SHORT INQUIRY
INTO THE
NATURE OF LANGUAGE,
AND TO
ASCERTAIN THE ORIGINAL MEANINGS
BY
Sanskrit Prepositions;
AFFORDED BY
COMPARISONS WITH THE GREEK AND LATIN.

BY
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A SHORT INQUIRY

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WITH A VIEW TO

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PRINTED BY J. L. COX AND SON, GREAT QUEEN STREET,
Lincoln's-Inn-Fields.
The manner in which the writer of the following remarks had treated the subject of Prepositions in his *Bengal Grammar*, having met the simultaneous approbation of such distinguished Oriental Scholars as *Shakespeare*, *Chézy*, *Schlegel*, and *Bopp*, he was induced, with a view to the Election pending at Oxford for a Sanskrit Professor, to reprint them with some short remarks on the nature of Nouns, Verbs, and Prepositions in general. He now submits them to a few of his private friends, with a view to a further discussion of the subject; and with the request that they will favour him with any observations that may suggest themselves on their perusal. The writer conceives that the truth can only be ascertained by a consideration of the mutual dependency of the Noun, Verb, and Preposition, and he therefore entreats, that no conclusion may be drawn as to any part, before the *whole* of this very short treatise has been perused.
A SHORT INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

In every inquiry which we make into the nature of language, we are bound to ascertain its relation to the other phenomena of nature, and to consider it as something more than a detached and subservient instrument of thought. When we examine it with care, it seems almost as mysterious as every thing which surrounds us. We are apt to think that those things with which we are familiarised from childhood possess nothing either profound or perplexing. When, however, we inquire into the remote principles of language, we find that it shares in the mystery and obscurity in which all the phenomena of nature are involved.

When language began to be employed by man, he was not yet aware of the relation in which he stood to the rest of nature; nor did he know that he was himself formed and directed by laws that rendered him subservient to the circumstances by which he was surrounded, and to which his own nature bore a close analogy. But when we investigate language, and rise from effects to causes, we are compelled to feel that man was merely a passive instrument, if not in its formation, at least in its improvement; and we acquire the conviction that we must thoroughly comprehend the nature of this first offspring of the human mind, before we can hope to arrive at any legitimate conclusion as to the laws that regulate the phenomena of mind itself. But if language has its basis in the principles of nature,
we must not forget that its perfection is the result of Progression, which is likewise the foundation of all improvement.

Man in the infancy of society, himself a mere infant in thought, was impelled by the pressure of his wants to the formation of a medium by which he might communicate with his own kind. The puppet of Nature, he was led by her to the formation of an instrument that has enabled him, by affixing names to his ideas, to turn general sentiments, which alone he could otherwise have felt, into individual thoughts. His mind being a sort of mirror that reflected every thing he felt and saw, he was driven by the principles implanted in his nature to the use of articulate sounds, with which as with colours he painted his own perceptions.

That language adapted itself in its infancy merely to represent the physical phenomena of nature, will be evident by an analysis of its parts. All things material were designated by the Noun, while the motions of these objects were indicated by the Verb in its simplest form. Such was the first step in language. The next was to invent words that should limit and define the points to which the motion implied by the verb tended, and thence resulted the Preposition; and it will be found that every subject may be conveyed intelligibly, though with some tautology, by these three parts of speech, and they consequently constitute the foundation of language. To express the physical qualities of the noun, it was only necessary to join to it some other noun which possessed in a prominent degree the quality which it was wished to attribute to it. Thus to express the different colours, such as green, red, white, &c. the names for grass, rose, snow, &c. or some other objects with the same qualities, were employed; so also the name for a lion, a fox, an ass, &c. served to designate the qualities of courage, cunning, stupidity, &c.; and these became the first Adjectives.* The Adverb was employed instead of a

* It was owing to his having considered the abstract nature of qualities, that Adam Smith was led into the error of supposing that adjectives must have cost a great effort to the human mind in their invention. The nature of qualities is of very difficult conception; but their designation by an adjective, it will be seen, was very easy.
whole phrase to complete some accessory idea of the verb, such as the nature, manner, quality, or intensity of its motion or action. From this it is evident that the adjective defined the noun in the same way as the adverb did the verb. The junction of one thing with another was intimated by the *Conjunction*. The *Pronouns* for *I* and *thou* must have been of the earliest invention in language, as they represented the speaker and the person spoken to, perhaps even before either had a name. The *Interjection* was employed to rouse the attention of another, or to mark the excitement felt by the person employing it. The *Article* (derived from the demonstrative pronoun) was the last improvement of speech, and is only found in those languages which have advanced to their utmost perfection of form.

But if we are anxious to push our enquiries to the utmost limits of human investigation, we shall find a reason for the uniform and universal laws that govern the philosophy of language in every varied condition and peculiarity of the human race. It must be evident that speech was either conferred upon man at his creation, or arose imperceptibly as it was required by his wants. If the first, we must suppose it was at once perfectly adapted to nature and to the social and intellectual relations in which he was to stand to his fellow man. But if it arose gradually, it was called into existence by the exigencies of his situation and the circumstances by which he was surrounded; and in either case it must be considered as the reflex of his sensations and perceptions, and consequently will be in exact relation to the general laws of nature. It is on this account that the *Noun* and *Verb* had each its archetype in *matter* and *motion*; and the *Preposition* that marked local relation, and the *Termination* or *Auxiliary* that denoted the tenses of the verb, had each its original in *space* and *time* long anterior to the appearance of man on the earth. Language is thus forced to adapt itself to an abstract model that eludes all investigation. Space and Time being the mere concomitants of matter and motion, and having therefore a relative and not an absolute existence, language will be often found to notice them only by implication;* and this might be adduced

* It may be seen that language often only notices them by implication; for when we
as a further proof of the dependence of language on those remote principles of nature which influence man without his being conscious of their agency.

It is owing to this plastic influence exerted over language and its own imitative tendency, as well as to the analogies to which the mind has recourse in all its deficiencies, that words which were originally participles or adjectives are employed permanently as nouns; and that nouns themselves acquire the force and nature of verbs or prepositions, and are classed, unconsciously by the mind, with those parts of speech to which they have, by a new use, acquired an affinity. And in the same way that such new words become either nouns, verbs, &c. so did the first primitive sounds conform to that abstract model which existed before either words or man, and which language adapted itself to delineate, and has, as it were, reproduced or reflected with considerable accuracy and fidelity. Hence, whatever may be the etymological sense of Nouns, Verbs, and Prepositions, they must ultimately represent the various modifications of Matter and Motion, Time and Space: for language would be a mere jumble of sounds, barely sufficient to indicate the more pressing wants and sentiments of our nature, if it had not had some guiding principles to which it originally conformed.

In consequence of the connection of the elementary principles of nature, and to which language unconsciously conforms, every investigation respecting the Noun, Verb, and Preposition* must be conducted with a due consideration of their

say he walked to town, both space and time are implied; and when we say the bird flew over the field, though space is expressed by the preposition over, still the verb to fly implies both space and time; for all motion must be through space and in time. But independently of the different tenses which specifically mark time, and the prepositions which designate the different relations of space, language necessarily comprehends one or other of these two categories in every primitive word.

* Though the Preposition only marks local relation, it can in no way be omitted in an investigation into the basis of language, as the motions of all things in nature have their limits, which are alone defined by this part of speech; and it is as necessary to the
mutual dependance. To consider any one of them without reference to the other two must lead to a partial, limited, and unsatisfactory result. These three parts of speech, therefore, being the mutual complements of one another, the truth can be alone elicited by considering them together. If it is conceded that Prepositions originally implied local relations, and the position seems hardly possible to be denied, Verbs must then be allowed to denote the different kinds of physical motion produced by the objects represented by Nouns. Hence there is an indissoluble connection existing between Nouns, Verbs, and Prepositions.

Such is the nature of the first or primitive state of language; but it deposes this physical character as soon as it is employed to represent those abstract relations, which, in proportion to the extent and accuracy with which they are comprehended by any individual, raise him, in the scale of reason, almost as much above the rest of mankind, as man is elevated above the brute.

Verb as those terminations or auxiliaries which mark time past, present, or future. It is on this account that it is almost invariably found compounded with it, as in Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, or put immediately after it, as in English.
OF THE NOUN.

Nouns may be divided into two classes, that is to say into concrete and abstract. *Concrete Nouns* are the names of such things as are perceived by the organs of sense, such as a house, a man, a tree, &c. As a further example, by the ear we perceive a sound, by the eye a star, by the nose a scent, by the palate a taste, and by the skin or touch the air; not one of which could we have discovered by any other organ than that which makes them respectively known to us. Concrete Nouns, therefore, are the names of sensible objects.

*Abstract Nouns* are the names of mental perceptions, whether they relate to actions, acts, results, states, modes, relations, powers, qualities, quantities, numbers, degrees, forms, colours, feelings, or passions.* It will be evident that language to be definite, and therefore perfect, ought to have a precise and distinct termination for each class of abstract words. Such a provision is of wonderful aid to abstract speculation, and relieves the mind from much unnecessary labour, as it places the conceptions of the writer in the exact light in which they are intended by him. Any one who will take the trouble of analysing the variety of senses in which the word vision is employed in the English language, or still more particularly the word motion, will see that the sense in which these words may be employed by a writer or speaker, can alone be discovered by a painful application of thought. In the same way the French have only one word for conscience and consciousness, which must often be the cause of obscurity. The Sanskrit and Latin are both particularly rich in such forms; but some confusion is observable in both these languages (though less in the former than in the latter) owing to the terminations having been improperly added by careless or illogical thinkers. For this, however,

* Examples: The action of striking, running, &c. produces the acts called a stroke, a run, &c.; so the action of bearing produces the result called a birth. The state of sleeping results in sleep, and dying in death.
every allowance is necessary, as mental perceptions do so closely approximate to one another, that it is frequently very difficult to discriminate to which class they properly belong; and indeed, in some instances, the same idea may be referred to more than one class, and some of the classes likewise would admit of subdivision.

A complete classification of the distinct perceptions of the mind has not yet been made, and is a great desideratum towards a perfect analysis of thought. Were a philosophic language ever to be invented this enquiry would be a preliminary step of indispensable necessity; as well as that of ascertaining the distinct local relations for which prepositions are used, and by limiting each to one definite sense, thereby preventing all chance of confusion and misconception.*

The noun of itself, without some verb being expressed or understood, cannot form a rational expression; it is on this account that though the noun may seem the most obvious part of speech, yet still its precise meaning can be understood only by a reference to a verb; it being by means of this part of speech that all the operations of indicating, comparing, and reasoning are performed and determined. Hence there is an obvious necessity for bearing in mind the reciprocal influence of Noun and Verb, and also, as has been already shewn, of the Preposition, in every investigation into the nature of any one of these three fundamental parts of speech.

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* A systematic classification, such as is here contemplated, would be of great value in forming the mind for metaphysical inquiries. An analysis of any process of reasoning, carried on with a reference to its distinctions, would afford the student a safe clue in many of the intricacies of thought in which he is often bewildered; and would give a clearness, and a consequent conviction of abstract truth, which the mind in vain seeks for when left to its own intuitive powers. Such an artificial aid would lead to the instant detection of sophistry in abstract speculations; for without a clear conception of the distinct differences of abstract words there can be no certainty in our conclusions. The employment of such a system of analysis would be an excellent conclusion to ordinary grammar, and might be termed abstract or transcendental grammar. In matters of feeling and opinion men cannot of course be expected to agree; but abstract questions, if the terms were properly defined, ought to be as capable of proof as the things from which they are abstracted.
OF THE VERB.

The following sketch of the verb in its different voices or states has been written in a concise way, to explain its real nature to the enquiring student.*

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

In the infancy of language the verb merely denoted the modes of motion peculiar to the simplest objects of nature, as to fly, to run, to strike, &c., but in process of time, as language became perfect, the verb adapted itself to the expression of every want of the human mind, and in this state it is considered as denoting action, being, or suffering. But it is solely by a metaphorical use that language is fitted for describing abstract ideas, and for this purpose the verb divests itself of its essential attribute, which is motion in a physical sense.

In all inquiries into language, the origin and formation of the verb has ever been deemed a subject of the highest interest. Either the first primitive language consisted simply of Substantives, which were insensibly moulded into Verbs and Prepositions, or the whole three sprang almost simultaneously into existence; but whether they are words originally and specifically invented to mark motion, or have been adapted by degrees to this end, they at last acquire the same nature as if they had been specially formed for the purpose.

DEFINITIONS.

When any sort of motion is expressed to be going on independent of the will of the agent, as, the wood burns, the verb is termed neuter; but the neuter

* These observations on Verbs and Prepositions are extracted from the Author's Bengālī Grammar.
state is in the agent, and not in the verb, which only conforms to the state of the noun.

If a verb denotes any particular kind of motion depending, or conceived to depend on the will of the agent, it is Active but intransitive; that is, it implies voluntary motion, which is commonly called Action, as, *he runs*, &c.; and when the motion passes on to an object on which it reposes, it is Active and Transitive, as, *he strikes the child*.

Again, where motion is communicated from one agent to another, the verb expressive of the motion is termed Causal; as *he caused the horse to gallop*; but the Cause exists in the first agent; the second is the Instrument; and the action of the verb remains unaltered in nature, but is marked in all languages by some modification in the sound of the word, as *করিতে* (*karite*) *to make*, *করাইতে* (*karâite*), *to cause to make*, in Bengálí; or, as in our own language, by compounding a verb implying agency with any infinitive expressive of the particular motion to be produced.

When an object is affected by any action in which it has no agency, and is put in the nominative case, the Verb expressive of the action is termed Passive; but the passion or suffering is in the object, and not in the Verb; and in some languages this peculiar use of the Verb is simply marked by a modification of the Verb itself, as *amo*, I love, *amor*, I am loved, in Latin; and *تُّنَيَّل* (*katala*), *he slew*, and *تُنْئِل* (*kutila*), *he was slain*, in Arabic.

In our own, and in most derivative languages, the passive sense is conveyed by an attributive expressive of past time, i.e. by a passive participle, and the affirmation of the different times is expressed by an auxiliary verb.

The verb is termed Impersonal when it denotes any particular mode of motion resulting from the spontaneous operations of nature, as *it rains*; or from the fitness of things, as *it behoves me to go*. Hence Nature and Necessity are the real nominatives to such verbs.

It thus appears that the Verb, whether we term it Neuter, Intransitive, Transitive, Causal, Passive, or Impersonal, was equally simple in its origin; and that it is
essentially the same in whatever voice it is used. The particular action, state, or passion it is supposed to imply, exists only in the agent or object, and not in itself. Still in almost all languages the sound of the verb is found modified to mark the voice in which it is used, though it is occasionally to be met with unaltered in sound, whether employed in a transitive, intransitive, or neuter sense. Our own words to bear, to burn, to feel, &c. shew that this may be done without any misconception.

From the foregoing remarks on the nature of the verb, it results, that Motion is its essential attribute; and that those who hold it to be a mere connective, have not, perhaps, sufficiently considered its origin; and have been led to observe its apparent use, which is often metaphorical, rather than its essential quality, which indicates different kinds of motion. But even when it is considered as a mere connective, it would be more correct to call it an affirmative.

It would seem that the real cause why the nature of the verb has been so much controverted, has simply arisen from the very partial and unconnected view which has been taken of it in every research into language. It is only by considering it with reference to the Noun and the Preposition, which are its natural complements, that we can arrive at any just ideas upon the subject. But viewed in connection with these, its real nature becomes obvious. (See Remarks on the Prepositions.)

After use had fixed the first forms of the verb, the rest were easily brought into existence by that love of analogy which is inseparably connected with the nature of the human mind. In our own language we can by convention form any number of verbs from nouns or adjectives. Thus we have made to shoe, to salt, to better, to blacken, &c., a peculiarity that tends to a singular conciseness and precision of expression; and leads us to regret that a language so copious and simple, has been adulterated by the admission of words from the French, the Latin, and the Greek. Our language is still rich enough to rival, and in some cases to surpass the German in beauty and simplicity, even after the rejection of almost every foreign word.

These remarks on the Verb have been hazarded under the hope of putting the
OF VOICES.

As it often becomes a matter of difficulty to ascertain the exact Voice to which a verb belongs, the following remarks in addition to what has been just said are added, with a view of putting the subject in a clear light.*

It is to be remarked, that in Sanskrit the fourth conjugation contains the great body of the neuter verbs, while at the same time it is that which in its middle voice is identical, in form, with the passive. My object is now to shew, that whatever purpose is effected by the letter य ya, which is the distinctive sign of the passive voice, is equally accomplished by the same letter for the fourth conjugation. In all languages there is an affinity between passive and neuter verbs, and there are some that might be almost indifferently classed under the passive or neuter voice: such instances frequently occur in Menu, the elucidation of which has led me to treat the subject at length.

The verb जायते jāyatē, he is born, is classed by the Sanskrit grammarians in the fourth conjugation, though, had they ranged it with the passive verbs, it would not have been changed in the slightest degree in form. That they have not done so shews the correctness of their notions of grammar. Dr. Johnson, in his Dictionary of the English Language, states that the verb to be born is

* These remarks on the voices of verbs are extracted from the Author's edition of the Institutes of Menu, Vol. I. p. 329.
neuter-passive. The verb is originally passive, for when all its parts are supplied, it means to be born by a mother; but in its popular and elliptical use, being employed without any reference to its agent, as when we say, he was born last year, it becomes truly a neuter verb, for it then merely affirms the first appearance of a child in the world. The verb nascor, in Latin, may be contested as belonging to the passive by its form, and to the neuter by its use; for it answers the conditions of a deponent verb, which requires a passive form without a passive signification. The French derivative of nascor, i.e. naître, is laid down to be neuter in the dictionary of the French Academy. In Hindústání the passive and some other verbs are conjugated with जाना jānā, to go, and none but neuter ones with होना honā, to be; and in that language to be born is पिया होना paidā honā, and therefore neuter. Thus we see that we have the analogy of language for considering to be born as neuter by its use, whatever may be the conclusion we come to by a reference to its derivation.

Perhaps the following reason for the solution of the equivocal nature of some neuter verbs may be of service, as affording a clue for determining their classification, and to shew why there is that similarity between the fourth conjugation and the passive voice in Sanskrit; and between all neuter and passive verbs.

The Subject both in the passive and neuter voice has no will or choice in the action implied by the verb: thus, in the sentence he dies, the subject is affected by a state over which he has no control, and which he would resist if he could; and in that of he is killed, he suffers from an action he cannot avoid. In both these instances the subject is exposed to but one result, independent of his will; the having or not having which, constitutes the real distinction in all animal sufferings and actions. It is on this account I conceive, that there is such a similarity between the fourth conjugation and the passive voice, for whether the subject of the verb be exposed to a state, or to an action, which he cannot avoid, he must be the object. If a conjecture might be offered as to the sense of the increment य या, which is the distinctive sign of both the passive and the fourth conjugation, I would say, that it is connected with या yā or i, go, and that it fills the same
office in Sanskrit which is done by the derivative jānā, to go, in Hindústáni and the other dialects.

To define the distinction in doubtful cases between a neuter and a passive verb, we have therefore only to consider whether the subject suffers from a state or an action; that is, whether there is the agency of natural causes, or of an individual, in producing the effect implied by the verb.

But if it be necessary, on the one hand, to distinguish accurately between the passive and the neuter, it is equally important to discriminate between the neuter and the intransitive verb, in nice and doubtful cases; for the neuter verb holds an intermediate place between the passive and the intransitive: and here again the same test will give us the true definition; namely, if the action implied by the verb depends upon its subject, we may be certain it is not neuter, and that the verb is consequently either transitive or intransitive. Had a rule of this kind, which would afford a logical arrangement, been kept in view, we should not have our grammarians differing about the nature of neuter verbs. That they have been much perplexed by making distinctions upon imperfect grounds of judgment, may be seen by referring to Mr. Lindley Murray’s English Grammar, on the Verb. The presence or absence of volition in the nominative can alone enable us to determine the nature of the verb, and consequently by that test are we to be guided whether the nominative is the agent or the object. Upon this view of the matter I have arranged the different verbs as follows: and have given examples, lest any doubt should arise as to their classification.

**VOLUNTARY.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Nominative</th>
<th>The Agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intransitive,</td>
<td>as He runs, stands, sits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitive,</td>
<td>— He kills, strikes, &amp;c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflective,</td>
<td>— He kills, &amp;c. (himself).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal,</td>
<td>— He causes to kill, strike, &amp;c.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IN VOLUNTARY.

The Nominative

The object.

Impersonal, as It rains, thunders, snows, &c.

Neuter, — He dies, sleeps, drowns, &c.

Passive, — He is killed, struck, &c.

Causal Passive, — He is caused to be killed, &c.

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Extract from the Sanskrit Grammar of Dr. Francis Bopp. Berlin, 1832.

PASSIVUM.

TEMPORA SPECIALA.

492. Passivum terminationibus personalibus Atmanépadi (middle voice) utitur, quibus in temporibus specialibus syllabam य ya praëgit; ita ut prorsus cum quartæ classis Atmanépado conveniat.

ANNOT. Cum quarta classis maximam partem verba neutra comprehendat, quorum significatio ad passivi naturam proxime accedit, (e g. ध्रिये mriyé, morior, जाये jāyē, nascor): Haughtonius* apte hac in re causam quæsivit, cur Passivum et quartæ classis Atmanépadum inter se non different. Etiam Passivi characteris य ya explicationem maxime probandum ofvert vir docetissimus, qui a radice ड i vel या ya या ire illum descendere putat, cum revera in Hindostanâ alisque dialectis Indicis Passivum circumscribatur per verbum auxiliare ejusdem significationis et originis, et quidem per जाना jānā (e. यान yāna, itio) in Hindostanâ et या jā in Bengalicâ linguâ. Dicitur e. c. Bengalicæ कार यार kāra jā, i. e. in actionem faciendi eo, pro fio. Conferatur Latina locutio amatum irī et verbum veneo ex ven et eo compositum. In Sanserito ipso legere memini यह्नाम् ययाय graham yaya, ivit in captionem pro captus est.

OF PREPOSITIONS.

The various local relations of objects are denoted by Prepositions; but though all languages do not in every case make use of the same relations, yet there are some primary ones that are common to all, as up, down; in, out, &c. As those persons who have not analysed language may find it difficult to attach a definite idea to the word relation, it may be rendered more intelligible by saying, it is that idea which results from contrasting together two things with reference to their mutual position: thus the sky is above the earth; above therefore implies the relation between sky and earth; but by altering our point of view we may say, the earth is beneath the sky; beneath therefore implies the relation between earth and sky. It is therefore evident that they were the first abstract words possessed by language.

The Noun is the name of the thing; the Verb describes its mode of motion or action; and the relation expressed by the Preposition defines the tendency of that motion; that is, whether it is to, from, by, against, under, over, &c. any given object. Hence its primary sense is that of local relation.

Thus Prepositions were originally employed to define the relative situations of the different objects of nature, which were of course, in the infancy of society, the first things that required the employment of speech for their description. But in proportion as the impressions received through the senses began to be compared and comprehended, the operations of the intellect were developed, and man became a reasoning being; and almost imperceptibly, a new application of language was required to express the various relations of abstract ideas. And though there may seem to be no necessary connection between abstract notions and the relations of material things; yet, as the comprehension of the former gradually arises out of the consideration of the modes of material existence, so this first and simple language, which had resulted from the necessity of describing whatever
came within the scope of the senses, was at last employed to denote the abstract conceptions of the mind; because it afforded a natural analogy, and saved the trouble of a new, and perhaps impossible, convention. Hence it must be purely metaphorical, as often as it is employed in the description of mental perceptions.

The obvious distinction between language which had been invented to describe natural objects, and its figurative application to denote abstract ideas, must never be lost sight of in practice. For, when Prepositions are employed for the purposes for which they were invented, they mark the relations of local position; as, "the bird flew to, above, before, behind, &c. the tree." But when the same Prepositions are borrowed to express abstract conceptions; as, "fancy triumphs over reason," or "the mind revolts against oppression," they imply nothing more than a mere mental contrast; and by convention we agree to think that what we assimilate in our minds to above and before, &c. is better than what we designate by below and behind, &c. although there can be neither up nor down, before nor after, in what is purely mental.

From what has been remarked above, it will be evident that Prepositions were, in the origin of language, almost as indispensable as verbs; for without their aid few verbs could convey a definite idea, as the Prepositions alone denote the tendency of the action of the verb. Perhaps they had been more properly termed definitives or limitatives than Prepositions. (See the Remarks on the Verb).

In the foregoing concise view of the nature of Prepositions, it is not pretended to give a decided opinion how they have come into their present form and use in the Sanskrit language, but merely to say that the closest and most impartial consideration bestowed on the subject confirms the belief already expressed, that as they are the natural complement of the noun and verb, whether they are original words or are borrowed, they at last express but one distinct relation, which is in its primary use a local one, and implies either up or down, in or out, &c. A reference to some words employed in the Bengáli, Hindústání, and other dialects springing from the Sanskrit, is of great value in elucidating the manner in which such words are divested of their original nature, and restricted to a given use.
The word न्मी सम्पा* originally meant, as is clear by its etymology, accompanied by water, but it is now only used in Bengali for in the vicinity or near. So the Bengali part होइते hoite, being, as a preposition implies from. In Hindustani पास, near, is a corruption of the Sanskrit form पासे, in the side; and में men, in, seems to be derived from the Sanskrit मध्ये, in the middle. These instances, which we can still trace to the original language, are sufficient to shew how words totally different in their nature may come at last to imply but one relation; and to this state they are brought by the very nature of the human mind, and those external causes that control and force language into such special classes, as Noun, Verb, and Preposition. The strongest reason that could be assigned for the primitive nature of Sanskrit Prepositions is the fact of their being often the shortest words in the language, and being incapable of decomposition. It ought not likewise to be forgotten that the inseparable Prepositions, being compounded with verbs and nouns, have been preserved by this union from the corruptions and changes which would have affected them in a separate state; and this may be one reason why there is less difference between the Prepositions in Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit (when they are the same words) than between the other words that are found to co-exist in these three cognate languages. That such very short words should act as adjectives to nouns, when in composition with them, leads to the idea that they are really primitives.

Prepositions are a very important part of speech; and particularly in so pure a language as the Sanskrit. A little attention to the etymology of the language may finally save the learner much time and trouble; as well as give him a more perfect knowledge of its structure than he could acquire from merely learning the words by rote. And in those instances where the words cannot be resolved by any general rules of etymology, we must bear in mind that many must be founded upon allusions which are lost in the remoteness of antiquity. It should not be forgotten, likewise, that words of more modern composition are generally less pure than

* Dr. Wilkins' Gram. Rule 1177.
the more ancient ones, owing to the compounds being formed without a reference to the distinction between the physical and the figurative senses of the elementary words. It is owing to this defect, which comes on with the growth of language, that Greek words compounded with a preposition admit of such unsatisfactory analysis. Indeed though the Greek language has retained many of the peculiarities of the Sanskrit, particularly in the forms of the verbs, yet in its words it is so much corrupted, that we must be convinced that it was introduced amongst a people whose organs of utterance were as unfitted for correctly imitating the original sounds, as those of our Saxon ancestors were for pronouncing the Norman French.

In conclusion it remains only to say that in the foregoing view of the Noun, the Verb, and the Preposition, the truth has been elicited by a reference to their mutual dependence on one another; and whoever considers the subject in the same connected point of view must come to the same result. As a general rule, whenever any verb implies a physical motion, such as to fly, to run, to leap, &c. the preposition employed will be found to express a local relation, as to fly up, to fly down, &c. and that such simple senses of the prepositions must be their primary significations is as clear as that the figurative meanings are those that are borrowed from them. To find, therefore, the original sense of a Preposition or Verb, we have only to consider whether it is employed in a physical or a figurative sense.

OF INSEPARABLE PREPOSITIONS.

In assigning the meanings of the following Prepositions, the primary, that is the local relation which they convey is printed in capitals; while those senses which arise from the primary idea by implication, or by a figurative use, are printed in italics. But it must not be thence concluded that they have really so many various significations. The multitude of nicely discriminative Prepositions in our own language, is the cause why we almost invariably reserve each of them to define but one relation of things; though what denotes before would equally well imply first, or against, and so on for the others. But even among our own Prepositions, though
we could (as far as regards meaning), most accurately substitute other particles that should convey every signification of by, as well as its primary sense of near, yet custom has determined that we must use it, instead of any other, in very many instances; and this word affords a good example of the way in which the following primary and derivative meanings of the Prepositions are to be understood.

If the figurative meaning assigned to one Preposition may seem occasionally to encroach upon that laid down for another, it should be remembered, that a word must necessarily, when metaphorically employed, be often equally capable of conveying the same idea as one whose primary signification is very different; for this reason the idea of excellence or superiority may be equally well denoted, in figurative language, by the word before, as by above, or beyond.

आ ठु. to, at, as far as. *

This Preposition denotes the relation subsisting between two things which both extend to the same point, hence it defines the limit of the action of any verb; as he went to the house: i.e. as far as the house. If prefixed to a root implying going, it makes it to mean coming; and if to a root signifying giving, it makes it imply taking; because the root only expresses some kind of motion generally; thus what goes to any one, comes to him; and again what is given to any one, is implied to be taken. Its use as a prefix to all words but verbs, seems rather obscure, except we remember that union implies perfection; thus आधां अभाः, splendour, from भाः, shine. It is identified with the Greek α, and the Latin ad, in which the d is pleonastic, as in prodesse and prodeo, without the same

* Agreeably to what has just been said, the primary local relation expressed by the Preposition is printed in capitals, and the derivative senses are given in italics.
necessity for its insertion, as in these two examples, where its use is to prevent any hiatus in sound.

अपः apa, off, or away: deriv. inferior, bad.

This Preposition may be considered as the reverse of अ ह a, as it marks the relation subsisting between objects which are off or away from one another; hence it denotes disjunction, and the commencement of action. Prefixed to a verb of motion it makes it imply separation; as अपगात्त apagata, gone away, or off; and added to any other kind of root or word, it deteriorates, or reverses the sense; because disjunction implies imperfection; as अपकृत apakrita, hindered, from कृति, do. अपचैया apachaya, loss, from चिति, accumulate. It is identified in origin with the Greek από, the Latin ab, and the English off.

प्र pra. fore, or before: deriv. prior, exceeding, excellent, very.

Prefixd to a verb of motion, it will of course seem to imply progressive motion, as forth, forward, &c. but the Preposition merely marks the direction of the motion implied by the verb. As that which precedes, exceeds, and is generally conceived to be better than that which follows; and as that which is before, is beyond the thing it is in contrast with, this Preposition serves to mark priority, excess, excellence, and intensity.

It is identified in origin with the Greek πρό; the Latin pro and praes; but pro seems to express the primary idea, and praes the derivative senses. And, finally, it is the same as the English for or fore.

परः para. opposite: deriv. over, across, contrary, reverse.

The relation intended by this Preposition expresses the situation of anything which is opposite to something else; as the further bank of a river,* &c. hence it

* This is the only preposition which admits of analysis; it is therefore of singular value in throwing light upon the history of these primitive words. The preposition परः para implies the relation that exists between two lines that are exactly opposite and therefore parallel (παρά ἀπαριθμόν) and equal to one another. In Sanskrit the near shore
OF PREPOSITIONS.

implies, 1. the position of any thing opposite or over the way; so पराक्रमम् parākrama (over-step):* any great exertion; as strength, prowess, valour, &c. and पराग parāga (over-going): an eclipse; dust, &c. 2. contrariety; as पराक parāk (going across): crooked, crookedly. 3. What is reverse; as परामुख parāmukha, (face-reversed): having the face averted; and पराभुत parābhūta, (become reversed); overcome. It might equally well denote what is parallel, or equal to; but it is very little used, and almost every instance of its occurrence has been exhausted in the foregoing examples. It seems exactly to correspond and to have a common origin with the Greek παρά and the Latin par.

अधि adhi. over: deriv. superior in station, quantity, quality, or degree.

It marks the relative position of something over, or above, another; and hence denotes that the action of the verb passed over, or above some given object; as अधित adhita (gone over), i.e. perused. Prefixed to nouns, it denotes their superiority in station, quantity, quality, or degree according to their meaning.

नि ni. in, of within, on, upon: deriv. entire, perfect, complete, ceasing, refraining.

of a river is termed बार vāra, but the opposite shore is called पार pāra, almost the very word we are considering; the word पार para too means other, beyond, and has given birth to the Greek παρά. In Latin we have par, adj. equal, even, corresponding, and from thence par, a pair, a match, an equal, and from this has sprung the French pair, the English pair and peer: all these senses arise out of the idea of two things exactly opposite and therefore equal to one another; and this Preposition, whether employed in Sanskrit or Greek, is so true to its origin, that it always implies a reference to two things one of which is meant to be opposite and equal to the other: so a paradox, παράδοξος, is an opinion contrary to the usual one. The two banks of a river, called vāra and pāra, therefore naturally suggested the relation intended to be conveyed by the Sanskrit पार, and the Greek παρά.

* The meaning put between parentheses is that which I derive from the word by Etymology, but those which immediately follow it are from the Dictionary.
This Preposition marks the relation between two things, one of which is contained by the other; as নিচিত nitchita, (collected in): full, complete, from চিতi, accumulate. The idea of wholeness, perfection, and completeness naturally arises in considering any object as having all its parts within itself. As what remains in, is implied to be in a state of cessation or refraining, this Preposition is occasionally employed to express both these qualities; so নিব্রুত nivritta (turned in): ceased, from র্তি vrit, turn; and নিবরা nivarú (refraining from a choice): a virgin, from র্তি vri, choose; because ancienly females had the right of choosing a husband, hence called বর vara, which signifies a choice. It is sometimes apparently confounded with নিম nir. In origin and meaning it is the same as the Greek ἔξω, and the Latin and English in.

নির nir. OUT, or WITHOUT: deriv. void, or destitute of. নির nih, নির্ন nis, নির্ন nish, নির্ব nir, are forms of which it is susceptible, according to the nature of the first letter of the word to which it is joined. (See the rules for the junction of letters at the end of the Author's Bengálì Grammar.)

The relation existing between two things of which one is outside of the other, is denoted by this Preposition; hence it serves, without any ambiguity, to mark destitution, or privation; as নিব্রক্তি nirákriti (without a form): formless. But even its most literal meaning will convey, under another point of view, an opposite sense; as নির্বচন nirvachana, speaking out, a speaking or narrating, &c.* It agrees exactly in sense, but not in origin with the Greek ἐξ, the Latin ex, and the English out.

সম sam. WITH, or BESIDE: deriv. complete, perfect.

সং sang, সং। san, সং। san, সন। san, সম। sam, are forms which it will be

* Here we have an instance of what has escaped notice, that the form of the word to which the preposition is added reacts on the preposition and modifies its meaning: in this instance, being added to the verbal noun the sense is reversed: this is one cause of the obscurity in which this branch of grammar has been so long involved.
found occasionally to assume, according to the letter with which the word to which it is prefixed, commences.

This preposition denotes the relation existing between things which are beside one another; hence it conveys the idea of **accompaniment, completeness, and perfection**. The Greek συν, and the Latin cum, con, seem perfectly identified with it in origin and signification.

अभि abhi. **BEFORE**: deriv. *first, better, against.*

The relation existing between objects, of which one is before or in front of the other, is expressed by this preposition; as अभिमुख abhimukha (before the face): present. As what is before may be considered as *first* and *better* than other things with which it has a relation, this preposition is sometimes employed for that purpose; as अभिजात abhijâta (first, or better-born): *noble*. It seems to be of the same origin as the Latin ob. The difference between it and प्र pra, may be, that the latter expresses something before, without relation to distance; while अभि abhi conveys the idea of what is immediately before, or in front.

अनु anu. **AFTER**: deriv. *following, imitating, successive.*

When of things one is after the other, the relation existing between them is expressed by this preposition; as अनुग anuga (going after): following. So what is done after any thing else, implies imitation; thus अनुकार anukâra (a doing after): imitation, resemblance. It further serves to mark regular succession, as अनुक्रम anukrama (step after step): *order, method.*

उ, ut, or ud. **UP**: deriv. *high, elevated, superior.*

This preposition agrees exactly with our *up*, and marks the relative position of any thing that is *up* or *above* something else: hence its derivative senses.

अव ava. **DOWN**: deriv. *low, contemptible, bad.*

It is the reverse of the preceding Preposition, and marks the relation between things one of which is below the other, and added to a verb implies that its action had a downward tendency; as अवतार avatâra, (passing down) descent, incarnation, from त्रि tri, pass, and अवगत avagata, (gone down to the heart), i.e. comprehended. The heart being conceived to be the seat of the understanding among the Eastern na-
It deteriorates or reverses the sense of words to which it is prefixed, by the same figurative use as अपः apa, because what is beneath another is considered inferior when used in a figurative sense; thus अवरसः avarasa, a bad taste, from रसः rasa, a taste, and अवराधः avarādha, dismounted, from रुहः ruh, mount. It corresponds in sense but not in origin to the Greek κάτω.

उपः upa. NEAR, OR BY: deriv. similar, inferior, subordinate.

When two things are near each other, their relative position is marked by उपः upa; as उपगतः upagata, (gone near); approached, from गतः gata, gone. What is near another in kind, is similar but inferior; therefore उपनामः upanāma, (near or almost a name): a by-name, a nick-name. उपधर्मः upadharma, (almost, or similar to a law, a subordinate law): a by-law. There seems to be a perfect resemblance between this preposition, in signification and origin, with the Greek κάτω and the Latin sub, though in the latter language the figurative has usurped the place of the primitive sense.

विझ vi. APART: deriv. peculiar, distinct, different, without.

This preposition denotes the relation in the state of a thing that is apart, or separate from another; thus विक्षिप्तः vikshipta, (thrown apart): scattered. Hence it figuratively implies peculiarity, or distinctness. It expresses the same idea as is common to our own and other languages, when we say any thing has a "peculiar form," by which we mean that it has a form apart, or distinct from something else, and which may be either good or bad by convention, but more commonly the latter. Thus विरेपः viripa (peculiar form): deformed, monstrous. As the idea of privation naturally arises from that which expresses sepa-

* The Sanskrit word manas implies heart and mind, and is thought to be the original of the Latin mens and the English mind. If the above analysis, making avagata refer to manas, should be contested, it will not shake the original sense assigned to the preposition; for in English to go to the bottom of a thing implies to understand it perfectly; and to understand a thing is to stand under, that is to be at the bottom of it.
OF PREPOSITIONS.

ration, this Preposition is frequently so employed; as विफल viphala (without fruit): fruitless; and in this sense it is identified with the Persian เยอะ bi. It seems to agree in sense and origin with the Latin de and di, which are perhaps corrupt forms of ve, as found in vecors and vesanus; but it is perfectly preserved in the Latin vidua, which is identical with the word विधवा vdhavā, (vi without dhava, a husband): whence also the Saxon prêa, from which comes the English widow.

परि pari. AROUND: deriv. entirely, thoroughly.

This preposition denotes the relation between things one of which is around something else; as परिक्षित parikshipta (thrown around): surrounded, entrenched. Hence it figuratively conveys the idea of any thing entirely done; because what is done all around implies completeness, or finish; as परिपूर्ण paripùrna, entirely, or quite full. It seems to agree in every respect with the Greek πτι, and the Latin per.

प्रति prati. AGAIN, OR AGAINST: deriv. contrary; repeated, several, returned, reflected; much.

It denotes the relation existing between things which by repetition return again in a sort of order, and consequently stand against each other. This idea is suggested by the winding back and forward of a rivulet,* or of a path, the coil of a rope, &c. Hence it marks, 1. contrariety; as परिक्षित prati

* Mankind in the infancy of language must have found the idea of repetition extremely difficult, and if we bear in mind that the English words two-fold, three-fold; the Latin duplex, triplex, and the Sanskrit dwiguna, triguna (two twists, three twists), all convey ideas borrowed from some material objects, we shall be convinced that it is to such things that the speaker must have had recourse to suggest this idea to another. A folding screen or a fan conveys the idea exactly of a thing which is repeated in exact order, but in the infancy of society a winding stream, the folds of the skin, or the coil of a rope, would be the most obvious images.
OF PREPOSITIONS.

(thrown against): rejected; repelled, resisted. 2. repetition; as \( प्रतिकृष्ट \) \( प्रतिक्रिष्ट \) (ploughed again): twice ploughed. 3. distribution, as \( प्रतिदिन \) \( प्रतिक्रिष्ट \) (day against (day): daily. 4. return; as \( दुःखपत्र भुगत्तरा \) (answering again): reply. 5. reflection; as \( प्रतिचित्र \) \( प्रतिचित्र \) (reflected shadow): image, picture. And from repetition arises the idea of intensity; as 6. \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतিতिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रतितिष्क \) \( प्रति
This preposition is only employed to enhance the value of nouns and adjectives; hence it conveys, according to the nature of the word to which it is prefixed, the idea and that of bad to the next, is contrary to the principle laid down that every preposition implied local relation: this objection is so obvious that it requires explanation. The prepositions, according to the nature of the word with which they were compounded, acted either as adverbs or adjectives, and were consequently the earliest words of that kind possessed by language. The first adjectives required would be good and bad, and the question immediately occurs which of the prepositions would best imply these two ideas. Independently of the general reasoning that might lead us to a just conclusion, we have the aid afforded by analogy.

In Latin proprius means near, and from it arises the adjective proprius, and thence comes likewise the French propre and the English proper, meaning good, fit, &c. From proprius likewise descends proprietas, property. In Sanskrit too the preposition सु su seems to have entered into the adjective सुस +as, own, and the noun सु su +am, property, hence we see why we have the Latin suus (su+us) his own, implying also proper, due, lawful. Now if we were to ask how land would be apportioned out among a population beginning to feel its value, certainly the law would be that each man should take that which was nearest to him, and thence vicinage would be held to confer the highest right in the division of the yet unappropriated earth. As an illustration, let us suppose for a moment men thrown upon an uninhabited island: as long as the hope of escape remained, if they had families, they would simply confine themselves to the preparation of some means of shelter from the weather; but as soon as the conviction arose that they must pass their lives where they were, an allotment of the land would take place, and each would claim that which was nearest to his own dwelling, and which on that account would be considered as his own property. The connection of this word with the idea of nearness is thus established, as well as with that of property. Its original signification therefore seems to be close, and the difference between it and उपः upa is that the latter means proximity in a general sense, while सु su implies close contact; an idea supported by the English verb to meet, which gives
of 1. perfection, or goodness: सुन्दर supatha, an excellent, or good road. 2. fitness, or propriety; as सुभाष sukhādyā (fit, or proper to be eaten): wholesome. 3. beauty; as सुज्ञ surangā (beautiful in colour): the orange. 4. kindness; as सुहां suhrit (a kind heart): a friend. 5. facility; as सुकत sukara, (easy done): practicable. 6. pleasingness; as सुख sukha (pleasing the senses): pleasure. 7. superiority; as सुवर्ण suvarna (superior class, or colour (to silver): gold (Compare सुर्यवर्ण silver). 8. intensity; as सुवीकृत sutikshna, very acute.

rise to the adjectives meet, proper, right, good, &c.; and to be fitting, that is, to be right, proper, good, &c. and which springs from the idea of things that fit together. The sense of good springs naturally from the idea of what belongs to ourselves in relation to the individual, the family, or the nation; thus our own opinions, our own family descent and customs, our own national qualities, we must from our very nature consider as better than those of others; and so true is language to this leading idea, that we call our property our goods (in French nos biens). This subject may be further illustrated by a reference to the Persian: M. Burnouf’s researches have demonstrated that the Sanskrit स्वदत्त swa-dattas, self-given, self-manifested, (Latin sui datus) is the original of the Zend کداتا kadāta, from this comes the modern Persian خدā khudā, which is identical with the Saxon and English God. In a similar manner, the Sanskrit सू + as, own, having given birth to the Persian خود khud + d, own, self, (the letter d being the pleonastic letter in Persian as in Latin) would lead to the belief that this last word is the original of the Saxon good and English good.

The truth of the foregoing inquiry is singularly confirmed by a reference to the Greek; for the preposition ἵε good gives birth to the adjective ἵε good, and the connection of ἵε his own with ἵε good, in the same way as ὁ su, good, with ὁ su + as, his own, is thus brought to light perhaps for the first time. The Greek aspirate in the above and other instances takes the place of the Latin and Sanskrit s, and is therefore quite distinct from the digamma. If there is any truth in this argument, the original sense of ὁ must be close or near, from which is derived the idea of own, and from own good.
It is exactly the reverse of _dur_ or _dus_, and agrees in signification and origin with the Greek _su_.

_दुर_ _dur_. **BAD:** deriv. _improper, vile, unfit, difficult, displeasing, paucity, &c._

_दुस_ _dus_; _दुस_ _dush_; _दुस_ _dus_, are forms which it must assume according to the consonant with which the word it is prefixed to may begin.

As it is exactly the reverse of _सु su_, it is employed to deprecate the nouns and adjectives to which it is joined; on this account it denotes 1. _vileness, or badness_; as _दुरद्धर_ _duradhwa_, a bad road; 2. _unfitness or impropriety_; as _दुरर्वालाप_ _durálápa_ (improper speech): abuse. 3. _difficulty_; as _दुस्त्रे_ _duschara_ (difficult to go): impracticable. 4. _displeasingness_; as _दुस्त्रे_ _dulkhaha_, (displeasing to the senses): pain. 5. _paucity_; as _दुरबल_ _durbala_ (of little strength): weak. 6. _inferiority_; as _दुर्वर्ण_ _durvarna_ (inferior class, or colour (to gold) (compare _दुर्बल_ _dus_), gold): silver. The Greek _dv_, and the Latin _dis_, seem to have a perfect analogy with it, in sense and origin.

These Prepositions cannot be added at pleasure to a root or word; but their uses must be determined by the custom of the language. Two or three are very often prefixed to one root, and, though rarely, even four may be found added, as in

* Nearly all that has been said regarding _सु su_ will, in a reversed sense, apply to this preposition. Whatever was distant, was considered as _bad_: in this way, _foreign, outlandish, strange, &c._ are always used by the vulgar with a deteriorating sense, and hence I have little doubt that this preposition is connected in origin with the Sanskrit _दर dāra_, distant. The English word _bad_ is evidently the same as the Persian _ब द bad_, and if we had any evidence that the Scandinavian nations migrated from the shores of the Caspian _after_ the intermixture of the Medes and Persians, I would without hesitation refer the origin of the Persian _ब द bad_ to some Syriac form connected with the Arabic _ब द buad_, _distance_; for we know that the Pahlavi or _border_ language was a mixture of a Syriac dialect with the old Persic, and this supposition would satisfactorily account for the many words apparently of the Semitic stock found in the Teutonic dialects. The original signification of _दुर_ _dur_ must therefore be _far_, from which is derived the idea of _bad_.
the word समविकाहत surrounded, attended upon, in which there are स, अभि, वि and आ prefixed to the root ह take.

Though, strictly speaking, the following words are adverbs, yet as they are very frequently used in the same manner as prepositions, they are on this account inserted immediately after them.

अधन adhas. DOWN, DOWNWARDS, BELOW: deriv. low, vile. अध अधह, अध अधह, अध अधह, अध अधह, are forms which it may occasionally assume when in composition.

अन्तर antar, अन्त antah, अन्तस antas, &c. Within, between, among. It is the same as the Latin inter.

उपरि upari. ABOVE OR OVER.

It is identified in origin and signification with the Greek οπ, the Latin super, the Gothick ufar, and the English over.

पुरस puras. IN FRONT, BEFORE: deriv. prior, first. पुर पुरह, पुरस puras, पुर पुर, are forms which it may occasionally assume. It seems identified with the Greek οπ.

वहिस vahis, or wahis.* Out, outwards, external. वहिस vahih, वहिर vahir, वहिश vahis, are forms which it may occasionally assume.

* This word seems to be the original of the Latin ex and the Greek ἐ. The letter ह h was anciently very guttural, approaching to the Arabic خ kh; hence wahis would be soon corrupted into wakhs, and then softened into ex and ἐ. Its occurrence in both Greek and Latin is almost decisive as to its being referable to the Sanskrit stock. For a similar reason we must refer the Greek οτ and Latin alius to the Sanskrit अन्यस, other.