troops. These soldiers whom he now commanded were not his old comrades in arms who had followed him in Italy and in Egypt. For the most part, he was not known personally to the rank and file, and if at the very outset he had announced his intention of destroying the Constitution by force, there would have been the possibility of their deserting him. Therefore, he planned to depose the councils peacefully, if that were possible. In the event that peaceful means were unsuccessful, he could still resort to the bayonet.

Bonaparte's commands as to the disposition of his troops between Saint-Cloud and Paris were given and executed in the early hours of the morning. With curiosity, the people of Paris watched the shifting of the battalions and saw the long procession of carriages and pedestrians moving toward Saint-Cloud. In the workers' quarters it was reported that the usual every-day labours were in progress, and that no symptoms of unrest were in evidence. Here and there in the central quarters there were occasional shouts of "Vive Bonaparte!"—but generally the mood was
one of expectancy. By evening a portion of the members of the two legislative bodies had arrived at Saint-Cloud, but the majority had postponed their departure until the next day, when the first session was to take place.

On the following day Bonaparte prepared to complete the coup by destroying the Council of Five Hundred. Although thus far matters had progressed according to schedule, he now had reason to feel certain grave apprehensions. To be sure, two of the three highest departments of the Directorial régime had already been dealt with: the Directory had ceased to exist, and the Council of Elders had shown itself to be a most submissive instrument, ready for self-liquidation. But in the Council of Five Hundred, 200 seats were occupied by staunch Leftists—"Jacobins," they were still called from old habit. While many of the council were ready to sell themselves for mercenary reasons or to submit out of fear, there was also this minority of quite another calibre—fragments of the great Revolutionary storms, men for whom the taking of the Bastille, the overthrow of the monarchy, the battle with the traitors, and the words "freedom, equality, or death!" were not mere empty phrases. Among them were some who did not set any great value on their own lives or on the lives of others, contending that tyrants must perish—either by the guillotine, or, where this was impossible, by the dagger of Brutus.

During the course of the preceding day, the Jacobin group had repeatedly attempted to meet in secret council to discuss ways and means of combatting what they suspected was a conspiracy to overthrow the Republic. They had been at a loss as to what course to take. Bonaparte's agents—it was revealed that even this group contained his spies—had not ceased to create confusion among them, contending that there was nothing in the decree to alarm them, that it had been adopted wholly as a means of crushing the royalist danger. The Jacobins listened; they both believed and did not believe, and when on the morning of the Nineteenth Brumaire they gathered at the session in the palace at Saint-Cloud, confusion reigned among them. At the same time the rage of several grew more and more intense.

That same morning Bonaparte, in an open carriage, rode out
of Paris toward Saint-Cloud. He was escorted by cavalry and followed by his retinue.

When he reached Saint-Cloud he learned that many of the members of the Council of Five Hundred were already showing open hostility. They had seen the masses of troops surrounding the palace, and now for the first time fully understood why their sessions had been transferred from the capital to Saint-Cloud. It was reported to Napoleon that they had referred to him as “the despot,” “the criminal,” and more often as “the brigand.” He inspected his troops—and remained content.

At one o’clock both legislative bodies went into session, each council convening in a separate room of the palace. Bonaparte and his retinue waited in the neighbouring apartments for the two bodies to vote the decrees necessary to transfer the authority to him and empower him to draft and execute a new constitution. But hour after hour went by—even the Council of Elders could come to no decision. It began to manifest confusion, and a tardy and timid desire to resist the projected illegality. Then and there Bonaparte made a firm resolve to conclude the business by evening. At four o’clock in the afternoon he suddenly made his appearance in the hall of the Council of Elders. Amidst a dead silence he uttered an even more incoherent speech than on the previous day. He demanded a speedy decision; he said that he had come to their assistance and that now they were calumniating him by comparing him with Caesar and Cromwell, that he wanted to save freedom, that at this moment no government actually existed. “I am not an intriguant; you know me. If I should prove a traitor, you would be free to act as Brutuses,” he said, inviting them to stab him, if he should make an attempt on the Republic. They began to answer him, to overwhelm him with their voices. He uttered a few threats, reminded them that he had armed forces at his disposal, and walked out of the hall without having attained his end. The undertaking was turning out badly; and the future promised even worse. It was up to him to have an understanding with the Council of Five Hundred, where, among the Jacobin portion of the assembly, the chances of meeting with a real disciple of Brutus were far more likely.
Several grenadiers followed him. But there were scarcely enough of them in the event of a mass physical assault on him, and this was something that might be expected. After him, among others, walked General Augereau, who had been with him during the Italian campaign. Just before he entered the session hall Bonaparte turned sharply and said: Augereau, do you remember Arcole?" He had suddenly recalled that terrible moment when, with the standard in his hands, he had flung himself into the thick of the Austrian fire and taken the Arcole bridge. And, actually, he now was faced with a situation that bore a striking similarity to that episode.

He opened the door, and showed himself on the threshold. Savage, angry outcries greeted him: "Down with the brigand! Down with the dictator! Deal with him outside the law! At once, outside the law!" A group of deputies made a rush for him. Hands grasped out at him and caught him by the collar. Others sought to clench his throat. One deputy struck him with full force on the shoulder. Bonaparte was in a precarious position. Small, as yet still lean, never of great physical strength, nervous, subject to fits resembling epilepsy—he was half smothered by the enraged deputies. Several grenadiers succeeded in pressing back the overwhelming human mass which had fallen upon him. Surrounded by his soldiers, he left the assembly hall. When he had gone, the deputies returned to their places. With wild shouts they demanded that a vote be taken on the proposal proclaiming Bonaparte to be outside the law.

Coming to himself after the terrible scene in the assembly hall, Napoleon made up his mind to disperse the Council of Five Hundred by means of force. He sent into the hall for his brother Lucien, who was the acting chairman of the Council of Five Hundred, as well as a party to the conspiracy. Lucien appeared and suggested that, since he was the chairman of the Council, it might impress the troops with the legality of the proceedings if he addressed them. Napoleon agreed, and Lucien, in his capacity of chairman, charged the soldiers "to liberate the majority of the Council" from "the swarms of rabid dogs." The soldiers' last doubts in the matter of legality vanished. Napoleon gave the or-
order to clear the hall. The roll of drums resounded. Led by Murat, the grenadiers entered the palace in double time.

While the roll of drums was rapidly nearing the hall in which the Council of Five Hundred was in session, voices rose among the deputies, proposing resistance and death rather than surrender. Then the doors swung open, and the grenadiers, their rifles atilt, ran into the hall. Still in double time, they moved around the room, clearing it of deputies. The beating of the drums drowned out all other sounds. The deputies broke into flight. They ran through the doors. Many flung open the windows or broke them, and sprang through them to the ground. The whole scene lasted from three to five minutes. Napoleon had ordered that the deputies be neither killed nor arrested. Those of the Council who had escaped via the doorways or the windows found themselves surrounded on all sides by troops. Above the roll of the drums there suddenly sounded the thunderous voice of Murat, addressing the soldiers: “Throw out all these people!”—words which rang in their ears not only during these first instants, but which were to ring in the memories of many of them for all time, as we know from published recollections.

A new idea came into Bonaparte’s mind—possibly inspired by his brother Lucien. He suddenly commanded the soldiers to catch some of the escaping deputies and bring them into the palace. When enough of them had been caught, they were ordered to reassemble in the council hall as “a sitting of the Council of Five Hundred.” At this second “session” Bonaparte commanded the “Council” to pass the decrees he needed. It acceded to every demand, after which it was permitted to depart, having voted its own dismissal.

In the evening, in one of the dimly lighted halls of the palace, the Council of Elders, without discussion, issued a degree transferring the entire authority of the Republic to three persons, called Consuls. The men appointed to the consulships were Bonaparte, Sieyès and Ducos. This was in accordance with Bonaparte’s desire. For the time being, he had no intention of being formally proclaimed the sole master of France. That would
come later. And, actually, he knew that as one of the Consuls he would be a complete dictator. He had definitely decided that his two colleagues should not play the slightest rôle in the new régime. The more simple-minded Ducos was already convinced of this, but the profounder Sieyès, as yet unsuspecting, was to find it out in a short time.

France was at Bonaparte's feet. At two o'clock in the morning the three Consuls took an oath of loyalty to the Republic, and Bonaparte returned to Paris.
From the moment, on the evening of the Nineteenth Brumaire at Saint-Cloud, that Murat reported to Napoleon that the hall of the Council of Five Hundred had been cleared and that everything was proceeding auspiciously, there was established in France for the space of 15 years a monarchy and an autocracy, and Bonaparte was transformed into a sovereign enjoying unlimited authority. The fact that during the first five years of this period the autocrat called himself First Consul, and during the final ten years he took the title of Emperor, changed nothing substantially in the content of his military dictatorship. He destroyed, created and changed the governmental departments, but their significance and their purpose remained the same. Their sole function was to serve as superficial instruments for the accomplishment of the one supreme will.

The same was true in the European countries which later fell under the influence of the conqueror. In some places Napoleon appointed his brothers or his marshals as kings, while in others he permitted the conquered monarchs to remain; but in both cases the crown-bearers had to render him absolute submission or lose their thrones.

In all his political undertakings, Napoleon's ultimate purpose was to establish and consolidate his complete supremacy. He employed many diverse means for its realisation—among them diplomacy. He possessed the capacity, upon occasion, of compromising, of concluding peace, meanwhile waiting in patience for the propitious moment to strike. With the years he began to lose
something of this ability, but at the beginning of his rule it was very much in evidence.

To many of the contemporaries who survived him it seemed that the years of the Consulship were Napoleon's best years, and the happiest for France during the whole of his reign. Authors of memoirs, eulogists of Napoleon, have described the period of the Consulship as a sort of untroubled, unclouded Arcadia, when trade, industry, science, art and social customs flourished; when the zealous, clear-eyed ruler, after the storms and catastrophes, created out of the fragments a new land and a new nation. Not until later was the demon of ambition to torment his soul and gain mastery over his sage will.

It was during the Consulship that Napoleon laid down the solid basis of the administrative, juridical and social structure by which bourgeois France has existed since then, and which it is now trying to preserve. Political authority in France has undergone frequent change. The Consulship was displaced by the Empire, the Empire by a constitutional monarchy, the dynasty of the Bonapartes by the dynasty of the Bourbons, the Bourbons by the House of Orleans, the House of Orleans by the Republic, the Republic once more by the dynasty of the Bonapartes, and then again by the Republic; the Revolution came and went, war followed war—all but one thing went on changing, and that was the strong skeleton structure created by the first Bonaparte. Today the same prefects rule over France; there is the same organisation of all of the ministries (even to the organisation of the departments and official head clerks), the same powerful police and secret service, the same statute book, "The Code of Napoleon", which regulates all the juridical and property relations of the French people, the same judicial rules, the same bureaucratic arrangements, the same educational system.

The apparatus of centralised governmental authority—later it was to become the basis for an unlimited monarchy—was created by Napoleon in the years of the Consulship. And with only one exception, none of the many governments which have ruled France from Napoleon's day to the present showed any inclination to change it in even the smallest detail. The sole exception was the Paris Commune.
The First Consul’s administrative reforms have always enraptured bourgeois historians. They are lost in admiration of Bonaparte’s creation of conditions guaranteeing the peaceful acquisition of money in trade and industry—in short, of the systematisation and clarification of everything that the bourgeoisie had fought for in the great cataclysm of 1789 and the years that followed. Napoleon’s constructive rôle as the “creator” of those outer forms of governmental superstructure which ensured the economic domination of the bourgeoisie, was particularly evident during the Consulship.

Thus the 30-year-old general, who had hitherto occupied himself solely with war, in a single blow destroyed the legal government of the Republic, and became, on the evening of the Nineteenth Brumaire, the autocrat of one of the greatest European states—a state which was still a stranger to him. Here was a nation which had enjoyed an historical political life of 1,300 years, even if one is to count only from the time of Clovis. This 1,300-year-old institution was destroyed by the Revolution, which had also ended the feudal order. The Republic had lived its short life, to be discarded by a Corsican soldier. Before him rose colossal difficulties, consisting of fragments of the old régime, new attitudes and forces born of the Revolution—a great many things begun and unfinished, or begun and cast aside, or cast aside and begun again: everything was in a state of chaos and ferment.

Beyond the frontiers of France lurked still other dangers. While Napoleon was engaged in conquering Egypt, the second European coalition reconquered Italy. Suvorov’s campaign robbed France of the fruits of Bonaparte’s victories of 1796-1797. To be sure, Suvorov lacked the strength to cross the Alps and invade France, as he had intended to do; but the Allies had by no means laid down their arms, and during the coming spring they would again threaten the French frontiers. There was no money in the French treasury. For months, entire army detachments had not received the sums necessary for their maintenance.

So it was with curiosity, not unmixed with irony, that active and experienced politicians watched to see how the young soldier, who hitherto had been engaged exclusively in military affairs, would
act under conditions so complicated, so entangled and so dangerous.

Bonaparte began by organising his autocracy. Not without inner humour is it possible to observe his first meetings with the old politicians—men like Sieyès who did not conceal their ambition of taking the leading rôles and acting as preceptors and mentors to the inexperienced young general. Napoleon even then regarded the professional politicians of contemporary France as antiquated chatters, too blind to see that their time had passed. He loathed the Jacobins—and was afraid of them. Of Maximilien and Augustin Robespierre, with whom he had been on such excellent terms, he never spoke: it was clear that he was well aware of the potential strength of those who had caused Robespierre's downfall. But, for the Thermidorian speculators, embezzlers and bribe-takers who concealed their dark little deeds with empty rhetoric, he had nothing but contempt.

Sieyès, whom Napoleon entrusted with the task of framing the new Constitution, zealously pondered over cleverly conceived and cunningly composed constitutional programmes, forgetting that what the bourgeoisie now demanded was a firm police order and a strengthening of the reforms won in the Revolution, especially those which touched upon freedom in commerce and industry. He overlooked the fact that the peasant landowners wanted complete assurance of the inviolability of their ownership of newly acquired lands. Abruptly and unexpectedly, Bonaparte called Sieyès's projects absurd, then gave some guiding directions and made "corrections."

The new Constitution was ready within a month after the upheaval. The heads of the Republic were the three Consuls, of whom the first was invested with full powers of authority, while the other two had the right to a consulting vote. The Consuls appointed the Senate, and the Senate, in turn, selected the members of the legislative departments from a group of several thousand candidates chosen by the public at large. Bonaparte, of course, was "appointed" First Consul.

The actual authority was concentrated in his hands. The remaining departments assumed the appearance of pale shadows.
They never had the slightest influence, nor had they pretensions of having any in the future. Sieyès was at a loss; he felt humiliated. But Bonaparte richly rewarded him with empty honours, while forever dismissing him from any kind of active rôle. He needed servants and executives, not advisers and law-givers.

It promptly became apparent that he had no need of criticism either. By a decree passed shortly after the new Constitution went into effect, he ordered that 60 of the 73 existing newspapers be closed, while the 13 that remained were subjected to stern police censorship. Actually, after a short interval, only four were permitted to survive. Temperamentally, Napoleon could not abide anything that even savoured of freedom of the press. These first steps clearly indicated the range of his authority.

When the Consuls assumed the leadership of the State, they promised that before the new Constitution went into effect it would be voted upon by the whole nation. But Napoleon suddenly announced that the Constitution would become operative at once, even before a plebiscite. What need had he for a vote of approval from the people; he knew that his unlimited power had been given him by his grenadiers on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Brumaire, and not at all by the nation. Why, then, should he bother with an all-national plebiscite, which in the circumstances was quite superfluous? In the future he would be beholden only to his grenadiers—that is, to himself. Force alone was important in gaining and holding authority. "Large battalions are always in the right," became one of his favourite sayings. The large battalions had conquered France for him on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Brumaire, just as previously they had conquered Italy and Egypt, and were later to conquer all of Europe. According to his conviction, no one could ask him for an accounting or expect to share in his authority.

The poet Goethe rightly said of Napoleon that for him power was like a musical instrument in the hands of a great artist. Though he had scarcely taken possession of it, the First Consul began to play upon this instrument with all the skill of a great master. As his first step, he seized upon the twin problems of ending the civil war in western France and of destroying the extensive brigandage in the South and North. He made great haste,
Bonaparte as there were far more important matters to settle before the spring, when the renewal of war impended.

Toward the end of the Directory's reign, all roads in southern and central France had been made impassable by bands of brigands. They were looked upon as a serious public menace. In broad daylight they stopped diligences and carriages in the main roads, sometimes contenting themselves with robbery, but more often killing the passengers. They openly attacked villages, torturing their victims on slow flames for hours, to make them confess where they had hidden their money. Now and then they made assaults on the larger towns with the same impunity. In a political sense, they were anti-Revolutionary, consisting for the most part of men who had suffered personally and directly from the overthrow of the monarchy. They screened themselves under the standard of the Bourbons, and attempted to create the impression that they were avenging the fate of the dethroned royalty and the Catholic altar. There were rumours, never authenticated but bearing the stamp of truth, that some of the brigand leaders yielded a portion of their plunder to the royalist agents. In any event, because of the disintegration and confusion existing in the police system toward the end of the Directorial régime these bands and their crimes went unpunished. The First Consul resolved to put an end to them. It took him a year to wipe out brigandage entirely, though the chief bands were disposed of during the first months of his rule.

He took the severest possible measures. There were to be no prisoners. Brigands who were caught were to be executed on the spot, and the same fate awaited those who gave them shelter or bought their booty. Military detachments were despatched, and these dealt ruthlessly not only with the criminals and their accomplices, but also with police officials found guilty of toleration or laxity in the performance of their duties.

Here was revealed another Napoleonic trait—his complete lack of mercy toward criminals. He considered that one crime was as bad as any other; he knew no modifying circumstances, nor wanted to know any. He literally rejected goodness in principle. He counted it a quality which for a ruler was injurious, hence
inadmissible. On one occasion his younger brother Louis, whom he appointed King of Holland in 1806, thought to flatter himself by saying that he was very much beloved by the Dutch. Hearing these words, Napoleon gravely said: "Brother, when they say of some king or other that he is good, it means that he has failed in his rule."

A similar episode occurred in April of 1811, when the newspaper Gazette de France, in an excess of zeal, spoke of the "goodness" of the Emperor who, overjoyed at the birth of an heir, had gratified a petitioner. Seeing the reference to himself in the publication, Napoleon flew into such a fury that he immediately wrote to the Minister of the Police: "Monsieur Duke Rovigo: Who has allowed the Gazette de France to print such a stupid article as the one about me in today's issue?" He commanded that the editor be promptly dismissed, for being "guilty of too many platitudes. . . . Take the editorship of the paper away from him!" It would seem that Bonaparte might more easily have forgiven someone for spreading the report that he was a wild beast, than for wrongly accusing him of being "good."

All this was to manifest itself more fully in the course of time, but already his merciless treatment of the brigands revealed that the new ruler, rejecting the well-known aphorism, was firmly of the mind that it was better to punish ten innocent people than to allow a single guilty person to escape. . . .

Simultaneously with the purging of France of these brigand bands, Bonaparte turned his attention to the Vendée.

Here, in the Vendée, the nobility and the clergy had attracted to themselves a portion of the peasantry, whom they organised and armed with excellent weapons supplied by the English. Taking advantage of the woods and the bogs, they carried on a prolonged guerrilla warfare against the succeeding governments of the Revolution. Against the Vendéens—or Chouans, as they were commonly known—Bonaparte adopted a tactic quite different from the one which he employed against the brigands. Immediately before the upheaval of the Eighteenth Brumaire, the Chouans had won a series of victories over the Republican troops. They had taken the town of Nantes and now talked loudly of the
early restoration of the Bourbons. On the one hand, Bonaparte reinforced the army combatting the Chouans; on the other, he promised amnesty to all rebels who would lay down their arms at once, making it clear at the same time that he would not persecute the worship of Catholicism. Finally, he arranged a meeting with the famous Chouan leader, Georges Cadoudal, promising him complete personal safety during his stay in Paris and a safe return, no matter how the conference ended.

Thus, this fanatical Breton peasant of enormous stature and legendary physical strength found himself for several hours alone in the company of the still lean but somewhat stocky Bonaparte. Anxious adjutants hovered in the neighbouring rooms; for they all knew Cadoudal was capable of any self-sacrifice for his cause and that he had long looked upon himself as a consecrated being.

But he did not make any attempt on Bonaparte’s life. In matter of fact he saw in Napoleon a possible future ally. Like so many other royalists in the years of the Consulship, he labored under the delusion that Bonaparte was destined to play the same rôle in France that General Monk had played in England in 1660, when he assisted the banished Stuarts to return to the throne and destroy the republic. Naturally, this was farthest from Napoleon’s mind. A nature such as his was quite incapable of yielding first place to anyone, even if such a course had been feasible from a practical standpoint.

Cadoudal did not strangle Bonaparte, but he left his study by no means reconciled. Among other things, the First Consul had offered him a generalship in the army, with the proviso, of course, that he should engage in battle only against the external foe. Cadoudal refused the offer and returned to the Vendée to continue the struggle. But from that time on he had to content himself with ambush assaults upon small detachments of soldiers. Another important Chouan leader, Frotté, was taken prisoner and shot. The successes of the Government troops, the promise of amnesty, the modification of the anti-Catholic policy, and the hope of the Bourbons that in Napoleon they would find an ally—all this did much to reduce the fighting capacity of the Chouans. Cadoudal saw that his detachments were thinning out. There de-
veloped in the Vendée a mood of expectancy and an inclination to cajole and predispose the new head of the French Republic in favour of the royalists. For the time being Bonaparté required nothing more. What was essential to him during these early months was the execution of only the most unavoidable measures, all the while keeping in mind the war which threatened France in the spring.

He passed from one urgent matter to another—from the brigands to the Chouans, from the Chouans to the vital matter of finances. He needed money to equip and feed the immense army which he was getting ready for the spring. There were no funds at his disposal, for the Directory had done a thorough job of clearing out the contents of the treasury. Napoleon needed a specialist—and an excellent specialist—and he promptly found one in Gaudin, whom he appointed Minister of Finance.

In the matter of financial policy, Bonaparté and Gaudin saw eye to eye. Both felt that indirect taxation would be far more effective than direct taxation. Indirect taxation, demanding in the final reckoning the same payments from the rich and the poor, appealed to Napoleon because of its conveniently automatic character: there could be no source of quarrel here between the tax-payer and the government tax-collector, since in the purchase of articles of utility, no matter how heavily taxed, there were no collectors, nor could there be. The Revolution had made some indecisive attempts to replace indirect taxation with direct taxation, but Bonaparté put an end to these measures immediately.

The bourgeoisie both in city and country was content with the new financial policy. It was gratified also with several other financial measures, such as the establishment of a control, the regulation of accounts, the rigourous prosecution of plundering and embezzling. For the first time since the Ninth Thermidor, the embezzlers—and there were so many of them that the historian sometimes is tempted to segregate them into a special “layer” of the bourgeoisie—began to lose their confidence in the future, and arrived at the conclusion that their specialty was becoming almost as dangerous as it had been during Robespierre’s rule.

Speculators and embezzlers soon felt the heavy hand of the new master. He sent to the gaol the then-famous contractor and
Bonaparte

grafted Ouvrard, and stimulated the prosecution of several others. He ordered that their accounts be rigidly audited; he held back payments which seemed to him to have no adequate basis. Several times he resorted to a peculiar method of his own devising. If he believed that a financier had been guilty of fraud, he would put him in gaol, no matter how adroitly the accused had succeeded in covering his traces. The prisoner would be held in confinement until he consented to yield his loot. This was, of course, a most arbitrary procedure, but in the final result, the thefts materially decreased.

Every State department was required to make an accounting of the disposition of each and every sou granted it. The system was first introduced into the army, whose affairs, in view of the approach of military operations, required the most prompt attention.

The Revolutionary governments which preceded Napoleon had divided France geographically into a number of departments. This inheritance Napoleon retained, but he lost no time in stamping out all traces of local self-government. All elective governmental offices were abolished. Henceforth, it became the function of the Minister of Internal Affairs to appoint a prefect for each department—a sovereign and master, a petty local tsar. The prefects, in turn, were commissioned to appoint the municipal councils, as well as the mayors of the cities and communes (villages). All local officials appointed by the prefect were responsible to him alone.

Associated with the prefect was a purely consultative organ—the chief council. It was wholly dependent upon him and served exclusively as a convenient method of acquainting him with the needs of the department. The Minister of Internal Affairs controlled the entire administrative life of the country, including commerce, industry, social labours and many other matters, which later were removed from his jurisdiction and transferred to other ministries.

The judicial department was also subjected to sharp reforms. In the middle of March, the First Consul signed a law creating a Ministry of Justice. The juridical arrangement created by that law has remained to the present day. In transforming the courts,
Napoleon abolished the jury system. His autocratic nature could not reconcile itself to giving society an independent voice in judicial decisions. Even Justice must depend wholly on his will. Next he created the Ministry of Police as a department entirely distinct from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ministry of Police was responsible to the First Consul alone. It was characteristic of him to assign all matters that immediately concerned the defense of the autocratic authority from domestic foes, to a ministry under his own supervision. He took great care in organising the prefecture of the Paris police. The prefect of the Paris police, although ostensibly responsible to the Minister of Police, made his reports personally to the First Consul. Generally speaking, the First Consul made it clear from the very beginning that he wished to have in the person of the Prefect of Police of Paris a controlling, informing instrument which might assist him in maintaining strict surveillance over the too powerful Minister of Police.

Bonaparte so organised his political police that they would spy not only on the people, but also on one another. At the head of the Ministry of Police, he placed Fouché, who was an adroit spy, a shrewd provocateur and a crafty intrigant—in a word, the most useful kind of detective-specialist. At the same time, Napoleon knew that were the occasion ever to arise, Fouché would not hesitate to betray him to his enemies. In order to obviate the danger from this direction, the First Consul employed spies of his own to spy on Fouché. And so that he would know the precise moment when Fouché noticed this and tried to buy them, Bonaparte maintained yet a second group of spies, whose function was to watch the spies watching Fouché.

Already in the first winter of his rule, Bonaparte had organised a trustworthy machine of centralised government, coördinated in all its parts and directed by the bureaucratic chiefs in Paris. In the framing the new Constitution, Bonaparte’s fundamental purpose had been the creation of unlimited authority centralised in the hands of the First Consul.

Bonaparte once said: “Yes, yes, write it so that it is both brief and ambiguous.” In these words he stated his general principles: when the matter concerns the constitutional limitation of the
upper authority, it is necessary to write as briefly and as foggily as possible. If ever on this earth there existed a king congenitally incapable of living in harmony with any sort of any real limitation of his authority however modest, it was Napoleon.

Shortly after the Eighteenth Brumaire, Sieyès's naïve misapprehension concerning Napoleon's aspirations vanished like smoke. When Sieyès presented to Napoleon his own draft of the proposed Constitution, he still had reason to feel that the young general was unconcerned with internal politics. In his version of the Constitution he provided for the appointment of an official chief representative of the nation—an office similar to the present presidency of the French Republic—surrounded by the highest distinctions and provided with a handsome income. But the actual governing was to be done by others, appointed by the chief representative but by no means dependent upon him. Sieyès, in his innocence, suggested that Napoleon fill this office. Napoleon promptly announced: "I shall never play such a ridiculous rôle," and unconditionally rejected Sieyès's project. Sieyès attempted to persist; he began to argue. . . . Almost immediately he was visited by the Minister of Police, Fouché, who confidentially and in all friendliness reminded him that the entire armed force of the country lay in Bonaparte's hands, and that for this reason there was no particular advantage to be gained by persisting in his arguments—quite the contrary, in fact. This had the desired effect on Sieyès, who thereafter remained silent.

"The Constitution of the Eighth Year of the Republic," as the document finally approved by Napoleon was called, adhered to the main Napoleonic principle of centralisation of power. The whole fullness of authority was concentrated in the hands of the First Consul, whose term of office was ten years. The two other Consuls, with their merely consultative voice, could be disregarded. The First Consul had the right to appoint the Senate consisting of 80 members. The First Consul appointed all civic and military officials, beginning with the ministers, who were entirely responsible to him. The legislative authority was ostensibly vested in two bodies, the Tribunate and the Legislative Corps. The members of these two institutions were selected by the Senate—in other words, by the First Consul himself—after
a personal examination of several thousand candidates who were "elected" by electors. With so large a number of candidates to choose from it was a simple matter to select 400 staunch supporters of the Government to fill the vacancies in the Tribunate and Legislative Corps. Under such conditions of selection, any kind of independent action was impossible.

In addition to these two institutions, provision was made for a State Council, directly appointed by the Government of the First Consul. The creation of this body served further to complicate the business of law-making—precisely as Bonaparte had intended it should.

The whole process of law-making was designed to be as intricate and involved as possible. It operated in the following manner: The Government introduced a law project in the State Council, whose function was to draft it into a bill and send it to the Tribunate. The Tribunate had the right to debate the issues involved, but did not have the power of decision. Having fulfilled its sole duty, the Tribunate passed the bill on to the Legislative Corps, which, in contra-distinction, had no right to discuss it, but had the power to decide upon it. After this procedure the bill was submitted to the First Consul for confirmation, whereupon it became a law.

This deliberately awkward "law-making" machine was, during the entire period of Napoleon's rule, the mute executor of his will. In 1807 he abolished the Tribunate as a completely useless institution. Little more need be said, except that for the purpose of speeding up the passage of a law, the First Consul could introduce a bill directly in the Senate, which would immediately issue the necessary law under the title of "Senatus Consultum." Thus the entire scope of the actual legislative authority, like the executive authority, was concentrated in Bonaparte's hands.

By the spring of 1800 the new autocrat had disposed of the most urgent affairs of State. He had given shape to the new governmental structure; he had wiped out many if not all of the brigand bands in the South; he had executed measures for the modification of the conditions in the Vendée; he had achieved the centralisation of the administrative authority of the country; and he had taken the first steps in the suppression of speculative
plundering and official embezzling. The immense, skillfully devised net of police espionage, under the guidance of Fouché, soon spread across the country.

Joseph Fouché was a born spy. The ancient Romans had an adage: "Orators are made, but poets are born." Fouché was the "poet" of the business of spying, and Napoleon offered ample scope to his creativeness. But being fully aware of his diverse qualities and his rather excessively many-sided nature, the First Consul kept him under the constant secret surveillance of his own private spies. Bonaparte realised that, having to leave in the spring on a distant campaign, he must strongly secure the political rear. He knew that as soon as he left the country the permanency of his autocracy would depend not upon the Constitution but upon the Ministry of Police. Therefore, he supplied the police with adequate funds, at the same time strengthening the newly created administrative machine by providing it with an efficient personnel. Finally he placed an iron-clad censorship over the newspapers.

But in April of 1800, a month before Napoleon's departure for the war with Austria, Fouché learned of the existence of an Anglo-royalist agency in Paris. The Minister of Police presented irrefutable proof of his discovery to the First Consul, implicated two of the princes of the House of Bourbon—Louis, Count of Provence, and Charles, Count of Artois. Quite openly, the royalists, assisted by the English and other interventionists, were preparing to overthrow the Government. The English, in their turn, were seeking the favour of the royalists, who stood ready to make all manner of economic and political concessions to the English bourgeoisie, provided they received the aid necessary to achieve the restoration of the Bourbons. Bonaparte had been well aware of the English attitude since January, when, in answer to his proposal for peaceful negotiations, King George III had counseled him to restore the Bourbons to the French throne.

The First Consul became confirmed in his belief that one of the most serious internal problems was the ruthless destruction of the royalists, while the main problem of foreign affairs was the stubborn struggle with England. Fouché received corresponding orders with regard to the active royalists. He was commanded to
keep them under constant surveillance, make arrests, and institute judicial proceedings whenever possible. In deciding upon the tactics to employ against the royalists, Napoleon was guided by an axiom which he often repeated: “There are two levers by which human beings may be moved—fear and personal interest.” To him “personal interest” signified not only cupidity in the strictest sense of the word, but also ambition, vanity and love of power. In dealing with the royalists, Napoleon again and again changed his tactics. On one occasion he would employ terror; on another, patronage and advancement.

But now in the spring of 1800, hurrying to join the active army, he had no time to use slower means, so he resorted to ruthless terror in crushing the traitors.

The other important problem—the struggle with England—was henceforth, even as before, to be continued not along English shores, in the presence of the powerful English fleet, but on the European continent, against the allies of England.

In May of 1800 Bonaparte left for the campaign against Austria. It was the first time he left Paris since his seizure of power. He realised that the further fate of the dictatorship depended on the results of the forthcoming war. Either he would again wrest northern Italy from Austria, or the Allies would reappear on the French frontiers.

Behind him he left a well-organised autocratic machine, which he entrusted to his ministers, demanding that they establish firm internal order in his absence.
Napoleon rarely drew up detailed plans of his campaigns beforehand. He merely noted the fundamental objectives, the major aims, and the chronological sequence of moves. Military problems claimed him exclusively only during the actual campaign, when, day by day, and sometimes hour by hour, he changed the position of his troops, adjusting himself not only to his projected aims but also to the movements of the enemy, reports of whom reached him ceaselessly. One iron-clad rule guided his entire military policy: he never considered the enemy less capable than himself, and he never concluded in advance that the foe would act less shrewdly in given conditions than he.

Before him, in occupation of northern Italy, from which Suvorov had ejected the French during the preceding year, lay the strong, well-equipped Austrian army. This time, however, there was no Suvorov to lead it, a factor of tremendous significance in the final outcome of the campaign. "An army of drums led by a lion is stronger than an army of lions led by a drum," Napoleon was to say somewhat later. He knew that Russia was no longer actively participating in the coalition, though he was as yet unaware of the fact that, while he was on the march to Italy to destroy the fruits of Suvorov's victories, Suvorov himself was being lowered into the earth in Alexandro-Nevsky Abbey, in St. Petersburg. No longer was there a Suvorov to bar his way. The Allied command had fallen to Melas, a general capable of executing
precise orders, of serving on a staff. He was one of those “correct” militarists whom Napoleon so often and so decisively defeated before and after 1800, and who never ceased to contend that Napoleon had done so by neglecting the rules. In keeping with his principle, Napoleon proceeded to act against Melas as though Melas were Napoleon, while Melas proceeded against Napoleon as though Napoleon were Melas.

The Austrians concentrated in the southern portion of the North Italian theatre of war, in the general direction of Genoa. Melas had not the imagination to suppose that Bonaparte would select the most hazardous route of march—the road from Switzerland across Great Saint Bernard Pass. Consequently, he did not station many troops there to bar the way. But it was this very road that the First Consul chose. The fierce cold of the snowy summits, the gaping abysses beneath their feet, the avalanches, the storms, the night shelters in the snow—all this Bonaparte's soldiers endured in the Alps in 1800, even as Suvorov's soldiers had endured it in 1799 and Hannibal's warriors 2,000 years before. But now cannon, gun-carriages and ammunition carts took the place of Hannibal's elephants. General Lannes led the advance guard. Behind him, stretching in an enormous line between the steep cliffs, Napoleon's entire army followed. The ascent of the Alps began on May 16. On May 21, Bonaparte and his main forces were on the Great Saint Bernard Pass. Ahead of him, on the slopes leading to Italy, skirmishes between his advance guard and the weak Austrian defence posts had already begun. The Austrians were flung back. The descent of the French toward the south was quickened, until suddenly in the last days of May Bonaparte's whole army, division after division, began to emerge from the southern Alps crevices and to deploy in the rear of the Austrian forces.

Without losing an instant, Bonaparte advanced directly upon Milan, entering this capital city of Lombardy on June 2. He promptly occupied Pavia, Cremona, Piacenza, Brescia and a number of other towns and villages, flinging back the Austrians all along the line—they had never considered the possibility of the main attack coming from this direction. Melas's army had been engaged in the siege of Genoa, which only a few days before
Bonaparte had capitulated to the Austrians. But the appearance of Bonaparte in Lombardy rendered Melas’s success in Genoa utterly negligible.

Melas made haste to meet the French army which had so unexpectedly attacked him from the north. Between the towns of Alessandria and Tortina lies a vast plain. In the middle of this plain is the tiny village of Marengo. As early as the winter of 1799-1800, while still in Paris, Bonaparte had pointed to this particular spot on a detailed map, saying to his generals: “Here's where we should smash the Austrians.” The meeting between the main Austrian and French forces occurred precisely at this point on June 14.

The Battle of Marengo was to have a tremendous effect on international policy in general, and on Bonaparte’s career in particular. A feeling of disquiet reigned throughout France. From day to day the royalists expected to learn that disaster had befallen Napoleon in the Alpine passes. There were rumors of the imminent landing of the English troops in the Vendée. The Chouan leaders—Cadoudal and his comrades—were convinced that the restoration of the Bourbons was not only assured, but that it might be effected at any moment. They only awaited a signal—news of Bonaparte’s death or of the defeat of the French army. Throughout Europe, even in neutral countries, royalist supporters tensely watched the developments in northern Italy. Everywhere they anticipated Austrian victories, after which they were prepared to join in the coalition against France. The Bourbons were getting ready to make the journey to Paris.

And Napoleon, together with his generals, officers and soldiers, was only too well aware of the significance of the game and the possibility of losing it. Not only were the Austrians more numerous and supplied with superior artillery, but they had the advantage of having enjoyed a long rest in comfortable quarters in the Italian cities and villages, while Napoleon’s army had only recently accomplished the difficult passage of the Great St. Bernard. The battle, which began on the morning of June 14 not far from Marengo, immediately revealed the strength of the Austrian armies. The French fought even as they retired, inflicting great damage on the enemy, but suffering heavy losses themselves.
At two o'clock in the afternoon the battle seemed irretrievably lost. At three o'clock the jubilant Melas sent a messenger to Vienna with news of his rout of the hitherto undefeated Bonaparte, together with a report of the capture of prisoners and trophies. Confusion reigned in the French staff, but Bonaparte himself appeared calm. Time and again he ordered the men to hold firm, contending that the battle was by no means over. And suddenly, just before five o'clock, matters took a sharp turn. General Desaix’s division, which had been sent south to cut off the enemy’s retreat, now, at this critical moment, came up to the field of battle and hurled itself on the Austrians.

The Austrians’ confidence in their complete victory was the cause of their undoing. At this hour whole detachments of them were preparing for rest and dinner. Following the onslaught of Desaix’s fresh division, Bonaparte’s entire army flung itself on the Austrians, who were completely routed. By five o’clock Melas was in full flight, pursued by the French cavalry. General Desaix himself was killed at the beginning of the attack. In the evening, after the battle, which was one of the greatest triumphs of his career, Bonaparte, with tears in his eyes, said: “How wonderful this day might have been, if only I could have embraced Desaix!” A few hours before, when in the heat of battle he had been informed that Desaix had just fallen dead from his horse, he cried: “Why am I not permitted to weep?” Only twice were his comrades-in-arms to see tears in Napoleon’s eyes after a battle. It occurred the second time several years later when Marshal Lannes, both his legs shot from under him, died in his commander-in-chief’s arms.

In the midst of the celebration at the Vienna court, after the first joyous tidings from Melas, burst a second messenger with news of the catastrophe that had occurred since the departure of the first courier. . . . Once again Italy was lost to the Austrians—this time, it seemed, forever. Bonaparte once more had proved himself unconquerable.

The first vague reports reached Paris six days after the battle, on June 20 (the First Messidor). The city awaited definite news with intense trepidation. Unconfirmed rumours were being circulated of a lost battle and of the death of Bonaparte. Suddenly,
at one o'clock in the afternoon, the cannon thundered a salute, then a second, and finally a third. A messenger had just arrived with official news of the complete rout of the Austrian army, of the capture of half the Austrian artillery, of the thousands of prisoners taken, of the thousands more slaughtered, and of Italy once again in Bonaparte's hands.

Paris buzzed with the wonderful news. There was rejoicing not only in the bourgeois quarter but also in the workers' section. In the Saint-Antoine district people danced in the streets until the early hours of morning. The dram shops and taverns were full of merry-makers. It was the first manifestation of joy seen in this quarter of hunger, poverty, oppression and unemployment in ages. At this moment the cheering workers as yet had no reason to feel that the new overlord would eventually crush them under his iron heel, that he would introduce "labour books" to intensify their dependence on their masters, and that his approaching reign would be characterised by the firm, systematic strengthening of a social order based on the exploitation of labour by capital, upheld by the law and unhindered in any way.

Immediately before the arrival of the news of Marengo, the workers of Paris, of all France, indeed of all Europe, were asking themselves the one question uppermost in their minds: would the benefits of the Revolution be maintained, or would they perish? If Bonaparte were killed or taken prisoner, or if his army were crushed by the enemy—one might expect the prompt landing of the émigrés and the English in the Vendée, a campaign against Paris, an upheaval in the capital, the invasion of France from the east by the Austrians and other interventionists, the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, and the resurrection of the old feudal order. But if, on the other hand, Bonaparte were victorious—the Consular "Republic" would survive, and with it many of the blessings of the Revolution. Thus was the problem formulated at that moment. In Bonaparte the workers saw a friend and a confederate. To them he was still "General Vendémiaire," whose cannon had mowed down the royalist reactionaries in the streets of Paris in 1796. To them he was the man who had conquered the hated interventionists in Italy in 1796, who had unmasked the traitor Pichegru in 1797. More
than that, he was the man who had taken Egypt, and from Egypt
was threatening the loathed Pitt—Pitt whom Robespierre and
Babeuf had proclaimed the chief foe of the Revolution, the in-
stigator of intervention. In short, it appeared to the workers of
the capital and to the plebeian masses of France that the First
Consul had always actively defended the Revolution against
royalist traitors and interventionists—from his very first public
appearance in 1793 when his adroit cannonading had forced the
royalists to yield Toulon to the Revolutionary troops, down to
the Eighteenth Brumaire, 1799, when he deposed the Directory,
a government of thieves, speculators, embezzlers, brokers and
wealthy sharpers. A great deal of this was by no means clear,
and in a great deal of it they were soon to be disillusioned; but on
this June day when the news of Marengo arrived, there was re-
joicing in the Saint-Antoine district in the victory of the Revolu-
tion.

In the neighbourhood of the Paris Bourse and the banking
offices, the boulevard crowds rejoiced even more ebulliently.
They rejoiced because the conqueror of Italy was the same man
who—so they had been led to assume—had crushed the revolu-
tion of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Brumaire, and whose
victory at Marengo had made him sufficiently strong, on the one
hand, to stamp out the "anarchy" and all attempts against prop-
erty and property-owners, and, on the other, to prevent the re-
turn of the feudal monarchy. The bourgeois masses expressed
their rapture even more vociferously, and more consciously, than
the workers.

Some of the more irreconcilable Jacobins maintained a morose
silence; the royalists were despondent. . . . But both, for the
time being, were pushed aside by the joy of the capital and the
provinces. Quite apart from this, the mania of military patriot-
ism, a kind of chauvinistic fever, took possession of many people
who before now had been sane and sober. This mood reached its
height on the First Consul's return to Paris. The workers aban-
donned their labours, and a crowd of many thousands went to meet
him. Moreover, the slightest indication of coolness toward Na-
poleon was accepted among the large masses as a sign of royalist
inclinations. "Aristocrats are living here! Why isn't the house
illuminated?" shouted the crowd on the day of Bonaparte's homecoming, and broke the windows of the suspected residence. All day long a countless throng hovered round the Tuileries, shouting cries of greeting and endeavoring to get a glimpse of Bonaparte. But he, unresponsive, did not appear on the balcony.

If in November, 1799, after the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Brumaire, Napoleon still entertained some doubts and hesitations—now, in June, 1800, after Marengo, in view of what was happening in the capital and the provinces, he had reason to know definitely that he was indisputably an autocrat, and henceforth the sole master of this mighty national organism.

Following Marengo the first problem that confronted Bonaparte was the signing of an advantageous peace with Austria*, England and the coalition in general. His second task was the resumption of the legislative program begun so promptly after the Brumaire upheaval and interrupted by his Italian campaign.

But there was yet another anxiety that persistently deflected Bonaparte's attention and tore him away from fundamental problems during the entire period of the Consulship. This was the struggle with the Jacobins and royalists. Fouché regarded the royalists as the graver and more immediate danger, but Bonaparte was but little inclined to believe him. He assumed that the Minister of Police was personally afraid of restoration—in the Convention of 1793, he had voted for the death of Louis XVI—and that he considered his former comrades, the Jacobins, the lesser of two evils. But, actually, Fouché was not inclined to watch the Jacobins simply because he believed they had little chance of achieving power.

In this instance, Fouché revealed a more comprehensive grasp of the internal political situation than his master. It is a matter of record that after the Eighteenth Brumaire, the Bourbon pretender, his brother, and all their supporters in the upper stratum of émigré circles were convinced that the success of the recent upheaval and the establishment of a dictatorship only proved the measure in which the French people had tired of the Revolution, and the avidity with which they thirsted for tranquillity and firm

* The war with Austria was still in progress in Bavaria, where the French army was commanded by Moreau. The victory at Hohenlinden did not occur until December, 1800.
Consolidation of the Dictatorship

authority. With this hypothesis as their first premise, they reasoned that surely France would prefer to be ruled by an ancient, historic dynasty rather than by an usurping Corsican immigrant? The Revolution, after a furious decade, finally had been destroyed on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Brumaire. Now it only remained for the same hand, that in November of 1799 had dealt the death-blow to this monster and in June of 1800 had routed the Austrians at Marengo, to place His Most Christian Majesty, King Louis XVIII, provisionally the Count of Provence, on the ancestral throne. Did the Count of Provence arrive at this droll conclusion independently, or was he influenced by his brother, with whom nature had not been overgenerous in the matter of mental gifts? It is all a matter of conjecture, but even before Marengo Louis despatched a letter to the First Consul from Mitau, appealing to him to restore the Bourbon dynasty, and promising in return any reward he might demand for himself and his friends. And, quite apart from the reward, Bonaparte would receive “the blessings of future generations.” Napoleon did not deign to answer. He and his wife Josephine began to receive new messages, proposals, letters.

In the summer of 1800, after Marengo, when really it seemed as though Bonaparte could do with France anything he saw fit, Louis once more turned to him with the same request. Then, for the first and last time, Bonaparte replied to the pretender: “I have received your letter. I thank you for all the pleasant things you say to me. You should not desire your return to France: it might be necessary for you to pass over a hundred thousand corpses. Sacrifice your interests to the repose and happiness of France: history will commend you for it.”

When the émigrés finally became convinced that Bonaparte belonged not to those who were ruled, but to those who ruled over others, as was evidenced by his terse refusal, they decided to assassinate him.

At almost the same time, a similar idea occurred to the Jacobins, but their attempt was promptly crushed by the resourceful Fouché. Learning of the projected undertaking from his agents, he acted on the definite information that it was to take place at the Opera on the evening of October 10, and arrested the armed
conspirators—Aréna, Ceracchi, Demerville and Topino-Lebrun—as they were approaching the First Consul's box. It was later affirmed that Fouché, in the rôle of provocateur, had himself provided them with weapons. The conspirators were executed, and Fouché's influence increased. His agents became all the more energetic, penetrating everywhere—from the sophisticated salons to the most wretched taverns and dram shops. There were rumours in the city of the preparation of new attempts on Bonaparte's life.

On the evening of the Third Nivôse (December 24, 1800), as the First Consul was on his way to the Opera, a terrible explosion occurred near his carriage, in the rue St. Nicaise. Bonaparte's carriage rolled past the infernal machine barely ten seconds before the explosion. The pavement was covered with dead and wounded. The badly damaged carriage conveyed the First Consul to the Opera in safety. He entered his box outwardly quite calm, so that the public learned of the occurrence at a much later date. The investigation which promptly followed, revealed nothing; no one was arrested on the spot immediately after the explosion. Bonaparte was convinced that this attempt, like the first, had been organised by the Jacobins. He accused Fouché of being far too much concerned with the royalists and not enough with the Jacobins. He decided to put to an end the opposition from the Left. He commanded that a list of the names of 130 Jacobin leaders be drawn up. Those named were arrested. Most of them were sent into exile to Guiana, whence few ever returned. The prefects in the provinces also began a cruel baiting of all those who in post-Revolutionary years, by word or by deed, had revealed a sympathy for the struggle against reaction. Now the surviving reactionaries began to settle accounts.

Many of those included in this first list of Leftists drawn up by Fouché did not get off with mere banishment, but were sent to hard-labour prisons, without investigation or trial, and were not released even after they had been proved innocent. It was Fouché himself who ferreted out the truth, and, as it happened, almost at the time he was despatching his former comrades to hard labour and exile. He knew better than anyone else that in this instance the Jacobins had had little to do with the matter. He was con-
Consolidation of the Dictatorship

vinced that they were being exiled for the sole purpose of pleasing the exasperated First Consul, who, from the very beginning, had followed quite the wrong trail.

Precisely two weeks after this second attempt on Bonaparte’s life, at the height of the purge of the Jacobins, the royalist Carbon, and a little later Saint-Réjant, Bourmont and many other restorationists legally or illegally residing in Paris, were detained. Carbon and Saint-Réjant, the actual perpetrators of the attempt, confessed. The whole affair had been organised exclusively by the royalists, with the object of killing Bonaparte and effecting the restoration of the Bourbons. This confession did not serve to abrogate the measures already in force against the Jacobins; nor were the royalists spared. Bonaparte had made up his mind to derive from the single attempt on his life a double political advantage. Later, when he was told that Fouché was wholly convinced of the innocence of the deported Jacobins, he answered: “Really? Fouché! He’s always like that! Anyway, it isn’t important. Now I’m rid of them (the Jacobins)!” The royalists directly implicated in the attempt were executed, and many others followed the Jacobins into banishment.

Nevertheless, Bonaparte’s anger against the royalists was by no means as harsh as might have been expected, if one is to judge by the summary justice he meted out to the Jacobins, innocent of complicity in the “infernal machine” affair. There is, however, something more to this than is conveyed in the psychological observations made on Napoleon by those near to him; something more than the mere fact that he had vented his whole anger on the Jacobins in the first weeks after the attempt on his life, so that there was little left for the royalists. Napoleon possessed the ability to be severe when he found it necessary, while retaining his coolness and calm. His procedure can be explained only on the ground that he hoped to detach from the Bourbons those royalists whose interests were wholly reconcilable with the new order of things in France—that is, those royalists who were willing to renounce all thought of resurrecting the hopelessly lost pre-Revolutionary feudal régime, willing to be absorbed by the bourgeois state which juridically and politically was created by the Revolution and given its final shape by Bonaparte. Such royalists would
be readily accepted by him, and their former sins against Revolutionary France forgiven. On the other hand, the ruthless struggle would be continued against those royalists who, regardless of this, persisted in adhering to their original goal of restoring the Bourbons and the old order.

Even before Marengo the First Consul instructed Fouché to draw up a list of those émigrés who might be permitted to return to France, and even after the "infernal machine" episode new names continued to be added to the list. Of the 145,000 émigrés, approximately 141,000 were granted the right to re-enter France. On arrival, of course, they were subjected to police surveillance. Only 3,373 were excluded. But even in their case, Bonaparte was lenient, for in May, 1802, a Senatus Consultum was issued permitting the reëntry of every émigré ready to swear an oath of loyalty to the new government. Countless émigrés, living in poverty abroad, returned to France.

For a time there were no more attempts on Bonaparte’s life. With redoubled energy he set to work on certain diplomatic tasks. Never, before or after this period, did he so strongly desire a speedy peace with the Coalition. He needed a respite for the improvement of finances, and for the completion of already initiated governmental reforms. Then, too, the bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the workers all hungered for the cessation of hostile relations.

In his diplomatic endeavours he chose as his aide a man fully as capable in this line as Fouché was in his. For if Fouché was unequalled in the art of provocation and espionage, Prince Talleyrand revealed himself a no-less-accomplished virtuoso in diplomacy. Yet there was a difference in the positions which the First Consul himself held in relation to the one and the other. Napoleon made use of Fouché and his apparatus, but he considered him and his companions scoundrels. To deal with Fouché and to gain an advantage over him was not for the Napoleon of this world. For one thing, Fouché could instantly detect the spies Napoleon had appointed to watch him. In the matter of police affairs, Bonaparte stood in need of Fouché and his special talents, because Fouché’s tasks called for a capacity which Napoleon
lacked, and to such a degree as to leave no room for comparison.

On the other hand, Napoleon had no reason to concede Talleyrand's superiority as a diplomat. Actually, to a certain degree, he surpassed him. Though Talleyrand was a skilled Minister of Foreign Affairs, Napoleon provided the fundamental directions. In addition, he conducted all the more important peace negotiations, leaving to Talleyrand the comparatively minor rôle of offering his counsel, formulating diplomatic notes, and evolving the tactical methods essential for the attainment of stipulated ends.

One of Napoleon's major diplomatic achievements indisputably was the complete change he effected in Russian policy. He notified Tsar Paul, with whom France was officially at war, that he desired immediate restoration to Russia of the 6,000 Russian prisoners taken after the rout of Korsakov's army in the autumn of 1799. Moreover, he did not demand French prisoners in exchange—though, to be sure, there were only a few French captives in Russia at the time. Bonaparte's offer sent Paul off into raptures. He despatched General Sprengporten to conclude the final arrangements in Paris.

Sprengporten arrived in the French capital in the middle of December, 1800. Bonaparte promptly expressed his warm sympathy and respect for Paul. He spoke glowingly of the nobility and greatness of soul which, in his opinion, distinguished the Russian Tsar. Simultaneously, he not only commanded that all the Russian prisoners be returned, but also that new regimental uniforms and footgear be made for them at the expense of the French treasury, and that their arms be returned to them. Such a courtesy had never before been extended during a war. Moreover, Bonaparte despatched a personal letter to Tsar Paul, assuring him that a peace between France and Russia might be concluded within 24 hours, if only he would send a responsible person to Paris. Paul was completely won over. From a violent enemy of France he suddenly became transformed into her well-wisher. He replied to Bonaparte with a personal letter, in which he agreed to peace in advance and reiterated the First Consul's wish to restore "peace and quiet" to Europe.

After this first success Napoleon decided to conclude not only
a peace with Russia but also a military alliance. The idea of such an alliance was dictated by two considerations: first, the absence of any conflict of interests between the two countries, and, second, the possibility that the joint forces of Russia and France might eventually threaten English domination in India through southern Russia and central Asia. The dream of conquering India obsessed Napoleon throughout his entire reign. At no stage in his career did he formulate specific plans for the attainment of this objective, but the fundamental idea was deeply rooted in his mind. In 1798 it was associated with Egypt, in 1801 with the sudden friendship with the Tsar, and in 1812 with the Moscow campaign. In not a single one of these three instances was it more than a remote and indefinite aspiration, although during the negotiations of 1801 it assumed something of the semblance of a preliminary reconnaissance.

The extraordinarily rapid development of the friendly negotiations between Bonaparte and Tsar Paul coincided with the Russian sovereign's equally sudden hostility to England, his latterly in the struggle against France. Without anything specific in mind Napoleon had considered the possibility of leading his French troops to southern Russia, where they might join forces with the Russian army. From there he planned to lead the combined armies across central Asia and into India. Paul was heartily in accord with Napoleon as to the feasibility of such a project. Actually he had forestalled the First Consul in making the first move for the realisation of this programme. The Cossack Ataman, Matvey Ivanovitch Platov, who for some unknown reason had been confined by the Tsar in the Peter and Paul fortress, was suddenly released after half a year's imprisonment. Brought before the Tsar, he was asked if he knew the road to India. Comprehending absolutely nothing, but imagining that in the event of a negative answer he would at once be returned to the fortress, Platov said that he did. Immediately, he was appointed chief of one of the four echelons of the Army of the Don, which in full strength was ordered to march on India. All four echelons, consisting of 22,500 men, left the Don on February 27, 1801, but did not proceed very far. . . .

With increasing disquietude, the governments of Europe ob-
served the growing friendship between Bonaparte and the Russian Tsar. In the event of the consummation of an alliance between the two countries, there was the possibility that Napoleon and Paul would jointly rule over the continent of Europe. This opinion was shared not only by the rulers of France and Russia, but by all the European diplomats of the time. England was openly apprehensive. It is true that on the sea France was infinitely weaker than England, while Russia's importance was quite negligible. But Bonaparte's designs on India and the sudden departure of the Army of the Don in the direction of India distressed and exasperated the British Prime Minister, William Pitt. All the European foreign offices and royal courts dreaded the coming of the spring of 1801, when it would be possible for allied France and Russia to make a decisive move. But on March 11, 1801, all of Napoleon's hopes were rudely shattered by the assassination of Tsar Paul.

When he suddenly learned that the Tsar had been strangled in Mikhailovsky Palace, Bonaparte flew into a rage. All his cunning negotiations, all his diplomatic successes of the preceding months were rendered useless. "The English missed me in Paris on the Third Nivôse*, but they did not miss me in St. Petersburg!" he shouted. No one had the least doubt that it was the English who had organised the assassination of Paul. The prospect of an alliance with Russia was shattered that night in March when the conspirators entered Paul's bedroom.

The First Consul had no alternative but promptly and radically to reconstruct his diplomatic batteries. He was quite as capable in this direction as on the field of battle.

For the time being he would have to change his plans. War was out of the question. A peace with England must be made immediately. Negotiations with Austria, which had been in progress for some time, were concluded on February 9, 1801, when Cobenzl, the Austrian plenipotentiary, signed a treaty of peace with France at Lunéville. In these negotiations France was officially represented by Talleyrand and Joseph Bonaparte, a brother of

* The Third Nivôse (December 24, 1800) was the day on which the infernal machine had exploded in the rue St. Nicaise.
the First Consul, but the pair merely executed Napoleon's instructions. They made excellent use of his recent friendship with Tsar Paul, which rendered possible an attack on Austria from both east and west. Austria conceded to practically every French demand. It was difficult to put up any opposition after Marengo and the French victories in Alsace, where General Moreau had defeated the Austrians at Hohenlinden. The Lunéville peace gave Napoleon everything he wanted from Austria: the final separation from Austria of the whole of Belgium; the cession of Luxembourg; all the German possessions on the left bank of the Rhine; the recognition of the "Batavian Republic" (Holland), the "Helvetian Republic" (Switzerland), the "Cisalpine Republic" (Genoa) and the "Ligurian Republic" (Lombardy), all of which, of course, remained factual possessions of France. As for Piedmont, the entire province remained, as in the past, in the occupation of French troops. In a letter to his chief, Count Colloredo, Cobenzl sadly reported: "Here it is, the unfortunate agreement which from necessity I had to sign. It is terrible both in form and in content."

Moreover, Cobenzl had additional reason to feel indignant. He was aware that the unscrupulous Talleyrand had secretly accepted rich gifts from the Austrian court during the course of the negotiations, all the while knowing that he could do nothing in return because the whole treaty had been dictated by Napoleon himself.

Thus the business with the Austrian Empire was finished—for the time being, at least. Because of her heavy losses, Austria would have to bide her time before attempting to indemnify herself. Meanwhile, she would, of necessity, submit.

It was fortunate for Napoleon that the news of Paul's death did not arrive until after he had concluded separate treaties of peace with all of France's enemies, except England. Sharply changing his front upon learning of the Tsar's assassination, Napoleon made the signing of a speedy peace with the English his chief concern.

England was going through a difficult period. As a result of the industrial-technical revolution of the late 18th century, she knew
no rivals in her purely economic relations with the European continent. This, augmented by the Anglo-French trade treaty of 1786, had made it possible for her to invade and dominate France's domestic textile and metallurgic markets, at the expense of the French manufacturers. For this reason, the French middle class had warmly welcomed the various anti-English commercial measures adopted by the Convention and by the Directory. In both countries, the entire war between England and France during the Revolution, had been regarded as a war of English merchants and manufacturers against French merchants and manufacturers.

The political head of the several anti-French European military coalitions had been William Pitt, the British Prime Minister. In his day he successively subsidised Prussia, Austria, Piedmont, Russia, then Austria again, and Naples, because he clearly foresaw the effect France's increasing power on the Continent would have on English political and economic interests.

But neither the subsidising of European coalitions, nor the active assistance given the Vendean counter-revolutionaries could stem the tide of French conquest. By the end of 1800, the majority of the people of England favoured the opening of negotiations with the new ruler of France, with a view to arriving at some agreement. It is true that this opinion was not shared by the manufacturers and those commercial groups whose continued prosperity depended upon the exploitation of the French and Dutch colonies seized during the course of the long war. But the merchant class, whose life-blood was European commerce, desired peace. At this moment the English working class, awakening from its long torpor, was showing signs of rebelling against its cruel exploitation and its subjection to a state bordering on complete starvation. The rage of the workers was manifested not only in the sabotaging of machinery, but sometimes in perfectly obvious defeatist tendencies, about which English historians writing of this period are curiously silent.

In short, when Bonaparte concluded the advantageous peace with Austria, yielding into his hands considerable new territory in Germany and in Italy, and when after the death of Tsar Paul he signed a treaty with his successor, Alexander I, and at the same time offered to conclude peace with England, the English ruling
circles, temporarily discouraged by the failure of their attempts to defeat France, decided to listen to his proposals. As it happened, William Pitt had been out of office since immediately before the assassination of Paul, and the new cabinet, headed by Addington, was composed of men who considered peace a possibility. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Hawkesbury, made it clear that England had no objection to concluding peace. After the assassination of Tsar Paul, Bonaparte offered to begin negotiations.

The peace conference was held in Amiens, where on March 26, 1802, a treaty with England was signed. England restored to France and to her vassals—Holland and Spain—all of the colonies which she had seized in the nine-year-war, except the islands of Ceylon and Trinidad. Malta was returned to the Maltese Knights. England obligated herself to evacuate all of the Adriatic and Mediterranean points occupied by her during the war. In return, France agreed to remove her troops from Egypt and Rome, and to restore Rome and other Papal possessions to the Pope. These were the chief conditions of the peace, but they did not alter the essential situation. On the whole, Napoleon had made very minor concessions, and the signing of the Treaty of Amiens did not materially lessen England's hostility toward France. In fact, it increased it. The ruling English aristocracy and bourgeoisie, having for nine years spent millions on armies and fleets, resented the fact that it had come off a decided second best at Amiens.

What was hardest for England's ruling classes to swallow was the fact that they had not succeeded in tearing from Bonaparte's grasp a single one of his European conquests. Belgium, Holland, Italy, Piedmont, and the left bank of the Rhine remained in his direct possession, and henceforth all of western Germany was to be numbered among his vassals. All these conquered and semi-conquered lands dominated by Bonaparte ceased to exist for the English home and colonial markets, for, despite all their efforts, the English diplomats at Amiens had failed to effect a trade agreement advantageous to British commerce. It could be taken for granted that the rich domestic market of France, which had been closed to English imports even before Bonaparte, would re-
main closed now. And quite apart from all this, from the purely military and political point of view, the safety of England from French attack was far from assured. While Bonaparte ruled over Belgium and Holland, he could truthfully say that “Antwerp is a pistol aimed at the British breast.”

The Amiens peace could not last for long. England did not consider herself as badly beaten as all that. But when the news of the signing of the peace with England reached Paris and the provinces, the joy of the population was unrestrained. It seemed that the most terrible, the most wealthy, the most stubborn and the most irreconcilable enemy had acknowledged her defeat and by her signature had confirmed all of Bonaparte’s conquests. Thus ended France’s long, oppressive war with Europe—and it ended with complete victory on all fronts.

But France and Europe were not to remain at peace during the Napoleonic era. The present peace lasted only two years—from the spring of 1801, when the treaty with Austria was concluded, till the spring of 1803, when, after the brief Peace of Amiens, war was renewed with England. During this period Napoleon laboured unceasingly on the internal governmental and legislative problems of France.

Now he could systematically attend to those legislative problems which hitherto he had been obliged to postpone. Although he had been concerned with them ever since the Battle of Marengo, he could not devote himself exclusively to them while he was negotiating the definitive peace with Austria and England, or while his relations with Tsar Paul directed his thoughts to new wars and distant conquests. Now, for the first time, he felt free to give them all his time and attention. He found himself confronted with such major problems as administration, finance, economy, and civil and criminal legislation. In spite of the rich experience gained in the two Italian wars and the Egyptian campaign, his knowledge of these major governmental problems was slight. He stood in need of instruction, and he proposed to get it in the most practical manner. Presiding over the meetings of the State Council, he listened to the reports of his ministers, commanded the appearance of all those who had worked on these reports, and
asked in great detail about anything which seemed unclear to him. He learned rapidly. From report to report he underwent such changes that his ministers failed to recognise him. During the first report it still was possible to deceive him, during the second it was harder, during the third—dangerous. "What! You're making mock of me, is that it?" he once shouted scornfully at an official in the Ministry of Finance. "You think that a man who was not born on a throne and who walked the streets on foot will allow you to bring him such absurd arguments?" He was capable of working almost without interruption for from 14 to 16 hours a day, and sometimes even longer. His worn-out ministers, secretaries, officials and adjutants did not enjoy a decent interval even for food, for Napoleon himself never spent more than 20 minutes at dinner. He ate the first thing that came to hand, without observing what he was eating. He was angry only when he was too long detained at table.

When, upon one occasion, his fatigued ministers were ready to fall asleep, sitting or standing, Napoleon shouted at them: "Well, well, Citizens and Ministers, wake up! It's only two o'clock in the morning, and you must earn the wages which the French nation is paying you!" He was incapable of resting; in fact, he disliked to. Without doubt he lied when he said to his court doctor, Corvisart: "I should like to rest, but the ox is yoked and he must needs plough the soil." During campaigns he often slept no more than four hours a day. Usually he would lie down at eight o'clock in the evening, and would rise at midnight. Of the remaining 20 hours he often spent as many as 12 going from place to place, either on horseback or in a carriage. There were changes of adjutants, of horses. He permitted rest to generals, who took turns at duty, but he himself was indefatigable.

Above all, he loved to converse with specialists and to learn from them.

"When you strike an unfamiliar city," he instructed his stepson, Eugène Beauharnais, subsequently Viceroy of Italy, "don't become bored; study the city. How do you know but that one day you will have to take it?" All of Napoleon is summed up in these words—knowledge must be gathered for its possible future utility. He astonished English ship captains by discussing with them
Consolidation of the Dictatorship

details of rigging not only of French but also English ships, and of the differences between English and French cables. Appearing unexpectedly in the department of the Ministry of Finance, he would demand to see the ledgers, and reprimand the clerks for negligence or inaccuracies. Watching the prices in the markets, he would demand daily reports of changing values in order to discover the reasons for their increase, after which he would institute investigations.

He attached great importance to economics, which during this epoch was associated with the development of capitalistic production. So thoroughly did he familiarise himself with the problems of trade and industry, of production and markets, of tariffs and customs, of sea freight and land transport, during the first two or three years of his rule, that he could tell the reason for the price fluctuations of Lyons velvet as readily as the Lyons merchants themselves, or detect the graft of a contractor building a highway at the other end of his immense empire. He was in a position not only to settle a frontier quarrel or a tangle of debated territories between different German kingdoms, but to base his decisions on the history of these disputes and territories.

He gave ear to everyone from whom he might expect to receive a valuable suggestion, but he made decisions himself. He often said that it was not he who gave excellent counsel who won the battle, but he who made himself responsible for its execution. Among the multitude of opinions to which a military commander listened, it was quite possible that one might be the right one, but he must know how to choose it and how to make use of it. The same was true in all legislative reforms and in the entire conduct of domestic policy.

On August 2, 1802, following the plebiscite, which finally was held after the Treaty of Amiens, a Senatus Consultum was issued, proclaiming Bonaparte "Consul for life" to carry out the will of the people as expressed in this "all-national decision." It thus became evident that France had been transformed into an absolute monarchy, and that in the near future the First Consul would be proclaimed King or Emperor. And this, his future throne, Napoleon sought to guarantee by enlisting the wholehearted support of the city and country bourgeoisie—of property-owning tradesmen,
of property-owning manufacturers, of property-owning landlords, of property-owning peasants. The unlimited right of ownership was to be a pillar of the new order they were creating. Every vestige of the feudal rights of the nobility was being destroyed forever. No longer would there be a law recognising the claims of landlord-seigniories to lands possessed by them or by their ancestors before them. In its place, Napoleon created the perpetual right to full ownership of lands purchased during the Revolution—lands forfeited by the émigrés, the churches and the monasteries. This right was assigned to those in present ownership of property. So much was accomplished for rural ownership.

In the field of trade and industry, Napoleon granted the owners of commercial and manufacturing undertakings the practically unlimited right to enter into contractual relations with workers on the basis of "voluntary agreement." This gave the owners unrestrained freedom for the exploitation of labour, and guaranteed them full authority over the workers. On the other hand, it deprived the workers of every right to a collective struggle against exploitation.

To ingratiate himself with the French tradesmen Napoleon committed the government to a policy of militant protection of the French domestic market from foreign competition. At the same time he promised to transform part, and possibly all, of Europe into a field of exploitation by French commercial and industrial capital. Napoleon was convinced that the order created and consolidated by him, as well as its domestic and foreign policy, would impel the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie to fall in line with all his dictatorial measures, and to resign all pretensions to active participation in political life. He looked for it to submit to a form of autocracy even more absolute than that which had existed during the reign of Louis XVI, and to reconcile itself to military conscription of a character not even dreamed of during the worst period of the old régime. He welded the bourgeois state so durably that to this day it stands on its original bases and offers the same appearance as when he first erected it.

First of all, he was resolved to do away with those heritages of the Revolution which created obstacles to his programme. He not only granted amnesty to the émigrés, though it is true that he sub-
jected them to the surveillance of the police, but he also arranged an official reconciliation of the French Government with the Catholic Church. Shortly after Brumaire, Catholic worship had once again become free. Now he authorised the keeping of Sunday as a day of worship and rest, allowed many priests to return from exile, and liberated many others from prisons. He initiated negotiations with the Pope, stipulating the conditions on which he would recognise Catholicism as "the religion of the majority of the French people," in addition to taking the Catholic Church under the protection of the State.

These negotiations resulted in the issuance of the famous Concordat, which bourgeois historians refer to as a "miracle of governmental wisdom."

Actually, the Concordat gave back to the Church the greater part of the positions won from it in behalf of free thought. The Revolution had deprived the Catholic clergy of its official influence on the French people, but Napoleon once more restored it. His reasons for doing so are logical and quite in keeping with his character and aspirations.

Napoleon himself, if not a convinced atheist, was, in any event, a rather indifferent and irresolute deist. He rarely discussed questions of religion. He never aspired to lean on the assistance of the higher being whose existence was assumed by the deists, nor did he reveal the slightest inclination to mysticism. At any rate, in the Italian aristocrat, Count Chiaramonti, who in 1799 became Pope Pius VII, Napoleon recognised not the successor to the Apostle Paul or God's vicar on earth, but only a sly old Italian with royalist sympathies. To his mind, the Pope would eagerly have entered into a conspiracy to effect the restoration of the Bourbons, for Bourbon restoration would have meant the return of the Church properties confiscated during the Revolution. The Pope had not meddled in French politics because of his fear of Napoleon, whose French armies occupied nearly all of Italy, even after Marengo.

Pius VII stood in mortal dread of Napoleon, whom he considered a ravager and pillager, but he was enough of a realist to know that Rome and the Papacy were wholly in the conqueror's hands. On the other hand, Napoleon did not believe a word
spoken by the Pope, and considered him an intriguant and a liar. Such were the opinions they entertained of each other before they began negotiations, such were the opinions they entertained after the negotiations had been concluded, and, indeed, until the very last. Apparently they never doubted the justice of their mutual evaluation. But it was not a question of the personality of the Pope. From Napoleon's point of view, the organisation of the Catholic Church was a force which it would have been folly to disregard, not only because it had the power to do much harm if it remained an enemy, but also because it might prove useful as an ally.

"The Popes, at any rate, are better than such charlatans as Cagliostro or Kant, or any of the other German visionaries," said Napoleon, putting in the same category the adventurer Cagliostro and the philosopher Kant, while he added that if human beings were disposed to believe in miracles, it was better to give them the opportunity to make use of the Church and the established teachings of the Church than to allow them to philosophise too much. Napoleon further argued that people endured the discomfort of vaccination so that they might avoid smallpox. In other words, it would be far better to have a talk with sly old Count Chiaramonti, who called himself Pope Pius VII and in whom human beings stupidly believed as God's vicar on earth—far better to admit into his service, side by side with the gendarmerie and Fouche's police, the numerous black police of Pope Pius VII—than to allow his Bourbon enemies to make use of this countless host of monks and priests, or to push the subject population into the embrace of elusive visionaries and philosophers, and thus encourage the development of free thought. More than that, Napoleon realised that this black Catholic host would be extremely useful in stifling the revolutionary ideology of enlightenment he so loathed. In July, 1801, the Concordat between the Pope and Napoleon was signed, and on April 15 of the following year the law of the Concordat, defining the new position of the Catholic Church in France, was promulgated in its final form.

In it Napoleon acknowledged Catholicism to be "the religion of the majority of French citizens," but not, as before the Revolution, the State religion. He permitted unhindered divine worship
Consolidation of the Dictatorship

throughout the whole country. In return, the Pope pledged himself never to demand the return of Church lands confiscated during the Revolution. Napoleon himself nominated the bishops and archbishops, and it was only then that the appointed ecclesiastics could receive the canonical dedication to the office from the Pope. In the same manner, the priests appointed by the bishops were permitted to enter the Church service only after approval by the Governmental authorities.

Napoleon was not wrong in his calculations. Soon after the Concordat was put into force—that is, during the Empire—the Catholic clergy introduced into all the schools of France an obligatory catechism, in which it was textually expressed—and its words had to be learned by heart—that “God... made the Emperor Napoleon the instrument of His power and His image upon the earth,” and “He who resists the Emperor Napoleon resists the order appointed by the Lord Himself and deserves eternal censure, and the soul of the resister is deserving of eternal damnation and hell.” The catechism taught other “truths” in the same spirit. The quotations above were included in the lessons on “religion.” And on holidays the clergy preached that the Holy Ghost had temporarily made His abode in Napoleon with the definite object of rooting out the Revolutionary anarchy and unbelief; the constant victories of the First Consul (and later Emperor) over all foreign enemies were to be explained by the direct strategical intervention of the Holy Ghost.

Napoleon was openly contemptuous of the weekly Sunday sermons proclaiming that he had the support of the Holy Ghost. He sneered at the stories of the many miracles that were attributed to him. The distance that separated the priests of Ammon-Ra, who proclaimed Alexander the Great to be the son of a god, from the archbishops of Paris, Lyons and Bordeaux, who affirmed the reincarnation of the Holy Ghost in Napoleon Bonaparte, does not appear to have been so great, after all.

In the months between the preliminary signing of the Concordat and its publication as a law, Napoleon created the Order of the Legion of Honour, which has survived to this day and still plays an important part in French life. Napoleon conceived this idea as early as the latter part of 1801. He decided to establish
a mark of merit for military and civil services. The Order was designed to have various degrees of distinction and to be awarded by the will of the supreme authority.

Napoleon laid the basis of the national educational system which, with scarcely any changes, exists to this day. It is true, there were no lower schools, but in the realm of higher and intermediate education there are no essential deviations of any kind.

At the head of the whole educational organisation was the ministry called l'Université. This ministry had at its head the Grand-Maître de l'Université—today his identity is preserved in the Minister of National Education. In Napoleon's day l'Université superintended the higher schools and the intermediate schools or lycées. Napoleon himself established only the higher schools, chiefly for the purpose of training technicians, engineers, notaries, examining judges, and administrative and financial officials. The discipline was very strict, of a purely military order, and the examinations were difficult. As for the lycées, they were established in the first place for the preparatory training of army officers. A person who had finished his training at a lycée, could, after preparation, take additional examinations permitting him to matriculate at one of the higher schools. For governmental service in the civil ministries it was sufficient to have been graduated from a lycée, but, naturally, the lycée graduate was not granted the same privileges in the service nor had the same chances of a career, as he who supplemented his lycée education with training at one of the higher schools.

Within two months after the Battle of Marengo and within several weeks after his return from Italy, the First Consul issued a decree (August 12, 1800) providing for the formation of a commission to draft a code of civil laws which was to become the keystone of the entire juridical system of France and of the countries conquered by France. The undertaking was one of immense difficulty, and for this reason Napoleon appointed a commission of four men to assist him. He could not endure large commissions, long speeches, numerous sittings. The four men were all major jurists.

The code which they drafted subsequently received the name
of the “Code of Napoleon,” confirmed by a decree of 1852 and to this day officially unchanged, though it has also been called the “Civil Code.” The code, as conceived by Napoleon, was intended as an instrument to consolidate the triumph won by the bourgeoisie over the feudal order, to render secure the positions which ownership of property should occupy in the new social order, and to ensure the inviolability of bourgeois ownership from all attack from whatever quarter—from the feudalists, who had no inclination to give up the ghost; or from the proletarians, desirous of breaking their chains.

From the point of view of clarity, logical sequence and durability, the Napoleonic code deserves a large measure of the praise it has long received from bourgeois juridical writers. But no impartial observer will deny that the code was a step backward in comparison with the legislation of the French bourgeois Revolution, which had advocated complete equality of rights, and complete individual freedom of action and self-determination.

The Code of Napoleon placed women in the position of having no rights before their husbands, and gave brothers priority over sisters in the matter of inheritance. The humane Revolutionary laws equalising the rights of illegitimate children with those of legitimate ones, were wholly abolished. So-called “outlawry” for criminals sentenced to hard labour, which had been abolished by the Revolution as an unnecessarily painful addition to an already sufficiently severe punishment, was restored by Napoleon. In building the new society, he borrowed from the Revolution all those principles which ensured the broadest and least hindered activity of the bourgeoisie, and rejected all of the democratic aspirations and tendencies of the masses. Naturally, in an undertaking as immense as the creation of civil laws, some attempts at protest were made. When the code began to pass through the “legislative departments,” someone in the Tribunate might now and then voice a timid protest. Nothing, however, came of it, and soon Bonaparte silenced even these feeble attempts to preserve the ideology of the Revolution. He excluded from the Tribunate all but 50 of the most taciturn members, and moreover, determined that in the future the Tribunate should never consist of more than 50 persons. After this incidental constitutional reform,
the undertaking proceeded rapidly. In March, 1803, the Code of Napoleon, already fully considered in the State Council and Tribunate, went to the Legislative Corps, which, not having the right to debate its provisions, silently accepted them one by one. In March, 1804, the Code, signed by Napoleon, became the fundamental law and the basis of French jurisprudence. The French bourgeoisie received precisely what it had desired; the bourgeois Revolution had given its posthumous fruit. To talk of the continuing Revolution in France after the Eighteenth Brumaire was wholly out of the question.

In the course of time, Napoleon added to the Code laws repressing the working class even more rigorously than before. He retained in full force the Law of Lechapelier (1791) identifying even the most peaceful strikes with crimes punishable by criminal prosecution. He gave capital complete freedom to exploit labour. And, in addition to all this, he created the so-called "labour books," which were retained in the employer's hands and without which no worker could secure a new position. In these books, the employer noted the worker's characteristics, and stated his reasons for parting with the worker's services. It requires no straining of the imagination to conceive of the abuses practised by the employers, in whose hands lay the power of depriving the workers of even the chance of procuring a new job and a means of livelihood.

By Napoleon's command, a code was drafted at the same time. It contained a series of decrees regulating and juridically guaranteeing commercial transactions, the procedure of banks and exchanges, and the rules of drafts and notes. Finally, with the publication of the criminal code, Napoleon finished his basic legislative labours. He preserved capital punishment, introduced for certain crimes physical punishment, either by flogging or by branding, and imposed the most severe measures upon all violators of the law of ownership. His criminal legislation indisputably marked a long step backward, when compared with the laws of the Revolutionary period.

All this enormous legislative activity had not yet come to its conclusion, when, in March, 1803, war again broke out with England.
Thus again, after a brief interval, a new gigantic struggle began. Both nations realised the difficulties involved. Against Napoleon—in whose hands were France, a large portion of Italy, western Germany, Belgium and Holland—were arrayed equally strong forces, formidable in their resources and diverse in their character. During all his life, it fell to Napoleon’s lot to fight against coalitions of economically backward, semi-feudal monarchies which were under the leadership of England, whose economic progressiveness made her supreme in the capitalistic world of the time. It was not merely a struggle of the French bourgeois state against feudal-absolutist states, not merely a struggle of a new progressive system of production against backward economic forms. This endless Napoleonic war was at the same time a conflict between France, which had only recently entered upon the path of industrial-capitalistic development, and England, which had entered upon the same path much earlier and which had already achieved incomparably larger results.

In its stubborn, irreconcilable struggle against the French bourgeoisie, the English bourgeoisie had on its side a highly developed technic, enormous resources in ready cash, productive exploited colonies, and immense trade connections all over the world. In this prolonged struggle, England successively availed herself of the services of the economically backward, semi-feudal monarchies; at her own expense and with her rifles she armed the
peasant serfs of these monarchies. When William Pitt the Younger granted subsidies of millions to Russia, Austria and Prussia, in order to have them fight against the French Revolution or Napoleon, he did precisely the same thing that had been done 40 years before him by his father, William Pitt the Elder, who subsidised the Iroquois and several other Indian tribes, instigating them to enter into a struggle against the French in Canada. The only difference, of course, was in the scale of the enterprise and the value of the prize at stake.

The Amiens peace concluded with England in March, 1802, lasted only a year. As soon as the joy over the cessation of the hard war had ceased, the English bourgeoisie and land-owning aristocracy plainly saw that they had lost the struggle, and that Bonaparte had won it. Not only did Bonaparte exclude English goods from the enormous markets under his control, but also, holding as he did Belgium and Holland, he was in a position directly to threaten England's shores. Above all, by 1802 he was so strongly entrenched that he could, without fear of opposition, coerce many, as yet, "independent" countries into "alliances" with him. After the Treaty of Amiens he was far more formidable and dangerous than even Louis XIV had been at the height of his power—the sum total of Louis XIV's conquests in western Rhenish Germany were as child's play compared with Bonaparte's domains in the same area. The establishment of a solid hegemony on the European continent under the French military dictator might serve as the prologue for an invasion of England.

During the brief Amiens peace, Napoleon had skillfully crushed the Negro uprising on the island of San Domingo, where even as late as the era of the Directory Toussaint l'Ouverture, the celebrated leader of the Negro population, had fortified himself. While formally acknowledging the island's dependence on the French, he was in fact its autonomous ruler.

In molding his colonial policy, Napoleon was guided by the interests of the French planters, who had never become reconciled to the liberation of the slaves which occurred during the years of the Convention. Napoleon, having received by the Treaty of Amiens, the French colonies which had been occupied by England—San Domingo, the Lesser Antilles, the Mascarene Islands, the
coast of Guiana—restored serfdom where it had been abolished, and reaffirmed the laws of slavery where the English had not had sufficient time to abolish them. To crush Toussaint l'Ouverture's revolt, Bonaparte in 1802 equipped a fleet, and an army of 10,000 men. Toussaint was cunningly enticed into the French camp, where on June 7, 1802, he was arrested and sent to France. As soon as the hero of Negro liberation arrived in France, Napoleon had him confined in a solitary cell in the Fort of Joux, near Besançon among the Juras. Here the severe damp climate, the harsh treatment, the absence of those near and dear to him, and the prohibition of normal physical exercise killed Toussaint l'Ouverture within nine months.

Napoleon had formed definite plans for the organisation and exploitation of the colonies, but the renewal of war with England in the spring of 1803 forced him to abandon them. In the absence of sea communications, it was impossible to maintain the distant territories west of the Mississippi River. Consequently, on April 30, 1803, Napoleon was forced to sell to the United States the portion of Louisiana still owned by France.

In demanding the breaking of the Treaty of Amiens, the English trading classes were motivated, in part, by their desire to wrest from Napoleon his growing colonial empire and to prevent him from further enlarging it.

Actually, the Amiens peace was becoming irksome to France, as well as to England. Napoleon had supposed that England's signing of this peace signified her willingness to cease meddling in European affairs and definite recognition of his hegemony on the Continent. But suddenly it dawned upon him that such was not the case, and that England had no intention of folding her arms while Bonaparte was accomplishing his purpose in Europe.

Extremely complicated negotiations were initiated. Neither side would or could yield to the other; each understood the other only too well. By the beginning of 1803 the negotiations had taken on a character which could lead only to open rupture in the near future. There were, to be sure, vacillations in both London and Paris. The English cabinet was far from convinced that the country was fully prepared to plunge into a dangerous conflict. It hesitated all the more because it would have to wage war, es-
especially in the beginning, without allies—for at this time France was at peace with all of Europe. On his part, Bonaparte knew that the commercial middle class of Paris and Lyons, as well as the manufacturers of luxury products, were prospering on orders from England. He was fully acquainted with the fact that, during the first months after the Treaty of Amiens, commerce had begun to thrive because of the arrival of 15,000 wealthy English tourists. Yet, even now in a time of peace, he could, if he so desired, forbid English goods into France. For this reason, a war with England would scarcely be profitable for the French manufacturers. It is true that during a war the prohibitory system might be intensified, strengthened and broadened to take in new countries, which was what Napoleon hoped. In any case, he also hesitated.

Matters finally reached a crisis during the celebrated audience in the Tuileries, when Napoleon and the English Ambassador, Lord Whitworth, came to open words. Napoleon, who apparently had been stifling his anger at Lord Whitworth’s obduracy, suddenly burst forth in searing, vituperative abuse. In reality, it was Napoleon’s last effort to intimidate his rival. It resulted in an open breach between England and France.

Napoleon’s rage was a peculiar manifestation that confounded many of his contemporaries. There is no doubt that his haughty, gloomy, fiery nature, so contemptuous of all the rest of the world, was prone to fits of violent anger. During these paroxysms he was, in truth, terrifying even to those of the most insensitive and courageous fibre. But, coupled with this, Napoleon was capable on occasion of enacting scenes of simulated anger, with well-defined aims based on fully deliberated schemes. These artificial bursts of vehemence were quite independent of his natural, authentic irascibility, but were accomplished with such a high degree of theatrical skill and with such an astonishingly clever ability to make them convincing, that only those who knew him most intimately could guess that he was acting. And even they could not always make the correct surmise; often they were mistaken.

From the very beginning, the English Ambassador had had little faith in the possibility of preserving the peace with Bonaparte. This was not because France had got by far the best of the
bargain in the Amiens treaty, but because, following it, the First Consul had begun to take a directing interest in the neighbouring countries of Europe in a manner that implied that they were already under his domination. For example, in the autumn of 1802 he notified Switzerland that he proposed to introduce new governmental forms in that country and to establish a government “friendly to France.” He explained his desire on the ground that Switzerland was geographically situated between France and vassal Italy. And he reinforced his geographical argument by sending to the Swiss frontiers an army of 30,000 men under General Ney. Switzerland submitted, and without contesting became a country subject to his will. At about the same time Napoleon formally and finally proclaimed the Kingdom of Piedmont a possession of France. The petty sovereigns and princes of western Germany, having, after the Lüneville peace of 1801 lost all hope of aid from Austria, trembled before him. On his side, he treated them precisely as lackeys. Finally, even Holland was firmly and irretrievably in his hands.

This was too much for England to tolerate. During the first grand audience on February 18, 1803, Napoleon staged the scene of rage which led to war. He bellowed of his might, of a struggle “to the death” should England dare to declare war. He caustically reminded Lord Whitworth that it was futile for England to hope for allies, since Austria as a great state was “no longer existent.” He spoke in such a tone and he shouted with such fury, that Lord Whitworth wrote to his chief, Lord Hawkesbury, the Minister of Foreign Affairs: “It seemed to me that I was listening to a Captain of the Dragoons rather than to the head of one of the mightiest states of Europe.” Napoleon was stubbornly possessed by the idea that he could prevent a war by intimidating England, and at the same time continue to act as master of Europe. But it was clearly a case of equally determined adversaries. The English middle and upper classes, sharply divergent in many things, were agreed upon this: Europe must not be permitted to fall under the subjection of the dictator Napoleon. When he threatened to call to arms a force of half a million, the English Government replied by reinforcing its fleet and making extensive military preparations.
On March 13 the final scene with Lord Whitworth was enacted. "So you want war?" bellowed Napoleon. "You want to fight for another 15 years—and you are forcing me to do it." He demanded the return of Malta—it had been seized by the English before the Amiens peace and, though they had promised to return it, they had made no haste to do so, anticipating some action on Napoleon's part inconsistent with the peace. "The English want war," he roared, "but if they are the first to bare the sword, let them know that I shall be the last to return mine to its sheath. . . . If you desire to arm, I too shall arm; if you want to fight, I too shall fight. You, perhaps, will kill France, but you cannot frighten her. . . . Woe to him who does not fulfill the conditions. . . . Malta or war!" Thus he shouted in his rage, and walked out of the hall.

At the beginning of May, 1803, Lord Whitworth left Paris. Then began the war with England, which did not cease until the very end of Napoleon's rule.

They knew in England that the war would be a difficult one, and a dangerous one. Almost immediately after the opening of hostilities, William Pitt once more became Prime Minister. He had not been in office since 1801, when it seemed to the English ruling classes that it was possible, and even necessary, to open peace negotiations with Bonaparte.

Now in 1803 William Pitt's hour had struck again. The man who for nine years had fought the French Revolution knew that he was assuming the responsibility of conducting a much more hazardous war against Napoleon. But Pitt believed that if, on the one hand, this new war would be more perilous than the struggle with the Revolutionary governments, it would, on the other hand, not awaken such disquietude as was awakened by the previous war with Revolutionary France. To be sure, Napoleonic France was a larger territorial unit. It was vastly richer, and it had a much better army. At its head was a skilled organiser and a great war captain. But there was no longer that Jacobin propaganda—"Revolutionary poison"—which in former days had undermined even His Britannic Majesty's fleet, not to speak of the working populations of the industrial and coal-mining centres.
William Pitt vividly remembered the sailors’ mutinies of 1797. Now France was ruled by a despot who dealt ruthlessly with the Jacobins and destroyed all traces of political liberty. Now, at any rate, there was no reason to fear any Revolutionary infection. Thus matters stood. And yet the first year and a half proved a period of anxiety. For the time being, England and France stood face to face alone, neither side aided by an ally.

Napoleon’s first move was to occupy Hanover, a large German possession belonging at one and the same time to the King of England and the Elector of Hanover. He followed this by ordering the occupation of a number of points in southern Italy, previously free of French troops. He commanded Holland and Spain to equip fleets and armies to aid the French. He issued an edict providing for the confiscation of all English goods found in lands under French domination. He decreed that all Englishmen still in France be arrested and held for the duration of the war. Finally, he set to work to organise a huge army, with headquarters at Boulogne, facing the English shores. From here he planned to cross the Channel, and invade and conquer England. “I need only three days of fog—and I will be master of London, of Parliament, of the Bank of England,” he said in June, 1803, a month after the war began. Boulogne became the centre of seething activity, which was intensified during the following year. This was equally true of all French ports. The “three days of fog” would give the French fleet a chance to slip by the English, and to land an army on England’s shores. And then—Napoleon would break down all barriers, promptly march on London, and take it. Such was Napoleon’s aim, and many in England were convinced that he would achieve it.

Subsequently, many Englishmen who lived through this period told of the effort made in England during the first months of the war to deride Napoleon’s plan of invasion. But from the end of the year 1803, and especially in 1804, the English were far from feeling cocksure. England had not been so shaken since the coming of the Spanish Armada in 1588. Napoleon made personal tours of inspection of the ports and coastal cities of northwestern France. He urged on the workers, encouraged the soldiers in
the camps and the labourers on the wharves, and painted glowing pictures for the inhabitants of the trade centres of the coming victory over their eternal competitor. The British Government received the most disturbing reports of Napoleon’s preparations. Only the most decisive measures would avail against so vast an undertaking. Here was a man who in 1798 had eluded the whole British navy on the Mediterranean sea; who, with an immense fleet and an immense army had successfully landed in Egypt, even stopping on the way to capture Malta. Such a man, taking cover under the fogs which were so scarce on the Mediterranean and so frequent on the Channel, might succeed this time in landing his troops in England.

What was to be done?

There were two alternatives.

For one thing, Pitt could open England’s coffers and attempt to organise and equip a new coalition of European states to strike at Napoleon from the east and thus avert an invasion of England. But Austria, badly beaten by Bonaparte and having lost so much by the Lunéville peace, was not yet in a position to embark on a new war. Though she wanted to fight, she could come to no decision. Prussia wavered. Russia was irresolute. The negotiations went on; Pitt did not lose hope of forming a coalition. Yet, although this plan assured a measure of success, it would take a long time in materialising. It might come too late.

There remained another possibility. For some time Pitt and Hawkesbury had known that the fanatical Georges Cadoudal, leader of the Chouan insurgents, was in London hatching some sort of royalist plot with Charles Artois, brother to the Count of Provence, the pretender to the French throne. Investigating further, the British government discovered that the royalists taking refuge in London were contemplating the assassination of Napoleon. They had become convinced of the complete failure of the Vendéean effort and of the impossibility of deposing the First Consul by open revolt, and had decided to repeat the attempt they had made on his life in 1800, when their bomb had missed its mark.
Unexpected perspectives opened up before Pitt. He desired, above all things, to conduct this affair with becoming delicacy. It would best serve his purposes if he could have repeated the little experiment of 1801 when Tsar Paul died just as he was preparing to march on India. It was highly desirable to lend every aid to the conspirators in organising the coup—quietly, of course—and yet be in a position afterwards to express the Government’s formal condolences, precisely as it had done on that occasion when the Russian Tsar succumbed to an “apoplectic stroke.”

To organise a similar “apoplectic stroke” in the Tuileries in 1803 was a far more difficult and complicated undertaking than it had been in Mikhailovsky Palace in 1801. There were no discontented officers of the Guard in Napoleon’s court—nor a Count Palen, nor a Benningsen, nor a Zubov, one of the direct authors of the “apoplectic stroke.” But the project was considerably facilitated by the royalist émigrés, who volunteered to negotiate with Georges Cadoudal and his comrades.

The conspiracy was organised in London, and it matured there. Georges Cadoudal agreed to lead an armed band of comrades in an assault upon the First Consul, while he was riding on his horse alone, near his suburban palace at Malmaison. They would capture him, spirit him away, and kill him.

Georges Cadoudal was a fanatic in the fullest sense of the word. Dozens of times he had risked his life in the Vendée, in the most incredible of adventures. Now, without hesitation or fear, he planned to assassinate Napoleon, in whom he saw the symbol of the triumph of the Revolution so hateful to him, the loathed usurper barring the legitimate King, Louis Bourbon, from ascending the throne.

On a dark night in August of 1803 Georges Cadoudal and his comrades were landed on the coast of Normandy by an English ship. They promptly set out for Paris. They had contacts in France, they were amply supplied with money, they had good connections in the capital—secret addresses and safe places of refuge. But before they could proceed further, they had to enter into negotiations with General Moreau, who had been selected as the man to seize the power after Napoleon’s death and extend to the Bourbons the invitation to ascend the hereditary throne.
To the royalists, Moreau seemed the ideal man for the undertaking. As intermediary between Moreau and Cadoudal they had chosen another general—Pichegru, who, since his deportation to Guiana after the Eighteenth Fructidor, had succeeded in escaping and was now in hiding in Paris. Pichegru, a convicted traitor and a fugitive from justice, had nothing to lose. General Moreau, however, was a man of quite another type, and he was in quite a different position. He was one of the most gifted generals in the French army, a man of ambition, but of insufficient decision. He had for a long time hated Bonaparte—to be precise, since the Eighteenth Brumaire—and all because Bonaparte had dared to do everything that his own vacillation had prevented him from attempting. From that time on he had been numbered among the silent opposition. Several Jacobins considered him a republican by conviction; his personal acquaintances among the royalists were convinced that out of sheer hatred for the First Consul he would consent to assist them. It is not clear where he stood at the time Pichegru informed him of the conspiracy.

His violent hatred for Bonaparte was his dominating passion. However, nothing that he had ever said or done indicated that he desired to restore the Bourbons on the throne. Be that as it may, the mere fact that he knew of the conspiracy and did not report it was enough to compromise him. Pichegru, in constant communication with the British government's agents, was full of assurances that Moreau was ready to coöperate. But Moreau refused to meet Cadoudal. He unequivocally informed Pichegru that though he was ready to act against Napoleon he was by no means willing to serve the Bourbons. While these negotiations and deliberations were in progress, Napoleon's police detected the conspiracy, and reported daily to the First Consul of its progress.

On February 15, 1804, General Moreau was arrested in his house. On the night of February 23, Pichegru was also arrested, after having been betrayed to the police for 300,000 francs by his best friend, the owner of the house which the conspirators used for their headquarters. Cross-examination followed cross-examination, but Pichegru refused to speak. Moreau was visited by Bonaparte's agents, who promised him a pardon and liberty if
he would confess that he had been seeing Cadoudal. Moreau refused. Forty days after his arrest Pichegru was found in his cell, strangled by his own neckerchief. Thenceforth, there were ceaseless rumours that Pichegru had not died by his own hand, but had been murdered by the order of the First Consul. Subsequently, Napoleon made scornful denial, saying: "I had a court of justice which could have condemned Pichegru, and a platoon of soldiers which could have shot him. I have never done useless things." But these rumours found fertile soil, for the reason that some days before Pichegru's mysterious death the higher circles of France and Europe had been shaken by the shooting of a member of the Bourbon dynasty, the Duke of Enghien.

From the moment when Moreau, Pichegru and other of the conspirators had been arrested, Napoleon was in an almost constant state of fury. He could clearly see the hand of the English in it; scarcely less clear was the guiding rôle of the Bourbons. He had known all along that the English had landed Cadoudal on French soil toward the end of the summer of 1803, that he had come with English money and with instructions from Charles Artois, and that even now he was in Paris and might any day make an attempt on his life, either alone or with the aid of his comrades. One day during this period of anxiety Napoleon, flying into a rage, shouted that he would make the Bourbons pay dearly for their efforts to kill him. Talleyrand chanced to be within hearing. To curry favour with his chief and at the same time, with little personal risk, to avenge himself upon the royalists, who detested him, he said: "Apparently, the Bourbons think that your blood is not as precious as theirs." These words precipitated Napoleon into a frenzy of fury. It was on this occasion that the name of the Duke of Enghien was first uttered, and it happened at an instant when Napoleon was beside himself. He called a council of several persons, among them Fouché and Talleyrand. The council decided to arrest the Duke of Enghien. There were two difficulties. In the first place, the Duke did not reside in France, but in Baden. Secondly, it was definitely known that he had not been connected with the discovered conspiracy. The first difficulty was of little consequence: Napoleon had com-
plete control of the affairs of western and southern Germany. As for the second, this too had scarcely any meaning, as he had decided beforehand to permit the Duke to be judged by a military tribunal, which would not scruple over such an unimportant consideration as the dearth of evidence. The order for the Duke's arrest was promptly despatched.

The Duke of Enghien was living in the town of Ettenheim, in Baden, little suspecting the calamity which was about to befall him. On the night of March 14-15 a detachment of mounted French gendarmerie crossed the border into Baden, entered Ettenheim, arrested the Duke and immediately returned with him to France. Apparently, the ministers of the Baden government were thankful to Napoleon for not having made them accompany the Duke. No one in authority in Baden showed the least sign of life when the arrest was made. By March 20 the Duke was in Paris, confined in the Castle of Vincennes. That same evening the military tribunal met in the castle. After a cross-examination at midnight, the trial began at one o'clock in the morning. The Duke of Enghien was accused of receiving money from England and of fighting against France. At a quarter to three he was sentenced to death. He wrote a letter to Napoleon and asked that it be delivered to him. The presiding officer of the tribunal, one of the heroes of the taking of the Bastille, wanted to write to Napoleon in the name of the court to recommend a modification of the sentence, but General Savary, especially sent from the Tuileries to follow the trial proceedings, tore the pen from his hand and announced: “Your work is done, the rest is mine.” A quarter of an hour later the Duke of Enghien was led out into the moat of the Castle of Vincennes and shot.

When Napoleon read the letter the Duke had written him immediately before his death, he said that if he had received it in time he would have shown mercy to the condemned man. But later he affirmed that he had been perfectly justified in having the Duke put to death—that it had been demanded by the interests of the State and as a warning to the Bourbons. He could not bear to let others shoulder the blame for his own actions.

Several days after the Duke's death the police finally succeeded in arresting the leader of the Chouans. Cadoudal had been
recognised by a detective while driving through a square in a carriage. Indeed, it had fallen to Cadoudal's lot to remain endlessly on the move, as he no longer had any shelter, or even sought one. The people of Paris had been warned that anyone who harboured Georges Cadoudal—or even knew his address—would be sentenced to death. The detective tried to stop the horses; Cadoudal shot him. Several police officers flung themselves upon him. The struggle lasted a long time. Cadoudal fiercely defended himself. Many were maimed by his flailing fists. But at last he was pinioned. The conspiracy was completely crushed. When, within several weeks, Cadoudal and his comrades successively ascended the guillotine, France, as well as the rest of Europe, became convinced that the royalists had been disposed of for a long time to come. Napoleon showed leniency to Moreau: he ordered him merely exiled from France.

The executions gave birth to the persistent rumour, originating in Paris and spreading to the provinces, that Cadoudal and his comrades had intended to place the Duke of Enghien on the French throne after the First Consul's assassination. There was no truth in this, but the rumour performed a very valuable service for Bonaparte. In a direct, unequivocal manner, Napoleon's creatures in the State departments—the members of the Tribunate, Legislative Corps and Senate—began to advocate measures which the First Consul had long desired. They reasoned that it was imperative to end, once and for all, the untenable situation, in which the tranquillity and welfare of the whole nation depended upon the life of a single man, and in which the enemies of France could build their hopes on attempted assassinations. The issue was clear: the Consulship for life must be transformed into a hereditary monarchy.

However, this new dynasty of the Bonapartes should not bear the royal title after the manner of the previous dynasties. The new sovereign expressed the desire to accept the title of Emperor of the West, first received by Charlemagne after his coronation in the year 800. He openly proclaimed that he was not taking over the heritage of the French kings but that of the Emperor Charlemagne.
By taking the title held by Charlemagne, Napoleon hoped to resurrect and continue the much larger Roman Empire. As heir to the Roman Empire, he could consider himself the uniter of the countries of western civilisation. Subsequently, he succeeded in establishing his sovereignty over a far vaster empire than was ever ruled by Charlemagne: prior to the Russian campaign of 1812—even excepting Rome's possessions in northern Africa and Asia Minor, and only considering the European continent—the Empire of Napoleon was larger than the Roman Empire, and far richer and more densely populated. But in the first moment that his intention of resurrecting the Empire of Charlemagne was announced, it was regarded by many as an arrogant presumption and as an insolent challenge to the civilised world by a conqueror who had lost all self-restraint.

In all the courts of Europe, ministers and ambassadors tensely followed the sudden, sharp, accelerated movement toward monarchy, which had become so evident in France after the discovery of Cadoudal's conspiracy and the execution of the Duke of Enghien. In a general sense, Enghien's execution may have brought Napoleon moral damage, but in at least one respect it did him a service, for it somewhat modified the mistrust and hostility which the old Jacobins felt toward him. With the blood of the Duke of Enghien he had once and for all dissociated himself from the old régime and the old aristocracy. This conclusion was by no means unanimous; nevertheless, it was accepted by the majority. The so-definitely-established Bourbon conspiracy of Cadoudal astonished the minds of men. And as more and more evidence came to light during the investigation and the trial, the middle and landowning classes became fired with the desire to consolidate the new order created by the Revolution and Napoleon, and to secure it against all hostile royalist attempts. On April 18, 1804, the Senate issued a decree conferring on the First Consul, Napoleon Bonaparte, the title of hereditary Emperor of the French. The formality of a plebiscite was managed even more easily than after the Brumaire in 1799.

None the less, the general bewilderment was considerable, even though the event had been anticipated since 1802. That portion of the bourgeoisie which wholeheartedly supported Na-
Pon's political behaviour had considered the resurrection of the monarchy as quite inevitable. The confirmed republicans, of course, could not reconcile themselves to the new situation. The days of the Revolution, the days of the dream of freedom and equality, the days of flaming denunciations of crowned despots, rose up in their memory. Some believed that Napoleon had diminished his tremendous fame by adding a title to a name which already reverberated throughout the world. "To be a Bonaparte—and after that to become an Emperor! What a fall!" exclaimed Paul-Louis Courier, the well-known publicist and pamphleteer. When the gilded throng of dignitaries, generals and opulently attired women attended the first court function in the Tuileries, only those few who were initiated in the secret knew that the new ruler—who alone among these adorned, effulgent people wore the simple blue uniform of the Chasseur Guards with boots and spurs—had dreams beyond the mere ascension of the throne, and that it was more than a whim which had prompted him to compare himself with Charlemagne.

Taking as his example the coronation of Charlemagne, Napoleon conceived the idea of having the Roman Pope personally participate in his elevation to the Emperorship. But Napoleon was resolved in this instance to introduce one significant improvement: whereas Charlemagne, for his coronation had traveled to the Pope at Rome, Napoleon decided that the Pope should come to Paris.

With fear and irritation Pope Pius VII learned of Napoleon's desire. His intimates attempted to console him with historical examples. Among other precedents they reminded him of Pope Leo I, who, in the fifth century when matters were going badly, restrained his wrath and journeyed to meet Attila the Hun, who in any event could not have been much of an improvement on the new French Emperor in good breeding, courtesy and refinement. Besides, to refuse was out of the question. Rome was threatened by Napoleon's troops in northern and middle Italy.

After brief reflection, the Pope decided to comply with Napoleon's demand. However, he hoped to profit by it, if possible, by bargaining to retrieve a few fragments of the Papal possessions seized by Napoleon in northern Italy. But neither Pius VII,
nor Cardinal Consalvi, nor the entire conclave of cardinals, was shrewd enough to get the better of a diplomat of Napoleon's calibre. The Pope acted craftily, complained bitterly, then again acted craftily, and again complained bitterly, but to no avail. Finally, he left for Paris with the hope—which Napoleon eagerly encouraged—that perhaps when he reached the French capital he would receive a moderate reward. He arrived in Paris—and received absolutely nothing.

It is a curious reflection on Napoleon's character to note his duplicity during the coronation. Pius VII was necessary to him, because hundreds of millions of people, including the majority of France, implicitly believed in the infallibility of the Pope. Therefore, the Pope must be an essential detail of the coronation ceremony, especially in view of the proposed resurrection of Charlemagne's rights and pretensions. But, on the other hand, Napoleon regarded the Pope as a conjurer and a sorcerer—moreover, as a sorcerer who consciously exploited human stupidity by means of various weapons of superstition within the Church and without. Having ordered the Pope's presence, he promised the cardinals that he would come out to welcome him. And so he did—but in a hunting costume, surrounded by huntsmen, whips and dogs. He met the Pope in the Forest of Fontainebleau, not far from Paris, and not many paces from the suburban palace, where he was at the time residing. The Papal procession paused. The Pope was invited to leave his carriage, cross the road, and climb into the carriage of the Emperor, who made no effort to stir from his place. Napoleon in no wise altered his attitude toward the Pontiff during the latter's stay in Paris.

On December 2, 1804, Napoleon was solemnly coronated in the Cathedral of Notre Dame. As the endless line of gilded carriages, carrying generals, dignitaries, the Pope and the cardinals, moved from the Palace toward Notre Dame, hordes of people gazed in wonderment at the brilliant spectacle. There is a legend that after the ceremony Napoleon asked an old soldier of republican conviction how he had liked the celebration, and received the startling answer: "Excellent, Your Majesty. But it is a pity that there are lacking today 300,000 persons willing to lay down their heads to make similar ceremonies impossible." The
same mythical words are sometimes attributed to one of the wit-

nesses of the signing of the Concordat.

In the central act of the coronation, to the consternation of
the Pope and in violation of the prearranged ritual, Napoleon
introduced a characteristic innovation. At that solemn moment
when Pius VII raised the large imperial crown, prepared to place
it on the Emperor's head—as his predecessor had done 1004
years before at Charlemagne's coronation—Napoleon suddenly
reached out and snatched it from him, and with his own hands
placed it upon his head. After this, his wife, the Empress Jose-
phine, knelt before him, and he placed a smaller crown upon her
head. This gesture of placing the Crown of Charlemagne upon
his head with his own hands had a symbolic significance. He did
not desire that undue importance should be attached to the Papal
"blessing." The victorious soldier, born of the French Revolu-
tion, could not bring himself to accept the crown from anyone's
hands but his own, and, least of all, from the hands of that church
organisation with whose influence he unwillingly had to reckon,
but which he neither loved nor respected, and which even in his
early reports to the Directory he called "le pretraille."

The celebration continued for several days. In the court, in
the city, and in the provinces there were fireworks and music
without end, while cannon thundered and bells tolled. All this
time the Emperor remained closeted in his cabinet. Ministers,
ambassadors, generals, secretaries and clerks bustled in and out
of the room as they made their reports. Alone, unstirring, be-
lieving no one, scrutinising everyone, daily dictating 40 or 50
orders, letters, ordinances, enquiries, decrees—he paced back
and forth, now and then seating himself at a table, only to rise
and resume his pacing. . . . This was the new Emperor.

During these days of endless rejoicing Napoleon knew, as no
one else did, the new danger that was threatening the Empire.
Even before the coronation he had received unimpeachable evi-
dence that William Pitt, following the failure of the Cadoudal
conspiracy, had redoubled his efforts to create a new (the third
from the beginning of the Revolutionary wars) coalition against
France. Indeed, he knew that the Third Coalition was, in fact,
already in existence.
Prodigally spending tens of millions of pounds sterling, William Pitt, having after the Cadoudal affair lost all hope of disposing of Napoleon by murder, began to work for a new coalition. In self-assured England something like a panic developed. Toward the end of 1804 and by the beginning of 1805 Napoleon's camp at Boulogne had grown into a formidable military force. The huge, well-trained, excellently equipped army remained at Boulogne, waiting for a fog on the Channel and for a signal to embark. In England efforts were made to organise something in the nature of an all-national militia. The newspapers of the well-to-do classes—there were no other newspapers in England at that time—spoke touchingly of a legendary gentleman who, with only one leg, the other being a wooden stump, came hobbling along to defend the fatherland against Bonaparte and his hordes; and they mentioned similar instances of patriotic fervour. At the same time the press maintained a dead silence on the definitely mutinous frame of mind of that section of the working class which years of savage exploitation, poverty and chronic starvation had brought to a state of open hostility. "No Bonaparte could make it any worse. Let him come!" These sentiments, expressed at the time in the workers' quarters, were censored until many years later; but the Government was well aware of them even then—very well aware of them. . . . Thus was England forced to put all her trust in a coalition.

Austria sympathised with the idea of a new war. The losses
she had suffered by the Lunéville peace were enormous. Moreover, Bonaparte subsequently began to manage the petty western and southern German states with so free a hand that in a new war lay Austria’s only hope of escaping the fate of becoming a minor power. Furthermore, here was an opportunity of financing a war on English money. Almost simultaneously with his secret negotiations with Austria, Pitt made advances to Russia.

On ascending the throne, Tsar Alexander I terminated the efforts for a Franco-Russian alliance which his father had begun. Better than anyone else he knew of England’s distant but extremely active aid in organising the “apoplectic stroke” which had accounted for his father’s death; all the more, as in the preparation of this event he himself had played a substantial rôle.

In addition, the young Tsar knew the degree to which the nobility, which sold its raw materials and wheat to England, was interested in friendship with that country; and the extent to which it feared Napoleon, who had abolished serfdom and demolished feudal prerogatives throughout Europe. He likewise observed where Napoleon’s armies and influence penetrated—and he realised that it was precisely in this that he must be considered the direct heir of the Revolution. “Robespierre on horseback,” they were beginning to call him. To all these considerations yet another might be added, a very weighty one. By spring of 1804 it had already become evident that the new coalition could hope to count on England, Austria, the Kingdom of Naples (so it was then supposed), and Prussia, which was equally perturbed by Napoleon’s domination on the Rhine. Certainly, this was the perfect opportunity for Russia to join in a war against the French dictator. It hardly seemed likely that Napoleon would find sufficient means and forces to prevail against such a phalanx of foes.

When the Duke of Enghien was executed, all monarchial Europe, which even without this added incentive was preparing for war, began a stormy and successful agitation against “the Corsican monster,” who had shed Bourbon blood. It was resolved to make all possible use of this opportune episode. At first the Grand Duke of Baden was counseled to protest against the flagrant violation of his state’s territorial rights committed
during Enghien's arrest. But the greatly frightened Grand Duke of Baden would do nothing. He even hastened to ask Napoleon, in a roundabout way, if he was satisfied with the conduct of the Baden authorities during the arrest, and if they had done everything that was demanded of them by the French gendarmes. Other monarchs contented themselves with expressing their indignation, sotto voce, within the narrow confines of their family circles. As a general rule, the vehemence of their protests was in direct ratio to the distance separating their frontiers from Napoleon. This explains the fact that the Russian Tsar was the one to show the greatest decisiveness. In a special note, he formally protested this infringement of the international law governing the inviolability of Baden territory.

Napoleon retaliated by commanding Talleyrand to give that famous answer which Alexander was never to forgive or forget. Couched in diplomatic language, it was the most terrible affront that Alexander had ever received. In his reply, Napoleon calculatedly argued that the Duke of Enghien had been arrested for participating in a conspiracy on his life. Further, he stated that if Alexander, discovering that his late father's assassins had taken refuge outside of Russia, had nevertheless seized them in direct violation of international law, France would have made no protest. More clearly, in a public and official way, to have called Alexander a parricide was impossible. All Europe knew that the conspirators had consulted with Alexander before strangling Paul, and that after his ascension to the throne the young Tsar had not dared touch them: neither Palen, nor Benningssen, nor Zubov, nor Talizin, although they tranquilly resided not in foreign territory, but in the city of St. Petersburg, and often visited the Winter Palace.

Alexander's personal hatred of Napoleon was another argument for Russia's entrance into the Third Coalition.

In an effort both to rationalise his militaristic intentions and to attract the sympathy of the liberal strata of society, Alexander ringingly denounced Napoleon's aspirations toward autocracy and his destruction of the French Republic. This was poorly masked hypocrisy. Alexander had far more reason to fear Napoleon as the destroyer of the feudal order, but he knew that the
transformation of France into an autocratic empire was a circumstance that undermined Napoleon's moral prestige both in France, and in the rest of Europe, among certain sections of middle-class society—among those human beings for whom the Revolution still preserved a certain fascination. This liberal censure of Napoleonic autocracy by the despotic master of an empire in which feudal serfdom still obtained, is one of the ironies of history.

Without the slightest hesitation William Pitt agreed to finance Russia—as previously he had promised to finance Austria, Naples, Prussia and, indeed, one and all who were willing to take up arms against Napoleon.

Throughout this period Napoleon was well informed of the diplomatic game of his enemies. But he saw that, despite Pitt's efforts, the coalition was forming very slowly. Until the autumn of 1805 it seemed to Napoleon that Austria was far from ready for war. Consequently, there was nothing left for him to do but to continue his preparation for a descent on England, and to act as if there were no one in Europe but himself. He desired to annex Piedmont—and he annexed it; he desired to annex Genoa—and he annexed it; he desired to proclaim himself King of Italy and to be crowned in Milan—and he was crowned in Milan; he desired to present a number of petty German territories to his German "allies" (vassals, like Bavaria)—and he did so.

After the Lunéville peace of 1801 and the full disposal of Austria, the petty German princes imagined that their only salvation lay in Napoleon. They crowded all the vestibules of the court and ministries, giving assurances of their loyalty, begging for fragments of neighbouring lands, informing and intriguing against one another, fawning upon Napoleon, showering Talleyrand with petitions and bribes. Not at first without astonishment—later they ceased to wonder at it—did Napoleon's courtiers observe this cringing and toady ing. On one occasion in the Palace of the Tuileries one of these little German monarchs stationed himself behind the armchair of the Emperor, who was playing cards, and from time to time bent over and kissed Napoleon's hand as it moved through the air. During this whole performance Napoleon did not pay the slightest attention to him.
The autumn of 1805 was at hand. Napoleon announced to his admirals that he needed only a single day of calm on the English Channel, and the assurance that there would be no British fleet, to effect a landing in England. The season of fogs was approaching. Napoleon had long since ordered Admiral Villeneuve to leave the Mediterranean and join the squadron of the English Channel. And suddenly—almost in a single day—there came to the Emperor, who was in the midst of his armies in Boulogne, two major pieces of news. The first was that Admiral Villeneuve was not in a position to execute his command promptly. The second was that the Russian troops were moving to join the Austrians, who were ready to open an offensive war against him and his German allies. At that very moment the armies of the Third Coalition were advancing westward.

Without hesitation, Napoleon completely changed his objectives. Realising that William Pitt had succeeded in saving England and that a landing was out of the question, he promptly prepared for the new war. In anticipation of just such an eventuality, he had previously drawn up a complete set of plans to forestall a threat from the east. They were directed not against England, but against Austria and Russia. The date was August 27, 1805.

It was the end of the Boulogne camp, the end of the two years of labour over its organisation, an end to all his dreams of humbling his stubborn foe. "If I am not in London within fifteen days, I must be in Vienna by the middle of November," said the Emperor before receiving the news which so radically changed his intentions. London was saved—but Vienna should pay for it. For several hours without interruption he dictated the dispositions for the new campaign. In all directions the orders flew: for the conscription of new recruits to fill in the reserves, for the equipment of the army during its march through France and Bavaria to meet the enemy. Messengers sped to Berlin, Madrid, Dresden and Amsterdam with new diplomatic instructions, with threats and commands, with proposals and baits. Bewilderment reigned in Paris, and a measure of alarm. It was reported to Napoleon that the merchants, the Bourse and the manufacturers were quietly complaining of his passion for annexations and of his inconsiderate foreign policy—that the blame for the new
war of all Europe against France was placed on him alone. The murmurs were not loud, they were cautious—but they were there, nevertheless.

And the Emperor knew it. None the less, within several days the Boulogne camp was abandoned, and the army began its march from the shores of the English Channel, across all of France, and into southern Bavaria.

If the Third Coalition, already decided upon in principle by its leading participants as early as the middle of 1804, did not take the field until the autumn of 1805, it was chiefly because of the desire to prepare particularly well this time, and to secure the maximum possibility of victory. The Austrian forces were better organised and equipped than at any previous period. General Mack's army was designated for the first collision with Napoleon's advance guard, and of it great hopes were entertained. Much depended on this first collision. The success expected of General Mack by the coalition was based not only on the preparation and excellent condition of his divisions, but also on the assumption that Napoleon would not immediately break up his whole camp at Boulogne and that he would move only part of his forces from Boulogne to the southeast, and that even if he should move them all, he would not be able to move them quickly and concentrate them where necessary.

Mack entered Bavaria and moved to the Fortress of Ulm, on the Danube. He realised that he had violated the international law of neutrality, but even the fact that Napoleon was advancing straight on Bavaria failed to disturb him. The neutrality of secondary states—either before, or during, or after Napoleon—existed only on paper. The Elector of Bavaria hesitated; he was in a state of constant terror. On one hand, the mighty coalition of Austria, Russia and England threatened him, demanding an alliance. On the other, Napoleon threatened and demanded an alliance. At first the Elector entered into a secret alliance with the coalition, promising Austria all possible assistance in the new war. But after several days of reflection he gathered together his family and his ministers, and fled to Würzburg, a city which Napoleon proclaimed would be occupied by one of the French
armies under the leadership of Bernadotte. Once in Würzburg, the Elector wholeheartedly went over to Napoleon’s side.

Precisely the same course was immediately taken by the Elector of Württemberg and by the Grand Duke of Baden. “Clenching their teeth, they temporarily forced themselves to silence their German hearts,” the latest German textbooks of the intermediate schools mournfully explain this episode. As a reward for this manly resistance to the demand of “their German hearts,” the Electors of Bavaria and Württemberg were promoted to the position of kings, titles which they, and later their descendants, held until the Revolution of November, 1918. The Grand Duke of Baden, as well as the two new kings, received a reward of new territory at the expense of Austria. They also asked for a little money, but this Napoleon refused.

The road into Bavaria was open. Napoleon ordered his marshals to accelerate their advance. From all sides, in hurried marches, they sped toward the Danube. Marshals Bernadotte, Davout, Soult, Lannes, Ney, Marmont and Murat, having received precise orders from the Emperor, executed them with the precision of a mechanism. Within less than three weeks the army, immense for those times, was transported, with negligible loss by illness or desertion, from the English Channel to the Danube. Napoleon once said that military genius consisted in a capacity for so arranging matters that an army “might live in parts, but fight as a unit.” The marshals advanced by different routes, previously designated by the Emperor. They easily provisioned themselves without encumbering the roads. Then, at a predetermined moment, they all appeared round Ulm, where, as in a bag, Mack was suffocated with the best part of the Austrian army.

Napoleon left Paris on September 24. He was in Strassburg on the 26th. He immediately crossed the Rhine with his army. At the start of the campaign, at Strassburg, Napoleon subjected the army to its final organisation. It would not be amiss at this point to make a few observations upon it. . . .

The troops advancing on Austria were officially designated the Grand Army, to distinguish them from other detachments which served as garrisons or as armies of occupation, in places remote
from the battlefields. The Grand Army was divided into seven corps, commanded by the more brilliant generals, who, after the coronation, were named marshals. Each corps was a complete army in itself. It consisted of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and all those other departments which are ordinarily included in the army as a whole. The main artillery and cavalry masses were not dependent on any one of the marshals, nor were they included in any one of the seven corps. They were organised in quite separate detachments of the Grand Army, and were placed under the direct and immediate command of the Emperor himself. Thus, Marshal Murat, whom Napoleon appointed chief of the entire cavalry, was actually only his adjutant, the transmitting and executive instrument of his commands. Napoleon was in a position, at a crucial moment, to fling his entire artillery and cavalry to the assistance of one of the seven corps.

Quite independent of the seven corps or of the cavalry and artillery, was the Imperial Guard. This consisted of 7,000 chosen men; later its numbers were increased. The Guard was composed of regiments of foot-grenadiers and foot-chasseurs, of regiments of mounted grenadiers and mounted chasseurs, of two squadrons of mounted gendarmes, of one squadron of Mamelukes recruited in Egypt, and, finally, of an "Italian Battalion," for Napoleon was not only the Emperor of the French, but also the King of Northern and Middle Italy. To be sure, there were more Frenchmen than Italians in the Italian Battalion of the Guard. Only soldiers especially distinguished were accepted into the Guard. They received good pay, were given excellent food, wore particularly handsome uniforms with high bear-fur caps, and occupied quarters immediately adjoining the Emperor's headquarters. Napoleon knew many of them in person.

Napoleon's disciplinary methods were most original. He permitted no corporal punishment in the army. In the case of a particularly serious infringement, a court-martial sentenced the guilty soldier to capital punishment, to hard labour and, in less serious circumstances, to the military detention-cell. There was, however, one especially authoritative court—a comrades' court. Nowhere was it designated in the regulations, but it was introduced into the army with Napoleon's silent assent. According
to the reports of eye-witnesses it operated in the following manner: A battle had taken place. It was observed by the company that two soldiers had not been seen during the fighting. The missing men appeared after the engagement and explained their absence, but the company was convinced that the accused had simply hidden themselves out of fear. It promptly elected three judges from among the rank and file. The judges cross-examined the accused, sentenced them to death, and shot them on the spot. The higher command was perfectly aware of what had taken place, saw it occur, but made no effort to interfere. Thus the matter ended. No officer was permitted to participate in the judgment, or even to show any cognisance—at least, officially—of the execution.

Claiming credit for the emancipation of the peasantry from feudal fetters, Napoleon—an autocrat who had been proclaimed the hereditary Emperor, the anointed of the Pope, and after the year 1810 a kinsman of the reigning Austrian house—managed to inculcate in his soldiers the idea that he and they, as formerly, were the defenders of the Revolution from the Bourbons and interventionists, and that he, as formerly, was the first soldier of the French Republic. Love for him, confidence in his objectives, faith in his genius and invincibility—these maintained the discipline of the army to as great a degree as courts-martial and the swift justice of comrades' courts. Yes, and how could the French peasant army forget that its Emperor had issued out of Revolutionary ranks, when it witnessed with its own eyes that serfs had ceased being serfs and that the nobility no longer dared to humiliate them without fear of reprisal, as was the rule in the days of the Bourbons. Instinctively, they knew that outside the borders of France, in the Europe he was conquering, their leader was fulfilling the aims of revolution, rather than counter-revolution. Their faith in him was implicit. Their affection for him was reflected in such pet nicknames as "the little Corporal" and "the little shorn one" ("le petit tondu"). They knew that Napoleon's words: "In every soldier's knapsack lies a marshal's baton," was no empty phrase. The rank and file were too well informed of the modest origins of Murat, Bernadotte, Lefebvre and several other brilliant generals on Napoleon's staff, to doubt the genuine-
ness of this statement. After every battle they saw themselves and their comrades showered with the rewards with which Napoleon was so fabulously prodigal.

Although the Emperor had absolute confidence in his soldiers and officers, he was not completely trustful of any of his marshals or generals. In his marshals he had surrounded himself with a retinue of men highly gifted in military strategy. They resembled one another only in one thing: they all possessed, if in varying degrees, the faculty of resourcefulness, the comprehension of conditions in any given moment, the capacity for making rapid decisions, the military instinct which as in a flash revealed the way out of a tight corner, the ability to persist where persistence was essential. Above all, Napoleon had trained them to grasp his thoughts from the slightest hint, and to develop it by themselves. His strategic genius made his marshals precise executors of his will, but at the same time did not deprive them of their own independence on the field of battle.

The illiterate, good-natured bruiser Lefebvre; the cold, naturally stern aristocrat Davout; the dashing cavalry captain Murat; the cartographer Berthier—all were exceptional tacticians, possessed of great initiative. In this respect, neither the brave Ney nor the equally brave Lannes had anything to teach the crafty and intelligent Bernadotte, or the methodical Masséna, or the dry and restrained Marmont. Personal courage was, of course, taken for granted among them; they were under obligation to set an example for the rank and file. There developed among them a remarkable esprit de corps, in which they took no little pride. When one day they spoke with rapture of the epic fearlessness of Marshal Lannes, who so often led his Hussar regiments into attack, Lannes, who was present, exclaimed with vexation: "A Hussar who is not killed at 30 is not a Hussar, but worthless rubbish!" At the time he made this statement he was 34 years old; two years later he was felled by the round shot of the enemy on the field of battle. Lannes was not only a brave Hussar, he was a capable war captain as well. Such were the men whom Napoleon chose for his aides and whom he advanced to high rank.

They were all with him at the outbreak of the war with the
Third Coalition in 1805. Desaix alone, killed at Marengo, was not on hand. At the head of this army, with such leaders at his disposal, was the Emperor himself. At this time he was in his prime, a military genius of the first order, and acknowledged as such by friend and foe.

The armies of Soult and Lannes and the cavalry of Murat crossed the Danube, and unexpectedly appeared in Mack's rear. Realising their danger, a portion of the Austrian army fled to the east, but the main mass was flung back toward the fortress by Ney. Mack was pressed on all sides; but he still had an opportunity to escape.

In this emergency Napoleon made use of a group of his most cunning spies, headed by the wily Schulmeister. He commanded them to win Mack's confidence and persuade him to hold his position at Ulm. Schulmeister and his underlings, after gaining the Austrian commander's ear, informed him that Napoleon would soon be forced to raise the siege, in order to quell a revolt directed against him in Paris. At first Mack refused to credit this report. Schulmeister immediately advised Napoleon of the Austrian's scepticism, whereupon, by means of the typographical equipment at the disposal of the French army, a special edition of a Parisian newspaper was printed. It contained news of the spurious revolution in the capital. A copy of the paper was shown to Mack, who read it and was reassured.

On October 15, Marshals Ney and Lannes, engaging the enemy, took the heights surrounding Ulm. Mack's position became desperate. Napoleon despatched a messenger to him, demanding that he capitulate. Further, he served warning that if the proposal was refused and if the fortress had to be taken by assault, no mercy would be shown the defenders. On October 20 Mack's surviving army, together with all of its military stores, artillery and standards, as well as the fortress of Ulm, were surrendered to Napoleon. The Emperor permitted Mack himself to go free, but sent the surrendered army to France to perform various labours. Soon after, Napoleon learned that Murat had succeeded in capturing an additional 8,000 men from among those who had escaped before the surrender of the fortress.
Strictly speaking, the humiliating surrender of Ulm sealed the doom of the Third Coalition. However, only a few of the generals on the Austrian and Russian staff promptly grasped this fact. Without stopping at Ulm, Napoleon and his marshals advanced along the right bank of the Danube straight upon Vienna. The French captured some 61,000 prisoners. As for the slain, the hopelessly wounded and the missing, the number remains unknown. “Two hundred cannon, 90 standards and all the generals are in our hands. Only 15,000 men have saved themselves of this army,” Napoleon announced to his soldiers in a special proclamation summing up the results of the first operations.

The advance of the French on Vienna continued at an accelerated pace. On November 13, preceded by Murat’s cavalry and surrounded by his Guard, Napoleon entered the Austrian capital. He took up his quarters in the Imperial Palace at Schönbrunn, on the outskirts of the city. He appointed his secretary Clarke (later Minister of War) Governor-General of Vienna. Emperor Francis of Austria, before his hurried flight, sent Napoleon a proposal of peace, to which Napoleon did not agree.

Henceforth, Tsar Alexander I and his Russian army remained the sole hope of the Third Coalition. Alexander, in turn, realised that his chances for success depended, to a large degree, on the possibility of drawing Prussia into the Coalition.

In October of that year, at the very time when Mack, locked in the fortress of Ulm, was preparing to yield his whole army, Alexander I was in Berlin attempting to persuade Frederick William III of Prussia to declare war against Napoleon. Frederick William was in the same state of trepidation and irresolution as the South German Electors. He was afraid of both Alexander and Napoleon. To gain his end, Alexander first thought of threatening to march the Russian army across the Prussian territories. But when the German monarch manifested unexpected firmness and prepared to resist any violation of neutrality, Alexander tried cajolery. Just at this moment came news that Napoleon had ordered Marshal Bernadotte, on his way to Austria, to march through Ansbach, a southern possession of Prussia. The violation of neutrality was downright. Frederick William
was offended by Napoleon's arbitrary methods. Neglecting to take into account the successes of the Grand Army—this was still before the surrender of Ulm—he began to think seriously of taking part in the war on the side of the Third Coalition.

The matter ended in a secret agreement between Frederick William and Alexander, which provided that Prussia should present certain demands in the nature of an ultimatum to Napoleon. After this, one of the most absurd scenes in all history was enacted. Frederick William, Queen Louisa and Alexander descended into a mausoleum and, before the tomb of Frederick the Great, took an oath of eternal mutual fealty. All this was done in the sentimental mood of the time. How paradoxical it is that this same Frederick the Great had for seven years waged war on Russia—had beaten the Russians, and in turn had been beaten by them, and had finally been driven to the verge of suicide when the Russian army had occupied Berlin! After this curious dramatization and demonstration of eternal Russo-Prussian love, Alexander left Berlin and hastened to the theatre of military operations in Austria.

England and Austria were overjoyed. If the entire Prussian army should make its passage across the Ore Mountains and appear on the field of action, Napoleon would be lost. Thus predicted the English newspapers, as with rapture they recounted the touching episode of the Russo-Prussian oath at the tomb of Frederick the Great. It now devolved upon Napoleon at all cost to hasten the enemy's debacle before Prussia's entry into the coalition.

Soon after the occupation of Vienna, the French, without engaging in battle, succeeded in taking an immense bridge connecting Vienna with the left bank of the Danube; for some reason it was the only bridge left intact by the Austrians. Of the capture of this bridge, there have been numerous anecdotal accounts, one of which—somewhat inaccurate and adorned by legend—is familiar to those who have read the second part of Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. Actually, this is what took place: Murat, Lannes, Bertrand and a colonel, whose name has been lost to posterity, artfully hid a battalion of grenadiers in the bushes and overgrowth. Then they themselves quite openly appeared before the
Austrian guards who had been ordered to blow up the structure at the first appearance of the enemy. They called to the perplexed Austrians, announcing that a peace had been concluded. They were permitted to cross the bridge, whereupon they repeated the same lie to General Prince Auersperg. Before he could make a response, the French grenadiers, at a given signal, suddenly sprang from the bushes and flung themselves on the Austrians and the cannon ranged along the bridge. Within a minute, the French battalion was in possession of the bridge. The Austrians attempted to counter-attack, but were quickly crushed.

Informed by the exultant Murat of this amazing exploit, Napoleon, without losing an hour, ordered his troops to cross the bridge and to make straight for the Russian army, which was placed in a most precarious position, as the result of this manœuvre. Napoleon with his main forces crossed the Danube near Vienna and immediately cut off the Russian armies retreating northward. Kutuzov, commander-in-chief of the Allied armies, saw at once that his sole hope of salvation lay in a speedy retirement from Krems to a position south of Olmütz. He had at hand approximately 45,000 men, while Napoleon had almost 100,000. In the Prussian army no one could understand the history of the Vienna bridge. They spoke loudly of treachery—of a secret Austrian alliance with Napoleon. The loss of the bridge seemed senseless and incredible to them. They realized that its capture gave Napoleon possession of the left bank of the Danube without the least opposition, thereby threatening the inevitable ruin of the Russian army. Some severe rear-guard forays followed. Kutuzov was forced to establish barriers doomed to destruction, merely to allow the main force time to escape. Finally, having already lost 12,000 of his 45,000 men, and having subjected the army to much hardship, he managed to avoid the humiliating surrender which menaced him. He slipped from the clutches of Napoleon and brought the remnants of his army to Olmütz, where the Emperors Alexander and Francis maintained their headquarters.

This was the situation: The Russian armies, including the Guard and other reinforcements which Kutuzov had brought to Olmütz and its environs, numbered 75,000 men. Of the Aus-
trians, there remained from 15,000 to 18,000. One Austrian army had already been destroyed by Napoleon before his occupation of Vienna. Another, still larger and equally well-equipped, was contending at this time in the Venetian area with Marshal Masséna’s army, which had been entrusted by Napoleon with the task of clearing the eastern part of Italy of the enemy. Thus, at the very best, the Allies in the region of Olmütz could count on no more than 90,000 to 93,000 men. None knew as well as Kutuzov how absurd it would be to put on the field of battle all of the 75,000 Russians available on paper. Thousands of them were unfit for duty following the terrible retreat from Krems. Kutuzov feared to give battle. In his judgment, it was necessary to continue the retreat begun after Napoleon’s crossing of the Danube. He felt it best to retire farther eastward, and to wait there, thus prolonging the war and giving the Prussians time to make up their minds for a decisive advance against the French. Here, however, he ran into the vigorous opposition of Emperor Alexander, who resolutely favoured an immediate general battle.

Alexander I knew absolutely nothing of military operations. He was, however, consumed with the thirst for fame. Confident of success, he did not entertain the least doubt that, after the famous oath made at the grave of Frederick the Great, the march of the Prussian army in the near future was assured. He was eager to engage in battle. To run from Napoleon while he had immense forces at his command, including the newly arrived Guards, and afterwards to take shelter in poor mountainous country, seemed to the Tsar both unnecessary and humiliating. His favourite, the young General-Adjutant, Prince Peter Dolgorukov, had already won the Tsar’s approbation, as had nearly all of the officers of the Guards, for maintaining the same opinions.

Kutuzov knew that the military knowledge of the Tsar, Dolgorukov and men like them was negligible. But, at the same time, Kutuzov was, from head to foot, an astute man of the court, in spite of his assumed simplicity. Although he was firmly convinced that a catastrophe awaited the Russian army, and that no time should be lost in fleeing from Napoleon and avoiding a decisive battle, he dared not oppose the fatal levity which possessed the
Tsar. He knew that in persisting with his arguments he would be risking his own position as commander-in-chief. It was far easier to throw away the lives of several tens of thousands of his soldiers. So, although he guessed Napoleon's game, he acquiesced.

Meanwhile, Napoleon, in pursuit of the Russians, had halted at Brünn, a short distance from the Allied camp at Olmütz. His only fear was that the Russians might retire and thus prolong the war. Far from France, knowing, too, that Haugwitz was on his way to him from Prussia bearing an ultimatum, Napoleon thirsted for an immediate general battle. He felt completely confident of victory, which would at one stroke end the war. During these days his diplomatic and histrionic gifts were at their best. He had guessed everything that was occurring in the Russian camp. It suited him to play Alexander against Kutuzov, who was making a last feeble effort to prevail upon the Tsar to withdraw his army as quickly as possible, and thus save it.

With supreme artistry, Napoleon began to play the rôle of a very frightened, enfeebled man, whose one anxiety was to avoid a battle. He knew that if he could convince his enemy that it would be a simple matter to crush the French army, the Russians would immediately attack. To accomplish this, he began by ordering his advance posts to retire. Next, he sent his General-Adjutant Savary to Alexander with a proposal for a truce and peace. He ordered Savary to ask Alexander to arrange a personal interview, or at least to send him a responsible person to conduct negotiations. The exultation in the Russian staff was complete. Bonaparte was afraid! Bonaparte had exhausted himself and was lost! Now that he was at their mercy they must not allow him to escape them!

And actually, Napoleon's behaviour was so utterly unlike him, so altogether humiliating, that they concluded that only bitter necessity could have brought him to such a pass. Here was the greatest war captain in the world, the proud Emperor of the French, suing for peace in the most abject manner. Kutuzov, with all his misgivings, seemed shamed and refuted. Alexander refused to grant Napoleon a personal interview, but sent Prince Dolgorukov to him. Subsequently, for a long time to come, Na-
Bonaparte

Bonaparte was to jest about this young courtier-general. Later, in an official document, he referred to him as “un freluquet” (a coxcomb). Dolgorukov conducted himself haughtily, unbendingly and pompously, behaving toward the French Emperor “as toward a boyar whom he intended to exile to Siberia,” as Napoleon later remarked, in recalling this interview. Dolgorukov proposed that France renounce Italy and a number of other conquests. Acting with consummate skill, Napoleon pretended to be troubled and distraught. And withal, perfectly aware that one should not overact one’s rôle—that everything on earth, even the stupidity of a Prince Dolgorukov, has its limits—he concluded the interview with the announcement that he could not agree to the proposed terms. But the rejection itself was couched in a form calculated to intensify rather than weaken the general impression of Napoleon’s uncertainty and diffidence.

After Dolgorukov had delivered his happy report, all hesitation in the Allied camp vanished. It was decided to launch an immediate attack on the enfeebled, distraught French Emperor and to crush him for all time.

On December 2, 1805, exactly a year after Napoleon’s coronation, the Battle of Austerlitz was fought. Upon the hilly expanse around the Pratzen heights, to the west of the village of Austerlitz and about 75 miles north of Vienna, there developed a sanguinary struggle, one of the most significant in all history.

Napoleon personally directed the battle from beginning to end, though nearly all of his marshals took part in it. The defeat of the Allies was already indicated in the early morning hours, yet the Russian army would not have suffered so terrible a debacle had the Russian generals avoided falling into a trap devised for them by Napoleon. He had rightly surmised that the Allies would attempt to cut off his approach to Vienna and the Danube, in order to surround him or drive him northward into the mountains. With this in mind, he left this sector of his position apparently undefended, deliberately moving back his new flank. When the Russians advanced toward their objective, he crushed them with the weight of his forces. The French, in possession of the Pratzen heights, pressed the Austrians against the line of half-
frozen ponds. Whole regiments were drowned or riddled with French grapeshot. Others surrendered and were made prisoners. The Russian mounted guardsmen were almost completely annihilated after a severe encounter with the mounted grenadiers of Napoleon's Guard.

The marshals were amazed both at the bravery of the Russian soldiers and the complete military incapacity of the Russian generals, with the single exception of Prince Bagration. They were particularly dumfounded by the behaviour of Buksgevden, the commander of the Russian left wing, who had at his disposal 29 battalions of infantry and 22 squadrons of cavalry. Instead of going to the aid of the perishing Russian army, Buksgevden allowed a negligible French detachment to tie him up for hours at an utterly unimportant point. And when he finally thought of making a retreat, it was too late. To make matters worse, he bungled the manoeuvre. Napoleon, who had observed the movement, ordered some broadsides fired into the ice on the ponds. Buksgevden's men were flung back toward the ponds, where thousands of them drowned in the icy waters. The rest were captured.

Emperors Francis and Alexander had fled from the field of battle long before the final catastrophe. Both of them ran in fear. They soon parted company, their horses bearing them in different directions.

The short winter day was ending. The sun, which shone brightly all day, had gone down, and Alexander and Francis, thanks to the dusk, saved themselves from prison. Alexander trembled as in a fever, and, losing his self-possession, wept. He did not slacken his flight in the days to come. The wounded Kutuzov barely saved himself from being captured.

Evening came. It was all over. Upon the wide plain, stumbling again and again over the countless corpses of men and horses, Napoleon rode by on his mount, surrounded by an immense retinue of marshals, generals, adjutants and grenadiers of the Guard. He was hailed by the exultant cries of the rank and file, who came running up from all sides to greet him. The Battle of Austerlitz had resulted in complete victory for him. Fifteen thousand of the Austrians and Russians lay dead on the field of battle, 20,000 more were prisoners and nearly all of the enemy
artillery was captured. And, what was most important of all, the Russo-Austrian army had ceased to exist. Completely destroyed, it had fled in three parts to all sides, abandoning the immense transport, all of the military equipment and vast quantities of provisions. The French had lost less than 9,000 of their 80,000 men.

On the following day, Napoleon issued a proclamation which was read among all the detachments of the French army. "Soldiers," it began, "I am content with you. In the day of Austerlitz you have realised everything that I anticipated of your courage. You have adorned your eagles with immortal fame. The army of 100,000 men, under the command of the Russian and Austrian Emperors, was in less than four hours broken and scattered. Those who escaped your sword were drowned in the lakes. . . ."

Emperor Francis promptly announced to Alexander that the continuance of the struggle was out of the question. Alexander agreed with him. The Austrian Emperor sent a letter to the victor, requesting a personal interview. Napoleon met him in his own camp, not far from Austerlitz. He received him courteously. At the same time, he immediately demanded that the remnants of the Russian army depart from Austria at once, and himself appointed a definite route of march. He announced that he would carry on peace negotiations only with Austria. Francis, of course, agreed unconditionally.

The Third Coalition was ended.

During the second half of November and the beginning of December of 1805, William Pitt, with painful trepidation, awaited news of a general battle. However, the English Prime Minister, the creator and instigator of the Third Coalition against Napoleon, was assured on one point. He knew that for a long time to come England was secure against invasion, for on October 21 of that year Admiral Nelson had completely destroyed the combined Franco-Spanish fleet in the Battle of Trafalgar. Henceforth, Napoleon would have no navy. Yet William Pitt, looking into the future, had ample cause for fear. He understood—as the entire commercial and industrial bourgeoisie of England understood—that the matter could not end here. Napoleon was
charting a straight course toward complete exclusion of English merchants from the markets of those European countries which fell under his direct or indirect sway. Furthermore, since he had at his disposal the richest lands of the Continent, with their ports and wharves, the French Emperor was in a position to build a new fleet and recreate the Boulogne camp.

The catastrophe at Ulm, the entry of Napoleon into Vienna, the seizure of the Vienna bridge, the retirement (or flight) of Kutuzov and his pursuit by the French army—all these events affected Pitt painfully. However, Prussia's evident desire to join the coalition somewhat reanimated his hopes. There was still a chance.

Finally, England learned the fatal news. The Third Coalition had hopelessly perished on the bloody fields of Austerlitz. In parliamentary circles, Pitt was loudly denounced for having nourished ruinous illusions. The opposition demanded his resignation. It pointed to the humiliation of England, and spoke of the millions of English pounds sterling which had been wasted on the creation of futile coalitions. Pitt suffered a nervous breakdown. He took to his bed, and, after lingering several weeks, died on January 23, 1806. Austerlitz had slain even this most stubborn and most gifted of Napoleon's enemies. The new cabinet, with Fox at its head, decided to negotiate for peace with Napoleon.

Napoleon was at the height of his power. He dictated conditions. Those who had been defeated by him, as well as those who had taken no part in the war, grovelled before him. With remarkable shrewdness he made the most of his victory. At last there arrived at Vienna the long-traveled Prussian diplomat Haugwitz, bearing the ultimatum of Frederick William III. Without further ado, he made haste to forget the purpose of his visit. When he appeared before Napoleon he smiled sweetly, bowed low, and warmly congratulated His Majesty on the rout of his adversaries. Haugwitz was as badly frightened as his king, who with grave apprehension awaited the reckoning for the oath made at the grave of Frederick the Great and for his other recent adventures.

At first, Napoleon shouted himself hoarse. He gave Haugwitz to understand that he was aware of Frederick William's trickery
and double-dealing. Afterwards, he consented to forgive and forget—on one condition: Prussia must enter into an alliance with him. By the conditions of the alliance, Prussia was to surrender to Bavaria her southern possession of Ansbach, and to cede to France the duchies of Neuchatel and Cleves, together with the town of Wesel. Furthermore, in becoming an ally of France, it was understood that Prussia should declare war on England. In recompense, Napoleon agreed to yield to Frederick William the English-owned Kingdom of Hanover, which had been occupied by French troops since 1803.

Haugwitz conceded to every demand. His master Frederick William was only too glad to agree, for he had anticipated a far more severe punishment.

France's ally Bavaria received the Tyrol from Austria, and Ansbach from Prussia; in return, she granted to Napoleon the rich industrial province of Berg. Finally, Austria ceded to Napoleon, as King of Italy, all of Venice, Friuli, Istria and Dalmatia. Altogether, Austria lost one sixth of her population (4,000,000 out of 24,000,000), one seventh of her state revenues, immense territories, and, in addition, paid the victor 40,000,000 florins in gold.

The Peace of Pressburg was concluded on December 25, 1805. Several days before this, Napoleon signed a binding military alliance with Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. Endless transports with booty taken in Austria wound their way into France and Italy. Of arms alone, 2,000 cannon and over 100,000 rifles were taken.

Before leaving Austria, Napoleon settled yet another matter. King Ferdinand of Naples and his wife Caroline, having, in October, 1805, after the Battle of Trafalgar, been led into believing that the Napoleonic goose was finally cooked, had entered into relations with England and Russia. This Neapolitan branch of the Bourbon dynasty had always entertained a particularly strong resentment against Napoleon's rule. Now, after Austerlitz, the day of reckoning came. "The Bourbons have ceased to reign in Naples," said Napoleon, and ordered the immediate occupation of the entire kingdom by French troops. Under the protection of
Destruction of the Third Coalition

the British fleet, the Bourbons fled to the island of Sicily. Napoleon appointed his brother Joseph, King of Naples.

After richly rewarding his soldiers with money, military orders and promotions, he left for Paris. Arriving in the capital on January 26, 1806, he was hailed by countless multitudes as he entered the Tuileries. Soon he learned that his mortal enemy, William Pitt, had died three days before his return, and that England desired peace. With some reason, he could now imagine himself the rightful heir of Charlemagne, the Emperor of the West.

Luxurious feasts, balls, banquets, a fabulously brilliant court, surrounded Napoleon. Hundreds of fawning courtiers vied for the favour of the Emperor, paid him honours usually conferred only on immortals, and showered upon him the most shameless flattery.

On July 12, 1806, at Napoleon's command, the German kings signed the pact creating the Confederation of the Rhine. Included in the Confederation were Bavaria, Württemberg, Regensburg, Baden, Berg, Hessen-Darmstadt, Nassau and seven other German duchies. Napoleon was "elected" its Protector, and in gratitude for the Emperor's acceptance of this new dignity, it obligated itself to furnish 63,000 soldiers, in the event of war. A large number of independent petty rulers, who previously had acknowledged the sovereignty of the Austrian Hapsburg emperors, transferred their allegiance to the Confederation. As a result, the so-called "Holy Roman Empire"—depending, as it did, on the sovereignty of the Austrian emperors over dismembered Germany and her independent princes—ceased to have any meaning. At Napoleon's command Francis of Austria in 1806 resigned as Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.

This new usurpation by Napoleon, this new and significant addition to his possessions, greatly distressed and irritated the Prussian government. It was clear that with the Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon had introduced his authority into the very bosom of Germany, directly threatening the future of Prussia. The danger from this direction was intensified by a series of appointments by Napoleon. These were merely feeble attempts to mask
the encroachments of the French Empire on the new states. As early as March 15, 1806, Marshal Murat became Duke of Cleves and Berg in southern Germany. On March 30, Joseph Bonaparte was appointed King of Naples, while Marshal Berthier was made Prince of Neuchatel. On June 5, another of Napoleon’s brothers, Louis Bonaparte, was appointed King of Holland; and at the same time the Minister of Foreign Affairs Talleyrand was made Prince de Benevente and Bernadotte became Duke of Ponte Corvo in southern Italy. These new monarchs were by no means vassals, but simply deputies of Napoleon, his governor-generals. And all of Europe understood this.

In the early spring of 1806 the Prussian king had already begun to have more than an inkling of the dangerous position in which he had stood. It was true that Napoleon had “forgiven;” he had even expressed the desire to have Prussia as his ally, and had offered to make her a gift of Hanover. In response to this, England had declared war against Prussia. Still he did not cede Hanover to Prussia, and continued to maintain his troops there. At this time, Frederick William III learned that Fox, the English Prime Minister, had sent Lord Yarmouth to Paris to open peace negotiations with Napoleon, and that the French Emperor had given Fox to understand that should England conclude a peace with him on desirable terms, he would restore Hanover to the King of England. The Prussian government realised immediately how badly it had been duped. Indignation prevailed, particularly in those circles which during the course of the year 1805 had so ardently urged Frederick William to join the Third Coalition. They asserted that had he done so he might have prevented Austerlitz and saved Prussia from the isolation in which, face to face with Napoleon, she now found herself.

Meanwhile, Napoleon was again preparing for war. In July, 1806, having formed the Confederation of the Rhine, he boldly announced to the legislative corps in Paris that he had an army of 450,000 men and the means to maintain it without incurring debt or deficit. He began to concentrate some 200,000 troops on both banks of the Rhine, in Alsace, in Lorraine and in the states of the newly created Confederation of the Rhine. There were ominous reports of new seizures being considered by the French Emperor.
Confusion and irritation reigned among the Prussian nobility and among a section of the middle class. The king was accused of cowardice, Haugwitz of treachery. The nobility loathed Napoleon not so much with a national as with a class hatred. They regarded him as the destroyer of ancient, feudal conditions—of that existence which fostered landowners and serfs. A part of the Prussian trading class was alarmed by Napoleon’s energy in erecting tariff and other walls between his vassal possessions and Prussia. With grave concern, it watched the deliberate manner with which he instituted measures to the advantage of French manufacturers. Among the army officers and generals of Prussia arose a fervent desire to avenge the humiliations which Napoleon had inflicted on them. Queen Louisa, the wife of Frederick William III, headed this military faction of the nobility and the army. From England and Prussia—even though at this very moment both of these countries were conducting fruitless negotiations with Napoleon—came all manner of encouragement.

Above all, the Prussian king was moved to take decisive steps because he knew that no matter how much he yielded, Napoleon would still insist on beginning a new war. It was resolved to send Napoleon a note asking him to explain his intentions concerning Prussia. The Emperor did not reply.

The Prussian army began its advance. Regiment after regiment, singing patriotic songs, passed through Berlin and Magdeburg, and marched westwards. Queen Louisa, with great show, came out to greet the troops. King Frederick William made a journey to see his army, which was concentrated in Magdeburg and farther west. “Surely the army of Frederick the Great will not fail to smash the army of these revolutionary sansculottes!” said the officers in Queen Louisa’s suite. The King sent Napoleon a new note: he demanded the removal of French troops from the frontiers of Prussia. In reply, Napoleon at the head of the Grand Army crossed the frontier into Prussia.
THE DEFEAT OF PRUSSIA AND
THE FINAL SUBJUGATION OF GERMANY
1806-1807

On October 8, 1806, Napoleon gave the command for the invasion of Saxony, an ally of Prussia. In three columns, the Grand Army, which since the Pressburg peace had been stationed in Bavaria, began to cross the frontier. To the fore, in the central column, was Murat with his cavalry. Behind him came Napoleon with the main forces. The active Grand Army consisted at the moment of approximately 195,000 men, a little more than half of all of Napoleon's military forces. He was forced to leave some 70,000 soldiers in his Italian possessions, and about the same number in his other vast domains. It is true that these 195,000 men were to be reinforced with new recruits, who for the present were being intensively trained in camps in the rear. Against Napoleon's army, Prussia placed a slightly smaller number of men on the field—somewhere between 175,000 and 180,000.

In order to grasp the significance of the sudden catastrophe which befell Prussia during the days that followed, it is not enough to point merely to Napoleon's insignificant numerical advantage over his enemy. It is not even enough to cite the quite exceptional military gifts of the French commander and the brilliant retinue of marshals and generals with whom he had surrounded himself. Here was a collision of two different social-economic ways of life, of two different governmental régimes, of two different military organisations and tactical methods, conditioned by two wholly different social systems. A servile, industrially backward feudal-absolutist order came into conflict with a
state which had experienced the profound bourgeois revolution—a revolution which had destroyed all the traces of feudalism—and was now coping with a rapidly growing condition of industrialism. At the head of Prussia was a king who boasted of being the first noble and landowner of Brandenburg; at the head of France was a dictator who consciously endeavoured to develop an autonomous national state of mighty industrial and agrarian stature, based on the principle of private ownership.

We have already spoken of the organisation of Napoleon's army. The Prussian army faithfully mirrored the servile structure of the state. The Prussian soldier was a peasant serf who had merely exchanged the blows of the landowner’s rod for the raps of the flat side of the officer’s sword-blade and for the face-slaps and kicks of any superior, beginning with the sergeant-major. Obligated to submit slavishly to an arbitrary authority, he knew only too well that there would be no improvement of his lot no matter how bravely he fought in battle. An officer was an officer only because he was a noble. And there were officers who boasted of the severity of their behaviour toward their soldiers, and saw in this the only true discipline. Generals were people who became generals only in their old age because of the patronage and eminence to which their lineage entitled them.

In the middle of the 18th century, at a time when this state of affairs had prevailed in the armies of all European monarchs, Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War was able to conquer the French, the Austrians and the Russians, even though he himself suffered occasional severe reverses. Being a shrewd man, Frederick II understood that only by the use of extreme cruelty could he force his oppressed and indignant soldiers to engage in battle. “There’s no greater enigma to me,” he once said to a general very close to him, “than how you and I come to be safe in our own camp.” Forty years had elapsed since the wars of Frederick the Great's age, but in Prussia conditions had remained unchanged. The only essential difference was that Frederick himself was no longer at the helm, and in his place the army command had fallen to the untalented Duke of Brunswick and his equally backward but titled colleagues.

It must seem strange that in 1806 Frederick William III, who
Bonaparte had been afraid to fight against the terrible Emperor only a year before—in alliance with England, Austria and Russia—should dare to fight him single-handed now. It can only be explained as the courage of despair. Frederick William had arrived at the conviction that he could not possibly save himself by submission; Napoleon would attack in any event. But the officers, the generals and all the higher nobility were in raptures. They loudly boasted of how they would humble the Corsican upstart, the murderer of the Duke of Enghien, the "Robespierre on horseback" who at the head of his sansculottes was freeing the serfs. Whom, they asked, had Napoleon conquered up to now? The barbarous Turks and the Egyptian Mamelukes? The enfeebled Italians? The Russians, scarcely less barbarous than the Turks and Mamelukes? Would not his fame crumble as soon as he collided with a real army, the army created by the great Frederick II?

The entire court-army faction—the military chiefs, the generals, the higher society, Queen Louisa and her myrmidons—indulged itself in this fantastic and boastful illusion. It was not disturbed by the fact that Napoleon drew upon the resources not only of France, but also of several other large and wealthy countries conquered by him. It was confident that as soon as the Prussian army toppled him over, the royalists would rise up in the rear and restore the Bourbons on the French throne.

The aged commander-in-chief, the Duke of Brunswick—the same general who in 1792 had been the leader of military intervention and who unintentionally had hastened the fall of the French monarchy by his absurd threatening manifesto—had always entertained an old-régime, feudal reactionary's hatred of the French, whom he regarded as arrogant revolutionary mutineers. Nevertheless, he feared the still unconquered Bonaparte, and did not share the festive, exultant mood of Queen Louisa, Prince Ludwig and their sycophants. In sermons, the Prussian clergy, without embarrassment, guaranteed the unqualified support of the Deity, who, as is well-known, had always been kindly disposed toward the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns. Impatiently, they awaited the first news of the war. No one had an inkling as to which side would be the first to cross the frontier. . . .
Napoleon’s three columns advanced through the Franconian forest toward the Elbe River, aiming for the rear of the Prussian army, with the object of cutting its communications.

The day after Napoleon’s invasion of Saxony, Prussia’s ally, the first battle was fought at Schleiz. This was on October 9. The advance guard under Murat and Bernadotte, acting on Napoleon’s order, attacked a Prussian detachment. The battle was a modest one. The Prussians were flung back, losing some 700 men, including 300 dead.

On the following day another and more serious battle took place. Marshall Lannes, with 9,000 men, arrived at the town of Saalfeld, which sheltered Prince Ludwig, head of the military party at court. The battle began immediately, and again ended in a victory for the French. After a stubborn resistance, the Prussians fled. Their losses in slain and prisoners numbered approximately 1,500 men. Toward the end of the battle Prince Ludwig himself fell, victim to a bayonet.

The fugitives from Saalfeld joined the main forces of the Prussian army, which was situated near the town of Jena, under the command of Prince Hohenlohe. Another section of the main forces, under the command of the Duke of Brunswick himself, was retiring northwards, towards Naumburg.

When, one after another, the reports of the Battles of Schleiz and Saalfeld and of the death of Prince Ludwig reached Berlin, there was general consternation. It is strange that two such relatively insignificant, if unsuccessful, battles should so sharply have changed the whole atmosphere. Not only was the excessive boasting silenced, but it was immediately replaced by confusion and fear. Queen Louisa, alone, did not lose courage. She gloried before the surrounding company in the heroic death of Prince Ludwig, and persuasively argued that the expected general battle would immediately set everything right.

Napoleon surmised that the main mass of the Prussian army would concentrate in the region of Weimar, in order to facilitate the retirement toward Berlin. He believed that the general battle would take place at Weimar on October 15. He issued orders to his marshals. Davout was sent to Naumburg and beyond it—
in the rear of the Prussian army. Bernadotte was commanded to join Davout, but showed no inclination to do so. Napoleon, with Marshals Soult, Ney and Murat, advanced toward Jena. Late in the afternoon of October 13, Napoleon entered the town of Jena. Searching the horizon from the heights of the surrounding hills, he espied the considerable forces of Prince Hohenlohe retiring along the road to Weimar. Hohenlohe, who knew that the French had entered Jena, had not grasped the fact that Napoleon himself was to be found there. On the night of October 13-14, Hohenlohe paused on the road, and, to the surprise of Napoleon, decided to give battle.

Before daybreak Napoleon made a tour of his detachments. He told the soldiers that the approaching battle would place the whole of Prussia in their hands, and that the Emperor trusted them to show their usual bravery. Then, as was his custom, he explained to them the main outlines of his plan for the following day.

At last the day broke—October 14—the day which was to decide the fate of Prussia. The battle began in the early hours after dawn. It was a prolonged and stubborn struggle. But even at the beginning ultimate victory for the French seemed assured. At first the Prussians and the Saxons retired slowly, stubbornly defending themselves. At this point, Napoleon skilfully concentrated and led into battle the best detachments of Soult, Lannes, Augereau, Ney, and the cavalry of Murat. When the Prussian troops wavered and suddenly took flight, the pursuit proved even more fatal for the conquered than at Austerlitz. The remnants of the Prussian army sped in the direction of Weimar, hotly pursued by Murat’s cavalry. A large number of them fell in the town of Weimar. The impassioned French horsemen slashed at them, unheeding of the cries for mercy; they took no prisoners. The Prussian army was completely shattered. Negligible detachments saved themselves. The rest were either slain or made prisoner, or—in a large degree—disappeared without leaving any trace.

Hohenlohe with a throng of fugitives succeeded in escaping. He fled toward Naumburg, where he counted on finding the untouched main portion of the army, the only surviving force that
might be relied upon. With this second portion of the army under the command of the Duke of Brunswick, was King Frederick William himself. And suddenly, toward the fugitives fleeing from Jena, other fugitives came running through all that evening and night. These told a tale of a new misfortune which had overtaken Prussia. The Duke of Brunswick, without reaching Naumburg, had paused near Auerstädt, about ten miles west of Naumburg. Here he had run into Marshal Davout. Notwithstanding an insufficiency of strength—for Davout had but a single corps, and did not receive the support of Bernadotte—he put to rout the main portion of the Prussian army. The Duke of Brunswick himself fell, mortally wounded in the heat of battle. The remnants of this army mingled in their flight with the fugitives running from Jena and Weimar.

Thus the king learned from the fugitives that in this single day, October 14th, in two battles with Napoleon and Marshal Davout, almost the entire Prussian army had ceased to exist. Certainly, no one in Europe, not even the most malignant enemy of Prussia, had anticipated that within six days after his invasion, Napoleon would have completely crushed his enemy.

A panic such as had never before been experienced took possession of the fugitives when, upon sharing their news, they learned that everything was lost and that there no longer was any kind of an army left.

The flight of the remnants of the Prussian army proceeded in great confusion. The French continued in pursuit, and on the way collected immense transports with provisions, equipage, horses and artillery. Napoleon continued his advance on Berlin. En route, he ordered the occupation of the Duchy of Hesse-Cassel, proclaiming the deposition of the existing dynasty. He also left troops in Brunswick, Erfurt, Naumburg, Halle, and Wittenberg. Prince Hohenlohe continued to retire northward, having gathered together about 20,000 men from different corps. But they were almost totally unarmed and demoralised, and refused to submit to their officers.

As it proceeded northward, Hohenlohe's army with each succeeding day diminished in numbers. In addition, Murat was in
hot pursuit with his cavalry. Beyond Prenzlau, on the way to Stettin, Hohenlohe found himself surrounded on all sides, and finally capitulated. Several days before this, on Marshal Lannes's first demand, the strong fortress of Spandau, with enormous stores of military provisions, surrendered to him. And several days after the surrender of Hohenlohe, General Lasalle, in command of the Hussars, approached Stettin, a formidable fortress with excellent artillery and a garrison consisting of over 6,000 men. The mighty stronghold, filled with abundance of food and provisions and defended by considerable artillery, yielded without a shot to the first demand of the Hussar general, who did not possess a single cannon. Unutterable, hopeless panic, simultaneously seized all of the generals, officers and rank and file of the vanishing remnants of the Prussian army. Of the boasted discipline there remained not a trace. In thousands, the Prussian soldiers surrendered to the French. But even the generals and officers cringed and cowered before their conquerors, who could scarcely believe what they saw. Could these be the same people who only two weeks before had boasted of putting an end to Napoleon?

On October 27th, 19 days after the outbreak of the war and 13 days after the Battles of Jena and Auerstädt—Napoleon, accompanied by four marshals, mounted grenadiers and chasseur guards, triumphantly entered Berlin. The burgomaster of the city handed the keys of the capital to Napoleon, and entreated him to spare the city. Napoleon commanded that the shops remain open and that life proceed in a normal manner. The population timorously met the Emperor. With respectful bows, it manifested absolute submission.

Having installed himself in Berlin, Napoleon's first act was to destroy the last remains of the Prussian army, which had scattered in all directions. In particular, there still remained the energetic General Blücher's detachment. Blücher had succeeded in collecting 20,000 soldiers and officers from among the fugitives of the routed armies. Fleeing northward with them, pursued by Marshals Bernadotte, Soult and Murat, he entered Lübeck. Beyond Lübeck was the Danish frontier. Denmark, terrified by Napoleon to the point of panic, categorically forbade Blücher to cross the frontier. But even if he had been allowed to
Defeat of Prussia
179

Do so, it could not have saved him, because the marshals would have shown no hesitation in following him across the frontier. On November 7, the marshals entered Lübeck. Here, in the streets of the city, they fell savagely on Blücher's troops. A fearful slaughter ensued. About 6,000 Prussians were accounted for—either slain or taken prisoner. Blücher managed to extricate himself from the city with the remaining 14,000, but towards evening, in the plain beyond the city of Lübeck, overtaken and surrounded by the French, he was forced to capitulate with all his men, including officers and generals. He was also forced to surrender all of his artillery and equipment.

At about the same time, the French approached the fortress of Küstrin on the Oder. They had become so accustomed to Prussia's complete demoralisation following Jena, that a mere four companies of infantry, unprovided with artillery, were sent against the fortress. The commander of this insignificant detachment, without so much as the pretence of beginning a siege, demanded the capitulation of the fortress. On his first demand, the stronghold of Küstrin—with its 4,000 men, excellent artillery and immense stores of provisions—surrendered. This series of unbelievable panicky surrenders of mighty citadels, without the slightest effort at resistance—a thing unheard of in military history—was crowned by the curious episode at Magdeburg.

Magdeburg, the one remaining unsurrendered fortress, was a first-class stronghold. It was at the same time a large and rich trading centre, with enormous stores of munitions and food provisions. It was equipped with considerable artillery, and its well-armed garrison consisted of 22,000 men under the command of General Kleist. After Blücher's surrender, this garrison was the last remnant of Prussia's armed forces. Marshal Ney approached the fortress. In his haste, confident as he was of success, he had made no effort to bring along any siege artillery, having with him only three or four light mortars. He sent a note to Kleist demanding a prompt surrender. Kleist refused. Ney ordered his light mortars to open fire. The shots did not—and could not—inFLICT the slightest damage on the city. This, however, proved sufficient. On November 8, General Kleist surrendered, and Marshal Ney, on entering the city, found it full of military equip-
ment and rich stores of supplies. In explanation of his conduct, Kleist later said that when the French mortars opened fire, the inhabitants, becoming terribly frighted, begged him, as commander of the fortress, to surrender the city at once. In capitulating, he claimed, he was merely yielding to their wish.

When the news of Magdeburg arrived, Napoleon, France and all of Europe finally realized that Prussia was finished. The army, by death and capture, had ceased to exist. All the fortresses, with the exception of Danzig, were in perfect order and in the hands of the French. The capital and nearly all the cities were under French authority. The populations everywhere fully submitted.

The King of Prussia, Queen Louisa, the royal children and the court (now greatly reduced) went into hiding in Memel on the outskirts of the Prussian monarchy, after disastrous wanderings in other places. King Frederick William vainly hoped for a truce and a peace. Napoleon imposed the most impossible conditions. He ordered the publication of articles in the French newspapers treating Queen Louisa with cruel irony and scorn. She was referred to as the person most responsible for Prussia's misfortunes.

At the very time that Napoleon was indulging his instinct for the malicious, he received a cordial letter from Frederick William III. In it the King of Prussia expressed the hope that his conqueror found everything in good order in the royal palace at Potsdam. Napoleon did not reply.

The autumn of 1806 marked the high point of Napoleon's long victorious career. Never again was he to attain so complete a success as was his at this time. In a single month (from October 8 to November 8) he had wholly destroyed one of his four greatest enemies. His unprecedented defeat of Prussia was totally devastating and shattering. During his entire reign on the Continent, Napoleon had never seen such utter panic as paralysed the Prussian government and military authority. Nor had he ever before come to blows with an army that so instantaneously submitted to him, without offering even a pretense of resistance. In all of his previous campaigns—against the Mamelukes, Austrians and
Italians—he had met vigorous opposition. And on the fields of Austerlitz, several of the Russian detachments had fought so valiantly as to win even Bonaparte's grudging praise.

Yet here was an army boasting of the traditions of Frederick the Great, a country proud of its efficient and honest administration, a people whose culture was on a level with the finest in Europe—and after a single defeat Prussia had been transformed into an inert mass. All Europe was shaken and frightened. In the ensuing days, one German state after another made haste to send representatives to the palace at Potsdam, notifying the conqueror of their complete submission.

During these October and November days, Napoleon's ambitions soared to the clouds. Nothing seemed too great for him to accomplish. As he roamed the huge palace in Potsdam, he daily received reports of the surrender of great fortresses and of the capitulation of the last remnants of the Prussian army. Kings and ambassadors genuflected before him, begging for mercy and patronage. Everywhere the fallen mighty flattered him with assurances of loyalty . . . It was but natural that in an atmosphere such as this should have come to fruition his plan to crush the economic power of his arch enemy, England. At this precise moment, with conquered Prussia grovelling at his feet, he felt that his long-cherished plan to create the Continental Blockade had become a possibility. Less than three weeks after Magdeburg surrendered to Marshal Ney, Napoleon signed his famous Berlin decree setting up the blockade. This was on November 21, 1806.

The Continental Blockade was to have a far-reaching significance on world history. Its effects were felt not only in the Napoleonic Empire and in all Europe, but also in America. It was to become the core of the entire economic—and, hence, political—struggle throughout the remainder of Napoleon's active career.

To gather the full import of the Berlin decree it is necessary to review, in brief, France's foreign economic policy . . . Even during the first years of the Revolution it was forbidden to trade with the English. In the decree of the Tenth Brumaire of the Fifth Year (1796) this prohibition was expressed with exceptional clarity. With the advent of Napoleon, the decree was repeated
and reaffirmed. As recently as February 22, 1806, the Emperor, in forbidding the importation of paper materials and yarn into France, once more confirmed his strongly protectionist views. He was intent on safeguarding the interests of French industry from all outside competition.

The Berlin decree of November 21, 1806, was not merely another effort to strengthen French industry's monopolisation of the imperial domestic market; it was a cruel blow aimed at the whole of British commerce. In creating the Continental Blockade, Napoleon was attempting to choke England as an economic power, to effect her governmental bankruptcy, to bring her to hunger and capitulation. Essentially it differed from all previous protectionist embargoes in that its avowed aim was to banish English trade not only from the French Empire, but from all of Europe. In unequivocal terms, Napoleon declared his intention of draining England's economic blood, of depriving her of all share in the profits of every European market.

The first paragraph of the decree stated: "The British islands are herewith proclaimed in a state of blockade." In the second paragraph occurred the words: "All traffic and all relations with the British islands are forbidden." The decree further forbade any form of communication with the English. An order was issued for the arrest of all Englishmen on the Continent, and for the confiscation of all their goods and property.

Even if there was not a mass of documentary evidence—and Napoleon's comments on the subject of the Continental Blockade were not voluminous—it would be quite sufficient to ponder the text of the Berlin decree to grasp its true historical significance. The success of the economic blockade of England was predicated on Napoleon's gaining absolute control of the whole European continent. Should a single nation succeed in maintaining her independence, and continue to trade with England, the whole decree would be rendered totally ineffective, for from this one refractory country English goods could be speedily and easily disseminated throughout all Europe.

The inference is clear. If to achieve a victory over England it was imperative that all countries strictly enforce the Continental Blockade, Napoleon must first subject all of Europe to his will.
To begin with, it was essential that he seize the entire European coastline, so that French customs officials and French gendarmes would be in a position to stop all contraband. One can readily understand how devastating the blockade would be not only for England but for the entire consuming public of Europe, which would find itself deprived of all English manufactured and colonial goods, beginning with cotton and ending with coffee and sugar. Napoleon realised beforehand that the contraband traffic on the part of the English merchants would be most lucrative—and, hence, energetic. He also knew that the French merchants, accustomed as they were to disposing of their raw materials to England, would eagerly resort to contraband. There was only one logical manner in which these prospective illegal activities could be thwarted. Napoleon must continue his wars of conquest until the entire Continent was subjugated.

He was soon to become convinced that at least one element of the European population—the industrial bourgeoisie—would rejoice at being rid of English competition. Immediately after the rout of Prussia, Saxony repudiated her alliance with Frederick William III, and made a pact with Napoleon, promising to enforce the Continental Blockade. The manufacturers of Saxony were overjoyed, but the merchants, the landowners and the large consuming masses were greatly perturbed and dejected. The workers experienced mingled feelings. As consumers, they were somewhat disquieted, though the fate of sugar and coffee did not particularly disturb them. On the other hand, they rejoiced at the decrease of unemployment which followed the prohibition of English imports.

From the moment the Berlin decree of November 21, 1806, was issued, the creation, expansion and consolidation of the "Empire of Charlemagne" became imperative—a logical necessity to render practical the economic system of conflict Napoleon had chosen to wage against England.

Talleyrand was ordered to the palace at Potsdam by Napoleon, who commanded him to notify all of the vassal and semivassal states that the Continental Blockade must be enforced immediately.

At the same time, the Emperor ordered his marshals to seize
the coastline of the North and Baltic seas. He fully realised what a monstrous measure he had decided to put into force. "It was at no small cost that we were forced to subordinate the interests of private individuals to the quarrels of monarchs, and to return after so many years of civilisation to principles characteristic of the barbarism of primitive times; but we were forced to oppose the common enemy with those weapons which he himself utilises." Thus Napoleon wrote in officially informing the French Senate of the creation of the Continental Blockade. The message bore the same date as the decree—November 21, 1806. Europe accepted the decree with silent, anxious docility. Following the shattering of Prussia, no one properly managed to collect his senses; many in terror counted their days and awaited destruction.

England immediately realised that now it had become a struggle to the death. Once more she turned for support to that nation to which she had turned on two previous occasions—in 1798 and in 1805. Again Alexander I was promised the financial support which would enable him to renew the struggle with Napoleon and attempt to save Prussia. The English cabinet made advances to Austria as well, but that country had not yet recovered from the fearful Austerlitz rout, and in addition rejoiced at the ruin of Prussia, which in 1805 had refused to enter the Third Coalition. On the other hand, Alexander of Russia was quite willing to launch a new campaign.

In all the capitals of Europe, and in St. Petersburg in particular, Napoleon maintained an army of spies, whose personnel represented all strata of society, beginning with counts, princes and sumptuous women of the court, and ending with ship captains, shopkeepers, lackeys, postal officials, physicians and couriers. They kept him informed of the progress of the negotiations between England and Russia, of the likelihood of Alexander's again declaring war, of England's promise of new subsidies of gold. Having set up temporary administrative headquarters in Berlin, Napoleon, without pause for rest, sought the solution to two difficult problems: First, he must establish measures for the realisation of the newly proclaimed Continental Blockade; second, he must prepare the army for the new war with Russia.
Napoleon ordered the occupation of the old trading seaports—Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck.

French troops advanced along the shores of the North and Baltic seas, occupying towns and coastal villages, arresting all English subjects, confiscating English goods, and stationing pickets and outposts for the seizure of English contraband. The Emperor worked incessantly on the organisation of customs bureaus along the German seacoast and inland frontiers—all with the one aim of enforcing the blockade. Hitherto Prussia, Saxony and the other German states had been obliged to maintain the French Grand Army during its occupation of the conquered lands. Now the Hanseatic towns were compelled to provide for the French customs officials and coast guards enforcing the embargo against English goods along the North Sea coast. Simultaneously, Napoleon prepared for the invasion of Poland and for a new campaign against Alexander I, who was even now advancing toward the frontiers of eastern Prussia.

Alexander's reasons for embarking on the new campaign were far more substantial than those which had prompted him to join the Third Coalition in 1805. In the first place, he knew that this time Napoleon frankly threatened the Russian frontiers; his armies had already begun their eastward advance from Berlin. In the second place, one Polish delegation after another had appeared before Napoleon at Potsdam, entreating him to re-establish Poland's independence. It was quite apparent that the Emperor of the French, the King of Italy, the Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, was by no means loath to add to these three titles yet a fourth, bound up with Poland. And this incidentally, was a threat to Russia's sovereignty over Lithuania, White Russia, and, quite possibly, Ukraine. In the third place, it was evident that the man who had created the Continental Blockade would not rest content until he had forced Russia to join those countries which were enforcing the decree. This would mean a break of commercial relations with England, an eventuality which would have devastating effects on the Russian agricultural raw-material market. Further it would endanger the maintenance of the already wavering Russian currency.
In short, Alexander had sufficient reasons to declare war against Napoleon, even discounting his perfectly natural desire to avenge the humiliation of Austerlitz. But on this occasion much more serious thought was given to the organisation of the army than in the previous campaign. Having learned a lesson from the incredibly rapid destruction of Prussia, the Russian authorities were now thoroughly aware of Napoleon's strength. Moreover, they knew that they could expect no real assistance from anyone. At this moment, the one possible ally, Prussia, had practically ceased to exist.

The St. Petersburg board of strategy decided to recruit an army of 100,000, supported by the main forces of the artillery and several regiments of Cossacks. This force would be sent to the field immediately, to be followed at a later date by the Guard.

On his part, Napoleon was resolved to forestall the Russian army. By November, the French were marching through Poland. The Polish nobility and large sections of the manufacturing classes greeted the invaders with joy. Having seen their country dismembered by Russia, Austria and Prussia at the end of the 18th century, the Polish autonomists fondly imagined that Napoleon, the arch enemy of the Coalition powers, would re-establish their nation's independence. Napoleon, however, showed little inclination to champion the Polish nationalists, and remained cool to all their advances. At the same time, he knew that the Poles could be useful to him in his tremendous game, and took care not to disillusion them too early. Because of their hatred of Russia and Austria, he believed that he might succeed in persuading them to act as an advance post against both these anti-French monarchies in eastern Europe. As for Prussia, he no longer took her into account.

At this particular moment, Poland was necessary to him as a source of army supplies and recruits. Taking full advantage of the Poles' sympathy for the French—whom they regarded as their deliverers from Russian and Austrian oppression—Napoleon was able to requisition whatever he needed for the maintenance of his troops.

Following the Tilsit peace he solved the "Polish question" by dismembering the country anew. To his new ally, the King of
Saxony, he gave the so-called Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which consisted of a large portion of conquered Prussian Poland. Meanwhile, during the period of uncertainty preceding the Tilsit peace, Napoleon succeeded in establishing a pro-French party in Poland. Its members were drawn chiefly from the ranks of the industrial magnates and petty nobility, who acted with extreme caution because of their fear that Russia might adopt repressive measures against their kinsmen in Lithuania, White Russia and Ukraine. Prince Joseph Poniatovski, Minister of War of the provisional government, who subsequently became a marshal of France, did not immediately align himself with Napoleon.

Napoleon’s internal policy in Poland was a step forward on the path of her bourgeois development. The first paragraph of the Constitution adopted by the Grand Duchy of Warsaw stated: “Serfdom is abolished. All citizens are equal before the law.” However, on leaving his native village, the “free toiler of the soil” was obligated to restore to the landowner his land property.

Under the influence of the French soldiers, who were free citizens in their own country, the peasant serfs of Prussian Poland began to show signs of revolting against the landowners. But the movement never developed in any great measure, and, as a result, the “liberation” of the peasants did not deprive the landowners of their authority.

Thanks to the resurrected hopes for the liberation of Poland from Prussian domination, and in the future from Austrian rule, with the prospect of a “union” of Lithuania, White Russia and Ukraine, the French army was received in Poland with open arms. In Posen a triumphal reception was arranged for Marshal Davout. Throughout this province, even in places where the French troops had not yet penetrated, the Prussian authorities were deposed and Polish officials substituted.

The anti-Prussian movement in Poland, led by Vibitzky, gradually developed in intensity. The first recruits were principally the nobility-militia, but toward the end of January, 1807, the regular regiments—the “legion” of General Dombrovski—joined them. By February, they had an army of 30,000 regular troops, led by former non-commissioned officers and officers of the “Po-
lish legions,” which Bonaparte had created during the Italian campaign of 1796-1797.

But, generally speaking, there was no mass movement in the country to furnish armed assistance to France. From Poland, Marshal Lannes wrote to Napoleon in Berlin that little aid could be expected from the Poles, that they were inclined to anarchy, and that it was impossible to create a solid movement among them.

Toward the end of November, Napoleon learned that the advance detachments of the Russian army had entered Warsaw. He immediately ordered Murat and Davout to advance against the city. On November 28, Murat with his cavalry entered Warsaw. It had been abandoned the evening before by the Russians, who retired beyond the Vistula River and burned the bridge behind them. Finally, Napoleon himself moved into Poland, appearing first in Posen, then in Warsaw. To the nobility who came to greet him, he announced that if Poland expected French assistance in throwing off the yoke of Austria, Prussia and Russia, she must first demonstrate her willingness to aid France. He sent to Paris for the famous Thaddeus Kosciusko, Poland’s national hero, who had fought against the dismemberment of his country during Catherine’s reign. Kosciusko, however, stipulated conditions designed to guarantee Poland’s future independence from Napoleon himself, for he regarded the French Emperor as a despot. Fouché, who was conducting the negotiations with the Polish patriot, deferentially asked Napoleon what he should say to Kosciusko, “Tell him that he is a fool,” wrote the Emperor in reply. He decided to manage with his own forces, having given up hope of inciting any general uprising in Lithuania and White Russia against Tsarist Russia.

The war with Russia began. Issuing from Warsaw, Napoleon attacked the Russian advance detachments. After a few skirmishes, a battle took place at Pultusk, on the Narova River, on December 26, 1806. The Russian army was commanded by Benningsen, one of the few relatively competent generals at the Tsar’s disposal. Alexander treated him with a mixture of antipathy and fear—as indeed he treated all of his accomplices in the
assassination of his father. He placed him in command only for want of a worthier man. The French forces were led by Marshal Lannes. The battle ended indecisively, and, as always happens in such cases, both sides boasted of victory. Lannes reported to Napoleon that the Russians had been flung back from Pultusk with heavy losses, while Benningsen informed the Tsar that he had crushed Napoleon himself—though, as a matter of fact, the French Emperor was not at Pultusk, or even anywhere near Pultusk.

After the battle, the French plainly saw that they had to deal not with dejected Prussians, but with fresh, vigorously aggressive troops.

Napoleon camped in Poland for the winter, drawing on France for reinforcements. At the same time, new forces from the more remote provinces joined the Russian army. Altogether, Napoleon had approximately 105,000 men. About 30,000 of these garrisoned the cities and served as a barrier from Thorn to Grudenz against a possible movement from Memel, although Frederick William had practically no troops at his disposal. Benningsen had between 80,000 and 90,000 men. Both sides sought an engagement.

It occurred on February 8, 1807, near the town of Preussisch-Eylau, in eastern Prussia. Napoleon commanded the French army in person.

This encounter was one of the bloodiest of the time, far more bloody than any battle in which Napoleon had hitherto taken part. It was nip and tuck. The losses on both sides were tremendous. Benningsen lost over a third of his army. The Russian artillery was numerically superior, and several of Napoleon's marshals were tardy in appearing on the field of battle. The greater part of Marshal Augereau's corps was destroyed by the Russian artillery fire. Napoleon himself, surrounded by infantry regiments, stood in the city graveyard, in the very thick of the battle, where on several occasions he came within inches of being killed by the Russian projectiles which fell all around him. Branches of trees, broken off by the enemy's shells and bullets, showered down on his head. Napoleon, as has already been said, always maintained that a commander-in-chief should not risk his
life except in a case of extreme urgency. Here, near Eylau, as at Lodi and Arcole Bridge, he saw that he must set a personal example, even at the risk of his life, to inspire the soldiers. So he stood with them in the cemetery, forcing them to remain firm for hours under the terrific Russian fire.

Those surrounding him knew that it was only the Emperor's presence that restrained the infantry from abandoning their exposed position. Napoleon remained motionless on the spot, delivering innumerable orders to his adjutants. The rank and file of the infantry, who surrounded him at the beginning, were gradually diminishing in numbers. Their places were taken by newcomers: chasseurs, grenadiers and cuirassiers. Napoleon coolly delivered his commands. In the end, his patience was rewarded when the entire French cavalry made a successful attack on the Russian forces. This onslaught saved the day. The graveyard of Eylau remained with the French.

When the darkness of night enveloped the field, the French considered themselves the victors because Benningsen had retired. In his bulletins Napoleon spoke of victory. Nevertheless, he was the first to understand that he had won no real victory at Eylau. Although he had lost large numbers of men, he knew that the Russians had lost even more—but by no means half their army, as was affirmed by the French. Moreover, Napoleon realised that Benningsen had preserved what was still a powerful fighting force, one that did not consider itself conquered, and, on the contrary, boasted of victory.

It was a cold, foggy winter. Circumstances forced the French to camp in devastated Poland and eastern Prussia. The hospitals were filled with badly wounded soldiers. For many miles around, there drifted a miasma, rising from the tens of thousands of uncollected, decomposed corpses, lying on the fields of Eylau. The French were finally forced to shift their quarters a considerable distance.

Napoleon decided to await the spring before renewing hostilities. He spent the interim in ceaseless personal inspections, in visiting the hospitals, in superintending the arrival of provisions, and in securing recruits from France to fill out the thinned ranks.
The Emperor allowed for the fact that the Russians were almost at home here, only a short distance from their frontiers. He, on the other hand, was separated from France by a vast and hostile conquered territory made up of European states which hated him. Provisions must be received from a distance. The local inhabitants, pillaged by the Russians as by the French, were themselves dying of hunger. With their wives and children, they wandered around the French camps and begged for alms.

Napoleon showed no inclination to spend a comfortable winter in one of the cities occupied by him. He ignored the conveniences of Posen, Breslau, and the sumptuous palace at Warsaw. As ever, he strove by personal example to encourage his wretched soldiers. "Not once in 15 days have I taken off my boots. . . . We are in the midst of snow and dirt, without wine, without vodka, without bread. We eat potatoes and meat; we make marches and countermarches, without any conveniences; we usually fight with the bayonet, or exchange grapeshot; the wounded are borne in open sleighs for long distances. . . . We are conducting the war with our full strength, and in all its horror. . . ." Thus the Emperor wrote from his winter quarters to his brother Joseph, the King of Naples. Napoleon not only failed to remove his boots for 15 days in succession while inspecting the camps and hospitals, but he sometimes slept without dismounting from his horse. The meat which the French army ate was salted and tough, the potatoes were soggy. At times there was no bread. It was not until summer that the situation improved somewhat.

During these months of forced armistice, Napoleon was busy day and night. Every third or fourth day a messenger arrived from Paris, Amsterdam, Milan, Naples, or Berlin, with reports from the ministers, marshals, deputies, and ambassadors. The autocratic ruler of several large states, Napoleon personally decided all major issues. Now he lived in a barn in Osterode, now in a peasant's hut. He constantly read reports and documents, and dictated decrees and resolutions. In the course of a single day he would write an order demanding stricter customs inspections; alter and sign a statute regulating the management of an institute for officers' daughters; pen a letter of reproof to the King of Holland (his brother Louis), or to the King of Naples (his brother...
Joseph); or demand of the King of Bavaria that he intensify his surveillance in the Tyrol. He issued commands to the Spanish Bourbons that they increase the coast guard. Growing angry at the literary opinions of the Mercure de France, he ordered his Minister of Police Fouché to see that it altered its critical judgments, pertinently suggesting that he discharge the editor and find an intelligent man to take his place. He also kept in touch with the latest developments in the silk industry of Lyons. He demanded to know why actresses of the State Theatre in Paris were permitted to intrigue against one another and thus jeopardize the theatrical venture. He commanded that Madame de Staël be driven from Paris for giving expression to her liberal views. He audited the accounts of the Ministry of Finance and discovered errors in them. He discharged and appointed officials in Italy; he instructed his spies to maintain a vigilant surveillance of Austria and of her military preparations; he instituted a census of the towns and villages of Prussia. He kept himself informed of commodity prices in the various parts of his Empire.

His decisions on all these diverse matters were rendered clearly, promptly and precisely. And, simultaneously, he gave attention to the immediate problem of military preparations for the coming spring campaign.

He scored one brilliant diplomatic victory at this time. Since the end of 1806, he had striven to arouse the Turkish Sultan to take energetic military steps against Russia, with whom he was officially at war. In March, 1807, he wrote Sultan Selim a letter so dexterously worded, and prior to this he so artfully led him to quarrel with England, that the Sultan redoubled his military efforts. This diverted a part of the Russian forces from the Vistula and the Niemen, where the fate of the campaign was certain to be settled. For a time the French Emperor also made overtures to the Prussian Court, which had sought refuge in Königsberg. His conditions were regarded as being too severe by Frederick William III, who after Eylau felt somewhat encouraged. Finally, at the insistence of Tsar Alexander, the Prussian king called a halt to these negotiations.

Napoleon would not acknowledge that such things as unimportant trifles existed in war. Hence, he weighed every issue,
foresaw every eventuality, knowing that the minutest details often spelled the difference between defeat and victory in a critical battle. When new soldiers, new artillery and new munitions arrived at the French camps, Napoleon himself allotted them to the various corps. As the result of a series of agreements, he received German, Italian and Dutch recruits to fill the gaps in his depleted army.

At this time, Europe was in such a state of alarm that Napoleon did exactly as he wished, even making demands from neutral countries not affected by the present campaign. Thus, for example, he decided that Spain might be persuaded to furnish him with 15,000 men. He had not the slightest basis for making this demand, as Spain was not in a state of war with Prussia or Russia. But a letter was promptly despatched by fast messenger. In it, Napoleon informed the Spanish Minister Godoy that these 15,000 men were "absolutely useless" in themselves, but that they might prove most useful to the French. This argument—there was no other, and there could be no other—seemed so convincing to the Spanish government that the 15,000 soldiers were immediately sent to Napoleon in eastern Prussia. Subsequently a number of them went to northern Germany.

By May of 1807, Napoleon had at his disposal eight marshals and an army of 228,000 men. Another 170,000 were in occupation of Prussia; as yet they were not called upon to participate in the spring campaign.

With the coming of spring, there was a marked improvement in the matter of provisions. On May 26, after a prolonged siege, Danzig surrendered to Marshal Lefebvre, and this capture was productive of an enormous quantity of supplies of every kind.

The dénouement was approaching. In the months following the Battle of Eylau, the Russian army also received numerical reinforcements. However, it was not as well equipped as Napoleon's. Nevertheless, abuses existed even in the French camp. Ruthlessly as Napoleon sought to stamp out the thieves and bribe-takers, speculators and fraudulent contractors, dishonest financiers and profiteers, he did not succeed in catching them all. In this struggle he won no victory. In France it was even said that the grafters only smiled when someone called the Emperor "un-
conquerable”—he had not conquered them! Still, conditions existing in the French army could not be even remotely compared with those obtaining among the Russians. Though the French had encountered many hardships in this devastated land during the winter of 1806-1807, their plight was immeasurably better than that of the Tsar's troops. The Russian soldiers hungered, froze, died.

Alexander I was apprehensive of a new Austerlitz. In the Russian court the idea had long prevailed that every material and spiritual effort must be strained to stimulate the people for the great struggle. This idea had most curious consequences. The means chosen for inspiring the nation was the Holy Synod. The synod decided on a strange course, giving many people cause for the deepest perplexity. An epistle was sent to all the Orthodox churches, proclaiming that Napoleon was the forerunner of Antichrist... the primordial foe of the Christian faith... the creator of the Jewish Sanhedrin. Moreover, it claimed that he had in his day recanted Christianity and abandoned himself to Mohammedanism (this was an allusion to Egypt and Syria), and that he had launched this campaign against Russia with the direct aim of destroying the Orthodox church.

Such was the principal content of this remarkable document, which was read from the altars in all the churches of Russia. But before this “ideological” preparation for the struggle with the military forces of Antichrist could develop, the decisive hour struck.

Early in May, Napoleon ordered all the detachments quartered in cities and villages to join the active camps. Soon the army was in complete readiness for battle. Ignorant of this, Benningsen decided to begin his advance during the first week of June. He was forced into taking decisive steps by Alexander, who had but recently arrived at the front. The Tsar based his counsel on the exaggerations of Benningsen himself, who, in adorning his initial account of the Battle of Eylau, had given the Tsar to believe that Napoleon had suffered a crushing defeat on February 8. Consequently, Alexander felt that now that winter had come to an end and the roads were again passable, it would be folly to lose a second.
The Russian army began its advance on June 5. At Benning-
sen's command, Bagration flung himself on Ney's corps. This
detachment was camped in the foreground, in front of the main
army, and was closest to the Russian positions. At the same time,
the Cossack Ataman Platov crossed the River Alle. Ney began
to retire, fighting. Approximately 30,000 men, a far greater
number than he had under his command, menaced him. Simultane-
ously, the Russian troops attacked in other sectors.

Napoleon had previously decided to move against the Russians
on June 10. The unexpected enemy advance forced him to form-
ulate a new plan. Repairing quickly to the scene of conflict, he was
astonished to observe that the Russians, for no comprehensible
reason, had suddenly halted and were giving up the pursuit of
Ney's corps; after remaining in their new position for nearly 48
hours, they as unexpectedly turned back. Napoleon quickly or-
dered six corps and his Guard to concentrate into a single "fist."
This whole force, consisting of over 125,000 men, was directed to
make a counter-attack on the enemy. At this moment, Benningsen
had under his command, according to some accounts 85,000, ac-
cording to others 100,000 fighting men. In the environs of Heils-
berg, Benningsen took cover in a fortified position, and here, on
June 10, a battle took place. The French advance guard lost
approximately 8,000 men, the Russians some 10,000.

Napoleon despatched two corps to the Königsberg road. As
a result of this manœuvre, Benningsen retired toward Bartenstein,
to the northeast. The battle near Heilsberg, thought Benningsen,
should have somewhat restrained Napoleon; but the Emperor
directed his main forces through Eylau straight upon Königsberg.
He had foreseen that Benningsen would attempt to save this
main city of eastern Prussia. At three o'clock on the morning of
June 14, Marshal Lannes observed that the Russian army, which
on the evening before had entered the little town of Friedland,
was preparing to cross to the western bank of the Alle, from
which it would advance in the direction of Königsberg. Promptly,
Lannes opened fire.

Thus began the momentous Battle of Friedland which ended
the war. Lannes sent adjutants to inform Napoleon of the latest
development. The Emperor with all of his troops hurried to the
battleground. Immediately, he discovered that Benningsen had made a ruinous mistake. The Russian general, in his haste to cross the river, had concentrated a large portion of his army in the bend of the Alle, where it was crushed. Marshal Ney received the dangerous assignment of making a thrust at the Russians. Benningsen's troops, especially the mounted guardsmen, defended themselves valiantly. A portion of Ney's corps, densely massed for attack, was destroyed in the assault. Fighting every instant, the French entered Friedland, having destroyed the bridges across the Alle.

Napoleon personally directed the battle. When a bomb sped by his head and a soldier standing beside him ducked, the Emperor, who had remained immobile during the flight of the projectile, turned to him and said: "If that bomb had been predestined for you, you could have hidden a hundred feet underground and it would still have got you."

Notwithstanding the bravery of the Russian troops, Benningsen's fatal mistake proved the cause of their undoing. Part of them fled along the river, part surrendered. Not many prisoners were taken; the number of drowned was incomparably larger. Nearly all of the Russian artillery fell into Napoleon's hands.

After the loss of his artillery and over 25,000 men, Benningsen quickly retired to the River Pregel, hotly pressed by the French. His only chance to escape complete destruction lay in flight. Immediately after the Battle of Friedland, Marshal Soult entered Königsberg, where he seized enormous quantities of munitions, bread and apparel. (As it happened, the English had just landed these supplies, not foreseeing the approaching catastrophe.) Napoleon's troops reached the Niemen on June 19, five days after the Battle of Friedland. The remnants of the Russian army had succeeded in crossing the river. Napoleon at Tilsit was at the frontier of the Russian Empire.

On the evening of June 19, a Russian army officer from Bagration's detachment, carrying a white flag, approached the advance posts of the French cavalry division stationed on the bank of the Niemen. He bore a letter for Marshal Murat from Benningsen. The Russian commander-in-chief offered to conclude a peace. Murat immediately dispatched the letter to the Em-
peror, who announced his assent. The sanguinary struggle was at an end.

To the last moment Alexander did not regard his venture as lost. At Tilsit, on June 12, when he received the news of the disastrous battle near Heilsberg, his brother Constantine stubbornly advised him to make an immediate peace with Napoleon. "Sire!" shouted the Tsarevitch. "If you don't want peace, you had better give a loaded pistol to every Russian soldier and tell them all to shoot themselves! You would get the same result that the new—and the last!—battle will give you. It will inevitably open up the gates of your empire to the French troops!" Alexander resolutely opposed his brother's point of view. On the evening of June 14, just at the moment when the Russian army was being destroyed in the waters of the Alle near Friedland, he left Tilsit to meet the reserves. Next morning the first reports of the catastrophe came in. They told of the destruction of a third of the Russian Guard, of the disinclination of the troops to continue the struggle, and of Benningsen's having lost complete control of the situation. The reports were soon confirmed with precise details. The Russian army had been defeated at Friedland almost as crushingly as at Austerlitz in 1805. Napoleon at the head of his Grand Army was free to invade Russia. Complete panic gripped the general staff of the Russian army.

The celebrated follower of Alexander I, Denis Davidov, who was in the Russian camp immediately after Friedland, subsequently wrote: "On June 18, I came galloping up to the main headquarters, where was collected a most heterogeneous crowd. Here were Englishmen, Swedes, Prussians, French royalists, Russian military and civil officials, and ordinary citizens, alien both to military and civil service, parasites, intriguants; in a word, it was a market-place for political and military speculators who had been bankrupted of all their hopes, plans and schemes. . . . Everything was in a thoroughly distraught state; it was as though doomsday itself were expected within half an hour."
Benningsen asked Alexander for permission to negotiate a truce. This time Alexander submitted.

Having received the Russian proposal, Napoleon assented. To prolong the war with Russia was of no further advantage to him. Such a campaign would require additional preparation. Prussia had been completely routed. Russia might agree to accept the Continental Blockade and thus would recognise Napoleon's political sovereignty. For the time being, this was all he wanted of Alexander.

On June 22, Alexander sent General Lobanov-Rostovskiy to visit Napoleon at Tilsit, where he had camped after the Battle of Friedland. The French Emperor prefaced his conversation with Lobanov by walking to a table upon which was spread a map of Europe. Pointing to the Vistula, he said: "Here is the frontier of both empires. On one side your Emperor should rule, and on the other side I." It was his way of declaring his intention of wiping Prussia off the face of the earth and, incidentally, sharing out Poland.

In the mean time, Alexander was cooling his heels at Schawli. During these portentous days, while waiting for Lobanov to return with a signed truce, the Tsar was more consumed with anxiety than he had been after Austerlitz. Actually, Napoleon might appear in Vilna in ten days' time. "We have lost a fearful number of officers and soldiers," Alexander admitted. "All our generals, and, in particular, the most capable ones, are either wounded or ill. Of course, the outlook for Prussia is bad, but there are circumstances which make one consider one's own self-preservation first, and to think of only one rule—the welfare of the State." Self-preservation—"sa propre conservation," as Alexander expressed himself in a conversation with Prince Kurakin at Schawli—forced the Tsar, within 24 hours after hearing the news of Friedland, to change his entire policy and to sue for peace and, if necessary, even to enter into an alliance with Napoleon. It was of but secondary importance to him that, because of his sudden change in policy, Prussia might cease to exist, or else become nothing but a territorial stump.
The courtiers who surrounded Alexander at Schawli trembled like autumn leaves, in anticipation of an attack by Napoleon’s advance guard.

Alexander and those about him were overjoyed when they learned that Napoleon had assented to a truce and a peace. “Heaven has saved us,” wrote the old courtier, Prince Kurakin. “We had neither money, nor provisions, nor arms . . . before us was the victorious enemy with forces thrice as strong as ours.”

Immediately, Alexander assured Napoleon of his fervent desire for a close alliance with France, saying that only a Franco-Russian pact could guarantee world happiness and peace. In confirming the armistice, he asked for a personal interview with Napoleon.

Alexander could no longer avoid giving an explanation to his friend Frederick William III, who to the last moment had counted on him. The Tsar, indeed, explained matters to him as they were. The king sent a request to Napoleon for a truce. He thought of despatching the patriotically minded Minister Hardenberg to the French Emperor’s residence at Tilsit. But Napoleon flew into such a frenzy of rage at the mere mention of Hardenberg and stamped so hard with his feet, that the minister’s name was never again breathed in his presence. The king of Prussia was given to understand that there could be no talk of mercy.

On June 25, at two o’clock in the afternoon, Napoleon and Alexander met for the first time. In order that the Tsar might be spared the ordeal of a conference on the bank of the Niemen conquered by the French, and so that Napoleon would not have to cross to the Russian side, a special raft was erected in the middle of the river. On the French bank was drawn up the entire French Guard; on the Russian side waited the small retinue of Alexander.

Denis Davidov and other Russian eye-witnesses riveted their gaze upon the rowboat which was taking Napoleon to the raft in the Niemen. In describing the scene, they subsequently referred to him as that “fabulous being, that most remarkable war captain since the times of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar” . . . “the greatest war captain, politician, law-giver, administra-
tor and conqueror, who amazed the armies of all Europe and twice our own army, and who now stands on the boundaries of Russia” . . . “a human being possessed of the gift of ruling over all those with whom he came into contact, remarkable for his great powers of penetration” . . . “an unconquerable leader” . . . “the thunder-bearing demi-god.” Thus did Denis Davidov and many others in Alexander’s retinue regard Napoleon, and this feeling was mingled with one of shame and secret anger.

In Russian military circles, this event seemed far more humiliating than the routs of Austerlitz and Friedland.

In 1823, Pushkin wrote:

“Such he was, when on the plains of Austerlitz
His right hand smote the warrior of the North,
And, for the first time, the Russian fled before destruction;
Such he was, when with victorious truce
And with peace and infamy he faced the youthful Tsar. . . .”

Only after the Russian Revolution was this text correctly published in Russia. In all of the old editions there is a modification—“with peace or infamy”—distorting Pushkin’s meaning.

Be this as it may, the cup that was Alexander’s to drain proved on first taste not so bitter as might have been expected. Scarcely had the two emperors reached the raft, boarding it simultaneously, when Napoleon embraced Alexander. Then they entered the pavilion together and began a conversation which was to last nearly two hours. Neither monarch left behind a detailed record of this conference. Only several phrases became known later. But the general drift of the talk is reflected in the treaty of peace signed some days later.

“Why do we war against each other?” Napoleon asked.

“I loathe the English as deeply as you, and I shall assist you in every measure you decide to take against them,” said Alexander.

“In that case, everything can be arranged, and a peace concluded,” replied Napoleon.

While the emperors sat in the pavilion on the raft, King Frederick William III waited on the Russian side of the Niemen,
hoping to be called. On parting with Alexander, Napoleon asked him to dinner, but did not invite the Prussian king; he barely nodded in his direction and turned his back on him. Only on the following day was Frederick William granted an interview, and even then he was treated with utter contempt.

At Napoleon's suggestion, Alexander, on June 26, moved his headquarters to Tilsit, and henceforth there were daily meetings between the emperors. At the beginning, Napoleon would not permit any of his ministers to take part in the conversations. "I shall be your secretary, and you shall be mine," he said to Alexander.

In Napoleon's very first words was revealed the desperate position of Prussia. He simply proposed that she be shared: Alexander was welcome to everything east of the Vistula, Napoleon would help himself to everything west of it. As for Frederick William, Napoleon was not inclined to talk with him. Indeed, on those rare occasions when he admitted him into his presence, he did not so much talk politics to him as to sharply rebuke and chide him. "A vile king, a vile nation, a vile army, a country which has deceived everybody and does not deserve to exist." Thus Napoleon referred to the King of Prussia in a conversation with Alexander. And Alexander, who in his day had so touchingly sworn eternal fealty and love for Prussia at Frederick the Great's grave, did not protest. He smiled courteously and affectionately, and only ventured to suggest that Napoleon might allow a small portion of Prussia to remain, notwithstanding all her reprehensible qualities.

Frederick William was panic-stricken. He resolved to resort to desperate measures. He especially sent for his wife to come to Tilsit; Queen Louisa was reputed to be a great beauty. This was the same Queen Louisa, who, at the beginning of the war with Prussia, had borne the brunt of Napoleon's abuse in the French newspapers. Nevertheless, Frederick William hoped that a personal interview and a confidential talk would moderate the harsh conqueror's wrath. Louisa received her instructions, though her advisers did not have much hope, knowing how little Napoleon was influenced by women, even by those in whom he
sought diversion. The queen was advised to ask for the return, at least, of the city of Magdeburg and various minor territories. Then an interview was quickly arranged.

Napoleon, just returned from a horseback ride, entered the palace at Tilsit to meet Queen Louisa. He wore the uniform of a chasseur, and carried a horsewhip in his hand. The queen was attired in her most sumptuous clothes. There ensued a prolonged conversation between the two, with no third person present. When, at last, Frederick William ventured to enter, and interrupted the tête à tête between the Emperor and the queen, Louisa had not yet succeeded in achieving any results. . . . "If only the Prussian king had entered a little later, I might have yielded Magdeburg," said Napoleon afterward, jesting with his marshals.

If Prussia remained on the map of Europe at all, it was, as Napoleon emphatically repeated, due exclusively "to the courtesy and respect" he felt toward Alexander. To Prussia was left "Old Prussia," Pomerania, Brandenburg and Silesia. All the rest of her territory in the west and east was taken away from her. Her possessions west of the Elbe became part of the newly organised Kingdom of Westphalia, in whose composition the French Emperor also included the Grand Duchy of Hessen and, a bit later, Hanover. Napoleon gave this new kingdom to his young brother, Jerome. Out of the Polish lands taken from Prussia (the regions of Posen and Warsaw), was created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, to which Napoleon appointed his new ally, the King of Saxony, Grand Duke. To Alexander I, on the insistence of Napoleon, Prussia ceded the small Bialystok region. A secret defensive and offensive alliance was concluded between Napoleon and Alexander. The terms of this pact obligated Russia to enforce Napoleon's Continental Blockade decree.

On July 8, 1807, the Peace of Tilsit, so humiliating to Germany, was finally signed.

Festivals and military reviews continued in Tilsit until the evening of the eighth. Both emperors were inseparable during this period. Napoleon made every effort to display his friendliness toward his former enemy and his present ally. On the following day, Napoleon and Alexander together inspected a review
of the French and Russian Guards. When, in front of the troops and the mass of spectators, they kissed each other and parted company, no one save the two emperors themselves and their most trusted statesmen knew that an enormous change in the world politics had taken place during these several Tilsit days.
From Tilsit, Napoleon journeyed to Paris. He was greeted throughout Germany with tokens of servile worship. It seemed as if he had now reached such inaccessible heights of power as had not been attained by any other potentate in history. He was the autocratic Emperor of the immense French Empire (which included Belgium, western Germany, Piedmont and Genoa); the King of Italy; the Protector of the extensive territories of the Confederation of the Rhine (to which was now joined Saxony); the monarch of Switzerland. With the same despotic hand with which he governed his own empire, he ruled in Holland and in Naples, where he had seated his brothers Louis and Joseph as kings; in all of middle and part of northern Germany, which as the Kingdom of Westphalia he had given to his third brother Jerome; to a considerable extent in the former lands of Austria, which he had taken from his enemy and given to his vassal, the King of Bavaria; in the northern part of the European seacoast, where Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, Danzig and Königsberg were occupied by his troops; in Poland, where Marshal Davout's newly created army was in actual control, although the vassal King of Saxony had been granted the title of Grand Duke.

Quite apart from all this, Napoleon controlled the Ionian Islands, the city of Cattaro and part of the Adriatic seacoast of the Balkan peninsula. Prussia, reduced to a tiny spot on the map, deprived of the right to maintain an army, crushed under the burden of various indemnities, trembled at Napoleon's every
word; Austria submitted in silence; Russia was closely allied with the French Empire. England alone carried on the struggle.

Order reigned in France. The administration was efficient, and the finances were in a brilliant condition. On arriving in Paris, Napoleon, with the assistance of the Minister of Finance Gaudin and the head of the treasury Mollien, instituted a series of sweeping reforms in reorganising finances, and direct and indirect taxation. As a result, the Empire’s annual revenues (750,000,000 to 770,000,000 francs) fully covered all expenditures, including the cost of maintaining the army in time of war. This was characteristic of Napoleon’s financial policy: the Emperor considered war expenses as “ordinary” expenditures. Government credit was so firm that the Bank of France reduced its interest rate from ten per cent, as had been the case in 1804 and 1805, to four per cent.

Italy, which was officially regarded as a kingdom “independent” of France, annually paid her 36,000,000 francs in gold. This sum the generous “King of Italy”—Napoleon—magnanimously presented annually to the Emperor of the French—Napoleon. The expenditures necessary for the administration of Italy were covered exclusively by Italian revenues. Napoleon’s deputy in Italy was his stepson, Eugene Beauharnais, who bore the title of Viceroy. Needless to say, the French army in occupation of Italy was maintained at Italy’s expense. Similar tributes of gold were paid by other countries over which, directly or indirectly, Napoleon ruled; and in a like manner each country supported a French army of occupation. Mercilessly extorting gold from the subjugated lands in the form of indemnities, Napoleon established a new mintage of French coins, which soon went into circulation. The regulation of finances, begun by him during the Consulship, was perfected in 1807, on his return from Tilsit.

Simultaneously, he wished to undertake a series of measures for the improvement of French industry, but this proved to be a more complex matter. The proposed measures were linked closely and indissolubly with the rigid enforcement of the Continental Blockade. Soon after his return from Tilsit, the Emperor began to consider an immense political undertaking, upon whose fate, in his opinion, hinged the future of the blockade.
against England. This was the Peninsula Campaign, aiming at the conquest of Spain and Portugal.

In the autumn months of 1807 and during the winter of 1808, a definite cleavage, as yet concealed from outsiders, developed between the Emperor and his marshals, between the Emperor and his ministers, between the Emperor and his most intimate advisers. Napoleon’s court surrounded itself with every luxury. The old and the new nobility, the old and the new bourgeoisie, rivalled one another in the brilliance of their banquets, fêtes and balls. Gold flowed in streams. Foreign princes and vassal kings who came to pay homage prolonged their visits in the French capital, and spent huge sums of money. An uninterrupted holiday was daily celebrated in the Tuileries, in Fontainebleau, in Saint-Cloud, in Malmaison. Never during the old régime had there been such resplendence and such immense throngs of begemmed courtiers of both sexes. . . . Yet they all knew that in some remote study in the palace, whither none of these sounds of gaiety penetrated, a man in a frock coat of grey cloth stood before a map of the Peninsula, contemplating an undertaking that should oblige these care-free pleasure-seekers to part with all their newly gained splendour, and again to take their nightly shelter on straw in cold barns and haylofts, again to face shells and bullets, again to derive sustenance from potatoes, again to slake their thirst with fetid water from puddles. And in the name of what?

Even after the Austerlitz victory many of Napoleon’s colleagues had felt that the time had at last come to call a halt—that France had attained a fabulous might, of which she had scarcely dared to dream. Of course, the entire population of the Empire submitted to Napoleon without a murmur. Thus far the peasants had borne up under the recruiting demands. The merchants (except those engaged in seacoast towns), and especially the manufacturers, rejoiced at the expansion of markets and trade possibilities. In any event, those of the statesmen and marshals who had begun to caution a cessation of further conquest after Tilsit, were not afraid of an internal revolution. They knew that the workers were repressed by Napoleon’s strong hand.
Their anxiety sprang from a different source; they were alarmed at the almost limitless sweep of the Napoleonic possessions.

The uncontrolled, absolutely unlimited power of the Emperor over the colossal conglomeration of lands and peoples—from Königsberg to the Pyrenees (and, factually, beyond the Pyrenees), from Warsaw and Danzig to Naples and Brindisi, from Antwerp to the northwestern Balkan Mountains, from Hamburg to the island of Corfu—began to disturb even those closest to him. A superficial knowledge of history was enough to warn them that similar world monarchies had been short-lived and were not only extremely rare phenomena but, in the highest degree, fragile creations of historical forces. They acknowledged to themselves—and later spoke their thought aloud—that everything that had been created by Napoleon, from the beginning of his career to Tilsit, resembled an extravagant fairy tale rather than an historical reality. Many of them—and not Talleyrand alone—assumed that to continue this policy of territorial expansion would become more and more difficult, and more and more dangerous.

Napoleon was fabulously generous with his military and civil aides. After Tilsit he gave Marshal Lannes 1,000,000 francs in gold; to Ney he presented an annuity of 300,000 francs for life; to Marshal Berthier 500,000 francs in gold and an annuity of 405,000 francs. He rewarded the other marshals and many generals and officers with corresponding lavishness. His gifts to the ministers—Gaudin, Mollien, Fouché and Talleyrand—while not as large as those bestowed on the marshals, were nevertheless most generous. All officers and privates who had taken an active part in the campaigns were also remembered; many were granted good pensions, the wounded receiving a triple share.

This bounty did not cost the French treasury a single franc. The Duchy of Warsaw paid 20,000,000 francs in cash, in return for the annulment of the Polish landowners' hypothecary debts to the Prussian treasury. In Hanover, a land fund of 20,000,000 francs was created. In Westphalia (excepting Hanover) a similar fund of 30,000,000 francs was organised. To the yearly interest on this sum, Napoleon ordered an additional annual tax
from Westphalia of 5,000,000 francs. Italy paid 1,250,000 francs a year.

As a result, Napoleon had at his disposal a special annual income of many millions, derived from the subjugated lands. It was this money that he used in so bountifully rewarding his servants. This revenue was entirely independent of the tremendous levies exacted from the submitting lands by the French treasury. “Don’t plunder,” Napoleon counseled his generals. “I’ll give you far more than anything you can take.” What he did not forgive and severely punished was the unscrupulous management of sums provided for the maintenance of the troops. At inspections he not only observed the military bearing of the individual soldier but also his general appearance: did he look satisfied and well-fed? And he was merciless with those to blame.

Yet all these rewards which were poured on the marshals and generals only increased their antipathy to renewed warfare. For life was passing and would pass by—in almost uninterrupted campaigns!

It was common knowledge that Napoleon, having scarcely returned from Tilsit, was already gathering an army for a thrust at Spain and Portugal. Many could not see what practical advantage such a venture would serve. But they were overlooking the Continental Blockade, with which every important Napoleonic action was henceforth to be associated.

Having decided to crush England economically with the assistance of the Continental Blockade, Napoleon took steps to ensure the success of the blockade. He could not trust either the Braganzas in Portugal or the Bourbons in Spain. He had no false hopes that they would consciously and conscientiously lay their countries waste, that they would forbid their peasants, farmers and landowners to export their merino wool, or prevent them from importing cheap English manufactured goods. Although they had accepted the Berlin decree creating the blockade, they would secretly wink at violations of it and permit contraband to enter in a thousand different ways. And, considering the immense coastline of the Spanish Peninsula, the English fleet’s complete control of all the seas bordering on it, and the existence of the English fortress of Gibraltar on the Peninsula itself, it was evi-
dent that an effective blockade could be maintained only if Napoleon became the absolute master of Portugal and Spain. For him, the principal problem was irrevocably decided: all the seacoasts of Europe must come under the direct control of the French customs authorities. Those who did not approve would be swept out of the way. The Spanish Bourbons abased themselves before him—and lied to him. They could not, and would not, banish the English, or hinder commerce with them. The Braganzas of Portugal did the same thing. They, too, humbled themselves before Napoleon, but also shut their eyes to the realities of the blockade.

Meanwhile England, deprived of allies after the Tilsit peace, was resolved to redouble her efforts to nullify the effects of Napoleon's anti-British foreign economic policy. When, at the beginning of September, 1807, it was rumoured that Denmark had decided to support the Continental Blockade, an English fleet bombarded Copenhagen. On hearing of this, Napoleon flew into a rage. Now, more than ever before, he was determined to conquer Portugal and Spain.

In October, 1807, an army of 27,000 men led by Marshal Junot advanced across Spanish territory toward Portugal. This army was almost immediately followed by another, consisting of 24,000 men, under the command of General Dupont. Quite apart from these forces, Napoleon sent 5,000 cavalrymen—dragoons, hussars and chasseurs. The Portuguese Prince-Regent turned to England for assistance. He feared Napoleon, but he was no less afraid of the English, whose fleet might as easily destroy Lisbon as it had Copenhagen.

Napoleon was not immediately concerned with Spain. He thought of undertaking a conquest of Spain after he had finished with Portugal, for then it would be easier to dispose of her, since he would have two bases in hand: one in southern France, the other in Portugal. He did not even bother to inform Spain diplomatically of his intention to march his troops across her territory. He simply ordered Marshal Junot to inform Madrid when once he had crossed the frontier. The Spanish government accepted the news with docility.

At the court of Napoleon, Cambacérès, the Arch Chancellor of the Empire, mildly opposed the new undertaking. On the
other hand, Talleyrand wholeheartedly encouraged the Emperor. In August, 1807, not long after the Tilsit peace, the crafty Minister of Foreign Affairs had retired. Ostensibly, he had resigned his position because of some remarks made by Napoleon accusing him of accepting bribes and extortions. However, the real reason for Talleyrand’s withdrawal was that already he remotely sensed the catastrophic tendency of Napoleon’s policy, and had decided gradually to withdraw from any active rôle. None the less, he remained at court, retaining high rank and esteem. Now, once more desiring to steal into Napoleon’s good graces, he toaded to him by approving all of his proposals, even though he personally regarded the Spanish undertaking as very difficult and one pregnant with dangerous consequences.

Junot’s army, marching through Spanish territory to Portugal, found the road an arduous one; it was badly built, desolate, and offered no provisions. The French pillaged the peasants, who retaliated when they could by killing those who lagged behind. On November 29, after a laborious six-week march, Junot entered Lisbon. Two days prior to the French army’s entry, the royal family embarked on an English ship and fled the capital.

Spain’s turn had now come.

On the Spanish throne sat Charles IV, a weak and clumsy man, wholly under the thumb of his wife and her favourite, Don Manuel Godoy. The king, Queen Maria Luisa and Godoy were openly hostile to the heir to the throne, Ferdinand, in whom the Spanish nobility and bourgeoisie centered their hopes. The complete breakdown of the financial and administrative policy, which disrupted trade, agriculture and industry, served for the time being to unite the nobility and the bourgeoisie. It seemed to them that if Godoy, the favourite of the old court, could be deposed, it would be possible to “resurrect” Spain. Very popular was the idea of a marriage between the heir Ferdinand and one of Napoleon’s kinswomen. Such an affiliation with the mighty French Emperor might, so they thought, lead him to support certain internal reforms without demanding the forfeiture of national autonomy. Ferdinand formally asked Napoleon for the hand of his niece. Napoleon rejected the proposal.
The French Emperor had quite another idea. He desired to depose the existing dynasty and appoint one of his brothers or marshals King of Spain. During the winter and spring of 1808, more and more of Napoleon's troops crossed the Pyrenees and poured into Spain. By March, 100,000 troops were concentrated there. Confident of his strength, he was resolved to act. Knowing of the strained relations existing in the Spanish royal family, he ordered Marshal Murat and his army of 80,000 men to advance against Madrid. King Charles IV, the queen and Godoy attempted to flee the capital, but were seized in Aranjuez by the indignant populace. Godoy was beaten and thrust into prison, and the king was forced to abdicate his throne in favour of Ferdinand. This occurred on March 17; six days later Murat entered the Spanish capital. Napoleon, however, refused to recognise Ferdinand. He demanded that the new as well as the old king, together with the entire Spanish Bourbon family, be sent to the city of Bayonne in France. He himself assumed the rôle of supreme arbiter. He would finally consider the case, and render judgment.

By April 30, Charles IV, his wife, Ferdinand and Godoy were all gathered at Bayonne. However, Napoleon would not proceed until all of the princes of the Spanish royal house had appeared before him. On learning of this, the populace of Madrid became rebellious. Napoleon's scheme was now apparent. Having cunningly lured the whole Spanish Bourbon family to Bayonne, he would proclaim it deposed, arrest its members, and then proceed, under one pretext or another, to annex Spain to France. On May 2, a revolt against the French troops of occupation broke out in Madrid. Marshal Murat drowned the uprising in blood. But this was only the beginning. . .

On receiving the news of the Madrid revolt, Napoleon, who arrived at Bayonne simultaneously with the Spanish royal family, suddenly took decisive steps. He demanded that Charles IV, as well as Ferdinand, renounce the Spanish throne and formally grant him the right to deal with Spain according to his will. This was done. Charles IV, Ferdinand and the queen remained in the hands of the French gendarmes and troops. Promptly, Napoleon
told them that, solicitous for their welfare and comfort, he would not permit them to return to Spain, but would send the king and queen to Fontainebleau, and Ferdinand and the other Bourbon princes to Talleyrand's castle at Valençay. Powerless to oppose him, the Bourbons voiced no objection. On May 10, Napoleon ordered his brother, the King of Naples, to leave for Madrid to assume the throne of Spain. At the same time, Marshal Murat was promoted from Grand Duke of Cleves-Berg (in Western Germany) to King of Naples.

The Emperor was content beyond measure. Everything, it seemed, had passed off easily and smoothly. Like puppets, the Spanish Bourbons had walked into the trap; painlessly he had obtained the Spanish Peninsula.

But suddenly—to the surprise of Napoleon and all of Europe, which in timorous silence had observed his latest violations—a fierce and sanguinary guerilla war broke out between the Spanish peasants and the French conquerors.

Here for the first time Napoleon came to blows with a very different kind of foe, a foe whose like he had not previously encountered, except possibly, for a brief space, years ago, in Egypt and in Syria. Before him stood wrathful Asturian peasants, armed with knives; ragged Sierra-Morena shepherds, holding rusty rifles; defiant Catalanian craftsmen, with iron rods and long daggers. "Tatterdemalions!" said Napoleon of them contemptuously. He, the sovereign of Europe, who had humiliated the Russian, Austrian and Prussian armies, with all their artillery, cavalry, kings and generals; he, who with but a word had destroyed old régimes and had replaced them with new ones—should he be afraid of this Spanish scum?

At this moment, neither he nor anyone else knew that it was precisely these "tatterdemalions" who had begun to dig the abyss into which the great Napoleonic Empire would eventually topple.

When Napoleon first conceived his Spanish venture in 1808 he was guided by the historical example of one of his predecessors. A little more than a hundred years before, Louis XIV had placed his grandson Philip on the Spanish throne, and by that act had planted a sprig of his Bourbon dynasty. This Philip was the progenitor of the "Spanish" Bourbons. The Spaniards of that time
had accepted the new king and the new dynasty, and had maintained them on the throne, although half of Europe had gone to war against Louis XIV with the object of removing Philip. Why, then, should not Napoleon, who was incomparably mightier than Louis XIV, do likewise? Why should he not be capable of installing a dynasty of “Spanish” Bonapartes? And there should be no occasion for warring with half of Europe, as Louis XIV had been compelled to do, for the entire continent, with the exception of his ally Russia, already lay prostrate before him.

Napoleon erred in that he was tempted by a purely superficial analogy. He did not grasp the fundamental distinction between the accession of Philip Bourbon in 1700 and the accession of Joseph Bonaparte in 1808. In 1700, the French merchants, ship-owners and adventurous nobility hailed the accession of Philip V, because they imagined, as did Louis XIV himself, that henceforth Spain’s enormous colonial possessions would become the property of France. Later they discovered their mistake. The Spanish planters and merchants united in resisting the penetration of French capital in the Spanish colonies. Philip V, with contrition, was forced to refuse his French countrymen equal rights with those of the Spaniards. As a result, Spain had not become an economic tributary of France, and it was for this reason alone that Philip and the Spanish Bourbons retained their hold on the Spanish throne. On the other hand, Joseph Bonaparte, as King of Spain, was no more than Napoleon’s deputy. He was appointed merely to enforce the Continental Blockade on the Peninsula and to assist the French bourgeoisie in gaining a monopoly of Spain’s markets and resources.

The Spanish knew that since the time of the Brumaire upheaval of 1799, the French manufacturers and industrialists had been showering Napoleon with petitions to institute a programme for the exploitation of Spain. Not a Spaniard but was aware that to submit to Napoleon was tantamount to committing economic suicide. Spain would become the monopolised market for the commodities of French manufacturers; her precious merino wool, the finest in the world, would be placed at the sole disposal of French industry; and her best soil, especially in Andalusia, would be utilised for the cultivation of cotton for the French textile
trade. All commerce between Spain and England would be prohibited. No longer would Spain be able to export her raw wool to England and to import low-priced English manufactured goods.

Consequently, French domination would have spelled almost complete ruin for cattle breeders, wool carders, clothiers, and industrialists; for the whole peasantry, which in one fashion or another, directly or indirectly, was associated with the production of cloth for profit; for the entire agrarian nobility, which was bound up with England and which depended for livelihood on its profitable colonial trade.

In particular, it meant the immediate cessation of commerce with Spain’s wealthy possessions all over the world, especially in America and the Philippine Islands. England, with her powerful navy, could, in self-defense, promptly declare war and deprive her of her colonies beyond the seas.

All these commercial interests, which Napoleon’s invasion had so rudely violated, were the economic causes of the national liberating movement against the French conqueror. The aroused peasants and craftsmen of Spain maintained the unequal struggle until Great Britain came to their assistance, and replaced their sickles, daggers, axes, pitchforks and rusty rifles with the best examples of English firearms. Only then did Napoleon realize the hazards entailed in the subjugation of the Peninsula. For the time being, however, everything appeared to proceed happily. Under the surveillance of the police, the arrested Spanish Bourbons journeyed to their places of detention at Fontainebleau and Valençay. Murat was in Madrid.

It is true, that reports of certain annoyances had already reached the Emperor. For example, Spanish peasants, traveling in groups, had ventured to steal up to the French bivouacs by night, and shoot at the soldiers. On those occasions when they were caught and placed before a firing squad, they remained silent, or else contemptuously abused their captors. During the Madrid revolt of May 2, when Marshal Murat shot into the crowd, the people did not disperse at once, but, fleeing, hid themselves in their houses and continued to shoot at the French from the windows. As the French entered their homes to seize the
snipers, the Spaniards, their ammunition exhausted, struggled with knives, fists, and teeth; they fought as long as their legs would support them. The French flung them out of the windows on to the bayonets of their comrades on the pavements. Only after the most desperate struggle did the Spaniards succumb.

All these oddities in themselves did not disturb Napoleon. He did not at once understand the nature of this war. From the very beginning, the French invaders met with constant manifestations of the Spaniards' fierce fanatical hatred toward them. One day a French detachment entered a village. Everything was deserted; the inhabitants had fled into the woods. In one hut they found a young woman with an infant—and also provisions. Before permitting the soldiers to eat the food, the officer in charge, scenting danger, asked the woman if it was poisoned. On receiving a reassuring answer, he ordered her to sample it first. Without hesitation, the peasant woman began eating. Not content with this, the officers demanded that she give some of the food to her baby. The mother promptly did as she was told. Then some of the soldiers began to eat. In a short time the mother, the infant and the soldiers who had eaten the food, died in agony. The trap had worked.

At the beginning, this and similar episodes continued to astonish the French. But soon it all became routine phenomena. After awhile nothing that occurred in this Spanish war could amaze the French soldiers.

By the middle of summer there were indications that some of the conquered countries were beginning to look hopefully at the flame developing beyond the Pyrenees. There were rumours that Austria was rearming. It was now three years since Austerlitz, and Austria had secured some rest and had improved her condition. In the court at Vienna, among the nobility, and in the trading classes, there were those who believed that the time was not far distant when the nation could wriggle from under the heel of Napoleon. As in Russia, so in Austria, the nobility above all else feared the continuation of Napoleonic domination; it feared that eventually Austria would be forced to adopt the Code of Napoleon, and that the rights of serf-ownership would lapse.

The Franco-Russian alliance constituted Napoleon's guaran-
tee against any sudden attack from Austria while he was settling matters with "mutinous" Spain.

"His Imperial Majesty will quickly bring all this wild Spanish rabble to its senses," respectfully commented the European press.

"It looks as though the brigand had himself run into a knife," whispered many newspaper readers—but they really did not dare to believe in the realisation of their own hopes.

And while Europe was on tenterhooks, came the sudden announcement that the French and Russian Emperors would meet at Erfurt in the autumn of the year (1808).

Napoleon had long before conceived the idea of providing a demonstration of the strength of the Franco-Russian alliance. However, in the middle of July an unusual event occurred, which forced Napoleon to hasten the interview with Alexander.

General Dupont, who had been proceeding with the conquest of southern Spain, had already invaded Andalusia and taken the city of Cordova. Moving on farther, he found himself in an immense sun-scorched plain, without provisions, and surrounded by countless peasant partisans, who attacked his detachment from all sides. On July 17, not far from Bailén, Dupont capitulated with his whole detachment. This, to be sure, did not indicate Spain's liberation from the French. However, the surrender created a tremendous stir in Europe. The seemingly unconquerable French troops had at last suffered an indisputable, if only partial, defeat.

When he learned of the surrender, Napoleon flew into a rage and had Dupont delivered to a court-martial. Although he later assumed an external calm, claiming that the Bailén loss was the merest trifle compared with the resources at his command, he understood only too well how the episode would affect Austria, which indeed began to arm with redoubled energy. Austria realised that Napoleon had unexpectedly revealed that he had not one front but two, and that henceforth this new front in southern Spain would greatly weaken him on the Danube. In order to restrain Austria from making war, he must give her to understand that Alexander I would invade the Austrian possessions from the north, while the French army would march on Vienna from the
From Tilsit to Wagram

west. It was chiefly for this reason that he conceived the idea for the Erfurt demonstration of friendship between himself and the Tsar.

Alexander I had experienced great difficulties after Tilsit. The alliance with Napoleon and the inevitable consequences of this alliance—the break with England—gravely retarded the economic interests of the merchants and nobles. Tilsit was regarded as not only a misfortune but also a humiliation.

The Tsar had hoped, thanks to Napoleon's promises, that in return for agreeing to the Franco-Russian alliance he would receive a portion of Turkey. With this, he would console the Guards and the nobility. But time went on, and there was no indication that Napoleon was taking any steps to fulfill his promise. Moreover, rumors began to reach St. Petersburg that Napoleon was encouraging the Turks in their war against Russia. Both members of the Franco-Russian alliance hoped in Erfurt to examine more closely the genuineness of the cards with the help of which each conducted his diplomatic game. Each ally deceived the other. Both knew it, though ignorant of the extent. Neither could trust the other, and each stood in need of the other. Alexander regarded Napoleon as a man of the greatest sagacity; Napoleon acknowledged the diplomatic finesse and cunning of Alexander.

"He is a real Byzantine," said Napoleon of the Tsar.

This explains the fact that on their first meeting at Erfurt, on September 27, 1808, they warmly embraced and exchanged kisses in public. Nor did they cease this display of mutual affection for the next two weeks. Inseparably, they appeared daily at reviews of troops, at parades, at balls, at banquets, at the theatre, at hunts, on outings on horseback. The main object of these tokens of friendship was the effect they would have on the public. For Napoleon, these kisses would have lost their sweetness if the Austrians had failed to hear of them; for Alexander, if the Turks had failed to hear of them.

During the year that passed between Tilsit and Erfurt, Alexander had become convinced that Napoleon had deliberately duped him with the promise of giving him "the East," while he himself would take "the West." It was now clear that the French Emperor would not only forbid him to capture Constan-
tinople, but that he even preferred that Moldavia and Wallachia remain in Turkey’s hands. On the other hand, the Tsar saw that for the whole year following Tilsit, Napoleon had not made any move to recall his troops from that portion of Prussia which he had “returned” to the Prussian king.

As for Napoleon, his chief concern was to restrain Austria from attacking France during the time he was engaged in putting an end to the guerilla warfare which was running rampant in Spain. Therefore, he wanted Alexander to obligate himself to move against Austria should the latter take the field against France. This was the last thing that Alexander desired: he did not want to give a direct promise, nor had any desire to fulfill it. In return for the assistance Napoleon needed, he was willing to make Alexander a present, in advance, of Galicia and the lands near the Carpathians. Subsequently, the leading Russian bourgeois historians bitterly reproached Alexander for refusing Napoleon’s proposals and for rejecting an opportunity which would not come again. However, after feeble attempts at resistance, the Tsar succumbed to the arguments of the Russian nobility, who saw in the alliance with Napoleon, who had twice routed the Russian armies, ruin, as well as humiliation. Anonymous letters reminding Alexander of the assassination of his father Paul, who had also been friendly to Napoleon, were sufficiently convincing.

Nevertheless, the Tsar feared the French Emperor, and had no desire to break with him. At the suggestion of Napoleon, who was anxious to see Sweden punished for her alliance with England, Alexander, in February, 1808, had declared war on her. When the conflict ended, Sweden had lost all of Finland as far as the River Torneo; it was annexed by Russia. Alexander knew that even this conquest had not soothed the irritation of the Russian landowners, with whom private interests weighed considerably heavier than territorial expansion in the fruitless North. In any event, the acquisition of Finland served Alexander as merely another argument to prove that a rupture with Napoleon would be not only dangerous but also unprofitable.

It was at Erfurt that Talleyrand first betrayed his Emperor by entering into secret relations with Alexander, whom he counseled
against submitting to Napoleonic hegemony. In the future, Talleyrand was to explain his behaviour by asserting that his advice to Alexander was prompted by his concern for France, whom the mad ambition of Napoleon was leading to ruin. Talleyrand later received some money from Alexander, though not as much as he had expected. No matter what selfish reasons he may have had, it is obvious that as early as 1808 Talleyrand had a definite prescience of Napoleon's eventual downfall.

Encouraged by Talleyrand's treachery, Alexander began to feel that the French Empire was not as stable and indestructible as some imagined. He refused to commit Russia into declaring war on Austria should the latter attack France. During one of these discussions, Napoleon, in a fury, flung his hat on to the ground and began stamping on it. In answer to this antic, Alexander declared: "You are brusque and I am obstinate. . . . Let us converse and discuss. Otherwise I shall be forced to take my leave."

The alliance remained formally in force, but henceforth Napoleon could not count upon it. In Russia, the people, in great perturbation, awaited the outcome of the interview at Erfurt. Would Napoleon arrest Alexander, as four months before he had seized the Spanish Bourbons after enticing them to Bayonne? "All of us had about given up hope that he would let you go, Your Majesty," said an old Prussian general, upon Alexander's return from Erfurt. Outwardly everything had been as it should. During the entire course of the Erfurt meeting, the vassal kings who made up Napoleon's retinue had been deeply moved by the hearty mutual love of the two emperors. But, on parting with Alexander, Napoleon himself was morose. He knew that neither the vassal kings nor Austria really believed in the stability of the Franco-Russian alliance. It was imperative to wind up the Spanish venture as quickly as possible.

Napoleon had 100,000 soldiers in Spain. He ordered that another 150,000 men be hurried there. The peasant revolt increased in intensity with every month. This guerilla war with the Spanish peasants, craftsmen, shepherds and mule-drivers worried the Emperor far more than had some of his big campaigns.
After Prussia’s slavish submission, Spain’s savage resistance was particularly disquieting. And yet, for all that, Napoleon did not even suspect how intense this Spanish bonfire would become.

Uncertain of the assistance of Alexander and almost convinced that Austria would declare war on him, Napoleon in the late autumn of 1808 hurried to Spain. With him was the “Polish Legion,” which he had created in 1807 when he had taken possession of Poland. He was full of wrath against the unsubmitting, filthy, illiterate Spanish “peasants.” The English had already succeeded in making a landing and in driving the French from Lisbon. Portugal had become an English rather than a French base. The French were dominant only in northern Spain, as far as the River Ebro; everywhere else there were scarcely any French troops left. To further complicate matters, the Spanish army was now equipped with English rifles.

Napoleon decided to attack. At Burgos, on November 10, he inflicted a stunning defeat upon the Spaniards. A few days later he fought two more battles, and it seemed as though the Spanish army had been annihilated. On November 30, he advanced against Madrid, which was defended by a strong garrison. In the storming of Madrid, the Polish Legion hacked at the Spaniards with desperate valour, heedless, as it were, of the humiliating rôle they were playing in crushing the national liberating movement of the Spanish people. Napoleon had declared that the Poles must earn their right to independence. So, here were the Poles proving that they were deserving of their fatherland by taking the Spaniards’ fatherland from them.

On December 4, Napoleon entered Madrid. The capital greeted him in sepulchral silence. The Emperor promptly proclaimed Spain and her capital under martial law and established military tribunals.

Now he turned his attention to the English. General Moore was severely repulsed and killed, and the remnants of the English army were pursued by the French.

Again it seemed that Spain was lost. Yet the more hopeless the cause of the revolting populace became, the more fierce grew their resistance.
The besieged city of Saragossa held out against the French for several months. Finally, Marshal Lannes, receiving the necessary reinforcements, made a breach in the defences and entered the city on January 27, 1809. But here the French found something which they had never before seen in a besieged city. Every house had been transformed into a fortress. Every barn, stable, cellar, attic, had to be taken separately. For three whole weeks the grim struggle continued in the already-captured but still resisting city.

Lannes’s soldiers killed everyone, without exception; not even women and children were spared. But then, in return, the women and children killed the French soldiers whenever an opportunity offered. The French butchered 22,000 of the garrison and over 32,000 of the population. Marshal Lannes, a spirited Hussar, afraid of nothing on earth, a veteran of the most desperate Napoleonic battles, ignorant of the meaning of the word “nerves,” felt crushed by the sight of the countless corpses, lying prostrate in the houses and on the streets—dead men, women and children, bathed in pools of blood. “What a war! To be forced to kill so many brave souls—even, let us say, mad souls! This victory brings only sadness,” Lannes remarked, turning to his retinue, as they rode through the dead city.

The siege and destruction of Saragossa made a profound impression on Europe, and, above all, on Austria, Prussia, and the other German states. The comparison between the courage of the Spaniards and the servility of the Germans was disquieting and degrading.

However, the predatory plundering of the Napoleonic monarchy forced the trading classes of the conquered lands into action. They had been awakened to life by Napoleon, liberated from feudalism and compelled to accept free capitalism. Now they were forced to devise means of liberating themselves from those economic jaws into which Napoleon’s foreign policy had thrust them.

Their efforts for self-preservation resulted in the national liberating movements against Napoleon. Separate outbreaks of this movement occurred in 1808, 1809 and 1810, and the mighty
conflagration of 1813 affected all the lands under Napoleon’s rule.

As far back as 1806, before the defeat of Prussia, Napoleon had shown how he would deal with national protest among the German people. In Bavaria, an anonymous pamphlet, “Germany in Her Deepest Humiliation,” written in an elegiac style, without any attempt to incite, was found in the possession of a Nürnberg bookseller named Palm. Napoleon demanded that the Bavarian government have its author shot. Palm refused to name the author. Then Napoleon ordered that Palm himself be shot. The order was promptly executed. This had occurred at the end of the summer of 1806, before Jena, Friedland and Tilsit. Now after Tilsit, Napoleon’s repressive measures became even more severe. He did exactly as he pleased not only in Bavaria and the states of the Confederation of the Rhine, but also in Hamburg, Danzig, Leipzig, Königsberg, Breslau, and, indeed, anywhere in Germany.

Napoleon did not know that in Berlin, Fichte in his lectures was throwing out misty patriotic allusions. He did not know that in German universities, students’ circles were being formed, which, while still afraid to revolt against their common conqueror, were animated by a deep hatred of him. He did not stop to consider that although the German bourgeoisie in the vassal lands rejoiced at the introduction of the anti-feudal Code of Napoleon, it writhed under the enforced political and financial yoke of the French, combined with the “tax of blood” (military conscription to secure recruits for the French Grand Army).

He knew nothing of this, nor did he care to know. In Erfurt, the German kings and aristocrats, together with their wives and daughters, had behaved according to one observer, like lackeys and chambermaids employed by an angry master. On one occasion, Germany’s greatest poet, Goethe, solicited an audience. Napoleon finally received him at Erfurt—forgetting, however, to ask the old man to be seated. But when the French Emperor courteously praised Werther, Goethe was overcome with gratitude. In short, the German upper classes—and Napoleon had no direct contact with any other class—seemed as submissive as ever.
The rest of the nation was silent. On the other hand, reports from Austria were becoming more and more disturbing.

In Austria, the people knew that, for the moment, Napoleon could fight with but a single hand, the other being weighed down by the terrible Spanish burden. The Austrians were convinced that Napoleon would never give up the conquest of Spain, that for him it was no mere despotic caprice. Indeed, they were aware that the French Emperor was even now intensifying the Continental Blockade with new decrees, new police measures and new political acts. To withdraw from the Peninsula at this time, when the English had already put in an appearance there, would signify the abandonment of the Continental Blockade, the very cornerstone of Napoleonic policy. No, it was obvious that the Emperor of France was stuck in Spain for a long time to come.

With all possible haste he prepared for war against Austria. In January, 1809, he quitted Spain, leaving it in charge of his marshals (who without him lost their military value), and to his brother Joseph, the King of Spain (who, whether with him or without him, never revealed any particular value). Following the recent military pogrom, Spain, with the departure of Napoleon, again was rent by a series of stubborn urban and peasant revolts, which spread all over the land. Elusive, intrepid, the foe continued to hold half of the Grand Army, 30,000 of Napoleon's best troops, in Spain. But the other half was being hurriedly organised for the new war with Austria. The Emperor ordered a premature conscription, which gave him 100,000 men. In addition, he demanded that the subject German states supply him with another 100,000. The command was obeyed without protest. Then he selected over 110,000 veterans upon whom he could rely, and sent another 70,000 old soldiers to Italy, where he expected an attack by the Austrians.

Thus toward spring of 1809 he had at his disposal over 300,000 men, whom, under his personal command, he could fling against the Austrians. But Austria was also gathering her forces. The Austrian court, the upper aristocracy and the middle nobility (the instigators of the war), acted as one. This time
even the Hungarian nobility was loyal to “the crown.” It knew that it must defend and strengthen the common cause so sacred to them all—the right to maintain serfs, a right which had been so radically abridged geographically and so crushingly shattered politically by Napoleon’s three previous wars (1796-1797, 1800 and 1805), when the Austrian armies had been routed and the Hapsburgs deprived of some of their most valuable lands. The industrial middle class, which had gained from the Continental Blockade, was—with the exception of Bohemia—still relatively insignificant in the Austrian monarchy. But the commercial middle class and the entire mass of consumers suffered greatly from the blockade. The war conceived by the Austrian court in 1809 was far more popular than any of the preceding wars waged against Napoleon. “A ray of Spanish sunlight has at last flashed on Central Europe,” declared the Austrians and Germans in perfect harmony...

The whole world held its breath with expectancy. Napoleon and three of his ablest marshals, Davout, Masséna and Lannes, were ready. He waited so that Austria might attack him first—this would give him an extra argument with which to attempt to persuade Alexander to declare war on Austria.

On April 14, 1809, Archduke Charles, Austria’s outstanding general, invaded Bavaria. On leaving for the field of battle, Napoleon said: “Within two months I shall force Austria to disarm, and then, if necessary, I will again make a journey to Spain.”

He counted little, of course, on the 100,000 conscripted Germans who, numerically at least, now comprised a third of his army. He knew how many splendid soldiers had been slain in battle on Spanish soil, and how many more French veterans were losing their lives there even now.

The first important battle took place at Abensberg in Bavaria. The Austrians were repulsed, losing over 13,000 men. But they fought valiantly, far better than at Arcole, or Marengo, or Austerlitz. A second battle—at Eckmühl on April 22—ended in another victory for Napoleon. Archduke Charles retired to the other side of the Danube, with heavy losses. Then Marshal Lannes took Regensburg by assault. In the heat of battle, Napo-
From Tilsit to Wagram

Leon, while directing siege operations, was wounded in the foot. The Emperor's boot was removed and a bandage quickly improvised. Thereupon, he ordered his attendants to replace him on his horse, forbidding anyone to speak of the wound, lest it dishearten the soldiers. On entering Regensburg, he saluted his men, and behind a smile hid the terrific pain he was suffering. The Battles of Eckmühl and Regensburg cost the Austrians some 50,000 men in killed, wounded, prisoners and missing.

Crossing the Danube, Napoleon continued to pursue the retiring Archduke Charles, whom he overtook at Ebersberg on May 3. Here, once more, he defeated him and flung him back. On May 8, Napoleon again, as in 1805, spent the night in the Austrian Emperor's palace at Schönbrunn. On May 13, the burgomaster of Vienna surrendered the key to the Austrian capital to Napoleon. It seemed that the campaign would soon be won. But Charles saved his army. Using the bridges at Vienna, he transferred his men to the northern bank of the Danube, after which he promptly burned the bridges.

Napoleon decided on an extremely difficult manœuvre. Approximately a third of a mile from the Vienna (southern) bank of the Danube, was the beginning of a shoal leading to the island of Lobau. Napoleon was resolved to erect a pontoon bridge to the shoal and transfer his main forces across it. From the island it would be a simple matter to cross the narrow arm of river separating Lobau from the northern bank of the Danube. The army was moved to Lobau on May 17. Then another pontoon bridge was strung across the narrow arm separating the island from the northern bank. Marshal Lannes's corps was the first to cross it; it was followed by Masséna's. The two marshals occupied the neighbouring villages of Aspern and Essling.

It was here that Archduke Charles assaulted the two corps and the French detachments following them. A fiercely fought battle developed. Lannes with his cavalry charged upon the Austrians, who retired in perfect order. Just at this moment, the bridge uniting the Vienna (southern) bank with the island suddenly collapsed, unexpectedly leaving the French army without munitions, with which up to this moment it had been regularly supplied. Napoleon ordered Lannes to retreat at once. As the
French retired, the Austrians counter-attacked, and heavy losses were suffered by both sides. During the engagement, Lannes was struck; both legs were mangled and almost torn from his body. He died in the arms of Napoleon, in whose eyes tears were seen for the second time in his life.

The French army returned to Lobau. Although Napoleon attempted to console himself with the fact that the French had lost only 10,000 men at Aspern (actually 16,000) as against Archduke Charles’s 35,000 (actually 27,000), there could be no hiding the fact that he had suffered a defeat and had been forced to retreat.

The fleeing Austrian court was exultant. It was preparing to return to the capital. Archduke Charles, an earnest and gifted man, did not boast of his victory, and was irritated by all the exaggerations.

In any event, this was no raising of the siege at Acre in 1799, nor was it even Eylau in 1807. This third Napoleonic failure was far more significant. Reports of the Battle of Aspern were spread all over Europe. There were even rumours—the wish being father to the thought—that the Emperor had been surrounded on the island of Lobau and taken prisoner. Nevertheless, these reports and rumours served to inspire the rebels in all the conquered lands, who now fought with renewed courage.

In Germany, Major Friedrich von Schill, with his regiment of Prussian Hussars, had suddenly begun a guerilla war against the French. In the mountains of the Tyrol, the peasant, Andreas Hofer, was leading a similar revolt. In Italy, the situation was uncertain. In Spain, the struggle had flared up with fresh intensity, despite the fact that 300,000 soldiers, the best part of the Grand Army, were stationed there.

However, Napoleon did not lose his courage and calm. Indeed, he seemed more affected by the death of Marshal Lannes than by the loss of the battle. He knew that the Austrian losses previous to the capture of Vienna had exceeded 50,000 men, and that they had lost a tremendous number in the battle of Aspern—far more than the French. Therefore, he calculatingly strengthened his army and prepared. At the same time he carefully read
the reports that reached him daily from all the ends of his empire. Not without curiosity, he learned that Pius VII and his cardinals were preaching that the Battle of Aspern was the Almighty's punishment of mankind's oppressor, the tyrant Bonaparte. Despite all the cares devolving upon him at this time, Napoleon made a note of the Pope's conduct, and he was not to forget it.

Napoleon now went to Vienna, now to Schönbrunn, now returned to the island of Lobau. He encouraged the soldiers, assuring them of approaching victory. The army rested, and received reinforcements. The island was excellently fortified. The Emperor was now fully confident that Archduke Charles, inactive since Aspern, was not really in a position to attack, and that it devolved upon the French to choose their own time for a decisive battle.

Having settled all immediate military matters and having a few days of leisure, Napoleon turned his attention to the Pope. Pius was bitterly to repent his haste in recognising the hand of God in the Battle of Aspern. On May 17, Napoleon issued a decree proclaiming that the city of Rome and all the Papal lands were henceforth the possessions of the French Empire, to which they were annexed.

Immediately after the signing of the decree, the French took possession of Rome, and the Papacy was deprived of all its domains. The Pope was seized and taken under guard to Savona, in southern France.

Having settled with the Pope, Napoleon again gave his attention to the war. On July 2, 3, and 4, he transferred some new army corps and over 550 cannon to Lobau. On July 5, he ordered that the army begin its passage from the island to the northern bank of the Danube. In addition to the regular reinforcements, Napoleon now had with him Macdonald's corps which was no longer needed in Italy.

The battle began on July 5. From the very outset, Archduke Charles was completely bewildered by Napoleon's manoeuvres. The Emperor firmly clung to his principle of never doing what the enemy expected. The French had between 550 and 560 can-
non, the Austrians over 500, and both artillery staffs were well equipped with ammunition.

The passage of troops across the Danube was accomplished with great precision. July 5, and in particular July 6, were precarious days for Napoleon. At all times he was to be found in the centre of battle. After a fearful cannonade, Macdonald’s column, 26 battalions in a phalanx, the side of which measured approximately 110 yards, suffering enormous losses, penetrated the centre of the Austrian army. It was followed by the reserves. Farther to the north, Marshal Davout, at Napoleon’s command, forced his way into the village of Wagram. After that, the entire Austrian army was routed.

By the evening of July 6 the French victory was complete. The Austrians had been flung back. Some of them fled pell-mell, but a portion preserved a semblance of order. The Austrian losses at Wagram were as severe as at Austerlitz. During the second day, 37,000 were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. But Napoleon had paid dearly for his victory. The French losses were also high, although not so great as those of the defeated.

For an entire week the French continued to pursue the broken Austrian army. Napoleon followed in the wake of his cavalry, which overtook separate Austrian detachments along the way. On July 11, he entered the town of Znaim and learned that Prince Lichtenstein, Emperor Francis’s General Adjutant, who had just arrived, desired an audience with him. Francis requested a truce. Napoleon assented, but only on the most severe terms. He insisted that all parts of Austria which had been penetrated by even the smallest detachments of French troops, must be evacuated immediately, and remain as hostages in the hands of the French, until the conclusion of a final peace. Lichtenstein readily agreed.

Negotiations were opened. Emperor Francis anticipated the worst, and now cursed all those who had urged him to begin this terrible struggle. With apprehension the court recalled how Napoleon had punished the Pope even before the Battle of Wagram. What would he do to Austria after Wagram?

Napoleon’s demands proved far more formidable than after
Austerlitz. He claimed new Austrian territories: Carinthia, Craiova, Istria, Trieste and the Trieste region, enormous territorial concessions in the west and northwest, a portion of Galicia, and indemnities amounting to 134,000,000 francs. The Austrians prolonged their bargaining. They implored, they used cunning; but the conqueror was inexorable. However, he reduced the indemnity by 49,000,000 francs in exchange for a few trifling territorial concessions.

Throughout the conferences he lived at Schönbrunn. All of occupied Austria was completely submissive. The hopes which had flared up in Austria and Germany after Aspern were now extinguished. Napoleon inserted a clause in the peace treaty, forbidding Austria to maintain an army of more than 150,000 men. Emperor Francis assented even to this.

On October 12, Napoleon reviewed his Guard before the palace at Schönbrunn. Hordes of people, anxious to have a look at the French Emperor, were on hand. When the review was almost over, a well-dressed young man made his way among the horses of Napoleon's retinue, and, with a petition in his left hand, walked up to the horse upon which the Emperor sat. He was caught as he attempted to draw a long sharp dagger.

At the conclusion of the review Napoleon had the young man brought before him. He proved to be a Naumberg student named Friedrich Staps.

"Why did you want to kill me?" asked the Emperor.

"I consider that while you are alive, Your Majesty, my fatherland and the whole world will never know peace and rest."

"Who put you up to this?"

"No one."

"Are you taught this in your universities?"

"No, Sire."

"You wanted to be Brutus?"

The student did not answer, apparently because, as Napoleon later explained, he did not know who Brutus was.

"And what will you do, if I let you go free now? Will you again try to kill me?"

For a long time Staps did not say anything. Finally, he answered: "I shall, Your Majesty."
Napoleon was silent for awhile; then he walked out of the room in profound reflection.
Staps was shot on the following day.
Within two days of this episode, the Austrian emperor finally agreed to sign the Schönbrunn peace, which deprived him of so many of his possessions and in equal measure increased the power of the dictator of Europe.
Immediately after the conclusion of the Schönbrunn peace, Napoleon left Vienna, and within several days, reentered his capital in triumph.

The French Empire was vaster than ever. The loyal vassals were lavishly rewarded; the impertinence of the recalcitrant ones was severely punished. The Pope stood deprived of his possessions. The Tyrolian revolters were scattered, and the Prussian rebel Major von Schill was shot by a Prussian military tribunal at Napoleon's command. From England came reports of financial ruin, of suicides and bankruptcies among the merchants and manufacturers, of discontent among the people. That meant the Continental Blockade had justified all the hopes the French Emperor had placed in it.

Although his star was in its zenith, Napoleon knew that he had subjugated Europe only by the means of force, and that he now held it only by terror. England showed no signs of yielding. Russia had only pretended to help in the war against Austria. The Spaniards, who were being destroyed as if they were wild beasts, still continued to struggle with untamable savagery.

Napoleon was surrounded by devoted marshals such as Junot, by ambitious career-seekers on the order of Bernadotte, by subtle aristocratic traitors like Talleyrand, by simple-minded executers such as Savary, who were ready on the first sign from the Emperor to shoot their own fathers. Again, there were men around him like Davout, who, without giving the matter a second thought, were capable of burning down Paris, if that seemed necessary in the interests of the service. He was dogged also by
his vain, giftless, cantankerous brothers and sisters. He had made kings and queens of them, yet they did not cease to complain and quarrel, causing Napoleon only trouble and vexation. There was not a single person with whom he could really talk. Never did he have such an intimate in his life, nor would his nature permit him to have one.

That there were still more wars before him Napoleon knew. Nor did anyone in France doubt that it was within the realms of possibility that the bullet which would kill the Emperor was in all likelihood already cast. With his characteristic penetration, Napoleon shrewdly differentiated between the services he had rendered France, first as French sovereign and, second as Emperor of the West, King of Italy and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. The former he considered durable, the latter he knew might be maintained only while he was alive. He needed a dynasty, an heir, and there was none forthcoming from his marriage with Josephine. It followed that a new wife was essential.

Now that the Regensburg bullet wound and Staps's dagger persistently reminded him of the frail thread on which the whole Napoleonic creation was sustained, the question of a dynasty became particularly acute.

If there was one woman whom Napoleon loved passionately, it was Josephine during the first years of his marriage. He never felt as deep an affection for anyone else, not even the Countess Walewska. But this had been long ago, in 1796 and 1797, when from his Italian camps he wrote ardent letters, breathing with passion, to her. He did not divorce her when he first learned that she had enjoyed other lovers in his absence, but he lost his former tenderness for her. As the years went by, Josephine began to lead an exemplary life. As empress her kindness endeared her to the French nation. She stood in great fear of her husband, but had become really attached to him. He forbade her to intervene for anyone, and, in refusing one of her petitioners, rarely forgot to add: "It is clear that he is a worthless wretch, or the Empress would not have taken an interest in him." He loathed even this mild form of women's meddling in state affairs.

That Josephine was empty-headed and incapable of thinking of anything but dresses, balls and diversions, did not annoy him. It
was said in contemporary circles that Napoleon persecuted Madame de Staël less for her liberal mode of thought and contrary spirit than for her intelligence and erudition. Such qualities he could not abide in women. From this standpoint, Josephine could not have vexed him. There can be little question that biographers are correct in affirming that Napoleon came to the decision to divorce Josephine with no light heart. But, as always, having once arrived at decision, he acted upon it deliberately, speedily and expeditiously.

A solemn council of dignitaries was convoked. After debating the matter, they resolved to petition the Emperor, for the welfare of France, to take himself a new wife. The majority of the council undoubtedly felt a real sympathy for Napoleon's intention. On the one hand, their material well-being was linked with the Empire. Consequently, they desired the continuation of the Empire of the Bonapartes, and were strongly opposed to the restoration of the monarchy of the Bourbons. Only in the birth of a direct heir to the imperial throne did they see any prospect of stabilising the "new France." On the other hand, all of them, even the traitor Talleyrand up to the time of his disgrace, had always hoped that Napoleon would intimately associate himself, dynastically as well as politically, with one of the great powers of Europe: Austria or Russia. This would serve to give a respite from the endless wars and perpetually arising dangers. There were some, with Fouche at their head, who wanted the Emperor to marry the Russian Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna, Tsar Alexander's sister. Others favoured the daughter of Emperor Francis of Austria, the Archduchess Marie Louise. Promptly, as soon as the divorce was formally resolved upon, Napoleon himself assumed the responsibility of finding a suitable bride.

An inspection of available prospective brides was, indeed, a simple matter, requiring no long quests. Except for the French Empire, there were but three great powers in Europe: England, Russia and Austria. As for England, France's war with her was a struggle to the death. There remained Russia and Austria. Russia, without a doubt, was stronger than Austria, whom Napoleon had only recently routed. That indicated that the search must begin in Russia, which harboured two Grand Duchesses,
sisters of Alexander. Which one he should choose was of secondary importance: after all, it was all the same to him, as he had not seen either of them. With startling speed, Catherine Pavlovna was married off to George of Oldenburg. The French ambassador in St. Petersburg was unofficially instructed to ask the Tsar for his remaining sister, Anna. In her case, Alexander ran up against the firm opposition of his mother, Maria Feodorovna and all of his closest intimates. Except for Rumyantzev and Speransky, there was not a single member of the court who advocated a further alliance with Napoleon.

During December, 1809, and January, 1810, great anxiety prevailed in the Russian court. At St. Petersburg, Alexander I did not cease, in the most flattering terms, to assure the French ambassador, Caulaincourt, that nothing would please him better personally than to see his sister married to Napoleon, but that in the opinion of the Queen Dowager, Maria Feodorovna, Anna was by far too young, being only sixteen. And at Pavlovsk, Maria Feodorovna was desperately resisting the marriage, and a significant part of the court sustained her. The more strictly Napoleon enforced the Continental Blockade, the more intense became the hatred felt for him by the entire nobility and, in particular, the large landowning aristocracy.

In January, 1810, Napoleon called a solemn conclave to discuss the divorce and a new marriage. Some of the dignitaries, led by the Arch Chancellor of the Empire Cambacérès, the King of Naples Murat, and the Minister of the Police Fouché, favoured Grand Duchess Anna Pavlova; others were equally interested in a marriage with Archduchess Marie Louise, daughter of Francis I of Austria. Apparently irritated by the evasiveness of the Russian court, Napoleon himself candidly gave them to understand that he was inclined in favour of the Austrian bride. The conference was not productive of any definite decision.

After nine days the news arrived from St. Petersburg that the mother of the Grand Duchess wished to delay the marriage between her daughter and Napoleon, because of Anna Pavlova’s youth. That same day Metternich, the Austrian ambassador in Paris, was asked whether the Austrian emperor was willing to give his daughter Maria Louise in marriage to Napoleon. Imme-
diately, without reflection—everything had been considered while the Russian match-making was still in progress—Metternich announced that Austria had assented to give him the young Archduchess. Promptly, on the evening of February 6, a new conclave was called in the Tuileries. It unanimously voted in favour of the marriage.

On the following day, the marriage agreement was drawn up. There was little need to spend much time in drafting the text of the document. Those entrusted with the task simply resorted to the archives, among which they discovered the agreement made by Napoleon’s predecessor, Louis XVI, at the time of his marriage to that other Austrian Archduchess, Marie Antoinette, who, as it happened, had been an aunt of the new bride, Marie Louise.

Emperor Francis of Austria lost no time in ratifying the marriage agreement, and news of it had already reached Paris by February 21. On the following day, Marshal Berthier, chief of the General Staff, was despatched to Vienna to represent Napoleon in the marriage by proxy with Marie Louise.

In Vienna the news of Napoleon’s sudden decision was received with joy. After the terrible losses of 1809, the marriage represented something in the nature of salvation. At the height of the preliminary celebrations, Napoleon ordered the shooting of the Tyrolian insurgent leader, Andreas Hofer, who had finally been taken prisoner. Before the salvo was fired—he was executed at Mantua—he cried out: “Long live my good Emperor Francis!” But “good Emperor Francis,” for whose sake Hofer had sacrificed his life, forbade the mention of the name of the Tyrolian peasant who, by his excessive devotion and misplaced patriotism, might have provoked Napoleon’s displeasure at the expense of all Austria.

On March 11, 1810, the 18-year-old Archduchess Marie Louise became the wife of Emperor Napoleon. The ceremony was solemnly performed in St. Stephen’s Cathedral, Vienna, in the presence of masses of people, the entire royal family and court, and all of the diplomats, dignitaries and generals of Austria. The bride had never seen the groom; nor did she see him on her wedding day. He apparently considered it unnecessary
to trouble himself to travel to Vienna. But in Vienna the court and the people were reconciled even to this. Marshal Berthier was a dignified proxy during the services. Then, with fitting honours, the new French Empress was despatched to Paris, together with her retinue. During her journey through the vassal lands, she was everywhere received as the wife of the ruler of Europe. Napoleon met her near Paris, on the road to Compiegne. Here, for the first time, husband and wife saw each other.

The marriage created a tremendous stir in Europe, and was variously interpreted. "Now the wars have come to an end. Europe has secured a balance. A happy era is beginning," said the merchants of the Hanseatic cities, confident that in having conclusively lost Austria's support on the Continent, England would be forced to make peace.

"Within a few years, he will fight with either of the two countries which does not promptly grant him a bride," said the French diplomats shortly after the first conclave on the question of Napoleon's divorce and marriage.

In view of the generally unstable condition of Europe, every consolidation of Napoleon's alliance with Russia menaced the very existence of the Austrian monarchy, and every new accord between Napoleon and Austria unbound his hands with respect to Russia. Certain Austrian aristocrats, on the order of old Prince Metternich, father of the Austrian ambassador in Paris, wept tears of joy when they heard of the coming marriage; his son, the already celebrated Clement Metternich, did not conceal his pleasure. "Austria is saved!" was the refrain in the imperial palace at Schönbrunn.

In St. Petersburg there was an atmosphere of confusion and alarm. Maria Feodorovna was in raptures because the daughter of the Austrian emperor, rather than her own Anna Pavlovna, had been flung as a sacrifice to the "monster Minotaur." But Alexander I, Rumyantzev, Kurakin and even the most violent foes of the French alliance, were deeply perturbed. It seemed to them that Austria was definitely becoming the favourite of Napoleonic policy, and that Russia had become a solitary figure on the European continent, face to face with the omnipotent soldier of revolution, the son-in-law of the Austrian emperor.
Immediately after his marriage, Napoleon turned his attention to the economic problems of the Empire.

Napoleon's economic policy was definitely bound up with his general policy. Having become transformed, as the result of predatory wars, from the Emperor of the French into the Emperor of the West, he aspired to broaden his domination to Egypt, Syria and India. As "new departments" were added to his realm, he sacrificed them to the economic interests of the "old departments;" in other words, to that France which he had found on the Eighteenth Brumaire when he became dictator. What, then, was the difference between the "old" and the "new" departments of the Empire? The difference was enormous. The "old departments" were consciously and systematically established by Napoleon in the position of exploiting forces, and the "new" in the position of the exploited. And to accomplish this, it was necessary violently to restrain the economic development of the conquered lands.

From the first year of his rule, Napoleon had at hand a complete set of economic rules, to which he adhered, without the slightest deviation, until the end of his reign. To his mind, there were, on the one hand, economic interests which were "national"—and, on the other, the interests of the rest of humanity. These latter interests were not merely subjected, but actually sacrificed, to the "national" interests. The "national" frontiers were the geographic boundaries of "old France:" Belgium on the north, Germany on the east, the Pyrenees on the south, and the English Channel and the Atlantic Ocean on the west. The more Napoleon aspired to broaden the frontiers of his administrative power, the more did he seek to constrict the definition of "national" interests. And this is quite understandable. Both aspirations were designed to benefit the French industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, whose support was indispensable to the Emperor. Consequently, their interests—the "national" interests—became the keystone of his pillaging policy in the conquered lands.

Thus, Belgium and Germany, securely conquered and divided into departments, were nevertheless "non-national" because they were the competitors of the French bourgeoisie. Therefore, every effort was made to ruin them economically and to open
their lands for exploitation by French capital. The same thing was true of Piedmont, Holland, the Hanseatic cities, and the Illyrian provinces. Napoleon considered the entire conquered Empire his own possession from the standpoint of demanding recruits, imposing taxes, and forcing the local inhabitants to pay for the maintenance of the armies of occupation. As a possible competitor of French industry, he regarded it as an alien possession.

Similar policies obtained in those areas which preserved the fiction of maintaining a separate existence from France: Italy, of which Napoleon was King; Switzerland, of which he was Mediator; the Confederation of the Rhine, of which he was Protector; the Kingdom of Westphalia, upon whose throne he had seated his brother Jerome; Poland, where his vassal, the King of Saxony, ruled. All these countries served as markets for French goods, or as a source of raw materials for French industry.

Napoleon personally superintended the enforcement of his policy. He did not permit Solingen knives into France, Holland and Italy; he forbade the import of Saxon cloth into Westphalia; he imposed prohibitive tariffs on the export of raw silk materials from Italy and Spain, since these materials were needed by the Lyons manufacturers; he levied special taxes upon goods sent from Illyria through vassal countries not directly subject to him.

This policy enriched the French bourgeoisie and fortified Napoleon's domination in France. On the other hand, it irritated, ruined and oppressed the industrial and commercial classes, as well as the large consuming masses, in all the regions of the Empire except the "old departments." During the entire period of his conquests, Napoleon remained the narrowly-national sovereign of the French. For the sake of the class interests of the French industrial bourgeoisie, he broadened the boundaries of his immense structure of world monarchy.

In view of the enforced suppression of the productive powers of the conquered lands, one must conclude that the gigantic Napoleonic empire inevitably would have crumbled, even if there had been no Spanish national revolt, no Moscow fire, no betrayal by Marmont near Paris, no tardiness on the part of Grouchy at Waterloo.
By 1811, the Continental Blockade had changed radically from the form in which it was created in 1806. Furthermore, the Napoleon of 1811 was a vastly different man from the Napoleon of 1806. During the second half of 1809, after Wagram and the Schönbrunn peace, two convictions seized upon Napoleon, convictions which first began to form after Austerlitz, crystalised more completely after Jena and the occupation of Berlin, and dictated his behaviour after Friedland and Tilsit. The first conviction was that England could be brought “to her knees” as a result of the economic havoc wrought upon her exclusively by the Continental Blockade. The second conviction found expression in the words: “I can do everything,” and it was logically supplemented by the thought: “And, consequently, I can establish the Continental Blockade, even if in doing so I am forced to transform the entire European continent into a French Empire.” A conqueror did as he desired. In the fifth century, Attila, desiring a wife, had stolen one from among the daughters of the petty princelings of the semi-barbarous German tribes. On Napoleon’s first demand, the Emperor of Austria had sent him his daughter, a princess of one of the most ancient dynasties of Europe. And even then this was counted a great blessing for the shattered Hapsburg monarchy.

In view of the slavish submission of the Continent, it appeared that the time was ripe to settle, once and for all, with the remaining enemy, England. There seemed no necessity for remembering other enemies. “The wretched canaille,” is the phrase with which Napoleon referred to the Spaniards. Apparently, he did care to consider them in the reckoning; he did not wish to concede to them the honour of being an enemy. Having badly beaten them again during 1809-1810, he pretended that he was not fighting them, but simply ordering that they be caught and shot. However, he did not find that he could nurse this illusion for long. The guerilla warfare went on, without abatement. But even here the Emperor could attribute the original cause of his difficulties to the English, who not only sent arms to the rebels, but themselves came over in whole detachments.

England—and England alone—barred his path. The mortal duel between Napoleon and England could end only in the des-
struction of one or of the other. In vain did Napoleon try to transform the duel into a struggle of the entire European continent against England. With increasing painfulness, the blockade lashed England with one end, and the Continent with the other. Napoleon was aware of this, and it was precisely this that now drove him to unconcealed fury.

During these years, his rage was first of all directed against all secret violators of the Continental Blockade. Upon the whole Continent there was no one who willingly obeyed the decree, excepting the insurgent government organised at the southernmost point of the Spanish Peninsula. Summary justice was dealt out to all violators. The smugglers were promptly shot, the confiscated English goods were burned, the monarchs who connived in permitting contraband were driven from their thrones.

In 1806, Napoleon had placed his brother Louis on the throne of Holland. The new king realised that a complete cessation of commercial relations with England was a threat to the welfare of bourgeois Holland. It menaced her agrarian economy, and it would wholly destroy her sea commerce. Since the English had deprived her of her colonies, Holland was in a significant measure dependent on the sale of her liquors, cheeses and fine linens to England, and on the import from England of colonial goods. All this forced Louis Bonaparte to wink at the smuggling trade on the Dutch coast.

After several severe reprimands had proved ineffective, Napoleon dethroned his brother, proclaiming the Dutch Kingdom abolished. By a special decree, he annexed Holland to the French Empire in 1810, dividing her into departments and placing prefects over them.

It was reported to him that the Hanseatic cities—Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck—were not strictly enforcing the laws against contraband, and that Bourrienne, his representative in Hamburg, accepted bribes for permitting violations of the laws. Promptly Napoleon removed Bourrienne and made the Hanseatic cities a part of the French Empire.

He banished the petty German rulers who had possessions on the seacoast, not because they were guilty of anything in particular, but because he trusted only himself. He banished the neutral
Duke of Oldenburg and added Oldenburg to his dominions, although this episode provoked the great displeasure of Tsar Alexander, one of the duke's kinsmen.

The difficulties of the undertaking assailed Napoleon from all sides. It soon became evident that it was next to impossible to find several tens of thousands of honest and zealous customs officials to enforce the blockade on the tremendous European coastline.

Coffee, cocoa, sugar, pepper, spices, cost five, eight, twelve times as much as before the blockade—these articles were available, though not in as great quantities as formerly. For indigo dyes and raw cotton, without which manufacturing must come to a standstill, prices five and ten times in excess of the pre-blockade prices were paid by the French, Saxon, Belgian, Bohemian and Rhenish cotton-mill owners and calico-print manufacturers. Where did this enormous artificial profit go? Primarily—into the pockets of the English shipowners and smugglers. Secondly—into the pockets of Napoleon's customs officials and gendarmes. When it was proposed to a patrol sentry or to a customs official that by enjoying a good night's sleep he could earn a sum equivalent to his salary for five years; or when it was suggested to a gendarme that if he would take a three hours' stroll a little farther from a certain coastal spot, he would receive in return 500 francs' worth of fine cloth and another 500 francs' worth of granulated sugar, the temptation proved too great.

Napoleon knew this, and realised that he would find it far more difficult to conquer on this front than at Austerlitz, Jena or Wagram. He appointed inspectors and controllers, both permanent and roving, but they too were bribed. He removed men from office and delivered them to tribunals, but their successors, instead of altering the ways of their predecessors, merely tried to be a little more cautious.

Then the Emperor attempted a new measure. He ordered an extensive search to be made, not only in the coastal towns and villages but also in the remote centres of Europe—in the shops, warehouses and offices. All goods "of English origin" were confiscated; moreover, it was incumbent upon the owners of these goods to prove their non-English origin if that was their conten-
tion. Facing ruin, the owners of the more suspicious colonial products sought to prove that these goods were of American, rather than English, origin. Americans were carrying on a profitable business by feeding the markets English goods brought over on American ships and under the protection of the American flag.

Then Napoleon instituted the Trianon prohibitory tariff of 1810, making any legal trade in colonial products impossible, whatever their place of origin. From end to end, Europe flamed with bonfires. Trusting no one—neither his customs officials, nor his police and gendarmes, nor his governmental authorities—Napoleon commanded that all confiscated goods be publicly burned.

In morose silence, crowds of people gazed at the mountainous heaps of calicoes, fine cloths, cashmere materials, sugar, coffee, cocoa, tea, cotton, cotton yarn, indigo, pepper and cinnamon, which were set afire. "Caesar is out of his mind," editorialised the contemporary English newspapers. Napoleon had decided that only the physical destruction of these imported stores could make contraband a really losing venture. His aim was to extend the risk beyond those who actually smuggled the illegal wares to include the rich merchants of Leipzig, Hamburg, Strassburg, Paris, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Genoa, Munich, Warsaw, Milan, Trieste and Venice, who, in the tranquil comfort of their offices, purchased these contraband goods at third or fourth hand.

That part of the bourgeoisie of the French Empire and the vassal lands which was engaged in industrial production continued, generally speaking, to approve of the Continental Blockade and to encourage all measures taken against the secret importation of English goods. The metallurgists, in particular, were content. But among the textile manufacturers a note of complaint was beginning to mingle with the praise. After all, there was no way of producing calicoes without cotton. And there was no way of dyeing the materials without indigo.

Things were still worse among the bourgeois luxury-goods manufacturers and dealers. Their complaints were more audible, for they remembered how, during the brief period of the Amiens peace (1802-1803), thousands of rich Englishmen had poured into the country and purchased quantities of trinkets, velvets and
At the Height of Power

silks. There were complaints against the endless wars which had ruined the former European clientele. The large consuming masses were even more disgruntled at the exorbitant prices of coffee, sugar, and even manufactured goods, which had risen in cost owing to the elimination of English competition from the French markets.

Such was the state of affairs in the Empire when the economic crisis of 1811 occurred.

As early as the late autumn of 1810, the markets for French goods had been perceptibly curtailed. Conditions grew rapidly worse, spreading all over the Empire, especially in the "old departments."

The manufacturers and merchants tactfully hinted that the blockade hit not only the Englishmen's pockets but was also beginning to hit theirs. They complained that they were without raw materials, and that, having plundered the conquered peoples of all their wealth, Napoleon had deprived the consumers of their purchasing power. Furthermore, they asserted that the arbitrary confiscation of goods and the debauch of illegality and self-assumed power on the part of the military and customs authorities had destroyed the possibility of normal credit, without which neither industry nor commerce could survive.

The situation grew more desperate with every month. For example, the Richard-Lenoir cotton-spinning factories, which before the crisis had maintained a personnel of over 12,000 men, could not have provided employment for even a fifth of that number in 1811, if Napoleon had not commanded that the company be granted an additional subsidy of 1,500,000 gold francs. Nevertheless, bankruptcy followed bankruptcy with startling regularity. In March, 1811, Napoleon arranged for a subsidy of 1,000,000 francs to be given to the manufacturers of Amiens, and spent 2,000,000 francs in a single transaction to buy goods in Rouen, St. Quentin and Ghent. Tremendous subsidies were granted to Lyons. But all this was as a single drop in the bucket.

The Minister of Internal Affairs reported to Napoleon on April 19, 1811: "The majority of craftsmen are complaining that they have no work. It is reported that an immense number
of workers are continuing to emigrate." Employment in Rouen was in such deplorable a state that Napoleon was forced to contribute 15,000,000 francs to support the perishing manufacturers.

The authorities grew bolder. The manager of the Bank of France candidly informed the Emperor on May 7, 1811, that the subjugated lands were in too impoverished a condition, and that French goods had found a better foreign market before the time of the conquests. He further reported that Parisian workers engaged in the manufacture of luxury goods were starving, because the consumption of such commodities both at home and abroad had sharply decreased. Napoleon granted subsidies, but did nothing to moderate the rigours of the blockade. As before, English goods—and this included all colonial goods—were confiscated and burned. The summer market fair at Beaucaire was raided by the police, who confiscated "an entire street" containing quantities of sugar, spices, indigo, and other merchandise.

Besides granting loans and subsidies of millions to manufacturers, Napoleon made immense purchases at the expense of the national treasury. He bought woolen materials for the army. He aided the Lyons manufacturers by ordering silks and velvets for his court, and by commanding all the European courts subject to him to make purchases there. As a result, 2,370 more looms were engaged in silk manufacture in Lyons in November, 1811, than in June of the same year. The winter was a hard one. Besides the subsidies made to industry, it was necessary during the winter months of 1811-1812 to come to the material assistance of the hungering working masses; but even these contributions could not materially alter their position. There was great unrest in the workers' quarters of Paris, as well as in other industrial centres.

In the winter of 1813-1814 this ferment was to manifest itself in outspoken discontent among the workers of Bordeaux, Paris, Toulon and Brest. But even in 1811 the position of the working population could not have been as comfortable as some contemporaries have attempted to paint it. The government's political spies could not hear everything that was being said; the provocateurs rarely succeeded in having confidential talks in the workers' quarters. So that, early in 1812, when the crisis showed signs of
At the Height of Power

abating, Napoleon concluded that the basic foundations of the Empire were unshakeable.

If the economic crisis of 1811 contained a lesson, Napoleon made haste to take advantage of it in a most definite fashion. He realised that as long as the Continental Blockade did not break England, as long as the seas were not open to the French, as long the war dragged on, the position of French commerce and industry would always remain uncertain. This indicated that the blockade must be rendered air-tight, and if this meant that he must take Moscow, then, of course, he would take Moscow.

Napoleon remembered that the Lyons silk manufacturers had partly explained the market crisis by the "sudden" stoppage of orders from Russia. This had been provoked by the new Russian customs tariff, signed by Alexander in November, 1810, subjecting all luxury goods—such as silk, velvet, costly wines, and all other merchandise which France usually exported to Russia—to an excessive tax.

Napoleon charged this against Alexander's account, which had been steadily accumulating since the Erfurt affair. In the course of the year 1811 the feeling had been growing in Napoleon that this account would have to be settled, and that it could be settled only in Moscow.

Immediately before the panic of 1811, the rate of exchange had been good; there had been plenty of gold in the treasury; the system of merciless financial and economic exploitation of all the conquered parts of the Empire, as well as of the vassal lands, had justified itself for several consecutive years.

And then, suddenly, an ominous crack had appeared in the immense structure. During the ordeal of 1811 Napoleon learned how infinitely more difficult it was to contend with a general economic crisis than with temporary financial difficulties, how much easier it was to liquidate treasury irregularities than to find and, above all, to destroy defects in the entire economic system of a vast state. Nothing could avail here: neither indemnities nor threats against financial swindlers, neither a model system of accounting nor severity of control; the perfect bureaucratic machine created by Napoleon was wholly useless in such a crisis.
The depression of 1811 was, above all, though by no means exclusively, a depression brought on by an absence of markets for articles which had enriched France in the past. Who was there to buy the famous jewelled wares made by the best Parisian craftsmen? Who could afford the expensive furniture, whose manufacture engaged nearly three quarters of the working population of the Saint-Antoine district? Or the expensive products of the leatherware industry, which nourished the Saint-Marcel quarter and the immense Mouffetard quarter? Or the fine women's and men's costumes, whose manufacture and sale employed countless tailor-craftsmen of the French capital? What could be done to maintain the prices of Lyons silks and velvets, of Sedan textiles, of Lille, Amiens and Roubaix linens, of Valenciennes laces?

All these luxury articles were manufactured not only for the domestic market, but for the entire world—and now that world was considerably diminished for the consumption of French goods. England was out of it; so was America; so were the rich planters of the Antilles, and of the Mascarene Islands. Generally speaking, the wealthy consumers of all lands separate from the European continent no longer offered a market, for the simple reason that the seas were in the sole possession of the English. But even the European markets fell off appreciably. Napoleon's conquests had ruined the subjugated lands. His victories, even where they were not direct, imposed upon the defeated the Continental Blockade, which reduced the rate of exchange of their money. From the moment that the Russian landowners were prohibited from selling their agricultural raw materials to England they no longer had English gold to pay for Parisian goods: after Tilsit, the value of the Russian ruble fell off 84 percent. The same thing happened in the case of the Poles, the Austrians and the Italian aristocracy. The feudal landowners of Germany suffered in like measure, not only in consequence of their submission to the Continental Blockade, but also because of Napoleon's revocation of the right to own serfs.

This impoverishment of the property-owning classes of semi-feudal Europe was sharply reflected in all the markets of French luxury goods and wines. The crisis of 1811 was felt not only in
the French manufacturing cities, but also in the wine-producing districts of Bordeaux, Rheims and Burgundy.

Napoleon hoped to mobilise the entire consuming power of the domestic market, in order to compensate for the loss of the foreign market. Yet how could this be done, when it was the luxury products that were most affected? It was possible to force Italy to buy the cheap woolen products of France. It was also possible to compel the Illyrian provinces to purchase cheap French calicoes. But it was impossible, in the absence of money, to force them to buy Lyons silks and velvets, fine Sedan cloths, beautiful ebony furniture, champagne and the more expensive cognacs, gold watches, jewelry and ball gowns.

It was, indeed, owing to something more than the critical position of the feudal classes of Europe. The newly developed bourgeoisie was becoming a force in all the lands conquered by Napoleon or dependent on him. Nothing could be done to crush the industrial development of the whole of western and a part of central Germany, of Bohemia (as the Czech part of Austria was then known), of Belgium, of portions of Silesia. The competition they offered, even if there were no traffic in English contraband, forced out even such French goods as did not come under the category of luxury products. On the other hand, there were not enough lavish and extravagant European merchants to replace the feudal landowners as buyers of French luxury goods and wines. But for woollens, coarser linens, metallurgical products and other everyday commodities, there still remained, in greater or lesser measure, the domestic market of the "old departments." Here Napoleon had excluded the competition of his other nationals, such as the Belgians, the Germans and the Italians.

Nevertheless, there was one extensive branch of industry which had long been under the especial protection of the Emperor, and which suffered not so much from the loss of markets as from the terrific rise in the price of raw materials. This was the cotton industry. Napoleon had banished all colonial goods from France and the Continent, and cotton was now worth almost its weight in gold. As a result, the manufacturers suffered for want of raw cotton, and were forced, wherever possible, to resort to contra-
band which, in spite of every effort, continued to be landed on the European coast.

This serious crisis, due in such a large part to the lack of raw materials, forced the manufacturers to reduce production. Faced by this calamity, faced by the menace of increasing unemployment and hunger in the workers’ quarters in Paris, Lyons and Rouen, faced by the ruin of the wine-producing southern departments, Napoleon made certain concessions which deviated from the regulations of the blockade. He issued a limited number of licenses, permitting the importation of “forbidden goods,” on the condition that French goods of equal value be disposed of abroad. These licenses, notwithstanding that they were most expensive proved exceedingly profitable to the purchasers.

Only extreme anxiety over the crisis of 1811 could have induced Napoleon to make this concession. Although these licenses could not bring any particularly great material advantage to the English, they were nevertheless a decided retreat from principle. As a weapon in the struggle against the depression, the licenses were of only limited value in improving the market.

In this respect, even less purpose was served by Napoleon’s demands that his courtiers dress as sumptuously as possible. Immediately, the members of court and the dignitaries began to fling their money about with real zest. They bought new clothes and jewelry. They held lavish banquets, at which champagne and costly wines ran in streams. They replaced their old furniture with new and more exquisite examples of the French craftsmen’s art. They began to adorn themselves and their servants with precious laces. They took their outings in new and sumptuous carriages.

In 1811, Napoleon himself placed a series of large orders with Paris and Lyons manufacturers for decorations for official buildings and palaces—to be sure, at the expense of the treasury. But even these purchases could not provide a sufficiently large market for luxury products.

Early in 1812 the crisis slowly began to abate. The workers in the capital and provinces never came to the point of actual revolt, although there were indications of irritation, impatience, apathy, and sometimes despair. Napoleon often said that the
only revolution that could be really dangerous was a revolution motivated by an empty stomach.

He realised of course, that not a single cause of the 1811 crisis had been removed; that the crisis in a concealed smouldering form would continue. He also knew that the economic situation of the Empire could not radically improve during the continuation of the war with England and the Continental Blockade associated with it. In order to abolish the blockade, it was first of all necessary to force England to lay down her arms. Now, more than ever before, he looked upon a speedy victory over England as the most effective means of consolidating his Empire both internally and externally. He was definitely convinced that England had already made an enormous breach in the blockade. Alexander was obviously playing a cunning game with him and deceiving him. English goods were being admitted into Russia and from there distributed along the entire western frontier, across Prussia, Poland, Austria—trickling through all the pores and crevices into Europe. All this would eventually destroy the effectiveness of the blockade, which would mean an end to his hope of "forcing England to her knees."

As early as 1810, Napoleon began to read books containing information about Russia, her history and her peculiarities.

To judge from the fragmentary utterances of the Emperor, rather scantily reported by those surrounding him, Napoleon was becoming convinced that his stubborn, elusive, pressing enemy, England, whom he had not succeeded in conquering in Cairo, Milan, or Madrid, could be crushed only in Moscow. This thought obsessed him and grew stronger with every month.

He must invade Moscow with the Grand Army—only that could bring about Alexander's submission, only that could mean the complete realisation of the Continental Blockade. A victory over England would end all wars, end all crises, end all unemployment. And England was invulnerable, save through Russia. The crisis of 1811 finally directed the Emperor's thoughts into this channel.

The phantom of a new, vast, armed struggle appeared on the horizon.
From Erfurt, Alexander returned to St. Petersburg with the intention of maintaining the Franco-Russian alliance. He had no desire to forfeit his rôle as Napoleon’s favorite—at any rate, not in the near future. However, in the four years that elapsed between 1808 and 1812, a complex struggle of hostile social forces and currents occurred in Russia.

It was obvious that certain reforms in the administration of the Russian Empire were essential. Of jolts contributing to the consciousness of this necessity there were enough: Austerlitz, Friedland, Tilsit. On the other hand, the terrible defeats suffered in the two great wars against Napoleon ended in a comparatively profitable alliance with the world conqueror, and soon thereafter in the acquisition of the immense territory of Finland. As a result, the Tsar did not discern any reason for fundamental reforms, even for such as had been instituted in Prussia after the Jena rout.

At this point the appearance on the scene of Speransky was extraordinarily opportune. A shrewd, adroit, cautious rank-and-file civilian, he returned from Erfurt with Alexander’s retinue and went into raptures over Napoleon. Speransky did not even remotely suggest altering the right to the ownership of serfs. Nor did he hold a brief against the Orthodox Church. On the contrary, he paid it compliments on every possible occasion. As for some limitation of autocracy, far from having any designs on it, he saw in Tsarist absolutism the main lever for effecting his conceived reforms.

These reforms were designed, so to speak, to transform the lymphatic semi-Oriental Romanov monarchy into a contemporary
European state, with a properly functioning bureaucracy, with a strong juridical system, with an organised control over finances, with an administration of trained and efficient officials, with a conversion of governors from satraps into prefects. In short, he desired to plant in Russian soil the contemporary Bonapartism, which, in his opinion, had made France the leading country in the world. This programme was not at all in conflict with Alexander’s aspirations; for several years the Tsar supported his favorite, whom he appointed secretary of state.

However, both Alexander and Speransky counted without their host. The well-born aristocracy and the middle nobility which it controlled, sensed a foe in Speransky, no matter how cleverly he sought to conceal himself under a mask of moderation and good intentions. Instinctively, they felt that Speransky aimed to transform the feudal-absolutist state into a bourgeois-absolutist state; that he hoped to create a governmental structure incompatible with the existing feudal order and with the political and social supremacy of the nobility.

In unanimous phalanx they resisted Speransky. To them Speransky’s reforms became associated with adherence to the Franco-Russian alliance, to friendship with the military dictator of Europe, to support of the French conqueror who was destroying the Russian nobility with the Continental Blockade. Had not Speransky introduced examinations for officials? Did he not desire to eject the aristocracy from the governmental machine, in order to hand it over to the rank and file, to the priestlings and to the merchants? Such was the firm line of the court nobility’s opposition in St. Petersburg and Moscow between 1808 and 1812. This opposition was directed with equal intensity against both the domestic and foreign policies of the Tsar and his secretary of state.

It was, indeed, this antagonism that deprived the alliance of any possible stability. In Russian aristocratic circles the conquest of Finland at the expense of Sweden was not generally approved, because it was made at the behest of Napoleon; nor had the nobility the slightest desire to acquire Galicia if it meant that in return Russia must assist the loathed Bonaparte against Austria in 1809. They were cool toward Caulaincourt, the French ambassador to
St. Petersburg, and the more cordial the Tsar’s treatment of him became the more demonstratively did the nobility of "new" St. Petersburg and, more particularly, of "old" Moscow reveal their hostility.

Toward the end of the year 1810, however, Alexander ceased to resist the anti-French attitude of his court. In the first place, Napoleon’s Tilsit speeches promising him Turkey and the East proved to be mere words. In the second place, the French Emperor had not removed his troops from Prussia. But, above all, Alexander felt that Napoleon was playing some sort of game with Poland. The resurrection of Poland imperilled the Russian frontiers and threatened the loss of Lithuania. Again, there were Napoleon’s protests against the Tsar’s lax enforcement of the Continental Blockade; these protests took on extremely humiliating forms. Moreover, the arbitrary annexation of entire kingdoms with a single flourish of the pen disquieted and annoyed Alexander.

Napoleon’s immeasurable might, in itself, hung as an eternal menace over his vassals. And after Tilsit, Alexander knew that he was looked upon as a mere vassal of the French conqueror. Jibes were directed at Alexander on the score of the petty gifts which Napoleon had “presented” to him—Prussian Bialystok in 1807, an Austrian district on the eastern (Galician) frontier in 1809. It was said that Napoleon was treating Alexander as the former Russian Tsars had treated their faithful bondsmen at court, repaying them for their services with so many “souls”.

When the proposed marriage between Napoleon and Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna fell through, all Europe spoke of the approaching rift between the two monarchs. Napoleon’s marriage to the daughter of the Austrian emperor was interpreted as an exchange of a Franco-Russian alliance for a Franco-Austrian alliance.

Napoleon began to concern himself with the question of the Russian war, and even to indulge in loud reflections concerning it, as early as January, 1811, when he learned of the new Russian customs tariff, ratified on December 31, 1810. This tariff considerably increased the duties on Russian imports of wines, silk
and velvet textiles and other luxury items. These, as it happened, were France's chief exports to Russia. Napoleon protested. In reply, the St. Petersburg government claimed that the lamentable condition of Russian finances had necessitated the measure. The tariff remained. France lodged a complaint that Russia permitted the entry of colonial goods, pretending that they came from neutral countries (actually English ships were coming in more frequently). Napoleon knew that English merchandise landed in Russia was being sold in Germany, Austria and Poland. In consequence, the blockade against Great Britain was rendered futile.

Alexander also considered war inevitable. He sought allies, negotiating with Bernadotte, formerly a marshal of France, who was now a prince and heir-apparent to the Swedish throne—and an enemy of Napoleon.

On August 15, 1811, at a solemn reception of the diplomatic corps, which met to congratulate Napoleon on his birthday, the Emperor, pausing near the Russian ambassador Kurakin, turned to him with angry words. He accused Tsar Alexander of disloyalty, of hostile actions.

“What hopes does your sovereign entertain?” he asked threateningly.

Napoleon proposed that Kurakin promptly sign an agreement, settling the misunderstanding between Russia and the French Empire.

Kurakin, intimidated and distraught, announced that he lacked plenipotentiary powers to sign such a paper.

“You haven't the plenipotentiary powers?” shouted Napoleon. “Then demand them! I do not want war, and I do not want to resurrect Poland. But you want to annex the Duchy of Warsaw and Danzig to Russia . . . . Until the secret intentions of your court come out into the open, I shall continue to increase the size of my German army of occupation!”

Kurakin attempted to justify his government by denying all of Napoleon’s charges, but the French Emperor would not listen to him and repeated his suspicions.

After this scene, no one in Europe doubted that open hostilities were not far in the offing.
Napoleon was gradually transforming all of vassal Germany into a drill ground for future invasion. Simultaneously, he was resolved to force both Prussia and Austria into a military alliance with him, as a necessary preliminary to an attack on Russia.

Prussia’s plight under the yoke of Napoleonic rule had been pitiful. Nevertheless, even during the first days after Tilsit, in 1807-1808, she had not experienced such a chronic panic as had seized her after Wagram and after Napoleon’s Austrian marriage. Earlier, under the influence of Baron vom Stein and the “party of reform,” although the right of serfdom was not wholly destroyed, its juridical bases were significantly broken down. And several other reforms were adopted.

Then suddenly, the ardent patriot vom Stein, too openly enthusiastic over the Spanish revolt, was hounded by the Napoleonic police. One of his letters was intercepted, a letter which Napoleon considered treasonable. Frederick William III was commanded to banish vom Stein from Prussia. The king, in token of his good will, not only fulfilled the command immediately, but also confiscated the property of the disgraced minister. The reform movement in Prussia was slowed down, but did not entirely cease. Minister of War Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and their associates set about the task of reorganising the army. Napoleon had forbidden Prussia to have an army of over 42,000 men; but by such adroit subterfuges as calling up men for short terms, military training had been given to the large masses. Thus while apparently obeying Napoleon’s will and outwardly submitting to humiliation, Prussia cunningly prepared for the future, and looked hopefully for some way to escape from the desperate position in which she had found herself after the rout of 1806 and the Tilsit peace of 1807.

With the outbreak of the war between France and Austria in 1809, Prussia made a single desperate effort to free herself from Napoleonic domination. It was, to be sure, an individual venture executed at personal risk by Major von Schill, who with part of a Hussar regiment, began a guerilla war. He was routed, however, and taken prisoner. At Napoleon’s command, he was
judged by a Prussian military tribunal and shot. King Frederick William was terror-stricken, and his rage against von Schill knew no bounds. But, for the time being, Napoleon contented himself with von Schill's punishment and the humiliating reassurances of the King of Prussia.

After Austria's fresh rout at Wagram, after the Schönbrunn peace and Napoleon's marriage to Marie Louise, Prussia's last hopes for liberation seemed to have vanished. There was the growing impression in Prussia that Austria, crushed and despairing, had sold out to Napoleon. Who could help Prussia now? On whom could she pin her hopes? On the breach that was widening between Napoleon and Russia? This rift was developing extremely slowly, and Prussia could no longer depend on Russia's might after Austerlitz and Friedland.

At the beginning of 1810, ill-omened rumours were circulated that Napoleon intended to abolish Prussia without a war—by the simple means of a decree. Prussia would be divided among the French Empire and the vassal states of Westphalia and Saxony. The Hohenzollern dynasty would, of course, be banished, and one of Napoleon's relatives or marshals substituted. When on July 10, 1810, Napoleon arbitrarily decreed the annexation of Holland and transformed it into nine new departments of the French Empire, it became evident that Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, the duchies of Lauenburg, Oldenburg, Salm-Salm, Arenberg and a series of other possessions might easily be joined to France. When, moreover, Marshal Davout, in occupation of the entire North German coast from Holland to Holstein, consoled the newly annexed countries by officially proclaiming: “Your independence was, after all, only imaginary!”—then the King of Prussia began to feel that his last hour had come.

His independence, too, was after all only “imaginary.” He remembered only too well that at Tilsit Napoleon had declared that if he did not wipe Prussia from the map of Europe it was only out of consideration for the Russian Tsar. And now, in 1810 and 1811, the relations between Napoleon and the Tsar were rapidly becoming so strained that there could no longer be any talk of “consideration.” Toward the end of 1810, during a period of peace, Napoleon felt no constraint in banishing the
Bonaparte

Duke of Oldenburg from his possessions and annexing them to France, in spite of the fact that the Duke’s son and heir was married to Alexander’s own sister, Catherine Pavlovna.

In 1810 and 1811, Prussia awaited destruction. King Frederick William III, by no means distinguished for his courage, was not the only one who lived in constant fear. Even those liberal patriotic organisations on the order of the Jugendbund, which in those days reflected the aspirations of the young German bourgeoisie who wished to liberate themselves from the alien oppressor and later create a new “free” Germany, lapse into inactivity. The Jugendbund was not the only illegal association; it was merely the most prominent. It became silent and apathetic in 1810, a condition that was intensified by 1811 and the beginning of 1812. The situation appeared hopeless. Baron von Hardenberg, who at one time had advocated resistance and for this reason had been banished from the Prussian court at Napoleon’s demand, now formally recanted. “On Napoleon alone depends our salvation,” wrote von Hardenberg to General Scharnhorst. In May, 1810, von Hardenberg himself said to the French ambassador Saint-Marsan: “Let His Imperial Majesty deign to say what share I may have in affairs. This will furnish a real proof of the King’s restoration into the confidence and favour of the Emperor.” Thus did he humiliate himself.

On June 5, 1810, Napoleon granted the petition and permitted Frederick William to appoint von Hardenburg state chancellor. Two days later the new Prussian chancellor wrote to Napoleon:

“Profoundly convinced (as I am) that Prussia can be regenerated and can secure its integrity and its future happiness only by faithfully adhering to your policies . . . I shall consider it the greatest honour to deserve the approbation and trust of Your Imperial Majesty. I remain, with the most profound esteem, the most humble and obedient servant. Baron von Hardenberg, State Chancellor to the King of Prussia.”

The indemnity was paid with regularity; the Continental Blockade was rigidly enforced; the king trembled and grovelled; von Hardenburg toadied and fawned—yet Napoleon did not evacuate his troops, nor did he vouchsafe any reassuring promises. When Napoleon, preparing for war with Russia, suddenly or-
ordered that Prussia furnish him with troops, there was a short but painful period of wavering. But the French Emperor put an end to all hesitation with a single blow. On November 14, 1811, he commanded Marshal Davout to seize on the first untoward action as a pretext to enter Prussia and occupy it with the entire French army. Prussia soon capitulated. On February 24, 1812, she signed an agreement in Paris, obligating herself actively to assist Napoleon in any war he should wage in the future.

With Prussia’s aid assured, Napoleon promptly turned to Austria. Here he experienced no particular difficulty. After Wagram and the Schönbrunn peace, Austria had trembled. Following Napoleon’s marriage to Marie Louise, Metternich and other active leaders decided that it would be profitable to become Napoleon’s favourite, that this opened the possibility of receiving some compensation in return for the lost provinces. Furthermore, Napoleon could strike at Austria’s western and northern frontiers from Bavaria and Saxony; at her southern borders from the Illyrian provinces (Carniole, Carinthia and the Kingdom of Italy); at her northeastern boundaries from Poland and Galicia. His Empire and his vassals pressed against her on all sides.

Fear of invasion and the hope of currying favour with his all-powerful son-in-law transformed Emperor Francis into a servant as obedient as the frightened Frederick William III. During these years, Napoleon heard nothing from Vienna but flattery. When in 1811 the Empress Marie Louise gave Napoleon a son and heir, a curious engraving was published in Vienna, which greatly pleased the court. It represented the Virgin Mother, with the face of Marie Louise, holding the Infant Christ in her arms; the Christ’s face was that of the newly born “King of Rome.” In the clouds above could be seen the Lord of Hosts himself—and his face was that of Napoleon. In short, any banality, any drollery, any absurdity, which expressed Austria’s servile admiration of the French Emperor was applauded.

Instinct and reason told those who possessed a broader intelligence—Metternich, for example—that the great Napoleonic Empire was a temporary phenomenon, and, in any event, bound up
only with the Emperor’s life. But on the other hand, during the years between 1810 and 1813, even the most sceptical persons were fully convinced that there could be no immediate deliverance from Napoleon.

England with her colonies and with her supremacy at sea still succeeded in holding firm. Yet even from the British Isles came increasingly frequent reports of bankrupt firms, of ruin, of unemployment, of the menace of revolution; in short, of the first fruits in England of the Continental Blockade. On the appearance of French troops, the impoverished Spanish shepherds fled to the mountains and woods, and from there continued their guerilla war. But Austria could not and would not carry on a similar struggle. What of Russia? She was clearly weaker than Napoleon. Humiliatingly crushed at Austerlitz in a vain effort to help Austria, she had betrayed Prussia at Tilsit. Whatever the future promised, the immediate present demanded that Austria side with Napoleon. In February of 1812, Napoleon forced Prussia to sign an alliance against Russia, and demanded the same from Austria. Without the least hesitation or bargaining, Emperor Francis declared himself for the French Emperor.

On March 14, 1812, a Franco-Austrian agreement was signed at Paris. Austria obligated herself to assist Napoleon with 30,000 men. In return, Napoleon promised to deprive Russia of Moldavia and Wallachia, and to grant Austria Galicia or correspondingly valuable territorial compensations elsewhere.

The “alliances” with Prussia and Austria were important to Napoleon not so much as a means of securing reinforcements for the Grand Army but because they would serve to deflect a portion of the Russian forces to the north and to the south of the straight road from Wilno (Vilna) to Moscow, along which he planned to direct his advance.

Prussia guaranteed to place 20,000 men at Napoleon’s disposal for the approaching war, 10,000 less than Austria. Beyond this, Prussia promised to provide Napoleon’s army—in lieu of a portion of unpaid debts—with 44,092,000 pounds of rye, 88,184,000 pounds of wheat, over 40,000 oxen and 30,000,000 bottles of spiritous liquors.
The diplomatic preparations for the war were concluded as early as the spring of 1812. But the campaign was delayed several months by the poor harvest of 1811, which caused famine in some areas of France. As a result, there were disturbances in the villages at the end of the winter and during the spring of 1812. Owing to a corner in the market and speculation in wheat, the agitation increased, and this too delayed Napoleon’s invasion of Russia.

Napoleon had at first considered opening hostilities in June, 1811. This date was mentioned by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Duke Bassano, in a report delivered to the Emperor on August 16, 1811, the day after the explosive scene between Napoleon and Prince Kurakin, June was deemed the most favourable time to begin the invasion, because the Polish and Russian roads were so muddy as to be almost impassable in March, April or even May. But consequences of the poor harvest and the ferment in the villages detained the Emperor.

Moreover, difficulties were encountered in the recruiting levies of 1811 and 1812. A greater number of men showed reluctance to joining the army than at any time during the preceding six years—and during these years, especially after the Austerlitz campaign, the number of those who had resisted conscription was considerable. They fled to the woods, hid themselves, sat it out. Napoleon organised special detachments to track them down and arrest them. The financial burdens brought on by the unceasing wars also prompted many able-bodied men to attempt to evade military service. Finally, a portion of the landowning peasantry complained that the recruiting levies deprived them of cheap labour to work the land for them.

Nevertheless, the drafts eventually furnished Napoleon with the number of men he needed for the Russian campaign.

To secure himself against attack from the rear, the Emperor decided to dismember Spain. In 1811, he annexed the rich and productive province of Catalonia to France, dividing it into four departments. In justification of this action, which enriched French commerce, Napoleon claimed that it was his punishment of the Spaniards for their "mutiny." Nevertheless, the "mutiny"
continued in the new Catalanian provinces of the French Empire.

And in the rest of Spain, also occupied by French troops, although it was still nominally considered "autonomous" and under the rule of King Joseph Bonaparte, the revolt did not abate in intensity. Marshals Soult, Marmont and Suchet, with large military detachments, remained behind in Spain. Their forces were sufficient, in Napoleon's opinion, to repulse both the English troops under Wellington and the Spanish partisans who had been waging the desperate struggle for four years.

England did not seem to offer any immediate danger. The Continental Blockade had made her domestic situation desperate. She suffered from unemployment. There was a tremendous workers' movement against the machines; the menace of sabotage imperilled entire industrial districts. Apart from all this, Napoleon's canny policy of granting commercial privileges to the United States of America, had resulted in the outbreak of a war between that nation and England.

This war, which had been impending since the beginning of 1812, was formally declared by President of the United States James Madison on June 15, exactly nine days before Napoleon's invasion of Russia. The war with America weakened England in her conflict with the French Empire.

The rear was thus secured; the way was open. The Emperor controlled military forces several times stronger than in any of his preceding wars. He faced a foe whom he had already beaten more than once.

The diplomats scented a catastrophe. But the overwhelming majority of them—shrewd men like Metternich, cautious men like von Hardenburg—believed that the chief sufferer would be Russia, against whom a storm was advancing such as she had not known since the time of the Tartar invasion.

Napoleon commanded an army of approximately 500,000 men, not counting the 50,000 promised by Austria and Prussia. Of this large force, 200,000 were to be provided by the vassals—Italy, Illyria, the Kingdom of Westphalia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Saxony, the Duchy of Warsaw, and all the remaining states of the Confederation of the Rhine. Altogether there were 90,000 Poles in Napoleon's army. Belgium, Holland and
the Hanseatic cities were not conscripted independently, for they were considered an integral part of the French Empire.

It was not without some justification that Napoleon at the time remarked: "Another three years—and I shall be master of the entire world!"

On May 9, 1812, at six o'clock in the morning, attended by the Empress Marie Louise, Napoleon left Saint-Cloud to join the Grand Army, which was already advancing through the German territories toward Poland, concentrating on the Vistula and the Niemen. On May 16, the Emperor entered Dresden, accompanied by the King of Saxony, who had come out to meet him the evening before.

In Dresden the many kings and grand dukes of the vassal states had gathered to greet the supreme ruler. Among them were King Frederick William III of Prussia, Emperor Francis of Austria and the Empress of Austria. For 15 days Napoleon remained in Dresden, surrounded by his servile vassals. In his presence, all of them, including his father-in-law, the Austrian Emperor, stood with bared head. Napoleon alone wore his celebrated three-cornered hat. On the whole, his attitude to them was benevolent. For example, he would playfully seize one of them by the ear and jestingly taunt him. If he thought especially highly of one of them, he would sometimes slap him on the back. Some of them he sharply reprimanded in public, though this occurred rarely in Dresden. They flattered him on every possible occasion, and in the most unrestrained terms. When someone even went so far as to hint of the divine origin of the world conqueror, Napoleon, accustomed as he was to all manner of flattery, was suddenly overcome with disgust and asked aloud:

"What! Do they think me a big fool, after all?"

Napoleon considered all those who composed his retinue in Dresden as slaves and grovellers, mortally afraid of him. While he placed no faith in their sincerity, their behaviour demonstrated to him that they were confident that he would emerge triumphant in the new war with Russia.

This feeling reigned everywhere at the moment: in Europe and in America, in all the palaces, in all the hovels, and behind
all the shop counters. Yet, as in the past, England awaited her hour and the Spanish peasants spat into the faces of the French soldiers when, with arms twisted behind their backs, they were led off to be shot. Only England and Spain were not represented at these magnificent Dresden celebrations, which served as a front for one of history's strangest exhibits of toadyism and panicky fear.

The general confidence in Napoleon's coming victory had an apparently sound basis. Russia was being invaded by the manifold regiments of a superbly organised army, headed by a military genius long regarded as a captain greater than Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar or Frederick II, and who, even before 1812, had won far more victories, major and minor, than all these generals of the past. His "alliances" with Austria and with Prussia, his domination over Europe, had numerically strengthened his forces and secured the rear. Before him was Russia, which opposed him with an army approximately one third the size of his. Furthermore, the Russian army was commanded by second-rate generals whom the French Emperor and his marshals had repeatedly beaten. As a matter of fact, Napoleon personally believed that the Russians had not a single competent general, with the exception of Prince Bagration.

The confidence of Napoleon in himself, in this instance, knew no bounds. His opinion was to change noticeably in the course of 1812. In Smolensk, he said one thing; observing the Moscow conflagration from the Kremlin, he said something else; at the time of the retirement of the Grand Army, he again contradicted his former judgments. But at this time, at the very beginning of the campaign, he dreamed his favourite dream: from Russia he would move toward the East, toward the conquest of India, toward those plans that he had rejected on May 20, 1799, when he ordered his army to raise the siege of Acre. Subsequently, he confided to Narbonne, one of his intimates:

"Alexander the Great attained the Ganges, having started from a point not less remote than Moscow. . . . Suppose you assume that Moscow is taken, Russia overthrown, the Tsar either reconciled or slain in some kind of court conspiracy. Then tell me—is access to the Ganges so impossible for the French army
and auxiliary troops? And it is sufficient for the Ganges to come in contact with the French sword to bring about the downfall of this structure of mercantile might (England)."

Rarely was Napoleon's diplomatic activity in Turkey, in Prussia and in Egypt so seething as in the years between 1810 and 1812. During these years the French consul Nercia was touring Syria and Egypt on an official mission, with secret instructions from Napoleon to make a preliminary survey for use in a future French expedition. From Egypt and Syria, the Emperor proposed to develop a subsidiary movement to India, the same movement which was interrupted at Acre in 1799.

From Dresden, Napoleon despatched Count Narbonne to Alexander at Vilna—as though he were making a final attempt to preserve peace. Count Narbonne—the same Narbonne with whom Napoleon had discussed his proposed future campaign against India—knew his instructions well. It was his duty to delay any possible Russian attack on Warsaw by means of idle conversations. The war, however, had been resolved upon by Napoleon—irretrievably. A host of 400,000 was already advancing through eastern Prussia toward the Niemen. It awaited only a signal to invade Russia.

From Dresden, Napoleon left for Posen, where he remained several days. The Polish nobility greeted him with even greater fervour than in 1807. For one thing, the Poles now had more reason to hope for the restoration of their fatherland within its original boundaries; at any rate, they felt they might at least acquire Lithuania and White Russia from Alexander. Furthermore, they no longer had reason to fear that their land would be shared out among the peasants. By 1812 Emperor Napoleon no longer advocated the revolutionary policies of "General Vendémiaire." The position of the Polish peasants* had been definitely settled, and there was no talk of liberating the Lithuanian and White Russian serfs. In consequence, the Polish nobility stood whole heartedly behind Napoleon.

From Posen, Napoleon journeyed to Thorn, then to Danzig, where he remained four days, directing the movements of count- less echelons of new troops. From Danzig he visited Königs-

* They had been "liberated" in 1807.
berg, where he devoted five days (June 12 to 17) to the problems of the administration of the army and the organisation of its supplies. On June 20, he was in the East Prussian town of Gumbinnen, and on June 22 in Lithuania, at Wolkowisk, where he signed his proclamation to the Grand Army:

"Soldiers! The second Polish war has begun. The first was concluded at Friedland and Tilsit. At Tilsit, Russia swore to an eternal alliance with France, and she swore to wage a war with Austria. She is now violating her oath. Not until the French eagles turn back and recross the Rhine, leaving our allies at her mercy, does she propose to explain her strange behaviour. Fate is drawing Russia after her: her destiny must be accomplished. Does she count us degenerate? Are we not soldiers of Austerlitz? She has placed the choice before us: dishonour or war. The choice cannot provoke any doubt in our minds. Hence, we shall go forward. We shall cross the Niemen, carrying the war into her territory. The second Polish war shall win renown for French arms, even as the first has done. And the peace we shall conclude will have its guarantees and will put to an end the ruinous influence which for the past fifty years Russia has exerted on the affairs of Europe."

Napoleon's proclamation was read to the streams of soldiers approaching the Niemen from all directions. With thunderous shouts, they greeted this official declaration of war.

Two days later, on the night of June 24, Napoleon ordered his troops to cross the Niemen. Three hundred Poles of the 13th Regiment were the first to set foot on Russian soil.

Not a soul was visible on the boundless plain beyond the Niemen after the last Cossack outpost detachments disappeared early on the morning on June 24. "Before us lay a desert, a brown yellowish soil with sparse vegetation and woods along the distant horizon," recalls one of the participators in the campaign, and this picture even then should have seemed ominous. But apparently, this was not the general impression. Rarely had a war conducted by Napoleon begun with such gaiety. During the long summer days, while the troops were crossing the river and beginning to advance toward Vilna, both banks of the Niemen resounded with music and songs. Regiment after regiment march-
ed past Napoleon, greeting him with cheers. As always in a time of war, he was animated and in good spirits. His most tremendous war was beginning, and, judging by the preparations he had made for it, he fully realised its hazards. Perhaps this was to be his last war in Europe and his first in Asia. Perhaps he would conclude the first part of the campaign at Smolensk and continue the advance to Moscow during the following year. These two hypotheses he had foreseen: of the Ganges and India, he had spoken with Narbonne; of a halt at Smolensk, with his marshals.

Surrounded by his adjutants and his immense retinue, unceasingly deafened by the pursuing shouts of the marching army, led by the entire cavalry, Napoleon rode along the road to Vilna, nowhere meeting with even a hint of resistance.
THE INVASION OF RUSSIA
1812

On the eve of one of his perpetual wars, Napoleon invariably evaluated the opposing commander-in-chief and the general organisation of the hostile command. Was the commander-in-chief a strong man? Did he exercise absolute independence in all his actions? To Napoleon, these were the two questions of paramount importance.

In the present instance, it would appear that the Emperor found a most gratifying answer to both questions. The only really efficient Russian general was Bagration, and he played only a secondary rôle. Benningssen was not as able as Bagration; "incompetent" was Napoleon's judgment of him. Badly defeated at Friedland, Benningssen was nevertheless a stubborn, resolute soldier, who had proved his firmness on that bloody day at Eylau. But Benningssen also was playing only a secondary rôle. What of Kutuzov? Though he had soundly beaten Kutuzov at Austerlitz, Napoleon had learned not to despise him; he considered him a cunning and cautious leader. Kutuzov, however, was out of the army. There remained only the commander-in-chief, Minister of War Barclay de Tolly, concerning whom Napoleon had too little material to form any complete judgment. However, he was not inclined to overestimate the ability of the Russian generals as a whole; considering them in the mass, he did not value them any too highly.

As regards the second question, there was no real unity of command in the Russian army. Nor could it have been otherwise, for Alexander was with the army and interfered with all of Barclay de Tolly's arrangements. Napoleon was well aware of this,
even while advancing on Vilna—for it was in Vilna that he ironically expressed himself in this vein to General-Adjutant Balashov, whom Alexander had despatched with a proposal of peace: "What are they all doing'? At the same time that General von Phull is proposing something, Baron Armfelt is contradicting him; while Benningsen is considering, Barclay de Tolly, upon whom the burden of execution is laid, does not know what to conclude, And thus the time passes and they do nothing!

Napoleon's answer to Balashov was a complete refusal. It was four days since he had crossed the Niemen, and everywhere he had been enthusiastically greeted by the loyal Polish gentry. Having met with absolutely no resistance, and being aware of the tremendous superiority of his forces, he felt that he had no reason to listen to any of Alexander's proposals.

Napoleon remained in Vilna for 18 entire days. Subsequently military historians considered this delay one of his fatal mistakes. But in Vilna, as earlier in Dresden, Napoleon awaited the arrival of the many additional detachments which had only recently come up. Of the 685,000 men at Napoleon's disposal for the war with Russia, he was forced, for the time being, to leave 235,000 in France and vassal Germany. Actually, he never had more than 420,000 men in Russia at one time, and even these were a long time in joining him. In Vilna, Napoleon received the first illomened report: thousands of the horses had died because of the insufficiency of fodder. There was yet another disappointment: the Poles of Lithuania and White Russia did not furnish sufficient fighting strength. And it was also at Vilna that Napoleon began to understand—more clearly than during the crossing of the frontier, more clearly than at Dresden—the many peculiarities and difficulties of the proposed campaign.

His newly gained knowledge was immediately reflected in his policy. To the profound disappointment of the Poles, he did not join Lithuania* to Poland; instead, he created a special provisional government for Lithuania. This was significant, for it proved that he did not wish to undertake anything that might hinder a future peace with Alexander. He considered it probable that the war would end in the full submission of Alexander

* Under the term "Lithuania," both Lithuania and White Russia were then implied.
and the conversion of Russia into an obedient vassal. But as the days went by, he tended more and more to the belief that the war would become transformed into a "political war"—thus he spoke of it before very long—a war of cabinets. Eventually, he believed it would develop into something of the nature of a diplomatic discussion, continued with the assistance of "gestures of arms," with both sides ultimately coming to some sort of common agreement.

As the difficulties connected with the campaign began to manifest themselves, his initial attitude to the war grew dim, and another took its place. Napoleon knew that although he had 420,000 men under his command, while the Russians had only a little more than half that number, his army was deficient in many ways. He realised that he could rely fully only on the French part of his army, and even then not on the whole of it, because the young recruits could not be ranged side by side with the hardened veterans who had been with him through previous campaigns. As for the Westphalians, Saxons, Bavarians, Rhenish and Hanseatic Germans, Italians, Belgians and Dutch, to say nothing of the enforced "allies" such as the Austrians and the Prussians, who hated Napoleon rather than the Russians—they could scarcely be expected to fight with any degree of fervour. Why he dragged along the Prussians and the Austrians has always remained a mystery. Well acquainted as he was with military history, he must have remembered that Xerxes, who had recruited his army from among the races subjugated by the ancient Persian kings, had derived no great value from them in the war against the Greeks. Napoleon had great expectations of the Poles, because they fought for themselves. But in their case he had not received the stipulated number of troops.

Napoleon was aware of the confusion which reigned in the Russian staff. While still at Vilna, he learned that the original plan of forming a defence on the Dvina, in the fortified camp of Drissa, had been abandoned, because Barclay de Tolly feared a flank movement round this base and inevitable capitulation. As a result, the Russian army was retiring in two columns into the centre of the country. Barclay de Tolly’s column was moving toward Vitebsk; Bagration’s toward Minsk. With his main forces,
Napoleon advanced against Barclay, who was proceeding more rapidly than Bagration. Discovering that he was being pursued, Barclay retired at an even greater speed, meanwhile commanding the chief of his rear guard, Count Ostermann-Tolstoy, to retard the advancing French army as long as possible. This order was executed in the battles near Ostorovno on July 25 and 26.

On entering Vitebsk on July 28, Napoleon found he had missed Barclay, who was now hurrying toward Smolensk to rejoin Bagration. This was a profound disappointment to the French Emperor, who had planned on crushing Barclay in one big decisive battle at Vitebsk. He had hoped that Vitebsk would be a new Austerlitz where with a single blow he could end the war and force Alexander to plead for peace.

All this while Davout had been advancing from Vilna toward Minsk, in an effort to cut off Bagration's avenue of escape and destroy him before he could succeed in reuniting with Barclay. But, fortunately for Bagration, Napoleon's brother, Jerome Bonaparte, King of Westphalia, allowed the Russian general to slip by him on the Grodno-Minsk road. On July 23, Davout collided with Bagration to the south of Mogilev. Deprived of the support of Jerome Bonaparte's troops, which arrived too late for the battle, Davout was beaten back by the Russians, who thereupon turned toward Smolensk, and continued to retire, very little harassed by the enemy.

On receiving news of the battle near Mogilev and of Bagration's successful retreat across the Dnieper at Novy Bikhov, Barclay moved across the Rudnya toward Smolensk to join him. Meanwhile, Napoleon's soldiers were becoming worn out by the intense heat and the difficult marches. It was so hot that the old veterans tried to console the younger men by telling them of the even greater heat they had suffered in Egypt. Fodder was lacking. Since leaving Vilna, more than half of the horses had succumbed. At the same time, the first signs of disintegration began to appear: pillaging assumed extraordinary proportions.

It had become necessary to advance farther and farther, in pursuit of Barclay and Bagration, who were marching toward Smolensk by different routes. Napoleon was forced to send several divisions toward the southern flank to repel the attacks of
the Russian troops hastening from Turkey, liberated after the sudden conclusion of a Russo-Turkish peace. Nevertheless, for the coming battle at Smolensk, Napoleon had far more troops than the Russians.

On August 14, the French met Neverovsky’s Russian division at Krasnoi. After a stubborn battle, in which Neverovsky staunchly resisted the assault of the superior forces of Ney and Murat and suffered the loss of a third of his troops, Napoleon approached Smolensk. Bagration ordered General Rayevsky to hold back the French, and in the collisions which followed Rayevsky fought with such stubbornness that Marshal Ney narrowly escaped being taken prisoner.

At ten o’clock on the morning of August 17, Napoleon ordered a general bombardment and the capture of Smolensk by assault. A fierce struggle ensued, lasting until six o’clock in the evening. The French succeeded in taking the environs of Smolensk, but failed to penetrate the heart of the city. Dokhturov’s corps, defending the city together with the division of Konovnitzin and the Prince of Würtemberg, fought with a courage and a stubbornness that surprised the French.

In the evening Napoleon ordered Marshal Davout to take Smolensk at all costs on the next morning. He had learned that Barclay and Bagration had finally joined forces. It now appeared that the struggle for Smolensk would prove to be the long-hoped-for battle against the entire Russian army, which until now had avoided a decisive meeting, surrendering vast stretches of territory without resistance.

When darkness came, Napoleon continued the bombardment of the city. Suddenly—in the middle of the night—one terrific explosion after another shook the earth. A fire broke out, spreading across the entire city. The Russians were exploding their stores of gunpowder and burning Smolensk. Barclay had given the command for the retirement of the garrison. At daybreak, the French scouts reported that the town had been evacuated by the troops—and Davout, without a battle, entered Smolensk.

Corpses of human beings and horses lay strewn about the streets. The groans and cries of thousands of wounded resounded through the city: they had been abandoned to their fate. Part of
the city was still burning. Morose and silent, Napoleon slowly rode through the streets of Smolensk accompanied by his retinue, studying the surroundings, giving orders for the work of extinguishing the conflagration, for the clearing of the streets of the ill-smelling corpses and the groaning wounded, for the collection of all available provisions. After inspecting the town, he entered a house where quarters had been hurriedly prepared for him. Flinging his sword on a table, he said: "The campaign of 1812 is ended!"

But he was forced to renounce the idea of dividing the Russian war into two campaigns. Circumstances made it impossible for him to pause in Smolensk, to consolidate the rear in Poland, Lithuania, White Russia, to draw on further reinforcements from the Continent, to renew the movement on Moscow in the spring of 1813.

What was important was that the enemy had once again slipped away. Napoleon was unaware of the difficulties which had beset Barclay with every new retirement. He did not know of the charges against the Russian commander-in-chief of treachery, of the consternation and confusion in the Russian court. He was aware of only one thing: there was no sign of a general battle. He must go yet further, eastwards, toward Moscow. And yet the deeper he penetrated eastward, the more difficult it would be to end the war in a peace, in a simple diplomatic agreement. After Smolensk, Napoleon no longer hoped to gain a complete and crushing victory over Russia. He saw things in a far different light than he had seen them three months before during the crossing of the Niemen.

It was not only that his army had diminished by half, in consequence of the necessity of maintaining the tremendous communications line, of garrisoning the provision and munition stores, of having to engage in petty yet stubborn and sanguinary skirmishes, of having to contend with the terrible heat, exhaustion and disease. He realised something more. It was that the Russian soldiers fought not a whit less bravely than at Eylau. Even apart from Bagration, the Russian generals were by no means as incompetent as he had been inclined to believe when he had conversed with Balashov in Vilna. Napoleon was usually very ac-
curate in appraising people's abilities; he was particularly accurate in his military judgments. He could not help but acknowledge that Rayevsky, Dokhturov, Tuchkov, Konovnitzin and Platov had executed the separate and very difficult manoeuvres entrusted to them in a manner that would not have shamed even the best of his marshals. Finally, the general character which the war had assumed had long since begun to disquiet the Emperor and his staff.

The Russians, methodically retiring, left the entire locality desolate. Here, in Smolensk, they had attempted to destroy not a mere village but a whole city, a considerable trading and administrative centre. This indicated that they considered the war a struggle to death. Napoleon remembered how in his former wars the Austrian emperor, on fleeing from Vienna, commanded the city authorities to fulfill all French demands; how the Prussian king, on fleeing from Berlin, wrote a personal letter expressing the hope that the conqueror would find the palace at Potsdam comfortable.

On the other hand, in Smolensk itself and on the road to Smolensk, conditions were different from those in Spain. Napoleon knew that it was not the Russian peasants who were burning down their cottages and their stores of food, nor that it was the inhabitants of Smolensk who had set fire to their city. Moreover, he had seen that after the departure of the Russian army, Marshal Davout had no occasion to kill the inhabitants and fling their corpses out of their homes, as Marshal Lannes had been forced to do with the Spaniards at Saragossa. Yet essentially it mattered not whether the initiative for such conduct originated with the national mass as in Spain or with the St. Petersburg authorities as here in Russia. It showed that Alexander, who stood at their backs, regarded this war as a mortal combat.

In those days at Smolensk, Napoleon spent many silent hours plunged in thought. Of the army halted for the time being at Smolensk, he ordered only Murat's cavalry to give pursuit to Barclay, now in sole command of the entire Russian army, which had begun to retire along the Moscow road. Then Ney and Davout advanced in the same direction. On August 18 and 19 engagements took place at Valutina-Gora and Lubina. Because of
The Invasion of Russia

273

the incapacity of Junot, who lost his way while moving against the flank of Barclay's army, the latter was able to retire farther eastward, after suffering a loss of 6,000 men. The French casualties were higher.

On the night of August 24, Napoleon with his Guard issued from Smolensk and advanced to Dorogobuzh. But Barclay disbanded his camp and moved farther to the east. Now he abandoned Dorogobuzh, not desiring to engage in rear-guard skirmishes, because of the disadvantaged topographical conditions. He was retiring toward Viazma, Gjatsk, Tsarevo-Zaimistche. Napoleon and the troops he had brought from Smolensk followed at his heels.

Each time the Russians came to a brief halt, Napoleon began to dream of a general battle. . . . Thus was it at Dorogobuzh, at Viazma, at Gjatsk. "The Minister (Barclay) is conducting the guest straight to Moscow," someone on Bagration's staff maliciously wrote to St. Petersburg.

Alexander himself did everything in his power to undermine Barclay's authority. Thus, with evident approval, he personally repeated to General Robert Wilson, a British commissioner to Russia, the words spoken to Barclay by Ataman Platov after the evacuation of Smolensk: "You can see, I am dressed in only a cloak. I shall never again put on a Russian uniform; it has become only a garment of dishonour."

Alexander I was experiencing the most tormenting days of his life. The court was in a panic. The confusion grew. The townsfolk and the peasantry were once again calling Napoleon the Antichrist. He conquered half of Russia without opposition. The loss of Smolensk plunged everyone into gloom. "The Tsar and the Tsar's brother Constantine have rubbed the angry moujik the wrong way," said the people during the first months of the war. But what precisely "the angry moujik" wanted was a mystery. Among the nobility the prevailing fear was more conscious, more defined and more potent than among the common people. A Napoleonic victory would mean not only the continuation and consolidation of the blockade, but it would also menace serf-owning rights. Disquiet reigned in the villages. The landowners

felt it keenly. To yield Moscow without a battle seemed suicidal to the Tsar and the nobility. Even the soldiers did not understand the meaning of the retreat.

When the Russian army, on its retirement from Gjatsk, had arrived at Tsarevo-Zaimistche, it already had a new commander-in-chief. Alexander removed Barclay and appointed Kutuzov, whom he loathed but whom he was forced to turn to for want of a more suitable general. Bagration was not altogether to be depended upon, and his origin, like Barclay's, was non-Russian.

Kutuzov knew, of course, that Barclay had been in the right; that the only way to destroy Napoleon—if anything could destroy him—was to put distance between him and his base, to compel him to conduct a prolonged war of months, even of years, several thousand miles from France, in a vast, desolate, impoverished, hostile country, with insufficient provisions, in an alien climate. Kutuzov realised that even he, in spite of his Russian birth, would not be permitted to yield Moscow without a general battle. He decided to accept this battle, an unnecessary one according to his profound conviction, even as he had accepted the battle at Austerlitz against his better judgment. Unnecessary from the strategic point of view, this battle was inevitable from the political point of view. To Napoleon the removal of Barclay, promptly reported to him by spies, was a signal that the Russians were at last resolved to offer a general battle.

On the morning of September 4, he ordered Murat and Ney to advance from Gjatsk to Gridnevo. The Russian army slowed down—it paused. Its rear guard was provided with reinforcements. A redoubt, constructed by the Russians at the village of Shevardino, projected forward to meet the first advancing Frenchmen. Napoleon, having arrived at the village of Gridnevo with his Guard, promptly began to study the valley stretching before him, in which the Russian army had halted. It was reported to him that the Shevardino redoubt was occupied by considerable Russian forces. Through a spyglass, far beyond the tiny half-dried-up River Kolotchay, he could discern the positions of the Russian troops. On the evening of September 4, he learned from his spies that the Russian army had arrived a full two days before
and had taken up its positions near the village of Borodino, where preparations were being made for defense.

The Battle of Borodino has attracted the attention of historians and military specialists, of great writers and great painters. However, the fate of the Napoleonic Empire was sealed not on the field of Borodino but during the entire period of the Russian campaign. Borodino was merely one of the acts of the tragedy, but not the whole of it. Even the Russian campaign as a whole was not the end, but merely the beginning of an end as yet remote.

The imagination of contemporaries and posterity has always been stirred by the field of Borodino with its 57,000 corpses, which no one took the trouble to clear away for months following the battle.

The moment approached for which Napoleon had prayed so many times: in Dresden, on the Niemen, in Vilna, in Vitebsk, in Smolensk, in Viazma, in Gjatsk. He had at his immediate disposal only one third as many men as he had had when he first invaded Russia.

Disease, the hardships of the campaign, desertion, the necessity of strengthening the distant flanks in the direction of Riga and St. Petersburg, the skirmishes against the Russian troops marching from Turkey on the south, the increasing difficulty of maintaining garrisons along the immense line of communications from the Niemen to Shevardino—all this had taken its toll from the Grand Army. At the moment Napoleon approached the Shevardino redoubt he had 135,000 men and 587 guns. The Russians had 103,000 regular troops and 640 guns, 7000 Cossacks and some 10,000 militiamen. In quality, the Russian artillery was on a par with the French; numerically, it was superior. Napoleon had lost so many horses that it was impossible for him to have all his large guns dragged from Mogilev, Vitebsk and Smolensk to the Moscow road.

During the Battle of Borodino Napoleon made his headquar ters in the village of Baluyeva.

He was wholly confident of victory, and the beginning of the battle only strengthened his confidence. On September 5, he or-
ordered an attack on the Shevardino redoubt. Murat flung back a portion of the Russian cavalry. After the artillery had done its work, General Compan, with five infantry regiments, led an assault and, after a stubborn bayonet attack, took the redoubt. The French soldiers spoke with astonishment of the Russian gunners who did not run, in spite of opportunities, when the attackers broke into the redoubt—they all remained and were stabbed in their places. At daybreak Napoleon mounted his horse and remained on horseback all day.

He was afraid that the Russians, situated several miles from Shevardino, would retire after the capture of the redoubt. But his fears were unwarranted. Kutuzov retained his former positions. The Emperor feared nothing so much as the retirement of the Russian army before a general battle could be fought. It was for this reason that he rejected Davout's proposal to skirt the left flank of the Russian army with large forces from the side of Utitza; this manœuvre might frighten Kutuzov and cause him to retire.

After Smolensk and his final resolve to end the war in a single year, Napoleon's main objective was to enter Moscow, and from there to offer peace to Alexander. But no matter how he thirsted for Moscow, he had no desire to possess the city without a battle. The destruction of the Russian army—a general battle before Moscow—was what he wanted at any price. He had no desire to chase Kutuzov, should the latter decide to retire beyond Moscow, to Vladimir, to Ryazan, or even farther. For the same reason that Barclay and Kutuzov tried to evade a battle, Napoleon needed one. Barclay, however, was now silent, obligated as he was after Tsarevo-Zaimistche to obey Kutuzov. But Kutuzov was also silent, lacking the courage to assume the terrible responsibility of departing without a battle, of abandoning Moscow to fate's mercies, even though he could save his army by this means.

Throughout the entire day following the capture of the Shevardino redoubt, Napoleon did not resume battle. He commanded that the soldiers be allowed a reasonable respite, that they be supplied with increased rations. As for himself, he spent his time drawing up a detailed plan of action for the following day. He gave precise and individual orders to his marshals and generals,
who accompanied him in a group during his horseback inspections. And he, and they, and the rank and file repeatedly glanced in the direction of the scarcely visible Russian positions—to see if Kutuzov had flown. But there was no sign of movement. The Russian troops remained where they were.

Napoleon was afflicted with a cold, but during this painstaking day he did not give the least indication of fatigue.

Night came. The troops retired early, for they knew that the battle would begin at daybreak. Napoleon scarcely lay down, notwithstanding the physical and mental strain of the day's activities. He concealed his perturbation, but for once he did not succeed in deceiving anyone. He talked with the adjutants, but it was evident that his mind was elsewhere. Again and again he left his tent to see if the fires were still burning in the enemy camp.

The sun had not yet risen when Napoleon gave the order for an advance against the Russians. At the Emperor's command, the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, led his corps on the village of Borodino—on the Russian left flank. Davout, Ney, Murat, one after the other, flung their corps upon Bagration's outworks at the village of Semenovskoe in the centre. From both sides there broke out such a thunderous, ceaseless rattle of artillery as had not been heard before, even by those veterans who had served at Eylau and at Wagram.

During the course of this long warm September day, Napoleon, according to the evidence of eye-witnesses, suffered a constant alternation of two moods. At daybreak, when the sun had just begun to rise above the line of the horizon, he cheerfully exclaimed: "Here is the sun of Austerlitz!" This mood lasted all morning. From the Shevardino redoubt, where the Emperor had his headquarters, it seemed that the Russians were gradually but steadily being driven from their positions. But distressing news was not long in arriving. In the early morning hours, Napoleon received the report that one of his ablest generals, the commander of the 106th Line Regiment, Plozonne, had broken into Borodino with his men, driven out the Russians, and, in pursuing them, had run into the Russian chasseurs. A large portion of Plozonne's troops had been destroyed and he himself killed. To be sure, assistance arrived, and the French occupied Borodino.
But the incident was significant in that it showed that the Russians were fighting with exceptional courage.

An adjutant arrived with the news that Marshal Davout's attack was developing successfully; but on his heels came another messenger—Davout's best division, that of General Compan, had come under terrible enemy fire. The general was wounded, his officers either killed or wounded. Marshal Davout, hurrying to their aid, stormed the Russian batteries, and captured them— but again the Russian gunners, as only two days before at Shevardino, refused to leave their guns. Firing to the last instant, they were slain at their positions. One of the shells killed Davout's horse, and the marshal himself suffered a contusion and fell unconscious to the ground.

Scarcely had the Emperor heard all this and issued new commands, when he learned that Marshal Ney, with three divisions, had broken into the outworks, which he was holding, although the Russians were persisting in a fierce counter-attack. A few minutes later another adjutant reported that Neverovsky's division had driven Ney out. Later Ney regained his position, but Bagration continued to struggle desperately in this quarter. One of the most important outworks taken by the French was subjected to a savage bayonet attack and recaptured by the Russians. Finally, however, Murat led another assault which was successful, although he suffered tremendous new losses.

At this point, the Russian losses were much greater than the French. The Russians refused to surrender, holding out to the last man as they counter-attacked in their attempts to recapture lost positions. In order to develop the movements of the French cavalry, all manner of attempts were made to seize low heights and uneven levels which intersected the centre of the field of battle. These natural barriers cost the French attackers countless lives. Rayevsky's corps, undefeated but torn to shreds, caused Ney and Murat such damage in the Semenovsky ravine district that they were forced to call upon all the detachments they could command. The ravine was won and lost several times. At last the marshals sent to Napoleon for reinforcements. They vouched for victory, if they could only take the Semenovsky ravine and the village of Semenovskoe before it was too late.
Napoleon despatched a single division to their assistance, but refused to send more. He concluded, from the unheard-of ferocity of the fighting, that Ney and Murat were mistaken in their notion that the Russian troops could be forced to retire from the field; on the contrary, they would not retire, and the French reserves would be wasted before the decisive moment arrived. But the decisive moment still did not come. General Morand’s division took Rayevsky’s battery by storm. The Russians launched a bayonet counter-attack and recaptured the battery. Their losses were enormous, but the battery was again in their hands, and Morand himself was killed fighting.

The news that the Russians had regained the big battery was received by Napoleon simultaneously with the report that Bagration was making attempt after attempt to wrest from Ney and Murat the three outworks which they had captured with so much effort. . . .

It was midday. Napoleon’s mood changed—and remained changed. It was not so much his cold that bothered him, as many of his biographers have insisted; rather it was an all-pervading feeling of futility. Time after time, he had received insistent requests from Ney and Murat for new reinforcements. They would eventually ask him for his Guard—and he would have to refuse. He now knew that Murat and Ney were correct in assuming that the Guard with its fresh strength would probably drive Bagration from Semenovskoe and assure a decisive French victory at Borodino. But he could not risk the Guard—and for a pressing reason. To divert the main French attack, the Russian cavalry and the Cossacks under Uvarov and Platov had suddenly attacked the provision train and the division which early in the morning had captured the village of Borodino. The Russian cavalry was driven off, but this attempt had, once and for all, convinced the Emperor that it would be impossible for him to release his Guard for battle.

At three o’clock in the afternoon. Napoleon again ordered an attack on Semenovskoe. The redoubt was retaken by the French in a fierce assault. Better than any of his marshals, Napoleon could weigh and evaluate the fearful losses, reports of which came to him from all points.
A desperate battle was being waged for the Semenovskoe outworks. In several hours' time they exchanged hands many times. In this single region over 700 guns were concentrated—400 French, and more than 300 Russian. The French and the Russians repeatedly engaged in hand-to-hand fighting; the entangled mass was sometimes swept indiscriminately by a broadside, before the gunners had time to learn of the existing position of their own troops.

The marshals who survived Borodino never ceased to speak of the conduct of the Russian troops in this battle over the outworks. But the French were as unrelenting. During the course of the struggle in this sector, the French grenadiers, under the shower of a broadside, with bayonets set, swept forward to attack Bagration's soldiers. Bagration, without returning fire, met them with his last cry: "Bravo! Bravo!" A few minutes later Prince Bagration—in the opinion of Napoleon, the most gifted general in the Russian army—fell mortally wounded and, dying under a hail of shot, was with difficulty borne from the field of Borodino.

The day was setting. The Emperor learned that Prince Bagration had fallen, stricken to death; that both Tuchkovs were killed; that Rayevsky's corps was almost destroyed; that the Russians, valiantly defending themselves, were at last retiring from Semenovskoe. The loss of Bagration, who had so long and so vainly thirsted for a general battle and at last had his patience rewarded, created a tremendous impression. Napoleon in person approached Semenovskoe. Morose, taciturn, glancing at the mountains of human bodies and dead horses, he did not reply to the most essential questions—questions which no one but he could answer. For the first time, his men observed him in a mood of gloomy apathy and indecision.

It had grown dark. Three hundred French guns began to fire at the Russian troops, who were retiring slowly and in complete order. But the final bombardment did not cause a rout, as the French had anticipated it would. The Russian soldiers continued to fall, but there was no flight. "They want some more!" cried Napoleon. "Give it to them!" The retreating Russians fired as they withdrew. Thus did night descend upon both sides.
When the first complete reports came in to Kutuzov that night and he learned that half the Russian army had been destroyed, he resolved to save the other half and to yield Moscow without a new battle. This did not prevent him from announcing Borodino as a victory, though it was clear that he was dejected and did not believe in his own words.

That same night Napoleon discovered that 40 of his generals had been killed or badly wounded, that thousands and thousands of his soldiers were dead or lying wounded on the field of battle. Then, at last, he realised that this had been the most costly battle of his career. However, this did not hinder him from proclaiming Borodino a French victory. But he, who had gained so many real, indisputable victories, knew that if Lodi, or Rivoli, or the Battle of the Pyramids, or Marengo, or Austerlitz, or Jena, or Wagram could be called victories, then some other definition must be devised for Borodino. He expected that Kutuzov would give a new battle under the very walls of Moscow; some of the Russian generals were in favour of it. This time, however Kutuzov declared resolutely against it. Napoleon did not learn until two days after the Battle of Borodino that Kutuzov had decided to surrender Moscow without a struggle.

Alexander I and Napoleon, and indeed all those who were close to Kutuzov, knew him to be a shrewd old courtier. But, in addition, he had the power to influence the rank and file, the serfs, who served under him. In this respect, he had learned much from his former mentor and chief, Suvorov. He posed as a good-natured old soldier in a general's uniform, who fought for the righteousness of his cause. He had the magic-performing ikon of Smolensk brought to him in camp. He acted his part well, and although he could not deceive his enemies as to his true character, he fooled the soldier masses, and, to some extent, posterity.

"This morning I visited the accursed Kutuzov. Our conversation convinced me of the baseness, instability and cowardice of the leader of our military forces," wrote Rostopchin to his wife, six days after Borodino, when the fate of Moscow was no longer in doubt. This was the obviously biased opinion of one of Kutuzov's most malignant enemies. Whatever else he may have been,
Kutuzov was not a "coward," though the charge of "instability" was to some degree substantiated by his having engaged in a general battle at Borodino, despite his better judgment. And as for "baseness," he, at least, never stooped to such depths as to permit himself to be swayed by the same stupid and light-minded Rostopchin, whose vehement arguments for a second general battle, after Borodino, might have destroyed the entire Russian army.

Murat with his cavalry advanced on the heels of the retiring Kutuzov. On September 9, Napoleon entered Mojaisk, and a day later Eugene Beauharnais was in Ruza. By the morning of September 13, the French Emperor and his retinue reached the Poklonnaya Hill near Moscow. Napoleon could not restrain his enthusiasm. The beauty of the spectacle enchanted him. Resplendent in the sun, the immense city spread out before his eyes. Here at last he could give his army a chance to rest and recuperate. Above all, Moscow would serve as a hostage to force Alexander to come to terms. The terrible picture of Borodino was at once overshadowed by this spectacle and these perspectives.

In three days, September 14, 15 and 16, the Russian army passed through Moscow and emerged on the Kolomna-Ryazan road. Murat was at its heels. Miloradovich, commander of the rear guard, obtained Murat's promise to allow the Russian troops to pass through the city undisturbed.

On September 16, Kutuzov's army crossed the Borovsky bridge spanning the Moskva River. It pitched camp for the night near the village of Kulakova, and on the following day, unobserved by Napoleon, turned to the left and advanced along the right bank of the River Pakhra. By the 19th it had crossed to the left bank near the village of Krasnaya Pakhra on the old Kaluga road. Napoleon's only path of communications—the Smolensk road—was seized by Kutuzov's cavalry.

When he arrived at Dorogomilovsk, strange rumours, emanating from the Guard, began to reach Napoleon. It was whispered that nearly all the inhabitants had abandoned Moscow, that the city was empty, and that no deputation with the keys of the city awaited the French. The rumours were confirmed.

On the eve of September 16, Napoleon entered Moscow.
Here and there a few fires flared up. But it was impossible to estimate either the ultimate immensity or significance of what was then merely beginning.

The next morning the fires grew more intense. By day they were not as yet very noticeable, but during that night a fierce wind came up, which continued without abatement for over 24 hours. A sea of flame enveloped the centre of the city near the Kremlin.

When the first fires were reported to him, Napoleon did not show any great concern, but when on the morning of the 17th he made a tour of the Kremlin and from the windows of the palace saw the raging ocean of fire sweeping in every direction, he grew pale and, contemplating the conflagration in silence, said at last:

“What a dreadful sight! And they started it themselves. . . . What resolution! What human beings! They are Scythians!”

In the mean time, the fire began to threaten the Kremlin. Soon a part of the Kremlin—the Troitzky Tower—was actually in flames. By this time it was impossible to leave by some of the gates, for the wind had blown the flames in every direction. The marshals began to urge the Emperor to move immediately to the Petrovsky palace on the outskirts of the city. At first Napoleon stubbornly refused; it nearly cost him his life. When, with his retinue, he issued from the Kremlin the sparks were already falling on him and his companions, and it was difficult to breathe. “We walked upon a blazing earth, under a blazing sky, between blazing walls,” wrote one of the officers, describing the incident.

The terrible conflagration raged on September 17 and 18, but toward the evening of the 18th it began to abate. The scattered fires continued to burn for some days following, but the worst was over. Nevertheless, a large part of the city had been destroyed.

Napoleon did not entertain the slightest doubt as to the origin of the wholly unexpected catastrophe: the Russians had burned down their city rather than permit it to fall into the hands of the conqueror. Incriminating evidence was abundant. Rostopchin had borne away all the fire-extinguishing apparatus; the fires
Bonaparte had started simultaneously in several widely separated places. There was also the testimony of various persons apprehended on suspicion of being incendiaries; several soldiers claimed to have seen men with torches. Subsequently, as is well known, Rostopchin alternated between boasting of his part in the Moscow fire and denying his participation in it. He repeatedly flaunted his fierce patriotism, only later to reject his own claims. He even wrote a special brochure on the subject.

According to unanimous testimony, Napoleon, while in the Petrovsky palace and later in the Kremlin to which he returned when the fires had begun to abate, lived through days of agonising disquietude. He was at times a raging madman, and it went ill with those whose duties brought them into his presence. Sometimes he spent hours in dead silence. His energy did not abandon him. From Moscow he continued to govern his empire, to sign decrees, edicts, appointments, transferences, and dismissals. In Moscow, as everywhere else, he manifested his interest in everything; neither primary nor secondary affairs escaped his attention. As an odd illustration of this, we have but to recall that the charter creating the Comédie Française was signed by Napoleon in Moscow, and that to this day the statute is called “the Moscow decree.”

But the most important problem importunately demanded solution. What was to be done now? The burning of Moscow did not deprive the Emperor of all the provisions in the city; there still remained stores which had escaped the fire. But the foraging expeditions outside the city met with no success; the soldiers wandered about, pillaging and often disappearing without leaving a trace; discipline was being visibly shattered. To remain in Moscow for the winter was, of course, possible, and some of the marshals and generals were in favour of it. Yet Napoleon instinctively felt that his empire was not stable enough and his “allies” not sufficiently trustworthy to permit him to abandon the Continent for any length of time and to hibernate amidst the Russian snows. Should he set in pursuit of Kutuzov, who gave no indications of life? Hardly—for Kutuzov could retire to Siberia, and even farther. The horses no longer fell by the thousands, but by the tens of thousands. The extensive com-
The invasion of Russia

Communications line was but weakly maintained, even though Napoleon had scattered many detachments along the way, thereby gravely impairing the effectiveness of his Grand Army. But the main cause for anxiety was the Moscow conflagration and the abandonment of the capital by the entire population. This, coupled with the memory of the Battle of Borodino, which—as Napoleon admitted at the end of his life—was the most terrible of all his battles, reminded the Emperor that his adversary was resolved to continue the struggle to the end.

There were two alternatives open to Napoleon. One was to give the Russian court to understand that he was willing to sign the most condescending, the most generous, the most honourable, the most inoffensive peace. The other was to issue a manifesto abolishing serfdom in Russian territory occupied by the French. In this manner, it might be possible to instigate a peasant revolt in the rear of Kutuzov’s army and at the same time to disintegrate the Russian army, whose rank and file consisted of serfs. We know what Napoleon thought and said about both these alternatives. He tried, however, to realise the first, but not the second. To conclude a peace while still at Moscow, to preserve the pose of a conqueror, to retreat from Russia with his army intact—this was the best that he could hope for now. He was ready to content himself with Alexander’s words and promises, and to make concessions. There was no longer any question of subjugating Alexander, of making a vassal of him. Yet how should he proceed to establish contact with the Tsar, with whom he had not been in communication since the insulting refusal in Vilna? Napoleon made three attempts to open peace negotiations with Alexander.

Major General Tutolmin, chief of the Educational Home in Moscow, appealed to the French military authorities for the protection of his institution and his charges, who had remained in Moscow. Napoleon summoned him and spoke to him at length of the shameful burning of Moscow, of the criminal barbarism of Rostopchin, of his own good intentions toward the city and its people, whom he had not planned to harm. When Tutolmin begged to be allowed to write a report of the Educational Home to the Empress Maria, Napoleon not only gave his assent, but
suddenly added: "I wish that you would at the same time write to Emperor Alexander, whom I esteem as formerly, and tell him that I desire peace." On that same day, September 18, Napoleon commanded that the French sentry posts permit the passage of an official of the Educational Home, with whom Tutolmin sent his report.

Napoleon received no response. He did not even wait for sufficient time to elapse for the arrival of an answer before he decided to make a second attempt. As it happened, a rich noble named Yakovlev, the father of Alexander Ivanovitch Herzen, had also been detained in Moscow against his will. He appealed to the French for protection. This was reported to Marshal Mortier, who had previously met him in Paris. The marshal mentioned Yakovlev's name to Napoleon, who commanded that the Russian be brought before him. In *My Past and Thoughts*, Herzen tells of the Emperor's conversation with his father:

"... Napoleon abused Rostopchin for the fire. He said that it was vandalism, and assured my father that, as always, he desired peace above everything else, and he explained that his war was with England, and not with Russia, and he expressed pleasure in having placed a guard over the Educational Home and the Uspensky Cathedral. He complained against Alexander; he said that he was surrounded by evil influences, that his (Napoleon's) peaceful inclinations were unknown to the Emperor. ... Napoleon reflected and suddenly asked: 'Will you undertake to deliver a letter to the Emperor from me?' 'I should willingly undertake Your Majesty's proposal, but it would be difficult for me to give a guarantee.'"

Thereupon, Napoleon wrote a letter to Alexander, containing a proposal of peace. This very conciliatory letter had one curious line: "I am carrying on a war with you without any malevolence." Evidently it seemed to Napoleon that, after all that had passed, it was not he who was provoking ill feeling, but it was he who had cause to feel grieved.

There was no answer to this second letter.

Then Napoleon made a third and final attempt to open negotiations.

On October 4, he sent Count Lauriston, who had been French
Ambassador to Russia immediately before the war, to Kutuzov’s camp in the village of Tarutino. The Emperor would have preferred to send General Caulaincourt, the Duke of Vicenza, who had been Ambassador to Russia before Lauriston. However, Caulaincourt strongly counseled Napoleon against making any further advances to Alexander, pointing out that to do so would indicate to the Russians that the French army was too weak to prolong the struggle. Napoleon was irritated; he had lost the knack of being able to listen impartially to an adversary in an argument. Lauriston repeated Caulaincourt’s counsel, but the Emperor promptly interrupted him with a direct command:

“I must have peace. Only our honour must be saved. You must go at once to the Russian camp!”

Lauriston’s arrival at the Russian advance posts immediately provoked a violent storm at general headquarters. Kutuzov favoured having a talk with the French representative. But there were Russian patriots on Kutuzov’s staff, more ardent than the general himself, and incomparably more vexed than he with the loss of Moscow. They included the official English agent with the Russian army, Wilson; Count Winzingerode, who had fled from the Confederation of the Rhine; the Duke of Württemberg; the Duke of Oldenburg; and several other foreigners, who jealously watched every step taken by Kutuzov. To these was allied Benningsen, who loathed Kutuzov, and had already denounced him to the Tsar for having surrendered Moscow without a battle. In the name of the Russian people and the Russian army as represented by these individuals, Wilson announced to Kutuzov that the soldiers would refuse to submit to him if he dared to venture out to the advance posts to talk face to face with Lauriston. Kutuzov humbly listened to this incredible threat—and submitted. Wilson’s tone was that of a master demanding that his hireling fulfill his obligations in return for the pounds sterling that had been given him. Kutuzov received Lauriston at staff headquarters, but refused to talk to him about a peace or a truce, merely promising to bring Napoleon’s proposal to Alexander’s attention.

The Tsar made no reply. There remained to Napoleon the other alternative: to instigate a Russian peasant revolt.
As early as December 17, 1806, when Napoleon, having destroyed Prussia, was approaching the Russian frontiers, Rostopchin warned the Tsar of the threat of an uprising of the serfs. He wrote Alexander that the projected arming of the national militia would instill ideas of freedom in the people, who would promptly attempt to destroy the nobility, "which destruction in all mutinies and insurrections is the sole aim of the rabble." And then he spoke of "the estate of servants, who were already awaiting Bonaparte, in order to gain their freedom."

In 1807, before Tilsit, at the very time the Holy Synod was proclaiming that Napoleon was a forerunner of Antichrist, the serfs in St. Petersburg were saying: "Bonaparte has written the Tsar that if he desires peace he must free the peasants; otherwise the war will continue everlastingly." Toward the end of June, 1812, General Rayevsky, brave in all other matters, confessed: "I am afraid of proclamations—of Napoleon giving freedom to the people. I am afraid of unrest in the country."

A feeling of uneasiness possessed the higher authorities after Napoleon's occupation of Moscow. It was reported to Alexander that not only were there rumours of freedom among the peasants but also that some of the soldiers were saying that the Tsar himself had secretly asked Napoleon to enter Russia and free the peasants, because of his own fear of the landowners. And in St. Petersburg there was even gossip that Napoleon was the son of Catherine II, and was coming to claim the legal all-Russian crown, after which he would liberate the serfs. A series of peasant revolts against the landowners broke out—some of them of a grave nature.

Napoleon visibly wavered for some time. He suddenly ordered that the archives of Moscow be searched for facts about Pugachev*, now those surrounding him made rough drafts of a manifesto to the serfs; he personally wrote to Eugene Beauharnais that it might be well to arouse the peasantry to revolt; he asked a Frenchwoman who owned a Moscow shop what she thought of the idea of liberating the serfs. Then he altogether

* The rebellion of Pugachev took place in 1773-1774 during Catherine II's reign. Pugachev was a Cossack, and the revolt he led developed into a movement that menaced the very foundations of the state.
ceased to talk about it and began to wonder about the Tartars and the Cossacks.

However, his thought returned to Pugachev and he asked to be furnished with the history of the revolt. This persistent concern with Pugachev proved that he was considering the possible consequences of any decisive step he might take in liberating the peasantry. If there was one thing that the Russian nobility feared even more than the Continental Blockade it was the threatened loss of their rights to own serfs in the event of a Napoleonic victory.

Napoleon had not the least inclination to instigate an all-national peasant revolt aimed at the abolition of slavery. For the ruler of new bourgeois Europe a peasant revolution would not have been welcome even in a conflict with a feudal-absolutist monarchy, not even in a moment when such a revolution seemed to offer the only chance of success.

Thus, also, while sitting in the Kremlin, he transiently thought of a rising in the Ukraine, of a possible movement among the Tartars. And he rejected these plans one after another. "He thought of instigating the Kazan tartars to revolt; he ordered the study of the revolt of Pugachev's Cossacks; he had a consciousness of the existence of the Ukraine... He thought of Mazeppa... To start a revolution in Russia was too serious an undertaking! Not without dread did he pause before the stern mysterious steppes... He was not a creator of revolutions, but their subduer; he had a desire for order; none more than he at any time possessed the feeling and, as it were, the instinct for imperial authority; he felt something in the nature of physical repulsion for national movement."

During that October day when Napoleon hesitated to issue a decree liberating the serfs, he experienced a strong inner conflict. For the 25-year-old general who suppressed counter-revolutionary Toulon, for the friend of Augustin Robespierre, for the partisan of Maximilien Robespierre, or even later for the author of the Code of Napoleon, only one course could have been open—complete freedom for the peasants. That the Russian serfs more nearly resembled negro slaves than the serfs of any of the

Bonaparte

defeated feudal-absolutist countries of Europe, Napoleon knew well enough; he maintained swarms of spies in Russia, who supplied him with the fullest and most diverse information. But he had long since ceased to be a revolutionary general. In the salons of the Petrovsky castle orderlies stealthily observed a man who paced back and forth in meditation—His Majesty Napoleon I, by God’s grace autocratic Emperor of the French, King of Italy, virtual supreme sovereign of the entire European continent, and son-in-law of the Austrian emperor; the man who had guillotined or imprisoned or exiled many people who in their time had been friends of Maximilien and Augustin Robespierre, people who had courageously remained loyal to their convictions.

A decree liberating the peasants in all the provinces occupied by Napoleon’s armies could have undermined the Russian army itself, which was composed almost wholly of serfs. Above all, it would have instigated a rebellion on the order of the Pugachev movement.

Russia was ready for revolution. Less than 40 years before Napoleon’s invasion she had experienced a peasant revolt on a grand scale, lasting a prolonged period, alternating in victories and defeats, involving the capture of large cities. The revolting force, occasionally manipulating better artillery than Catherine II’s troops, victoriously advanced across a vast territory, and for several months shook the whole structure of the Russian Empire. Of the German peasant revolt Napoleon could learn only from 300-year-old documents; of the Russian Pugachev uprising he might have heard personal reminiscences from contemporaries. The serf existence of the Russian peasants had changed very little since Pugachev’s time. The Saltitches, who used to fling the peasants on burning coals, had been replaced by the Ismailovs and Kamenskis with their torture-chambers and harems. And even the slave markets, where it was possible to buy serfs at both wholesale and retail, and children separately from their parents, remained much the same as they had been in Catherine’s day: Nizhni-Novgorod in the North, and Kremenchug in the South.

In the event of a peasant revolt, the French army, in occupa-
tion of the central portion of the country, would have served as a formidable support. This was the sole difference.

The Orthodox clergy in Smolensk had already begun, in some measure, to offer prayers for the devout French Emperor, and there is not the slightest reason to doubt that at Napoleon’s first command it would have proclaimed the abolition of serf-rights.

The masses maintained a deathly silence in greeting the intensely pale Alexander as he approached Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg immediately after receiving the reports of the Borodino losses and of the entry of the French Emperor into Moscow.

What restrained Napoleon’s hand? Why did he not make overtures to the many-millioned host of serfs? There is little need to surmise; he explained it himself. He subsequently asserted that he had feared to let loose the elements of national revolt, that he had been disinclined to create a situation in which there “would be no one with whom” he might conclude a peace. In short, the Emperor of the new bourgeois monarchy felt himself to be far more in sympathy with the master of the semi-feudal serf state than with peasant revolters. With the first he might very expeditiously come to terms, if not at this time, then later—he knew this well from the Tilsit experiment; while with the second he lacked all inclination to enter into negotiations. If the French bourgeois revolutionaries dreaded the French peasant uprising of the summer and early autumn of 1789 and were terrified of any intensification of this movement, it was scarcely astonishing that the bourgeois Emperor of 1812 felt no desire to evoke the shadow of Pugachev.

Having rejected the idea of instigating a peasant revolt in Russia, and having at the same time disposed of the idea of remaining in Moscow for the winter, Napoleon was faced with the problem of deciding on an immediate course of action. Obviously, Alexander had no intention of entering into negotiations.

Napoleon’s first thought was to advance against St. Petersburg. After the surrender of Moscow, St. Petersburg was in a panic. The court was already beginning to pack, in order to be able to depart at a moment’s notice. Alexander’s mother, Maria Feodorovna, who passionately loathed Napoleon, was the most
terrified person in the whole court. She now wanted a peace as quickly as possible. Constantine also desired it, as did the thoroughly frightened Arakeheyev. If Napoleon had advanced against St. Petersburg, the quaking Russian court would have fled. But such an advance proved impracticable. It is true that the soldiers had enjoyed a respite and were better nourished than before, but horses were scarce, so scarce that the marshals coun-
seled the abandonment of some of the guns.

They had found neither hay nor oats in Moscow, and the foraging parties sent out in this thoroughly devastated country found little to reward them for their pains. Moreover, the lowered morale of the French army made a distant northward campaign hazardous. A sudden Russian attack forced Napoleon to hasten his decision. On October 17, a portion of Kutuzov’s army fell upon Murat’s observation post on the River Chernishnya near the enemy’s camp. The attack soon developed into a battle. Murat was flung back beyond the village of Spas-Kuplia. To be sure, this was only a secondary collision, but it plainly showed that Kutuzov had received reinforcements after Borodino, and that further Russian onslaughts might be expected. Actually, the engagement was contrary to Kutuzov’s wish; Benningsen was enraged with the commander-in-chief for refusing to furnish him with the necessary forces.

Napoleon at last arrived at a decision. He proposed to leave a garrison of 10,000 in Moscow under the command of Marshal Mortier, and with the rest of his army to move against Kutuzov along the old Kaluga road. He, as well as Kutuzov, had received reinforcements. He had over 100,000 men, including 22,000 chosen soldiers and officers of the Imperial Guard. Napoleon gave the command, and on October 19 the entire French army, with the exception of Marshal Mortier’s corps, advanced along the old Kaluga road.

An endless train of carriages and transport carts, filled with provisions and loot, followed the army. Discipline had been relaxed to such a degree that even Marshal Davout had ceased to shoot offenders. Many of the rank and file, under one pretext or another, had hidden pillaged valuables in the carts, in spite of the fact that there were not sufficient horses to haul the artillery.
As it issued from the city with this endless transport, the army appeared cumbersome and unwieldy. Its progress was slow—after an entire day of uninterrupted advance on the extremely broad Kaluga road (along which eight carriages could move abreast freely) the transport had not yet entirely departed from the city.

Napoleon's military instinct promptly warned him of the precariousness of such a transport for the army, of the tremendous difficulty of protecting this endless line from sudden assaults of enemy cavalry.

Yet he feared to give the command that would have rid him of this unnecessary encumbrance. It was no longer the same army, he reasoned. After all it had experienced, clearly conscious of its critical position, fully comprehending the ordeal of days yet before it, the army was held together not so much by discipline as by its instinct for self-preservation in a hostile land. Although the Emperor's personal magnetism had lost nothing in the eyes of the old French soldiers, the troops conscripted from the conquered territories were not held in restraint by any feeling of devotion for their leader.

Surveying the long line of provision carts and conscious of the relaxation of discipline, Napoleon abruptly changed his whole plan.

He now resolved not to attack Kutuzov. A new Borodino, even a victorious Borodino, could not alter his decision to retreat from Moscow. He foresaw the impression his departure from Moscow would create on the Continent, and he was apprehensive of this impression. But, once having decided to avoid a battle with Kutuzov, Napoleon promptly turned from the old Kaluga road, and began to detour around the Russian army. It was his intention to come out on the Borovsk road, and to march toward Smolensk through areas in the Kaluga province untouched by war. He had not as yet decided to reject further war, although he planned to make his way peacefully through Malo-Yaroslavetz, and then from Kaluga to Smolensk. Possibly he would winter in Smolensk or in Vilna. But, first of all, Moscow must be completely abandoned. On the evening of October 20, Napoleon, from his headquarters in Troitzky, sent a command to Marshal
Bonaparte

Mortier to blow up the Kremlin and then proceed to join the main army.

The order to blow up the Kremlin was only partially executed. In the confusion of sudden departure, Mortier could not give his undivided attention to this undertaking, and as a result only a portion of the Kremlin was destroyed. "I never do useless things," Napoleon once said when it was rumoured that he had ordered the strangling of Pichegru in his prison cell. But there can be no doubt that the blowing up of the Kremlin was a useless venture. It was, to be sure, Napoleon's answer to Alexander's silence to his three peace proposals.

Thus the army, fulfilling Napoleon's command, suddenly turned from the old Kaluga road onto the new road and by October 23 most of the troops had reached Borovsk. Having divined Napoleon's plan, Kutuzov was resolved to obstruct the new Kaluga road. On October 24, at daybreak, General Dokhturov, and after him Rayevsky, attacked Malo-Yaroslavetz, which had been occupied the evening before by General Delsonne. Both sides were gradually reinforced, with the result that the engagement developed into a sanguinary battle which lasted the entire day. Generals Delsonne and Levier were killed. Malo-Yaroslavetz changed hands six times. The seventh time it passed into the hands of the French and remained with them, but the losses on both sides were heavy. The French lost some 5,000 men by death alone. Malo-Yaroslavetz was burned down to the ground. It caught fire during the battle, and several hundred Frenchmen and Russians were burned to death in the streets.

Early on the following day, Napoleon with a small retinue left the village of Gorodny to survey the Russian positions. Suddenly a Cossack cavalry troop, with lances set, galloped upon the group of horsemen. Two marshals who were with Napoleon—Murat and Bessières—and several officers crowded round their Emperor and made an effort to beat off the attackers. At that moment some Polish light cavalrmen and some chasseur guards came up and saved the Emperor and the group surrounding him. The danger of immediate death or imprisonment was so great, that it is doubtful if the smile which Napoleon wore throughout the episode was genuine. But all saw it and all spoke of it with
rapture: it was for this that the Emperor had smiled. In the evening he ordered the physician of the Guard to mix up a strong poison. He kept the phial containing it on his person; he would use it in the event of his being made a prisoner.

After examining the positions, Napoleon called a military council in Gorodny. Malo-Yaroslavetz had demonstrated that while Napoleon had no desire for a new Borodino, the Russians themselves were seeking it. A new general battle threatened in the southern provinces, through which the French army must pass.

The military council unanimously agreed that a major engagement must be rejected if it were at all possible. There was no alternative but to follow the utterly devastated road to Smolensk. This must be done with all possible speed, before the Russians could occupy Mojaïsk, and thus cut off the retreat.

But Kutuzov had no desire for a battle and did not seek one.

After the battle at Malo-Yaroslavetz, Kutuzov was firmly resolved to give Napoleon an opportunity to retire, without exerting the slightest active pressure against him. When the foreigners at Russian headquarters became too meddlesome and began to reproach the old field marshal for his lack of energy, he suddenly showed his claws. Mincing no words, he let them know that he understood their game and that he was well aware of their reasons for not desiring a "premature" conclusion of Russia's war with Napoleon. Speaking to the English Commissioner, Wilson, in October of 1812, he declared:

"I will say again, as I have already said to you before, that I am not at all convinced that the complete destruction of the Emperor Napoleon and his army would be such a boon for the world. His legacy would not be destined for Russia, nor for any other continental country, but for that country which even now dominates the seas and whose sway should then become unendurable."

The Emperor gave the order for a retirement to Smolensk. On October 27 the men turned from Borovsk toward Vereyú, Mojaïsk, Dorogobuzh and Smolensk. This time, by Napoleon's command, all the villages through which the army passed were burned; scarcely a farmhouse escaped. Beginning, however,
with Mojaisk there was hardly anything left to burn, so terribly had these regions been devastated before the Battle of Borodino. The town of Mojaisk had been utterly laid waste. Passing the field of Borodino, the soldiers gazed at the 57,000 putrescent Russian and French corpses. Napoleon commanded his men to make haste to leave the place behind. The terrible spectacle depressed the soldiers, now that they knew the war had been lost.

As they were approaching Gjatsk on October 30, the first severe frosts were felt. This was, to some degree, unexpected. According to tabulations made for Napoleon before the invasion, the 1811 frosts in this zone had not begun until the end of December. The winter of 1812 began extraordinarily early and proved to be exceptionally cold. Kutuzov followed on the heels of the retiring enemy. The Cossacks harassed the French with sudden attacks. Before Vyazma the regular Russian cavalry made an assault on the French army, but Kutuzov deliberately avoided a general battle, although all his advisers goaded him on. All that mattered to Kutuzov was the assurance that Napoleon would leave Russia, while for the throng of Germans and French émigrés who surrounded him, Napoleon’s retreat from Russia was not the end but only the beginning of a matter of vital importance to their nations. They wanted to be rid of Napoleon for all time, and this was only possible by a complete defeat, imprisonment or death. Otherwise—so it seemed to them—everything on the Continent would remain as formerly, and Napoleon would continue to hold power as far as the Niemen. This time, however, Kutuzov refused to yield.

The weather grew colder and colder. The Cossacks and the Russian militia, led by Figner, Seslavin and Davidov, raided the French provision train and captured all manner of foodstuffs and ammunition. Gradually Napoleon’s army became weaker and more dispirited.

When on November 6 the French reached Dorogobuzh there remained only 50,000 men fit for battle.

As always, Napoleon endured all the hardships of the campaign, and made every effort to hearten his soldiers by personal example. For hours on end he tramped across the snowdrifts, supporting himself on a stick, and chatting with the rank and file
who walked beside him. As yet he did not know whether he would winter in Smolensk, or even whether he would remain there at all. However, on arriving in Dorogobuzh, he received news from Paris that hastened his resolution to leave Smolensk.

It seemed that a certain General Malet, an old republican who had long been confined in prison, had somehow managed to escape. He forged a Senate decree and appeared with it before a military company. Announcing the death of Napoleon in Russia, he read them the forged decree proclaiming a republic, arrested Minister of Police Savary, and wounded the Minister of War. The disturbance lasted two hours. Malet was finally recognised, seized, handed over to a military tribunal and shot. With him were executed 11 other persons, whose only guilt lay in their belief in the authenticity of the decree. Malet had conceived the entire conspiracy by himself, while confined in prison.

For all its absurdity, this episode made a profound impression on Napoleon. He felt that his presence was needed in Paris.

The frosts grew more bitter. By the time Napoleon's men reached Smolensk on November 9, some of them had grown so weak that when they lay down to rest they were unable to rise again—they froze to death where they lay. They had failed to bring warm winter clothes from Moscow, and this fatal negligence at the very beginning of the retreat proved to be their undoing. They were forced to abandon a large portion of the transport and part of the artillery; there could be no lingering, for the horses continued to fall by the wayside in even greater numbers than before. The Russian militia and the Cossacks became daily more bold, attacking the rear guard and the laggards at every turn in the road.

When Napoleon received reports of fresh defeats of detachments of his army, he realised that to remain in Smolensk was unthinkable. It was imperative to ford the Berezina before the Russians cut off the crossing. Speed—and speed alone—could save the Emperor and the remnant of his army from capture.

On leaving Moscow Napoleon had some 100,000 men; on evacuating Smolensk on November 14 only 76,000 men preserved military formation, several thousand lagging behind the main detachments of the army. Now Napoleon did what he had
so much hesitated to do upon leaving Moscow: he ordered all
carts and carriages to be burned, so that there would be enough
horses to drag the cannon.

On November 16, the Russians attacked Eugene Beauharnais’s corps near Krasnoe, and inflicted severe losses on them. The battle was renewed the following day. The French were forced to retire, after losing 14,000 men in two days. Of these, 5,000 were either killed or wounded; the rest were made prisoners. Even now the battles near Krasnoe were by no means ended.

Cut off from the rest of the army, Marshal Ney lost 3,000 of his 7,000 men. With the remainder of his troops he found himself forced back to the river bank by almost the whole of Kutuzov’s army. By night he crossed the Dnieper, north of Krasnoe. The thin ice cracked, and many of his men fell through and perished. Ney and 1,200 survivors managed to reach Orsha.

Napoleon made every effort to maintain discipline, but he did not give sufficient attention to his line of communications in the direction of Minsk. When he reached Dubrovka he learned that his Polish detachments, which had been holding Mogilev and Minsk, had been pushed back. General Dombrovski, having received the command to advance to Borisov, had given no assistance to General Bronikovski, and on November 16 Minsk was occupied by Chichagov. At Minsk the Russians captured the immense stores of provisions collected at Napoleon’s command by the Duke of Bassano (Maret). A thaw began.

The position had become wholly desperate. From the north, Wittgenstein was approaching to prevent Napoleon from crossing the Berezina; Marshals Oudinot and Victor could not check him. From the south, Chichagov was advancing toward the city of Borisov on the Berezina. On November 22, Chichagov entered Borisov, ejecting Dombrovski.

Napoleon paled when this was reported to him. The detachments of Platov and Ermolov—Kutuzov’s advance posts—were by this time a mere one or two marches away from him. He might at any moment be surrounded and forced to surrender. Promptly he ordered that another location be found, where it would be possible to erect bridges.

There had been a permanent bridge at Borisov, but when it
was learned that it had been destroyed, the most courageous men on the Emperor's staff were distraught. Napoleon soon recovered his self-possession. After a report from General Corbino, he decided to cross at Studianka, to the north of Borisov, where the Polish Uhlans had found a ford. At this point the River Berezina was less than 30 yards in width, but both banks were covered with slimy mud, which made it necessary to build a bridge three times the width of the river.

By an adroit manoeuvre, Napoleon deceived Chichagov. He pretended that he still intended to cross at Borisov. On November 23, Marshal Oudinot defeated Count Pahlen, the commander of Chichagov's advance guard, and, continuing his pursuit, forced Chichagov to abandon Borisov, which he had but lately occupied. But Chichagov remained in the neighbourhood, while from the north Wittgenstein was approaching with all possible speed.

To make a crossing here was impracticable, if not impossible. Yet because of Napoleon's misleading actions, Chichagov was convinced that the crossing would be made at or below Borisov. But by daybreak of November 26, Napoleon himself was already at Studianka. Promptly the French sappers, standing up to their waists in water amidst floating ice, began to erect two pontoon bridges. Soon after midday Oudinot's corps began the crossing. The Russians on the right bank made an attempt to attack the detachments making their way across the river, but the French Cuirassier Guards counter-attacked and forced General Chaplitz to retire. Wittgenstein, even as Chicagov, had been duped by Napoleon, and the remnants of the French army saved themselves from capture. The Russian military historian, Apukhtin, says: "One can hardly blame Chichagov and Wittgenstein, obviously incompetent generals, for their lack of courage in failing to enter into single combat with Napoleon."

The crossing was orderly, and nearly the whole French army had succeeded in reaching the other side without mishap, when suddenly 14,000 soldiers who had fallen behind rushed toward the bridge, pursued by Cossacks. In a panic, the laggards flung themselves upon the bridge, but the last regular detachment of Victor's corps held them back with fixed bayonets. Informed by
the Cossacks that the French army was crossing at Studianka, Kutuzov promptly notified Chichagov. At this time one of the artillery bridges collapsed, and after being repaired, it collapsed again. Had Chichagov arrived in time, the catastrophe would have been a final one. But, deliberately or not, he was so late that Napoleon and his army succeeded in crossing to the right bank.

Of 14,000 laggards, driven off the bridge by Victor’s regulars, 10,000 remained on the left bank; they were in part beaten to death by the Cossacks and in part made prisoners. The crossing accomplished, Napoleon promptly ordered the bridges burned. But for this, the others might also have been saved, but necessity demanded that the Russians be denied the means of crossing, while the destruction of 10,000 stragglers did not deter the Emperor. He considered necessary only those soldiers who remained in the ranks. As for those who left the ranks, no matter for what cause—whether because of illness or frozen hands and feet—they ceased to be valuable fighting material; he was not concerned with what was likely to befall them later. Napoleon was solicitous of the sick and wounded only when his solicitude could not injure the soldiers fit for battle. In this instance, conditions demanded that the bridges be burned as quickly as possible; he therefore burned them without the slightest hesitation.

The remnants of Napoleon’s army proceeded towards Vilna. But the temporary thaw, which had made it necessary to build the bridges over the Berezina, suddenly changed to intense cold. The temperature dropped to 15, then to 20, 26, 28 degrees below zero—and the soldiers began to succumb by the tens and hundreds. The marching army walked round the corpses, the half dead, the suddenly stricken—then closed ranks and marched on. Nothing more horrible had previously occurred during this calamitous retreat. Never before had the soldiers experienced such unendurable cold. Kutuzov followed almost at Napoleon’s heels. His army also suffered, but it was far better clothed than the French. Kutuzov had left for Malo-Yaroslavetz with an army of over 100,000 men; when he came to Vilna in mid-December he had less than 27,500. And of his 622 guns, he had lost 425 on the way.
Napoleon feared only the attacks of Kutuzov’s main army. The Cossacks, to be sure, greatly harassed the retiring French army, attacking its transport and its rear guard. But by themselves they were not strong enough to conduct independent battles against the French. In the engagements before Krasnoe they played an important though only a subsidiary rôle. As for the Russian militia, the French feared them even less than they did the Cossacks. There were several militia detachments, commanded by Davidov, Figner, Dorokhov, Seslavin, Vadbolsky, Kudashev and two or three others. The French did not recognise them as a part of the regular army and instead of taking them prisoners, they shot them outright. And the militiamen retaliated in kind. Figner in particular was notorious for his cruelty. The militia consisted of volunteer officers and rank and file who had been dismissed by the authorities. The French scarcely mention these militiamen in their memoirs, while they have a great deal to say about the Cossacks, unanimously admitting the great injury which the fast elusive Cossack cavalry wrought among the retreating army by its sudden raids. But the militia attacked only the wholly disorganised detachments.

Here is a picture from life, drawn by the famous militiaman, Denis Davidov:

“At last the old Guard came up. In the midst of it was Napoleon himself. . . . We sprang upon our horses and again appeared on the main road. The enemy, on sighting our noisy crowds, cocked their guns and proudly walked on, without increasing their pace. No matter how hard we tried to part but a single ranker from these compact columns, they, as if made of granite, scornful of all our efforts, remained untouched. I shall never forget the easy gait and stern bearing of these warriors tried by all manner of death. Shielded by tall bearskin busbies, in blue regimentals, white leather adjuncts, with red plumes and epaulettes, they looked like poppy-coloured spots amidst the snowy fields. . . . All our Asiatic attacks made not the least impression on the compactly serried European formation. . . . The columns moved one after another, driving us away with their riflefire and making mock of our futile equestrian antics as we circled round them. In the course of this day we captured a gen-
eral, a quantity of transports and 700 prisoners, but the Guard with Napoleon in their midst passed through the throngs of our Cossacks like a hundred-gunned frigate through a swarm of fishing rowboats.”

The militiamen, it will be observed, had on this day joined with the Cossacks—it was only for this reason that they had succeeded in capturing 700 men. But they made excellent scouts, and provided Kutuzov and his generals with much advance information.

It would not be amiss here to say something of the so-called Russian “national war” of 1812.

Never did Napoleon, or his marshals, or their companions in arms, speak of the war of 1812 as a “national” war, in the same sense that they spoke of the Spanish guerilla war as a “national” war. Nor could they compare the two phenomena. The war in Russia lasted six months. Of these six months, the first three saw Napoleon constantly victorious as he advanced along a direct line from Kovno to Vilna to Smolensk to Moscow, interrupted by battles and petty skirmishes with the regular Russian army. There was, however, not a single national mass revolt against the French—neither then nor after Napoleon’s entry into Moscow. Indeed, there were occurrences of quite a contrary nature, as when the peasants of Smolensk complained to the French authorities that their master, the landowner Engelhardt, had been guilty of betraying the French. Incidentally, Engelhardt was shot by the French after this.

Following the Battle of Malo-Yaroslavetz, when the frosts intensified the profound disorganisation of the retreating French army, there came into being that phenomenon which contemporaries accurately described as “the actions of the militia detachments,” but which later came to be known as “a national war.” The heads of the militia—Figner, Davidov, Seslavin, Kudashev, Vadbolsky—were officers of the regular Russian army who had been authorised to organise detachments of volunteers (from among the soldiers of the regular army and willing newcomers). These militia detachments had instructions to harass the French army by sudden forays on its transport, on its lagging detach-
ments and generally on those points where these small "parties" (never consisting of more than several hundred men) might attack with some prospect of success. In these militia corps were to be found soldiers, Cossacks, and reserves. The peasants as a group took no part in these activities. Their duties were to give topographical directions and generally to answer questions put to them by the militia chiefs. On occasion they were ordered to act as guides in localities unfamiliar to the militiamen, or to make assaults on single French soldiers lagging behind the main army.

All this transpired in the course of approximately five weeks, in October and November. Later, when the French army left the Smolensk province and entered White Russia, the peasantry, with little personal risk, captured many of the hungry, half-frozen French laggards. Most of them were immediately put to death.

This disorganised stalking by the peasantry bore little resemblance to that ruthless and indefatigable war which the Spanish people, on their own initiative, waged for five years. This struggle had begun when Napoleon's desire to conquer Spain was scarcely revealed, and it ended only when Napoleon finally renounced his ambition and ordered the last French soldiers to leave the Peninsula. In this conflict the Spanish peasants abandoned their villages for years at a time, organising special detachments which attacked the French in irregular fashion and once forced an entire French army corps to surrender. They fought with such savagery that Napoleon's men considered them demented. Saragossa had shown how cities defended themselves, and the French who had fought in Spain afterwards asserted that every village proved a miniature Saragossa.

It is clear that if the Spanish guerilla warfare might justifiably be called a national war, it would be impossible to apply this term to any Russian movement in the war of 1812.

People began to regard even the burning of Smolensk and Moscow and the firing of villages as manifestations of "national war," overlooking the fact that these were systematic acts of the Russian army in its retreat to Moscow.

After Berezina the French army diminished not only in consequence of the terrible frosts, but also because Partouneaux's
division, ordered by Napoleon to bewilder Chichagov by remaining at Borisov, was attacked by Kutuzov’s main forces. Of Partouneaux’s 4,000, over half were killed or captured in that two-day battle; the remainder capitulated after being completely surrounded.

The cold was so intense between the Berezina and Vilna, where the army arrived on December 9, that the wounded and those who had fallen in their tracks from exhaustion were left behind to freeze to death.

In Vilna the remnants of the shattered army stood on the threshold of salvation. They approached the city in confusion, suffering from cold and fatigue. However, several detachments still were fit for battle. When close to Vilna, Ney and Maisonne opened an intensive artillery fire on the pressing Russians, and the pursuit weakened for several days.

The army that entered Vilna was an undisciplined, demoralised mob. Separate detachments fought with each other as they sought for shelter and food and began to pillage the stores and the shops. From December 10 to 12 the army marched toward Kovno, pursued by the stubborn Cossacks. Kutuzov with his main forces was still several marches from Vilna. Without pausing at Kovno, the remnants of the Grand Army crossed the frozen Niemen.

The terrible Moscow campaign had come to an end. Of the 420,000 men who had crossed the frontier in June, 1812, there remained only small scattered groups in December of the same year. Later in Prussia and in Poland it was possible to organise a small army of approximately 30,000 men, consisting chiefly of those detachments which had remained in the rear during the half year. The rest were prisoners in Russia or had perished. By the most optimistic reckoning, the prisoners left behind did not exceed 100,000 men. All the others perished either on the battlefields, or from cold, hunger, fatigue and disease during the retreat.

On the evening of December 5, in the village of Smorgoni—a full week before the army finally recrossed the Russian frontier—Napoleon, accompanied by Caulaincourt, Duroc, Lobo and the
Polish officer Vonsovitch, departed from the army, after transferring the command to Murat.

His departure was preceded by a conference with his marshals, who at first deferentially attempted to dissuade him. But when Napoleon asserted that the army now ran no danger of capture, such as had threatened it before the crossing of the Berezina, and that, in his opinion, the marshals were quite capable of conducting the remnants to Prussia, they assented.

Napoleon was quite calm during his talk with the marshals. That he was not forsaking the army out of fear, that his own life was now out of danger, that he had often met real danger in their presence without blinking an eye—they knew well. Nor did he manifest any concern when he spoke to them of this terrible war and the lost Grand Army. To be sure, it was sad, but after all it had been more a misfortune than a mistake: there was the horrible climate. Yet he reluctantly admitted that there had been mistakes on his part. For example, too long a halt in Moscow. During this conversation Napoleon revealed not a shadow of confusion or discomposure. He demanded that his marshals temporarily keep his departure a secret. It was not only important to prevent complete disorganisation of the soldiers during the several days that yet remained before they could reach the Niemen, but it was even more important to make the passage through Germany before the Germans discovered the complete truth of the loss of the Grand Army and the fact that the Emperor was traveling through the country without a guard.

There was one thing which the marshals did not doubt. It was that the Emperor was making the journey to create a new army, that he would accomplish this expeditiously, and that he would lead them again in the face of the enemy’s guns.

As they escorted him to the sleigh in which Caulaincourt was already waiting, the marshals observed that he was as calm as he had been during the first victorious days of the Moscow campaign. Among the marshals were men who had been with him in all his battles, from his first conquest of Italy to the end of the Russian invasion, and they imagined that they could never again witness anything so terrible as Borodino. They had yet to experience Leipzig!
The solitary sleigh, which disappeared in the snowy dusk of the December evening, bore away a man who was firmly resolved not to yield his domination of Europe without the most stubborn struggle.
For twelve days and nights, first in a sleigh, then in a carriage, Napoleon dashed across Poland, Germany and France, and on the morning of December 18, 1812, he appeared in the Tuileries.

He had maintained the strictest incognito during his journey, comprehending to the full the danger of these critical days. He had no illusion that any genuine feeling of friendliness toward himself existed among the Germans. Caulaincourt, who accompanied him, spoke of Napoleon's complete calm, his good cheer, his energy and his eagerness for a further struggle. Of the recent Russian campaign, Napoleon said: "I erred, but not in the aim and not in the political necessity of this war, but rather in the manner in which I conducted it. I should have remained in Vitebsk. Alexander would now have been at my feet."

The entire tone of these conversations with Caulaincourt suggested that of a grand master of chess who had just lost a game and was analysing his mistakes in the interval between the lost game and the approaching new one, which it would be well to make every effort to win. Not only was there lacking the slightest consciousness of the horror of all that had transpired and his own preponderant personal responsibility, but there was not even a trace of that troubled mood which had so often and so noticeably descended upon him in the years 1810 and 1811, when he was at the height of his power. War was in so large a degree his element that when he prepared for it or conducted it he always gave the impression of living a full life, of breathing with a full chest. And his whole thought, from the moment he seated himself in
the sleigh with Caulaincourt, was directed toward the next war. These questions concerned him: Must he continue his war with the Russians? If Europe rose up against him, which country would initiate the revolt, and how precisely could he forestall it? How many months would it take to organise a new army?

He stopped en route in Warsaw and spoke to his minister to the King of Saxony, the Abbé Pradt. Pradt, too, was astonished at his calm. It was to him that the Emperor spoke the famous words: "From the sublime to the ridiculous is but a step." At this point, however, he added that he would soon return to the Vistula with an army of 300,000 and that "the Russians would pay dearly for their successes, for which they could thank not themselves, but nature." Who did not experience failure? "To be sure, such failures no one had ever experienced, but—they must be proportionate to my good fortune; in any event, they will soon be smoothed out."

On his arrival in Paris, on December 18, Napoleon immediately sensed the people’s disappointment at the unsuccessful campaign. The ominous rumours had been confirmed two days before Napoleon’s arrival at the capital by the famous Bulletin 29, in which the Emperor spoke frankly of the Russian campaign and its conclusion. The mourning of several hundred thousand families only added to the common atmosphere of gloom.

During the ensuing days Napoleon received his ministers, the State Council and the Senate. Sternly and contemptuously he commented on the confusion of the authorities during the October revolt of General Malet, and demanded an accounting of their behaviour. However, he spoke only evasively about his Russian campaign, vouchsafing no detailed explanations.

As in the past his courtiers flattered him and toadied to him. President Lacépède of the Senate suggested that coronation rites be held for the year-and-a-half-old heir "as a symbol of the uninterrupted of authority." At this point the Senate in full quorum genuflected three times before the Emperor. In his response, Napoleon touched upon the war with Russia; it was clearly revealed here that he was again consoling himself with the illusion (from which one would have imagined he had wholly rid himself when he ordered Mortier to blow up the Kremlin) that it was
still possible to conclude a peace with Alexander, having played the game to a draw.

"The war which I am carrying on is a political war. I have undertaken it without hostility. I wanted to rid Russia of those evils which she herself had caused. I could have armed against her a part of her own population, by proclaiming the liberation of the peasants. . . . Many villages begged me to do this, but I rejected a measure which would have doomed to death thousands of families." Over the heads of his senators, Napoleon addressed himself to the Russian landowners and to the "first" among the Russian landowners—to the Tsar himself. Napoleon now demanded gratitude from the Tsar and the landowners for delivering them from a new Pugachev rebellion, as though he did not quite grasp the fact that now, in the throne-room of the Tuileries, this weapon, feared so much while he was in the throne-room of the Kremlin, was quite useless, since he was no longer in a position to use it even if he had been so inclined. All these recepections, all this comedy of servile lies on the one hand, and high-flown responsive lies on the other—all this, of course, was merely a smokescreen to hide the true plight of France from vassal Europe.

There were two immediate problems which awaited solution. The first was to create an army. The second was to secure if not the assistance then the neutrality of Austria, and, as far as it was possible, of Prussia also.

The first problem was quickly solved. While still in Russia, Napoleon had issued an order for the premature conscription of the recruits of 1813. Now in the spring of 1813, the training period of the new recruits was almost at an end. There were 140,000 men. As early as 1812 Napoleon had ordered the organisation of "cohorts of the national guard," and now he included them in the army, presumably by their own desire, even though the national guard's sole duty was to preserve order within the Empire. This provided another 100,000 men. In June of 1812, Napoleon had left 235,000 men behind him in France and in vassal Germany. Now it was possible to count on these as well. Finally, several tens of thousands of men—about
30,000 as it turned out later—survived the rigours of the Russian campaign.

As a result the Emperor hoped to have an army of from 400,000 to 450,000 men by the spring of 1813. He realised that this estimate might prove to be an optimistic one, but in any case he did not doubt he would have a large army at his disposal, and that before very long.

Now in the spring of 1813 Alexander I disregarded the pacific notes in Napoleon’s speeches to the Senate, even as he had disregarded the letters transmitted to him by Tutolmin, Yakovlev and Lauristion in the autumn of 1812. But Napoleon had the fullest assurance that he would meet the Russians on the Vistula and completely destroy them. He knew that Kutuzov had suffered immense losses during the winter of 1812, though he did not know that in the two months’ pursuit to the Niemen the Russian commander had lost two thirds of his army of 100,000 men, and over two thirds of his artillery. Considering the state of the Russian roads, and Russian conditions generally, Napoleon felt that it would be a long time before Alexander could make up these losses. Without repeating the mistake of invading Russia, it would be possible calmly to await the Tsar’s troops on the Vistula and the Niemen and to destroy them there.

But here a grave problem presented itself: would the Russians be alone? Napoleon remembered how in December of 1812, the Prussian General York, who, by the terms of Prussia’s “alliance” with France was under the command of Marshal Macdonald, had suddenly gone over to the Russian side. It is true that the frightened Frederick William made haste to repudiate York, but Napoleon knew that the king was in a precarious position—that the Russians could depose him if he did not come to their aid. Napoleon also realised that it was absurd to expect that the Prussia which had been crushed by him should fail to make some effort to free herself from his domination if the Russian army entered the country.

Kutuzov favoured a cessation of the war, not only because he did not see any reason to shed more Russian blood in order to liberate Prussia and the German states, but also because he fore-
saw the obvious difficulties exhausted Russia would experience in a new war with Napoleon. But Alexander was wholly irreconcilable. He reasoned that to give Napoleon a respite was to abandon all of Europe to his former authority, and to create a permanent threat on the Niemen.

And if the Russian army, having entered the frontiers of Prussia, should receive reinforcements, it was clear that the Prussian king would be forced to take up arms against the French Emperor.

Austria's conduct also began to displease Napoleon. His father-in-law, Emperor Francis, and Metternich had signed a "truce" with Russia, with whom Austria, as Napoleon's "ally," had been officially at war since 1812. It was clear that notwithstanding their new kinship, the Austrian emperor considered the position into which his son-in-law had fallen as an unexpected bit of fortune for Austria, as a pledge of approaching liberation from the terrible ignominy which she had suffered since Wagram and the Schönbrunn peace.

During this precarious period the French Emperor suddenly remembered that having occupied Rome in 1809 he had taken the Roman Pope under guard and brought him to Savona, while in 1812, before leaving for Moscow, he had ordered him transferred to Fontainebleau. The fiction had been maintained that the guard was a convoy of honour, and that the imperial palace at Fontainebleau was not a place of confinement but a shelter for a guest of His Majesty. The Pope did not cease to protest, both against the seizure of the city of Rome (which Napoleon had presented to his new-born son, the "King of Rome") and his imprisonment. Unexpectedly, Napoleon paid a visit to his captive on January 19, 1813. It seemed politic to make peace with the Catholics; since 1809 they had been murmuring against the Emperor. However, in spite of all the pleasantries exchanged by Napoleon and the Pope, nothing came of the visit.

The Emperor forced Pius VII to sign a new Concordat, but he did not restore Rome to him. In any case, the new Concordat was merely a repetition of the decree of 1802.

Napoleon did not make any concessions. He did not like concessions, and he had no capacity for making them. These futile
advances to Pius VII ended when Napoleon discovered the hostile counsel given the Pope by Cardinal di Pietro. Di Pietro was arrested and exiled from Fontainebleau.

During this unsuccessful attempt to make peace with the Pope, the Emperor said: “We shall leave Rome alone for the time being. . . . This number has been placed in an urn—and it will come out only after my great victory on the Elbe or the Vistula.” In this, indeed, as we shall presently see, lay the root of the whole matter: in the course of the entire year 1813, and beyond that, Napoleon continued to suspend negotiations with his enemies, always hoping for a great victory. Fortune had played on his side for too long. When related to his whole life and when contrasted with all he had accomplished—beginning with the capture of Toulon in 1793 and ending in the creation of a world state in 1812—it must be admitted that the war of 1812 was the sole dark spot on his banner of successes.

Prussia was ready to sever her alliance. The king asked Napoleon for the liberation of at least a few areas from French military occupation; he also asked for the 94,000,000 francs which the French treasury owed Prussia for the maintenance of French troops—and he received a refusal on both counts. England could not reconcile herself to the French conquest of Spain, while Napoleon, on opening the sessions of the Legislative Corps on February 14, 1813, bluntly announced: “The French dynasty is ruling and shall continue to rule in Spain.” In March, Metternich demanded to know the conditions upon which Napoleon would be willing to conclude a general peace—and he was not vouchsafed a direct answer. All this was dependent, as in the Pope’s case, upon a great victory on the Vistula or the Niemen; such a victory would decide everything. In his speech of February 14, Napoleon guaranteed that the entire territory of the Empire would remain inviolable, that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw would retain its former status. Metternich, not desirous at that moment of breaking with Napoleon, told Otto, the French Ambassador in Vienna, that this pronouncement made it impossible for Napoleon to conclude a peace with Russia, England or Prussia.

Austrian representatives visited Castlereagh in London and
Alexander in Kalisch. And in both cities they received the same answer: if Napoleon refused to make some definite concessions, there could be no alternative to war. Finally, the Prussian king formally concluded an alliance with Alexander. In reply to this, Napoleon proclaimed a new conscription levy. Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden remained loyal to him.

On April 15, 1813, Napoleon left Paris to join his army at Erfurt, preparatory to the advance against the Russians and Prussians. The troops were excellently equipped. In the course of the first months of 1813, Napoleon devoted whole days to the creation and organisation of the army, and his nights to the improvement of the finances. As a consequence, the army did not stand in need of anything for which it could not pay with ready coin: it was highly important not to vex the inhabitants of the German lands while they remained docile "allies."

Two hundred thousand of his men were in complete readiness; approximately the same number of reserves were in training or in process of formation. Immediately before the beginning of the campaign, Kutuzov died, and at the moment when hostilities began the Russians and Prussians were without a commander-in-chief. Success crowned Napoleon's first efforts. The Russians were forced out of Weissenfels. Then, on May 1 and 2, there followed French victories at Weissenfels and Lützen. In the battle at Weissenfels, Marshal Bessières, who was with the Emperor several paces in front of the old Guard, was struck by an enemy projectile which rent his breast, killing him. "Death is approaching us," said Napoleon, looking on as the dead marshal was being wrapped in a cloak to be borne away from the field of battle. The battle at Lützen was stubborn and sanguinary. On his mount Napoleon sped from one flank to the other, directing all operations. Alexander and Frederick William were not far from the scene of battle, but took no actual part in it. The Russians and Prussians were forced to retire. The Allies lost about 20,000 men, and the French somewhat less. Within several days Napoleon was in Dresden.

After Napoleon's victory at Lützen, Metternich made an effort to negotiate a peace between France and the Allies. He
promised Napoleon the support of Austria, in return for the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, the Protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, the Hanseatic cities and Illyria. All the rest of the French Empire—Belgium, all of Italy, Holland, the Kingdom of Westphalia—would remain Napoleon’s, as formerly. Napoleon rejected the proposal. He was resolved to fight and fight again, conceding nothing. An uprising against Napoleon was discovered in Hamburg. The Emperor despatched Davout to punish the Hanseatic cities for their insubordination to the police and to the French customs officials, who had ruined local trade by their strict enforcement of the Continental Blockade. Davout had orders to shoot the members of the Hamburg Senate, all the leaders of the anti-French movement and several officers. He was also instructed to arrest the 500 wealthiest citizens suspected of political activity and to confiscate their property.

Having issued these commands, Napoleon left Dresden with the Guard and joined the army advancing eastward to Bautzen. He was accompanied on the road from Dresden to Breslau by four army corps—those of Ney, Marmont, Oudinot and Bertrand. The Allied commanders Wittgenstein, Barclay de Tolly, Miloradovitch and Blücher opposed them. The Battle of Bautzen began on May 20 and ended on the evening of the 21st. Napoleon directed Ney to deploy to the north to cut off the right flank of the enemy. But Ney, neglecting the counsel of his chief of staff Jomini, was late in arriving at his destination. The Allies retired in good order.

The battle was almost as bloody as the Battle of Lützen. Some 30,000 men on both sides were killed and wounded. The victory was again Napoleon’s, and it was his intention, while pursuing the retreating Russians and Prussians, to march straight to Berlin. The Allies retired fighting, slowing down the pursuit. On May 22 the Emperor attacked the rear guard of the retreating enemy near Görlitz, and forced it to retire.

Toward evening, as the battle was coming to an end with the enemy preparing to retire, Duroc approached Napoleon and spoke to him. As he walked away, he remarked, sadly, to Caulaincourt:
"My friend, have you been observing the Emperor? Now after his failures, which should have been a lesson to him, he is again enjoying victories. But you can see how little he has changed. He seeks battles, without becoming satiated with them. . . No happy end can come of all this."

Just at that moment, a large projectile struck a tree beside which Napoleon stood; it ricocheted and struck Duroc. He barely managed to wish the Emperor victory and a conclusion of peace before he died.

"Farewell," Napoleon answered, "perhaps, we shall meet soon."

The death of Duroc—one of the few men whom Napoleon loved and trusted—intensely impressed him. Pensively, he seated himself on a tree stump. The bullets of the Prussian rear guard whizzed past him, but so deeply did he meditate that he did not soon rise from the stump. Throughout the campaign of 1813 he often needlessly exposed himself to danger—something he had not permitted himself to do before. During the pursuit of the retreating enemy, which kept up an energetic fire, he was with the advance guard among the young recruits, in a position of the greatest danger, where there was not the slightest necessity for his presence.

After Bautzen and several days' pursuit of the retreating Allies, the warring nations accepted Austria's mediation proposals, which had been inspired by Metternich, and concluded a truce. On June 4 the truce was signed at Pleiswitz.

In signing the peace, neither the Allies nor Napoleon desired a permanent cessation of hostilities, although both sides agreed to Metternich's proposal to send their representatives to Prague for a parley. The Allies realised that Napoleon, who had not been inclined to yield even before Lützen and Bautzen, was even less likely to yield after two such victories. If Alexander, for his part, agreed to a truce, it was because Barclay de Tolly candidly announced that the army was not in a condition, after the recent battles, to continue the war without reorganisation and reinforcements. Napoleon likewise agreed to an armistice for the sole purpose of gaining time to receive recruits with which he
could finally crush the Allies. In signing the truce he committed a fatal blunder. The truce was a boon to his enemies, serving as one of the causes for Austria’s abandonment of her mediatory rôle and for her alliance with the Allies.

“All—or nothing!” With this slogan Napoleon had begun the great conflict of 1813, and with this slogan he now continued it. Even on the island of Saint Helena, after the loss of everything—even his personal freedom—he never expressed the slightest regret for this error. And, in fact, he never considered it an error. “If I were not myself, but my own grandson,” he said ironically, “I might have returned defeated and reigned after losing.” And again and again he clarified his thought, defining the difference between himself and the monarchs ruling by hereditary right.

However, this is not by any means the whole truth. After the horrors of the Moscow campaign, Napoleon met with unquestionable submission in Paris. There is little reason to doubt that it would have received him in the same mood—intensified a hundredfold—if after his brilliant spring campaign of 1813 he had returned home, having preserved all his immense domains except distant Illyria, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and the Confederation of the Rhine (where, as a matter of fact, he ruled not in person but through vassals). But he knew that these concessions, this rejection of the idea of completing his world empire, would have signified the economic and political triumph of England. The problem—which he considered his—would have remained unsolved. French commerce and industry would have been rendered powerless to carry on the struggle against English commerce and industry; the crisis of 1811, as well as unemployment, would have become a chronic phenomenon. The “revolution of the empty stomach,” which was not afraid of bullets, would have built itself a nest in the workers’ quarters, in the capital and in the provinces. The bourgeoisie, whose faithful leader he had been in the economic conflict with England, would find no further need of him. He doubted that the French bourgeoisie which had thus far borne his unheard-of despotism, would continue to bear it in the future. And to rule differently he neither wished nor could.
It was this, then, that caused Napoleon to reject Metternich's proposals and to send Davout with the command to shoot and to confiscate in the Hanseatic cities. It was this that impelled him to think not of peace and a return to Paris, but of a new campaign on the Vistula and the Niemen. It was this that made the conversations in Prague an empty comedy. They asked him to cede Hamburg, and he thought of the Niemen; they suggested that he yield Illyria, but he had not yet recalled his agents from Turkey, Persia, Syria and Egypt. Guns alone could decide this dispute, not diplomatic subtleties. Austrian diplomacy, in essence, neither desired a final Napoleonic victory over the Coalition, nor a final Coalition victory over Napoleon. Such a victory would have given European hegemony to the Tsar. Metternich made every effort to prevail upon Napoleon to make concessions. Arriving at the palace in Dresden, where Napoleon was making his quarters, he appeared before him on June 28.

Napoleon began threateningly, accusing Austria, under the pretext of mediation, of preparing to join the Coalition:

"Admit it! You want to war upon me? That proves that human beings are incorrigible! Lessons serve them to no purpose! The Russians and the Prussians, notwithstanding hard experience, have grown venturesome after the successes of last winter and have become impertinent towards me—And I've given them a drubbing. Do you want to receive one in your turn? Good. You shall receive yours. I shall make an appointment with you in Vienna in October!"

Metternich respectfully but very firmly protested that Austria had nothing of the sort in view, that she wanted a durable peace. And at this point he stated the conditions: Napoleon could retain all of his Empire save Illyria, Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and sovereignty over the Confederation of the Rhine.

Napoleon flew into a rage:

"I know your secret! You Austrians want all of Italy, your Russian friends want Poland, the Prussians Saxony, the English Belgium and Holland . . . and if I yield to you today, tomorrow you will demand all this from me! But for this you must be ready to mobilise millions of people, shed the blood of several
generations—and carry on negotiations at the foot of Montmartre!"

Metternich replied that he demanded nothing of the sort, that the peace which he had proposed was a fine, honourable peace. Napoleon contended that the slightest concession would humiliate him.

"Your sovereigns, born on the throne, cannot understand the feelings which inspire me," he said. "They return conquered to their capitals, and for them everything is the same. But I am a soldier. Honour and fame are necessary to me. I cannot show myself humiliated before my people. It is necessary for me to remain great, renowned, provoking rapture!"

Metternich replied that, if such was the case, there would be no end to hostilities, in spite of the fact that all of Europe, France included, was tired of war.

"Sire, I have only just passed by your regiments," said Metternich. "Your soldiers are children. You have imposed several premature levies, and you have called to the colours young men who have barely reached their growth. When this generation is destroyed by the present war, will you be able to impose another premature levy? Will you call to the colours even younger men?"

Napoleon paled with fury, and flung his hat on the ground. "You are not a military man," he shouted. "You haven't the soul of a soldier, as I have. You haven't lived in camp. You haven't learned to despise your own life and the lives of others when that is necessary. What do 200,000 men mean to me?"

Napoleon was in one of those paroxysms of rage, when he would make the most cynical statements, if only to overwhelm his opponent.

"Finally," he continued, "those Frenchmen whose blood you are defending cannot complain against me in this fashion. I have lost, it is true, 200,000 men in Russia. Among that number were 100,000 of my best French soldiers. Those I truly regret. As for the rest, they were Italians, Poles and, above all, Germans!"

At the last word, he made a contemptuous gesture.

"Let us admit that," Metternich replied, "but you must agree,
Sire, that that is not the sort of argument that can be used in talking with Germans.”

After such words, the conversation, of course, came to nothing. Napoleon ridiculed Austria’s pretensions to military power. When Metternich requested that he be permitted to proceed with his diplomatic mediation on the terms already indicated, Napoleon shouted:

“So you insist! You still want to dictate laws to me! Very well. Let there be war! But—farewell! We shall meet in Vienna!”

Metternich took his leave and entered the salon where he ran into Marshal Berthier, who asked him the result of the conversation. (Berthier himself passionately desired peace, and considered the proposed conditions wholly acceptable and honourable.) Metternich replied:

“I swear to you, your sovereign has lost his senses!”

Notwithstanding this scene—during which he incidentally proclaimed that he had shown Austria favour and condescension in making Marie Louise his wife and that this had been a mistake on his part—Napoleon finally agreed to Austrian mediation, but did not officially bind himself. At Metternich’s invitation the Russian, Prussian and Austrian diplomats met in Prague on July 12. While the time dragged in fruitless conversations, Napoleon's army was being reinforced. Meanwhile, the general political situation was every day becoming more desperate.

At this time, Napoleon received a series of reports of French defeats and failures in Spain. The Spanish guerilla fighters and the English troops had driven the French toward the Pyrenees. The battle at Vittoria ended in a complete victory for the English commander-in-chief, the Duke of Wellington.

Knowing beforehand that nothing would come of the Prague negotiations—and desiring that nothing should—Napoleon played for time. The Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries and Metternich himself felt outraged by the protraction. From July 12 they sat in Prague, awaiting the French representatives, who when they finally appeared, created all manner of difficulties.

In any event, after Metternich’s conversation with Napoleon, Austria ceased to hesitate. Metternich frankly told the French
diplomat Narbonne that if the Prague conference did not settle something by the expiration of the armistice (August 10), Austria would throw in her lot with the Coalition.

The negotiations came to nothing. Napoleon had provided for that. He had instructed Count Narbonne to protract the preliminaries in an attempt to make it impossible for the conferences to begin. However, should the council convene, Narbonne was to make no concessions whatsoever and to observe the diplomatic principle expressed in the Latin formula: "He who possesses anything, let it remain with him."

Narbonne, Caulaincourt, Fouché, Savary, Berthier, indeed nearly all the marshals, attempted to prevail upon Napoleon to conclude a peace. It was all in vain. Minister of Police Savary, whom Napoleon had made Duke of Rovigo, ventured to tell the Emperor that the nation, exhausted by endless wars, might finally turn on its adored monarch. In response to this, the Minister of Police was commanded to hold his tongue and "not to meddle in something of which he was ignorant."

On August 10 the truce came to an end, and on the 11th Metternich proclaimed Austria's declaration of war against Napoleon.

Great was the rejoicing in London and in the Russo-Prussian camp. The forces of the Coalition were now obviously superior to those of Napoleon.

The dénouement of the campaign of 1813 was approaching. Recruiting levy followed recruiting levy in Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Reserves were being mobilised, every nerve was being strained. Once more England lavishly provided funds from her treasury to strengthen the Coalition; she spared no pains in reinforcing Wellington in Spain. The Coalition now had at its disposal an army which, with reserves, numbered nearly 850,000 men. Napoleon, also with reserves, had approximately 550,000.

The Austrian Field Marshal Schwarzenberg was named Commander-in-Chief of all the Allied forces. Napoleon feared him not at all. The Russians now had neither a Kutuzov nor a Bagration; Napoleon thought no more highly of the remaining Russian generals than he had before 1812. He thought well of
certain minor military leaders, but in general was contemptuous of the Russian general staff. He held, for example, that their moves at the time of his retreat from Moscow had revealed an absurd incompetence. And he maintained to the end of his life that only the immeasurable spaces, the Moscow fire, the terrible cold, his own mistake in occupying Moscow for too long a period, had been responsible for the failure of his campaign. To his mind, the Russian generals, strategists and tacticians were quite incapable of taking even the smallest advantage of their great strokes of fortune. But as for the Russian rank and file, he ranked them even higher than after Eylau; indeed, far higher than any of the soldiers of the other hostile armies.

Nor did he discern any real military leader among the Prussians and Austrians. But Bernadotte, the Emperor’s former marshal and now the Swedish heir-apparent, had espoused Alexander’s cause. He pleaded with the Allied monarchs to secure the services of the talented General Moreau, who had been exiled from France by Napoleon after the conspiracy of 1804. An irreconcilable enemy of Napoleon, Moreau responded to the Allies’ advances, leaving America to join the Coalition’s general staff. He arrived at Alexander’s camp just at the time when hostilities were renewed.

“Don’t attack those detachments of the army among which Napoleon himself is to be found; attack only his marshals,” was Moreau’s first counsel to Alexander and the Allies.

After the renewal of the campaign, the first major battle occurred near Dresden on August 27. In this engagement Napoleon won one of his most brilliant victories. The Allies lost 25,000 men; the French 10,000. Part of the Allied army retired in excellent order, although some of the corps fled from the field of battle, hotly pursued by the French cavalry. Both sides were well equipped with artillery, and during the entire engagement there was a ceaseless rattle of 1,200 guns.

In the heat of the battle, when the left wing of the Allies was wholly crushed, Napoleon took personal charge of the artillery. From a low hill he observed a group of enemy horsemen, upon whom he commanded one of the batteries to train their guns. In the centre of this group of riders were Tsar Alexander and Gen-
eral Moreau, who was appearing for the first time as leader of the Allied troops. One of the first projectiles crushed General Moreau's legs. He died several days later. This incident resulted in the legend, which was circulated in both camps, that Moreau had been slain by a cannon ball fired by Napoleon himself, after he had recognised the "traitor" through his spy-glass. However that may be, the rout of the Allied detachments at Dresden was complete; and so promptly to have lost Moreau, their most gifted strategist, was for the Allies an additionally bitter pill to swallow.

The Allies, put to flight at Dresden, fled toward the Ore Mountains. During the succeeding days Marshals Marmont, Victor, Murat, St. Cyr and General Vandamme pursued the retreating Allies, capturing several thousand additional prisoners.

However, Vandamme was overzealous in pursuit, and drew ahead of the main forces of the advance guard. On August 29 and 30, in a battle at Kulm, he was defeated, wounded and taken captive with a portion of his detachment.

This served to encourage the Allies. To persist at all costs, to refuse to make peace with Napoleon after defeats—this was one of the counsels which Moreau succeeded in imparting to the Allies before his death. The Coalition leaders realised that if the military genius of Napoleon had lost none of its cunning, his rank and file were infinitely inferior. Eighteen and nineteen year old youths could not replace those unconquerable iron legions which had fought with him in Egypt and in Syria, with whom he had conquered Europe, with whom he had marched to Moscow, and with whose bones he had strewn the battlefields of the Continent.

Napoleon was also aware of this. He saw yet another difficulty before him. He firmly believed that military strategy demanded that a commander have forces stronger than the enemy's at any given moment and place. And he himself, when so much depended on this campaign in Saxony, had violated this rule. Where was Davout, one of his most able marshals, with a large detachment? He was shooting down merchants in Hamburg. Where were the detachments of infantry, artillery and cavalry, which might have been useful to Napoleon in the decisive battle to come? They were in Danzig, in northern Germany, in south-
ern and central Italy, in Spain. If he recalled them in order to reinforce his army, he must, on his own initiative, destroy the great Empire, now maintained exclusively by the forces of these garrisons. Not to recall them likewise meant the destruction of the Empire through the inevitable victory of the Allies, who now, after Moreau's death, were without competent generals, but had forces which in sheer numbers were almost twice as great as his.

Thus did Napoleon find himself on the horns of an insoluble dilemma.

The road to Berlin proved an arduous one. Bernadotte with a Swedish army and Bülow with a Prussian detachment flung back the French divisions, which contained too many vassal Bavarians and Saxons, who with each succeeding day became increasingly untrustworthy: they deserted by the hundreds and showed no inclination whatsoever to fight against other Germans. On August 23, at Gross-Beeren, Marshal Oudinot was forced to retire from the roads which led to Berlin. Macdonald suffered a defeat on the River Katzbach on the way to Silesia. On September 4, Murat attacked Blücher and routed him, but did not succeed in destroying his entire army corps. On September 6, Marshal Ney was defeated at Dennewitz.

Napoleon could no longer depend on his German soldiers. Ney was forced to retire for no other reason than that the Saxons in his detachment abandoned the struggle on the slightest provocation. Nor was Napoleon wholly satisfied with his marshals. "The generals and officers are suffering from war fatigue, and they have no longer the mobility which once impelled them to great deeds," wrote Napoleon to his Minister of War Clarke on September, 1813, in conjunction with the command to provide reinforcements and provisions for the Pyreneese fortress garrisons. "The Emperor himself conquers each time he appears; but he cannot be everywhere, while the chiefs executing separate commands rarely live up to his expectations."

September came to an end indecisively, but both Napoleon and the Allies desired a general battle before winter. Germany was in a state of continued unrest. Volunteer guerilla detachments were organised by the Jugendbund and other patriotic associa-
tions. The youthful bourgeoisie, the student bodies of Prussia, Saxony, the states of the Confederation of the Rhine and Westphalia, now began to entertain hopes of liberating themselves from the alien conqueror—and at the same time from surviving feudal-absolutist conditions. At that moment they saw in Napoleon only a despot.

Napoleon began to make intensive preparations for the autumn campaign. He was convinced that a French victory would not necessarily bring the war to a speedy end. For he was firmly resolved not to make any concessions and he realised that the Allies, with their enormous reserves, even in the event of a defeat would not acknowledge themselves beaten. He now issued a new decree calling another 280,000 young men to the colours. This number included 160,000 not due to be called up until 1815. They were mere boys still in their teens. Thus was Metternich's prognostication realised: youngsters, practically children, appeared at the recruiting barracks.

Early in October the Russians invaded the Kingdom of Westphalia. The king, Jerome Bonaparte, fled. Bavaria renounced her alliance with France and joined the Coalition. As the days went by the conviction grew on Napoleon that he must seek and win a general battle immediately. He spoke of this necessity. Yet he could not avoid comprehending the ominous meaning of the circumstance that, independent of the results of the approaching battles, his vassals had already begun to betray him.

On October 16, in the plain near the city of Leipzig, the biggest battle of the Napoleonic epoch began—the "Battle of the Nations," as it was then called in Germany. On the fields of Leipzig, Napoleon fought a coalition of Russians, Austrians, Prussians and Swedes. His own army, quite apart from the French, contained Poles, Saxons, Dutchmen, Italians, Belgians and Germans from the Confederation of the Rhine. On the first day of the battle Napoleon's forces numbered 155,000 men; the Allies', 220,000. When night descended, both sides maintained their ground; no advantage had been gained by one or the other. Napoleon's losses during the day were nearly 30,000, those of the Allies, about 40,000.

Reinforcements continued to arrive in both camps during the
night. But whereas Napoleon received an additional 15,000 men for the second day's battle, the Allies were reinforced by the whole northern army of Bernadotte and Benningsen, consisting of 110,000 men. Early in the morning of the 17th, Napoleon, accompanied by Murat, made an inspection of the field of battle. Murat pointed out that since Borodino there had been no such mass of slain. During those early hours Napoleon considered the advisability of ordering a retreat, but finally decided to remain. He asked that the Austrian General Merveldt, made a prisoner the evening before, be brought to him. To Merveldt he spoke of a peace with Austria. The Austrian general declared that he knew that even now his country would welcome peace; that if Napoleon would only assent "for the happiness of the whole world and France," it would be possible to negotiate an immediate armistice.

The entire day of the 17th was spent in removing the wounded and in preparing for a continuation of the battle. After some hesitation, Napoleon decided to retire to the line of the River Saale. But he had not succeeded in carrying out this intention, when at daybreak of the 18th a new battle was in full sway. The numerical advantage had swung sharply in favour of the Allies. Having lost 40,000 men on October 16, they had received reinforcements on the 17th and during the night of the 18th, giving them a force almost double that of Napoleon. The battle of the 18th was even more fearful than that of the 16th. During the heat of battle, the whole Saxon army, which had been fighting in Napoleon's ranks against its will, suddenly passed over into the enemy camp. The Saxons instantaneously reversed their guns, turning them on the French, in whose ranks they had until that moment been fighting. But, notwithstanding his desperate position, Napoleon continued the battle with redoubled energy.

When dusk descended, both sides remained facing each other. Neither had won any decisive advantage.

But during the night of October 18-19 the crisis came. After the day's losses and the treachery of the Saxons, Napoleon could not hold his ground. He decided to retreat. The movement began in the night and continued the entire day of October 19. He retreated, fighting, from Leipzig and beyond Leipzig, hard
Bonaparte pressed by the Allies. The battle was made the more sanguinary, in consequence of the crowding of the city streets, suburbs and bridges by the French troops. Napoleon ordered the bridges to be blown up, but the sappers made a mistake in their timing and destroyed them prematurely, so that some 28,000 men, including the Poles, failed to cross. The wounded Marshal Poniatovski, commanding the Polish corps, was drowned while crossing the River Elster on horseback. But the pursuit soon came to an end. Napoleon retired with his army and moved in the direction of the Rhine.

The French losses from October 16 to October 19 were 65,000 men, the Allies', 60,000. For many succeeding days the harrowing cries of the wounded could be heard on the Leipzig battlefields; the stench from the decomposing corpses soon became unendurable. There were not enough workers to clear the field nor a large enough medical staff to assist the mutilated and the wounded.

From Leipzig Napoleon retreated toward the frontier of France, toward that frontier which before Napoleon's conquests had separated France from the German states—the banks of the Rhine.

During these late October and early November days, Napoleon was torn by an agonising mental conflict. He did not speak of his anguish to his immediate retinue, who rode behind him among the thinned ranks of mounted grenadiers of the old Guard, but it found expression in his austere expression and morose eyes. During the autumn of 1813 and the spring of 1814 this expression was observed by the entire army.

Napoleon realised that his immense empire had crashed, that that motley conglomeration of lands and peoples which he so ardently tried to weld together had fallen apart. Here was Murat, his marshal, his chief of cavalry, the hero of many battles, the soldier whom he had made King of Naples—here was Murat saying farewell before departing for Naples, and all the while Napoleon knew that he was leaving to betray him, that already he had secretly passed over to the side of the Coalition, in order to preserve his throne. Here was his brother Joseph, whom he
The "Battle of the Nations"

had appointed King of Spain, being driven from the Peninsula by the English and the Spanish insurgents. Another of his brothers, Jerome, the King of Westphalia, had just departed from Cassel. In Hamburg Marshal Davout was besieged by the Russians and Prussians. French authority in Holland was trembling in the balance. England, Russia, Austria and Prussia would not rest until France was restricted to her former frontiers. The life of the great empire he had created was nearing its end.

He still commanded an army of 100,000 men, 40,000 of them fully armed; it remained to arm the others and form them into ranks. And he still had garrisons in Danzig and in Hamburg, and here and there loyal detachments scattered throughout Europe—from 150,000 to 180,000 men in all. The youths due to have been conscripted in 1815 but actually called up in 1813 were being speedily trained in the camps.

Napoleon did not yet lay down his arms. He thought of the approaching stage of the struggle, and when, breaking his morose silence, he at last spoke to his marshals, it was only to give fresh commands. He now permitted the Pope to return to Rome. The Spanish king, Ferdinand VII, who had been held captive for five years, was released and allowed to reenter Spain.

It took the loss of 125,000 during the "Battle of the Nations," and, above all, the retreat from Leipzig, to convince Napoleon of the impossibility of repairing with a single blow everything that had happened since the beginning of the Russian campaign. There was no blotting out Borodino, the Moscow fire, the extinction of the Grand Army amidst the Russian snows, the defection of Prussia, Austria, Saxony, Bavaria, and the Kingdom of Westphalia. There was no recovery from Leipzig, the Spanish national war, and Wellington's victories on the Peninsula.

As early as June, July and August of this terrible year of 1813 Napoleon could shout at Metternich, and stamp his feet, and ask him how much money he had received from the English; he could still insult the Austrian emperor, and break off peace negotiations, and rage at the mere thought of yielding Illyria in the South or the Hanseatic cities in the North; he could continue to burn confiscated English goods, and shoot down Hamburg sen-
ators. In short, he could continue to behave as though he had returned conqueror of Russia in 1812, and as though he were merely punishing mutinous Prussia in 1813. But after Leipzig, approaching the frontiers of old France with his enemies at his heels, he at last realised that he could no longer act the part of the master of Europe. Now he was faced with an Allied invasion of France, with the necessity of defending his territories.

On the march to the Rhine he had to fight his way through the Bavarian-Austrian detachments at Hanau (October 30), and when on November 2, 1813, he entered the city of Mainz, he had at his disposal but 40,000 men fit for battle. The rest of the army more resembled a disorganised throng of disarmed, exhausted, ailing human beings, than the military hordes of the Emperor of the West.

By the middle of November Napoleon was in Paris. The campaign of 1813 had come to an end; the campaign of 1814 had begun.

The war now raged more and more intensely, and the guns already thundered at the frontiers of France.

The time had come for a reckoning. The country was again undergoing an economic crisis similar to the one it had experienced during the first half of 1811. But this time there was no attempt, nor could there be, of moderating unemployment by means of governmental subsidies; nor was any hope entertained of a speedy end of unemployment. In 1813, while Napoleon was fighting in Germany, the Paris police began to notice that the workers were murmuring, were showing irritation, were beginning to give utterance to "mutinous sentiments."

Oppressed for over 18 years by the Emperor's military despotism, the inhabitants of the workers' quarter became restive and unsubmitting. The foreign market had for many years shown signs of falling off; and now the domestic market was also collapsing. There was money, but it was "being hidden:" this phenomenon was observed by a diversity of witnesses. The moneyed bigwigs had long ago lost hope of a cessation of war during Napoleon's reign, and after the debacle of the Grand Army in Russia, and especially after the breakdown of the Prague peace nego-
tiations, the thought of the Emperor’s inevitable defeat caused them to withhold credit. As a result, business deals and contracts could no longer be consummated.

But in 1813, in spite of unemployment and intensified need in the workers’ quarters, the discontent never approached actual revolt. Even small demonstrations were rare. This would at first appear unusual when one recalls that the workers had every reason to hate Napoleon. Had he not instituted the labour books, which placed the workers in a position of virtual bondage? Had he not annually demanded blood duties—at first the grown sons and later the 18-year-old youths, whose corpses he had left in hundreds of thousands on the distant fields of carnage? Had he not stifled even the phantom, the merest shadow of any possibility of the workers’ asserting their rights against exploitation by their masters? The autocrat Napoleon had no reason to expect love or devotion from the labouring class.

To a small degree Fouche and the Duke of Rovigo were responsible for the comparative calm in the workers’ quarters. Fouche’s espionage machine, cunningly developed during his term of office and maintained at its height by his successor Savary, the Duke of Rovigo, policed the city with indefatigable zeal. Mounted and uniformed patrols kept a constant surveillance over the masses in the Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marcel districts, in the Mouffetard and in the Temple quarter.

But even the energy of the police does not explain the fact that no open revolts flared up in Paris and in the provinces. Something far more fundamental was responsible for this phenomenon. It had its basis in the masses’ loathing for the old dynasty of the Bourbons. Now, as at the beginning of the Revolution, an alien invader was approaching the French frontiers with the avowed aim of deposing the Empire and enthroning the Bourbons. The image of the blood-stained iron despot, the insatiate lover of power, seemed suddenly to recede; in its place appeared the long-forgotten image of the young revolutionary general, belted with a woollen scarf, a simple sword hanging from his side, whose batteries had driven the English fleet from Toulon. To the workers he was again the conqueror of the counter-revolutionaries, the friend of Augustin Robespierre; he was “General Vendémiaire,”
who, in the streets of Paris, had fired broadsides of grapeshot into the restorationists, the priests, and the nobles.

And now, in October and December of 1813, these same royalists, these same émigré-traitors, were again marching against France, against Paris. Hiding themselves in the transport carts of an alien invasion, they were already dreaming of restoring prerevolutionary conditions and of stamping out all of the blessings of the Revolution—some of which, if not enough, had been retained by Napoleon. And again these despised restorationists were opposed by the same "General Vendémiaire," the same "Little Corporal," who was at one and the same time the comrade as well as the adored commander of the rank and file, and who, notwithstanding all the catastrophes of the past year and a half, had retained their trust and affection.

What were the workers to do? Rise up in Napoleon’s rear and thus make it easier for his enemies to subjugate France and enthrone the Bourbons?

The working masses did not rebel either at the end of 1813 or the beginning of 1814, although never during the entire Napoleonic era had they suffered as intensely as during this period.

The mood of the bourgeoisie was quite different. The majority of the manufacturers were for Napoleon. They knew better than anyone else what England desired; they realised how difficult it would be to struggle with English competition at home and abroad, in the event of Napoleon’s defeat. On the other hand, the shopkeepers, the upper and middle mercantile class, the financiers, and the stock brokers had long complained of the ceaseless wars and the arbitrary conditions of the prevailing economic system. As yet, they had not advocated a change of dynasty, although they had long ago come to the conclusion that there could be no permanent peace on the Continent while Napoleon remained in power. Impatience, bitterness, despondency and irritation seized upon this large section of the bourgeoisie. They were rapidly withdrawing their support from Napoleon.

An even greater degree of opposition was developing among the bourgeois intelligentsia, among the so-called free professions, among white-collar workers. This class loathed the despotic imperial government, which had destroyed the press, except for the
four official organs, and which had banished everything that even remotely recalled the 18-century philosophy of enlightenment. This faction of the bourgeoisie felt that any government that might succeed Napoleon would undoubtedly permit some semblance of an independent political press and would reëstablish the constitutional order that had vanished with the birth of the Empire. The prospect of a Bourbon restoration did not, at the end of 1813 and at the beginning of 1814, alarm people of this class unduly, as it undoubtedly did the workers and the landowning peasantry of every section but the Vendée.

Above all, it was the peasants who feared the political changes which must follow if Napoleon was defeated. For the overwhelming majority of the peasants, the return of the Bourbons signified the resurrection of feudalism; the overlords would regain their authority and reclaim the free land, which, after being confiscated from the church and the former landowners, had been purchased by the bourgeoisie and the peasants during the period of revolution. It was true that Napoleon, with his never-ending conscriptions, had desolated the French villages; nevertheless, this was more endurable than the old feudal order, which the Bourbons would bring back with them.

Finally, there was that small but influential group composed of the old and the new aristocracy. The old—though a portion of it served Napoleon—was, of course, more in sympathy with the Bourbons than with the Emperor. The new—the marshals, counts, barons created by Napoleon and lavishly rewarded with gold and all manner of imperial favours—did not unanimously support the Emperor. They had had enough of the existence they were forced to lead. They thirsted to make some use of their enormous material resources. They dreamed of living in honour and in comfort.

"You no longer have a heart for fighting. You would like to have a jolly time in Paris!" said the vexed Emperor to one of his generals in 1813.

"Yes, Your Majesty, but then I have had so few opportunities for having a jolly time in Paris!" replied the other with bitterness.

Existence in bivouacs, amidst perpetual dangers, exposed to
grapeshot, and, above all, menaced constantly by the spectre of death, had so harassed and tired them, that even the bravest and the staunchest, such as Macdonald, Ney, Augerau, Sebastiani and Victor, and the most devoted, such as Caulaincourt and Savary, began to give ear to the hints and insinuations of Talleyrand and Fouché, who for a long time had secretly planned to betray the Emperor.

Such was the situation, such were the moods, when Napoleon appeared in Paris in November of 1813 and began to recruit new forces to meet the invasion of the European nations advancing upon France.

"Let's go out and beat up Grandfather Francis," said the tiny King of Naples, repeating with all the seriousness of a three-year-old the phrase taught him by his father. The Emperor, who adored his son, laughed unrestrainedly on hearing these words, which the infant, parrot-like, continued to repeat, unaware of their meaning.

Meanwhile, as the Allied armies approached the banks of the Rhine, "Grandfather Francis" experienced considerable and increasingly growing indecision. And not he alone, but also his guide and mentor, Metternich.

Francis's perplexity did not arise from the fact that Napoleon was married to his daughter or that her son was the heir to the French throne. There were other considerations which gave the Austrian emperor pause, which made him look farther into the future than the English, or Alexander I, or Frederick William III of Prussia. In the eyes of the English, Napoleon was the most dangerous foe against whom she had struggled in 15 centuries of her history. While he reigned there could be no prolonged peace between France and England. Alexander detested him in a personal sense; but quite apart from that, he deemed him the one monarch who might resurrect Poland at the first convenient moment. And he did not doubt in the least that if Napoleon retained the throne he would eventually find both military and diplomatic opportunities for inflicting crushing blows on his adversaries.

To a great—indeed, to a far greater—degree the same motive guided the Prussian king. Frederick William III, who was
coerced into taking up arms against Napoleon in 1813, had been in a state of almost constant fear until the Battle of Leipzig. He gave way to emotional outbursts in the presence of Alexander, particularly after defeats—after Lützen, after Bautzen, after Dresden. "Here I am on the Vistula again!" he repeated in despair. Even Leipzig did not wholly reassure him. This curious characteristic of panic, of almost superstitious fear of Napoleon, was widespread at the time. Even after Leipzig, after the loss of nearly all of his conquests, with exhausted and discontented France in his rear, Napoleon appeared so terrifying that Frederick William III was horrified when he recollected that after the war was over and the Allies had departed he would once again be forced to live in close proximity to this terrible neighbour.

Austria had no such motives as inspired England, Alexander and Frederick William, who were of the opinion that if the Coalition permitted Napoleon to remain on the throne, all the blood spilled during 1812 and 1813 would have been shed in vain. Metternich felt that Russia’s power must be balanced in the West. He desired Napoleon to remain in Europe, no longer a danger to Austria, but very inconvenient for Russia as a possible Austrian ally.

There was still another motive. "The vile rabble is for Napoleon!" reported the Allied and Bourbon spies from Paris, where they had observed that the workers' hatred for the interventionists and restorationists was increasing daily. Metternich had always believed that the only man who could hold this menacing revolutionary strength in check was Napoleon.

Suppose the restored Bourbons should be unable to cope with the rebellious inhabitants of the workers' quarter in Paris? Suppose a new revolution should flare up in Paris, and from there spread to Germany, where the liberal and national societies had prepared the soil for just such a movement? Metternich and Francis I decided to attempt to negotiate with Napoleon.

Metternich brought pressure to bear on the Allies by threatening Austria's withdrawal from the Coalition, and succeeded in forcing England, Russia and Prussia to agree to offer peace to Napoleon, on the condition that he was to relinquish his conquests (already lost, in any case) and to cease waging war. He was to
be permitted to retain France within the frontiers (with slight changes) determined by the Lunéville peace of 1801. The Allied monarchs were in Frankfurt at this time. Metternich spoke to the French diplomat Saint-Aignan, who was detained at Frankfurt. In the presence of the English and Russian representatives, Saint-Aignan was entrusted with the responsibility of transmitting the Allied proposal of peace to Napoleon.

The Lunéville treaty of 1801 had resulted from a victorious war. To Napoleon, therefore, remained the great country which he had created in 1801, after the French victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden. While on the very brink of an abyss, Napoleon was being offered this unexpected chance of salvation. If he acquiesced to the liberal terms of his enemies, he might remain the ruler of a major power.

Saint-Aignan arrived in Paris on November 14, 1813. Napoleon would not express his views immediately. He was feverishly occupied in recruiting troops and making preparations for another war. Unwillingly, with reservations, he agreed to enter into the proposed negotiations. At the same time he intensified the mobilisation of the new army.

"Just wait! Just wait!" he said, without turning to anyone in particular, as he paced up and down his study. "You shall soon learn that my soldiers and I have not forgotten our trade! We were conquered between the Elbe and the Rhine—by treachery! But between the Rhine and Paris there will be no traitors. . . ."

These words were borne across France and across Europe.

No one who knew Napoleon believed that the Allied peace proposals would materialise into anything of lasting value. New regiments passed daily before the Emperor's appraising eyes and marched eastward toward the Rhine.

The great tragedy was approaching its finale.
In 1814, even as during the struggle with Europe in 1813, Napoleon placed all his trust in weapons of war, and only in weapons of war. But he knew that now, after Leipzig and on the eve of the enemy's invasion of France, he could not behave as he had in July and August of 1813, when he deliberately and systematically broke off the Prague negotiations. At that time the Allies would have permitted him to retain not only France, but also all his conquests, with the exceptions of Illyria, the Hanseatic cities, and a few territories in Germany; as well as all his rights and titles, except that of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. But he had discontinued the negotiations because he had hoped to crush the hostile Coalition with a single blow.

Now, to be sure, the terms offered were not so generous. Yet he was not oblivious of the fact that all France thirsted for peace. The peasants and the workers, the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, the entire bureaucracy he had created, and—this was particularly significant—the upper ranks of the army headed by the marshals, all were weary of war. For this reason, Napoleon did not at once reject the conditions sent him from Frankfurt. For nearly two months he made it appear that he also desired peace, and with every possible means protracted the matter.

He hoped—and he had good reasons for such a hope—that the Allies themselves would violate these conditions and that the blame for the renewal of the war would not fall on his shoulders. He knew that, except for Austria, not one of the powers warring with him wished to see a continuation of his rule, and that Eng-
land, in particular, would not rest content as long as Antwerp remained in his hands. Yet by the terms sent him from Frankfurt not only Antwerp but the whole of Belgium remained a part of the French Empire. Nor was he unaware of the possibility that England’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Castlereagh, might reject the conditions to which the English representative at Frankfurt had consented, under pressure from Metternich.

For the present, however, it was to Napoleon’s advantage to give the impression that he was in no sense resisting the proposed negotiations, and that if he was demanding new recruiting levies it was not so much for war purposes as for the reinforcement of his peaceful intentions. “Nothing on my part is hindering the re-establishment of peace,” he said, addressing the senators from his throne on December 19, 1813. “I know and share the feelings of Frenchmen. I say ‘Frenchmen,’ because there is not one among them who wants peace at the price of honour. It is with regret that I must request new sacrifices of this noble nation, but these sacrifices are dictated by the noblest and most precious interests of the nation. I have been forced to strengthen my armies with numerous levies: nations can conduct negotiations with no danger to themselves only when they continue to strengthen all their forces.” It was clear that he had no desire for peace. “Let not the future generations say of us: They sacrificed the primary interests of the land; they acknowledged the laws which England had vainly tried to force on France.”

Thus concluded his throne speech in response to the peace proposals made over a month before by the powers.

A hundred and ten thousand new recruits were called in December, 1813; and a new levy was begun. Napoleon sent senators to all parts of France to assist the local authorities in accelerating conscriptions and collecting ordinary and special taxes for the maintenance of the army.

In January of 1814 news arrived that the hostile armies had at last crossed the Rhine; the invading forces were pouring into Alsace and Franche-Comté. At the same time it was learned that Wellington was crossing the Pyrenees from Spain into southern France.

“I do not hesitate to acknowledge,” said the Emperor, address-
ing the gathered senators whom he had appointed to tour through France, "that I have warred a great deal. I conceived tremendous plans. I wanted to make France dominant over the entire world. I erred. These projects were not commensurate with the numbered forces of our population. The entire population en masse should perhaps have been called to arms, but I admit that the progress of social existence, the modification of custom, do not permit the transformation of a whole people into soldiers."

If the senators had not lost the gift of speech during Napoleon's reign, they might have retorted that he was being unduly modest, that he had in fact already transformed the entire nation, except for women, children and old men, into soldiers.

"I have erred, and I must suffer," the Emperor continued. "France has not sinned in anything. She has generously donated to me her blood, she has not refused me a single sacrifice." He discerned his own personal self-sacrifice in that he was concluding a peace and rejecting "the greatest ambition, which it was possible to have... in the name of the happiness of my people I sacrifice the greatness, which might be realised only by such demands as I no longer wish to make."

Rarely had Napoleon spoken so frankly as on this occasion. But he little trusted his senators. The slaves of today, the traitors of tomorrow—that, apparently, was his final judgment of them. He no longer doubted the treachery of Talleyrand. In November of 1813, after Leipzig, having just returned to Paris, he paused before Talleyrand at one of his general receptions: "Why are you here?" he shouted at him: "Be careful—you'll gain nothing by fighting against my might. I give you notice, that if I should fall dangerously ill, you would die before me!"

But he did not order Talleyrand to be shot, as the old diplomat feared for a while he might do. And in January, 1814, Napoleon actually proposed that Talleyrand, together with Caulaincourt, should represent him at the peace conference; he angrily flourished his fist when Talleyrand refused.

Nor did he believe in Fouché's loyalty. Indeed, at this moment he no longer trusted even his marshals. He had confidence only in the rank and file. Not, of course, the youngsters whom during the past two years he had torn away from their families, but the
veterans in the service. However, not many of these remained; their bones were strewn from Jerusalem to Moscow, from Madrid to Leipzig. He immediately recalled the veterans from Spain, Holland and Italy. And still he desired battles, not peace negotiations.

In any event, the Allies, having already invaded French soil, became convinced of the weariness of the country, of the wholesale desertions of young recruits, and proposed new terms. They offered Napoleon the old 1790 frontiers of France (without Belgium, Holland, Savoy, and that part of the left bank of the Rhine which had been joined to France during the epoch of the Revolution). This was less than they had offered in November. They were all in agreement about these new terms—even Lord Castlereagh, who had personally visited the Allies’ headquarters.

The peace congress met at Châtillon on February 5, during the heat of the struggle. As was to have been expected, these negotiations came to absolutely nothing.

“[I am so distressed by the odious project (the peace agreement) which you have sent me, that I consider myself dishonoured by the mere fact that it is proposed to us,” Napoleon wrote to Caulaincourt, his representative at the Châtillon congress. Caulaincourt maintained that it was Napoleon’s only alternative if he hoped to retain the imperial throne and forestall the restoration of the Bourbons. “You are harping on the Bourbons,” replied the Emperor, “but I should prefer to see the Bourbons in France with reasonable terms of peace than to accept these odious conditions which you have sent me!”

War, and only war, should decide everything. The Châtillon congress accomplished nothing; it simply disbanded.

On January 25, 1814, Napoleon took leave of his wife and son, whom he was never again to see, and journeyed from Paris to join his army.

New recruits were still in training; new levies continued. Of soldiers fit for battle, Napoleon and his marshals had approximately 47,000 men in all; the invading Allies had some 230,000, and almost as many more were advancing by various roads to lend a helping hand. Nearly all of the marshals—even Ney—were despondent. The Emperor alone preserved his good spirits
and animation as he attempted to inspire them with his courage. "He seemed cheerful and suddenly grown young," reported eye-witnesses.

Two days after his arrival at Vitry (January 26) Napoleon, drawing upon the forces of his marshals, drove Blücher's detachments from St. Dizier. From there, observing his enemy's movements, the Emperor ordered his forces to advance against Blücher and Osten-Saken's Russian corps. On January 31, after a stubborn battle at Brienne, the French won another victory. This raised the spirits of the soldiers, who had grown disheartened prior to Napoleon's reappearance on the field of battle.

Immediately after his defeat, Blücher made haste to reach Bar-sur-Aube, where Schwarzenberg's main forces were concentrated. Between Chaumont and Bar-sur-Aube, the Allies had at their disposal 122,000 men.

At this moment Napoleon had only 30,000 troops under his command—yet he was resolved not to retreat; he would accept battle. The Battle of La Rothière began on the morning of February 1 and lasted ten hours. After the battle, Napoleon voluntarily retreated, crossing the River Aube and entering the town of Troyes on February 3.

After the Battle of La Rothière, the French felt they had won a moral victory, so successful had been Napoleon's defence against forces four or five times as large as his. Nevertheless, his position remained a precarious one; he was receiving but few reinforcements, and they came slowly. Ney, Macdonald, Berthier and Marmont thought the Emperor's sole hope of salvation lay in the peace negotiations, and when the Châlillon congress was threatened with dissolution the marshals became despondent.

But as his danger increased, Napoleon became increasingly energetic. In 1812 the marshals observed a certain weariness in him, an apparent weakening of his military genius. But now, in February and March of 1814, they could not believe their own eyes. Before them was General Bonaparte, the young hero of Italy and Egypt. It was as if there had been no 15 intervening years of uninterrupted bloody wars, of autocratic administration, of an immense empire and a vassal Europe. He sustained the
spirit of the marshals, the courage of the rank and file, the fortitude of the ministers in Paris.

On February 10, after several quick marches, he fell upon Olsufyev’s corps at Champaubert and completely routed it. Over 1,500 Russians were slain, and 3,000, including Olsufyev himself, were made prisoners; the rest fled.

In the evening, Napoleon spoke to his marshals. “If I should be as happy tomorrow as I am today,” he said, “then I can fling the enemy back to the Rhine in 15 days; and from the Rhine to the Vistula is but a step!”

On the following day, he turned from Champaubert to Montmirail, where Russian and Prussian detachments were stationed. The Battle of Montmirail, which occurred on February 11, ended in another brilliant victory for Napoleon. Of their 20,000 troops, the Allies lost 8,000, while Napoleon’s casualties numbered less than 1,000. The Allies beat a hasty retreat from the field of battle. Napoleon promptly advanced on Château-Thierry, where some 18,000 Prussians and 10,000 Russians were concentrated. “I have found the boots I wore in the Italian campaign,” exclaimed Napoleon, recalling his lightning victories of 1796.

Military critics consider the campaign of 1814 one of the most remarkable military achievements of Napoleon’s career.

The battle at Château-Thierry on February 12 ended in a decisive victory for Napoleon. Had it not been for Marshal MacDonald’s ill-timed movement, the battle would have ended in the complete destruction of the Allied forces stationed at Château-Thierry. On February 13, Blücher badly defeated Marshal Marmont, but on the following day Napoleon hastened to Marmont’s aid and once more routed Blücher in the Battle of Vauchamp. Blücher lost 9,000 men. Napoleon received reinforcements, and the Allies suffered a series of reverses. Nevertheless, the Emperor’s position remained critical, for the Allied forces were far greater than his.

But these unexpected successes, which daily followed one another, so dumfounded the Allies that the recognised commander-in-chief, Schwarzenberg, sent an adjutant to Napoleon’s camp
First Abdication of Napoleon

with a request for a truce. Two new French victories—at Mormant and Villeneuve—forced the Allies to take this unexpected step. Napoleon refused Schwarzenberg's envoy Count Parr a personal interview, but accepted the enemy commander's letter. But he did not answer immediately.

"I have taken between 30,000 and 40,000 prisoners; I have taken 200 guns and a large number of generals," he wrote to Caulaincourt, at the same time proclaiming that he would make peace with the Coalition only on the condition that France retained her "natural frontiers" (the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees). He did not agree to an armistice.

On February 18 a new battle occurred at Montereau, and again the Allies suffered a reverse, losing 3,000 in killed and wounded and 4,000 in prisoners.

According to even his most hostile critics, Napoleon surpassed himself in this seemingly hopeless campaign of 1814. But he had too few soldiers, and Marshals Victor and Augereau blundered continually in the execution of manoeuvres; they were too exhausted to function with any of their former precision. For this reason, Napoleon could not take full advantage of his unexpected and brilliant victories. In anger, he reprimanded his marshals and tried to rouse them.

"What pitiful justifications you are bringing me, Augereau! I have destroyed 80,000 of my enemies with the assistance of new recruits, who have barely donned their uniforms. . . . If your 69 years are too much for you, why don't you resign? . . . 

"The Emperor never showed any inclination to understand that not all those who served under him were Napoleons," one of his generals later declared, in recalling this period.

Schwarzenberg called a military council. The opinions of Tsar Alexander, King Frederick William and Emperor Francis, were considered, and it was finally decided once more to propose an armistice to Napoleon.

One of the most illustrious overlords of Austria, Prince Lichtenstein, was sent with the new proposal of peace. It was clear that the Allies were gravely distressed, and that some of them were most anxious to end the war as quickly as possible—if necessary, with a compromise.
This time Napoleon did not refuse to receive the Coalition's envoy. Lichtenstein spoke in conciliatory tones, assuring Napoleon that the Allies earnestly desired peace and had no intention of seating the Bourbons on the French throne. This interview bore no fruit either. In the heat of his brilliant successes, having shattered, as he then imagined, nearly half of the Allied armies—80,000 out of 200,000—Napoleon still put his trust in his military genius. With it he had again and again conquered his most powerful enemy; with it he would eventually return the victor.

Talleyrand and others had long and actively conducted secret negotiations with the Allies, preparing for the restoration of the Bourbons. The Allies bore themselves with great restraint toward the Bourbons. Even Napoleon's most irreconcilable foes—Alexander, for example—would have been gratified with the King of Rome's succession to the French throne, provided the Emperor himself promptly abdicated. But now, after Napoleon's unexpected February victories, the abdication of the Emperor was no longer mentioned.

The old French aristocrat, Baron de Gouot, of Troyes, petitioned Alexander to render assistance to the Bourbons. The Tsar replied that the Allies had arrived at no decision to substitute the dynasty of the Bourbons for the dynasty of Bonaparte, and cautioned the petitioners—the baron was but one among many—to think twice before making such rash requests in the future.

Several days passed. Napoleon entered the city of Troyes. De Gouot was arrested, handed over to a field court-martial and shot. Some time later Alexander admitted that, astonishing as it was, none of the French peasants really manifested any desire to be liberated from Napoleon. On the contrary, the peasants in the Vosges Mountains, in Lorraine, in the South, began to attack the lagging Allied soldiers, revealing a positive hatred for the invading foe. In some measure, of course, this was a protest against the pillaging of peasant property by the Russians and Prussians—there were fewer complaints against the Austrians. But, above all, it was because of the villagers' fear that Allied victory would mean the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty and
the reëstablishment of the seigniorial pre-Revolutionary order. Napoleon quickly sensed this. "We must fight with all the resolution of 1793," he wrote his marshals.

Nor did the Allies, notwithstanding their reverses, feel wholly discouraged. There was too much at stake. This astonishing string of victories by the seemingly perishing French Emperor more than ever before convinced them that they had to contend with the greatest war captain of all time. What if he should remain on the throne and, after resting awhile, once more gather fresh forces to resume war? Who would be able to contend with him within a year, or within two years?

By the beginning of March the Emperor had over 75,000 men under his command. He placed 40,000 of these as a barrier against the retiring Schwarzenberg. With the remaining 35,000 he advanced against Blücher, who would have been destroyed by the pursuing French, had it not been for the blunder of the commandant of Soissons, who surrendered the city.

Though he had saved himself from being taken prisoner, Blücher did not escape battle. On March 7, Napoleon overtook him at Craonne and routed him. After suffering heavy losses, Blücher fled to the city of Laon. Napoleon's attempts on March 9 and 10 to oust him from his Laon positions were unsuccessful. For a time, he left Blücher to his own devices, though he had not succeeded in finishing him off, as he had anticipated. During this period, however, Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald, in command of the 40,000 troops who were following Schwarzenberg, were forced to retire in the region of Provence.

On March 9, at Chaumont, the representatives of the Allied powers concluded a new pact. They pledged themselves to continue the war until Napoleon had restored France to her pre-1792 frontiers and had completely liberated Holland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and all the German states. Russia, Austria and Prussia guaranteed to provide another 150,000 soldiers apiece, while Great Britain agreed to furnish an annual subsidy of 5,000,000 pounds sterling, as long as the war should last.

The Allies had no idea, not even an approximate one, as to when and how they should succeed in breaking down the desperate resistance of Napoleon, who, as in the past, would not lis-
Bonaparte
ten to any peace proposal which so much as hinted at his renouncing any significant part of his empire.

On the other hand, his marshals suffered reverse after reverse. In the South, Wellington’s English army, having crossed the Pyrenees, was advancing against Bordeaux, after having forced Marshals Soult and Suchet to retire. Schwarzenberg was giving Macdonald and Oudinot more than they had bargained for.

Allowing neither himself nor his army any rest after the Battle of Laon, Napoleon attacked the Russo-Prussian detachment, of 15,000 men, which had just entered Rheims under the command of the Tsar’s general, Count Saint-Priest (a Frenchman who had emigrated during the Revolution). The battle at Rheims on March 13 ended in the extinction of half the Allied force, in the rout of the detachment, and in the death of Saint-Priest himself.

Yet even these new victories could change nothing: the Allies were firmly resolved not to yield in their conditions, and Napoleon was as firmly resolved not to accept them. Far better lose everything, even the throne, than see the Empire within its former frontiers.

At Napoleon’s command, Caulaincourt, after protracting the Châtillon peace congress as long as possible announced to the Allied diplomats that the French Emperor had finally decided to reject their terms, demanding that the Empire, as formerly, include the left bank of the Rhine and the cities of Cologne, Mainz, Antwerp, Flanders, Savoy and Nice. As soon as Napoleon’s answer was made known, the negotiations were suspended.

On March 17, Alexander received Baron de Vitrolles, agent of the Bourbons and emissary from Talleyrand, in the Allied camp. The baron had succeeded in penetrating Napoleon’s lines and the Russian advance posts. He brought word from Talleyrand, who counseled the Allies to give up the pursuit of Napoleon and make all haste to get to Paris, where the people eagerly awaited the deposition of the Emperor and the restoration of the Bourbons—in the person of Louis XVIII (the Count of Provence).

But Alexander was not to be duped by Talleyrand’s sly insinuations. To the dismay of Baron de Vitrolles, he declared that, while he earnestly desired the deposition of Napoleon, he
did not feel that the Allies should meddle in the question of his successor. Indeed, he contended that it might not be a bad thing if France should again become a republic. The baron could not believe his ears. "So we’ve lived to see this—O God!" he exclaimed, in describing the interview.

Evidently, Alexander had reason to fear the news that the war was beginning to assume the character of a defence of the new post-Revolutionary France against the invasion of aliens who aimed to restore the old order with the Bourbons at the head. He realised that this belief reinforced the position of the still terrifying, still victorious Napoleon. Therefore, he schemed to change the issue from "Napoleon or the Bourbons" to "Napoleon or a republic." This was an adroit tactical move. But the courtly, legitimist, émigré head of Baron de Vitrolles was too narrow to comprehend the Tsar’s motive; consequently, the French republicanism of the Russian autocrat dumfounded him.

Alexander knew, and had always known, that the Bourbons and all their de Vitrolles did not sense the mood of the French "rabble" (la vile populace). But Talleyrand’s advice, transmitted through de Vitrolles, together with his unsigned and deliberately illiterate written memorandum, made Alexander stop to consider. Talleyrand’s little note insistently counseled Alexander and the Allies to march straight to Paris, even though they might be forced to leave the still dangerous Napoleon in their rear and on their flank. In writing it, Talleyrand was risking his head, for Baron de Vitrolles might have been seized on the road by Napoleon’s gendarmes, the note discovered, and the identity of its author disclosed. The risk was not at all characteristic of Talleyrand, a cautious traitor; but he was well aware of the confusion and uncertainty reigning in Paris and beyond Paris, in the city and among the troops.

On March 20 Napoleon collided with Schwarzenberg at Arcis-sur-Aube. At the beginning of the battle each of the two rival commanders had 30,000 men, but toward the end Schwarzenberg was reinforced with an additional 60,000. Although Napoleon, having forced the retirement of the enemy at various points, considered himself the victor, neither side won any decisive advantage. The French were in no position to pursue Schwarzenberg
after the engagement; they recrossed the River Aube, blowing up the bridges behind them. Napoleon lost only 3,000 men at Arcis-sur-Aube as against the Allies' 9,000, but he did not succeed in routing Schwarzenberg's forces. The Allies were apprehensive of a national war, of a general armed uprising on the order of the one that had saved France from the interventionists and the restorationists during the heroic period of the French Revolution in 1792. Alexander, Frederick William, Francis, Schwarzenberg and Metternich would have felt reassured had they heard Napoleon talking to General Sebastiani the evening after the Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube. “Well, General, what do you say to what's happening?” asked the Emperor. “I will say, that Your Majesty undoubtedly possesses new resources of which we are ignorant.” “Only those which you see before your eyes, and no others.” “Why, then, does not Your Majesty think of something to stir up the people?” “Chimeras! Chimeras, borrowed from recollections of Spain and of the French Revolution! How can I hope to stir up the people in a land where the Revolution has destroyed the nobility and the priesthood, and where I myself have destroyed the Revolution?” Napoleon properly understood matters. In spite of the fact that he had killed every recollection of revolution, every token of the revolutionary spirit, he could have called upon Pugachev's mob during the Russian campaign and thereby saved the Grand Army. But his autocratic nature would not reconcile itself to such a move, even then. Now, desperately fighting for Paris, he could not, even if he desired it, call to his assistance the French Revolution, which he had so long and so successfully stifled. After the Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, Napoleon decided to advance against the Allies' rear, and to attack their communications with the Rhine. But the Allies had already decided to march direct upon Paris. From letters accidentally intercepted by the Cossacks—letters written to Napoleon by Marie Louise and Minister of Police Savary—Alexander became convinced
that the temper of Paris was such that popular resistance was not to be expected, and that the entry of the Allied army into the capital would promptly decide the entire war, causing the Emperor's deposition.

The Allies made their final decision under the influence of Count Pozzi di Borgo, a Corsican by birth, and long a mortal enemy of Napoleon, and by this token an intimate friend of Alexander. After the Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, when the Allied leaders first learned of Napoleon's intention to destroy the rear of the Coalition's army, Pozzi di Borgo declared that "the aim of the war is in Paris. While you go on thinking of battles, you run the risk of being badly beaten, because Napoleon will always be able to fight better than you and because his army, although dissatisfied, will always be inspired by the idea of honour and will fight to the last man, as long as Napoleon is near. No matter how much his military might has been shaken, it is still great, very great, and, in consequence of his genius, it is greater than your might. But his political power has been destroyed. The times have changed. Military despotism was accepted as a boon on the day following Revolution, but it has now perished in public opinion. . . . You should attempt to end the war not by military means, but by political. . . . Touch Paris with a mere finger—and colossus Napoleon will come tumbling down. In this manner you will break his sword, which you are unable to wrest from his hands!"

Pozzi di Borgo was certain that France had quite forgotten the Bourbons and he expressed himself to this effect. In any case, the Allies also knew this. The Allied powers agreed that after the deposition of Napoleon, the Bourbons would become "possible." Alexander no longer considered it necessary to talk of a republic. He saw that Napoleon might be crushed without resorting to this unpleasant device. It was decided to accept the risk. Taking advantage of Napoleon's geographical remoteness (he, indeed, was advancing toward the Allies' rear to detain them far from Paris), they would march straight upon the French capital, staking everything on the treachery of the Parisians, who might be persuaded to yield the city before the Emperor himself could appear there.
The road was barred only by Marshals Marmont and Mortier, who had between them some 25,000 men. Napoleon with the main forces was far away, in the rear of the Allies. The battle at Fère-Champenoise on March 25 ended in an Allied victory over the marshals. Marmont and Mortier were forced to retire toward Paris. The Allied army, 100,000 strong, approached the capital.

Four days after the Battle of Fère-Champenoise, the Empress Marie Louise with her tiny son, the King of Rome, left Paris for Blois.

France had approximately 40,000 men for the defence of the capital. Paris was panic-stricken. The French army outside the city, without the presence of Napoleon, was depressed. Alexander desired no bloodshed at Paris. "Paris, deprived of her defenders and of her great leader, is not strong enough to resist; I am convinced of that," said the Tsar to M. F. Orlov, cautioning him to cease fighting whenever the slightest hope appeared that the capital would surrender peacefully. A fierce battle raged for several hours, during which the Allies lost 9,000 men, of whom 6,000 were Russians. But, influenced by Talleyrand and oppressed by the fear of defeat, Marshal Marmont capitulated at 5:00 p.m. on March 30.

On March 27, during the heat of the battles he was waging between St. Dizier and Bar-sur-Aube, Napoleon learned of the Allies' unexpected advance on Paris. "That's a fine chess move! Really, I could never have believed that the Allies had a general capable of making it!" he declared. It was the specialist in strategic warfare speaking.

He immediately rushed to Paris with his army.

On the night of March 30, he reached Fontainebleau, and it was here that he learned of Marmont's defeat and of the surrender of Paris.

His resolution was as firm as ever. After receiving the news, he was silent for a quarter of an hour—then he outlined a new plan to Caulaincourt and the generals who were with him. Caulaincourt was to speed to Paris and accept the Allied peace terms made at Châtillon. Then, under various pretexts, Caulaincourt was to spend three days in making repeated journeys between
First Abdication of Napoleon

Paris and Fontainebleau. During this three-day respite all the forces with which Napoleon had but lately operated at St. Dizier would have time to come up—and then the Allies would be ejected from Paris. Caulaincourt appeared to hesitate: Why offer false peace? he asked. Why not actually propose to make peace with the Allies on the Châtillon terms? “No, no!” the Emperor retorted. “It’s enough for me that you’ve hesitated for a moment. No, the sword will settle everything. Stop humiliating me!”

Caulaincourt went to Paris immediately, while Napoleon energetically prepared for the forthcoming battle. He realised the importance of forestalling the Allies for three or four days so that they should not undertake any definite political measures which would arouse discord and confusion in the minds of the vacillating. It was for this that he had devised the farce of offering a peace based on the Châtillon conditions, which he had so scornfully rejected but two weeks before.

But all of Napoleon’s cunning was to no avail. The joyous royalist manifestations which met the Allied monarchs on their arrival in Paris, the apathy and submissiveness of the bourgeoisie, the muffled irritation of the workers (which did not, however, develop into any kind of demonstration)—all this indicated that the capital would accept any government that was imposed on it. Even during the most critical moments of 1814 Napoleon had forbidden the workers to possess arms; in consequence they were powerless to offer resistance in the present crisis.

The Allied monarchs issued a proclamation announcing that they would not negotiate with Napoleon, but that they would recognise any government and administration which the French people chose to form. In these circumstances, Caulaincourt’s conversations with the Allied monarchs were robbed of all their intended effect. Alexander frankly told Caulaincourt that France was tired of Napoleon and no longer wanted him. Bitterly, Schwarzenberg reminded Caulaincourt that for 18 uninterrupted years Napoleon had shaken the entire world, and that while he was in power there could be no peace anywhere. He argued that Napoleon had time and again refused to accept a peace which
Bonaparte

would have permitted him to retain his empire, and that it was now too late. As he spoke these words Schwarzenberg was not aware that even now Napoleon had no intention of yielding a single point, and that he had sent Caulaincourt merely to play for three days' grace, to allow his army to reach Fontainebleau.

When Caulaincourt returned to Fontainebleau, he found the troops rallying toward the Emperor's headquarters. By April 5 Napoleon would have 70,000 men at his disposal; then he would move on Paris.

On the morning of April 4, Napoleon conducted a review of his troops. Turning to them, he said:

"Soldiers! The enemy having forestalled us by three marches has taken possession of Paris. It is necessary to oust him from there. Unworthy Frenchmen—émigrés—whom we once had the weakness to forgive, have joined with the enemy and donned the white cockade. Infamous wretches! They shall receive what they deserve for this new attempt! Let us make a vow to conquer or to die, to avenge the humiliation inflicted on our fatherland and our arms!"

"We swear!" the soldiers shouted in reply.

But when Napoleon entered the Palace of Fontainebleau after the review, he found a different mood. In sad silence, with hanging heads, his marshals awaited him. Not one among them had the heart to speak. Here were Oudinot, Ney, Macdonald, Berthier, the Duke of Bassano.

Napoleon asked for an explanation. They replied that they had no hope whatsoever of victory; that all of Paris was trembling with dread at the prospect of a French attack on the Allies, because such an attack would mean the destruction of the population and the capital; that the Allies would avenge Moscow by burning down Paris; that it would be difficult to force the soldiers to fight on the ruins of Paris.

"Leave me now, and I shall call you and tell you of my decision," said Napoleon.

He retained the company of only Caulaincourt, Berthier and the Duke of Bassano. He angrily complained of the timidity of his marshals, of their lack of devotion to him.

Several minutes later he announced to his marshals that he
was abdicating the French throne in favour of his son, the tiny King of Rome, under the regency of Marie Louise, and that if the Allies were willing to conclude a peace on these conditions the war was at an end. Immediately after these words, he read them a document he had composed. In it he had written that inasmuch as the Allied powers had declared that the Emperor Napoleon was the sole obstacle to the reestablishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, signified his willingness to descend from the throne, to abandon France and even life itself, for the welfare of the fatherland—a welfare inseparable from the rights of his son, from the empress’s rights of regency and from the laws of the Empire.

The marshals warmly applauded this act. Having read the paper, Napoleon took pen in hand—then suddenly, just before signing, he said:

“But perhaps we should move to attack them? We will beat them!”

The marshals were silent. Not one of them said an approving word. Napoleon signed the paper and entrusted it to Caulaincourt, Ney and Macdonald, who departed for Paris.

Much happened in Paris during the days that followed. Talleyrand promptly called together some of the senators in whom he had confidence, and coerced them into voting the deposition of the Bonaparte dynasty and an invitation to the Bourbons. Of far greater importance was Marshal Marmont’s betrayal of Napoleon; he retired with his corps to Versailles, and with this act went over to Talleyrand’s side.

At first Alexander hesitated; neither he nor the Austrian emperor had any reason to protest against the accession of the three-year-old King of Rome. But the royalists who surrounded the Allied monarchs, insisted that Napoleon’s proposal be rejected. Marmont’s treachery came just at the moment when the Allies were debating the question of accepting the French Emperor’s terms of abdication. But after the departure of the main forces at Napoleon’s direct disposal, the Allies knew that the threat of an assault on Paris was removed. Accordingly, they decided to reject his proposal and instead offer the throne to the
Bonaparte. "Convince your sovereign of the necessity of submitting to fate," said Alexander, on parting with Caulaincourt. "Everything that it is possible to do for Napoleon's honour shall be done." And he again called Napoleon "the great man."

As Caulaincourt was taking his leave of them, the Allies pleaded with him to persuade Napoleon to abdicate without stipulating conditions. They promised the Emperor the preservation of his title and full sovereignty over the island of Elba in the Mediterranean. They insisted that he abdicate immediately. The Allies and the royalists, now openly headed by the traitor Talleyrand, plainly feared civil war or a revolt of the soldier masses, who, as formerly, were completely loyal to the Emperor. Napoleon's official abdication would, to a degree, lessen the danger of sedition. The Senate's decision carried no moral weight in this instance. The senators were looked upon as Napoleon's lackeys. They willingly betrayed their master to gain favour with their new patrons.

"This contemptible Senate!" exclaimed Marshal Ney to Alexander. "It always made haste to submit to the will of the man whom it now calls tyrant! By what right does the Senate now raise its voice? It was silent when it should have spoken. How dare it permit itself to speak at this time, when everything enjoins it to remain silent?"

Only Napoleon himself could terminate all this painful indecision; his word alone could liberate the soldiers, officers, generals and officials from their vow. Thus assumed Frenchmen of all parties; thus assumed the Allies.

On the evening of April 5, Caulaincourt, Ney and Macdonald returned to Fontainebleau. After hearing what had transpired in Paris, Napoleon declared that he still had some troops, that the soldiers were faithful to him. "In any case, we shall see. Wait until tomorrow." After they had taken their leave, he had Caulaincourt brought back to him.

"Oh, mortals, mortals, Caulaincourt!" he exclaimed. "My marshals would have been ashamed to have behaved like Marmont. They speak of him with indignation, but they are vexed because he has preceded them on the road to patronage. They would have liked—to be sure, without covering themselves with
dishonour—to have earned the favour of the Bourbons. . . . " He spoke at length of Marmont's treachery in this decisive hour. "The unfortunate man does not know what awaits him. His name is dishonoured. Believe me, I am not thinking of myself. My course has been run, or is close to its end. In any event, what gratification could I now have in ruling over hearts which are already weary of me and are ready to give themselves to others? . . . I am thinking of France. . . . Oh, if only these fools had not betrayed me, I might within four hours have restored her greatness, because—believe me!—the Allies, in their present position, with Paris in their rear and me before them, would perish! If they ventured to leave Paris, in order to avoid this danger, they should never again have returned there. . . . This unfortunate Marmont has made this splendid outcome impossible. . . . Of course there would have been ways of continuing the war and striking back. From all directions news is reaching me that the peasants in Lorraine, in Champagne, in Bourgogne, are destroying separate detachments of the enemy's troops. . . . The Bourbons will appear, and God alone knows what will follow. . . . The Bourbons mean external peace, but internal war. Consider, what they have done in a single year with this country! . . . In any event, at this moment not I am necessary, but something else. My name, my image, my sword—all these awaken fear. It is necessary to yield. I shall call in the marshals, and you shall see their joy when I relieve them of their anxiety and authorise them to follow in Marmont's footsteps without forfeiting their honour in so doing."

During that night he spoke to Caulaincourt of many matters which had long preoccupied him. His words evoked memories of the incredible tedium of this sanguinary rule, of this endless dance of death, of this hecatomb of corpses, of this sacrifice of entire generations for a clearly inaccessible goal.

"I wished to give France power over the whole world," Napoleon frankly acknowledged in 1814. He did not then know that in the future a whole school of patriotic French historians would arise who would attempt to prove that Napoleon, far from having attacked others, had only defended himself; that, in reality, he had entered Vienna, Milan, Madrid, Berlin and Moscow only
as a means of defending the "natural frontiers," and that on the Moskva River he had "defended" the Rhine. Napoleon himself had not formulated such an explanation. He was far too candid.

Nor did he know of the precise computations which the present-day research worker, Albert Meynier, was to complete on the basis of all official and unofficial archives. According to Meynier's reckoning, the number of French citizens killed or unaccounted for in Napoleonic battles and campaigns was a little over 1,000,000—there were 471,000 officially registered as killed, and 530,000 lost without a trace and never heard of again. These figures of course, do not take into account the badly wounded and mutilated, whose death occurred off the field of battle, in the military hospitals.

This final summation of Meynier does not include the entire Napoleonic Empire, but only "old France"—the "old departments" of pre-Napoleonic, pre-Revolutionary days. Nor are all of Napoleon's wars included, but only those which he waged on and after 1800. There are no figures available of the first conquest of Italy in 1796-1797, of the campaign in Egypt and Syria. That out of a population of 26,000,000 in the "old departments" (counting women and children) over 1,000,000 grown men should have been killed and lost, this Napoleon could not precisely know; but he did see the villages desolated by recruiting levies, and the corpses heaped on the fields of his countless battles. Sometimes he sought to console others (he himself was troubled about it only moderately) by pointing out that the soldiers recruited into his armies from vassal and "allied" lands had perished in greater numbers than the French.

But the destruction of three or four million foreigners who fought in Napoleon's ranks, was a poor consolation for the destruction of 1,000,000 "pure" Frenchmen. To the millions of foes slain, mutilated and lost, he never gave so much as a thought.

Now, in the long night, part of which he spent in pacing up and down the resplendent salons of the luxurious, if gloomy, Palace of Fontainebleau, Napoleon expressed but one basic conclusion to Caulaincourt: he had worn France out, the country was exhausted. Perhaps the Bourbons were bad also; perhaps they would not remain for long on the throne; but now it was not he
who was needed—whatever it was, it was something else. During these April days it had been reported to him that though the merchants and upper bourgeoisie of Paris did not greet the Allies with such rapture as the nobility and royalists, even they admitted that they were tired and ruined by the wars.

The middle class, for which he had done so much, was also on the verge of rebellion, even as were the marshals, whom he had showered with rewards. But in order to enjoy these benefactions, the bourgeoisie, as well as the marshals, needed peace, a durable peace, impossible while Napoleon reigned.

He was up most of that night. Morning came—morning of April 6, 1814. He commanded the marshals to appear before him.

"Gentlemen," he said, "make your minds easy! There shall be no occasion for either you or the army to shed further blood. I am ready to abdicate. I should have wished for your sake, as for the sake of my family, to have secured the succession to the throne for my son. I think such an outcome would have been even more advantageous for you than for me, because then you might have continued to live under the authority of a régime corresponding to your origins, your feelings, your interests. . . . This should have been possible, but base treachery has deprived you of what I wished to secure for you. Had it not been for the retirement of the Sixth (Marmont's) Corps, we should have achieved this, and much else. . . . But everything has come out differently. I am resigned to my lot, you must resign yourselves to yours. You must reconcile yourselves to living under the Bourbons, and you must serve faithfully. You desired repose—and now you shall have it. But—alas! May it please God that I should be mistaken in my forebodings, but we were not a generation born for repose. The peace which you so much desire will mow down on your downy beds more of you than any war could have mown down in the bivouacs."

Then, picking up a sheet of paper, he read from it:

"The Allied powers having declared that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the reéstablishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor, faithful to his vows, herewith declares that he renounces, for himself and his heirs, the thrones of France
and Italy, and that there is no sacrifice, not even that of life, which he is not ready to make for the interests of France."

He sat down at the table—and signed the paper. The marshals were agitated. They began to kiss his hands, showering him with that flattery to which he had so become accustomed. And, immediately, Caulaincourt and two marshals bore the document away with them to Paris.

Alexander and his allies awaited the issue with considerable trepidation. On receiving the decree of abdication, their joy knew no bounds. Alexander affirmed that the island of Elba would be promptly ceded to Napoleon, subject to his complete jurisdiction; and that the King of Rome and Marie Louise would receive an independent possession in Italy.

It was all over.

Among the rank and file and the non-commissioned officers the news of the Emperor's abdication was received with sincere grief. During the night of April 6-7, the chasseurs and grenadiers of the Guard, shouting "Long live the Emperor! Down with the traitors!" paraded through all the streets of Fontainebleau and gathered outside the palace. In anger they cried out against the decree, threatening to kill the marshals who had betrayed Napoleon. . . .

The Emperor requested them to put aside all thoughts of revolt, and to return to the barracks.

At this moment Napoleon thought of something which had doubtless occurred to him many times during the campaign of 1814, a campaign strategically brilliant, but politically hopeless. Even earlier, in 1813, the marshals, generals, officers, retinue, and the Guard, had noticed that the Emperor quite needlessly subjected himself to mortal danger. In former wars—at Arcole bridge and at the city graveyard of Eylau—he had faced death from military necessity. Of late, he had been doing so to no seeming purpose at all.

As an example, after Duroc's death the Emperor seated himself on a tree stump and remained in that position for some time, a perfect target for the bullets which sped around him. During 1814, these strange antics began to multiply; it was no longer
First Abdication of Napoleon

possible to misunderstand their significance. When, for example, in the Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube on March 20, Napoleon purposelessly rode to a point on the battlefield which by his own command had been cleared of soldiers, because of the impossibility of maintaining a position there, Marshal Exelmans rushed after him to restrain him. But Marshal Sebastiani spoke to Exelmans of that which everyone had long known: “Let him be! Can’t you see that he is doing it deliberately? He wants to put an end to himself!”

Napoleon had always regarded suicide as a sign of weakness. It was evident that at Arcis-sur-Aube and in many other similar instances during 1813 and 1814 he exercised deceptive cunning over himself, aiming at masked suicide, seeking death, but death by hands other than his own.

But on April 11, 1814, five days after his abdication, when preparations were already being made at Fontainebleau for his departure to Elba, Napoleon, having taken farewell of Caulaincourt, with whom he spent much time during these days, went alone to his apartment. In his campaign dressing-case was a phial containing an opium solution, with which he never parted company. He had ordered it prepared for him in 1812, after the Battle of Malo-Yaroslavetz, where he had almost been taken prisoner. Now he took the phial and drank its contents.

The terrible torments began. Sensing something untoward, Caulaincourt entered Napoleon’s room. Seeing the Emperor’s obvious agony he thought he had been suddenly taken ill and wished to rush for the palace doctor. Napoleon begged him not to call anyone; he even angrily forbade him to do so. The convulsions were so horrible that Caulaincourt broke away, ran from the room, and awakened the doctor. On observing the phial on the table, the physician at once guessed what had happened. Napoleon began to complain that the poison was weak or else had evaporated. He angrily demanded that fresh opium be promptly furnished him. The doctor refused and fled from the room.

Napoleon’s torments continued for several hours, for he refused to take an antidote. He demanded that his attempted suicide be kept a secret from everyone. “How difficult it is to
die! How easy it would have been to have died on the field of battle! Why was I not killed at Arcis-sur-Aube?" broke from him amidst his terrible convulsions. The poison did not produce death; it had lain too long in his dressing-case.

Never again did Napoleon make an attempt on his life and never again did he speak of his one attempt.

The preparations were nearly completed. The Allies granted the Emperor one battalion of his Guard to accompany him to Elba.

The rest of the Guard—the rank and file and the non-commisioned officers in particular—loudly expressed their envy of the battalion that was to follow Napoleon.

On April 20, 1814, the time for departure arrived. The carriages for Napoleon, his small retinue and the Allied commisioners who were to accompany him to Elba, were drawn up outside of the palace.

Napoleon desired to take farewell of his Guard. The guardsmen collected on the palace parade ground, in that immense square which is now known as "La Cour des Adieux."

In the foreground, with the officers and generals, stood the old Guard, behind them the newer recruits. As the Emperor strode out of the palace, the soldiers presented arms, and the standard bearer lowered the colours of the old Guard at Napoleon's feet.

"Soldiers, you my old comrades in arms, with whom I have always walked on the road of honour, the time has now come for us to part. I might have remained longer amongst you. But it would have been necessary to continue the fierce struggle, to add perhaps to the war against foreigners an internecine war—and I could not decide to further tear the heart of France. Make use of the repose which you have rightly won, and be happy. As for me—do not mourn my fate. I have a mission, and in order to fulfill it I am content to live. It is my duty to tell posterity of the great deeds which we have together accomplished. I wish I might embrace you all—at least let me kiss this standard, which represents you all, . . . ."

Napoleon could no longer speak. His voice broke. He em-
braced and kissed the standard-bearer and the standard, then quickly walked away and seated himself in the carriage. According to eye-witnesses, the soldiers of the Guard wept like little children. The carriages rolled away amidst unceasing cries of "Long live the Emperor!"

"The grandest heroic epic of universal history was finished: he took farewell of his Guard." Thus the English newspapers of that day referred to this event.

But this 20-year epic, which began in February, 1793, in Toulon, was by no means ended in April, 1814, at Fontainebleau.
When he landed at Elba on May 13, 1814, Napoleon was without plans for the future. He considered his political career at an end, and during the first half year of his sojourn on the island he gave every evidence of being about to begin writing the history of his reign. He was calm and even-tempered. During his journey through the southern departments he had been greeted with such hostility by the royalists that his life was sometimes in danger. Now he found himself on the solitary isle, among an alien and peaceful population, which met him with respect and esteem.

Three years before his arrival at Elba, Napoleon received the Bavarian General Wrede at the Tuileries, and when Wrede deferentially suggested that it might be better to forgo the then scarcely secret project of invading Russia, the Emperor sharply interrupted him with the words:

“Within three years I shall be the master of the entire world!”

Now, three years after this conversation, the great French Empire had vanished, and Napoleon was sovereign over an island of approximately 140 square miles, which boasted three tiny towns and several thousand inhabitants.

The fortunes of war had brought Napoleon close to the place of his birth, for Elba is approximately 31 miles from Corsica. Until April, 1814, it had belonged to the Duchy of Tuscany, one of Napoleon's Italian possessions. Now, after the fall of the Empire, the island was given into the full possession of the defeated Emperor.

Napoleon acquainted himself with his new kingdom, received its inhabitants, made administrative arrangements, and, to all
appearances, prepared for a long stay. From time to time he had
visitors—his mother, Letizia; his sister, the Princess Borghese;
the Polish Countess Walewska, with whom he had been intimate
in 1807, and who continued to love him to the end. His wife,
Marie Louise, and his tiny son never came; the Empress’s father,
Francis of Austria, would not permit it. Nor did Marie Louise
show any particular desire to visit her spouse. Napoleon’s French
biographers are inclined to censure the Empress for her indiffer-
ence and for her betrayal of her husband, but they overlook the
fact that when the Emperor demanded her for his wife in 1810,
neither he nor anyone else showed sufficient interest to so much
as ask her if she desired this marriage. Writing from Ofen in
January, 1810, to a close friend of her youth, she said:

“Since Napoleon’s divorce I often open the pages of the Frank-
furt newspapers with the thought that I may find there the name
of his new wife—and I must confess that the delay is causing me
much disquiet. I have entrusted my lot to divine Providence.
. . . But if my unfortunate fate demands it, I am ready to sacri-
fice my personal interests to the welfare of the State.”

It was thus that the future wife of the Emperor regarded the
marriage that threatened her. It is clear that to her the fall of
Napoleon’s Empire was tantamount to liberation from a prison.

Nor did he have any visit from his first wife, whom he had
once loved so passionately and whom he had set aside. Josephine
died in her palace at Malmaison on May 29, several weeks after
Napoleon’s arrival on the island. The Emperor was morose and
taciturn for many days after hearing this news.

The tenor of his life during his first months at Elba was calm
and even. In no way did he betray his thoughts or emotions to
anyone. He spent long hours in profound meditation. It became
evident, however, in November and December of 1814, that he
was closely following political events in France and at the Vienna
Congress, which had just begun its sessions. His numerous in-
formants constantly brought him direct reports from France
which clearly indicated that the restored Bourbons and those sur-
rounding them were behaving with even less caution and common
sense than might have been expected.

Talleyrand, the shrewdest of all those who had betrayed Na-
poleon and aided in the restoration of the Bourbons in 1814, said of their very first actions: "They have forgotten nothing, and they have learned nothing." The same thought was expressed by Alexander I in a conversation with Caulaincourt: "The Bourbons have not altered—and they are incapable of being altered."

The king himself, the old, ailing, gouty Louis XVIII, was a prudent man; but his brother Charles Artois and the entire swarm of returned émigrés conducted themselves as though there had been no revolution and no Napoleon. They most graciously agreed to forgive and forget the transgressions of France—but only on the condition that the country repent its folly and accept the old pre-Revolutionary order. But for all their narrow-mindedness, they were soon convinced that it was absolutely impossible to destroy the institutions established by Napoleon, and all these institutions remained inviolable. No attempt was made to change the provincial prefectures, the organisation of the ministries, the police, the system of financial taxation, the Code of Napoleon or the tribunals. Under the restored Bourbons, France retained the same bureaucratic apparatus, the same administration of the army, of the universities, of the higher and intermediate schools. Indeed, the entire Napoleonic governmental structure remained intact, save that the autocratic Emperor was replaced by a constitutional monarch.

The king had been forced to grant the people a constitution. This was demanded by Alexander I, who was convinced that without a constitution the Bourbons would have no chance of surviving. The Constitution granted electoral rights to only a small group of wealthy people (to 100,000 out of a population of from 28,000,000 to 29,000,000); it permitted a limited degree of freedom of the press, and proclaimed personal security.

The advocates of the complete restoration of the old order, the "ultra-royalists," furiously opposed the Constitution. Why should an usurper have ruled for so many years with dictatorial powers, they argued, while a legitimate, divinely appointed king should be limited in his powers? Other things increased their unhappiness. From the very first days they did not cease to clamour for their former lands, which had been confiscated during the Revolution and sold to the peasants and bourgeoisie. They
now wanted these lands restored to them. To be sure, no one dared insist on it, but the mere talk of it caused fierce resentment among the peasants, and intensely agitated the villages.

The priesthood, in a body, supported the returned nobility, and even preached from the pulpit that the peasants who had once bought the confiscated lands were guilty in the eyes of God and "would be consumed by dogs, even as had been the biblical Jezebel."

The returned noblemen behaved arrogantly. Peasants were beaten, and could secure no redress in the royal court. The shrewder followers of Louis XVIII despaired when they observed what was happening in the villages, but they could do nothing.

The bourgeoisie, which had at first accepted the Bourbons, soon came to despise them. In the first days after the fall of the Empire, the majority of the trading class felt a certain measure of relief. There appeared the prospect of a cessation of the endless wars, of a renewal of business, of a discontinuance of recruiting levies. There was also the new hope that arbitrary administrative methods, which had been so harmful to business, would be abolished. During the years 1813 and 1814, even the manufacturers had ceased to regard the Empire as essential to their welfare.

But several months after the fall of the Empire and the abrogation of the Continental Blockade, the manufacturers began to wail. English goods, suddenly pouring into France and Europe, swept French products from the market. During the first period, the Bourbon government did not dare to begin a decisive tariff war against the English, who had so energetically participated in Napoleon's fall.

If there was one group among the bourgeoisie that received the Bourbons with a certain sympathy and maintained this sympathy for a longer period than some of the others, it was the intelligentsia—people of the liberal professions, lawyers, doctors and journalists. After the iron despotism of Napoleon, the moderate constitution granted by Louis XVIII appeared to them something of a blessing. The volume of newspapers, pamphlets and books (which had been restricted under the Emperor)
Bonaparte greatly increased. But this educated group, brought up on the 18th-century literature of enlightenment, very soon became irritated by the great influence exerted by the priesthood in the administrative and in social life. Everything redolent of the Voltaireian spirit was ruthlessly persecuted on all sides. The fanatics did as they pleased in the provinces, where new officials were often appointed at the direct instance of the Church.

With each succeeding month the Bourbons and their adherents, by their own actions, more and more jeopardised their position. Unable to reestablish the old order and to destroy the Revolutionary and Napoleonic civil laws, powerless even to dent the structure erected by Napoleon, they provoked the peasantry as well as the bourgeoisie with their words, articles, fierce agitation, and insolent behaviour. Their threats and provocations menaced the political stability of the country. The villages, in particular, were in a state of intense disquiet.

There was yet another circumstance which had vast significance. Almost the entire rank and file of the army, and, in considerable measure, the officers, regarded the Bourbons as a necessary evil forced on them from without, an evil to which they must silently and patiently resign themselves. In the course of time, they began to forget the horrors of Napoleonic warfare, the uninterrupted carnage, the terrible retreat from Moscow. Now they remembered the Emperor only as the man who had once led them to fabulous victories. For them he was not only a great hero, the mightiest of war captains, the former master of half the world—for them he had remained a comrade in arms, the "Little Corporal," who remembered them by name, who tweaked them by their ears and moustaches in token of his good will. It had always seemed to them that Napoleon loved them even as they loved him. And the Emperor had cunningly encouraged this illusion.

The officers were not as hostile to the Bourbons as were the soldiers. In any event, many of them were tired of wars and anxious for repose. But the Bourbons suspected the officers' political convictions. In addition, they felt that, since no wars threatened, it was absurd to maintain large cadres, and as a result retired many of the commissioned men at half-pay. These retired
men found themselves in the position of proletarians. Those who remained in the service were contemptuous of the new young officers of royalist and noble origin, who were often promoted above their heads. The rank and file and the officers were also incensed at the Bourbons for having substituted a white banner for the tricolour of the Revolution and Napoleon. Napoleon’s soldiers regarded the white standard as the standard of émigré-traitors, whom in years past they had met and defeated. Now, under this banner, the counter-revolutionary renegades (assisted by Russian, Austrian and Prussian bayonets) had come into power, and were preparing to rob the peasants of their soil.

“Where is he? When will he reappear?”

This question was asked in the barracks and villages long before it was heard anywhere else.

Napoleon knew this. And he knew something else. From Italy he learned the details of what was going on at the Vienna Congress. Observing how the sovereigns and diplomats were sharing his immense heritage, he noted the difficulties they were encountering in apportioning it. He saw how his former conquests were arousing the envy of the Allies, who were quarreling among themselves. He was aware that England and Austria resolutely opposed Russia and Prussia on the questions of Saxony and Poland. The former unity of action on the part of the European powers, which had put an end to Napoleon’s Empire, was no longer in evidence.

In December, 1814, while strolling near his palace in Porto Ferrajo, Elba’s principal city, Napoleon suddenly paused near a grenadier doing sentry duty. He was a soldier of the old Guard, who, with the permission of the Allies, had accompanied the Emperor to the island.

“Well, old grumbler, do you find it tedious here?”

“No, Sire, but there isn’t much amusement.”

Napoleon thrust a gold coin into his hand and said in a whisper as he walked away:

“That won’t go on forever.”

Did a report of this or similar episodes reach someone? We do not know. But we do know that Metternich, and Louis XVIII, and the English cabinet suddenly began to worry about Napo-
Bonaparte

leon's proximity to the shores of France. There was talk of transferring him to some more remote point. He continued to appear terrifying even on his tiny island. There were rumours that assassins would be sent after him. The more follies the Bourbons and their partisans in France committed, the more the sovereigns and diplomats in Vienna fretted. Yet, at the same time, the most reassuring reports continued to arrive from Elba, contradicting the disquieting rumours. The Emperor, it was said, scarcely left his rooms; he was very calm; he had fully reconciled himself to his lot; he had spoken most graciously with the English representative Campbell, telling him that nothing interested him now except his little island.

On the evening of March 5, a ball was given at the imperial palace at Vienna, in honour of the gathered monarchs and representatives of the European powers. Suddenly, at the height of the festivities, the guests noticed a commotion around Emperor Francis. It was as though a fire had broken out in the palace. In the twinkling of an eye the incredible news swept the room, causing the guests to leave in a panic. . . . A messenger had just arrived, bringing the report that Napoleon had abandoned Elba and had landed in France—and, unarmed, was following the direct road to Paris.

As early as February, 1815, a resolution began to form in Napoleon's mind to return to France and restore the Empire. He told no one how he came to this decision. It is possible that at the very end of 1814 and during the first month of 1815 the conviction matured in him that the entire army, and not merely his Guard, felt towards him as before, and that apart from the marshals who had prevailed upon him to abdicate in April of 1814 there were other marshals, in retirement and in active service, who regarded the Bourbons with loathing and contempt, fully sharing the feelings of the rank and file. He also believed that many of the marshals who had thirsted for repose and who had not scrupled about entering the service of the Bourbons were by now thoroughly dissatisfied with Louis XVIII, his brother, and his nephews, the Dukes of Angoulême and Berry. He knew the temper of the peasants, and he was aware of the unrest growing
in the villages. One communication, in particular, must have hastened his resolve.

In the middle of February he spoke with a messenger from Maret, Duke of Bassano, his former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was now living in France. Maret had commissioned his courier to tell the Emperor, in detail, of the growth of the general discontent; of the behaviour of the aristocratic émigrés on their return to the villages; of the fact that at heart the soldiers considered Napoleon their only rightful sovereign. In any event, the Emperor already knew a great deal of this even before the arrival of Maret's emissary. After this conversation his mind was made up.

At this time he received a visit from his mother, Letizia, a shrewd, firm, courageous woman, whom Napoleon respected more than any other member of his family. She was the first person to whom he revealed his intention.

"I cannot die on this island and end my career in unworthy repose," he said to her. "The army wants me. Everything impels me to hope that as soon as it sees me, the army will hasten to me. Of course, I might meet some unforeseen obstacle on the road. I might meet an officer loyal to the Bourbons, who will check the rush of the troops, and then my end will come within a few hours. That end is better than remaining on this island. . . . I want to leave and try my fortune once more. What do you think, mother?"

Letizia was so shaken by the unexpected question that she replied only after a pause.

"Allow me to be your mother for a brief moment," she said. "I will answer you later."

And after a long silence, she continued:

"Go, my son, and follow your destiny. It may be that failure will overtake you, and immediately after failure—death. But you cannot remain here—with sorrow, I must admit it. We must hope that God, who has preserved you through so many battles, will preserve you yet once more."

Saying which, she strongly embraced her son.

Promptly after his conversation with his mother, Napoleon summoned the generals who had accompanied him to the island:
Bonaparte

Bertrand, Drouot and Cambronne. Bertrand and Cambronne received the decision with joy, but Drouot doubted the feasibility of the venture. However, Napoleon remarked that he had no intention of causing a war or of ruling autocratically; it was his one desire to free the French nation. This was characteristic of the new political programme with which Napoleon began this undertaking. Perhaps he did not intend to realise it, but at least he proposed to utilise it for tactical reasons.

He promptly gave commands and instructions to his generals. He was not leaving the island to reconquer France by means of force. It was his simple intention to make a landing on the French shore, to proclaim his aims and to demand the return of the imperial throne. So great was his faith in the magic of his name that it seemed to him that, even without a battle, without any effort at resistance, the people would immediately kneel at his feet. Consequently, his lack of military resources would not be an obstacle. At the same time, there was little chance of his being prematurely arrested and rendered powerless—even if someone should learn of his landing—because he had his own followers at hand. For one thing, he had 724 men with him, a number which was sufficient for immediate personal protection—necessary only at the very beginning. Of these, 600 were grenadiers and unmounted chasseurs of the old Guard, and over 100 were cavalrymen. Moreover, he found at his disposal over 300 soldiers of the 35th Regiment, who had been on the island since before his deposition, when he had ordered them to Elba to serve as a garrison. Thus, there were approximately 1,100 men in all upon whom Napoleon could depend. For transport he found several small sailing craft anchored in the island’s harbours.

All the preparations were made in deepest secrecy. Napoleon commanded his three generals to be in complete readiness by February 26. On that date, after midday, the 1,100 soldiers, fully armed, were suddenly ordered to march to the harbour and were embarked on the ships. They had no idea of where they were going; they were not informed by so much as a single word as to the mystery of their journey. But, of course, they had guessed Napoleon’s aim even before they boarded the boats, and they now cheered their Emperor when he appeared in the harbour ac-
The Hundred Days

369

panied by the three generals and several officers of the old Guard.

Napoleon's mother wept inconsolably as she took farewell of her son, whom she would never again see.

The soldiers, officers, generals, and Napoleon himself, took their places in the small vessels, and by seven o'clock in the evening the tiny flotilla, favoured by a kindly wind, sailed northward.

The first danger came from the English and French frigates which constantly cruised around the island. These ships might appear at any moment, and wreck the entire plot in its infancy. One French frigate passed by so closely that one of its officers was able to exchange a few words through the speaking trumpet with the captain of Napoleon's brig.

"How is the Emperor's health?" the officer asked.

"Excellent!" the Captain replied.

With that, the meeting ended. The soldiers were hidden in the hold, and no one on the royal ship noticed anything amiss. Luck was with Napoleon; he did not encounter a single English ship. The voyage lasted almost three days, for the favourable wind had died down.

On March 1, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the flotilla reached the coast of France. It dropped anchor in the Gulf of Juan, not far from Cape Antibes. The Emperor stepped on shore and ordered an immediate landing. The customs guards ran up, and, seeing Napoleon, uncovered their heads and shouted, "Long live the Emperor!" Napoleon sent General Cambronne with several soldiers to Cannes for food stuffs. The provisions promptly arrived, after which Napoleon moved northward, through the Province of Dauphiné. He decided to go by the mountain roads. At the same time he ordered the presses of the city of Grasse to print his proclamations to the French army and nation. The city of Cannes and the city of Grasse peacefully submitted to him. Without halting, he advanced farther, through the tiny villages of Seranon and Digne-Gap—toward Grenoble.

The commander of the troops stationed in Grenoble, the principal city of the department, was preparing to resist, but the rank and file emphatically announced that they would on no account fight against the Emperor. The Grenoble bourgeoisie was
alarmed and bewildered; one half of the nobility besieged the authorities, imploring them to resist, while the other half fled from the city in all directions.

On March 7, Government troops entered Grenoble, with orders to oppose Napoleon. These consisted of two and a half infantry regiments reinforced with artillery, and one regiment of Hussars.

Napoleon was already close to Grenoble. The most critical moment was approaching. It would be futile to engage in a battle with these powerful regiments and their artillery. The royalist troops were strong enough to annihilate the Emperor and all of his soldiers without the loss of a man—at a distance. Napoleon had not a single heavy gun.

On the morning of March 7, Napoleon reached the village of La Mure. Ahead of him he saw the Government troops ranged in battle formation, barring the road. For a long time he gazed through the spy-glass at the opposing force. Then he ordered his soldiers to place their rifles under their left arms, the muzzle turned downward toward the ground. "Forward!" he commanded, and took his place at the head of the line, marching straight toward the advance battalions of the royal troops, who stood with rifles pointed at him.

The commander of the royal battalion glanced at his men, then turned to the garrison commander’s adjutant, and, indicating his soldiers, said:

"What should I do? See how pale they are, even as death itself. And they tremble at the mere thought of being forced to shoot at this man!"

He ordered the battalion to aim—but it was too late. Napoleon despatched 50 of his cavalrymen to persuade the Government troops not to shoot.

"Friends, don’t fire!" the cavalrymen shouted. "Here is the Emperor!"

The battalion paused. Napoleon strode up to the soldiers, who stood stock-still, their rifles atilt, their eyes fixed on the solitary figure in the grey coat and three-cornered hat who was resolutely approaching them.
"Soldiers of the Fifth Regiment!" the Emperor shouted. "Don't you know me?"

"Yes, yes, yes!" came from the ranks.

Napoleon threw open his coat, baring his breast. "If any amongst you wants to kill his Emperor, let him do so!"

Thunderous shouts of welcome answered him. All the troops sent for the defence of Grenoble, regiment after regiment, passed over to him. Colonel Labédoïère, who commanded the regiment stationed in Grenoble since March 7, was too impatient to wait for Napoleon's arrival. He drew up his regiment in the main square, and shouting "Long live the Emperor!" marched off to meet Napoleon. Napoleon entered Grenoble, followed by the regiments which had passed over to him and by a host of peasants armed with pitchforks and old rifles.

In Grenoble he was met by the local authorities and by all the leading departmental officials, except for the few who had fled from the city. At these receptions Napoleon repeated that he was definitely resolved to give the nation peace and freedom, admitting that he had once "loved renown and conquests far too well," and that now he intended to be guided by a different policy. Speaking of the past, he said that "he must be forgiven for succumbing to the temptation to make France the master of all the world." Even more characteristic was his assertion, reiterated with scarcely less emphasis, that he had come to save the peasants from the restoration of the feudal order threatened by the Bourbons, that he had come to secure the peasant lands from attempts at seizure by the returned émigrés. He declared that he wished to reëxamine the administrative structure he himself had created and to transform the Empire into a constitutional monarchy, a real monarchy with a representative form of government. In these words he frankly acknowledged that the legislative corps which had existed during his reign was anything but a real representative institution. He promised complete amnesty to all those who deserted the Bourbons and lent him their support. He admitted that he himself, on abdicating, had counseled his comrades to serve the Bourbons, but contended that the Bourbons had proved that they were "incompatible with the new France."
Having commanded the regiments in the vicinity to appear in Grenoble, and having reviewed his troops, he moved straight toward Lyons, with six regiments and considerable artillery. Everywhere he was met by peasant delegations. Before him went a detachment of 7,000 men and 30 guns. Napoleon with the rest of his troops remained another day in Grenoble, where he issued a series of decrees and commands. Again he considered himself the sovereign of France. Moreover, he was now in a position, in case of necessity, to fight a battle with the royal troops. However, as before, he was firmly convinced that he would have no occasion to fire a single shot; that, generally speaking, there had never been any royalist troops in France, and that the so-called “royalist” troops were his troops, which had been forced for 11 months to serve under an alien white standard.

Hosts of peasants—sometimes consisting of as many as 4,000 persons—followed Napoleon and his army, gathering on the way, bringing along provisions, and offering every manner of assistance. Napoleon himself, for all his self-assurance, could not have expected such an encouraging reception. He no longer had the slightest doubt that in a few days he would be in Paris. What could stop him? The locked gates of cities? But then, even in Grenoble, the royalists had attempted to lock the gates. “I knocked on those gates with but my snuffbox, and they opened before me.” As a matter of fact, he exaggerated his exertions; he had no occasion to knock on the gates, for the gates were flung open before him at his mere approach. Triumphant in the midst of the cheering peasant throngs, adored by the fine regiments which marched with him, Napoleon advanced in a direct line upon Lyons, issuing commands on the way, sending relay messages, receiving petitions, appointing new commanders and dignitaries.

On the evening of March 5, Louis XVIII received the sudden and incredible news that Napoleon had effected a landing in France.

Paris at that moment knew nothing; the king commanded that the report be kept a secret. Not until March 7 were the newspapers permitted to mention the incident. The impression it made was a staggering one. At first no one could understand how Na-
The Hundred Days

Ponel had managed to elude the two fleets in the Mediterranean which maintained surveillance over the island of Elba. And, further, how could he, unarmed as he was, escape immediate arrest after landing. At the beginning, the authorities were fully convinced that this petty revolt would soon be crushed. The "bandit Bonaparte" had evidently lost his wits, because only a madman could possibly embark on such a venture.

The police of Paris, however, immediately discerned one disquieting symptom: the revolutionaries, the Jacobins, the atheists, openly rejoiced when they heard the news of Napoleon's landing; they rejoiced at the return of the despot, who at the beginning of his career had strangled the Revolution and who for so long a time had continued to strangle its adherents. And this before they knew of the new political programme which the Emperor promised to put into effect or of the "freedom" he swore to bring back to France!

But in Paris there was also disquietude, especially amongst the well-to-do bourgeoisie. Above all, they feared a new war and a new threat to commerce. The liberal constitutionalists saw in the possible triumph of Napoleon a return to military despotism and an end to representative government.

But absolute panic reigned among the returned nobility. They were terrified lest they lose their heads. What would the Corsican cannibal do to them? The blood-stained shadow of the Duke of Enghien persistently hovered before the eyes of the Bourbons and their court during these harrowing days.

Nevertheless, the king refused to believe in the gravity of the situation. Later reports told of Napoleon's movements among the mountains in the direction of Grenoble. No one yet knew of the episode at La Mure, but that the troops were untrustworthy was quite evident. The marshals and generals had so far remained loyal. It was possible that the officers, too, might support the king, but the rank and file of the Paris garrison did not attempt to conceal their joy.

It was decided to oppose Napoleon with a man who, after the Emperor himself, was perhaps the most popular in the army: Marshal Ney. It seemed that Ney had sincerely joined the cause of the Bourbons; more than anyone else he had prevailed upon
Napoleon to abdicate in 1814. On the other hand, it was Napoleon himself who had conferred on him his marshal's baton, and later his titles; and what made him even more esteemed in the eyes of the rank and file was the fact that the Emperor had called him "the bravest of the brave." If such a man could be prevailed upon to command the army, it was possible, even likely, that the soldiers would follow him—even against Napoleon.

Ney was called into the king's presence. The marshal was definitely unsympathetic toward Napoleon's new undertaking, from which he anticipated nothing but evil for France. An ardent fighter, a hot-tempered soldier, under the influence of the servile flattery of the king and the entire Bourbon court, he exclaimed: "I will bring him back a captive—in an iron cage!"

But even before Marshal Ney set out, there arrived new reports of even more terrifying import than any that had come before. The troops were joining the Emperor's forces without battle; province after province, city after city, was falling at his feet, without a shadow of resistance.

Cost what it might, it was necessary to hold Lyons—after Paris the second city in France in wealth, in population and in political importance. Thither journeyed the king's brother, the loathed Count of Artois, with the naïve hope of inspiring the workers of Lyons with a feeling of devotion to the Bourbons. Thither also went Marshal Macdonald, upon whom the Bourbons depended. Macdonald barricaded the bridges, improvised hurried defences, and conceived the idea of staging a review of his troops to present the king's brother, Charles Artois, to them.

Everything was in readiness for the review, when suddenly a general appeared before Macdonald and suggested the advisability of transporting the king's brother to a less dangerous place. Macdonald collected three regiments. He spoke to them of the menace of a new war with Europe in the event of Napoleon's triumph, and proposed that they greet the Count of Artois with the cry: "Long live the king!" in order, in this manner, to demonstrate their loyalty to the Bourbons. Dead silence was the answer. In full panic the Count of Artois fled from the review, and with all speed abandoned Lyons. Macdonald alone remained, to direct the preparations for the defence of the city.
The soldiers were sulky. One sapper walked up to the marshal and reproachfully said: "You had better lead us to our sovereign, Emperor Napoleon." The Marshal made no response.

"Long live the Emperor!" With this cry the peasants, entering the suburbs of Lyons, apprised the city of the approach of the imperial advance guard.

And presently Napoleon's Hussars were entering the city. Macdonald with his troops went to meet them, counting on forcing a battle. But scarcely did his regiments, led by the Dragoons, come in sight of Napoleon's troops than, with the shout, "Long live the Emperor!", they joined with them. In a few minutes, all the detachments under Macdonald's command had mingled with Napoleon's troops. To avoid capture by his own soldiers, Macdonald galloped away and fled from the city.

Within half an hour after this meeting, Napoleon, surrounded by his retinue, entered Lyons, which, like the other cities, fell into his hands without a single shot. This was on March 10, nine days after he had landed off the Gulf of Juan.

As he received the Lyons city authorities, Napoleon reaffirmed what he had said in Grenoble: he would give France freedom within, and peace without. He had come to preserve and consolidate the principles of the great Revolution; he realised that the times had changed and henceforth he would content himself with France alone and give no thought to conquests. In Lyons he signed the decree abolishing the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies (institutions created by the Bourbon Constitution). He dismissed all the Bourbon juridical officials and appointed new ones in their place. He retained the majority of prefects, because, with few exceptions, they were his own prefects, whom the Bourbons had not replaced.

In Lyons he formally restored his empire, having deposed the dynasty of the Bourbons and abolished its constitution. At the head of nearly 15,000 troops he left the city and advanced upon Paris. "My eagles shall fly from belfry to belfry and settle on the Cathedral of Notre Dame," he had said in his first proclamation to his soldiers, almost immediately after landing in France.

Napoleon, as before, met with no obstacles in his march toward Paris. In triumph, he entered Mâcon, the villages between
Bonaparte

Lyons and Mâcon, and those between Mâcon and Chalon-sur-Saône. But the critical meeting with Marshal Ney was not far in the offing.

Napoleon knew Ney well; he loved his heart, but did not respect his head. He had seen Ney in battles, he remembered his feats at Borodino, and he had never forgotten his courage while commanding the rear guard of the Grand Army on its retreat from Russia. When he left Mâcon and it was reported to him that Marshal Ney barred his way at Lons-le-Saunier, Napoleon no longer feared a battle. But he did not want bloodshed. It was highly important for him to take possession of the country without a single human sacrifice, because he could not conceive of a more convincing political demonstration in the interests of the Empire.

Marshal Ney arrived in Lons-le-Saunier on March 12. He was accompanied by four regiments, and was expecting reinforcements. He was at the moment strongly convinced of the righteousness of his cause, just as in 1814 he had been convinced that only the Emperor's abdication could save France. He felt that Napoleon had broken his agreement with the Allies by leaving Elba, and that his new resolve to occupy the French throne would inevitably lead to a war with Europe. Ney honestly believed that he was justified in taking up arms against the Emperor. He knew that all the hopes of Louis XVIII, who trusted him, now rested on his shoulders.

Yet his soldiers were silent when he, their favourite, tried to speak to them. He called his officers and men together and addressed them. In his speech he reminded them how, unmindful of himself, he had served his Emperor faithfully all his life, but that now the restoration of the Empire would bring misfortune upon France and, above all, a war with all of Europe. He added that he would release any of his soldiers who had no heart for the coming battle, and that he would lead the rest. The silence of the officers and rank and file was the only answer he received. Irritated and perturbed, he returned to his headquarters.

During the night of March 13-14, the marshal was awakened by the news that the artillery detachment sent to him from Chalon had mutinied and, together with its cavalry escort, had gone over
The Hundred Days

to Napoleon. The next morning report after report reached him of towns ejecting the royalist authorities and joining the Emperor, and of Napoleon's advance in the direction of Lons-le-Saunier. In the moment of his greatest indecision, when he found himself surrounded by morose soldiers who evinced no desire to speak to him or answer his questions, and with officers who avoided his glance, a note was brought to him by a mounted orderly—

from Napoleon:

"I shall receive you, even as I received you on the day after the battle near Moscow. Napoleon."

Marshal Ney's hesitation was at an end. He ordered the regimental commanders to assemble their troops. Then, drawing his sword from its scabbard, he shouted: "Soldiers! The cause of the Bourbons is lost forever. The legal dynasty, which France has chosen for herself, is ascending the throne. Your sovereign, Emperor Napoleon, has first claim to the throne of this beautiful land." Cries of "Long live the Emperor! Long live Marshal Ney!" drowned out his voice. Several royalist officers immediately took to flight. Ney did not attempt to stop them. One of them broke his sword and bitterly reproached the marshal.

"Well, in your opinion, what was there to do?" retorted Ney. "Do you think I can hold back the tides of the sea with my two arms?"

In Paris the news of Napoleon's entry into Lyons, of his further movement northward and of Ney's decision to join his side arrived almost simultaneously.

To fly! This was the first thought of the royal court. To fly from mortal danger without stopping to look back; to fly from the Vincennes lion pit, where the corpse of the Duke of Enghien was rotting. The confusion of the courtiers was unimaginable. Louis XVIII at first resisted the idea of flight. It seemed to him humiliating; moreover, if he fled he might lose his throne. But what else was there to do?

Matters reached such a pass that even the following strategic plan was given serious consideration: The king would seat himself in a carriage with his dignitaries, with all his family, with the higher clergy. They would ride out to the gates of the city. There the carriages would pause and await the usurper. The usurper,
upon seeing the grey-haired legitimate monarch, proud in his righteousness and with his untrembling person barring the way into the city, would without question feel ashamed of his conduct—and turn back. Indeed, there was scarcely an absurdity that was not proposed.

The attitude of the Governmental press and the Paris press changed from complete self-assurance to unconcealed terror. Typical of its conduct were the series of epithets applied to Napoleon as he advanced northward toward the capital. The first news produced this: "The Corsican monster has landed in the Gulf of Juan." The second: "The cannibal is marching to Grasse." The third: "The usurper has entered Grenoble." The fourth: "Bonaparte has occupied Lyons." The fifth: "Napoleon is approaching Fontainebleau." The sixth: "His Imperial Majesty is expected tomorrow in his loyal Paris." This literary gamut appeared in one and the same newspaper, under one and the same editorship, in the course of several days.

On the night of March 19-20, Napoleon and his army entered Fontainebleau. At 11 p.m. the king and his entire family fled from Paris in the direction of the Belgian frontier.

At nine o'clock in the evening of March 20, Napoleon, accompanied by his retinue and cavalry, entered Paris.

A huge throng awaited him in the outer court of the Tuileries and around the palace. The frenzied people swept toward the Emperor and, pushing the retinue aside, opened the door of the carriage. Then, amidst a ceaseless din, they placed him on their shoulders and bore him into the palace, up the main staircase to the apartments of the second story.

After his grandest victories, after his most brilliant campaigns, after his greatest and richest conquests, never had he been met in Paris as he was on the evening of March 20, 1815. An old royalist later remarked that this was the most authentic idol-worship.

After some difficulty, the crowd was persuaded to leave the palace. Napoleon, finding himself in his old study (from which, but 24 hours before, Louis XVIII had fled), promptly gave his attention to the immediate affairs of state.

The seemingly impossible had happened. An unarmed man, without firing a single shot, without encountering the slightest
opposition, had in 19 days marched from the Mediterranean shores to Paris, had driven out the Bourbon dynasty and had re-established himself as the ruler of France. But better than anyone else, he knew that once more he had brought not peace, but war, and that Europe, startled by his sudden reappearance, would this time make every effort to prevent him from gathering his forces. . . .

Beginning his new reign, Napoleon took a solemn oath to give France freedom and peace, candidly admitting that during his first reign he had given her neither freedom nor peace. But a freedom-loving, peace-loving Napoleon seemed as incongruous as cold fire or hot ice.

A man of Napoleon's clear intelligence must have known only too well that if, without the slightest struggle, he was able to regain the French throne, it was not because the populace was charmed by his promises of freedom and peace. Indeed, the Bourbons had granted more freedom than Napoleonic France had ever expected; and thus far they had not violated the peace, nor had they any intentions of doing so. It followed, that the people of France had turned away from them for other reasons. He very clearly understood that his success was due in no small degree to his promises to the peasantry, who comprised the overwhelming majority of the nation.

"The peasants shouted: 'Long live the Emperor! Down with the aristocrats! Down with the priests!' They followed me from town to town, and when they could follow me no farther, their places were taken by others. . . . It was they who composed my cortège, while those who furnished me with all these friends were the real conspirators, the Bourbons themselves." In these words did Napoleon, shortly after his arrival in Paris, describe his march through France.

It was easy to gratify the peasants. For them Napoleon stood as a symbol of the complete destruction of feudalism and as a guarantee of peasant ownership of the land. To be sure, the peasants did not like wars or recruiting levies, and they cocked their ears when he spoke of his future policy of peace. But the
question of peace was not, in any case, of paramount importance. There was something of far greater moment. Napoleon clearly saw that after 11 months of a constitutional monarchy and a certain measure of the freedom of the press, the urban bourgeoisie expected him to grant at least a minimum of "freedom." Moreover, it would be well as soon as possible to give some practical demonstration of the programme which he had developed as he advanced toward Paris. Enacting the rôle of a revolutionary general, he had said in Grenoble: "I have come to save France from the émigrés. I am the son of the Revolution." In Lyons he announced: "Let the priests and the nobles who tried to subject France to slavery take care. *I will hang them to the lamp posts.*"

He received countless petitions from old Jacobins, who in some manner had survived the persecutions of his first reign. Now they greeted him as the avenger of the Revolution, who would destroy the Bourbons, monks, nobles and priests. In Toulouse they paraded in the streets, carrying a bust of Napoleon, singing the "Marseillaise" and shouting: "Aristocrats' heads on pikes!" Marshal Davout, whom the Emperor promptly appointed Minister of War, was deluged with requests to reintroduce the Terror of 1793.

Napoleon himself knew this prevailing state of mind. On the night of March 20, after he had been carried into the palace on the shoulders of the crowd, he said to Count Louis Molé: "I have found everywhere the same fierce loathing of priests and nobility that prevailed at the beginning of the Revolution."

But even as he had feared to ally himself with the Russian agrarian revolution in 1812, so he now recoiled at the thought of reviving revolutionary terror to gain the assistance of the *jacquerie*. In the first instance he had not called a "Pugachev" to his aid, now he did not call upon a "Marat." Napoleon would always remain the champion of the upper bourgeoisie. It had triumphed in the era of the Revolution and he had consolidated its victory. Now it felt itself closer to the enemy—to Alexander I than to Pugachev; closer to Louis XVIII than to Marat. "I do not desire to become the king of the *jacquerie*," said Napoleon to the bourgeois leader, Benjamin Constant. It was the Em-
peror’s aim to institute liberal governmental reforms to gratify the bourgeoisie, and at the same time pacify the Jacobins, who had so suddenly come to life.

Napoleon was well aware that only a revolutionary movement could have aided him at this particular moment. He realised that a moderately liberal constitution would not solve the essential problem. “My system of defence was worthless, because the means employed were not at all commensurate with the danger. I should have had to stir up the Revolution again, in order to receive from revolution all the means which it was capable of creating. It would have been necessary to revive all the passions, in order to utilise their blindness. Without this I was no longer able to save France,” he said later, in recalling the year 1815. And the celebrated military critic, General Jomini, is in this instance wholly in agreement with the Emperor. Rejecting every attempt to call to life the mighty revolutionary forces of 1793, Napoleon ordered that the liberal theoretician-publicist, Benjamin Constant, be found and brought to him. Constant had gone into hiding because of an article which he had written a day before Napoleon’s entry into Paris. In his article Constant had referred to the Emperor’s return as a “common calamity” and had called Napoleon a “Nero.”

On April 6, not without trepidation, Constant appeared before “Nero.” But to his great joy he learned that far from intending to execute him, the Emperor desired him to prepare a constitution for the French Empire.

By April 23, the Constitution was ready. The document was strangely christened: “A Supplementary Act to the Constitutions of the Empire.” Napoleon hoped by this title to bridge the gap between his first and second reign. Constant merely took the Charter (the constitution adopted by Louis XVIII in 1814) and made it somewhat more “liberal.” The electoral qualifications were considerably lowered for both voters and office holders, but it was still necessary to possess wealth in order to participate in affairs of state. A slightly greater measure of freedom was granted to the press. The preliminary censorship was abolished, and any journalistic violation could be punished only after a court trial. In addition to the elective Chamber of Deputies, another
institution, the "Upper Chamber," was established. Members of this latter body were to hold their seats either by imperial appointment or by hereditary right. Bills had to pass both Chambers and be approved by the Emperor before they became laws.

Napoleon accepted this project, and the new Constitution was proclaimed on April 23. The Emperor offered little opposition to Constant's liberal creation. He merely desired to postpone the elections and the convocation of the Chambers until the war issue had been settled. And then, if victory were achieved, it was quite clear what he would do with the deputies, with the press, and with Benjamin Constant himself. For the time being the Constitution would serve to still restless minds. But the liberal bourgeoisie had no great faith in Napoleon's liberalism, and he was strongly importuned to convocate the Chambers immediately. After some objections, he consented, and designated May 26 as the day on which the results of the plebiscite would be proclaimed.

The result of the plebiscite showed 1,552,450 votes for the Constitution and 4,800 against. The ceremony of seating the deputies actually took place not on May 26 but on June 10. As in the past the two Chambers were called the Legislative Corps.

The national representatives had been in session for barely a week and a half, when Napoleon began to show his dissatisfaction with them. The deputies, as if in token of their independence, had selected as their presiding officer the former Girondist and moderate liberal Lanjuinais, whom Napoleon disliked. As in the past, the Emperor was absolutely incapable of submitting to any limitation of authority, and upon receiving this news from the Legislative Corps, he angrily exclaimed:

"Let us not emulate the example of Byzantium which, when pressed on all sides by the barbarians, became the laughing-stock of posterity for engaging in abstract discussions at a moment when the battering-ram was already breaking down the gates of the city."

He was alluding to the European Coalition, whose hordes were threatening the French frontiers from all sides.

When he set out to join the army on June 12, Napoleon fully realised that he was leaving untrustworthy officials in his rear.
He was threatened less by the liberals of the Legislative Corps than by the man whom, immediately on his return from Elba, he had again appointed Minister of Police. Joseph Fouché had been adroit enough, before Napoleon's return to Paris, to provoke the anger of the Bourbons and to fall into disgrace. This cunning manoeuvre resulted in his securing the post he coveted. That Fouché was capable of every intrigue and treachery was well known to Napoleon. But, in the first place, there was unrest in the Vendée, and no one knew the nature of these Vendéan insurrections as well as Fouché. In the second place, the Emperor counted on a quarrel with the Bourbons. And, withal, as during his first reign, Napoleon maintained a special secret surveillance of his Minister of Police. Secret negotiations between Fouché and Metternich had come to light as early as May. It is true that Fouché escaped punishment, but, none the less, Napoleon, in concluding his talk with the crafty provocateur, declared: "Fouché, you are a traitor! I should have you hanged!" In response to this, Fouché, who during his long service with Napoleon had become accustomed to such turns in the conversation, bowed low and said: "I do not share Your Majesty's opinion."

What was there for Napoleon to do under the circumstances? In the event of victory over the Allies, the Chambers would submit, and Fouché would remain faithful and harmless. And in the event of defeat—what difference could it make who conducted the burial services of the Empire: the liberal deputies, or the treacherous ministers?

Napoleon trusted Davout, whom he left behind as Governor-General of Paris and Minister of War. He could rely on the old republican Carnot, who had offered his services to Napoleon in 1814 because he considered the despotic Emperor a lesser evil than the Bourbons.

Napoleon was also convinced that the workers, who were in even greater want than in the spring of 1814, would not rise against him in the rear. They would remain loyal for the same reason that had brought Carnot into his service, for the same reason that the Jacobins had rejoiced over his return from Elba. All these revolutionaries now thought of him not as an emperor defending his throne from a rival monarchist pretender, but as
the military leader of post-Revolutionary France, who was preparing to defend French territory from invasion by the interventionists and Bourbons who hoped to reestablish the old order.

Of the 198,000 men at Napoleon’s disposal on June 10, 1815, more than a third were scattered throughout France; there was, for instance, a considerable force in the Vendée. For the approaching campaign the Emperor had under his direct command approximately 128,000 men and 344 guns. In addition, there was the “extraordinary army,” consisting of the national guard and similar organizations, numbering 200,000 men, of whom one half were without uniforms and a third without arms. Should the campaign prove to be a protracted one, the Emperor’s Minister of War, Davout, would furnish him with another 230,000 to 240,000 men. On the other hand, it seemed more likely that the struggle would soon be over, for the English, Prussians and Russians already had 700,000 men in the field and could count on another 300,000 by the end of summer. Further Allied reinforcements would be forthcoming in the autumn if necessary.

The Coalition had definitely decided to destroy Napoleon’s power for all time. After the first scare caused by the Emperor’s return from Elba, the governments represented at the Vienna Congress set about their task with redoubled energy. All of Napoleon’s proposals for a separate peace with individual members of the Coalition were rejected. He was declared outside the law, “an enemy of humanity.”

There was more than hatred for the despoiler and conqueror, more than terror before the triumphant war captain. This time Alexander, Francis, Frederick William, Metternich and Lord Castlereagh (who was alarmed by the present mood of the English workers and middle-class reformists) were influenced by their apprehensions on the score of Napoleon’s new “Jacobin” and “liberal” tendencies. The red kerchief which Marat had once wrapped around his head was far more terrifying to the reactionary rulers of Europe than Napoleon’s imperial crown. In 1815, it seemed to them that Napoleon was preparing to “resurrect Marat” for the coming struggle. Napoleon had, in fact, come to no such decision. But in Vienna, in London, in Berlin and
in St. Petersburg the illusion persisted. And this intensified the hostility toward the conqueror.

The army greeted Napoleon with a fervour reminiscent of Austerlitz and Wagram. English spies could not conceal their astonishment at his reception and reported to Lord Wellington, the English commander, that the soldiers' adulation of the Emperor was greater than ever before. Other foreign observers, who studied the currents in France, concur in this opinion. And because of the love they bore their leader, the French rank and file distrusted their generals and marshals. Indeed, even as early as 1814, they suspected many marshals of treachery to the Emperor. Blindly believing in Napoleon, they begged him to be as severe to the "traitors" as the Convention had at one time been with all suspicious generals: "The guillotine for traitors in generals' boots!" But Napoleon did nothing of the sort. The marshals and generals retained their posts. The Emperor was not inclined to resort to the terroristic tactics of the Revolution, either in the rear or at the front, though he himself had acknowledged that such methods would have doubled his strength.

Napoleon's presence raised the soldiers' spirits. They soon felt reassured that the generals and marshals were under strict surveillance and that there was no need to fear their suddenly betraying the Emperor.

At the moment, Napoleon was opposed by the English and the Prussians, who had taken the field in advance of the other Allies. The Austrians were also making haste to reach the Rhine.

Meanwhile, Napoleon had lost his only ally. Murat, the King of Naples, who had retained his throne in 1814, had been conceded the right to continue his rule by the Vienna Congress. However, when he suddenly learned of Napoleon's landing in France, he threw in his lot with his former commander. He promptly declared war on Austria and was crushed even before the Emperor himself advanced against the Coalition. In consequence, Napoleon could not count on this partial diversion of a portion of Austria's troops. But the Austrians were still distant.

Napoleon's first problem was to fling back the English and Prussian armies. Wellington at the head of the English army was
stationed in Brussels and its environs; Blücher with his Prussians was on the Sambre and the Meuse, between Charleroi and Liége.

On June 14, Napoleon began the invasion of Belgium. He speedily advanced into the area separating Wellington from Blücher, and flung himself on the Prussian commander. The French occupied Charleroi and fought their way across the Sambre. But Napoleon’s manoeuvres on the right flank were retarded by the treachery of General Bourmont, a royalist by conviction, and long suspected by the rank and file, who fled to the Prussian camp. Blücher considered the episode a good omen, although he refused to accept Bourmont in his camp, and even spoke of him as “a dog’s excrement.” (Blücher, in fact, expressed himself even more forcibly.)

When Bourmont’s treachery was reported to Napoleon, he merely said: “Once a white, always a white!”

On June 15, Napoleon ordered Marshal Ney to occupy the village of Quatre Bras on the road to Brussels, in order to block the anticipated English advance. But Ney was dilatory. On June 16, Napoleon defeated Blücher in a major battle at Ligny. The French lost 11,000 men; the Prussians, 20,000. However, Napoleon was far from satisfied with his victory. Had it not been for Ney’s blunder in detaining the first army corps, which remained idle between Quatre Bras and Ligny, the entire Prussian army might have been destroyed at Ligny. Blücher was beaten and flung back—but he was not routed.

On June 17, Napoleon permitted his army, a day’s respite. At midday he placed Marshal Grouchy in command of 36,000 men, and commanded him to follow Blücher and crush him. A portion of the French cavalry pursued the English, who had attempted to cut off the French at Quatre Bras the evening before. But a heavy summer downpour inundated the roads and halted the pursuit. With his main forces Napoleon joined Ney and marched northward in a straight line toward Brussels. Wellington barred the Emperor’s advance, occupying a position approximately 14 miles from Brussels, on the plateau of Mont St. Jean, to the south of the village of Waterloo. The forest of Soignes, north of Waterloo, cut off his avenue of retreat toward Brussels.
Wellington fortified himself on the plateau. From this strong position he planned to hold Napoleon in check until Blücher should recover from his defeat and come to his assistance.

The English scouts reported that, notwithstanding the almost impassable state of the rain-soaked roads, Napoleon was uninterruptedly advancing straight upon Mont St. Jean plateau. If Wellington could maintain his position until Blücher's arrival, the victory would be his; if he should fail, it would mean the complete rout of the English army. Such were the alternatives which faced the English commander when Blücher's chief of staff, Gneisenau, brought the news that the Prussians would hasten to Waterloo as soon as their forces could be reorganized.

Toward the evening of the 17th, Napoleon reached the plateau. In the misty distance he could discern the English army.

On the morning of June 18, 72,000 Frenchmen took the field against 70,000 English. Both sides momentarily anticipated reinforcements. Napoleon awaited Marshal Grouchy and his 36,000 men. Wellington expected Blücher, who, even after the defeat at Ligny, still had some 80,000 men, from whom he could draw 40,000 who were fit for battle.

Napoleon was in position long before daybreak, but could not begin his attack immediately because the rains had made the ground so soft that it offered a treacherous footing for the cavalry. Early in the morning the Emperor, on horseback, inspected his troops, who cheered him to the echo as he rode by. It was the most exceptional manifestation of mass enthusiasm he had encountered since the days of Austerlitz. This inspection, the last he would ever make, indelibly impressed itself in his memory.

At half past eleven in the morning Napoleon decided that the ground was sufficiently dry, and ordered the battle to begin. He concentrated an artillery fire of 84 guns on the English left wing, and sent Marshal Ney to lead an assault. Simultaneously, he launched a milder attack on the English right wing stationed at Hougoumont Castle, to divert Wellington. This latter attack encountered energetic resistance when it collided with the enemy's fortified position.

Ney's onslaught on the English left wing had been in progress for an hour and a half when Napoleon suddenly noticed the dim
Bonaparte

Outlines of advancing troops to the northeast, in the direction of Saint Lambert. At first he thought it was Grouchy. But it was not. It was Blücher, who, having adroitly eluded Grouchy's pursuit, was now hurrying to Wellington's assistance. On learning the truth, Napoleon was not dismayed. He felt confident that Grouchy was advancing on Blücher's heels, and that both would come up to the battlefield at almost the same time. Reinforced by Blücher, Wellington would have a numerical advantage that even the arrival of Grouchy and his 36,000 men could not quite balance. However, this did not greatly perturb the Emperor, who felt that if he could inflict a crushing blow on the English commander before Blücher's appearance, the battle would turn into a rout after the approach of Grouchy.

Directed cavalry detachments against Blücher, Napoleon ordered Ney to continue the savage attack on the English left wing and centre, reinforcing him with the corps of d'Erlon, which advanced in compact battle formation. A fierce and sanguinary battle developed along this entire front, as the English met the massive French columns with deadly rifle-fire and desperate counter-attacks. One after another the French divisions entered the fight, but, in spite of terrific losses, could make no dent in the enemy's lines. The Scottish cavalry flung itself upon the French attackers and destroyed a third of their numbers. Observing this stubborn contest, Napoleon dashed toward the elevation at La Belle Alliance farm, followed by several thousand of General Milhaud's Cuirassiers. The added pressure of the Cuirassier charge was too much for the Scots, who after losing an entire regiment, were forced to retire.

But this attack disrupted almost the entire army corps of d'Erlon. The English left wing remained unbroken. Realizing that time was getting short, Napoleon changed his tactics and transferred the main attack to the centre and right wing of the English army. At half past three La Haye Sainte farm was taken by the left-flank division of the corps of d'Erlon. But this division was not strong enough to develop its success. In consequence, Napoleon ordered Ney to take 40 squadrons of Milhaud's and Lefèvre-Desnoyettes' cavalry and strike a blow at the English right wing between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. Hougoumont
Castle was finally taken, but the English stood their ground, falling in hundreds but refusing to retreat.

During this famous attack, the French cavalry was raked by the fire of the English infantry and artillery. But this did not cause them to lose heart or abate the savagery of their onslaught. There was a moment when Wellington and his staff thought that all was lost. Yet, even when it was reported to him that his troops could no longer maintain their positions, the English commander resolutely replied: "If such is the case, let them die on the spot! I have no further reinforcements. Let them die to the last man, but we must maintain our positions until Blücher arrives."

Without waiting for infantry reserves, Napoleon sent 37 squadrons of Kellermann's cavalry into the heat of gunfire. Evening came. Finally, the Emperor ordered his Guard into the battle, and himself directed the attack. At this moment, shouts and the rattle of rifle-fire resounded on the French right flank. Blücher with 30,000 troops had arrived on the field of battle. But the Guard continued to struggle, for Napoleon still believed that Grouchy was advancing hard upon Blücher's rear.

Soon, however, a wave of panic swept the French lines. The Prussian cavalry had flung itself on Napoleon's Guard, which now found itself hemmed in by Wellington in front and Blücher in the rear. With his remaining forces, Blücher concentrated on La Belle Alliance farm, which Napoleon had only recently quitted in order to launch the attack of his Guard. By means of this manœuvre Blücher hoped to cut off Napoleon's retreat. At eight o'clock in the evening, Wellington, who for an entire day had stood resisting the unceasing deadly attacks of the French, ordered an assault along the whole line. And still Grouchy did not come. To the last instant the Emperor vainly awaited him.

The end had come. The Guard, forming a phalanx round Napoleon, slowly retired, desperately fighting its way through the compact lines of the enemy. Napoleon walked beside his horse in the midst of his battalion of Grenadiers of the Guard. The old Guard's desperate resistance held off the victors. "Brave Frenchmen, surrender!" shouted the English General Halkett, who had reached the French phalanx commanded by General Cambronne and completely surrounded it; but the Guard continued to fight,
preferring death to surrender. In other sections, the French troops resisted as vigourously as before, but in the end, subjected to the attacks of fresh Prussian forces, they scattered in all directions, saving themselves by flight. It was not until the following day, and then only partially, that they began to form into organized units. The Prussians continued the pursuit through the entire night.

Twenty-five thousand Frenchmen and 22,000 Englishmen and Prussians lay dead and wounded on the field of Waterloo. Napoleon's position was now quite hopeless, a fact which he promptly recognised. His army had been defeated, almost all of his artillery captured, his frontiers were being approached by hundreds of thousands of fresh Austrian troops and many more hundred thousands would shortly arrive from Russia. As he retired from the shambles of Waterloo, he knew that his bloody career was at an end.

Had Grouchy betrayed him and caused the French army to be destroyed by his dilatory tactics, or had he accidentally lost his way? Had Ney borne himself like a hero during his cavalry attack (as Thiers claimed) or like a madman (as Madelin contended)? Had it been wise to wait until midday, or should the Emperor have begun the battle at daybreak, in order to crush the English before Blücher's arrival? All these and myriads of other questions have occupied military historians for the past century—although they little occupied Napoleon himself at this moment. Outwardly he was calm and meditative during the entire journey from Waterloo to Paris. But he was not morose as he had been after Leipzig, despite the fact that everything was now lost, finally and irretrievably.

Curious, indeed, is Napoleon's own evaluation of this defeat. Only a week after Waterloo he said: "The powers are waging a war not with me, but with the Revolution. They always considered me its representative, a man of the Revolution."

In this opinion he wholly contradicts the contentions of his contemporaneous defenders among the freethinkers of Europe. It is sufficient to recall Herzen's angry comment when he was shown a picture representing Wellington and Blücher meeting at night on the field of Waterloo and congratulating each other on
their victory. "He (Napoleon)," writes Herzen, "had goaded the other nations to a wild fury of resentment, and they began to fight desperately for their servitude and for their masters. This time military despotism was conquered by feudal despotism. I cannot indifferently pass by the engraving which depicts the reunion of Wellington and Blücher in the moment of victory at Waterloo. When I look at it I cannot tear my eyes away, and there arises a cold and terrible feeling within my breast. . . . (Wellington and Blücher) joyously greet each other, and why should they not be glad? They have just deflected history from a great road into ruts of mire, from which it would take ages to pull it out again. . . . This occurred at daybreak. . . . Europe still slept at this hour, not knowing that her destiny had changed." But Herzen placed the blame on Napoleon himself, for having aroused the hatred of the European powers by his arbitrary actions and by his contempt for their interests and dignity. To the end of his life Napoleon remained silent on this point; it did not interest him in the least. Nevertheless, he clearly understood that the feudal-absolutist aristocracy, which he had so often defeated, was in a measure taking its temporary revenge; when the old Guard retreated on June 18, 1815, the French Revolution retreated with it.

Almost immediately after Waterloo, Napoleon resigned himself to whatever might befall him. He arrived in Paris not to fight for his throne, but to yield all his honours. . . . He had not lost a whit of his superhuman energy, but he sensed that for good or ill his life work was done, and that there was no longer any place for him. When only 15 months before, immediately before signing his first abdication at Fontainebleau, he had suddenly asked his marshals: "But perhaps we should move to attack them? We shall beat them!" it had seemed to him that his course was not yet run. When he had returned from Elba and, unopposed, had won back his throne, he had full confidence in himself and in his destiny. Now—he was suddenly and everlastingly bereft of all hope. The defeat at Waterloo did not fill him with such despair as had gripped him on April 11, 1814, when he had attempted to end his life by taking poison. In place of despair had come submissiveness. He had lost all inclination for
decisive activity, and simply waited for coming events to do with him what they would.

Arriving in Paris on June 21, he summoned his ministers. Car- not suggested a dictatorship. Davout counseled an interruption of the sessions of the Chambers and the dismissal of the deputies. The Emperor refused to adopt either course. Meanwhile, the Chambers hastily convened and, acting on Lafayette's resolution, proclaimed themselves beyond dismissal. Napoleon later de- clared that at a single word from him the masses would have cut the throats of all the deputies—and many deputies who lived through those days confirmed his words. But again, his only al- ternative would have been to oppose Lafayette, who had just appeared on the historical scene, with a Marat. But, motivated by bourgeois attitudes, he could not call upon the forces of the Revolution to aid him in retaining his crown.

Strange reports began to emanate from the workers' quarters, where large groups petitioned the Emperor to continue the military struggle against the threatened invasion rather than ab- dicate.

From June 21 to June 23, the streets in the Saint-Antoine, Saint-Marcel and Temple districts were crowded with shouting workers. "The Emperor—or death!" they cried. "Down with the traitors!"—"Abdication is unnecessary!"—"Down with the Chambers!" But Napoleon no longer cared to prolong the struggle. In Paris there were conferences of alarmed financiers, of members of the Chamber of Commerce, of bankers. The Bourse was thrown into a panic. Napoleon plainly saw that the bourgeoisie was abandoning him, that it now found him a dan- gerous encumbrance. Yet he could not bring himself to accept the support of the masses.

On June 22, he once more abdicated in favour of his infant son, who, since the spring of 1814, had been living with Marie Louise at the Austrian court. Napoleon's second reign, which lasted one hundred days, was at an end. This time the Emperor had little reason to hope that the Allies would sacrifice the Bour- bons in favour of his son.

A tremendous crowd gathered round the Elysée palace, where Napoleon had taken up his residence since his return from the
army. "Abdication is unnecessary!" shouted the populace. The bourgeoisie of the central quarters of the capital was terrified; it anticipated a revolutionary outbreak. It not only feared a revolution, but a revolution which would acclaim Napoleon dictator. The phantom of such an uprising frightened even the usually sober Bourse. But when it was rumoured that the Emperor intended to abdicate, government stocks shot sharply upward. The bourgeoisie far more easily reconciled itself to the prospect of a foreign invasion of the capital than to the political interference, apparently just beginning, of the Parisian workers, who desired to resist the entry of the Allies. On learning that Napoleon had departed for Malmaison, and that he had definitely resolved upon abdication, the crowds slowly disbanded.

Never before had Napoleon received such enthusiastic support from the masses. To a great degree it was the result of an influx of tens of thousands of transient workers from the provinces. These masons, carpenters, cabinet-makers, locksmiths, painters, roofers, decorators and navvies were employed in Paris during the summer months in paving streets, building houses and making other improvements. Coming direct from the villages, they bore a double hatred for the Bourbons—both as workers and as peasants. In Napoleon they saw their guarantee against future Bourbon restoration and a return to feudalism. In consequence, they protested against the Emperor's decision to abdicate, even going to the extreme of attacking and half beating to death several well-dressed people whom they suspected of being royalists because they refused to join in the shout: "Abdication is unnecessary!"

These crowds of "construction workers" continued to make demonstrations even after Napoleon's abdication had become a fact. "Never has the people, that people which pays and fights the battles, shown greater attachment to the Emperor," wrote an eye-witness of the events of June 23 to June 25, when thousands of new arrivals from the provinces still refused to accept Napoleon's decision to give up the throne.

On June 28, the abdicating Emperor left Malmaison, and journeyed to the Atlantic coast. He was resolved to embark on
one of the frigates anchored off Rochefort, and to leave for America. By order of the Minister of Naval Affairs, two frigates were placed at his disposal. When at eight o'clock in the morning of July 3 the Emperor arrived at Rochefort, the frigates *Saale* and *Medusa* stood in readiness, but it was impossible to put out to sea, because an English squadron was blockading the harbour. There was nothing to do but to wait. Napoleon seemed to tarry deliberately.

He rejected the proposal to embark secretly on a small private ship. As soon as his presence in Rochefort became known, crowds of from 15,000 to 20,000 daily congregated before the windows of his residence, shouting: "Long live the Emperor!" Finally, on July 8, Napoleon boarded the *Saale*, and accompanied by the *Medusa*, sailed out to sea.

The frigates stopped at the island of Aix, northwest of Rochefort. Taking advantage of the pause, Napoleon spent several hours on shore. He was promptly recognised. The soldiers of the local garrison, begged him to review them. To their great joy, Napoleon assented. He also inspected the fortifications of the island, which had been built by his orders years before. But when he returned to the *Saale* he learned that an order had been sent from Paris to put out to sea only in the absence of English warships. . . . Meanwhile, an English squadron had cut off all avenues of escape. . . .

On the instant, Napoleon came to a new decision. He sent his companions, Savary and Las Cases, to the commander of the English squadron with a request that the French frigates be permitted to go their way unmolested so that they might convey him to America. Received aboard the English cruiser *Bellerophon* by Captain Maitland, Savary and Las Cases met with a courteous but firm refusal.

"What assurance have we," asked Maitland, "that Emperor Napoleon, if he is now allowed to sail to America, will not return again and force England and all of Europe to render new sacrifices of blood and wealth?"

To this, Savary replied that there was a significant difference between the first abdication in 1814 and the present abdication.
He claimed that now Napoleon was voluntarily withdrawing from public life forever, although he might have remained on the throne and continued the war even after Waterloo.

"If such is the case, why does not the Emperor turn to England and ask her for a refuge?" retorted Maitland.

Further conversation, however, vouchsafed Napoleon's ambassadors no definite promise, not even as to whether England would consider him a prisoner or a free man.

Savary and Las Cases returned to the Saale. When the sailors and officers of the two French frigates learned that the Emperor might fall into the hands of the English, they were deeply agitated. Captain Ponée of the Medusa announced to General Montholon:

"I have just consulted all my officers and crew. Therefore, I speak on their behalf, as well as my own."

With this introduction he presented his plan. His frigate, the Medusa, would attack the Bellerophon by night and engage it in battle. This would occupy and divert the English for two hours. The Medusa, of course, would be destroyed after a two-hour battle, but during this time the Saale, bearing the Emperor, could slip by the English squadron and reach the open sea.

When this proposal was put to Napoleon he told Montholon that he could not accept such a sacrifice. Had he still been Emperor, he contended to Montholon, it might have been different, but to save a private individual at the cost of a French warship and its crew was out of the question. Leaving the Saale, he again went ashore. There several young officers offered to smuggle him aboard a small ship, which would stealthily convey him to America. But Napoleon refused the offer. He had by now completely resigned himself to whatever might befall him. Las Cases again went to Captain Maitland, and informed him that Napoleon had decided to put his trust in England. Maitland assured him—unofficially, of course—that the Emperor would be accorded a courteous and respectful welcome.

On July 15, Napoleon embarked on the brig Hawk, which was to convey him to the Bellerophon. He wore his favourite uniform, that of the Chasseur Guards, and his three-cornered hat. As Napoléon boarded the vessel, the crew of the Hawk shouted:
“Long live the Emperor!” When the Hawk drew up alongside the Bellerophon, Captain Maitland, bowing deeply, met his “guest” on the lowest step of the ladder. Mounting to the deck, Napoleon was greeted by the crew, which stood at attention to receive him.

England’s most powerful, most stubborn and most dangerous enemy was in her hands.
THE ISLAND OF SAINT HELENA
1815-1821

On May 21, 1501, the Portuguese navigator, Vasco da Gama, discovered a desolate island in the South Atlantic Ocean, which was named Saint Helena. In the 17th century it became a Dutch colony but was finally made an English possession in 1673, when it became a base of the East India Company for ships plying between the British Isles and India.

It was here that the English cabinet decided to send Napoleon when it learned that he was aboard the Bellerophon. The nearest African port was nearly 1,200 miles distant, and at least two and a half months were required for the journey from England to the island. It was Saint Helena's geographical position, above everything else, that influenced the English government's decision. After The Hundred Days, Napoleon had become even more terrifying than before the final act of his epic. The possibility of his returning to France brought visions of a new restoration of the Empire and a new all-European war.

Situated in mid-ocean, far from any other land, Saint Helena's remoteness guaranteed the impossibility of Napoleon's return.

Upon being informed of his place of exile, Napoleon protested, insisting that he was not a prisoner of war. From the Bellerophon he was transferred to the frigate Northumberland, which, on October 15, after a two-and-a-half-month voyage, brought the captive Emperor to the island on which he was to spend his remaining years.

A small retinue accompanied him into exile—Marshal Bertrand and his wife, General Montholon and his wife, General Gourgaud, Las Cases and Las Cases's son. In addition, he took with him his servant, Marchand, and a male domestic, Natale.
Cantini, of Corsica. The Emperor’s first quarters were not particularly comfortable, but he was later assigned a more spacious residence in the Longwood district of the island.

In April, 1816, Admiral Cockburn was replaced as Governor of Saint Helena by Sir Hudson Lowe, who continued in authority until Napoleon’s death in 1821. A dull-witted, timid individual, Lowe lived in mortal dread lest Napoleon succeed in making an escape. Yet his instructions required him to permit the former Emperor to go and come as he pleased, to receive whom he desired, and to do whatever he liked as long as he did not attempt to leave the island. From the very beginning Napoleon took a dislike to his jailer. He rarely received the governor, and did not reply to his invitations to dinner—on the ground that they were addressed to “General Bonaparte.”

Representatives from France, Russia and Austria were also stationed on the island. Napoleon sometimes received travelers en route to or from India and Africa, who chanced to stop at Saint Helena. He was guarded by a detachment of troops, quartered at Jamestown, the island’s only town, which is situated at some distance from Longwood. Strangely enough, the officers and the rank and file of the garrison held Napoleon, England’s mortal enemy, in great esteem, sometimes exhibiting toward him a sentimental veneration reminiscent of the attitude of the old Guard. They sent him bouquets of flowers, and implored his retinue for permission to snatch stolen glances at him. Even after many years, the officers, in recalling the prisoner on whose account they had been forced to live for several years on the lonely island, revealed an animated sympathy, quite alien to the English character.

“The most astonishing thing of all,” wrote Count Balmain, the Russian commissioner, “is the influence which this man—a prisoner, deprived of a throne, surrounded by a watch—wields on anyone who comes near him. . . . The French tremble at the sight of him and consider themselves the most fortunate of men in being allowed to serve him. . . . The English approach him only with something like awe. Even those who stand guard over him jealously seek his glance, and are avid for one little word from him. No one dares to approach him on a basis of equality.”
It is interesting to note that the members of the tiny court which followed Napoleon to Saint Helena continued to quarrel and intrigue among themselves for the Emperor's favour much as if they were still at the Tuileries in Paris. Worshipping Napoleon as a god, Las Cases, Gourgaud, Montholon and Bertrand lived together in a strained atmosphere as they jealously vied with one another for the Emperor's affection. On one occasion General Gourgaud challenged Montholon to a duel, and only Napoleon's angry protest put an end to the quarrel. After three years, Gourgaud was sent back to Europe, and in 1818, at the instance of Hudson Lowe, Las Cases followed him. Prior to his departure, Las Cases had recorded Napoleon's conversations and recollections, but when he was forced to leave, the Emperor, deprived of his enlightened secretary, committed less of his thought to paper.

Neither the vexing and petty captiousness of Hudson Lowe, nor the climate of the island, nor the material conditions of his life, were responsible for that morose anguish which Napoleon never shared with his intimates but which was obvious to all who came into contact with him. Above everything, idleness was killing him. He read a great deal, rode horseback, took walks, and dictated to Las Cases. But to change to such an existence, after having become accustomed throughout his life to 15 and often 18 hours of incessant labour each day, was unbearable for him.

To the best of his ability, he concealed this mood from those around him. He strove to be talkative and animated when in the company of others, and often, it seemed, this diverted him from his own nostalgia. He bore his lot stoically.

While still aboard the Northumberland he had begun to dictate his memoirs to Las Cases, and he continued this task until Las Cases' unavoidable departure. His conversations with Las Cases, with Montholon, with Gourgaud, and "The Letters From the Cape"—which Las Cases was later authorised to publish—give an understanding, not of objective historical facts, but of Napoleon's interpretation of these facts.

When Napoleon conversed with those who surrounded him, he spoke less for their benefit, than for that of posterity. Could he
even then have had any firm assurance that his dynasty would again rule over France? That we do not know. But the nature of his utterances convince us that he seemed to take this for granted. Once he did declare that his son would one day wear the crown.

Of special interest are his abundant military observations. Every word is that of a master strategist, a connoisseur and lover of the profession of arms. "War is a strange art," he once said. "I have fought in 60 battles and I assure you that from them all I learned nothing that I did not already know in my first battle." He ranked Frederick the Great, Turenne and Condé high among the war captains of history. He considered himself, without question, the greatest of them all, though he never said so in these precise words. With especial pride he spoke of Austerlitz, Borodino and Wagram, of his first Italian campaign of 1796-1797 and of his penultimate campaign of 1814. He considered the rout of the Austrian army at Wagram one of his outstanding strategic achievements. Had Turenne and Condé been with him at Wagram, he once remarked, they would promptly have perceived where the key to the situation lay, even as he himself saw it, "but Caesar or Hannibal would not have seen it. . . . If I had had Turenne to aid me in my wars, I should have been master of the entire world." He said that a great army was an army in which every officer knew what to do in any given circumstance.

He expressed regret at not having been killed at Borodino or in the Kremlin. Sometimes, in this connection, he named not Borodino, but Dresden, and even more often Waterloo. Of The Hundred Days, he spoke with pride, and remembered the "nation's love" towards him, the love that manifested itself both after his landing off the Gulf of Juan and after Waterloo.

To the end he regretted his abandonment of the conquest of Egypt and Syria following the raising of the Siege of Acre in 1799. He maintained that he could have remained in the East, conquered Arabia and India, and become an eastern rather than a western emperor. "If I had taken Acre, I should have advanced to India." He who possessed Egypt could hold India, he claimed. "What worthless wretches the English are!" he said, in referring to England's domination of India, adding that if he
could have succeeded in reaching India, with even a small detachment of troops, he would have forced the British to surrender these Asiatic holdings. He often spoke of Waterloo, arguing that only the loss of such marshals as Bessières, Lannes and Murat, together with unforeseen circumstances, had caused this defeat. It irked him particularly to recall that his final battle had been won by the English. "Poor France! To be beaten by these wretches!"

That the invasion of Spain—"the Spanish pest", as he called it—was his first mistake, and the Russian campaign of 1812 his second and the most fatal blunder, he now frankly admitted, though he attempted to exonerate himself by speaking of the "misunderstanding" that involved him outside of Moscow. But by no means did he reject his responsibility. He now felt that, when he had learned of Bernadotte's alliance with Alexander I in 1812 and of Turkey's withdrawal from the Russian war, he should have given up all idea of invading Russia. Once having entered Moscow, however, he should have left it immediately to pursue Kutuzov's army and destroy it. "This fatal war with Russia, into which I was drawn by a misunderstanding, this frightful severity of the elements which swallowed up an entire army . . . ."

Several times he returned to the subject of the execution of the Duke of Enghien. Far from feeling regret for his conduct in that episode, he admitted that he would have taken the same course had the problem again presented itself to him later in his reign. It is significant of his character that all the bloodshed he had provoked in the 25 years of his active career did not pain him in the least. It is quite true that he aspired to conquests, but he had, generally speaking, one supreme passion: he "exceedingly loved war."

Betsy Balcombe, the little daughter of an English contractor who lived on the island, spent many hours in Napoleon's company. He taught her the French tongue and permitted her to chatter with him. When she and another little girl once asked him if it were true that he ate human beings (as they had been told in England), he laughingly assured them that he really did eat human beings and found them nourishing. . . . He was
amused, because the children understood their elders' words in a literal sense; this expression had, of course, reached him long before, but never, except for a contemptuous shrug, did it awaken any response.

After the estrangement of Josephine, after the death of Lannes at Essling, after the death of Duroc at Görlitz, there remained but one person whom Napoleon loved: his little son. As early as 1814, at the beginning of his exile on Saint Helena, he expressed the conviction that his son would yet reign. It must have been obvious to him that the future ruler of France would have to rely upon the support of the masses, yet such was his external inconsistency that he still continued to approve of his refusal to lead a popular movement against the Bourbons at the time of his final abdication.

The inconsistency here was external, arising out of an incorrect analysis of conditions: Napoleon's monarchy was not "national" (popular), but bourgeois; and the reign he envisioned for his son could not rest on the will and interests of the plebeian, working masses, but on the will and interests of the bourgeoisie. "In what are these people obligated to me? I found them in poverty and I leave them in poverty!" These words broke from him after Waterloo, when a crowd of workers surrounded his palace and demanded that he remain on the throne.

And to Montholon Napoleon repeated that, had he desired to take advantage of the revolutionary hatred of the nobility and the clergy, which he found when he had landed in France in 1815, he would have entered Paris accompanied by "two million peasants;" but he had no desire to lead the "rabble," and "resented the mere thought of it."

It was clear that he had not changed his views during his reign. But suddenly—toward the very end, under the obvious influence of news of the revolutionary ferment in Germany—he sharply changed his front and announced to Montholon: "I should have built my empire on the support of the Jacobins." He had finally realised that the Jacobin revolution was a volcano which would have blown up Prussia. And if the Revolution had conquered Prussia, Prussia and all of Europe must have been his "by my arms and the force of Jacobinism." It is true, that when he spoke
of a future revolution, his thought did not extend beyond pettybourgeois "Jacobinism" and did not presuppose a social upheaval.

This conversation with Montholon occurred on March 10, 1819, and was one of the last of his important utterances.

There was no longer any Las Cases, no longer any Gourgaud. After some time the Irish doctor O'Meara also departed, having incidentally played the rôle of spy by keeping the Governor informed of what transpired at Longwood. Among those who remained was Dr. Francesco Antommarchi, who had been sent by Napoleon's family. He was worthless as a doctor and a falsifier of memoirs—and in the end Napoleon refused even to see him.

Bertrand, Montholon and several servants—it was these who saw Napoleon during the final two years.

At the beginning of 1819, he began to ail more and more frequently. In 1820 his malady grew worse, and early in 1821 the English physician, Archibald Arnott, found his condition serious. Yet there were long intervals of relief, when Napoleon was able to take strolls. Toward the end of 1820 his fatigue became more noticeable. He would begin a sentence and, falling into meditation, leave it unfinished. He became taciturn in contrast to his former garrulity.

In March, 1821, his terrible internal pains grew more intense and occurred with greater frequency. Evidently, he had long surmised that he suffered from cancer, a disease hereditary in his family. He rarely drove out in his carriage, and he had long ago ceased to ride horseback.

Dr. Arnott informed Marshal Bertrand and General Montholon of the Emperor's serious condition, but there was nothing anyone could do. When the pains abated Napoleon attempted to lessen the grief of those present by appearing animated and cheerful. He was witty, too, about his illness. "A cancer—that is an internal Waterloo."

On April 13, he dictated his will to Count Montholon, and on the 15th he rewrote and signed it. Among other things it contains those lines which now adorn the marble tablet over his tomb at the Invalides: "It is my wish that my ashes repose on the banks of the Seine, in the midst of the French people, whom I have loved
so well.” The major portion of the will deals with bequests of money to various persons. Montholon was left 2,000,000 francs, Bertrand 500,000, the servant Marchand 400,000, and others who served him on the island were bequeathed 100,000 each. The same amounts were left to Las Cases and other generals and dignitaries in France of whose devotion he had not the least doubt. As for the main part of his wealth, amounting to 200,000,000 gold francs, he willed half of it “to the officers and soldiers,” who had fought under his banners, while the other half went to the people of certain areas of France who had suffered from the invasions of 1814 and 1815. There is, incidentally, a clause dedicated to the English and to Hudson Lowe: “I die prematurely, slain by the English oligarchy and its hirelings.” He counseled his son never to fight against France and to live by the motto: “Everything for the people of France.”

At four o’clock, during the night of April 21, he suddenly began to dictate to Montholon concerning a project for the reconstruction of the national guard in France, with the object of a more rational utilisation of this force in defending French territory from hostile invasion.

On May 2, Doctors Arnott, Shortt and Michaels advised the retinue that death was quite near. The Emperor’s agony grew so intense that during the night of May 5, half in delirium, he got out of bed and, convulsively clutching Montholon, fell to the floor with the General crushed to him. He was put back to bed, but lost consciousness. For several hours he lay motionless, eyes closed, never uttering a groan.

The retinue and the servants gathered in the Emperor’s room, some at the bedside, others at the door. Learning that their charge was near death, Sir Hudson Lowe and the officers of the English garrison hurriedly came to the house but remained outside the death chamber. The Emperor’s last words, heard only by those standing at his bedside, were:

“France . . . army . . . advance guard . . .”

At six o’clock in the evening of May 5, 1821, Napoleon died. Weeping bitterly, the servant Marchand brought out the old uniform Napoleon had worn on June 14, 1800, during the Battle of Marengo, and covered the body with it. Then the Gov-
The Island of St. Helena

Ernor and the officers entered and bowed low before the dead man. They were followed by the commissioners of the powers, who for the first time since their sojourn on the island saw the man whom they had come to guard.

Four days later the coffin was borne from Longwood. Apart from the retinue and the servants, the funeral procession included the Governor, the entire garrison, all the sailors and naval officers, all the civil officials, and almost the entire population of Saint Helena. When the coffin was lowered into the grave, the cannon roared in a thunderous salute: the English had rendered the last military tribute to the dead Emperor!
SOME CONCLUSIONS: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND MILITARY

It has often been claimed for Napoleon that he consolidated the victory of the French Revolution. This of course is not the case. He borrowed from the Revolution those reforms designed to further the economic development of the French bourgeoisie, but in so doing he also extinguished the revolutionary flame which had been burning so fiercely for ten years. He did not so much "complete" the Revolution as "liquidate" it.

The French middle-class Revolution might have realised its basic aim—the deposition of the feudal order in favour of the bourgeois order—with the establishment of a democratic republic. It might have utilised the movement of the national masses during the first years of the upheaval to stamp out feudalism—an eventuality that terrified the higher urban bourgeoisie. That the Revolution ended with the inauguration of Napoleon's dictatorship signified, above all, the victory of the upper bourgeois elements over the industrial workers and the petty-bourgeois masses, over the plebeian storm which from 1789 to 1794 had directed the course of the Revolution.

At the same time, the property-owning peasantry, whose interests Napoleon defended against Bourbon feudalism, wholeheartedly supported his dictatorship. Yet, essentially, the French peasant of the epoch of Napoleon I is the same peasant of whom Karl Marx speaks in his *Eighteenth Brumaire*. This peasant is "not the revolutionary peasant, but the conservative peasant, not the peasant who aspires beyond the social bounds of his existence, but, on the contrary, the one who desires to reinforce these conditions; not that village population which with its
own energy, in conjunction with the cities, desires to depose the old order, but that village population which, stubbornly shutting itself within the frames of the old order, thirsts for delivery and protection from the phantom of Empire. The Bonaparte dynasty is representative not of the enlightenment of peasants, but of their superstition; not of their understanding, but of their prejudices; not of their future, but of their past.”

Only by remembering this can we understand the degree to which Napoleon “completed” the Revolution, and the degree to which he “liquidated” it. The Napoleon who repressed the workers and shot down the Jacobins, who made himself an autocratic monarch and transformed the surrounding republics into kingdoms which he parceled out among his relatives and marshals, can hardly be called the “fulfiller” of the Revolution.

For the sake of the French bourgeoisie he erected an harmonious and lasting structure, built upon a foundation created by the Revolution and out of materials collected by the Revolution. His immense gifts, his organisational genius, his instinct for order and clarity, his tremendous and pliant governing mind, his acuteness and penetration, logic and precision, superhuman energy and indefatigability—all these, in conjunction with his iron will, permitted him to create an administrative machine which serves the French bourgeoisie even today. However, his legislation too often went a step backward, as compared with what had been bequeathed by the Revolution.

In the realm of foreign policy, Napoleon’s imperialistic tendencies, dictated by the interests of the French bourgeoisie, brought him into conflict with the rotting, actively decomposing semi-feudal world of Europe, which could not successfully cope with his initial onslaughts. At the same time, the blows which the Emperor’s policy inflicted on English economic conditions were reflected in the intensified revolutionary mood of the English working classes.

His significance in the realm of war, in military theory and practice, which had played such a tremendous rôle in the destruction of feudalism and absolutism in serf-ridden Europe, may be qualified by the same factors: the bourgeois Revolution had
created the possibilities of which Napoleon's genius made such effective use. Not he, but the Revolution had made possible and inevitable the mass movements, the tactics of scattered groups working in conjunction with dense columns, the vast armies, the consciousness of the rank and file, the new principles of the recruiting levies. But it was he who demonstrated how it was possible to utilise all these theories most effectively. In the sphere of military activity, he proved himself to be an incomparable genius, the greatest among the great. But in this sphere, as in all others, he capably built upon the heritage of the Revolution and out of revolutionary materials.

In the opinion of Engels, Napoleon stood head and shoulders above all his predecessors and successors. "The immortal merit of Napoleon consists in his having found the only correct tactical and strategic application of the immense armed masses made possible by the Revolution. To add to this, he carried this strategy and tactic to such a degree of perfection, that, as a rule, contemporary generals incapable of rivaling him merely try to imitate him in their most brilliant and successful operations."

In general, Engels regards Napoleon as the greatest of war captains, a general who remained great even in those campaigns which ended in defeat. "The two most remarkable examples of offensive operations and direct attacks applied in a defensive campaign were Napoleon's expedition of 1814, which ended in his being sent into exile on Elba, and in the expedition of 1815, which ended in his defeat at Waterloo and the surrender of Paris. In both these remarkable campaigns, the commander, acting exclusively in the defence of a country subjected to invasion, attacked his adversaries at all points and at every convenient opportunity; always being, on the whole, weaker than the enemy, yet each time showing himself to be the stronger and usually overcoming him at the given point of attack."

Both campaigns—1814 and 1815—were lost for causes "completely independent" of Napoleon, chiefly in consequence of Allied Europe's tremendous numerical superiority and "of the impossibility for a single nation, exhausted by 25 years of war, to resist the attack of an entire world armed against it." Of Austerlitz, Engels says that "the incomparable military genius of Napo-
leon,” which manifested itself in this battle, “is above all praise,” and that “his penetration and lightning speed in completing the rout . . . is worthy of every manner of admiration. Austerlitz represents the miracle of strategy; it will not be forgotten as long as wars continue to exist.”

“In Europe there are many good generals,” said Napoleon, “but they try to see several things at the same time, but I see only one—the masses (of the enemy), and I try to destroy them.” Napoleon was also unrivaled in utilising a victory, in his ability to consummate the rout of an enemy by further pursuit. The Prussian strategist, Count York von Wartenburg, author of a notable two-volume military study of Napoleon, says that the Emperor’s order to Marshal Soult on December 3, 1805 (the day following Austerlitz) contains “in brief words the whole art of pursuit, expressed by the most authoritative of sources.” Napoleon remains unsurpassed in his ability to control immense masses of troops. He could force them to manœuvre not only during the period of preparation but also on the field of battle, where he often compelled them to execute sudden new formations unforeseen by anyone.

Napoleon was expert with the map. He knew how to use it as no one else, excelling even his own chief of staff, the learned cartographer, Marshal Berthier. At the same time, the map never bound him. When he tore himself from it, and found himself in the field, encouraging his troops, giving commands, manœuvring the tremendous columns—he found himself as much at home as he did when plotting a campaign. His commands, his letters to his marshals, his separate dicta, have significance to this day as basic treatises on questions of fortifications, artillery, disposition of the rear, flank movements, detours, and the most diverse objectives of military science.

With the possible exception of Alexander the Great, no other war captain enjoyed such propitious opportunities for prolonged activity as Napoleon. He was not only an unlimited monarch and commander-in-chief, but he reigned over one of the wealthiest nations in the world. Julius Caesar fought for many years under the authority of the Roman Senate, which had entrusted him to conquer a new province, while during the final years of his life he
Bonaparte conducted a long and stubborn struggle pursuing the armies of a hostile party. Never did he fight at the head of all the forces of the Roman state in the rôle of its sovereign. Hannibal, as a war commander, depended on the parsimonious and intriguing Senate of a mercantile republic. Turenne and Condé were ruled by the whims of the French Court, Suvorov by the unsympathetic Catherine and later by the half-demented Paul and the Austrian Hofkriegsrat. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, Charles XII of Sweden and Frederick II of Prussia were, to be sure, unlimited monarchs, but the human reserves and material means provided by the small, impoverished lands over which they ruled, were scanty, indeed.

In Napoleon's case, only his first victories—Toulon, Italy, Egypt, the Syrian campaign—were achieved while he was subject to external authority, an authority to which, in any case, he did not submit. By 1799 he was the unlimited ruler of France and of all the countries either directly or indirectly subject to her. And among these countries there were several which, in an economic sense, were among the foremost in Europe: France herself, Holland, and the Germany of the Rhine. After the Eighteenth Brumaire, Napoleon was an unlimited master for 15 years. Julius Caesar, after crossing the Rubicon, was master for only four years, of which the first two were occupied in an internecine struggle, which divided the forces of the government.

Napoleon, with his original manner of expressing himself, likened the complex of qualities necessary in a good military commander to a square, whose foundation and height are always equal. By "foundation" he meant character, daring, courage, decision; by "height," mind and intellect. If character were stronger than mind, the war captain would be disposed to go farther than necessary. If mind were stronger than character, he would lack the courage to realise his plan. He considered absolute unity of command essential in an army: "One poor commander-in-chief is better than two good ones." And he himself, with the exception of the siege and capture of Toulon in 1793, never operated with either a co-commander or with a commander who was his superior.
We shall touch upon but a few particulars.

Napoleon did away with the worship of bayonet assaults, which Suvorov had been so influential in having generally accepted. “Today battles are settled with gunfire and not in hand-to-hand engagements,” the Emperor asserted in his work on field defences. Continuing to apply the tactics used by the armies of the French Revolution, he flung mobile “lines” of riflemen to the fore, who, supported by the artillery, prepared for the main attack and cleared the way for the storm columns. He himself repeatedly warned his marshals that it was not sufficient merely to teach soldiers to shoot, but that it was imperative that they be instructed to shoot accurately. On the other hand, he held that it was inadvisable to leave the infantry riflemen without artillery support, for if the enemy’s artillery should happen to direct its fire against them, there was the danger of their losing courage and resorting to flight. The artillery-fire should be directed as energetically as possible, because only the concerted action of cannon-fire was capable of producing any serious effect. In Napoleon’s battles, artillery played a preponderant and sometimes decisive rôle—as, for example, at Friedland, where 40 heavy guns, supporting Victor’s corps at the very beginning of the battle, created such terrible confusion in the Russian ranks that the enemy army was forced to begin its ruinous and disorderly retreat through the town of Friedland and across the River Alle.

Beginning with 1807 Napoleon more frequently employed new tactics, utilising over-massive—and hence vulnerable—formations, something he had not attempted during the first half of his military career. But only after the ranks of his older revolutionary armies (comprised of veterans of Egypt, Marengo and Austerlitz) began to thin out, did he resort to this exaggerated compactness of his fighting masses.

The prevalent opinion that Napoleon attached too little significance to the enemy’s fortifications is incorrect. Rather, he showed his marshals and generals that what won wars was not the capture of the enemy’s fortresses but the destruction of his armies in the field. Of course, even in this matter he manifested his astonishing pliancy and his capacity for taking special and unexpected circumstances into account.
Thus in 1805 he saw that by the capture of Ulm he would destroy the main forces of the Austrian army. Hence, it was precisely on the siege of this fortress that he directed all his efforts and his main attack.

The secondary significance which he attached to fortresses is logically associated with his attitude to initiative, which was so characteristic of him. Begin a campaign only after deliberation, but once having begun it fight to the last extremity to maintain the initiative—such was his rule.

The terrible day of February 8, 1807, at Eylau, has come to an end. Napoleon's army, even as the Russian army, has experienced such losses that some of the regiments have only a single battalion left, and some not even that. Napoleon retires for the night to his tent, and writes a note to his friend Duroc, in which, with vague hints, he acknowledges his failure. But now comes the dim winter dawn, and it is learned that Benningsen has not only retired, but retired precipitately. That means, the initiative has remained with Napoleon. That means, yesterday was a victory for him. And promptly the Emperor begins to call Eylau his victory, although he knows that the Russians are far from broken. Benningsen lacked fortitude and stubbornness; he had given way to timidity, and was the first to retire; he did not wrest the initiative from Napoleon, although the battle losses of both sides were almost equal.

Napoleon believed that initiative in the general conduct of war, in the choice of time and place, in the initial tactical operations before battle and at its beginning, should remain in the hands of the commander-in-chief. But, having given the marshals remarkably clear instructions before battle, Napoleon never embarrassed them with petty details, for which some of the contemporary commanders-in-chief of the old school had such a penchant.

He ordered his marshals to solve a specific problem in a specific region, and indicated his general strategic aim. As to how the marshals were to realise their particular objectives were matters that they themselves must decide. But during the battle Napoleon remained the centre—the brain—of the army. As they laboured to accomplish their particular tasks, the marshals re-
mained in constant communication with the Emperor, keeping him informed of the progress of operations, requesting reinforcements, and never for a moment leaving him in ignorance of the constantly changing course of battle.

What his contemporaries and what posterity found most difficult to understand was how Napoleon succeeded in maintaining this directing rôle without destroying the personal initiative of his marshals and generals. To a degree his policy of centralising authority in himself did have the effect of making his lieutenants dependent on him, but this was of no very great significance as there were only a few really gifted independent commanders on his staff: Davout, Masséna, and, in some measure, Augereau. The rest were, for the most part, merely gifted executors. Napoleon sadly acknowledged this, when, on one occasion, he exclaimed: "But I cannot be everywhere at the same time!"

Nevertheless, his excellent choice of assistants made it possible for him to introduce the tactic of deep detour movements. He demonstrated time and again that the success of a detour manœuvre depended on severing the enemy’s communications and in forcing him to engage in a general battle in which the flanking columns participated.

When the enemy shut himself within a fortress or a fortified camp, Napoleon resorted to siege tactics. If the enemy refused to surrender, he attempted to take the fortress by storm, dealing mercilessly with his vanquished adversary in the event of victory. When Blücher resisted the French in the streets of Lübeck in 1806, the Emperor, in keeping with the old tradition, directed his soldiers to pillage the city and slaughter its inhabitants. There were many such examples of barbarism in the Napoleonic wars. After the capture of Jaffa in 1799, and after the surrender of Saragossa in 1809, the civil population of both cities were put to the sword.

When the Turkish army landed in Egypt in 1799 and locked itself inside the fortress of Aboukir, Napoleon realised that his conquest of Egypt was seriously endangered. The 15,000 Turks quickly fortified themselves. Siege operations could not be employed, as the Turks could count upon securing aid from the Eng-
Bonaparte

lish on the sea side. Napoleon finally decided on a headlong frontal attack, cost what it might. Lannes and Murat with their detachments were the first to break into the fortress. They were followed by the main forces. The whole Turkish army was slain on the spot. "This was one of the finest battles I ever saw; of the entire enemy army that landed here not a single man saved himself," wrote Napoleon two days after the assault. Frontal attacks, however, were always costly, and Napoleon resorted to them only when no other method seemed feasible.

Although he valued individual courage and ability highly, the Emperor did not believe that scattered groups of horsemen (on the order of the Mamelukes or the Cossacks) could contend with the large compact masses of a disciplined European army. In the final reckoning the masses must triumph: "big battalions are always in the right," was an axiom that Napoleon never tired of repeating. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in all the campaigns in which he was defeated he rejected this basic principle.

In the Moscow campaign, for example, he was confronted by a triple problem: he was forced to leave armies of occupation in the conquered European countries, to maintain a line of communications in his rear, and to advance into Russia with a force strong enough to crush the enemy. Of the 420,000 men who crossed the border with him in June of 1812, only 363,000 followed him into the heart of Russia. The rest were left behind to guard the northern and southern flanks of the line of invasion. When he reached Vitebsk he had only 229,000 men and by the time he occupied Smolensk a mere 185,000 remained. After the Battle of Smolensk and the garrisoning of that city he entered Gjatsk with 155,000 men. At Borodina, he led 134,000 and when he finally marched into Moscow his total forces numbered 95,000. The vast communications line had swallowed up as great a part of the Grand Army as had been destroyed by the enemy or by the climate.

But at the same time, he told Las Cases, there are moments when it is wise to burn one's ships, to gather all one's strength for the decisive blow, and to rout the enemy with a crushing victory.
For this it was necessary even to risk weakening the communications line. "In the campaign of 1805, when I fought in the centre of Moravia, Prussia was ready to attack me, and it was impossible to retreat into Germany. But I won at Austerlitz. In 1806 . . . I saw that Austria was about to attack my communications lines, while Spain was on the verge of crossing the Pyrenees to invade France. But I won at Jena." Still more menacing were the circumstances during the war in 1809. "But I won at Wagram."

Napoleon showed great solicitude for the army's "spirit." He confirmed the abolition of corporal punishment achieved by the Revolution and, discussing the matter with Englishmen, expressed his abomination of the use of the cat-o'-nine-tails. "What can be expected of dishonoured men? How can a man be sensitive to honour when he has been subjected to corporal punishment in the presence of his comrades? Instead of a cat-o'-nine-tails, I employed honour. . . . After a battle I always gathered my soldiers and officers and asked them who had most distinguished himself."

He firmly believed in rewards rather than in punishments as the best means to maintain the discipline and morale of his troops. "The soldier fights for fame, distinction and rewards," he said. "The soldiers of the Republic have wrought great deeds because they are the sons of peasants and farmers, and not enlisted mercenaries; their officers are not officers of the nobility, but new officers, and they have ambition."
Babeuf, François-Noël, nicknamed "Gracchus" (1760-1797). He was active in the French Revolution, and later headed a conspiracy during the Thermidor reaction. His doctrines represent a turning from radicalism to communism. Instead of joining the camp of reaction or taking a middle course, Babeuf advocated a new social basis, which took into consideration the dim strivings of the newly awakened proletarian class. However, Babeuf and his followers did not sufficiently clarify the class position and historic rôle of the proletariat, and, as Marx observed in *The Holy Family*, they were not "developed communists" who built their system on a scientific basis, but "coarse and uncivilised materialists." Engels, in speaking of Babeuf, maintains that the "communistic idea did not succeed because the communism of that day was too crude and superficial."

Babeuf's conspiracy was treacherously revealed, and Babeuf, after being apprehended, was guillotined on May 27, 1797.

Colbert, Jean Baptiste (1619-1683). French statesman and minister to Louis XIV. He advocated the expansion and protection of French industry, and the development of foreign commerce. As France was at this time an agricultural country, Colbert's policy undermined the nation's agricultural economy.

Condé, Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de (1621-1686). Known as "the Great Condé," he was the most gifted French military commander during the reign of Louis XIV. He took part in the Thirty Years' War, in the struggle with Spain, and later with the coalitions fighting against Louis XIV.

Jacquerie. This was the name applied to the revolt of the French peasants in 1358. It derives from Jacques Bonhomme ("Goodman Jack") and was derisively used by the feudalists in referring to the peasants. The development of financial economy and the feudal exploitation of the peasants were the chief causes of the movement.

The revolt began in the spring of 1358, but was brutally crushed in its infancy. The leader of the peasants, Guillaume Cale (or Charles), was trapped by the nobles, caught and beheaded.
Employing the battle-cry "Death to the peasants!" the aristocrats ruthlessly killed 20,000 peasants—men, women and children.

**Montagnards.** This term, which was applied to the Left Wing of the Convention, derives from the French word "la montagne," meaning "the mountain." The members of this faction received this name in consequence of the fact that they occupied high benches situated under the ceilings of the Convention hall. Socially, the Montagnards represented the petty and middle bourgeoisie. They carried on a fierce struggle in the Convention against the Girondists (Right Wing). After the fall of the Girondists, they established themselves as the ruling party, and set up a revolutionary dictatorship. They introduced the Terror as a means of defending France from the assaults of inner and outer counter-revolutionaries.

**Raynal, Guillaume Thomas François** (1713-1796). French historian and philosopher. As a result of having been editor of *Mercure de France*, he became intimate with leading writers and philosophers, particularly Helvetius and Holbach. His most popular work, *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes*, published in 1770, reflects the philosophy of the 18th century, a school associated with the Encyclopedists.

**Rousseau, Jean-Jacques** (1712-1778). French writer and philosopher. He was the ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie (plebeianism) and the prophet of the French Revolution. In his socio-philosophical treatises and novels, he rebelled against social inequality, engendered by the development of capitalism, as well as the remnants of feudalism. His *Social Contrat* exerted a powerful influence on the French Revolution.

**Turenne, Henri, Vicomte de** (1611-1675). French marshal. Took part in the Thirty Years' War and in the Fronde revolt. He fought first in the ranks of the feudalists, and later as commander of the royal army.

**Stein, Heinrich Friedrich Karl, Baron vom** (1757-1831). German statesman. Head of the German ministry in 1807-1808, following Napoleon's rout of Prussia. He advocated the liberation of the German peasants from serf allegiance on the basis of purchase. On Napoleon's demand, Stein was removed from his ministerial post. He fled to Austria, then to Russia, where he aided the Allies in their anti-Napoleonic activities.
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Abensberg, 224  
Aboukir, 70  
Aboukir Bay, 67  
Acre, 69, 226, 262, 263, 400  
Addington, 120  
Alembert, d', 16  
Alessandria, 106  
Alexander the Great, 59, 199, 262  
Alexandria, 62-64  
Alexeyev, 8  
Alps, 91  
Alvintzy, 43, 44  
Amiens, Treaty of, 120, 121, 123, 132-135  
Anglas, Boissy d', 27  
Angoulême, Duke of, 366  
Anna Pavlovna, 233, 236, 252  
Antommarchi, Dr. Francesco, 403  
Antraigues, Count d', 49, 51  
Apukhtin, 299  
Arakeheyev, 292  
Aranjuez, 211  
Arcis-sur-Aube, Battle of, 346, 347, 357  
Arcole, 86, 190, 224  
Aréna, 112  
Armfelt, Baron, 267  
Arnott, Dr. Archibald, 404  
Artois, Charles, Count of, 102, 138, 362, 374  
Aspern, 225-227, 229  
Attilla, 239  
Aubry, 24  
Auersperg, Prince, 161  
Auerstädt, 178  
Augereau, 67, 224  
Austerlitz, 164, 165  
Auxonne, 17, 18  
Babeuf, 49, 74, 109  
Baden, Grand Duke of, 149, 150, 154  
Bagration, Prince, 165, 195, 196, 262, 266, 268-271, 274, 279, 280, 320  
Bailén, 216  
Balashov, 267, 271  
Balmain, Count, 398  
Bank of France, 205  
Baraguay-d'Hilliers, 48  
Barclay de Tolly, 266-274, 314, 315  
Barra, 27, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36, 50, 52, 56, 60, 61, 72, 73, 75-78, 80, 82, 83  
Barthélemy, 50, 52  
Basse, Treaty of, 35  
Bastille, 81, 84  
Batavian Republic, 118  
Battle of the Nations. See Battle of Leipzig, 324  
Bautzen, Battle of, 314, 315, 333  
Bavaria, Elector of, 153  
Bayonne, 211  
Beauharnais, Eugene, 122, 205, 277, 282, 288, 298  
Beaulieu, 39  
Bellérophon, 394-397  
Bennington, 139, 150, 180, 190, 194-198, 266, 267, 287, 292, 325  
Berezina, 297  
Bernadotte, 59, 80, 154, 156, 157, 159, 170, 175-178, 231, 253, 321, 323, 325, 401  
Berry, Duke of, 366  

423
Index

Berthier, 37, 157, 207, 235, 236, 319, 320, 339, 350
Bertrand, 160, 314, 368, 397, 399, 403, 404
Bessières, 294, 313, 401
Bey-Mamelukes, 63-65
Binasco, 55
Blücher, 178, 179, 314, 323, 339, 340, 343, 386-391
Bonaparte, Carlo, 13-15
Bonaparte, Jerome, 202, 204, 238, 269, 324, 327
Bonaparte, Joseph, 15, 117, 169, 170, 191, 204, 213, 223, 260, 326
Bonaparte, Letizia, 13, 14, 361, 367
Bonaparte, Louis, 19, 95, 170, 191, 204, 240
Bonaparte, Lucien, 86, 87
Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Napoleon I
Bonaparte, Pauline, 361
Bordeaux, 344
Borghese, Princess. See Pauline Bonaparte
Borgo, Pozzi di, Count, 347
Borisov, 298, 299, 304
Borodino, 275, 277, 279-282
Botto, 82
Boulogne, 137, 148, 153, 167
Bourdon, 27
Bourmont, 113, 386
Bourriene, 20, 240
Brescia, 42, 105
Briand, 7
Brienne, 14, 16
Bronikovski, 298
Brueys, 68
Brunswick, Duke of, 173-175, 177
Bülow, 7, 323
Burgos, 220
Cadoudal, Georges, 74, 96, 106, 138-144, 148
Caesar, Julius, 8, 22, 59, 86, 199, 262, 400
Cagliostro, 126
Cairo, 64, 65, 67, 70
Cambacerès, 209, 234
Cambronne, 368, 369, 389
Campo Formio, Treaty of, 47, 53, 55, 59, 61
Cannes, 369
Cape Antibes, 369
Cape Fréjus, 72
Carbon, 113
Carnot, 23, 25, 36, 50, 52, 383, 392
Caroline, Queen of Naples, 168
Castiglione, 43
Castlereagh, Lord, 312, 336, 338, 384
Catherine Pavlovna, 234, 256
Catherine II, Tsarina of Russia, 288
Catholic Church, the, 46, 125, 126
Ceracchi, 112
Chalon-sur-Saône, 376
Chamber of Deputies, 375, 381
Chamber of Peers, 375
Champaubert, 344
Chapitz, 299
Chaplin, 59, 143-145, 169
Charles, Archduke, 224-227
Charles IV, King of Spain, 210, 211
Châtillon, 338, 344, 348
Chaumont, 343
Chichagov, 298, 300, 304
Chouans, 95-97, 142
Cisalpine Republic, 48, 54, 118
Clarke, 159, 323
Clovis, 91
Cobenzl, Count, 53, 117, 118
Cockburn, 398
Code of Napoleon, 17, 90, 129, 130, 215, 222, 362
Colli, 40
Colloredo, Count, 118
Comédie Française, 284
Committee of Public Safety, 23, 24
Committee of Public Safety, Topographical Section, 25
Compan, 276, 278
Concordat, 125-127, 148
Condé, Prince, 51, 400
Confederation of the Rhine, 169, 170, 204, 222, 232, 238, 316, 317, 335
Consalvi, Cardinal, 146
Constant, Benjamin, 380-382
Constantine (brother of Alexander I of Russia), 197, 273, 292
Constantinople, 63
Constitution of the Eighth Year of the Republic, 100
Convention, 132
Copts, 63
Corbina, 299
Corneille, 16
Cornet, 80
Corniche, 39, 41
Corsica, 19, 20, 21
Corvisart, 122
Cossacks, 186
Council of Elders, 27, 28, 52, 80-85, 87
Council of Five Hundred, 27-29, 50, 52, 75, 80, 81, 83-87, 89
Courrier, Paul-Louis, 145
Couthon, 23
Craonne, 343
Cremona, 105
Cromwell, 85
Crouazier, 67
Danzig, 180, 263
Darjanto, 39
Davidov, Denis, 197, 199, 200, 296, 301, 302
Declaration of Rights, 18
Delsonne, 204
Demerville, 112
Desaix, 107, 158
Digne-Gap, 369
Directories, 35, 36, 45-47, 49, 50, 52, 54-61, 71-76, 79, 82-84, 94, 109, 132, 147
Divans, 65
Dogommier, 22
Dolgoroukoff, Prince Peter, 162-164
Dombrovski, 187
Dorogobuzh, 296, 297
Dorokhov, 301
Dresden, 261-263, 267, 321, 322, 333
Drouot, 368
Dubrovka, 298
Ducos, 76, 79, 82, 87, 88
Dupont, 209, 216
Duroc, 304, 314, 315, 356, 402
Ebersberg, 225
Eckmühl, 224, 225
Eighteenth Brumaire, 79, 80, 93, 100, 109-111, 130, 140, 237
Eighteenth Fructidor, 52, 72, 77, 140
El Arish, 68
Elba, 352, 356, 358, 360, 361, 366, 368, 373, 383, 384, 391
El-Koraim, Sidi-Mohammed, 66, 67
Emperor of the West, 143, 169
Engelien, Duke of, 141-144, 149, 150, 174, 373, 377, 401
Erfurt, 216-219, 222, 245
Ermolov, 298
Essling, 225
Ettenheim, 142
Excelmans, 357
Eylau, 189, 190
fellaheen, 63, 65, 67
Ferdinand, King of Naples, 168
Ferdinand VII, King of Spain, 210, 212, 327
Fère-Champenoise, Battle of, 348
Fichte, 222
Figner, 296, 301, 302
First Prairial, 26
Foch, 7, 8
Foche-Borelle, 51
Halkett, 389
Hannibal, 8, 22, 105, 262, 400
Hardenberg, 199, 256, 260
Haugwitz, 163, 167, 171
Hawk, 395, 396
Hawkesbury, Lord, 120, 135, 138
Heilsberg, 195, 197
Helvetic Republic, 118
Herzen, 286, 390, 391
Hoche, 27
Hofer, Andreas, 226, 235
Hohenlinden, 110, 118, 334
Hohenlohe, Prince, 175-178
Holy Roman Empire, 169
Holy Synod, 194, 288
Hougomont Castle, 387
Imperial Guard, 155
Ionian Islands, 59
Isthmus of Suez, 68
Jacobin Club, 23
Jacobins, 74, 76-78, 84, 92, 110-113, 137, 144, 373, 380, 381, 383
Jaffa, 68
Jena, 175-178
Jomini, 39, 381
Josephine de Beauharnais (afterwards Empress), 33, 34, III, 147, 232, 233, 361, 402
Joubert, 73
Jugenbund, 256, 323
Junot, 31, 45, 209, 210, 231, 273
Kant, 126
Karl, Archduke, 43, 44
Kellermann, 389
King of Bavaria, 192
King of Rome, 257, 342, 348, 351, 356
King of Saxony, 204, 261, 308
Kleber, 66, 71
Kleist, 179, 180
Knights of Malta, 62
Königsberg, 192
Konovnitzin, 270, 272
Koran, 64, 66
Graudenz, 189
Grenoble, 369-373, 374, 378, 380
Grouchy, 238, 386-390
Gulf of Juan, 369, 375, 378, 400
Gumbinnen, 264

Fontainebleau, 206, 214, 311, 378
Fouché, 78, 80, 99, 100, 102, 110-114, 126, 141, 188, 192, 207, 233, 234, 320, 329, 332, 337, 383
Francis I, Emperor of Austria from 1804-1835 (ruler of Austria from 1792-1835), 161, 165, 166, 169, 228, 229, 234, 235, 257, 261, 311, 333, 341, 346, 361, 366, 384
Franco-Russian alliance, 215-217, 219, 250, 251
Frankfurt, 334
Frederick the Great, 8, 22, 160, 162, 167, 171, 173, 174, 262, 400
Fréron, 27
Friedland, Battle of, 195, 196
Frotté, 74, 96
Gaudin, 97, 205, 207
Genoa, 105, 106
George III, King of England from 1760-1820, 102
Gibraltar, 62
Girondists, 23, 81
Gneisenau, 254, 387
Godoy, 193, 210, 211
Goethe, 16, 93, 222
Görlitz, 314, 402
Gothier, 76, 79, 82
Gouot, Baron de, 342
Gourgaud, 392, 397, 399, 403
Grand Army, 154, 155, 160, 171, 172, 185, 197, 222, 223, 226, 249, 261, 262, 264, 265, 304, 305, 327, 328, 376
Grasse, 369, 378
Karl, Archduke, 43, 44
Kellermann, 389
King of Bavaria, 192
King of Rome, 257, 342, 348, 351, 356
King of Saxony, 204, 261, 308
Kleber, 66, 71
Kleist, 179, 180
Knights of Malta, 62
Königsberg, 192
Konovnitzin, 270, 272
Koran, 64, 66

Index
Korsakov, 74, 115
Kosciusko, 188
Krasnoe, 298, 301
Krasnoi, 270
Kremlin, 262, 283, 284, 294, 309
Krems, 161
Kudashev, 301, 302
Kulis, 322
Kurakin, Prince, 198, 199, 236, 253, 259
Kuistriin, 179
Kutuzov, 161-163, 165, 167, 266, 274, 276, 277, 281, 282, 284, 285, 287, 292, 293, 295, 296, 298, 300, 301, 304, 310, 313, 320, 401
Labedoyère, 371
La Belle Alliance farm, 388, 389
Lacépède, 308
La Cour des Adieux, 358
Lafayette, 392
La Haye Sainte farm, 388
Lalande, 25
La Mure, 370, 373
Lannes, 39, 105, 107, 154, 157, 158, 160, 175, 176, 178, 188, 189, 195, 207, 221, 224-226, 272, 401, 402
Laon, 343, 344
Laplace, 15
La Revellière-Lépeaux, 50, 54
Larochejaquelin, 74
La Rothiere, Battle of, 339
Lasalle, 178
Las Cases, 394, 395, 397, 399, 404
Lauriston, Count, 286, 287, 310
Lechapelier, Law of, 130
Leclerc, 80
Lefebre, 156, 157, 193
Legion of Honour, Order of, 127
Legislative Corps, 100, 101, 130, 143, 312, 382, 383
Leibnitz, 58
Leipzig, Battle of, 323-326
Leo I, Pope from 440-461, 145
Leoben, Treaty of, 45, 47-49, 52
Levier, 294
Lichtenstein, Prince, 228, 341, 342
Ligny, 386
Ligurian Republic, 118
Lisbon, 210
Lobanov-Rostovsky, 198
Lobau, 225-227
Lobo, 304
Lodi, Battle of, 41, 43
Lonato, 42
Lons-Le-Saunier, 377
Louis XIV, King of France from 1643-1715, 58, 132, 212, 213
Louis XVI, King of France from 1774-1793, 20, 26, 110, 124, 235
Louisa, Queen of Prussia (wife of Frederick William III), 160, 171, 174, 175, 180, 201, 202
Louisiana, 133
l'Ouverture, Toussaint, 132, 133
Lowe, Sir Hudson, 398, 399, 404
Lübeck, 178, 179
Ludendorff, 8
Ludwig, Prince, 174, 175
Lugo, 55
Lunéville, Treaty of, 117, 118, 135, 138, 149, 151, 334
Lützen, 313, 315, 333
Lyons, 372, 374-376, 380
Mably, 16
Macdonald, 80, 227, 228, 310, 332, 339, 340, 343, 344, 350-352, 374, 375
Mack, 153, 158, 159
Mâcon, 376
Madelin, 390
Madison, James, President of the United States from 1809-1817, 260
Madrid, 214
Magdeburg, 179, 180, 202
Maisonne, 304
Maitland, Captain, 394-396
Malet, 297, 308
Index

Malmaison, 206, 303
Malo-Yaroslavetz, 293-295, 300, 302, 357
Malta, 59, 62, 63, 138
Mamelukes, 63-66, 68, 174
Mantua, 42-44, 48
Marat, 380, 384, 392
Marchand, 397, 404
Marengo, Battle of, 106, 107
Maret, 298, 367
Maria Feodorovna, 234, 236, 291
Maria Luisa, Queen of Spain (wife of Charles IV), 210
Marie Antoinette, 235
Marie Louise, Empress of France (wife of Napoleon I), 34, 233-235, 255, 257, 261, 319, 346, 348, 351, 356, 361, 392
Marmont, 154, 157, 238, 260, 314, 322, 339-341, 348, 351-353
Marseilles, 58
Masséna, 37, 74, 157, 162, 224, 225
Mattei, Cardinal, 45
Medusa, 394, 395
Melas, 43, 104-107
Ménier, Albert, 354
Menou, 29, 30
Mercure de France, 192
Merveldt, 325
Michaels, 404
Milan, 105
Milhaud, 388
Millesimo, 39
Milordovich, 39, 282, 314
Ministry of Internal Affairs, 99
Ministry of Justice, 98
Ministry of Police, 99
Minsk, 298
Mohammedanism, 64-66
Molé, Count Louis, 380
Molière, 16
Mollien, 205, 207
Mondovì, 40
Monge, 15

Monk, 96
Montagnards, 22, 27
Montenotti, 39
Montholon, 397, 399, 402-404
Montmartre, 318
Montmirail, Battle of, 340
Moore, 220
Morand, 279
Moreau, 35, 47, 110, 118, 139-141, 143, 321, 322
Mortier, 286, 292, 294, 348
Moscow, 276, 282
Moscow fire, 284
Moulin, 76, 79, 82
Murat, 39, 41, 80, 87, 89, 154-161, 170, 172, 175-178, 188, 196, 211, 212, 214, 234, 272, 274, 276-279, 282, 292, 294, 322, 325, 326, 385, 401

Nantes, 95
Napoleon I, Emperor of France from 1804-April 1814 and March-June 1815, passim
Narbonne, 262, 263, 265, 320
Naumburg, 176, 177
Nelson, 61-63, 166
Neverovsky, 270, 278
Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia from 1825-1855, 32
Nien, 192, 264, 304, 310, 311
Nile, 70
Nineteenth Brumaire, 84, 89, 91, 93, 109-111
Ninth Thermidor, 23-25, 76, 77, 97
Northumberland, 397, 399
Novi, 73

Oldenburg, George, Duke of, 234, 256, 287
Olmutz, 161-163
Olsufyev, 340
O'Meara, 403
Index

Orlov, 347
Ossian, 16
Osten-Saken, 339
Ostermann-Tolstoy, Count, 269
Ostorovno, 269
Otto, 312
Oudinot, 298, 299, 314, 323, 343, 344, 350
Palm, 222
Paoli, 13, 14, 19, 21
Paris Commune, 90
Parma, Duke of, 40
Parr, Count, 341
Partouneaux, 304
Paul I, Tsar of Russia from 1796-1801, 74, 115-121, 139
Pavia, 55, 105
Peninsula Campaign, 206
Pernod family, 25
Philip V, King of Spain from 1700-1746, 212, 213
Philippine Islands, 214
Phull, General von, 267
Piacenza, 105
Pichegru, 50, 51, 108, 140, 141, 294
Piedmont, 42
Pietro, Cardinal di, 312
Pitt, 27, 109, 117, 119, 120, 132, 136-139, 147, 148, 151, 152, 166, 167, 169
Pius VI, Pope from 1775-1799, 45, 46
Pius VII, Pope from 1800-1823, 125, 126, 145-147, 227, 311, 312
Platov, 195, 272, 273, 279, 298
Plozonne, 277
Pleiswitz, 315
Polish Legion, 220
Poniatovski, Prince Joseph, 187
Porto Ferrajo, 365
Posen, 263
Pradt, Abbé, 308
Prairial Executions, 26
Prairial Revolt, 26, 73, 76
Prairial Terror, 74, 76
Prefects, 98
Pressburg, Treaty of, 168, 172

Provence, Count of. See Louis XVIII
Pugachev, 288-291, 346, 380
Pultusk, 188, 189
Pushkin, 200
Pyramids, 64

Racine, 16
Rayevsky, 270, 272, 278-280, 288, 294
Raynal, 16
Rebelle, 50
Regensburg, 224, 225, 232
Rémuat, Madame de, 34
Revolution, French, 17-19, 21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 55, 72, 91, 97, 109-111, 126, 127, 132, 144, 145, 156, 365, 373
Rivoli, 44, 48
Robespierre, Augustin, 22-24, 92, 289, 299, 329
Robespierre, Maximilien, 23-27, 77, 92, 109, 289, 290
Rochefort, 394
Rome, 46, 47
Rostopchin, 281-285
Rousseau, 16, 17
Rumyantzev, 234, 236

Saale, 304, 395
Saalfeld, 175
Saint-Aignan, 334
Saint-Cloud, 81-85, 89, 206, 261
St. Cyr, 322
Saint Helena, 316, 397-399, 402, 405
Saint-Just, 23
Saint-Marsan, 256
Saint-Priest, Count, 344
Saint-Réjant, 113
Saliceti, 21, 22
Salo, 42
San Domingo, 132
Saragossa, 221, 272, 303
Savary, 142, 163, 231, 297, 320, 329, 332, 346, 394, 395
Scharnhorst, 254, 256
Schawli, 198
Schill, Major Friedrich von, 226, 231, 254, 255
Schleiz, 175
Schönbrunn, 225, 227, 229-231, 233, 257
Schulmeister, 158
Schwarzenberg, 320, 339-341, 343-346, 349, 350
Sebastiani, 332, 346, 357
Semenovskoe, 273, 279, 280
Senate, 92, 100, 101, 143, 144, 308, 352
Senatus Consultum, 101, 123
Seranov, 369
Sérurier, 37
Seslavin, 296, 301, 302
Seven Years' War, 173
Shevardino, 274-277
Shortt, 404
Slyës, 76-79, 82, 87, 88, 92, 93, 100
Smith, Sir Sidney, 69
Smolensk, 262, 269-272
Smorgoni, 304
Soissons, 173
Soul, 154, 158, 176, 178, 196, 260, 344
Spanish Armada, 137
Speranský, 234, 251
Sprengporten, 115
Staël, Mme. de, 34, 192, 233
Staps, Friedrich, 229, 230
State Council, 101, 121, 130, 308
State Theatre, 192
Stein, Baron von, 254
Strassburg, 154
Suchet, 260, 344
Suvorov, 22, 36, 73, 74, 91, 104, 105, 281
Talizin, 150
Tallien, 27
Thermidor Convention, 25, 26, 28, 29, 36
Thermidor Terror, 23
Thermidorians, 27
Thiers, 390
Third Nivôse, 112, 117
Thirteenth Vendémiaire, 32, 33, 77
Thorn, 189, 263
Tilsit, Treaty of, 197-203
Tolentino, 46
Topino-Lebrun, 112
Tortina, 106
Toulon, 21-23, 25, 33, 62, 109
Trafalgar, Battle of, 166
Tribunate, 100, 101, 129, 130, 143
Troitsky Tower, 283
Tuchkov, 272
Tuileries, 20, 80, 82, 110, 134, 169, 206, 309
Turenne, 400
Tuscany, Duke of, 41
Tuttolmin, 285, 310
Twelfth Germinal, 26
Ulma, 153, 154, 158-160, 167
Uvarov, 279
Vadbolsky, 301, 302
Valence, 212, 214
Valette, 43
Vandamme, 322
Vatican, 47
Vauchamp, Battle of, 340
Vendée, 74, 95, 97, 101, 106, 108
Vendémiaire Revolt, 35, 38, 49
Venice, 48
Vibitzky, 187
Vicenza, 43
Vicente Amadeus, King of Piedmont, 40
Vienne, 44
Villeneuve, 152, 341
Vilna, 267, 304
Vistula, 192, 310
Vitebsk, 269, 307
Vitrolles, Baron de, 344, 345
Voltaire, 16
Vonsovitch, 305
Wagram, Battle of, 228
Walewska, Countess, 34, 232, 361
War and Peace, 160
Index

Waterloo, Battle of, 386, 387, 390, 391, 395, 400, 401
Weimar, 176, 177
Weissenfels, 313
Wellington, 260, 319, 320, 327, 344, 385-391
Whitworth, Lord, 134-136
Wilson, General Robert, 273, 287, 295
Winzingerode, Count, 287
Wittgenstein, 298, 299, 314
Wolkowisk, 264

World War, 7, 8
Wrede, 360
Wurmsen, 42-45
Xerxes, 268
Yakovlev, 286, 310
Yarmouth, Lord, 170
York, 310
Zubov, 139, 150
A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR

**Eugene Victor Tarlé (1874- )** is today considered the outstanding authority on the economic and social forces behind the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Era. Since 1909 he has devoted practically all his time to the subject, and as the editor of the *Revue des Études Napoléoniennes* has unearthed much new and illuminating material from hitherto untouched archives. Since 1927 he has headed the Section of Universal History of the Leningrad Historical Research Institute.

He was graduated from Kiev University in 1896. He lectured on history at St. Petersburg University until 1905, when he was badly wounded by the police during a political demonstration. When he first began to devote himself to the history of France he became greatly interested in the economic aspects of the French Revolution—its commerce, industry and the condition of the working class at this period. This subject has claimed him ever since.

In 1918 Eugene Tarlé was appointed Professor of History at the University of St. Petersburg and in 1923 was elected a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, becoming a regular Academician four years later. He is a member of the American Academy of Political Science.

When Upsala University in Sweden recently invited him to deliver a course of lectures on the history of the Continental Blockade, he was referred to as “the first authority on the subject.” He is also the author of many very important historical studies.